Security of UN facilities
Background

Security in UN Missions is the responsibility of the UN Department of Security & Safety (DSS); however there are some aspects of physical security that may require the deployment of the Military or Formed Police Units with regard to the protection of premises and facilities. Should it become necessary to extract endangered UN staff or even to evacuate a UN Mission, the FPU may again be called upon to assist the DSS in this task.

Additional security may also become necessary during the visit of high profile VIPs, such as the UN Seniors, In these cases, the FPU may be called upon to augment the UN DSS Close Protection Team or provide the second or third circle of security in certain circumstances.

This module deals predominantly with the protection of UN buildings and the measures that the FPU will be expected to take, when tasked with physical security of UN Compounds and other premises. These issues are also applicable to their own compound.

Aim

Familiarize the FPU in the provision of security for UN premises.

Learning outcomes

On completion of this module participants will be able to:

- Plan for and establish static or dynamic security
- Establish and manage access control
- Being able to sensitize other police officers and other UN staff.

Training sequence

The material in this module is designed to be delivered over a 40 minute classroom based theory lesson. This is on the assumption that the students have received no previous training in this subject.

Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum Session time</th>
<th>Lecture/Presentation</th>
<th>Question/Assessment</th>
<th>Session Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>40 mins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Options</td>
<td>Mission Specific</td>
<td>Optional film</td>
<td>Optional activity</td>
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Methodology

This module contains a PowerPoint theory presentation to explain and show the various techniques. There is no practical element to this lesson as the situations will vary greatly from Mission to Mission. The main aim of the lesson it to familiarise the unit, in case they are required to carry out these functions, and to use some of the principles in the security of their own camp/compound.

The instructor should inform participants of the content, format and timing. Knowing what to expect, participants can improve their ability to focus on the subject and benefit better from the session.

- Security of UN premises (40 minute classroom lesson)

Instructors are encouraged to add practical examples and mission specific information related to the specific deployment of participants, if known.

Instructor Profile

This module is best presented by an instructor who has practical experience in peacekeeping operations and who could share his/her experience with the group. He/She must be practiced and skilled to be able to demonstrate the technique correctly. If there is more than one instructor, at least one should have practical experience as trainer in either domestic policing or a peacekeeping mission.

Instructor Preparations

Required Readings

- DPKO Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials

General Preparations

Equipment:
1. Computer and PowerPoint slides
2. Projector and Screen
Lesson 1 – Security of UN Premises (Theory)

Contents:

CONTENTS

- Aim
- Learning outcomes
- Legal Basis
- Perimeters
- Locations
- Plans
- Examples
- Summary

Slide 1

AIM

Familiarize the FPU in the provision of security for UN premises

Slide 2
The overall responsibility for the security of UN personnel in UN Missions lies with the United Nations Department of Safety & Security (UNDSS), although it is the Host State which is ultimately responsible, albeit that in a peacekeeping situation they may not be able to fulfil this responsibility without the assistance of the UN.

FPUs may be tasked by the SRSG or the Police Commissioner to assist the UNDSS in this responsibility, either by assisting other components of the UN with static armed security or by providing physical security around buildings or overseeing the access to UN facilities.

They may also be tasked with providing additional security for VIP visits, either static uniformed or as secondary detail to the Close Protection team or convoy escorts.
To start the risk assessment, it is important to look at the environment around the building or compound.

If the UN building is located in an urban area, the advantages are likely to be that several roads (normally) in good condition, will give ease of access to the building. There is likely to be a good means of communication, either telephone network, internet connection or both and mobile phone coverage is likely to be available in one form or another. If there is a host country police force in place, there are more likely to be local Police patrols in the vicinity.

The disadvantages may be that with a high density of population, terrorist or criminal elements may find it easier to blend into the daily population and there is cover for them to launch an attack. Traffic is likely to be heavier with many vehicles around the building, particularly if there is a problem with parking, and ideal situation for planting a vehicle bomb. With large urban populations people often don’t know each other i.e. terrorists go unnoticed.

Another negative aspect of the urban area is that, due to the concentration of population, demonstrators can be mobilized much faster and in greater number and the multiplicity of potential targets may result into scattering the UN forces, (the same may apply to the host country security forces).
If the UN building is located in a rural area, the advantages may be that the local population will identify strangers quickly and if there is a need to better secure the building, the external environment can be modified more easily. In order to increase security, for example bushes can be cut down and earthworks moved to give greater protection.

The disadvantages can be that access to the UN building may be difficult as roads are rare and or in bad condition. Mobile telephone and internet connections are less likely or will be poor strength and land line networks can be neutralised easily by cutting lines. Passive and active security measures have to be set up around the building and vicinities. The absence of street lighting will make it less secure at night and it is more likely that the building can be observed in detail from a remote position without the knowledge of the UN. For this reason, sentries have to know very well their watch sectors, (pictures and sketches of the different observation distances) and from time to time go to check if there would be signs of surveillances, (cigarette buds in numbers, holes dug in the ground…). It is important to bear in mind that, most of the time; a good observation spot toward the UN compound can be turned into a sniping spot too. Being cautious and proactive is therefore an effective security measure.
Physical building protection has three major elements. The overarching aim is to protect the building from external threats. This could be in the form of terrorists, criminals, or from espionage. Public order sorts of threats are actually of a much more frequent occurrence but might be slightly more predictable.

There are distinct areas that must be assessed;

- The internal area of the building and any compound surrounding it,

- The immediate area outside the compound

- The area over 50 metres from the compound walls.

In addition, to ensure the safety and security of the building, there will need to be some form of access control. This will require a physical check of passes and ID cards of all those entering. It may also be necessary to deny access to either pedestrians, or vehicles, or both either at certain times or at all times. This will depend on events and the nature of the occupants or visitors to the building.

The level of access control to buildings and compounds will always depend on the information and intelligence available and following a risk assessment of all the facts.
Three different areas:

The most sensitive area is inside the compound (red), the immediate area is sensitive but the danger can be kept outside (yellow), the distant area does not constitute an immediate threat (green).

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**PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS**

**Considerations:**

- The distant area
  - Surroundings
    - Neighbouring buildings
    - Compounds
    - Pipelines and sewers
  - The key road junctions
  - Access

*Determine the weak and strong points*

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The first consideration is the distant area surrounding the building or compound.

Firstly the surroundings need to be assessed. This will include neighbouring buildings, their design, and if they overlook key points of the UN compound or it is possible to gain access to the UN compound from them. It is important to know who owns the buildings, land, who actually lives there and if any security specifics are
attached to them, (it can be an Embassy, the residence of a preeminent local political personality…).

Places have to be assessed on the basis of what could they could be used to pose a threat to the UN facilities, (it can be surveillance, areas where a sniper could take place or an area whereby a mortar shell could be launched.

Many questions have to be considered, such as pipes, sewers and underground tunnels, is it possible to access the building or compound through these? Where do they start and finish? If they are secure who has access to them?

Key road junctions in the area, can they be compromised? What is the traffic flow like?

Finally, access roads: direct and indirect accesses for both vehicles and pedestrians.

Even though, these threat/risk assessments are conducted by DSS, it is important for FPU officers to be aware of them.

The area outside the compound, (even though it is outside of the UN premises), can be rearranged with the approval of the local Authorities, in order to mitigate the identified risks. It can the prohibition for the regular traffic to access the street, prohibition to park cars along the compound walls…).

The immediate area around the building will need to be assessed for the best method in which to control accesses and at the same time, define the procedure whereby staff movements are regulated, (is it by physical check of the ID card or by an electronic method (swipe card style access machines)?), or will all staff be subject to a checkpoint where they will be stopped and searched?

The control of visitors is another consideration. The procedure will depend on the

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**PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS**

- The immediate area
  - Control of entrances
  - Control of staff
  - Control of visitors
  - Car parking
  - Lighting
  - Security detail

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number and kind of expected visitors, what will define if there is a need to a separate entrance with searching facilities.

The same goes for the access of vehicles and it will raise the same questions, such as, whether or not staff will be allowed to enter in vehicles, what checks will be carried out if that is the case? Will visitors be allowed to enter? Were inside the compound will vehicles be parked?). They should not be allowed to be parked next to any buildings as this becomes a major security threat from car bombs.

Lighting in the immediate area is another consideration; is the existing good enough to protect the building or is there the need for more or important “dark dead angles”; flood lighting can be used to deter intrusions and attacks on the building at night.

The other consideration is whether a private security firm is used to assist in the checking process; this will be a matter for the UNDSS. However, FPU can be tasked to reinforce the security on a given site and it is important for these officers to know what to check and where liabilities may lie.

### PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS

- The Building or Compound
  - External security
  - Internal security
  - Patrols
  - Map
  - Command post
  - Contingency plans
  - Safe Area(s)

Within the sensitive area of the building or compound, the security has to be assessed according to its sensitivity and how much it might be considered as a likely target and a vital building. This may require additional protective measures and envisaging the worst case scenario is a good to avoid over looking major considerations which would reveal themselves at the moment a crisis strikes.

External security measures such as watch towers, barbed wire, and gabions can be added as required. The building may have Close Circuit Television (CCTV) or this may be considered, depending on the threat. The use of CCTV can reduce the number of officers required to patrol the building.

Internal security measures include all staff wearing ID cards and those not doing so
being challenged. It can be advisable to install security glass or curtains on the windows to guard against bombs, bars and locks to prevent criminal activity and alarm systems so that staff can be warned if the security is breached.

The building can be patrolled by security officers, police or military components.

It is important that there is a map of the compound or building and that all staff is aware of emergency exits and procedures.

If there is a command post then it needs to be sited in an appropriate position and have access to communications for the whole building/compound.

Contingency plans need to be drawn up for emergencies such as evacuation for fire or bomb threat. Once again, these plans are prepared by DSS but FPUs and Military are always associated to them in various capacities and their rehearsal is highly advisable.

There should also be safe rooms where the staff can retreat to secure themselves inside and await assistance.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROTECTION OF BUILDINGS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Key Considerations:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Maps</td>
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<td>• Patrols</td>
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<td>• Surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaison</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Entrance point</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Road blocks</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Contingency Plans</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Slide 12: A reserve intervention element has to be added to this list, between patrols and surveillance.

Key considerations:

Have a map of the area, it may be necessary to respond to threats outside the building and therefore to be familiar with the area.

In case of a looming threat, additional patrols have to be conducted by UN units, FPU, UNPOL or Military, day and night shift as appropriate. It reassures the civilian staff, deter intrusions and keep the guarding unit in “cautious mode”. It shouldn’t be resorted to often or for too long to additional patrols since it may have a counterproductive effect if multiplied inappropriately, (fatigue, disbelief in the actual
threat…).

It is also essential for the officer responsible for the security of the compound, to keep 24/7 an intervention team, capable of providing the first immediate response to whatever on going threats. This intervention team must be immediately available, with weapons readily accessible, (lethal and non lethal).

Maintain surveillance of the area from the UN building: this can be by the use of watch towers, or from the roof of the building, the officers should be provided with binoculars to look out for suspects that hare carrying out their own surveillance on the UN building.

Intelligence should be sought from the staff as well as the local police.

There should be a liaison plan with the other counterparts for example, local police, fire fighters, UN military component etc.

There should be some form of electric power back-up/source such as generators; the same should apply for communications systems.

There should be only one main gate, this should be staffed if necessary with a security detail who will conduct checks and searched as appropriate to the threat.

Road blocks should be placed in the road leading to the main entrance to deter vehicle born explosive devices and to reduce their impact if they are used.

Prioritise two means of communication (radio and phone) that can be used for the security detail.

Have contingency plans – see next slide.

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**ESTABLISH CONTINGENCY PLANS**

- Security plan
- Fire plan
- Evacuation Plan
- Defence plan

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Slide 13: Once again, it is critical to include a reserve intervention element to this list.

A Security plan is established by UNDSS and all the UN personnel are informed.
regularly of the evaluation of the security level and potential threats.

A Fire fighting plan should include the location of the relevant equipment, where the alarms are situated and plans of the evacuation routes out of the building. It should also include details of how the host state fire service will be called to assist.

UNDSS is in charge of establishing the evacuation plan for UN personnel and UNDSS is responsible for organising evacuation exercises, FPUs are often involved in these exercises.

The Defence plan will be the responsibility of the unit carrying out the physical security of the premises and must include orders for shooting and use of firearms, orders for access (check points, day and night) methods of Identification required (ID Card etc.) instructions for searching, and any Standard Operating Procedures and limitations.

Here are a few examples of common mistake which may result into dramatic consequences in case of an attack:

Slide 14

Slide 14 shows an example of where vegetation has been allowed to grow and masks the view of any suspects approaching the perimeter and consequently prevents the UN guarding element to see them coming close.
Slide 15 shows where a weapon has been suspended in position and a poorly protected watch tower.

**SUMMARY**

- Legal Basis
- Perimeters
- Locations
- Plans
- Examples

Slide 16

The officers should be given a summary of the key points of the lesson before being asked if they have any questions.
QUESTIONS

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Slide 17