Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers:

*We need to change the way we are doing business*

ABSTRACT

Since 1948, more than 3,500 personnel have lost their lives serving in United Nations peace operations with 943 due to acts of violence. During the past five years (2013 – 2017) a consistent increase in peacekeeper fatalities due to violent acts resulted in 195 deaths.

This report, directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, uses internal United Nations data and reporting to analyze the causes of fatalities due to violent acts. Based upon over 160 personal interviews and the professional experience of the authors, the report provides no-nonsense, practical, short and long-term actions to reduce fatalities.

The report’s focus is to change the way the United Nations does business in high-security risk peacekeeping operations.

DECEMBER 19, 2017
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In memoriam

To the 943 United Nations peacekeepers who lost their lives, due to acts of violence.¹

In acknowledgement

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¹ From 6 July 1948 to 19 December 2017.
Executive Summary

Peacekeeping is a risky activity. A certain number of casualties may occur even if all necessary preventive measures are taken. But since 2013, casualties have spiked. 195 personnel in United Nations peacekeeping missions have been killed by acts of violence, more than during any other 5-year period in history. In 2017, there had been 56 fatalities at the time of publication – the highest number since 1994. These numbers go beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk, and they are likely to rise even higher. Something needs to change to reverse the trend.

This report aims to identify why the UN has had so many fatalities caused by acts of violence in recent years, and what should be done to reduce these casualties. Overall, the United Nations and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries need to adapt to a new reality: The blue helmet and the UN flag no longer offer “natural” protection. Peacekeeping environments now feature armed groups, terrorists, organized crime, street gangs, criminal and political exploitation, and other threats. The era of “Chapter VI-style” peacekeeping is over, but the United Nations and Troop/Police-Contributing Countries are, by and large, still gripped by a “Chapter VI Syndrome.” If the United Nations and T/PCCs do not change their mindset, take risks and show willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm’s way.

Casualties will continue to occur, and will even increase, if the United Nations and TCCs fail to change in the following areas:

**LEADERSHIP:** A deficit of leadership is one of the main problems that prevents the United Nations from adapting. Leadership at all levels, from New York to the most remote field locations, fails to demonstrate initiative, commitment, and determination to adapt. This has grave consequences in the form of fatalities. To stay secure, the United Nations must be robust not only through its military, police, and civilian personnel in the field, but in its political behavior as well, actively seeking solutions rather than waiting for casualties to stop.

**OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR:** Fatalities rarely occur as a result of troops and leadership taking action: the United Nations is most often attacked as a result of inaction. When leaders’ decision-making processes depend too heavily on general standard procedures, they are bound to fail to take appropriate timely action to promote security. Operational behaviour on the ground should therefore be based on a risk assessment, according to the specific situation and threat environment. Each mission is unique, and even within each country, different situations require different actions given the threat that prevails in an area. But what never changes is that the interpretation of mandates, rules of engagements and other documents should support taking **ACTION**, and not be used to justify **INACTION**.
USE OF FORCE: Unfortunately, hostile forces do not understand a language other than force. To deter and repel attacks and to defeat attackers, the United Nations needs to be strong and not fear to use force when necessary. Some T/PCCs and leadership remain risk-averse when it comes to using force, but they have failed to understand projecting strength is more secure for uniformed and civilian personnel.

DEFENSIVE POSTURE: To improve security, missions should identify threats to their security and take initiative, using all the tactics, to neutralize or eliminate the threats. Missions should go where the threat is, in order to neutralize it. Missions should also push combat to the night, to take advantage of their superior technology. Waiting in a defensive posture only gives freedom to hostile forces to decide when, where and how attack the United Nations.

PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING: The United Nations should provide an updated interpretation of the basic principles for peacekeeping. Troops should not see the principles as restrictions on initiative and the use of force. The principles should clarify that in high-risk areas featuring high-intensity conflicts (ambushes, for instance), troops should use overwhelming force and be proactive and preemptive. In battles and in fights, the United Nations needs to win or troops, police and civilian personnel will die.

SELECTION OF TCCs/PCCs: The United Nations should clearly establish what it expects from T/PCCs on the ground in terms of posture, mindset, training and proper equipment. T/PCCs should make a formal commitment to satisfy this profile, and be held accountable to it. T/PCCs may seek to participate in peacekeeping for different reasons and interests. This is normal and acceptable, but they must perform. The United Nations should not accept caveats, because they weaken integration and mutual protection within missions. This increases the risk of casualties. At the same time, United Nations leadership must be held accountable to do everything possible to keep troops safe. This includes demanding that leadership from the SRSG to the rank and file will default to action, and not inaction, when faced with security-related decisions.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING: Deficient pre-deployment training is one of the main causes of fatalities and serious injuries in the field. Some contingents and commanders are visibly unprepared to demonstrate the operational behavior required in the field. The United Nations and T/PCCs are both responsible for this unpreparedness. The United Nations conducts a pre-deployment visit to verify the contingent's preparation. This should be an opportunity to verify the training, including by surprise exercises and tests. The United Nations must have, and exercise, the authority to say yes or no: if contingents do not pass, the United Nations should refuse to authorize deployment and recommend specific points for further training. In the same way, troops putting themselves and their colleagues at risk of death and injury because of their poor performance should be subjected to intensive in-mission training and repatriated in serious cases. Basic training should be complemented with specialized training to prepare troops for specific threats, such as operating in jungle areas and in areas with improvised explosive devices. This training should continue in-mission. To reduce deficiencies in pre-deployment training and contingent-owned equipment, the UN should create a system to pay in advance part of the...
annual reimbursement to the T/PCCs. This will allow T/PCCs to conduct better preparation in terms of training and basic equipment, and the United Nations will have more authority during the verification process.

**EQUIPMENT:** Troops should not be deployed without the necessary and appropriate equipment in the threat environment. Inadequate or missing equipment facilitates and increases the number of casualties. In some missions, specialized equipment like mine-protected vehicles, special weapons, and special ammunitions are needed.

**INTELLIGENCE:** To prevent casualties, peacekeeping missions need tactical intelligence. Missions must be able to transform intelligence into simple tasks and actions that boost security, but they often fail to do this. Missions do not lack high-tech resources to collect intelligence. They lack the basics, especially human intelligence, networks of informants, situational awareness, and capacity to communicate with the population. Military units should also have more structures for tactical intelligence. And when information is available, troops sometimes do not take the appropriate action. The end state of intelligence should be action and results that increase security, not a written report.

**TECHNOLOGY:** The United Nations must review and initiate efforts to rapidly equip troops with basic technology for improving security. High-level sophisticated technology will not give personnel the capabilities and information they need on the ground. Knowing who is who, where and when will make it possible to prevent attacks and identify attackers. Then, basic technology will enable personnel to take action against attackers. Appropriate vehicles, special rifles for snipers, special ammunition, night vision capability to operate during the night, and laser aim, among other forms of technology, are needed.

**MEDICAL:** To save lives after attacks occur, improving the quality and availability of first-aid and Level 1 hospitals is crucial. Military units, convoys and long range patrols should have more medical teams, equipment and capacity for communications with bases and helicopters.

**BASES:** Bases must have the best possible physical security measures. But security also comes from action: bases should be a point for irradiating security. All bases should be surrounded by a clearly-defined security zone including few kilometers of roads, villages and IDP camps in the vicinity, where all the population should know that it is an area with “zero tolerance” for the presence of armed groups. United Nations troops should use all tactics to dominate the area, including night operations, foot patrols, occupation of hidden/dissimulated static positions during the day and night to impose restriction of movement on criminal groups.

**MISSION FOOTPRINTS:** Overstretched deployment without a clear objective imposes frequent long, slow supply convoys along roads in very bad conditions. This facilitates attacks against the United Nations by armed groups. Large footprints also force some missions to dedicate about of 90% of their operational capacity dedicated to escorting convoys and self-protection. This leaves missions without capacity to concentrate forces and means to solve local problems, such as eliminating spoilers who would target the
United Nations. Missions should deploy personnel to solve specific security problems and not to have a national presence, like a national army would.

**ADMINISTRATION:** Administration, not operations, tends to dominate logistics. The slow procurement of operational assets, lengthy check-in processes for personnel, and other processes reduce the operational effectiveness of missions and hinder them from taking proactive action against threats and responding swiftly to attacks. They also reduce flexibility needed to provide the capabilities needed to boost security, for instance, ensuring that all patrols should have interpreters to communicate with the population and collect information. An “operational administration” is fundamental to improving security.

**IMPUNITY:** When the United Nations lets criminals enjoy impunity after attacks, they are likely to view the organization as weak and attack again. The United Nations should pursue the armed groups and individuals who attack, kill and seriously injure personnel, to arrest them and bring them to justice. Immediately after a security incident, the United Nations should respond strongly, by mobilizing forces and creating a special operational project, in order to prevent impunity from stimulating future violence against personnel.

The report discusses these factors in four broad domains: changing mindsets, improving capacity, achieving a threat-sensitive mission footprint, and enhancing accountability. It makes specific recommendations in 16 areas, identifying steps to be taken in the short-term and medium/long-term, and linking each one to a responsible actor. The report also recommends four proposals for extra-budgetary funding from the Peace and Security Trust Fund.

Enactment of the recommendations requires strong and committed leadership at all levels. These recommendations will reduce fatalities and injuries due to acts of violence. Otherwise, the fatalities trend will likely worsen. **We need to change the way we are doing business!**

Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz
19 December 2017
Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers:

We need to change the way we are doing business

Section I

Introduction

The 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations states, “Since 1948, more than 3,300 personnel have lost their lives serving in United Nations peace operations. This sacrifice in the service of peace is a solemn testimony to the need to continuously improve the safety and security of personnel.”

Two years later, over 3,500 peace operations' personnel have lost their lives serving in United Nations peace operations, including over 900 due to acts of violence. Today, two-thirds of all United Nations’ peacekeepers are deployed in environments of ongoing conflict and operate in increasingly complex, high-risk environments. Over the past three years, hostile acts against peacekeepers have doubled each year. The Improving Security Peacekeeping Project is a Secretariat field-focused initiative to improve the security of United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

The Improving Security Peacekeeping Project comprises two phases. Phase I provides this report on the current security-related challenges, both external and internal, that peacekeeping civilian, military and police personnel are currently facing, including a strategy with recommendations on how to address those challenges. Phase II will develop high-impact projects/work streams that will implement one or more of the Phase I recommendations.

Background details


About the authors

Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz was the Force Commander of MINUSTAH in Haiti and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently, he is the National Secretary for Public Security, Brazil Ministry of Justice and Public Security. He has more than 40 years of national and international public security and military experience.

William R. Phillips is a retired United States Army Colonel and retired from the United Nations. He was recalled to the United Nations for this project. He has extensive experience in mission security risk issues. His most recent field mission assignment was as Mission Chief of Staff of MINUSMA in Mali.

Salvator Cusimano is the Special Assistant to the Director, Africa II Division of the Office of Operations in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In 2017, he served a short-assignment in MINUSCA in the Central African Republic.

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Scope of the Report

This report aims to propose practical, implementable and effective recommendations to reduce peacekeeping personnel fatalities and injuries from acts of violence. It is an enabler for short and mid/long-term actions.

The subject of this report is security. Security deals with human intent and actions to intentionally cause harm. Acts of violence are the consequence of security threats that stem from armed conflict, terrorism, violent civil unrest and crime. This report focuses on direct acts of violence against United Nations peacekeeping personnel and direct acts of violence against others which result in collateral injury or death to United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

The report excludes safety which addresses natural or human-made hazards (e.g. earthquakes or workplace accidents) which may cause illness, injury or death. Also excluded are health and medical issues not directly the result of security incidents and deaths from suicide.

This report focuses upon improving the security of United Nations peacekeeping personnel, meaning personnel who serve in United Nations peacekeeping missions including: all international and national civilian staff, United Nations volunteers and other civilian persons under the United Nations Security Management System; and all uniformed. The report does not address personnel of United Nations Country Teams in integrated peacekeeping missions or other United Nations system personnel. A small number of United Nations Secretariat Headquarters personnel who were injured or killed while directly supporting a peacekeeping mission are included in statistics used in the report.

Lastly, this report does not include employees of commercial vendors under contract to the United Nations. This exclusion is forced by the lack of fatality and injury data due to the absence of a required reporting regimen. Further observation on reporting on this category will appear later in this report.

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3 ‘Malicious acts’ is a term commonly used in the United Nations. This term has legal implications; therefore, this report uses the terminology ‘acts of violence’.
4 Natural and man-made workplace hazards are addressed by the DPKO-DFS Field Occupational Safety Risk Management Programme.
5 The military and police components consist of individually deployed military personnel (e.g. observers, liaison officers and staff officers) and United Nations Police officers and cohesive units (e.g. military battalions and Formed Police Units). The latter are referred to as ‘formed units’.
Methodology

Phase 1 of the project comprised six steps:

- 1: Project scoping and definition;
- 2: specifying the problem and examining contributing causes through statistical analysis and document review;
- 3: I travel to MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to obtain field views and observe high-risk field sites;
- 4: Project expansion by the Secretary-General’s September 2017 decision to appoint a high-level person;
- 5: an expanded Review Team visit to the two highest-risk missions: MINUSCA and MINUSMA, and development of recommendations; and,
- 6: outreach to the Member States and selected research institutes\(^6\) (throughout Phase I).

Phase 1 involved: the acquisition and review of 9 casualty-related databases; 43 mission senior leadership end of mission reports; 97 Board of Inquiry reports; 11 military and police assessment reports of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Peacekeeping Strategic Partnerships; 2 special investigation reports (UNMISS); and numerous academic and ‘think tank’ publications. Also, Phase 1 included the conduct over 160 interviews of senior leadership, mid-level staff and technical experts at HQ and the field; and consultations with representatives of Member States; and three academic, research institutions and subject-matter experts. Due to a large number of interviews and historical documentation (e.g. End of Mission and other reports), machine learning software was used enhance knowledge discovery, especially in determining patterns and prominence of issues and topics related to peacekeeping mission fatalities. All observations and recommendations are based on these data, as well as the expertise of the Review Team Leader.

\(^6\) Center for International Peace Operations/Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF), Berlin, Germany; Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), Pretoria, South Africa; and The Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., USA.
Section II

Defining the Problem

Peacekeeping Fatalities since 1948

The first United Nations peacekeeping mission was deployed in 1948. In the following 69 years, 943 peacekeepers died due to malicious acts. This represents an average of 13.7 fatalities per year. Visualization 1 depicts the number of peacekeeping fatalities each year.

Visualisation 1


Both the first and second spikes were sharp increases followed by sharp decreases in fatalities as missions were withdrawn.

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7 The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) founded on 29 May 1948 and still in existence.
The third increase began in 2011, became critical in 2013 and continues into 2017. This increase takes place during the deployment, since 2007, of the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). These missions account for the overwhelming number of fatalities during this period. This increase is not a spike but rather a rise to a continuing plateau. This third increase accounts for 195 fatalities of 20.6% of the 943 total fatalities since 1948, accounting for a higher proportion than both of the first two spikes of 130 fatalities (13.8%) and 154 fatalities (16.3%), respectively. With 56 fatalities, 2017 has been the deadliest single year on record since 1994.

The challenge is to bring the current fatality plateau and spike down and keep it down.

Peacekeeping Fatalities from 2013 - 2017

Since 2011, peacekeeping fatalities due to acts of violence are rising with 2013-2016 establishing a plateau. 2017 ends the plateau with significantly higher fatalities. 90.2% of fatalities are suffered by military components with the vast majority from attacks on movements and camps. While MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMISS and UNISFA sustained higher fatalities in the past, today MINUSMA and MINUSCA represent an increasingly higher level of fatalities. Except MINUSMA, most mission fatalities result from small arms (i.e. guns, RPGs, etc.). Uniquely, MINUSMA threats include significant VBIED, IED and indirect fire attacks. African peacekeeping troops suffer the overwhelming number of fatalities.

Visualization 2 portrays the breakdown – by mission component - of the 195 fatalities during the period 1 January 2013 through 9 December 2017.⁹

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The 176 fatalities of military personnel, almost entirely in formed military units, comprised the vast majority (90.2%) of fatalities since 2013. Nine (5%) United Nations Police died, including four during ambushes of convoys and escort patrols, one in an attack on position and four from criminal acts. Eight (4%) national civilians died, including three during ambushes on convoys and five while off duty.\textsuperscript{10} Two (<1%) United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) died during terrorist attacks. No international civilian fatalities occurred.

From 1 January 2017 through 8 December 2017, mission personnel suffered 56 fatalities (4.6/month) and an estimated 199 wounded (16.6/month) due to acts of violence.\textsuperscript{11} These numbers cause a significant rise in the fatality plateau in 2017.

*Two parallel actions: prevent a rise in civilian and police casualties and significantly reduce military casualties.*

**Weapons and Activities Relevant to Fatalities**

From 2013-2017, mobile convoys, convoy escorts, patrols and quick reaction forces represent the areas of highest fatalities from malicious acts. Second are fatalities as a consequence of attacks on camps, team sites and positions. For the later, fatality numbers reflect both United Nations peacekeepers defending perimeters as well as peacekeepers who died in the camp during the attack. Small arms (i.e. guns) and the combination of IEDs,

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\textsuperscript{10} International and national civilian fatalities represent civilian persons under the United Nations Security Management System.

\textsuperscript{11} Data source for injuries: Precise information on injuries is limited, but Board of Inquiry data shows a ratio of 3.55 persons with severe injuries for each fatality.
VBIEDs and land mines were used in the overwhelming majority of fatalities. Visualizations 3 and 4 depict weapons and activities associated with fatalities.

**Visualisation 3**

![2013 - 2017 Weapons versus Numbers of Fatalities](image1)

**Visualisation 4**

![2013 - 2017 Activities versus Number of Fatalities](image2)
Visualizations 5-7 show the Missions and Troop and Police Contributing Countries with the highest numbers of fatalities due to acts of violence.

**Visualisation 5**

![2013 - 2017 Number of Fatalities by Mission](image)

**Visualisation 6**

![2013 - 2017 Fatalities by Member State](image)
In past spikes of peacekeeper fatalities, the United Nations closed the missions. In today’s environment, closures of the high security-risk mission are unlikely. Therefore, the United Nations must adapt to the modern operational environments and adopt strong and effective measures to reduce fatalities. The following section provided recommendations to accomplish that task. Notably, it does not focus on the question of whether mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations should be adjusted, as the Review Team considers these to be within the purview of the Security Council.

Section III

Introduction and Overall Observations

Fatalities are rising in United Nations peacekeeping operations because the United Nations and the Member States are failing to adapt and take measures needed to operate securely in dangerous environments. The causes of fatalities are well-known, but United Nations Headquarters, field missions, and the Member States have failed to fully adapt to increasingly risky operational environments. Although some period of adjustment is normal and some adaptation efforts have started, there is no adequate explanation for why some basic measures have still not been taken to reduce fatalities. This indicates that a
lack of will, determination, and accountability among the United Nations and Member States continues to put personnel at risk. **If the United Nations and Troop/Police-Contributing Countries do not immediately take responsibility for reversing this trend, they will be consciously placing personnel in harm’s way and compromising the mandates of peacekeeping operations. If we do not change, we will continue to be an easy target.**

The Review Team identified four broad areas in which the United Nations and the Member States must take action to reduce fatalities: 1) **changing mindsets**, so that personnel are aware of the risks and empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks; 2) **improving capacity**, so that that personnel are equipped and trained to operate in high-threat environments, and that missions have the assets and procedures necessary to deter attacks and limit fatalities and injuries when they occur; 3) **achieving a sensible mission footprint** that is coherent with mission mandates and limits the exposure of the mission to threat; and, 4) **enhancing accountability**, to ensure that those able to take action to prevent fatalities and injuries are placed before their responsibilities.

The Review Team also realises that efforts to adapt to the modern operational environment that would involve legislative or major bureaucratic changes in Headquarters will take time. Therefore, the imperative is to adapt at the Mission level, and UNHQ must provide full backing to mission efforts.

**Changing Mindset**

> “When TCCs send recce missions, they are all staring at us like a kid in a toy shop, seeing how different this environment is. ‘Oops, you can die in this country, not by heart attack or accident but by enemy attack.’ This is not what they’re expecting in peacekeeping, and that is what they are unprepared for.”

- The United Nations must update the principles of peacekeeping to reflect that the blue helmet and flag do not offer natural protection, they are a target. This must be the mindset of all personnel, leadership, and T/PCCs in peacekeeping operations.
- The United Nations and T/PCCs must plan operations based on threat assessment of the specific environment, not standards and policies better suited to “traditional” peacekeeping.
- Peacekeepers must adopt a proactive posture in self-defense: they must take initiative to use force to eliminate threats and end impunity for attackers by quickly organizing special operations. Bases must become a point of irradiating security. Overwhelming force is necessary to defeat and gain the respect of hostile actors.
- Commanders must ensure that peacekeepers take basic precautions against common threats such as IEDs, ambushes, and camp/base protection.

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12 Mindset is the mental state of all peacekeepers of all components that entails beliefs, values and dispositions to act in effective ways in the operational environment to achieve mandated tasks.
The United Nations should work to attract new T/PCCs, as they are normally receptive to a change in mindset.

The United Nations and many T/PCCs are gripped by a “Chapter VI Syndrome” that leads them to plan and deploy peacekeeping operations without a full appreciation of security risks in the field and the operational approach needed to address them. The United Nations and T/PCCs continue to rely on the assumptions, approaches, methods and procedures of “traditional” peacekeeping environments, where there was little or no hostile threat to personnel. This often permeates all aspects of the pre-deployment preparation of contingents, the configuration of the mission, and the operation of troops in the field.

“The Mission lacks the mindset to undertake a proactive and robust approach, and instead remains paralyzed against threats. The contingents continue to lack the ability to operate in or respond to asymmetric environment... they lack the necessary ‘mind-set’ to undertake robust operations.”

The result of this “syndrome” is that peacekeepers tend to take a defensive posture that cedes initiative, freedom of movement, and the first strike to hostile actors. Peacekeepers’ failure to take the initiative to adopt a proactive posture – to dismantle installations that pose a threat to the mission and the population, to swiftly arrest the perpetrators and sponsors of violence – invites attack. Their failure to push combat to the night and to remain along the road and in bases makes them predictable and undermines the advantage of their superior technology. Hostile actors are aware that they will be able to take time to plan their attacks and move into a favourable position to carry them out unimpeded. The failure to take initiative to conduct even activities that do not require the use of force – such as building local support and fostering networks of informants – indicates that personnel lack the appropriate mindset to act.

“We should take action to limit the freedom of movement and freedom of action of the armed groups. ...We need to reverse the tendency: they should run from us, not us from them.”

Within a proactive posture, bases become a point of irradiating security. All bases should be surrounded by a clearly-defined security zone including few kilometers of roads, villages and IDP camps in the vicinity, where all the population should know that it is an area with “zero tolerance” for the presence of armed groups. United Nations troops should use all tactics to dominate the area, including night operations, foot patrols, occupation of hidden/dissimulated static positions during the day and night to impose restriction of movement on criminal groups.

“We are defending our premises from inside the perimeter. This means the opposition is at the gate. Instead, we have to defend the perimeter from outside!”
Personnel, leadership, and some T/PCCs remain risk-averse and unwilling to use force, leaving attacks unpunished and undeterred. Fatalities often occur when troops fail to use force to defend themselves and deter attack. The fear of responding to Boards of Inquiry and pressure from capital cities to refrain from using force leads many commanders and troops to use the mandate to justify inaction. Risk aversion affects more than troops: it permeates missions from top to bottom and exists at headquarters and in many capitals. Personnel need to be assured by their commanders, their Headquarters, and their capitals that they have the right to self-defence and must respond with force to hostile acts. This is perfectly acceptable within any mandate. Otherwise, the perpetrators of attacks will not respect the mission’s capabilities, impunity will reign, and they are likely to repeat their attacks.

“The leadership must be able to build and sustain credibility to gain respect. A strong posture will reduce casualties.”

“I always ask after an attack how many dead there were on the other side. A classic peacekeeping mandate permits self-defence, and that means you are allowed to use force! Personnel show reluctance to take the initiative.”

At the same time, some personnel take too many unwise risks that expose them to attacks. The Review Team heard accounts of personnel dying after failing to take basic precautions and implement standard procedures. Examples included personnel riding in (or on top of) soft-skinned vehicles; putting mine/IED detection capabilities at the back of convoys instead of at the front, and lacking alertness at daybreak in a static position as the enemy gathered around overnight. This lax mindset extends to mission leadership and United Nations headquarters, where appropriate precautions regarding equipment and camp security entail long bureaucratic processes. This mindset often does not change until attacks occur all too easily. This tendency tells hostile elements that peacekeeping missions are easy targets, which invites further attack.

“The attack that targeted our base was unfortunate, but it helped me convince people that it’s an unsafe area, and we moved it. No one believed it until they almost got killed.”

The proper mindset is especially important regarding the use of force. Under normal, lower risk conditions (e.g. civil demonstrations) the use of “proportional” force is a sound concept. However, in higher-risk environments, where opposition’s tools include ambush, terrorist attack, and open combat, the United Nations must employ overwhelming force. If such confrontations are not won by the United Nations, personnel die.

To summarize, to reduce fatalities and enhance mandate implementation, posture, behaviour, leadership and initiative needs to change, at all levels from New York to the most remote places in peacekeeping missions. Emphasis and resources should be towards the civilians, military and police on the “front line”; mission headquarters should consume the minimum personnel and resources. Operational behaviour
should be dictated by risk assessment and not by standard procedures. A strong posture on the ground will create a more secure environment for mission personnel and the local population.

Improving Capacity

“Most contingents are equipped and trained for ‘traditional’ peacekeeping, but the threat is asymmetric.”

- T/PCCs and the United Nations must ensure that pre-deployment training provides troops with the basic soldiering skills and environment-specific training needed to repel attacks and conduct operations against hostile elements.
- The United Nations and battalion commanders must ensure sufficient in-mission training to ensure soldiers maintain their skills and adapt to the threat environment.
- T/PCCs with high-quality technology, training and equipment should partner with and mentor other TCCs, and share information to enable operations against spoilers.
- T/PCCs must deploy suitable contingent-owned equipment and ensure that it is maintained in-mission. The United Nations should update and adapt SURs to the threat environment.
- The United Nations should generate intelligence capabilities that are well-suited to the environment, particularly low-tech solutions that generate tactical intelligence. All mission components should focus more on human intelligence.
- The United Nations must review and initiate efforts to rapidly equip troops with basic technology for improving security.
- The United Nations and T/PCCs must ensure better medical training for personnel; generate and deploy embedded and mobile medical capacity; clarify and implement CASEVAC; and include medical personnel in operational planning.
- The United Nations must invest in physical defence structures at camps, but these are no replacement for troops taking basic measures to defend the camp and take a proactive posture to turn the base into a point of irradiation of security.

Fatalities are occurring because personnel are unprepared regarding training and equipment to deter and respond to hostile acts. Contingent-owned equipment that is essential for security is often ill-suited to the environment; not functioning when it arrives in mission; absent despite having been verified pre-deployment; not replaced when destroyed in attacks, and left poorly maintained until non-functional. Pre-deployment training does not properly prepare troops for the operational environment, and many contingents lack even basic soldiering skills required to repel an attack (e.g. firing a weapon). Specialized functions essential to maintaining the security of all personnel arrive in missions without knowledge of their function. After deployment, personnel often also fail to maintain or improve skills (shooting practice, jungle warfare training, convoy escort with IED threat, etc.).

“We learned that they had forgotten everything because there was no continuous training in the unit.”
On the other hand, contingents possessing the best-quality training, equipment, and technology are not making significant contributions to operational effectiveness. Such TCC units deployed in United Nations missions tend to operate in a bubble excluding the TCCs that they serve alongside and their proximate Sector commands. Caveats break the equality between contingents and damage the integration required to maintain security. Troops should protect each other share information in favour of mission-wide situational awareness that contributes to the security of all personnel. Higher standards often fail to produce significant practical results.

“That contingent is well-equipped but is not under the sector commander, so we don’t know what they do and I don’t get much feedback... They only do their task, their mission, and don’t share, except very rarely.”

Intelligence is often unable to provide timely information that could help prevent, avoid and respond to attack. Intelligence in peacekeeping is overly reliant on technology that is ill-suited to the operational environment, information is not shared among key mission components, and human intelligence is underdeveloped or non-existent. The intelligence cycle is incomplete, with information rarely translating into operational/tactical activities. This leaves missions liable to surprise attack, hesitant when embarking on risky operations, and unable to attack the source of threats in advance and in self-defence. Missions are therefore unable to compensate for the natural advantage of hostile actors, including knowledge of the terrain and situation within the population.

“We have a clear lack of tactical intel or tactical information in the field. And when we do have it, we are not proactive. So, it’s difficult to anticipate an attack.”

Basic technology, not high-level sophisticated technology, will provide personnel with the capabilities and information they need to remain secure on the ground. Knowing know who is who, where and when will make it possible to prevent attacks and identify attackers. Then, basic technology will enable personnel to take action against them. Appropriate vehicles, special rifles for snipers, special ammunition, night vision capability to operate during the night, and laser aim, among other forms of technology, are needed.

Physical structures for protection are deficient even in bases that have been well-established for some time. Sensors, gates, walls, and bunkers at camps are outdated, inadequate, and sometimes simply non-operational or even absent. Yet this provides no excuse for troops who do not take responsibility for their own security, including by taking a proactive posture to create a zone of security around the camp.

Civilian components, which have an important role to play in threat mitigation, are sometimes limited in their work by notions of insecurity and rigid, misguided perceptions of the value of integration. Civilian-military coordination (CIMIC) activities
help prevent attacks and permit an operational response by reinforcing local support networks and obtaining essential information.

When attacks do occur, life is sometimes lost and injuries become more serious where medical capacity is inadequate. This is especially urgent at the attack site, where civilian and uniformed personnel need basic first aid training and equipment required to preserve life, and at Level 1 hospitals, where life-saving care is meant to occur. Where CASEVAC is required, personnel at or near the incident site have encountered confusing or slow procedures, causing delays that cost lives. The absence of critical air assets has also hampered medical response and, in Mali, left large swathes of the area of operation outside the “10-1-2” standard. Patrols and convoys sometimes lack a mobile medical team (e.g. well-equipped ambulances), limiting the ability to quickly stabilize a victim who may otherwise have had a good prognosis.

“Out of the 10-1-2, the biggest challenge that MINUSMA has is the 10.”

A Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint

- Missions must match their footprint at high-risk locations with the strategic objective of their presence there.
- Missions should concentrate forces to solve security problems, re-tasking assets that are excess to operational needs in their current location towards active operations on spoilers.

Heavy mission footprints place an immense burden on resources that inhibits operational effectiveness and puts personnel at risk. Long, slow-moving convoys traveling extreme distances to large, remote field presences present easy targets, as evidenced by the fact that over 50% of fatalities were sustained during vehicle movements (i.e. convoys, escorts, patrols, etc.). Civilian staffing levels that exceed what is absolutely required to achieve the Mission’s objective in a particular location implies inherent risk to personnel while their requirements for sustenance by burdensome logistic convoys increase risk as described above. Although all interlocutors stressed the strategic and political importance of showing “presence” in remote locations, it appears that this could be achieved with a much lighter footprint that would lower the exposure of personnel to risk.

“Logistically we need to know why our presence has to be so big. Do we need to be economical with our presence to reduce the need for heavy convoys?”

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13 Measures commenced by emergency medical personnel within 1 hour of wounding. Damage Control surgery. Depending on the specific and individual requirement the aim is to be able to provide damage control surgery within 1 hour, but no later than 2 hours of wounding (Level II Facility).
By pinning down the Force to logistics and self-protection, an incoherent mission footprint that emphasizes maintaining presence contributes to insecurity by preventing the mission from eliminating security threats. In some missions, interlocutors estimated that 90% of the capacity of the Force is spent on logistics (e.g. convoy escort) and self-protection. This allows security threats in the form of armed and terrorist groups to widen their areas of operation and take the initiative, because uniformed components are unable to conduct operations to eliminate threats and deter attacks.

“If I had 800 operational troops committed to this region and its security problem and not to protection camps and convoys, I could eliminate the armed group problem in a month.”

Enhancing Accountability

- United Nations leadership at all levels must be held accountable for failing to adapt to high-risk operational environments.
- The United Nations should exercise the authority to say "yes or no" when evaluating pre-deployment preparation and performance in the field. The United Nations should refuse to deploy personnel that are unprepared for the threat environment, repatriate such personnel that are already deployed, and reject caveats that reduce integration and operational effectiveness needed for security.

United Nations leadership at all levels in New York, at Mission HQ, and in the most distant field locations has failed to take urgent action to reduce fatalities. Although individual leaders seem aware of the causes of fatalities and have many suggestions on how to reduce them, they have not shown the energy, initiative, courage, and motivation needed to turn the tide. Simplistic interpretations of mandates, regulations, standard procedures, and rules of engagement continue to justify the military posture and approach to the use of force that allows attacks to occur. Heads of mission components have become locked in disagreements over who should lead operations to arrest spoilers instead of decisively mobilizing a swift response. Civilian leadership has often reacted only after attacks occur rather than taking necessary preventive measures. Logistics, meanwhile, are defined by administration instead of by operations, resulting in extremely slow processes that hinder missions’ ability from taking quick action against spoilers. The exercise of leadership in the United Nations is unique: the diverse interests, motivations, and cultures of personnel require all leaders to lead by example. All commanders should be present at the front line to stimulate action among personnel and demonstrate the qualities needed to meet threats, while civilian leadership should treat security threats as if their own lives were at stake. If they do not, they must be held accountable for their inaction, which encourages repeated, fatal attacks on peacekeepers.
"To conduct such operations, you need strong leadership, and you need tough troops – for the moment, I don’t have it in that region!"

The United Nations must hold itself accountable to its obligation to ensure that its missions are staffed by well-trained personnel with the right knowledge, equipment and mindset for the job. Some contingents visibly fail to meet standards required to operate in multidimensional peacekeeping missions in hostile environments. However, they are certified and deployed anyway. Similarly, troops with poor performance on the ground regarding security remain deployed. The result is that personnel who are known to be likely victims of attack remain in the field and die. At the same time, contingents with higher-quality means are not contributing to overall operational effectiveness. Political and financial considerations must therefore be put aside when it comes to training and selecting contingents and evaluating their performance. The United Nations should not deploy unprepared troops and should consider repatriating those whose performance puts them at high risk for fatalities or contributes little to overall operational effectiveness.

“We need to have a genuine willingness to say ‘no.’”

The United Nations must be more demanding on accountability. Countries participate in peacekeeping for a variety of reasons and interests. Regardless of the reason, once a decision is made to send a contingent to a dangerous environment, it must meet the proper standard. The United Nations should clearly establish what it expects from T/PCCs on the ground in terms of posture, mindset, training and proper equipment. T/PCCs should make a formal commitment to satisfy this profile, and be held accountable to it. This commitment must be taken seriously, and the United Nations must do more to demand that troops are ready for the task and have the right mindset to complete it. Only motivated personnel can work with the quality, dynamism, and action on the ground needed to reduce fatalities. If this is lacking, the United Nations should repatriate personnel or refuse their deployment in the first place.

“We had one very dangerous, complicated axis but that contingent succeeded to clean it up. They showed their robustness. The chief of defence staff of the country even visited to put the pressure on them to do more. The credibility of the country within the mission but also more broadly was at stake.”
Issues and Recommendations

The following identifies issues and problems, overviews what is being done and makes short and mid/long-term recommendations that, in combination, will reduce fatalities due to acts of violence.

### Issue 1 - Organizational Adaptation

- **The problem:** The United Nations has not fully adapted to modern hostile, operational environments and Security Council mandates. The United Nations lacks a conceptual approach as certain missions operate outside the governing principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and use of force. The United Nations also lacks required supporting skill sets, and resource processes and mindset for delivering peace operations in modern, complex conflict environments and forceful Security Council mandates.

- **What is already being done:** DPKO and DFS have produced a myriad of documentation which supports adaptation to the new operational environment. One ongoing initiative is Adapting Peace Operations to Complex Conflict Environments project which seeks to identify specific areas of adaptation for United Nations peace operations to complex conflict environments that present a heightened physical risk for the organisation and the people it serves.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SHORT TERM</th>
<th>MID-LONG TERM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mission leadership (SRSG, DSRSG, FC, PC, Heads of Field Offices, Sector Commanders, Battalion Commanders) must immediately take initiative to change attitudes in the field, and should adapt the mission concept, concept of operations, deployment footprint and mandated activities to the threat environment.</td>
<td>The Capstone Doctrine needs to be updated to reflect modern realities.</td>
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<td>T/PCCs should assess the operational environment and ensure training, equipment and mindset are suited to threat environment before and during deployment; adjust composition, mindset, equipment of units between rotations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO should adjust the focus of the Adapting Peace Operations project to identify what must change in practical terms to operate in the modern operational environment and develop the required conceptual approach.</td>
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### Issue 2 - Operational Behavior and Mindset

- **The problem:** When missions fail to take a proactive posture, they cede the initiative to hostile actors and become more vulnerable to attack. When missions fail to use force and face challenges with determination, hostile actors can continue their campaign undeterred. Impunity is a factor that increases the risk of reiterate attacks.
and casualties. Personnel and leadership have lacked the mindset to develop proactive operations. This will establish and sustain credibility and result in a reduction in fatalities.

**What is already being done:**

| SHORT TERM: | • SRSG, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Headquarters in New York, and T/PCCs should issue clear guidance to troops and police that the use of force must be used to reduce threats to the mission.  
• The Force Commander should demand that sector, battalion, and company commanders increase presence outside of the base, by increasing the number of intelligence-oriented patrols and static observation points outside the bases, adopting measures to reduce predictability. Snipers should be used to protect troops.  
• Commanders should intensify night operation and activities, using more technology including night vision systems, special weapons and special ammunition.  
• The Force and UNPOL should conduct more joint and coordinated patrols. Coordinated patrols with national security forces should be increased where possible to boost ownership and intelligence.  
• Missions should take action against criminals promoting violence and abuses, including acts of violence against the United Nations.  
• TCCs should eliminate declared and undeclared caveats that limit movement and robust engagement. The United Nations should not accept caveats.  
• United Nations Headquarters should hold mission leadership accountable for maintaining a proper posture. Mission leadership should inform United Nations Headquarters of formed unit and staff leadership lacking proper mindset for security-based upon performance.  
• SURs and MOUs should include personnel, equipment and activities that permit a proactive, robust posture, such as enhanced night vision technology, sniper capability, etc. |
| MID-LONG TERM | • The United Nations and TCCs should generate units and equipment that permit flexibility, mobility, and operational performance. |

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**Issue 3 - Command and Control**

**The problem:** The quality of leadership at the sector-level, battalion-level and below is essential to the maintenance of security of peacekeepers. It is at this level that the majority of operations are planned and executed, and it is here where peacekeepers often fail to take initiative and neglect to implement basic regulations that would keep them more secure. Furthermore, the presence of several small contingents from different nationalities in the same base can reduce operational strength needed to
proactively address security threats. Under these conditions personnel dedicate themselves to the sustainment of their own small contingent rather than contributing to overall operational effectiveness in the area of operation.

- **What is already being done:** Current OMA policy and procedures provide an effective structure for Sector Headquarters, but a crucial element for overall success is the selection and appointment of the Sector Commander (the DPKO-MILAD approves OMA recommendations for Sector Command posts) and the Battalion Commander (by TCCs).

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<th>Issue 4 - Mission-Specific SUR</th>
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- **The problem:** Force Commanders and Police Commissioners indicate that some military formed units and Formed Police Units are not structured, manned and equipped for specific operational tasks and security demands of the mission in high-threat environments. Contingents are often ill-suited to the terrain, and are not prepared to conduct warfare in jungles and deserts, for example. To be better able to support the military and police aspects of mandate implementation, units need mission-specific rather than generic or standardized capabilities.

- **What is already being done:** Both DPKO/OMA and DPKO/OROLSI/PD have processes to amend generic statements of unit requirements to address mission-specific needs. Policy exists for the review the operational readiness of uniformed components.

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- The DPKO/Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and DPKO/OROLSI/Police Division (PD), in collaboration with Mission components, should review currently-deployed military and UNPOL formed units to determine needed mission-specific improvements in capability. Thereafter, OMA and PD
amend statements of requirements to reflect any needed changes and coordinate with T/PCCs to provide needed capabilities.

- DPKO/DFS should conduct in-mission assessments. Mission-specific requirements and changes to prior requirements should be provided to OMA and PD promptly to allow for the development of amended capabilities.

### MID-LONG TERM

- DPKO and T/PCCs should tailor training for rotations to reflect new situations and needs.

### Issue 5 – Establishing Facts Following Serious Security Incidents

- **The problem:** After incidents in which peacekeepers are killed or injured, several differing and sometimes conflicting reports of what happened tend to emerge. Mission responses to incidents are inconsistent. The lack of immediately available information prevents operational adaptation both in real-time and in the longer-term.

- **What is already being done:** The Board of Inquiry process is useful but not timely to determine immediate measures to reduce similar security incidents.

### SHORT TERM:

- Mission leadership should establish a standing after-action interview group that will move to an incident site as soon as possible following the incident and interview involved persons to establish facts. This information will be used for immediate adjustments to operational posture to prevent or deal with further attack and orient the necessary strong UN reaction.

### MID-LONG TERM

- United Nations headquarters and missions should establish a procedure whereby an after-incident information team is dispatched to observe the scene of a violent act and interview all relevant witnesses within 24 hours of the event.

### Issue 6 - Impunity and Accountability

- **The problem:** Very few of those responsible for violent acts that cause fatalities are arrested. Even in contexts where intelligence has provided the necessary information required to locate and apprehend individuals responsible for violent acts against peacekeepers (and the population), operations to carry out the arrest is not put into action. As a result, hostile elements are allowed to gain strength, and their perception of peacekeepers as weak and indecisive is further solidified. This encourages them to attack peacekeepers, meaning that there is a direct link between the failure to implement operations to hold attackers to account and fatalities (which in turn speaks to an accountability problem within the peacekeeping mission). The UN should not accept that criminals enjoy impunity.
• **What is already being done:**

| SHORT TERM: | • The Mission should act swiftly and robustly to arrest and bring attackers to justice. Troops and police should be tireless in taking action against the criminals responsible for attacking the United Nations (and civilians). Security should be created by action and not by mere presence. Senior leadership that do not conduct these operations quickly should be held to account.  
• The United Nations should clarify its characterisation of attacks against peacekeepers, which are often weakly referred to in statements as “may” constitute war crimes. |

| MID-LONG TERM | • Ensure that all attacks on United Nations personnel or premises (including those within them) are brought to the attention of the relevant prosecutorial or judicial authorities as a systematic course of action, and – strategically and where applicable – the ICC.  
• The United Nations should enhance cooperation with national judiciaries and the International Criminal Court and actively seek the prosecution of persons responsible for attacking United Nations peacekeepers. |

### Issue 7 - TCC Pre-Deployment Operational Readiness

• **The problem:** Many military contingents arrive in missions lacking needed individual and collective skills, equipment and proper mindset. Although detailed United Nations policy and guidance exist for required operational readiness of military contingents, many TCCs deploy units unprepared to implement mandated tasks in hostile operational environments. Unit deficiencies result in fatalities and injuries due to acts of violence.

• **What is already being done:** DPKO conducts Assessment Advisory Visits for all TCCs. TCCs self-certify the operational readiness of contingents, and DPKO conducts a pre-deployment visit (PDV) for selected contingents close to deployment. DPKO-DFS has issued two relevant documents: DPKO-DFS Ref. 2015.16, Policy: Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement, (Dec. 2015); and DPKO-DFS 2016.08, Guidelines: Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions (Dec. 2016). However, it appears that the United Nations sometimes lacks the authority to enforce its policies or challenge TCC self-certification.

| SHORT TERM: | • DPKO/OMA, in collaboration with DPKO/DPET/ITS, should review the implementation of the current policy and guidance with the aim of increasing its effectiveness. DPKO should enforce the existing policy and guidance.  
• DPKO should amend policy and guidance to reflect that the United Nations will verify the TCC self-certification, especially in critical areas affecting the security of personnel. |
• Member states should ensure basic soldiering skills, as well as specific capacities that will troops’ ability to take necessary measures to enhance their security according to the specific mission threat environment (e.g. night operations, tactical intelligence, etc.)
• DPKO should prepare and conduct exercises (unannounced / surprise) that accurately assess the performance of troops and commanders during the PDV.
• DPKO should not deploy troops in the event of unsuccessful performance / equipment during the PDV, issue a list of corrective measures for prolonged training, and conduct a follow-up visit.
• Member states should take the necessary corrective measures.
• DPKO and Member States should ensure that training is specialized to the operational environment, e.g. jungle warfare in DRC and escort convoys and IED mitigation in Mali.

DPKO should conduct pre-deployment visits for all rotations of TCCs providing troops to higher-security risk missions. Mission-specific, mandate-task related, scenario-based field exercises should be mandatory. UNHQ/Mission observers should verify unit and individual performance during the exercise(s).

To obtain more authority and to enable TCCs to conduct these activities and acquire necessary equipment in critical areas affecting the security of personnel, DPKO should advance part of the troop reimbursement allocated for pre-deployment activities.

Member States should expand bilateral pre-deployment training to ensure that basic soldiering skills of troops are enhanced to boosting the ability of personnel to respond to attack and project their security zone. DPKO should support such initiatives but continue to exercise responsibility for verification.

**Issue 8 - PCC Pre-Deployment Operational Readiness**

• **The problem**: Force Commanders and Police Commissioners indicate that some military formed units and Formed Police Units are not structured, manned and equipped for specific operational tasks and security demands of the mission in high-threat environments. To be better able to support the military and police aspects of mandate implementation, units need mission-specific rather than generic or standardised capabilities.

| SHORT TERM: | The DPKO/Office of Military Affairs (OMA) and DPKO/OROLSI/Police Division (PD), in collaboration with Mission components, should review currently-deployed military and UNPOL formed units to determine needed mission-specific improvements in capability. After that, OMA and PD amend statements of requirements to reflect any needed changes and coordinate with T/PCCs to provide needed capabilities.  
| | DPKO should conduct in-mission assessments and provide mission-specific requirements and changes to prior requirements to OMA and PD promptly to allow for the development of amended capabilities. |
| MID-LONG TERM | DPKO should participate in determination of mission-specific military and police requirements. Assess current unit performance and needed changes. Tailor training for rotations to reflect new situations and needs. |

### Issue 9 – In-Mission Training and Readiness

- **The problem:** When personnel arrive at missions unprepared and under-equipped, they require additional training to be able to operate securely. Even units that arrive well-trained and well-equipped require practice to adapt to the situation and retain readiness to deter, counter, and mitigate threats. Yet, many contingents do not exercise the required skills, sometimes failing to respond properly to repel violent attacks. Also, 100% rotation of troops implies loss of knowledge on the situation, terrain, personal relationships with local police and armed forces, the local population, informants, intelligence, and perception of the operational environment. Frequent rotation (i.e. more than twice a year) also implies constant administrative measures that consume time that the contingent could use to train and operate. This loss of knowledge and lack of exercise can decrease readiness and expose the mission to attack.

- **What is already being done:** The review team learned of ad hoc in-mission initiatives, sometimes at Force Commander-level and sometimes at Sector HQ-level, to maintain and improve the skills required to uphold security.

| SHORT TERM: | Force commanders should require all troops to conduct a minimum amount of exercises for essential skills each month (e.g. firing a minimum number of rounds per month at the shooting range, ambush and counter-ambush exercises).  
| | New contingents should participate in school patrols, which should include activities such as night patrols and, where necessary, IED detection exercises.  
| | The United Nations should enforce its policies related to troop rotation whereby six months is the minimum rotation permitted. |
| MID-LONG TERM | The United Nations and TCCs should develop a rotation system whereby troops rotate on a 50% basis or keep at least 20% of the contingent with experience in the operational context. |
• **The problem:** Mobile convoys, convoy escorts, patrols and quick reaction forces represent the areas of highest fatalities from malicious acts. Many of these attacks occur in ambush situations. Poor preparation and discipline at static positions have on occasion allowed armed elements to surround the position and ambush at the opportune moment with little impediment. At the same time, bad road conditions, often-avoidable vehicle breakdown, convoy size, geography and other factors can make personnel a slow-moving target that is easily attacked. **Road conditions are related to ambushes, logistics, PoC, development, state authority, and UN security.** Bad roads facilitate ambushes against the UN and difficult access to act against armed groups hiding normally far from the UN bases and villages. Improvement in road conditions is significantly responsible for the defeat of armed groups. It is fundamental to increase UN security. Suggestion: UN should orient all the agencies and government supported NGOs to apply at least 20% of the budget in infrastructure independent of the nature of the organization.

• **What is already being done:** Generation and deployment of the Combat Convoy Battalion, a specialised unit for convoy escort given the risk of ambush and IED attack (see below), is underway. However, the generation of this unit has taken over one year, and there is no immediate expectation that it will be operational in the field.

| SHORT TERM: | • T/PCCs should ensure that pre-deployment training includes intense practice of ambush and counter-ambush techniques.  
• Sector commanders and contingent commanders should ensure that personnel dominate routes and surroundings, and deploy forward intelligence to anticipate threats. Critical points should be identified and great care exercised at these points.  
• The use of small drones is recommended. Especially in areas characterised by heavy vegetation, troops should operate on foot or with a combination foot/vehicles patrols.  
• Troops need to combine movement and occupation of ambush positions day and night so that hostile forces lose freedom of movement.  
• Missions should demand that contractors and troops demonstrate good maintenance of vehicles that will participate in convoys. |
| MID-LONG TERM | • Missions should use QIPs and UNCT funds and coordination to improve road infrastructure in high-risk areas.  
• Enhance pre-deployment and in-mission training related to ambush threat mitigation and ambush and counter-ambush techniques. |
The problem: MINUSMA is the peacekeeping mission with the highest fatality numbers due to IEDs, with the majority occurring during convoy operations. In 2017, the frequency of attacks and quantity of explosives used in IEDs have increased, and emplacement methods have become more effective. These trends will likely worsen in the future, and the spread of IED technology to other contexts is possible. Personnel are killed and seriously injured by IEDs when they lack the training, equipment, and discipline needed to detect IEDs and avoid an explosion. For example, Search and Detect (S&D) teams have located IEDs when deployed. However, they are sometimes not deployed at all or deployed without their equipment.

What is already being done: Since early 2015, UNMAS has been delivering a wide range of IED threat mitigation measures specifically targeted to convoy escort operations in the north of Mali. These measures are designed to bridge the gaps in preparedness of troops to deal with IED attacks. UNMAS assesses that such measures are adequate, but the challenge is achieving full use of these means by TCCs. Generation of additional Mine-Protected Vehicles for MINUSMA is underway.

Member States must ensure that pre-deployment training establishes IED mitigation skills and mindset of troops.

DPKO leadership should engage senior TCC military leadership on IED threat mitigation to emphasize the vital need to integrate IED mitigation tactics as a core military skill.

DPKO and Missions should ensure that counter-IED training continues in-mission; the initial patrols following deployment (e.g. the first five, or for the first month), should be “school patrols”, under the direct supervision of military engineers.

Mission leadership, sector commanders, battalion commanders, and convoy commanders must ensure that personnel enact IED threat mitigation measures during operations and convoy escort, including use of MPVs, deployment of medical teams and special ambulances, presence of EOD capacity, radio communication with bases and air support/helicopters.

DPKO and member states should ensure that UNMAS retains funding to continue providing its efforts in MINUSMA and to address future expansion of the IED threat.

DPKO should quicken the activation of the Combat Convoy Battalion or decide to take a different course of action, such as specialization of an existing contingent that is already escorting convoys.

TCCs/PCCs selected to be deployed in missions with IED risk should be fully

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14 Observation on training for IEDs from UNMAS (2017): Since July 2013, in Mali, UNMAS has recorded 458 IED incidents resulting in over 1,000 casualties - 256 killed and 809 injured. While MINUSMA troops - 29.7% - and Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) - 28.2% - are the most impacted, civilians are also substantively affected with 20.5% of the victims. Among the reasons for the high toll of casualties among uniformed personnel was their lack of preparedness to operate in an asymmetric and IED context.
LONG TERM  

| equipped with appropriate mine-protected vehicles (MPV) and include a small cell of military engineers who would supervise anti-IED planning/operations/procedures.  
| Missions and battalions should enhance intelligence capabilities for IED detection, including human intelligence.  
| Missions should acquire adequate technical means (e.g. tactical drones) to gather forward information ahead of convoys where appropriate. The effective use of such technology requires that in-depth skills such as information gathering and analysis be fully integrated Mission-wide.  

**Issue 12 - Mitigation of Attacks on Camps/Bases**

- **The problem:** Hostile elements have attacked the camps/bases in several peacekeeping missions, most recently in DRC, Mali and CAR. The second-highest cause of fatalities in MINUSMA is attacks on camps involving VBIEDs, guns and indirect fire. The defensive posture of personnel, in which they conduct limited activities outside the base, invites attack because it allows hostile elements to take positions close to bases/camps from which they can launch attacks by both direct- and indirect fire. The lack of overhead cover in particular increases vulnerability to indirect fire. Adequate sensor systems, walls, gates, and bunker installations are absent in some high-risk locations, increasing the possibility of fatalities and serious injuries.

- **What is already being done:** Troops have adopted a more proactive posture, and physical camp security has been improved at certain high-risk locations. In Kidal, Tessalit, Timbuktu, Menaka, Gao and Mopti (Mali), overhead protection of base facilities will be implemented, and accommodation layouts for personnel under UNDSS in the locations above have been redesigned. Within the Framework of the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping several pilot projects have been established for providing comprehensive sensor suites (radars, cameras, infrared and other sensors) for camp security at Bangui/MINUSCA and Kidal/MINUSMA. Other similar projects are planned for Gao (Mali). MINUSMA is also improving overhead protection of base facilities in Kidal, Tessalit, Timbuktu, Menaka, Gao and Mopti.

SHORT TERM:
- Sector Commanders and the Force Commander should stimulate a more proactive posture, in which personnel dominate the area surrounding the base/camp, through intelligence-oriented patrols in the range sufficient to deter and prevent attack (establish observation posts during the night using night vision equipment, laser aim, special weapons and ammunition, attack aggressors that seek to establish themselves including with special weapons/ammunition, establish posts outside the base/camp).
- Sector commanders and battalion commanders should demand that troops conduct basic soldiering activities to boost physical camp security (e.g. digging trenches, filling sandbags, cutting vegetation).
- Quick Reaction Force (QRF) should react to incidents inside and outside the camp, and maintain immediate readiness through daily practice.
Mission leadership should immediately ensure basic physical protection measures (gates, walls/fences, etc.) of camps in high-risk locations. Missions should review the effectiveness of existing physical protection measures and begin to build/replace where necessary. United Nations Headquarters should continue to support funding for the MINUSMA overhead cover effort, and MINUSMA should complete the project while involving occupational health and safety in the effort.

**MID-TERM**
- DPKO and DFS/ICTD should partner to establish an updated, standardized sensor suite.
- The United Nations and T/PCCs should ensure that pre-deployment training is conducted on protection of bases and establishment of security zones around the bases.
- Continue to support funding for the MINUSMA overhead cover effort.

**Issue 13 - Intelligence for the Security of Peacekeeping Personnel**

**The problem:** Intelligence is not functional and does not generate mission action against threats. Intelligence capability in higher fatality missions lacks a common conceptual approach resulting in a lack of tactical intelligence to support peacekeeping activities. Human intelligence is often absent. A lack of tactical intelligence, including due to an over-emphasis on high-tech intelligence collection methods with little tactical value, prevents leadership and personnel from detecting, avoiding, and countering threats. A bridge at the Mission level between intelligence, operations and strategic engagement is currently unclear. The “intelligence cycle” is incomplete, as personnel conduct operations in risky environments with little or no basis in intelligence. This raises the vulnerability of peacekeepers and contributes to death and injury from acts of violence.

**What is already being done:** Some missions possess capabilities, practices and structures for intelligence which could be built upon. DPKO-DFS approved a Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy in April 2017. In 2017 DPKO initiated an Intelligence Initiative (ongoing) that will provide a significantly improved mission tactical intelligence capability, working to address conceptual approach, training, specific resources and mindset. Yet despite these ongoing initiatives, few practical results have improved the security of personnel.

**SHORT TERM:**
- SRSGs and Force Commanders should demand that intelligence collected in a high-risk sector be shared with personnel planning and conducting operations there.
- As appropriate, missions should enhance cooperation with external actors (national security forces, parallel forces) on the collection and sharing of security-related intelligence.
- Missions should ensure that intelligence activities integrate uniformed and civilian components.
- Missions should build human intelligence, including by developing a
network of informants.

- Missions should contract interpreters who speak the local language and patrols should not operate without interpreters.
- Missions should make greater use of high-visibility, high impact programs (e.g. QIPs) in selected communities where security issues are of high concern, as a means to build local support and networks.
- Missions should phase out/ repatriate high-tech intelligence gathering sensors that are ill-suited to the operational environment and do not contribute to tactics/operations (including to improve security). For example, in some settings, smaller tactical drones that can move with convoys, patrols, etc. will be more useful than large UAV systems. Missions should also acquire other basic equipment for intelligence, such as high-quality cameras.
- TCCs should ensure that battalions have adequate number of intelligence units so that when battalions are split over different locations, each part of the battalion will have an intelligence unit embedded with it.

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<td>MOUs and SURs should require the inclusion of intelligence specialists and interpreters in military and police unit. Battalions require enough intelligence teams (at least 4) to overcome fragmentation of units across several sites and provide troops with timely and clear situational awareness.</td>
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**Issue 14 – Field Medical/Health Care System**

- **The problem:** The field medical system is essential to saving lives and limiting the severity of injuries when attacks occur, but capabilities are often inadequate and response time sometimes too slow to achieve good outcomes. First aid training is lacking, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC should be agile. Contingents are often embedded with inadequate medical capacity, medical personnel are seldom included in operational planning. Field hospitals/medical capacity sometimes suffer from a lack of capacity relative to demands. Battalions may also be fragmented, and each section may not have a medical team with it. These factors mean that lives that could be saved are sometimes lost, and injuries that could be alleviated are not. This is particularly urgent at the incident site and in the primary care facility (e.g. Level 1 hospital), as life-saving interventions will happen here.

- **What is already being done:** The Peacekeeping Section/Medical Services Division/DM put forth a project plan to address the key issues requiring addressing in the recommendation. Additionally, in DPKO, the CASEVAC SOP is under review.

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15 The project is divided into eight streams: 1) Implementation of the United Nations Buddy First Aid Course (UNBFAC) for all personnel; 2) Development and implementation of Combat Medics Training; 3) Development and implementation of CASEVAC Policy; 4) Standardisation of Health Care Quality and Patient safety in Level I Facilities; 5) Standardisation of Health Care Quality and Patient safety in Level II/III Facilities; 6) Implementation of the Health Risk Assessment: Implementation in all missions 7) Development of Aerial Medical Evacuation Team (AMET); and 8) Formation of a dedicated United Nations Medical Centre of Expertise.
| SHORT TERM: | • All personnel (civilian, military, police) in high-risk missions should complete a certification in first-aid.  
• TCCs should ensure pre-deployment training provides troops with expertise in first-aid, evacuation preparation, and Level 1 hospital procedures.  
• DPKO and TCCs should ensure technical clearance of military medical personnel before deployment. DPKO and TCCs should ensure medical units deploy with adequate training, equipment and, where necessary, interpretation.  
• Mission leadership, especially the Force Commander, Sector Commanders, and Battalion Commanders should ensure that medical services are included in planning and implementation of higher-risk operations/activities of all components and that convoys and long-range patrols have medical teams.  
• Missions should require that long-range patrols remain inside limits for medical evacuation by helicopter. Patrols and groups in operational activities must have secure communications with the base and helicopters.  
• Mission field offices should reinforce cooperation/coordination among on-site medical capacity, e.g. contingent-linked Level 1 hospitals and ambulances and ensure that mass casualty/emergency planning includes up-to-date mapping of all medical assets on-site.  
• DPKO and TCCs should generate air assets to allow high-risk missions to expand the coverage of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC, as well as helicopters with the emergency medical team and basic equipment for intensive medical treatment. Helicopters and crews should have night flight capability.  
• Mission leadership should ensure decentralised CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures to avoid delays. Mission leadership should immediately clarify the procedures for CASEVAC and decentralise the process so that decision-making and control of air assets rest with the Sector HQ. Sector Commander or Battalion commander, depending on the operational level of command and control of the operation, should be able to task air assets for evacuation. |
| MID-LONG TERM | • DPKO should ensure full implementation of all 8 workstreams (see footnote) of the Field Medical/Health System with a priority to high-risk missions.  
• DPKO and TCCs should include a tailored medical capability (including ambulances, doctors, nurses/paramedics) in statements of unit requirements suficient to support locations of civilian, military and police personnel. These should ensure that medical capability can support the activities and tactical concepts of operation of all components, including and especially when a battalion is deployed across several locations. Units should not have more detachments than the number of embedded medical teams.  
• DPKO should develop a concept to establish mobile Level 1 medical capacities (ambulances suited to operational environment – including armoured if needed – combat medics) capable of supporting higher-risk activities and operations (i.e. convoys, escorts, patrols, etc.).  
• The capacity of Level 1 hospitals should be increased. |
**Issue 15 - Mission Footprint**

- **The problem:** Mission deployment footprints should be problem-oriented, with a mass concentration of resources and means to neutralize and eliminate threats. A heavy mission footprint in high-risk environments places an immense burden on resources that inhibits operational effectiveness and puts personnel unnecessarily at risk. Establishing a mission presence in remote locations in vast countries requires large, slow-moving convoys to travel along poor road infrastructure with Force escort across long distances. Intense movement of long-range convoys facilitates attacks against the mission. About 90% of the capacity of the Force is being spent on securing convoys and conducting self-protection. In some cases, the mission footprint at a particular location may be too small to ensure security, and mission resources are expended in areas that do not require a heavy presence rather than sending personnel to use overwhelming force to deal with security issues. It is not advisable to deploy to separate locations contingents below company size.

- **What is already being done:** Programme criticality framework is in effect, permitting relocation of staff to safer duty stations, but this is a costly measure that does not necessarily enhance mandate implementation.

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<td>- Mission leadership and United Nations Headquarters should review mission footprint as part of planned review exercises, and undertake additional review processes where necessary.</td>
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<td>- Mission leadership should take measures to adjust mission footprint within discretionary staffing decisions to neutralize and eliminate threats. Troops should be concentrated to solve problems and not to have a national presence, such as a normal national army would.</td>
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<td>- Mission leadership and United Nations headquarters should take measures to adjust the mission concept.</td>
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**Issue 16 - Mutual Accountability**

- **The problem:** Fatalities are a consequence of deficiencies in training, equipment and performance. The UN and TCCs are responsible for training and authorizing deployment, and should therefore be held accountable for deficiencies.

- **What is already being done:** In a limited number of cases, the United Nations has refused to deploy ill-prepared troops.

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<td>- The United Nations should exercise its prerogative to refuse deployment of units that are not prepared for high-risk operational environments and initiate repatriation of troops that are at high risk of fatalities due to performance, command and control, and equipment.</td>
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• The United Nations should increase the premium paid to killed and seriously injured personnel.
• The United Nations should pledge to swiftly implement all measures in this report and hold leadership at Headquarters and in missions to account: security outcomes and operational robustness should be a standard feature of performance evaluations/assessments of senior leadership.

**Issue 17 - Peacekeeping Fatalities and Injuries Data**

- **The problem:** Peacekeepers fatalities data is considered an integral part of the Organisation’s data assets. A more precise analysis reveals significant variations and trends that may help identify the causes and help prevent future losses. However, no single data source can be considered the authoritative source of fatalities data.

- **What is already being done:** As an offshoot of the Improving Security Peacekeeping Project, in October 2017, the DPKO-DFS/OPCOS/PK-IMU conducted an information management technical assessment of peacekeeping fatalities data. The assessment concluded and recommended that the Organization keep the existing functional systems and instead create a fatalities database to act as the centralised source of the United Nations personnel, military and police fatalities data.

**SHORT TERM:**

- DPKO should create a fatalities and severe injuries database.

**Issue 18 - Contractor Fatalities and Injuries Data**

- **The problem:** While not within the Scope of this Project, the issue of contractor fatalities and injuries is important.

In peacekeeping missions, fatalities and injuries to vendor (contractor) employee are either not reported or reported in an ad hoc manner. As vendors provide numerous services (e.g. security guards, convoy drivers, aviation crews, etc.), lack of reporting adversely impacts the Headquarters and mission understanding of the total fatality and severe injury situation.

- **What is already being done:**

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16 DPKO-DFS/OCOS/PK-IMU Information Management Technical Assessment of Peacekeeping Fatalities Data [Caused by Malicious Act], October 2017.
MID-LONG TERM

- Include in all peacekeeping contracts a requirement for vendors to report to the mission all employee fatalities and severe injuries due to acts of violence and directly related to vendor activities supporting peacekeeping missions. Require missions to report such fatalities and injuries to Headquarters. Include this information in the recommended fatalities and injuries data mart.

Section IV

Proposed Projects

The Project Terms of Reference specifies that the report should propose follow-on projects for extra-budgetary funding from the Peace and Security Trust Fund. The proposals should stem from the report issues and recommendations and, if funded and implemented during 2018, should contribute to reducing fatalities from acts of violence.

The Project/Review team proposes the following Phase II projects for extra-budgetary funding during Phase II (2018) of the Improving Security Peacekeeping Project.

1. **Report Issue 14: Field Medical/Health System** - support the attainment of medical umbrella for all high-risk missions and reform of the medical/health system from the point of incident to Level 3 care. Lead Organization for further project development: Department of Management/Medical Services Division.

2. **Report Issues 7 and 8: T/PCC Pre-deployment Operational Readiness** - increase the unit capability to operate in modern hostile environments. Lead Organizations for further project development: Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Office of Military Affairs and Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions/Police Division.

4. **Cross-cutting Report Issue - Implementation of Basic Technology** - contingents lack basic technology needed to conduct operational activities against hostile actors and to collect tactical intelligence. Individual equipment (e.g. night-vision goggles), weapons (e.g. special weapons and ammunition), and vehicles (appropriate to the terrain and threat). This proposed project will identify required basic technology and propose methods to provide the required technology to T/PCCs.

**Section V**

**Summary and Way Ahead**

This report reviews fatalities and injuries due to acts of violence. It makes specific observations and recommendations in 18 issue areas which, if enacted, will reduce fatalities and injuries. The report also proposes four high-impact issues for potential funding as projects under the Peace and Security Trust Fund.

Successful implementation of this report’s recommendations and proposals require a strong partnership between the Secretariat and the Member States, especially T/PCCs. Therefore, the authors of this report recommend that the United Nations make this report available to the Member States and the public.

**Enactment of the recommendations requires strong and committed leadership at all levels from the Secretary-General to line supervisors and commanders.** It is essential to establish a senior governance body to oversee implementation of the recommendations and proposals. Such a body should comprise Secretariat senior leadership and one or two external experts. Secondly, a sub-body of the governance structure needs to assess the actual performance on the ground of implementation of recommendations and proposals. This sub-body should also include external persons with knowledge of United Nations peacekeeping and the current issues. If governance and assessment mechanisms are established and recommendations implemented, fatalities and injuries will lessen. Otherwise, the fatalities trend will likely worsen.

*We need to change the way we are doing business.*

*Inaction kills our people.*
Photograph: Night Patrol, MINUSMA Senegal Contingent, Gao, Mali, 2017