PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise
United Nations Security Council Resolution
RESOLUTION 1544 (20XX)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8000th meeting on 22 M+3 20XX

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana,

Expressing its utmost concerns at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).


Commending the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the Continent Regional Coalition, the United Nations Secretary-General, and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Carana,

Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the authorities of Carana, to assist the restoration of Carana’s integrity,

Stressing the need to restore democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly against the civilian population, and urging the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure the
continued promotion and protection of human rights,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant humanitarian crisis in the region and over the insecurity that hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons, Emphasizing the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and United Nations personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

Mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Taking note of the Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 31 May xxxx and urging all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Welcoming the human rights commitments contained in that Agreement,

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new Government of National Reconciliation.

Taking note of the listing of Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) and reiterating its readiness to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Noting that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasising the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region to this end, as well as the need for coordination of United Nations efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by transnational crime in the region, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism and strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions,
Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, to stability in the 8th Continent sub-region, and to the peace process for Carana,

Commending the Continent Regional Coalition, as well as the Secretary-General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Carana, and encourages to maintain coordination in support of the stabilization of the situation in Carana, including the national political dialogue and electoral process,

Welcoming the deployment of the CRCAC to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the measures to restore order and national unity in Carana, including the adoption of the Kalari Peace Agreement;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the CRC, to support all dimensions of the Kalari Peace Agreement, with a view to its swift implementation;

3. Urges the Government of National Reconciliation in Carana to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections as soon as technically possible, stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of elections;

4. Decides to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC), further decides that the authority be transferred from CRCAC to UNAC on 1 M + 3 2016 at which point UNAC shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraph 7 below, for an initial period of 12 months and requests the Secretary-General to include in UNAC, in close coordination with CRC, CRCAC military personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana;

6. Decides that UNAC will consist of up to 6,800 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 160 staff officers, up to 1250 police personnel, including formed police units, and up to 200 corrections officers, to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component;

7. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:
Support for the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement:

(a) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation of Carana to implement swiftly the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement towards the restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Carana;

(b) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

(c) To observe and monitor the implementation of the peace agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;

(d) To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties military forces;

(e) To develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall implementation of a voluntary disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

(f) To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDRR programme;

(g) To provide security to the highest priority locations within capabilities and areas of deployment;

Protection of Civilians:

All necessary action, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians.

Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:
(h) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;

(i) To monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana and to fight impunity, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

Support for Security reform:

(j) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

(k) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

(l) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

(m) To assist the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in preparing for national elections scheduled for no later than end 20xx;

(n) To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) conjunction with other international partners in
developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

8. Demands that all the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfill their obligations under the Kalari Peace Agreement;

9. Reiterates its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilisation of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;

10. Authorizes UNAC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capabilities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraph 7 and requests UNAC’s civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 7 above;

11. Authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of UNAC until the end of UNAC’s mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of UNAC when under imminent and serious threat upon the request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Carana and to coordinate reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 24 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its commencement;

12. Encourages UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to support the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees and IDPs;

13. Calls upon all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to IDPs and refugees.

14. Recognizes the importance of the protection of children in armed conflict, in accordance with its resolution 1379 (2004) and related resolutions;
15. 

Demands that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Caranan population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;

16. 

Requests the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

17. 

Reaffirms the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000) and in particular women’s rights under the Constitution to fully participate in the political, economic and social spheres of Caranan life, recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Caranan parties to actively address these issues;

18. 

Calls on the international community to consider how it might help future economic development aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;

19. 

Stresses the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio station to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;

20. 

Calls on the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDRR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and rebel groups MPC and CISC, to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations, and donor nations, in the implementation of a DDRR programme;

21. 

Requests the Carana Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of force agreement dated 9 October 1993 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

22. 

Calls upon all parties to co-operate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety,
security, and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, together with associated personnel, throughout Carana;

23. Call on the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDRR programme, and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;

24. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Carana and the implementation of the mandate of UNAC, to report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution and then every three months on the security situation, the priority political elements, relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as a review of troop level, force generation and deployment of all UNAC constituent elements;

25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Mission Concept of Operations

United Nations
The Mission Concept of Operations would be drafted by the Carana Peacekeeping Mission Planning Team as part of the Integrated and Assessment Planning process. The draft mission concept would be presented for approval to the USGs of DPKO and DFS after the mandate has been issued by the Security Council. It uses the template from Reference A below.

**UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

References:

B. UN Integrated Strategy on Carana (notional)
F. UN Security Council Resolution 1544 (draft).

Summary: This Mission Concept defines the overall approach, priorities and sequencing of the mandated tasks of the UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) during its start-up period and beyond. The main focus of UNAC in the initial period will be (a) the deployment and establishment of the Mission and (b) supporting the implementation of Kalari Peace Agreement in accordance with UNSCR 2300

**A. CONTEXT**

1. On 19 May 2017, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement, called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), was signed between the country’s government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.
2. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR). It commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured national armed force. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity, repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict. This KPA has an ambitious timeline for its implementation and UNAC will not be operational in Carana until several months after the agreement. The success of the KPA depends on continued political agreement between the parties and the confidence to DDR. UNACs early military presence in the areas were MPC face CDF and CISC face CDF will reduce the risk of confrontation, disarmament is unlikely before this time and thus subsequent events will be delayed. Elections within a year is a challenge as preconditions include sufficient security throughout Carana, UNAC will advise GNR on this issue and be prepared for postponement.

3. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who have provided the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire. CRC are likely to be supportive of UNAC, can influence the GNR and contribute to regional security. The UN's Regional Representative will lead on coordination and cooperation with CRC informing UNAC.

4. GNR had already invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rímosa border with a 6-month mandate to counter Islamist activities. Op INTREPIDE will remain a separate Mission but UNAC will need to coordinate closely and prepare for the security vacuum left by their departure.

5. The ceasefire has largely held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict. The GNR, while mostly united, is struggling with its responsibilities, and there are security vacuums in the country. There are areas controlled by Carana National Police, Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and state security agencies; areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC; and about a third of the country un ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority barely function. UNAC cannot address all these issues in the initial deployment and priority must be given to maintaining political consent for the adoption of the KPA and avoiding a return to conflict.

6. Crime rates are high. Organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, GALASI, are under the control of youth gangs. In Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police. In addition to the military conflict there are longer term law and order challenges, a continued security vacuum will enable organized criminal groups to become stronger and harder to tackle in the long run. Efforts to support Carana in tackling these issues need to be identified early.
Mission CONOPS

7. In Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving splinter elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA). The situation in MPC areas and CISC areas are substantially different and need individual approaches. Leppko province is likely to be an enduring security issue and will additionally involve engagement with Rimosa.

8. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 100,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. Some areas are not accessible to humanitarian agencies due to the security situation and UNAC has a role in enabling this access. UNAC will need to work closely with the Humanitarian sector to identify areas where we can assist. The return of refugees and IDPs to their homes will need to be carefully managed, and will be a factor in election planning.

9. The countries surrounding Carana are part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Samosa are traditionally good, however those with Katsi have been strained as Carana has accused Katsi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the CISC. The UN Regional representative will lead in this area but his office and UNAC will need a coordinated information strategy. UNAC will be unable to focus on border issues during the initial stages of the Mission but should support GNR in planning for future engagement.

B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

10. **Consent of the Parties.** UNAC has been invited by GNR and the parties to the conflict. UNAC will work with GNR, at the strategic and operational level, to deliver security and stability for Carana. At the tactical level there are likely to be events where parties to the KPA try to restrain UNACs Freedom of Action, these will need to be tackled carefully with direction from UNAC HQ.

11. **Impartiality.** UNAC will be impartial, particularly in its actions in supporting the ceasefire and separation of forces. This means being even handed but being prepared to act robustly (politically and militarily) to any violations.

12. **Non Use of Force except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate.** The ROE and DUF will make it clear how the military and police components can utilize force to achieve the mandated tasks.

13. **Other Success Factors.** Promotion of national and local ownership is key to the UN’s success in Carana and is a guideline for both UNAC and the UN
Country Team. UNAC is supporting GNR both at the national and local level and must listen to their leadership and support their intent.

C. OVERALL MISSION OBJECTIVES

14. **UN Strategic Objective in Carana.** The overall objective of the UN in Carana is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united CARANA, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which IDPs and refugees can return home in safety and in dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.

15. **UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.** UNACs plan to support the UN’s Strategic Objective in Carana is through the achievement of the following objective:

   a. **To support the implementation of the KPA:**

      KPA irreversible as MPC and CISC no longer military entities, successful elections conducted and legitimate political processes recognized as the way to improve the conditions of all people in Carana.

   b. **To Protect Civilians:**

      Civilians able to move freely within Carana. Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs at a level that can be neutralized by Carana security forces.

   c. **To support Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:**

      Security situation sufficient that UNCT and IO/NGOs can access all parts of Carana.

   d. **To support Security Sector Reform (SSR):**

      CDF, CNP and other security institutions on a path to being ethnically representative, effective and accountable security institutions, that operate under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights.

   e. **To support the wider implementation of the Peace Process.**

      Through dialogue and engagement and supporting the creation of a protective environment UNAC has enabled national and local stake holders to commit to the peace process
16. **UNAC End State.** A democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens and enable peacebuilding activities to continue.

D. **KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS**

17. **Assumptions.**

a. The continued cooperation of the GNR and the continued consent of the parties to UNAC’s deployment.

b. Sufficient access to Carana ports and airheads to enable force flow and sustainment.

c. That Field Support elements can deploy and sustain to meet the Mission CONOPS.

18. **Risks and Mitigating Action.**

a. **The parties return to conflict before UNAC deploys and there is no peace to keep.** In this event UNAC will halt its deployment and await DPKO direction.

b. **The parties return to conflict while UNAC is deploying / deployed.** UNAC will withdraw from confrontation areas but seek to contain the movement of MPC Eastwards and CISC Northwards in order to protect civilians. UNAC will not directly support CDF.

E. **MISSION PHASES – CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

19. The CONOPS covers the initial deployment in tasks in detail and the remaining phases in outline. There are four phases:

- **Initial Deployment:** (- M+90). Priority: Early influence on KPA. Benchmarks include: Mission HQ and Field Offices established; UNAC leading JCC and JLTs; Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups; Police presence in Galasi. DDR and SSR outline plans agreed.

- **Expansion:** (M+91-M+180). Priority: Greater security presence throughout Carana. Benchmarks include: Military Component at 80% of authorised strength with reach throughout Carana; Disarmament has begun; armed groups
are cantoned, and 70% of CDF are in barracks; Humanitarian access to 60% of Carana. Election planning commenced.

Consolidation: (M+181 onwards until output achieved). Priority: Conditions set for Elections
Benchmarks include: Sufficient security for elections; military aspects of the KPA irreversible; MPC and CISC fully demobilized; FOM throughout Carana. Humanitarian access to 60% of Carana.

Capacity Building and Drawdown (tbc). Priority: CNP able to provide security throughout Carana. While capacity building will have begun earlier, Mission resources are now available to make this activity a main effort and implement the planning conducted earlier. Priority will be on CNP capability as this will drive the rate of drawdown. Bench marks to follow.

20. Phase 1 – Initial Deployment:

a. During the Initial Deployment Phase, UNAC will establish its HQ in GALASI in order to strengthen dialogue with GNR, government departments and national security bodies. It will assume the chair of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) in accordance with the KPA and support the GNR’s DDR programme.

b. It will establish close coordination and sharing of information with the UNCT and implement a Senior Leaders Forum.

c. The first UNAC Field Offices will be established in FARON and MUKA to engage with local authorities including the leadership of MPC and CISC.

d. After establishing a security presence in GALASI, the Military Component is to support the GNR to ensure that the military aspects of the KPA are implemented. It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of the JLTs so that the JCC has the situational awareness to respond quickly to any threats to the KPA. A return to civil war is the greatest threat to civilians. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary respond to breaches of the military aspects of the KPA, initially in areas where MPC and CDF and CISC and CDF are most likely to clash (hot spots) but elsewhere as resources allow. Thereafter the Military Component will operate where it is best able to support the Mission Objectives.
e. CRCAC observers, who meet UN Standards, will be re-designated to UNAC as soon as UNAC’s capabilities permit.

f. Protection of Civilians is UNACs priority task and against which the Mission will be judged. UNAC will conduct actions across Tier 1 (Dialogue and Engagement), Tier II (Physical Protection) and Tier III (Establishing a Protective Environment) to mitigate the risks to civilians.

g. UNAC will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian agencies to continue to identify areas where UNAC may support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to the delivery of humanitarian aid.

h. UNAC will support the GNR’s SSR (identified in the KPA) in particular the restructuring of the police force and the formation of a new and restructured Carana military, both of these tasks will be in cooperation with the interested organisations and states.

i. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will include assisting the GNR to establish national authority throughout the country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections and assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

F. PRIORITIES

21. In Phase 1 and onwards UNAC will focus on the following priorities:

a. Protection of UN personnel and facilities. This is the top priority but for the police and military components it must be accepted that some risk must be taken in order to defend our mandate and protect civilians. This risk must be managed through thorough understanding the operational environment, planning, preparation and coordination.

b. Protection of Civilians. At all times it is our responsibility to Protect Civilians all UNAC activities should have this as a central purpose. In the first instance the best way to protect civilians is to prevent a return to conflict. It is accepted that we have limited means and in Phase 1 a limited presence, this places an increased requirement for establishing and maintaining situational awareness so that capabilities can be in the right place at the right time to pre-empt threats to civilians.
c. **Monitoring the Ceasefire and Disengagement.** This is the key activity in the KPA. Accurate and timely reporting of incidents to the JCC will enable early resolution. The military component must be prepared to deter, pre-empt and respond to incidents.

d. **Dialogue and Engagement.** At Mission level and in the field we must constantly reach out to engage with government and other key actors, including the leaders of MPC and CISC. This engagement needs to be managed and coordinated so that the Mission speaks in one voice and is seen to be robust, impartial and here to help.

e. **Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance.** UNAC will reach out humanitarian and Human Rights organisations, primarily through the DSRSG (HC) but also at Field Office level to identify how our capabilities can assist their operations. In Phase 1 we will be limited by our capacity and the need to focus on the confrontation areas but our wider deployment in Phase 2 should be influenced by the humanitarian and Human Rights priorities for access.

f.

G. **CORE OUTPUTS**

22. The core outputs necessary to the achievement of the Objectives in Section D are at Annex E.

H. **STRATEGIC GUIDANCE TO COMPONENTS**

23. **General.** Cross pillar planning, thematic coordination and coordination with Carana authorities and the UN Country Team apply to all components so that UNAC delivers its mandate effectively. COS UNAC will detail the HQ coordination mechanisms.

24. **Civilian Component.** The Component will divide between DSRSG(Political) and DSRSG (HC/RC) to be more effective in delivering the mandate. The priority in Phase 1 will be to identify and engage with government and local leaders to establish situational awareness, explain UNAC’s purpose and build a level of trust which is essential for successful interactions.

25. **Military Component.** The initial effort is to be in ‘policing’ the ceasefire and disengagement. If this is effective it will create the confidence in the UN presence that will encourage the armed groups that they will be protected from the CDF when they disarm. The likely areas of confrontation will be the main effort until these groups have disarmed, thereafter resources can be tasked to other priorities in Carana.
26. **Police Component.** The initial effort is to be in Galsi to support the CNP in combatting criminal activity in the capital. Thereafter police capabilities should be provided for Muka and Faron to support existing local police capacities. HOPC is to identify how best the Police Component may support the planning and implementation of Police Reform and capacity building noting that this may require additional specialized capabilities on Phase 3 and 4.

I. **RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**

27. The Mission Structure, Military Resources, Police Resources and Support Concept are at Annexes A-D.

ANNEXES

A. UNAC HQ Structure  
B. Military Resources  
C. Police Resources  
D. Support Concept (not included)  
E. Core Outputs for Each Objective
In addition: Field Offices at Galasi, Muka and Faron
MILITARY RESOURCES

UNAC will consist of up to 9,100 United Nations military personnel, including up to 200 military observers and 265 staff officers

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<td>2</td>
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POLICE RESOURCES

Total Strength: 1250 police personnel plus 200 Corrections Officers

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<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Corrections Officers</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND OUTPUTS (extract)

To support the implementation of the KPA:

KPA irreversible as MPC and CISC no longer military entities, successful elections conducted and legitimate political processes recognized as the way to improve the conditions of all people in Carana.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>Phase 1 Initial Deployment</th>
<th>Phase 2 Expansion</th>
<th>Phase 3 Consolidation</th>
<th>Phase 4 Capacity Building and Withdrawal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNR implement DDR</td>
<td>Plan agreed by GNR and the parties</td>
<td>50% Disarmed 20% Demobilised 10% Reintegrated</td>
<td>MPC and CISC volunteers for CDF identified</td>
<td>100% Disarmed 80% Demobilised 40% Reintegrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPC complying with KPA</td>
<td>&lt; 5 major Ceasefire violations MPC agree DDR plan</td>
<td>50% of MPC disarmed &gt;20% demobilized 15% Reintegrated</td>
<td>100% of MPC disarmed &gt;80% Demobilised / moved to CDF &lt;20% cantoned</td>
<td>100% Disarmed 100% Demobilised 80% Reintegrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC complying with KPA</td>
<td>&lt; 5 major Ceasefire violations</td>
<td>50% of CISC disarmed &gt;20% demobilized 7% Reintegrated</td>
<td>100% of MPC disarmed &gt;80% Demobilised / moved to CDF &lt;20% cantoned</td>
<td>100% Disarmed 0% cantoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free and fair Elections</td>
<td>GNR commit to free speech and creation of political parties</td>
<td>GNR have election plan (including logistics)</td>
<td>Election conducted in line with international standards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To Protect Civilians:

Civilians able to move freely within Carana. Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs at a level that can be neutralized by Carana security forces.
## Mission CONOPS

### OUTPUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Deployment</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Capacity Building and Withdrawal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian FOM within Carana</th>
<th>% area by Province</th>
<th>% area by Province</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in illegal armed groups in Carana</td>
<td>Number of armed groups in Carana</td>
<td>Number of armed groups in Carana</td>
<td>Within national capacities to neutralise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in Criminal Gangs</td>
<td>% reduction in incidents in Galasi</td>
<td>% reduction in incidents in Galasi</td>
<td>% reduction in incidents in Galasi</td>
<td>Within national capacities to neutralise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### To support Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

Security situation sufficient that UNCT and IO/NGOs can access all parts of Carana.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial Deployment</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Capacity Building and Withdrawal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Humanitarian Access | Fellari, Guthar, Hana and Karin provinces | + 60% Koloni, 80% Mahbek and 50% of Leppko provinces | All provinces | All provinces |

### To support Security Sector Reform (SSR):

CDF, CNP and other security institutions on a path to being ethnically representative, effective and accountable security institutions, that operate under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
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<th>Phase 4</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Capacity Building and Withdrawal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GNR implement SSR</th>
<th>Plans agreed by parties and funded</th>
<th>International donors secured</th>
<th>Security budget for FY agreed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military implement SSR</td>
<td>CDF new structure and estate agreed</td>
<td>Surplus members of CDF identified and redundancy package agreed</td>
<td>MPC and CISC volunteers mustered as CDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quotas allocated for MPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>CDF surplus departed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission CONOPS</td>
<td>and CISC</td>
<td>Plan for implementing CDF new structure etc agreed and funded</td>
<td>CDF in new structure Training started in new structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police implement SSR</td>
<td>CNP new structure and estate agreed</td>
<td>Plan for implementing CNP new structure etc agreed and funded CNP in 40% of Carana</td>
<td>CNP in 100% of Carana CNP in new structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison and Correction Service SSR</td>
<td>Review Prisons and Corrections service with GNR</td>
<td>Implement recommendations of review</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**To support the wider implementation of the Peace Process:**

Through dialogue and engagement and supporting the creation of a protective environment UNAC has enabled national and local stakeholders to commit to the peace process.

**OUTPUTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
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</table>

To follow
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

Military Component Concept of Operations

United Nations
FORCES HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN CARANA
(UNAC)

References:
A. Security Council Resolution 1544 (20xx) [Not attached]
B. Kalari Peace Agreement signed on 23 July 2006 [Not attached]
C. Report of Secretary-General on situation in Carana (S/2006/195) [Not attached]
D. UNAC Force Structure (Annex A)
E. UNAC Force Deployment Plan (Annex B)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. ASSUMPTIONS

In preparing this Concept of Operations, the following assumptions were made:

a. Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC), Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) will respect the Kalari Peace Agreement, observe a total cessation of hostilities and provide information on their forces. The PDC and Maheng Dar Party (MDP) will subsequently agree to join in the peace process.

b. The Government of Carana will provide necessary security at ports and create soft landing conditions for the UNAC Force.

c. The parties completed the Kalari Peace Agreement, which will lead to a newly elected Government.

d. Carana’s neighbours will respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

e. The International Community will continue its support and commitment to the achievement of the desired end-state — lasting peace and stability in Carana.
2. CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS

a. **Constraints:** UNAC force capabilities will be expected to support the UN and national police efforts whenever requested to bring criminal and rogue elements in Carana under control.

b. **Restraints:** No UNAC military operations will be allowed in any of the countries adjacent to Carana.

3. MISSION

UNAC Force is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in Carana in accordance to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

4. EXECUTION

a. **COMMANDER’S INTENT**

We will focus our efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Carana. As a first priority in Carana, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control.

To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II)

Law and order issues will impact significantly on the process of establishing a safe environment for all. Limitations in the capability of the international police force in UNAC, dictate the need for us to coordinate closely with and vigorously support it in certain circumstances. Peaceful resolution of all military-related issues is our objective.

b. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**
(1) **Phases:** UNAC military operations will be broken down into the following phases:

(a) Phase 1 – Deployment

(b) Phase 2 – Establish secure environment

(c) Phase 3 – Maintain secure environment, protect civilians from physical violence and support other mission-mandated tasks

(d) Phase 4 – Transition

(e) Phase 5 – Exit

(2) The UNAC force’s main effort will be to create, as quickly as possible, the conditions necessary for all our peacekeeping partners to conduct their tasks in a safe and secure environment. Force assets and efforts will be initially concentrated on the more difficult situation found in the NW of Carana and S where the CISC elements and organized criminal groups will be the biggest challenge.

(3) Humanitarian conditions in Carana, particularly for the displaced, are very poor. Within capabilities and security operational demands, UNAC forces are to assist agencies dealing with those in dire need. Close coordination with those agencies will be essential to ensure military assets are used judiciously and as a last resort.

(4) Law and order in Carana is directly linked to the issue of security. Close cooperation with the UNAC and national police performing law-and-order tasks, will be essential, as will the need to conduct joint military/police operations.

(6) Use of military force must be a last resort in all situations. Our objective remains to resolve all situations peacefully.

(7) **End-State**

(a) The end-state for UNAC force operations will be reached when we have done the following:

(i) Created a safe and secure environment in Carana — one conducive to a stable civil society,
(ii) Established the relationships necessary with all military factions to transition to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, and

(iii) The subsequent development of a representative national military force in Carana.

c. TASKS

(1) Phase 1 – Deploy and establish essential liaison in Sectors

(2) Phase 2 – Tasks

(a) Sector 1

(i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector

(ii) Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians

(iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with MDP and PDC forces

(iv) Assist UNAC police with law-and-order issues

(v) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts

(vi) Monitor major border-crossing areas for arms smuggling and paramilitary support activities.

(vii) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities

(viii) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(b) Sector 2
(i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector

(ii) **Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians**

(iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with paramilitary forces

(iv) Assist UNAC civilian police with law-and-order issues

(v) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts

(vi) Monitor major border-crossing areas for paramilitary support activities

(vii) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities

(viii) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(c) **Sector 3**

(i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector

(ii) Generate a safe and secure environment with an emphasis on Protection of Civilians

(iii) Monitor activities of factional forces

(iv) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with factional paramilitary forces

(v) Assist UNAC civilian police with law-and-order issues

(vi) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts

(vii) Monitor major border-crossing areas for arms smuggling and paramilitary support activities
(viii) Be prepared to act on orders to detach up to two Infantry Companies (Coys) Operational Control (OPCON) to UNAC Force HQ

(ix) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities

(x) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(i) Establish a UN military presence throughout Sector

(ii) Generate a safe and secure environment

(iii) Establish Military Coordination Committees at sector and unit level with paramilitary forces

(iv) Within capabilities, provide coordinated emergency assistance to humanitarian efforts

(v) Within capabilities, provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities

(vi) Encourage respect for Human Rights in paramilitary elements

(e) Force Reserve

(i) Be ready to reinforce Sectors on order

(ii) Establish liaison with the UN police and local police for crowd control tasks

(f) Military Observers

As directed by Sector Senior Military Observers, assigned United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) teams are to assist, as appropriate, in establishing continuous observation of key areas for potential clashes between the former warring factions, and a military presence throughout their sectors.

(3) Phase 3

(a) All Elements
(i) Maintain appropriate presence and security operations with an emphasis on Civilians at risk

(ii) Be prepared to, when directed,

- Support the DDR process
- Conduct disarmament operations
- Provide a secure environment for the election process and provide protection in cooperation with national security forces to designated person or groups
- Coordinate closely with UNAC Police to support DDR and Elections
- Support and advise the training and establishment of the Carana Armed Force (CDF), as needed

(4) Phase 4 – Phased handover of security responsibilities to Carana Armed Forces (CDF and National Police)

(5) Phase 5 – Redeploy to home stations

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. UNAC Force and Sector HQs – See UNAC Force Structure (Annex A)
b. Sectors and Boundaries – See UNAC Force Deployment (Annex B)
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Force Commander
Order of Operations

United Nations
SITUATION

a. General Political and Strategic Situation. On 19 May 2006, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), Ref A, was signed between the country’s government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.

i. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured armed forces. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.

ii. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who provided an Observer Mission called the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to observe the implementation of the KPA. Additionally the GNR invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDÉ, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosa border to counter Islamist extremism.

iii. UNSCR 2300 (2015), Ref B, authorizes an integrated mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement the provisions of the KPA. CRCAC military personnel will be incorporated within UNAC but not Op INTRÉPIDÉ.
iv. The ceasefire has held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.

v. The GNR is struggling with its responsibilities and there are security vacuums. Even when in power the previous government struggled to provide law and order outside the rebel held areas. Police presence is very low, they are under-resourced and were heavily politicized under the previous regime. So there are areas still controlled by the regime, areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority have ceased to exist. Crime rates are high, organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs, in Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police and in Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).

vi. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 1000,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas.

vii. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.

b. General Military Situation and Assessment of Armed Groups.

i. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC and the government Carana Defence Forces (CDF) have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made. While no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

ii. Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its CDF counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local population in
its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in Alur and following the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre for the region as the MPC take over government and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran ethnicities although it is now developing a political platform on which to campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters, since the ceasefire 5000 have returned home but are on short notice to return to their formations if required.

Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR and participate in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic government and return to political and military confrontation with the Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces from Carana.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

ii. Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population, due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately targeted Tatsis in the Southern region. The CISC also regularly abducts civilians to bolster its ranks. Its area of influence is confined to Leppko Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations or its organisational capability, CISC will support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of law and order into Leppko Province. Due to a record of CISC atrocities,
few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF, those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim populations.

Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable. CISC resumes operations against Carana forces in order to allow it the freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op INTRÉPIDE in the SW of Leppko Province. Some elements are likely to be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be increased accordingly.

iv. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area of Akkabar, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and have also attacked government institutions. Although not and armed group, the miners have links to criminal cartels are a major destabilising influence in Hanno Province.

c. Government Security Forces. These security forces, while national, have developed over nearly 30 years of government by President Ogavo into Caran dominated entities and no longer representative of the country. The KPA has identified their reform as an essential part of peace.

i. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF is the state security apparatus and has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). Prior to the KPA, the chiefs of the service reported direct to the president. The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few, un-operational light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army, which equipped with light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, Artillery Guns and Mortars, Missile Launchers and Anti-Aircraft Guns. Some of this equipment is very old and much is in considerable need of repair. The CDF have maintained their positions after the ceasefire with four battalions opposite the MPC in the West and three facing the CISC in the South-West. The battalions in the South West have a history of perpetuating acts of politicide, ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations.
**Assessment:** The CDF are too Caran dominated to be considered an impartial force. As the national force, they are not required to disarm within the terms of the KPA, but they need be to be closely monitored, particularly in Leppko Province. The reduction in the numbers of soldiers currently in the CDF, to make way for the entry of MPC and CISC combatants and the reform of the CDF to become an multi-ethnic is likely to create its own tensions and will need to be planed carefully with the Carana government.

ii. **Presidential Guard.** The Presidential Guard is approximately 1500 strong, based in Galasi and fiercely loyal to President Ogavo. The President has been in hiding since April 2015, accompanied by elements of the Guard.

**Assessment:** The Presidential Guard elements remaining in Galasi are not part of the CDF and are potential spoilers – particularly if President Ogavo, indicted by the ICC and the GNR, reappears.

iii. **Carana National Police (CNP).** The Police consists of the CNP who are largely located in population centres and report to the Ministry of Interior, and the Gendarmerie in the rural areas who report to the Ministry of Defence and also have responsibility for border security – both have been traditional seen as enforces of Ogavo’s repressive regime and as such disliked and not trusted by much of the population. There are 10,000 CNP and Gendarmerie, although numbers have decreased through desertions and assassinations by anti-Ogavo elements. The Police are ill-trained, poorly paid, ill equipped and have bad morale.

**Assessment:** The CNP and Gendarmerie are very unlikely to be accepted into MPC or CISC controlled areas and a very different police force will be required if it is to acceptable throughout Carana.

d. **Friendly and Cooperating Organisations.**

i. **CRC and CRCAC.** The CRC will continue to support the KPA and endeavour to restrain any unsupportive actions by Katasi and Rimosa. The CRCAC military members will be subsumed into UNAC provided they meet the UN standards.

ii. **Op INTRÉPIDE.** The French mission terminates after 6 months. UNAC will need to establish liaison and coordination in preparation for assuming control of their Area of Responsibility.

iii. **UN Country Team (UNCT).** UNDP lead the country team, which is based in Galasi. The UNCT are represented in most parts of Carana but due to the security situation they are unable to access some areas to conduct a needs assessment and then provide support.
iv. **NGOs and ICRC.** A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women’s issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), are present in Galasi, Corma and Alur.

e. **United Nations Direction.** The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. The tasks for UNAC are to:

- Support the implementation of the KPA
- Protect civilians including humanitarians and human rights defenders
- Support humanitarian and Human Rights assistance
- Support Security reform
- Support the implementation of the peace process including elections

Mission end-state is a democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces sufficiently able to protect all its civilians and where human rights are respected.

2. MISSION

UNAC Force is to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in Carana in accordance to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

3. EXECUTION

a. **COMMANDER’S INTENT**

We will focus our efforts on creating safe and secure conditions throughout Carana. As a first priority in Carana, every possible effort must be made to bring the parties to the conflict under control.
To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II)

Law and order issues will impact significantly on the process of establishing a safe environment for all. Limitations in the capability of the international police force in UNAC, dictate the need for us to coordinate closely with and vigorously support it in certain circumstances. Peaceful resolution of all military-related issues is our objective.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Sector Commander Warning Order

United Nations
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC)

SECTOR 2 HQ

WARNING ORDER (WARNO) 01/ 20xx

References:

A. UNSCR 1544
B. OPORD FHQ
C. Deployment Maps

1. SITUATION

a. General Political and Strategic Situation. On 19 May 2006, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement called the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA), Ref A, was signed between the country’s government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.

   i. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire, the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), and commits to elections within a year, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured armed forces. The GNR replaces the largely one party, one ethnicity repressive governance of President Ogavo whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.

   ii. The KPA was brokered by the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) who provided an Observer Mission called the CRC Assistance Mission to Carana (CRCAC) to observe the implementation of the KPA. Additionally the GNR invited a French force, Op INTRÉPIDE, to deploy to SW Carana on the Rimosa border to counter Islamist extremism.
iii. UNSCR 2300 (2015), Ref B, authorizes an integrated mission, the UN Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) to assist the GNR to implement the provisions of the KPA. CRCAC military personnel will be incorporated within UNAC but not Op INTREPID.

iv. The ceasefire has held although the forces have not significantly withdrawn leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict.

v. The GNR is struggling with its responsibilities and there are security vacuums. Even when in power the previous government struggled to provide law and order outside the rebel held areas. Police presence is very low, they are under-resourced and were heavily politicized under the previous regime. So there are areas still controlled by the regime, areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority have ceased to exist. Crime rates are high, organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs, in Akkabar there is open conflict between miners and the police and in Leppko province there is radicalized and sectarian violence involving elements of the CISC but also uncontrolled armed groups (not party to the KPA).

vi. There is a significant humanitarian situation. There are an estimated 100,000 refugees and 1000,000 IDPs. Most IDPs have fled to the coastal cities and are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns with inadequate health and sanitation. Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas.

vii. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the CRC. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, however those with Katasi have been strained as Carana accused Katasi of supporting the rebel MPC. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Lassi Liberation Front, having loose links with the Combatants.

b. General Military Situation and Assessment of Armed Groups.

i. Following the signing of the KPA, the MPC, CISC and the government Carana Defence Forces (CDF) have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made. While no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-
signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

ii. Movement Patriote de Carana (MPC). The MPC is a well-structured and efficient military opposition that has achieved some local success over the CDF and has appeared better prepared than many of its CDF counterparts. It has gained increasing support from the local population in its area of influence. It currently has no aspirations beyond the western provinces. The official HQ of MPC is in Alur and following the ceasefire, this has increased in importance and become a basic administrative centre for the region as the MPC take over government and basic administrative functions providing some basic needs and security for the population in the West. However, the MPC has no coherent political strategy other than the removal of the Ogavo government (now achieved) and better representation for non-Caran ethnicities although it is now developing a political platform on which to campaign in the elections. The MPC has a total strength of around 10,000 fighters, since the ceasefire 5000 have returned home but are on short notice to return to their formations if required.

Assessment:

Most Likely: The MPC leadership continue to support the KPA, this will include disarming their combatants in expectation of the inclusion of some of their fighters in the reformed CDF. Continue representation in the GNR and participate in the elections

Most Dangerous: MPA lose faith in the KPA and a multi-ethnic government and return to political and military confrontation with the Government with aspirations for the separation of the western provinces from Carana.

Response to UNAC Deployment: MPC will remain supportive as long as UNAC is seen as impartial and effective

iii. Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC). The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels of diverse backgrounds. Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by force. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 fighters. It has a weak command and control structure and discipline and internal cohesion is low, as is the standard of training. However, an influx of experienced, extremist, foreign fighters upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations before the treaty. The movement has been successful in recruiting young men from the local population, due to its military successes and reaction against the brutality of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign, which indiscriminately targeted
Tatsis in the Southern region. The CISC also regularly abducts civilians to bolster its ranks. Its area of influence is confined to Leppko Province, with less influence on the Leppko coast.

Assessment:

Most Likely: Within the limitations or its organisational capability, CISC will support the KPA and accept GNR governance and the expansion of law and order into Leppko Province. Due to a record of CISC atrocities, few combatants are likely to be accepted into the CDF, those rejected may return to the field in splinter groups. These will continue violence against non-Tatsi, non-Muslim populations.

Most Dangerous: Spurred on the foreign radical Islamist fighters and external support the CISC becomes more radical and more capable. CISC resumes operations against Carana forces in order to allow it the freedom of manoeuvre to conduct its own operations against Caran and other minorities in order to secure the primacy of Tatsi, Muslim authority.

Response to UNAC Deployment: CISC are unlikely to welcome UNACs presence, particularly as they are already under the vigilance of Op INTRÉPID in the SW of Leppko Province. Some elements are likely to be hostile to UNAC and force protection will need to be increased accordingly.

iv. Other Groups. There are a number of relatively small armed groups / armed criminal gangs who have taken advantage of the security vacuum and operate in their local areas. They were not part of the KPA process and are likely to continue their activities until UN / Carana Government security deployments prevent them. In the coal mining area of Akkabar, the miners are in open conflict with the national police and have also attacked government institutions. Although not and armed group, the miners have links to criminal cartels are a major destabilising influence in Hanno Province.

c. Government Security Forces. These security forces, while national, have developed over nearly 30 years of government by President Ogavo into Caran dominated entities and no longer representative of the country. The KPA has identified their reform as an essential part of peace.

i. Carana Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF is the state security apparatus and has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). Prior to the KPA, the chiefs of the service reported direct to the president. The navy has a small number of coastal and river patrol boats. The air force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a
few, un-operational light bombers, has a limited strike capacity. The main military force in the CDF is the army, which equipped with light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, Armored Personnel Carriers, Artillery Guns and Mortars, Missile Launchers and Anti-Aircraft Guns. Some of this equipment is very old and much is in considerable need of repair. The CDF have maintained their positions after the ceasefire with four battalions opposite the MPC in the West and three facing the CISC in the South-West. The battalions in the South West have a history of perpetuating acts of politicide, ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations.

Assessment: The CDF are too Caran dominated to be considered an impartial force. As the national force, they are not required to disarm within the terms of the KPA, but they need be to be closely monitored, particularly in Leppko Province. The reduction in the numbers of soldiers currently in the CDF, to make way for the entry of MPC and CISC combatants and the reform of the CDF to become an multi-ethnic force is likely to create its own tensions and will need to be planed carefully with the Carana government.

ii. Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard is approximately 1500 strong, based in Galasi and fiercely loyal to President Ogavo. The President has been in hiding since April 2015, accompanied by elements of the Guard.

Assessment: The Presidential Guard elements remaining in Galasi are not part of the CDF and are potential spoilers – particularly if President Ogavo, indicted by the ICC and the GNR, reappears.

iii. Carana National Police (CNP). The Police consists of the CNP who are largely located in population centres and report to the Ministry of Interior, and the Gendarmerie in the rural areas who report to the Ministry of Defence and also have responsibility for border security – both have been traditional seen as enforces of Ogavo’s repressive regime and as such disliked and not trusted by much of the population. There are 10,000 CNP and Gendarmerie, although numbers have decreased through desertions and assassinations by anti-Ogavo elements. The Police are ill-trained, poorly paid, ill equipped and have bad morale.

Assessment: The CNP and Gendarmerie are very unlikely to be accepted into MPC or CISC controlled areas and a very different police force will be required if it is to acceptable throughout Carana.

d. Friendly and Cooperating Organisations.
i. CRC and CRCAC. The CRC will continue to support the KPA and endeavor to restrain any unsupportive actions by Katasi and Rimosa. The CRCAC military members will be subsumed into UNAC provided they meet the UN standards.

ii. Op INTRÉPIDE. The French mission terminates after 6 months. UNAC will need to establish liaison and coordination in preparation for assuming control of their Area of Responsibility.

iii. UN Country Team (UNCT). UNDP lead the country team, which is based in Galasi. The UNCT are represented in most parts of Carana but due to the security situation they are unable to access some areas to conduct a needs assessment and then provide support.

iv. NGOs and ICRC. A total of twelve international and eighteen local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women’s issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), are present in Galasi, Corma and Alur.

e. United Nations Direction. The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. The tasks for UNAC are to:

- Support the implementation of the KPA
- Protect civilians including humanitarians and human rights defenders
- Support humanitarian and Human Rights assistance
- Support Security reform
- Support the implementation of the peace process including elections

Mission end-state is a democratically elected government with restructured, ethnically representative and accountable security forces sufficiently able to protect all its civilians and where human rights are respected.

2. MISSION

UNAC Sector 2 units are to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in their AORs in accordance to UNSCR 1544, including all necessary actions, up to and including the use of
deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians. The execution of this mission aims to provide all necessary support that will lead to the restoration of stability in Carana.

3. EXECUTION

a. COMMANDER’S INTENT

To ensure the effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence emanating from any armed group (Tier II), we need to effectively generate, and rehearse tactical plans under all phases of response. In addition, all military units should be ready to support and enable other protection partners in resolving their protection imperatives (Tier I&II).

Battalion Commanders to conduct a Mission Analysis for your AOR and brief this SHQ on 03NOV17 at 0900H on the Risk Analysis of the threat identified in your AOR, a summary of possible COAs in all phases of response and additional resources you may need to execute your operations.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TBD after unit’s Mission Analysis (MDMP) are reviewed by SHQ.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

Current Situation in the Area Of Responsibility (AOR)

United Nations
Current Situation

Latest Development

Civilian populations: (in the vicinity of – IVO)

Karaoy (IVO 578, 6685)
Noviy (IVO 590, 6704)
Pyatiletka (area South and East of 586, 6683)
Shamalgan (IVO 557, 6702)

Battalion Command Post is located in Karaoy. One company (-) is currently protecting the IDP camp in Shamalgan with a platoon protecting the nearby airstrip.

The Airstrip has the capacity to sustain up to C-130 and Mi-26 operations.

CDF is a battalion-size element with ground transport capabilities and currently moving from E to W (Sector 1 to Sector 2). Mission HQ is unsure of their intent and all Requests for Information (RFIs) have been ignored. However, it is known that if they continue moving they will enter in the BATT AOR in about 8 hours.

IDP Camp in Shamalgan has approximately 1,800 IDs consisting of approx. 700 women, 450 girls, 300 men and 350 boys.

OXFAM has 10 staff members, ICRC has 3-4 staff and UNHCR has 5 staff working in the IDP camp.

Karaoy consists of approximately 400 families. We are unsure of the breakdown of this population.

Noviy has approximately 3,000 displaced people from Pyataleka. We are unsure of the breakdown of this population.

There are criminal groups operating in the Mining Sector. Revenue from the mines go to government forces. The criminal groups are made up of mercenaries and associated with the government.

Reports have shown that CISC have been operating in Sector 2 for a few months with approx. 20 combatants. Their objective is to sabotage the peace process using terrorist attacks and forced recruitment. They are an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. The total
strength is estimated to be around 3000 fighters. Public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province.

The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

The MPC have approx. 1,000 soldiers and can move around 400 soldiers in the AOR at any given time. They live in rebel area of Pyatiletka. It is estimated that there are 3-4,000 rebels of which 1,000 are armed. MPC’s aim is to consolidate their current position and wait for elections.

The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters, structured into groups of 700 men, with 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the west and cuts across the different religions. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. While the groups have no internally defined military structure they are based on a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the sub-commanders is high and discipline is good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Karaoy but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas, the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

Note to Instructor: The following details of the situation should be presented to the audience by illustrating locations on the corresponding Map.
**Current Situation in the AOR**

**Situation Map**

Note to instructor: Graphic information presented in this sketch should be presented to audience in an overlay format on the hi-resolution map provided. Each group should be provided one copy. Exact positions of the populations and armed groups, etc. should be precisely located on the hi-resolution map.