Policy

Planning and Review of Peacekeeping Operations

Approved by: USG DPKO
USG DFS
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A. PURPOSE

1. This Policy sets out principles, main decision milestones, processes and structures for planning peacekeeping operations by DPKO and DFS, which also includes assessments and strategic reviews. The purpose of the Policy is to articulate a clear and agreed standard planning process, to clarify roles and responsibilities and to ensure coordination and coherence between all parts of the two departments in planning peacekeeping operations. Planning is a deliberate, structured process of identifying objectives based on analysis and assessment of options, developing plans in furtherance of the objectives, monitoring the implementation based on impact on the ground and periodic review or reassessment of the situation. The term “planning” or “planning process” as used in this Policy includes assessment, the “development of plans” phase, monitoring during implementation, and review of peacekeeping operations. This Policy is specific to planning peacekeeping operations but falls under the overall purview and is fully
consistent with the United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) (2013), which applies to UN-wide planning.

B. SCOPE

2. This Policy applies to DPKO, DFS, and to all peacekeeping operations.

3. This Policy is intended for those responsible for planning and managing peacekeeping missions at Headquarters and in the field. All DPKO and DFS staff at Headquarters and in the field should be aware of this Policy.¹

4. This Policy is mandatory for any planning process involving a peacekeeping operation throughout its lifecycle, including start-up, steady-state, reconfiguration, transition, and drawdown and withdrawal. Implementation of this Policy must be consistent with the IAP Policy.

5. This Policy recognizes that a peacekeeping operation may be one of several options, which may involve DPKO and/or DFS as part of a broader planning effort.

C. RATIONALE

6. The IAP Policy sets out the principles and minimum requirements for UN-wide planning whenever an integrated presence is in place or is being considered. The IAP Policy replaced the guidelines for the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) but does not address the specifics of planning peacekeeping operations. While guidance on particular elements of the planning process exists, such as in the Mission Start-up Guide and the Mission Concept Guidelines, there is no overall policy specific to planning peacekeeping operations by DPKO and DFS.

7. To fill this policy gap, drawing on lessons learned from past planning processes, DPKO and DFS have developed this Policy in consultation with other relevant departments and UN partners. This Policy intends to present a clear, consistent and predictable joint DPKO-DFS process, which can be adapted to complex and quickly changing situations on the ground. This Policy aims to ensure coherence and a unity of purpose in planning and managing peacekeeping operations. This Policy is in line with the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people (2015) and the report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (2015) to strengthen analysis and planning.

8. EOSG designates the lead department and decides when the transfer of the lead on United Nations peace operations should take place from DPA to DPKO and vice versa,

¹ Where human rights components are part of peacekeeping missions, OHCHR staff that backstops the missions should also be aware of this Policy. OHCHR staff should also engage, as appropriate, in the assessment and planning process consistent with the DPKO/DPA/DFS/OHCHR Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011).
and may provide initial planning guidance to inform a particular planning process. Planning peacekeeping operations is a highly complex endeavor, which requires adequate time to ensure a rigorous formulation of options for the Secretary-General to present to the Security Council and a timely response on the ground. It is therefore typically necessary that DPKO and DFS begin an assessment and planning process in anticipation of a possible future peacekeeping operation, in close collaboration with DPA who will remain the designated lead Department until otherwise decided, and other relevant UN entities. In this regard, it is also important to recognize that DFS and DPKO may contribute in parallel to non-peacekeeping options through the ITF or IATF when applicable. This policy is intended to increase clarity, coordination and transparency regarding assessment and planning processes undertaken by DPKO and DFS including during periods when DPKO is not the lead department. It also recognizes situations where other departments, such as DPA, or other UN actors may need to undertake advance planning when DPKO is in the lead.

D. POLICY

9. This Policy may also be applicable within the context of a planning exercise that has been triggered by a planning directive from the Secretary-General. This Policy is consistent with and builds on the IAP Policy, which applies to all UN entities in the context of integrated presences. The Policy provides more detail on the planning process specific to peacekeeping operations, drawing on lessons learned studies and after-action reviews on planning. The planning process set out in this Policy is anchored in a series of decisions taken by the Under-Secretaries General of DPKO and DFS, as illustrated in the Annex. While the Policy calls for joint decisions, it is understood that the USG of DPKO will lead on providing strategic and overall operational direction while the USG of DFS will lead on aspects related to support. The joint decisions are intended to provide coherent and unified guidance to the work of the two departments. The Policy recognizes that planning is an iterative process, and it is expected that a specific planning process may require some deviations from the model process described here. Certain stages of the planning process may need to be compressed or combined with others to satisfy the imperatives of a specific situation, due to events on the ground, compressed timelines or operational requirements. Such deviations will require specific approval of the USGs of DPKO and DFS and clear communication to all participants in the planning process, without prejudice to the IAP Policy requirements and the role of the ITF.

10. The Policy outlines the rationale for each decision; deliverables; structures and mechanisms; approaches and methodologies; and modalities for engagement with interlocutors.

11. The overall planning process can be described as broadly comprising four phases: (i) assessment in the context of a start-up, (ii) the development of plans phase, (iii) implementation and monitoring and (iv) review of existing operations or an assessment of the overall UN presence.

12. The diagram below presents an overview of the planning process, specifically in the case of planning for new operations:
13. The diagram below maps out the universe of main planning documents as they relate to the planning of peacekeeping operations:
GUIDING PRINCIPLES

14. In addition to the principles articulated in the IAP Policy\(^2\), the following principles will guide the implementation of this Policy:

14.1. **Integrity of the process.** Whereas consultations, stakeholders’ positions and the political situation will shape the findings of the analysis, assessment and planning, it is critical to safeguard the integrity of the process, and be aware of pressure from actors who will seek to influence it.

14.2. **Participation.** The actors and entities that may be affected by the outcome of an assessment and planning process related to a peacekeeping operation should be invited to participate. During each phase, DPKO/DFS planners should reach out proactively to key partners and external sources of expertise. However, participation in the overall process will not always require a constant presence of each individual entity, including in particular for field visits. All positions shall be considered as a part of decision-making, but decisions will not require unanimity among all participants in a planning process.

\(^2\) The principles in the IAP policy include inclusivity, form follows function, comparative advantages, flexibility to context, national ownership, clear UN role in relation to other peace consolidation actors, recognition of the diversity of UN mandates and principles, upfront analysis of risks and benefits, and mainstreaming.
14.3. **Coherence.** This policy seeks to establish a coherent process for planning peacekeeping operations and to ensure alignment between the various elements and components involved.

14.4. **Transparency.** With greater clarity regarding the steps, structures, principles and requirements guiding the process, this policy is expected to increase transparency and hence confidence in the outcomes of planning exercises.

14.5. **Consistency.** Objectives, priorities and benchmarks/targets should be consistent across the strategic mission-level planning documents (such as the mission concept and component concepts). Such objectives, priorities and benchmarks/targets should inform and be consistent with mission-wide operational plans and strategies (such as the mission plan, protection of civilians strategy, etc.), which in turn should inform and be consistent with component and individual work plans (including the SRSG’s compact). The allocation of resources, and hence budgetary documents (such as the results-based budget), need to be closely guided by the strategic and operational planning documents, based on a rigorous conflict analysis and assessment of UN responses.3

**ASSESSMENT PHASE**

15. **Decision to monitor and assess (Decision 1).** The decision presented for consideration to the USGs of DPKO and DFS is whether to formally monitor and assess a specific situation by both Departments in the context of the possible future establishment of a peacekeeping operation.

15.1. In addition to DPA, which is the lead Department in the Secretariat for monitoring peace and security issues in countries without peacekeeping operations, regional divisions in the Office of Operations regularly follow developments of interest in regions under their purview, paying close attention, as relevant, to specific situations of increased insecurity, even in countries where no UN peacekeeping presence is deployed.

15.2. In certain circumstances, a further deterioration of the situation, an escalating crisis, an imminent ceasefire or other factors may warrant a formal decision for DPKO and DFS to monitor and assess the situation. Such a decision will be based on the particular change in circumstances and on whether the developments may result in a UN peacekeeping response in the future. The decision to “monitor and assess” may also be taken on the basis of a request from the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Government of the relevant country, or a regional or sub-regional organization. The ASG of the Office of Operations will submit a proposal to “monitor and assess” to the USGs of DPKO and DFS after consultations with the ASGs of OMA, OROLSI, DFS and the Director of DPET.

15.3. Once a decision to "monitor and assess" is taken, DPKO and DFS -- in close cooperation with DPA and the ITF (if one exists), the UN Country Team on the

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3 Also see paragraph 56 of the IAP Policy regarding consistency between the ISF and mission planning documents.
ground and other relevant partners -- will build its knowledge base, become fully engaged with existing processes and mechanisms, and prepare for a possible strategic assessment. This does not supersede the lead responsibilities of DPA, but begins to build a knowledge base and situational awareness to allow for a timelier and informed peacekeeping response in the future, if required.

15.4. While DPA will remain the lead department during this phase, DPKO and DFS focal points will be appointed to monitor and assess relevant developments in consultation with the lead department. In addition to the relevant regional division in the Office of Operations, the focal points may include representatives of OMA; the Police Division and relevant expertise in OROLSI; DFS; DPET and UNOCC. The ASG/OO or designated Director/Team Leader in OO will be responsible for convening the focal points and coordinating the monitoring and assessment phase.

15.5. The designated focal points will monitor and assess the situation, and provide regular briefings on a monthly basis (or more frequently, as needed) to DPKO and DFS leadership. The focal points will engage pro-actively with DPA, and, in close coordination with DPA, with internal and external actors who are already engaged in crisis management or the planning process. Focal points will engage, as appropriate, with regional and sub-regional organizations, international financial institutions, academic experts on the country and the region, human rights and gender experts, national and international civil society on the ground, and the UN entities on the ground and in the region, and will seek to undertake a preliminary assessment of the potential host state’s or the parties’ positions vis-à-vis a potential UN peacekeeping operation. Individual Member States, including members of the Security Council, may also be consulted, as appropriate.

16. Decision to recommend a strategic assessment (Decision 2). The decision presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS is whether to recommend that a strategic assessment be launched and to set parameters for the participation of DPKO and DFS in this process.

16.1. While DPA remains the lead department, the USGs of DPKO and DFS may decide to propose conducting a strategic assessment under the IAP Policy. The decision to recommend a strategic assessment may follow (i) an indication of interest or request from the Security Council, the General Assembly, the potential host government, and/or regional or sub-regional organizations; (ii) a deterioration of the situation that may constitute a threat to regional or international peace and security; (iii) a likely ceasefire or peace agreement that requires UN involvement; or (iv) a change in circumstances that may require a UN peacekeeping response.

16.2. The decision to launch a strategic assessment will be taken in accordance with the IAP Policy⁴. If a strategic assessment is launched, it shall follow the UN-wide IAP Policy on the conduct of integrated assessments.

16.3. If a UN peacekeeping response may be a potential option, a peacekeeping working group should be created to participate in the strategic assessment under the auspices of the Integrated Task Force or the Inter-Agency Task Force. In addition to the focal points referenced in section 15.4, the peacekeeping working group will include relevant DPKO and DFS thematic and cross-cutting specialists. The

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⁴ The decision to launch a strategic assessment can be made by the Secretary-General, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security or an ITF at the director level or above.
peacekeeping working group will be coordinated internally under the overall authority of the ASG of the Office of Operations. It is understood that DPKO and DFS may also be involved in considering support for other options for UN responses that do not involve peacekeeping.

16.4. In conducting a strategic assessment, the development of strategic options for overall UN responses should be grounded in a thorough and comprehensive conflict analysis, also taking full account of human rights and gender dimensions. The strategic options should consider the following essential elements: (i) priority objectives for establishing peace and security in the country, based on the conflict analysis, (ii) UN capabilities writ large (political, financial, logistical, technological, uniformed and civilian capacity, etc.) and (iii) stakeholder positions vis-à-vis the UN responses considered. A comparative advantage analysis should inform the proposed division of responsibilities, including between the UN and other actors, as well as within the UN System. Options should be subjected to stress tests (analytical exercises to test the robustness of the proposals) and risk analysis\(^5\) to ensure feasibility, rigor and resilience to possible scenarios.

16.5. As part of a strategic assessment, relevant interlocutors should be consulted as broadly as reasonable. Members of the Security Council should be consulted. If a regional organization is deployed with uniformed personnel on the ground under a Security Council mandate, the option of re-hatting non-UN forces, if considered, should be evaluated at the strategic level. Clarity should be sought from the Security Council as to whether or not the Council may contemplate re-hatting the regional force. The host government, relevant Member States in the region and potential troop- and police-contributing countries should be closely consulted to inform the development of options for UN responses. Potential troop- and police-contributing Member States should also be formally briefed before and after the completion of the strategic assessment. In terms of consultations with the host country (or countries), in addition to government representatives and parties to the conflict, the views of civil society and local communities should inform the process of formulating options. Gender and human rights perspectives should also be included. Strategic communications considerations should be taken into account, including an initial media mapping.

16.6. Regional and sub-regional organizations should always be consulted. Any disagreements should be duly noted as part of the overall assessment and planning process. If a regional or sub-regional organization is involved in addressing the conflict/situation, its representative should be invited to join the strategic assessment. In cases of significant involvement of regional organizations, the possibility of a joint strategic assessment should be considered. If such an organization has already deployed a mission on the ground, its engagement in the strategic assessment should be increased substantially. If a transfer of responsibility is contemplated from a regional or sub-regional organization to the UN, both strategic and operational benchmarks, including support, training and equipment considerations for such a transfer should be identified and agreed upon between the two organizations and their legislative bodies as early as possible.

\(^5\) Paragraph 24 of the IAP Policy requires that analysis of risks and benefits that integration arrangements may result in, in particular for humanitarian activities, as well as options to manage them, should be part of the integrated assessment and planning process.
16.7. At the time of the strategic assessment or shortly thereafter, DFS will begin conducting technical assessment surveys. As part of the technical assessments, the host government and neighboring states, as appropriate, should be engaged on deployment sites, ports of entry, transport routes and other relevant aspects.

16.8. The strategic assessment process, consistent with the IAP Policy, should produce strategic-level options for UN responses, with corresponding broad financial implications.

16.9. If it is decided that assessment and planning for a peacekeeping operation should continue following the strategic assessment, the Security Council should be encouraged to formally request the UN to undertake a planning effort. Commitment authority should be used to fund the planning effort once the Council has provided a legislative basis for it. DFS and DPKO should jointly prepare options for resourcing the planning effort, including in the absence of the commitment authority. The two departments should also identify candidates for the head of the peacekeeping planning team and potential candidates to serve as members. The candidates should preferably have prior planning experience and knowledge of the region.

16.10. If the strategic assessment does not retain a peacekeeping option but considers that UN peacekeeping may become an option in the future, the USGs of DPKO and DFS may decide to continue to monitor and assess the situation on a contingency basis, depending on the circumstances on the ground.

17. Decision to plan and to issue a peacekeeping planning directive providing strategic guidance (Decision 3A) and decision to appoint a peacekeeping planning team and its head (Decision 3B). The decisions presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS are to direct further assessment and planning based on the peacekeeping planning directive and to appoint a peacekeeping planning team and its head.

17.1. On the basis of the findings of the strategic assessment and if options for a peacekeeping operation are retained, the Office of Operations, in coordination with DFS, OMA, and OROLSI, shall prepare a “peacekeeping planning directive” for decision by the USGs of DPKO and DFS. The peacekeeping planning directive shall contain strategic guidance, including and consistent with any superior guidance or direction provided by the Secretary-General in the Secretary-General’s planning directives, for planning a peacekeeping operation in support of a broad political strategy. For each option involving a peacekeeping operation, the peacekeeping planning directive will include (i) assumptions, limitations and constraints, (ii) a broad political strategy for the UN presence, (iii) the end state(s) and the strategic objectives to achieve the end state(s), (iii), a broad outline of the overall UN response and peacekeeping options to be considered, and (iv) partnerships (how to engage or relate to key actors that are internal and external to the UN). In terms of process, the peacekeeping planning directive will set out (v) the specifics of the planning process for a peacekeeping option or options, including timelines, deliverables and the composition of the peacekeeping planning team.

17.2. The decision to appoint a peacekeeping planning team and its head will formalize the planning structures and line up the resources, such as financial, human, capability, planning and other. The peacekeeping planning team will report to a head planner at the level of D-1 or above, with the understanding that the planning team members are expected to regularly inform and consult their functional directors. The head planner will report to the ITF and to the USGs of DPKO and DFS through the
ASG of the Office of Operations who will regularly consult with the ASG of DFS and will ensure that key recommendations are agreed upon with the ASG of DFS. The head planner should have knowledge and experience of both substantive and support issues and be able to leverage the broad collective peacekeeping expertise of the team. The team will spearhead the planning effort with respect to the peacekeeping option(s). Members of the team shall serve on a full-time basis and shall comprise staff from OO, OMA, OROLSI, DFS and DPET and others as appropriate, as set forth in the peacekeeping planning directive. OCOS (strategic communications), DPA, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, PBSO and DSS, as well as entities with relevant interests in the planning process (e.g. with significant operations on the ground or whose operations may be significantly affected by the peacekeeping planning process) should be invited to join the expanded peacekeeping planning team. The expanded peacekeeping planning team will constitute a coordination and consultation mechanism for peacekeeping planning through which its members will be regularly briefed and consulted as part of the peacekeeping planning process. The Office of Legal Affairs should be consulted throughout the planning process, as appropriate.

17.3. Members of the peacekeeping planning team or of the expanded peacekeeping planning team must be empowered by their parent entities to represent their respective positions during planning. They should also be prepared to deploy to the field to support the planning effort in the mission and ensure continuity of plans in the start-up phase.

17.4. As long as DPA remains the lead department, the peacekeeping planning team and the expanded peacekeeping planning team mechanism will continue to work as a sub-group/working group of the ITF or IATF.

17.5. The peacekeeping planning team shall coordinate closely with other actors involved in the planning process and consult with relevant stakeholders. The team should map areas where other actors, in particular regional and sub-regional organizations, are involved and should identify opportunities for collaboration.

17.6. The peacekeeping planning team shall coordinate closely with regional and sub-regional organizations. To facilitate planning with regional or sub-regional organizations, in some cases, a coordination mechanism may be established, preferably with the participation of the relevant regional UN offices. A coordination mechanism should always be established if a re-hatting of a regional uniformed presence is contemplated.

17.7. In coordination with the peacekeeping planning team, the Force Generation Service in OMA and Selection and Recruitment Section in the Police Division, should engage – as early as possible – in meetings and discussions with troop- and police-contributing countries on potential contributions based on pledges registered in the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System to secure agreements/consents “subject to a future mandate” for the mission-specific planning effort. The Security Council and troop- and police-contributing Member States should be briefed on the findings of the strategic assessment and any technical assessments. If the peacekeeping option is preferred by the host government, it should be encouraged to issue a formal communication directed to the Security Council requesting a peacekeeping operation.
17.8. At this stage in the planning process, a technical assessment mission should be completed. DFS should have completed technical assessment surveys to inform the feasibility of the options. Security risk assessments also need to be completed at this stage.

17.9. If re-hatting regional or sub-regional forces is considered, the capacity of such forces should be assessed with respect to UN standards, including a risk assessment, and in particular for first-time contributors, regarding conduct and discipline, as well as compliance with human rights standards. In considering re-hatting, support and operational benchmarks, including capability, should be identified and agreed.

17.10. The peacekeeping planning team will further refine and elaborate the options identified in the strategic assessment that involve peacekeeping, on the basis of the peacekeeping planning directive. In doing so, the peacekeeping planning team will continue to refine and update the underlying analysis, consistent with the overall planning process through the ITF or IATF, and subject each option to a series of stress tests and risk analysis, as well as an evaluation through a red-teaming exercise (in which a team of colleagues not closely familiar with the planning process will identify and question potential vulnerabilities in the options under consideration).

17.11. For each peacekeeping option, the peacekeeping planning team should articulate, at a minimum, the following elements based on the findings of the strategic assessment conducted by the ITF:

- assumptions, limitations and constraints;
- a broad political strategy underpinning the UN presence (unless already available);
- end state(s) and strategic objectives to achieve the end state(s);
- an integrated and sequenced line of UN peacekeeping engagement to achieve each objective;
- strategic priorities for the initial phase (or phases);
- benchmarks/targets on the ground for each objective;
- comparative advantage assessment of UN peacekeeping vis-à-vis other UN and non-UN actors, particularly regional organizations;
- risk management strategy;
- geographic locations and infrastructure, including environmental impact;
- uniformed personnel numbers, required capabilities (units) and key tasks to be performed;
- broad mission structures, including individual components and how they interrelate;
- special measures required;
- resource implications;
- define senior leadership and key initial positions whose prompt appointment after the mandate will ensure leadership and ownership of the plans in the field; and
- modalities for engagement with other actors on the ground (e.g. forces deployed) and regional and sub-regional actors.

Priorities should be few and clear, and tasks should be concrete and achievable, as well as based on clear sequencing and comparative advantage. Sufficient development of these elements is necessary to ensure rigorous advice to the Secretary-General and the Security Council with respect to potential mandated tasks, and capabilities and resources required, and to avoid significant revisions later.
17.12. These elements will serve as the basis for the mission concept and component concepts once the key elements have been consulted, approved by the USGs of DPKO and DFS and on the basis of a Security Council mandate. Broad consultations in developing these elements will aim to ensure that all critical parts of DPKO and DFS broadly agree on the proposals and their feasibility, as well as coherence in the planning effort with members of the expanded planning team. It is critical that the key elements of the military, police and support concepts be coherent and formally agreed upon among the three entities responsible for developing them as well as consistent with the key elements of the mission concept before being presented to leadership for decision. If disagreements or inconsistencies persist, they should be explicitly flagged for discussion and decision between the USGs. Subsequently, the elements will form the basis of proposals presented to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

17.13. In consultation with relevant stakeholders, DFS will prepare and consult with the Controller on a draft commitment authority proposal, based on the planning variables, to be ready for approval as soon as possible after the mandate is issued by the Security Council. If the proposed requirements are under $150 million, approval will be sought from the ACABQ; otherwise, from the General Assembly.

17.14. The Senior Leadership Appointments Section, Field Personnel Division in DFS and the Office of Operations shall identify, review and evaluate candidates for senior mission leadership and other key positions, in coordination with other entities responsible for selecting candidates, and prepare for their appointment as soon as the Security Council has decided on the mandate.

17.15. OMA and the Police Division, in consultation with the peacekeeping planning team, OO and DFS, shall develop the force and police generation and capabilities plan. The plan should contain the following elements: troop- and police-contributors' capabilities, availability, priorities, sequencing and deployment, and modalities for the conduct of assessment and advisory, pre-deployment and reconnaissance visits. The plan should take into account available human rights information and analysis of how possible human rights-related concerns would need to be addressed. The plan should also include a risk assessment on conduct and discipline issues by troop- and police-contributors, in particular pertaining to sexual abuse and exploitation, and outline risk management and mitigation measures. If re-hatting a regional or sub-regional force is one of the scenarios, the plan should reflect the specifics of that scenario. This plan will enable the Office of the Military Affairs and the Police Division to identify, and plan the capabilities and deployment of troop- and police-contributing countries in support of the proposed options.

17.16. As per the IAP Policy, the ITF should begin the process of developing the Secretary-General’s Directive to senior UN leadership on the ground.

FROM ASSESSMENT TO DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS PHASE

18. Decision on peacekeeping option(s), defining key elements of the mission concept and component concepts (Decision 4A) and decision to approve the force and police generation and capabilities plan (Decision 4B). The first part of the decision presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS will be to approve or select peacekeeping option(s) and corresponding key elements of proposed strategic plans that will serve as a basis for the
Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council. The second part of the decision will be to approve, based on the consideration of options, the force and police generation and capabilities plan(s).

18.1. Following decisions on the peacekeeping option(s) by the USGs of DPKO and DFS and their approval of the key elements of the mission concept and component concepts, the peacekeeping planning team, in consultation with the ITF, will prepare a report of the Secretary-General (or other document, as appropriate, or sections thereof related to peacekeeping, if the report/document is drafted by DPA) to the Security Council outlining the options or a recommendation for a proposed UN response. The options or a recommendation presented in the Secretary-General’s report should clearly articulate priorities, sequencing of a UN response, estimated required uniformed capability and the associated cost.

18.2. The approval of the force and police generation and capabilities plan gives the authority to formally engage with Member States for “in principle” contributions of uniformed capabilities prior to a Security Council mandate. Troop- and police-contributing Member States should be briefed on the key elements of the mission concept and component concepts. The contributions will be confirmed by DPKO when a peacekeeping operation is authorized.

18.3. If the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation, it is assumed that DPKO will become the lead department, unless so designated already. An IOT will be constituted. With the establishment of the IOT, some members of the peacekeeping planning team shall deploy to the field to support the planning effort. Other members of the peacekeeping planning team will continue to work together, as a single team, with the IOT, for up to 12 months or until the initial operational capacity is reached, whichever is earlier. In general, the IOT Team Leader will become the deputy head planner, reporting to the head planner, unless otherwise decided by the USG of DPKO.

18.4. If a coordination mechanism has been established with a regional organization (as provided for in section 16.6 above), it should continue to facilitate coordinated or joint planning, as appropriate.

18.5. The ITF shall remain the forum for UN-wide assessment and planning and will be consulted regularly about planning related to peacekeeping operations.

18.6. The peacekeeping planning team/IOT shall finalize the draft mission concept, based on the Security Council mandate. They will review and update the underlying analysis in view of the latest developments on the ground, revisit planning assumptions, and consult closely with the SRSG or other senior leaders on the ground as well as other relevant UN partners, as appropriate. The mission concept shall be consistent with the draft Directive of the Secretary-General to senior UN leadership on the ground, which will set out common UN priorities and objectives for peace consolidation in accordance with the IAP Policy. The priorities and sequencing in the mission concept will inform the civilian mission structures and staffing tables. The draft mission concept shall be presented for approval to the USGs of DPKO and DFS after the mandate has been issued by the Security Council.

18.7. On the basis of the draft mission concept, DFS, OMA and Police Division shall develop and consult drafts of their respective concepts. As drafts are further
developed, all drafters will have to coordinate changes and ensure consistency with their counterparts in other departments.

18.8. In the meantime, DSS will prepare a security concept to address aspects related to the security of UN personnel. The mission concept and all component concepts need to be coordinated to ensure consistency with the security concept.

18.9. DPKO and DFS shall facilitate a prompt deployment of mission leadership and key personnel to the field. The mission leadership and key personnel shall deploy to the field no later than one month following their appointment.

18.10. The preparation of the first full budget will begin, with the timeline dependent on the legislative bodies’ schedule.

19. Decision to approve the mission concept (Decision 5). The decision presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS, following consultation with the mission leadership, will be to approve the mission concept.

19.1. If approved, the mission concept shall be jointly signed by the USGs of DPKO and DFS.

19.2. On the basis of the mission concept, OMA, Police Division and DFS shall finalize the military and police concepts of operations, and the support concept, respectively. The three must be consistent and coherent among themselves and with the mission concept.

19.3. Deployment to and further planning in the field will be based on the mission concept, according to identified priorities and sequencing. DPKO and DFS should take all actions necessary to ensure a capable planning capacity is deployed to the field as early as possible to continue the planning effort. The planning capacity should remain for a period sufficient to ensure continuity.

20. Decision to approve all component concepts (Decision 6). The decision presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS will be to approve and sign the component concepts. The three – military, police and support – shall be presented as one single package.

20.1. Following consultations with the field, the component concepts shall be presented for approval and signature to the USGs of DPKO and DFS as a single package.

20.2. In consultation with EOSG, the ITF will finalize the directive of the Secretary-General to the senior UN leadership on the ground in accordance with the IAP Policy.

21. Decision to finalize and propose for issuance the SG’s directive to senior UN leadership on the ground (Decision 7). The USG of DPKO will decide whether to sign off on the directive of the Secretary-General and convey it to EOSG for approval and issuance.

21.1. With the issuance of the Secretary-General’s directive to senior UN leadership on the ground, the core strategic planning documents will have been completed at Headquarters.

21.2. The SRSG will finalize the “mission plan,” which will be reviewed jointly with Headquarters, revised if needed, and prepared for implementation. The mission
plan will translate the strategic guidance from the mission concept and component concepts into a concrete operational plan spanning all priority areas of the mission’s work in implementing its mandate. The mission plan will identify concrete goals and timelines corresponding to integrated lines of activity for each objective, the milestones and benchmarks, and will serve as a tool for the SRSG for tracking progress and managing all of the mission’s areas of work. The mission plan should also be consistent with the strategic guidance provided in the Secretary-General’s directive to senior UN leadership on the ground, which will inform the development of an ISF.

21.3. The mission plan will be reviewed jointly by DPKO and DFS for consistency with the strategic plans, including the mission concept, component concepts and the Secretary-General’s directive to senior UN leadership on the ground.

IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING PHASE

22. Decision to periodically monitor the mission’s performance and effectiveness against benchmarks/targets and adjust concepts/plans accordingly (Decision 8). Based on the monitoring of the performance of the mission and its effectiveness against benchmarks/targets, as well as the evolving situation on the ground, the USGs of DPKO and DFS, jointly with the mission leadership, will decide whether to maintain or revise the mission concept, component concepts and the mission plan.

22.1. The planning process does not cease with the completion of all major plans. It is an ongoing and iterative process, which continues throughout implementation and monitoring of impact on the basis of existing plans. The planning process also continues with the review and reassessment of the mission or the wider UN presence on the ground, which may require adjustments to plans.

22.2. As the mission implements the mission plan, it will be essential to ensure that, on the one hand, strategic concepts and plans correspond to reality, and on the other, that the mission’s performance against the benchmarks/targets identified in the mission concept and the mission plan is on track. The objective of this decision will be to ensure that the assumptions, the political strategy, strategic objectives, priorities, sequencing, and benchmarks/targets are still consistent with the situation on the ground. The decision will also determine whether the implementation of the mission plan is consistent and on track with the strategies and plans or whether they need to be adjusted. The objective of the periodic monitoring will be to focus on the impact rather than the activities of the mission.

22.3. In the first year of a peacekeeping operation, the joint monitoring between the USGs of DPKO and DFS and mission leadership shall be conducted quarterly. After the first year, the monitoring shall be conducted every 6 to 12 months or following a significant change in circumstances on the ground. The findings of these monitoring exercises will be reflected in the periodic reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

22.4. To support the joint monitoring, the mission shall prepare and share with Headquarters an updated and integrated situation and conflict analysis, and reports of the mission’s performance and impact monitoring against benchmarks/targets in accordance with the mission plan.
22.5. The financial and human resource allocation in the mission shall be reviewed to ensure that it continues to conform to the evolving priorities and the operational environment.

REVIEW/ASSESSMENT PHASE

23. Decision to maintain or revise plans following a strategic review of the mission or a strategic assessment (Decision 9). The decision presented to the USGs of DPKO and DFS is whether to conduct a strategic review or assessment and, following the exercise, whether to maintain or revise plans.

23.1. Strategic reviews will bring DPKO and DFS and other UN entities whose operations may be significantly affected by the review, and, in the case of a strategic assessment, the UN System, together to analyze the situation, review the performance and impact of the mission or the UN on the ground, and recommend adjustments, if appropriate, to inform the mandate renewal or adjust the UN response on the ground.

23.2. When the overall UN response needs to be assessed, in accordance with the IAP Policy, a strategic assessment will be conducted by the ITF.

23.3. Otherwise, strategic reviews of missions will focus on the mission and should be undertaken every 2 or 3 years, or more frequently, depending on the circumstances. The strategic review should be conducted, to the extent possible, before a mandate renewal and in time for its findings to be reasonably reflected in the next budget.

23.4. Technical reviews (TAMs, civilian staffing reviews, military capabilities studies, police capability reviews and other thematic reviews) should normally follow a strategic review or a strategic assessment, elaborating on specific aspects. In some cases, however, a technical review of the mission may be conducted as part of a strategic review. Proliferation of reviews can constitute a burden on missions; therefore, reviews should be consulted, streamlined and rationalized so as to minimize disruptions to the mission’s work.

23.5. On the basis of an updated conflict analysis and changes in the situation on the ground, the assumptions, strategic priorities, benchmarks/targets and other elements, as needed, will be reviewed, using an approach described in section 15. The field will lead on providing situation and conflict analysis as well as performance and impact monitoring, while Headquarters will lead on developing strategic options on the way forward, in close consultation with the mission leadership.

23.6. Following both strategic reviews and strategic assessments, DPKO and DFS, in consultation with the SRSG, will review the mission concept and component-level concepts, and will make the necessary revisions, if needed, following the renewal of the mandate of the mission. The mission will then revise the mission plan accordingly.

23.7. Following the strategic review or assessment, the planning process will broadly follow Decisions 4A (and 4B if relevant), 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, adjusted as appropriate for existing missions. The diagram below outlines the basic steps of the planning process following a strategic assessment or review:
PLANNING FOR DRAWDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

24. The Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal will apply to all UN actors involved in the planning process for a drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation.

25. The planning process articulated in this Policy will apply when planning for a drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation, including the phases of the assessment, development of key plans in consultation with others, implementation and monitoring and, if applicable, a subsequent assessment. Given that mission drawdown and withdrawal impacts UN and non-UN partners, planning in an integrated manner with the partners who will remain on the ground will be essential even when developing mission-specific plans. Therefore, when considering the winding down or departure of a peacekeeping operation, a strategic assessment should be conducted to ensure a full engagement of relevant partners when determining the appropriate follow-on UN presence, if any. The assessment should identify residual peacebuilding needs that would require support after drawdown. Based on this, a mapping of the mission’s key relevant mandated and programmatic tasks and activities should be conducted to determine which types of activities should continue, by whom and with what resources. The mission should
support the UNCT in developing new projects and activities to address key areas for peace consolidation. It is critical to subject the options for a drawdown or withdrawal to stress tests on the basis of possible scenarios in order to ensure feasibility and resilience of plans.

26. Careful consideration should be given to ensure that assessments and development of plans can be aligned with timelines for mandate renewals and budgetary preparation and approval in the context of drawdown or withdrawal.

27. Strong leadership and coordination from Headquarters will be critical. While DPKO will maintain the lead when planning for a drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation, the planners on the IOTs should ensure that the ITF partners, including DPA, are engaged and have the necessary space to undertake planning for a successor UN presence on the ground, if relevant. The role of DFS in planning and implementing a drawdown will be critical.

**ENGAGEMENT WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERS**

28. **EOSG.** EOSG should be regularly informed about the assessment and planning process. Clarity on strategic direction from the Secretary-General should be sought early on. In the case where a possible peacekeeping operation is one of the possible options, clarity on the designation of the lead department should be requested to facilitate predictability and coherence in the planning process.

29. **DPA.** It is essential to engage with DPA at all times during the planning process. In particular, when DPA is the lead department, coordination of all planning efforts will be critical to ensure coherence and timeliness for completing analysis and assessment, and developing solid plans. When transition from DPKO as the lead department to DPA is contemplated, DPKO shall provide an enabling space for planning for a follow-on presence.

30. **UN Partners.** UN partners should be involved or consulted as part of mission-specific assessment and planning processes to the extent that their operations are or may be significantly affected.

31. **Security Council.** It is critical to consult the Security Council in the assessment process early, seeking legislative basis to carry forward the assessment and planning process mindful of the lead times necessary to achieve deployment and operational capability on the ground. A specific request from the Security Council to present options for UN responses on the basis of an assessment and planning process should be sought when possible. The positions of the Security Council may not always align with the positions of individual members of the Security Council. Likewise, the positions may differ between capitals, embassies and Permanent Missions to the UN for a given Member State. Consultations with the Security Council should be mindful of the views of regional organizations and, where applicable, other mechanisms, such as Groups of Friends. While the views of some members of the Security Council may differ from the proposals developed by the Secretariat through assessment and planning, it is the duty of the Secretariat to present a frank and accurate assessment of the situation and the most appropriate proposals on UN responses.

32. **Regional and Sub-regional Organizations.** Regional and sub-regional organizations are increasingly involved in peace and security issues, conflict prevention and peacekeeping. They are a critical partner that can bring to the table expertise, as well as political and
diplomatic support that is crucial for the success of peace processes. As a general rule, DPKO and DFS will consult with regional and sub-regional organizations in each phase of the planning process for peacekeeping operations. The two departments should associate representatives of such organizations to start-up planning processes, particularly where a regional force has already been deployed or is being contemplated by the Security Council.

33. DPKO and DFS should offer planning and force generation expertise and seek to participate in the planning effort by the relevant regional organization where the Security Council is contemplating authorizing a regional force to deploy, particularly when the re-hatting of this force at a later stage is either already envisaged or likely. The support to regional forces should be extended through their operations as well, including through the embedding of United Nations planning expertise to prepare for a smooth transition to a UN force.

34. Cooperation with regional organizations should be guided by an assessment of respective comparative advantages such as speed of deployment, robustness, sustainability and multi-dimensionality, among others, as well as guidance received from the Secretary-General or Security Council.

35. Host country or countries. The consent of the parties is a fundamental principle of peacekeeping. While the government’s consent is essential, consent of other stakeholders – e.g., parties to the conflict, civil society, local communities – should be ascertained and, if needed, secured through concerted engagement and a communication strategy. A compact may be sought between the UN and the national authorities for peace sustainment or consolidation.

36. Troop- and police-contributing countries. The speed with which a mission will be able to achieve the initial and then full operating capability will depend in large part on how early the necessary uniformed personnel and capabilities can be generated. Potential troop- and police-contributing Member States should be closely consulted and regularly briefed throughout the assessment and planning process to ensure their understanding and support.

37. Member States. In addition to Council members and troop- and police-contributing Member States, it is expected that consultations with Members States more broadly as well as efforts to enlist their support will be undertaken continuously throughout the assessment and planning process. In particular, Member States are critical to ensuring that a future peacekeeping mission has the necessary political support, as well as proper resources and capabilities, including through bilateral and extra-budgetary voluntary support. Ensuring a proper understanding by the Member States can also be key in ensuring the best-suited candidates for mission leadership positions. Support for the UN effort from neighboring countries or Member States from the region can also be very important to the success of a peacekeeping operation.

E. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

38. As per the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations (A/61/858) and a General Assembly resolution (A/RES/61/279), which defined the roles and responsibilities of DPKO and DFS, and the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the
Organization of the Department of Field Support (ST/SGB/2010/2), DPKO will determine and provide direction to DFS on priorities and needs of peacekeeping, and DFS will receive direction from DPKO on such matters and ensure support in keeping with the principle of unity of command and integration of efforts. On the ground, the SRSG has ultimate authority and responsibility for operations and support at the mission level.

39. The USGs of DPKO and DFS shall be responsible for taking structured and informed decisions and for issuing coordinated and coherent guidance to the two departments, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the host government. The two USGs are accountable for the overall assessment and planning process performed by the two departments.

40. The ASGs of DPKO and DFS shall be responsible for coordination and ensuring rigorous, integrated and realistic planning through their respective representatives on the peacekeeping planning team. The ASG of the Office of Operations will be responsible for the overall coordination.

41. The head of the peacekeeping planning team shall be responsible for leading the assessment and planning process and for producing the plans, based on consultations with stakeholders. The head shall report to the ITF and to the USGs of DPKO and DFS through the ASG of the Office of Operations who will consult regularly with the ASG of DFS and will ensure that key recommendations are agreed upon with the ASG of DFS. The entities contributing members to the peacekeeping planning team and expanded peacekeeping planning team shall empower these staff to represent the entities in the planning process. Upon the completion of the planning process resulting in the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, the head of the peacekeeping planning team shall identify lessons and best practices in the planning process.

42. The offices and divisions within DPKO and DFS shall be responsible for supporting the peacekeeping planning team and the effort led by its head. The Offices and Divisions of DPKO and DFS should empower their staff seconded to the peacekeeping planning team to represent the views and positions of their respective offices and divisions during planning to ensure coherence and timely progression of the process.

43. DPKO and DFS in Headquarters shall be responsible for providing strategic direction to the mission, based on consultations and joint work between Headquarters and the field. This will include leading the strategic assessment or review and drafting the peacekeeping planning directive, the mission concept and the component concepts. The mission shall be responsible for contributing to the planning effort in Headquarters, developing implementation plans and their implementation on the ground. This will include drafting and implementing the mission plan and component-specific plans and work plans on the basis of strategic-level documents developed by Headquarters.

44. All DPKO and DFS staff shall follow the requirements outlined in this Policy. If a planning process needs to deviate significantly from the requirements of this Policy to respond to specific circumstances, such deviations will need to be approved by the USGs of DPKO and DFS.

45. It is expected that UN partners will provide timely, substantive and informed contributions as part of consultations throughout the assessment and planning process.

F. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
G. REFERENCES

Normative or Superior References


Related Policies


Other References


H. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

46. ASG/OO and ASG/DFS will jointly monitor compliance with this Policy.

47. It is expected that an after-action report will be produced after each significant assessment and planning process, the conclusions of which could be reviewed by the E-SMT.

I. CONTACT

48. The contact for this Policy is the Integrated Assessment and Planning Unit in the Office of Operations, DPKO.

J. HISTORY
49. This is the first version of the Policy on Planning and Reviews of Peacekeeping Operations.

Hervé Ladsous, USG DPKO

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:

DATE OF APPROVAL:

Atul Khare, USG DFS

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:

DATE OF APPROVAL:

JAN 13 2017