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All photos have been taken from official UN photos.

All comments and questions about the Handbook are welcome and should be forwarded to PBPS-POC-UNHQ@un.org.

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FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce the first handbook on the protection of civilians (POC) in UN peacekeeping, which will serve as a practical guide for civilian, police and military personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations.

Strengthening the protection provided by peacekeeping operations is one of the priorities areas of the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P), and an area to which I personally attach significant importance. This handbook incorporates and translates into action the principles set out in the DPO Policy on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping, and brings together the best practices of POC in UN peacekeeping; it captures the lessons from a wide range of experiences and provides all mission components with tools and techniques to interpret and implement POC mandates in contexts that vary greatly.

Given the increasing complexity of today’s conflicts, effective implementation of POC is as challenging as ever. The protection of civilians has become the most visible standard by which the performance of UN peacekeeping is often judged. Yet, peacekeeping operations cannot protect everyone, everywhere, at all times. Our operations constantly assess the threats to civilians and prioritize capacities and resources to prevent and respond effectively, in an integrated way that builds on all components of the missions: civilian, police and military. Our efforts to protect civilians need to be comprehensive, integrated and well-planned, and this handbook provides essential guidance that applies to the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Ultimately, the ability of our missions to protect civilians depends on the capacity, courage and conviction of all our peacekeepers in the field and at Headquarters.

I would like to express gratitude to the Government of Sweden, which provided generous and valuable support for the development of this handbook through the Folke Bernadotte Academy. I would like to further thank all the peacekeeping personnel (civilian and uniformed) who provided “voices from the field” and case studies that were incorporated in the handbook to provide real world examples of how peacekeeping missions protect civilians in challenging circumstances. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge all of you who will use this handbook as a tool in our collective commitment to strengthening the protection provided by UN peacekeeping, as recently reaffirmed in the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, so that we can do our utmost for those who look to UN peacekeeping for protection.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations
Part I: Introduction to the POC Context

The United Nations Security Council votes to explicitly include protection of civilians (POC) in the mandate of a peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) for the first time. (1999)

UN Photo/Ron da Silva
1.1 POC ON THE AGENDA OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The protection of civilians (POC) by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations is only one facet of the wider POC agenda at the UN. The protection of civilians in armed conflict has been on the agenda of the UN Security Council in its current form since 1999 when the Council adopted its first thematic resolution on the subject, recognizing the protection of civilians as essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. Beginning with that first resolution, the Security Council has focused on complementary objectives: enhancing compliance with applicable international law and relevant Council decisions in the conduct of hostilities; facilitating access to humanitarian assistance; protecting forcibly displaced persons, women and children; providing protection through UN peace operations; and responding to violations through targeted measures and the promotion of accountability.

The approach of the Security Council to the protection of civilians in armed conflict has included: engaging duty bearers under international human rights law and international humanitarian law; developing and promoting compliance, monitoring and accountability mechanisms; and using the range of tools available in the UN system to support and promote the protection of civilians. The POC agenda also sits alongside complementary programmes and mandates such as the promotion and protection of human rights, children and armed conflict, and women, peace and security, including conflict-related sexual violence.

The protection of civilians by UN peace operations is therefore part of the Security Council’s broader agenda on POC, which utilizes a range of different tools and approaches. The role of peace operations on POC is set out in both thematic and country-specific Security Council resolutions and is further defined and elaborated in the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping. A key distinguishing element of the POC mandate in peacekeeping is the authorization given to peacekeeping operations to use all necessary means, up to and including deadly force, to protect civilians under threat or imminent threat of physical violence. In its approach to POC in peacekeeping, the Security Council has also mandated the protection of civilians by certain peacekeeping operations in situations where there is no active armed conflict, recognizing the preventive role that peace operations can play in the protection of civilians.

In planning their approach to POC, it is therefore useful for peacekeeping operations to understand and to be aware of this broader context and to consider the need to complement and align with other ongoing UN approaches and activities that contribute to the implementation of the Security Council’s POC agenda. These may include, for example: sanctions regimes; monitoring, reporting and accountability mechanisms; the provision of humanitarian assistance; protection activities by UN agencies, funds and programmes including protection of refugees and internally displaced persons; the protection and promotion of human rights; support for the rule of law; and political and peacebuilding activities.

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1 S/RES/1265 (1999).
4 Where this Handbook refers to “the POC mandate”, it means the general concept of the POC mandate in peacekeeping as set out by Security Council resolutions and DPO policy, and the specific mandate of an individual peacekeeping mission to protect civilians.
1.2 POC IN UN PEACEKEEPING

Since the first POC-mandated peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, both UN peacekeeping operations have been confronted with a broad range of threats to civilians and increasingly complex operational environments. As the nature of peacekeeping has evolved, so has the POC mandate and the tasks, activities, roles and responsibilities necessary to implement it. At the same time, the high expectations on missions to protect civilians present risks to the UN’s credibility where these expectations are not met or managed effectively.

Initially faced with limited standardized guidance, specialized staff or dedicated tools for the protection of civilians, UN peacekeeping operations progressively developed their own approaches to POC — strategies, capacities, mechanisms and tools. Much of this has since been captured in policy, guidance and training, and is continuously developed and built upon through ongoing sharing of best practices and lessons learned. A continual learning process that captures mission-specific POC challenges, lessons learned and good practices is required to adapt to changing environments.

Contemporary approaches to POC involve and rely on many other aspects of mission planning and other mandated activities. In particular, POC requires strategic political engagement and proactive and preventive action and relies upon effective integrated planning and coordination including with the host state, humanitarians, civil society and the affected communities. This contributes to ensuring a comprehensive approach.

The protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping is defined as: “without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, integrated and coordinated activities by all civilian and uniformed mission components to prevent, deter or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians, within the mission’s capabilities and areas of deployment, through the use of all necessary means, up to and including deadly force.”

1.3 RATIONALE, SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This handbook complements and further builds upon official policy and guidelines on POC in UN peacekeeping (see references at the end of each chapter). It seeks to aid the operationalization of policy and doctrine and guide all peacekeeping personnel (civilian and uniformed) to effectively implement the mandate to protect civilians. The guidance provided here applies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
The management of a peacekeeping operation at United Nations Headquarters and at the level of mission headquarters (the Head of Mission and Mission Leadership Team) is considered to be the **strategic level** of authority, command and control.

The field-based management of a peacekeeping operation at the mission headquarters is considered to be the **operational level**. Depending on the mission configuration, operational level can also extend to the regional or sector level.

The management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of mission headquarters, as well as the supervision of individual personnel, is considered to be at the **tactical level** and is exercised at various levels by subordinate commanders of military and police components and designated civilian heads at levels below the mission headquarters.

This handbook provides mission personnel with tools and techniques to interpret and implement POC mandates within the particular context of their missions:

- **To promote the primary responsibility of the host state to protect civilians**
- **To enhance strategic and operational planning and coordination**
- **To contribute to ensuring readiness, and to shape and implement protection-sensitive tactical operations**

Designed to acknowledge and address the multiplicity of operating contexts and challenges faced by peacekeeping operations, this handbook aims to provide concrete and modular response options for civilian, police and military peacekeepers to consider when analysing and addressing POC threats. It is based on the foundation that POC relies on integrated mission processes and systems, including analysis, strategic decision-making, planning, communication, engagement and dialogue, operations, crisis management and training. This handbook emphasizes the whole-of-mission approach to POC, and thus is not structured around mission components or type of personnel. The objective is for mission personnel to understand the importance of working together using a range of tools and techniques to protect civilians.

The handbook does not replace formal DPO doctrine, including existing policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs). It consolidates existing good practices, methodologies, models, templates, checklists and other tools. The guidance and templates contained herein can be elaborated and adjusted as necessary to suit the particular context and needs of a mission.

Finally, the handbook is designed as a self-reference tool, but it does not replace the Core Pre-Deployment Training, Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Training, scenario-based training or mentoring on POC.

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6 This Handbook makes no principled distinction between ‘analysis’ and ‘assessment’. Missions that do should consider in each instance which is required, and which mission actor is best placed to perform the function.
1.4 CONTENTS

This handbook is structured in six parts:

**Part I** *(Introduction to the POC Context)* provides guidance on how to interpret the POC mandate given to a mission by the UN Security Council, including key mandate language. It also identifies contextual and systemic constraints that may hamper missions in implementing their POC mandates and suggests how these constraints may be addressed, circumvented or overcome.

**Part II** *(Leading, Planning, Coordination and Strategic Communication)* provides guidance for mission leaders and managers on ensuring that the protection of civilians is at the heart of a mission’s political strategy, providing strategic vision, deciding on resource allocation and mainstreaming POC in strategic planning and performance processes. It further suggests how to establish POC coordination mechanisms at all levels, both within a mission and with humanitarian actors and host authorities, for information sharing and analysis, planning, decision making, implementation and monitoring and reporting of POC activities. This part also provides guidance on how to develop a communication and influence plan on POC, which will include dialogue, engagement, public information and advocacy in support of a mission’s political approach to POC.

**Part III** *(Identifying and Prioritizing POC Threats and Risks)* provides guidance for civilian (substantive and support), police and military components on how to identify and prioritize POC threats and risks for the purpose of POC planning and action. It suggests a process and factors to be taken into account for a mission to identify and prioritize POC threats and risks as well as tools to be used to facilitate that process. Missions can and should adapt these tools to meet their particular circumstances and requirements. This part also provides guidance for civilian, police and military components on how to engage with communities to understand protection threats faced by the population to inform the mission approach to POC and support local protection efforts.

**Part IV** *(Operational Readiness and Response)* provides guidance on how to integrate POC into mission operational planning, preparedness and coordination as well as the planning of security operations, including training and coordination with civilian, police and military components. It provides guidance and options on how peacekeeping missions can utilize and balance different options available to respond to threats to civilians.

**Part V** *(Key Advice)* provides guidance on how to ensure a gendered approach to POC, as well as recommendations for POC advisers on how to proactively advise and support mission leaders, including on preparedness, planning and coordination of activities and operations to protect civilians.

**Part VI** *(Scenarios and Annexes)* provides guidance on responding when civilians are threatened, with simple scenarios followed by a list of Do’s and Don’ts. The Annexes provide an acronym list, as well as templates, SOPs and terms of reference (TORs) for tools and mechanisms to facilitate implementation of the POC mandate, for missions to adapt to their own needs and resources.

1.5 TARGET AUDIENCE

Any and all personnel in UN peacekeeping operations should benefit from this handbook to understand the POC mandate and its implementation. Everyone in peacekeeping has a role in protecting civilians and is responsible for that protection. **Each chapter should be relevant to all peacekeeping personnel**, but may be particularly relevant to those serving in specific roles, as described in the “who” section at the beginning of each chapter.
Chapter 2: Understanding POC

**WHAT**

POC is a priority mandate of most UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations since 1999 and is high on the political agenda of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In order to implement POC, the specific POC mandate of the mission must be interpreted and understood.

**WHY**

While there is a core of standardized terminology, the specific language used by the Security Council when mandating POC in peacekeeping has evolved over the years and may vary between peacekeeping operations. To translate the mandate into strategic and operational goals and specific tasks and responsibilities, and to manage expectations of the mission, a clear and unified understanding of the requirements and limits of the POC mandate — in the specific context of the mission — is necessary.

**HOW**

The country-specific mandate is the starting point for each mission to develop its strategic and operational approach to POC, in line with DPO policy. It starts with preparing a conflict analysis and developing key mission documentation including: the mission concept, rules of engagement (ROE) and directives on the use of force (DUF), military and police concept of operations (CONOPS) and a POC strategy. The agreed understanding of the requirements of the mandate should then flow through mission planning processes, training, resource allocation and activities.

**WHO**

Developing a shared understanding of the POC mandate is the overall responsibility of mission leadership, in consultation with DPO and other relevant departments at UN Headquarters, and with support from the mission Legal Adviser and POC Adviser. The interpretation of the POC mandate should be shared among all mission components and with external stakeholders, including local communities, host governments, armed actors, Member States, humanitarian partners and the local and international media.

**WHERE**

Interpreting the POC mandate is done jointly between UN Headquarters in New York and mission headquarters, while operationalizing the mandate occurs at mission headquarters and in mission field offices.

**WHEN**

Consideration of a mission’s POC mandate and approach is critical at mission start-up. It is also necessary when there is a change in mandate or a significant change in the situation on the ground, such as a crisis. All new peacekeeping personnel should familiarize themselves with the POC mandate and approach of the mission upon onboarding.
2.1 THE SCOPE OF THE POC MANDATE IN UN PEACEKEEPING

There are multiple legal, policy and operational issues to consider when interpreting an individual mission’s POC mandate. The DPO POC Policy provides the conceptual framework, standard definitions, guiding principles, key considerations and the operational concept for the interpretation and implementation of the POC mandate. As a first step, all peacekeeping personnel should be aware of and understand the essential components of the POC mandate as set out in the DPO POC Policy.

Within country-specific Security Council resolutions, POC mandates can be broad and open or can be more prescriptive. Increasingly, the Security Council has included more detailed guidance on the strategic direction and tasks that a particular mission should undertake as part of the POC mandate. Any changes to the mandate language should be examined for their legal, policy and operational implications.

**Example of broad mandate:**

UNIFIL mandate language on POC (S/RES/1701 (2006)):

12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence . . .

**Example of prescriptive mandate:**

MINUSMA mandate language on POC (S/RES/2480 (2019)):

28 (c) Protection of civilians

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities, civilians under threat of physical violence;

(ii) In support of the Malian authorities, to take active steps to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to the civilian population, notably in the North and Center of Mali, through a comprehensive and integrated approach, and, in this regard:

- to strengthen early warning and to increase efforts to monitor and document violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law;

- to strengthen community engagement and protection mechanisms, including interaction with civilians, community outreach, reconciliation, mediation, support to the resolution of local and intercommunal conflicts and public information;

- to take mobile, flexible, robust and proactive steps to protect civilians, including through the deployment of ground and air assets, as available, in high risk areas where civilians are most at risk;

- to mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military or police operation, including by tracking, preventing, minimizing, and addressing civilian harm resulting from the mission’s operations;

- to prevent the return of active armed elements to key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats . . .
2.1.1 Interpreting mandate language

**‘Imminent’ threats**

Early mandate language on POC required the protection of civilians under ‘imminent threat of physical violence.’ In most multidimensional missions, the word ‘imminent’ has since been removed and the mandate now requires the protection of civilians under ‘threat of physical violence.’ This language change clarified that a mission can and should take proactive and preventive action to protect civilians under threat and that these actions can include all necessary means (including the use of deadly force). Those missions which still have ‘imminent’ threat within the POC mandate language are still expected to take a proactive and preventive approach to POC, but short of using force when the threat is not imminent.

**In support of the host state**

As the host state always bears the primary responsibility to protect civilians, most country-specific mandates include explicit language that the protection of civilians is without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the host state, so that the mission is not expected to substitute for the role of the host state in protecting the population. There may also be language in the mandate on certain tasks being in support of the host state (see, e.g., MINUSMA mandate language above). This highlights the importance of supporting the protection efforts and capacity of the host state, though it does not diminish the authorization for the mission to act independently to protect civilians, in particular, when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so. In situations where the host state has a history of failing to protect civilians or is itself a threat to civilians, the mandate language has sometimes not referenced support to the protection efforts of the host state. For example, when the UNMISS mandate was renewed in 2014, following the outbreak of war in South Sudan, the mandate changed to exclude language on support to the host state, including on protection.\(^{7}\)

**A priority mandate**

Most mandates are explicit that the protection of civilians is a priority for the mission in terms of its allocation of capabilities and resources. However, even where this is not stated in the country-specific mandate, the Security Council has been clear that where mandated, the protection of civilians is a priority unless the relevant Security Council resolution stipulates otherwise.\(^{8}\)

**All necessary means/all necessary action**

The mandate to protect civilians has always been accompanied by an authorization to use all necessary means or actions. This is the language used by the Security Council to authorize the full range of measures available to the mission, up to and including the use of deadly force.

**Within capabilities and areas of deployment**

The mandate to protect civilians is normally specified to be within the capabilities and areas of deployment of the mission. This limitation recognizes that peacekeeping operations have limited capacity and footprint and cannot protect everyone, everywhere, at all times. However, missions should consider the various threats to civilians when determining the mission footprint and deployment of resources and should be prepared to redeploy resources as necessary to respond to serious threats to civilians.

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7 S/RES/2155 (2014). Following the Revised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict on the Situation in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), subsequent UNMISS mandates have reinserted language on support to the state. See, e.g., S/RES/2459 (2019).

2.1.2 Who is a civilian?

Defining Civilians

Defining “civilians” and distinguishing them from combatants is a feature of international humanitarian law (IHL), which specifically applies to situations of armed conflict. However, the term “civilians” as used in POC mandates is also applied in contexts unrelated to armed conflict. A principal aim of IHL is to ensure that parties to conflict respect and protect those who are not or are no longer directly participating in hostilities, such as civilians. Under IHL, therefore, the main purpose of defining civilians is directly related to the obligation of those engaged in conflict to protect civilians from harm. Under IHL, civilians are generally defined as persons who are not members of the armed forces or of organized armed groups.

For the specific purposes of the POC mandate in peacekeeping, the DPO POC Policy sets out who is considered a civilian:

For the purposes of the protection of civilians mandate in peacekeeping, everyone is to be considered a civilian, except persons falling in one of the following categories:

- members of armed forces;
- members of organized armed groups who have continuous combat functions; and
- civilians directly participating in hostilities, for such time as they do so.

In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.

Everyone who is not excluded, as stated above, falls within the scope of the POC mandate. They may be preventively and proactively protected by a peacekeeping operation from threats of physical violence. Where a peacekeeping operation is deployed in a non-armed conflict situation, everyone except members of armed forces are civilians within the scope of the POC mandate.

In some situations, such as community-based violence or criminal gang activity, the perpetrators or potential perpetrators of violence against civilians will be other civilians. Where this is the case, the mission must make an operational decision on how to apply the POC mandate, with support from Headquarters, as required.
Examples: POC mandate application when civilians are perpetrators of violence against other civilians

- Where two armed groups or two armed communities are violently clashing, the mission would not normally be expected to intervene under the POC mandate to protect those participating in the clashes but would be expected to protect other civilians affected by those clashes.

- Where intercommunal violence involves attacks against civilians, rather than direct attacks against an armed adversary, the mission should intervene to protect.

- Where an armed mob attacks a group of unarmed civilians, the mission should intervene to protect.

- Where organized criminal entities are preying on the local civilian population, the mission should intervene to protect.

- Where a physically violent crime, unrelated to armed conflict, occurs in the presence or vicinity of peacekeepers, the mission should intervene to protect the victims of the crime. However, the mission cannot be expected to intervene or address all ordinary crime without an executive policing mandate.

- Where an individual on the premises of a UN peacekeeping operation (such as in a POC site in UNMISS) is committing crimes or causing violence to others, the mission should intervene to protect. However, as the individual is still a civilian, and if he/she is on UN premises to avoid harm from an armed conflict, the mission must still protect the individual. Where expelling him/her or handing him/her over to local government authorities would endanger him/her, the mission must respect the principle of non-refoulement.9

Distinguishing Civilians

In developing an understanding of the scope of the POC mandate, key mission documents on POC at strategic, operational and tactical levels should clarify who is a civilian that a peacekeeping operation may seek to protect where it has the capacity to do so. In distinguishing civilians, the mission should:

- Identify armed forces or organized armed groups operating in the mission area, members of which would not normally be civilians protected under the POC mandate, bearing in mind that:
  - The level of ‘organization’ of an armed group can be difficult to appreciate but the mission can consider factors such as the group’s structure and extent of its hierarchy, its control over a geographical area and its self-identification as an armed group.
  - Membership in an armed group or state security force may be difficult to ascertain but the mission can take into account factors including whether the individual(s) concerned are wearing a uniform or distinctive clothing or signs, carrying a weapon or taking active part in hostilities or attacks on civilians. However, absence of uniforms or signs is not definitive, as members of armed groups or state security forces may display no visible signs revealing their status.
  - Where an armed group has both a military and a political wing, persons involved only in the political wing would normally be considered civilians. Where political actors of any affiliation endorse orders for violence, they remain civilians, but it may not be advisable to exercise the POC mandate to protect them.

9 The principle of non-refoulement, reflected in different bodies of international law, protects a person from being transferred from one authority to another when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of being subjected to irreparable harm, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment, or other serious human rights violations.
Dependants of armed forces or an armed group would normally be considered to be civilians to the extent that they do not directly participate in hostilities.

A member of an armed force or armed group can become a civilian when he/she disengages from active duty or their fighting function and reintegrate into civilian life.

Recall that civilians who directly participate in hostilities are excluded from protection for such time as they do so. This may include civilians in self-defence groups. However, once they cease to engage in violence they should be protected.

Consider that possession of a weapon does not in itself prevent a civilian from being considered a civilian, especially in contexts where it may be tradition to carry a weapon (whether guns, machetes, knives, spears, etc.).

Remember that, in case of doubt, the individual or group of individuals shall be considered civilian and protected as civilians until determined otherwise.

Once the mission has identified those individuals or groups falling within the scope of the POC mandate, and determined that the POC mandate applies to protecting them, then the mission must prioritize among threats and civilians at risk, based on the prevention and response capabilities available (see chapter 8) as well as other relevant circumstances.

CASE STUDY

Opening the gates in South Sudan - Who to let in?

In December 2013, when violence broke out in Juba, and then quickly spread to other areas of South Sudan, thousands of people fled to UNMISS compounds seeking refuge. They were men, women and children of all ethnicities. In the immediate moment, and the initial days to follow, the mission had no time or capacity to assess who was coming in to the compounds. Two simple rules were established: no uniforms and no weapons. Anyone willing to abide by those rules was determined to merit protection. The reality of this was that many fighters arrived at the gates, laid down their guns, and changed clothes. Piles of weapons and fatigues grew at the gates, with the mission safely storing the former. This approach drew strong criticism from the government, particularly once fighting had died down and it was suspected that many former fighters were in the POC sites. However, UNMISS stood by its policy that these individuals, even if they were former fighters, should be protected once they ceased to directly participate in hostilities by effectively disengaging from their fighting function. This demonstrates the operational challenges in the field to determine who falls within the POC mandate.
2.2 THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR POC IN UN PEACEKEEPING

The operational concept for the protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping is set out in the DPO POC Policy. In accordance with the POC Policy, protection of civilians in peacekeeping is implemented through three tiers, namely, protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment, as outlined below.

**Tier I:**
Protection through dialogue and engagement

Tier I activities include active, structured and regular dialogue with perpetrators or potential perpetrators of violence against civilians; conflict resolution and mediation between parties to the conflict; advocating with the host government, its security institutions and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians; local conflict resolution and social cohesion activities; strategic communication; investigation; advocacy; reconciliation initiatives; reporting on human rights and protection concerns; and other initiatives that seek to protect civilians through communications, dialogue and direct or indirect engagement.

**Tier II:**
Provision of physical protection

Tier II encompasses activities by all mission components to physically protect civilians, whether through protective presence, interpositioning, the threat or use of force, or facilitating safe passage or refuge. Notably, Tier II includes activities by uniformed components involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to threats to civilians. However, civilian mission components can also act as a protective presence through their regular, visible and direct engagement with civilian populations at risk.

**Tier III:**
Establishment of a protective environment

Tier III activities are frequently programmatic in nature and designed with committed resources for peace-building and conflict prevention/resolution objectives. Sometimes presented as separate mandated tasks under country-specific resolutions, activities under Tier III help create a protective environment for civilians, prevent the (re-)emergence of threats of physical violence, support the legitimacy of the host state and its capacity to protect civilians, and support the (re-)establishment of the rule of law and criminal justice chain.

The three tiers are mutually accommodating and reinforcing and are implemented simultaneously and strategically in accordance with the mission mandate, mission phase and the circumstances on the ground. There is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing between the tiers.

The protection of civilians requires actions with both short-term and long-term outlook, based on an analysis of the environment, the phase of the conflict, if any, and the mission’s lifecycle, as well as the nature of the threat. The strategic approach to POC, and the three tiers, are therefore implemented along four phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Pre-emption</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Consolidation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>where no clear threat to civilians has been identified (longer term)</td>
<td>where likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated (short term)</td>
<td>where attacks against civilians are imminent or occurring (short term)</td>
<td>where violence against civilians is subsiding (longer term)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar to the tiers, these phases are not mutually exclusive and can overlap. There can be phases to individual threats in specific places and at specific times, and there can be phases to entire conflicts. The same action by the mission can potentially address various phases simultaneously.

### 2.3 RELATING POC IN PEACEKEEPING TO OTHER PROTECTION MANDATES

The protection of civilians in peacekeeping is linked to other UN protection mandates both within and beyond the peacekeeping operation.

#### 2.3.1 Within the peacekeeping operation

The POC mandate in UN peacekeeping is grounded in international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law, and reflects the desire of the Security Council to protect civilians from harm. As such, the POC mandate in peacekeeping is also linked to other protection mandates given to peacekeeping missions by the Security Council, in particular those on human rights, children and armed conflict (CAAC), conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and rule of law. The implementation of the POC mandate should support and reinforce the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. Interpreting the scope of the POC mandate therefore requires consideration of the interaction and complementarity of these other protection mandates.

#### Other Peacekeeping Protection Mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Scope and Focus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>• Protection and prevention based on law, advocacy and capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Addresses everyone and all human rights, not only physical integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)</strong></td>
<td>• Focuses on children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Built around the six grave violations (killing and maiming, recruitment or use,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sexual violence, abduction, attacks against schools or hospitals, denial of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>humanitarian access)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)</strong></td>
<td>• Focuses on women, girls, boys and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Requires a conflict-nexus, does not include all sexual and gender based violence (SGBV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule of Law</strong></td>
<td>• Protection and prevention based on support to criminal justice institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focuses on combatting impunity through investigations and prosecutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In understanding how the POC mandate mainstreams and relates to other peacekeeping protection mandates, missions should take into account:

- The Human Rights up Front initiative, a system-wide approach to identifying and preventing serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

- The integration of human rights components within the mission structure and their role in monitoring and reporting on violations, early warning, capacity building and technical assistance to the host state.

- Specific initiatives under the CAAC and CRSV mandates such as their monitoring and reporting systems (Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism [MRM] and Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements [MARA], respectively) and the process of listing persistent violators in reports of the Secretary-General.

To ensure coherence and complementarity between the mission’s protection mandates, there should be close coordination and cooperation between mission advisers and experts on the various protection mandates, including POC, child protection, women’s protection, gender, police, justice, corrections and human rights personnel (including where child protection and women’s protection are consolidated within human rights). These protection mandates should be seen as mutually reinforcing and supportive and efforts should be made to find ways to achieve mandated goals in an efficient way through coordination and cooperation.

**CASE STUDY**

**Shabunda Action Plan in DRC**

From November 2017, an increasing number of attacks against civilians by armed groups in several villages in Kigulube, in Shabunda territory, South Kivu, were reported. These attacks involved rapes, gang rapes, abductions, recruitments of children, forced labour, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, forced displacement and looting. To address the situation, MONUSCO, jointly with UN agencies and the Protection Cluster, developed a comprehensive “Shabunda Action Plan”, which was launched in 2019. The plan addressed: 1) restoration of state authority through increased national police and armed forces presence and capacity; 2) fight against impunity through technical and logistical support to military justice, investigation and prosecution of grave human rights abuses; 3) preventive engagement with armed group commanders on a roadmap to end CRSV, recruitment of child soldiers and other grave violations of child rights; and 4) community engagement, including with women and youth associations, to establish early warning mechanisms and protection networks and to promote social cohesion.

As a result of the Shabunda Action Plan…there was a significant decrease of CRSV in Shabunda in the first six months of 2019.

As a result, additional national security actors were deployed to the area. MONUSCO ensured that the officers deployed were trained in human rights, CRSV, child protection and POC. Support was also provided to the Congolese military justice system in investigations. A protection plan for victims/survivors and witnesses was developed by MONUSCO, UNHCR (through INTERSOS), and the Taskforce for Justice, composed of both national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On 26 March 2019, “Kokodikko,” the commander of the armed group Raia Mutomboki, and his deputy were arrested by the national armed forces. Other combatants from the same faction surrendered following the arrest. Mobile court sessions began in September 2019. MONUSCO also sought to engage with the faction and other armed actors in the area to sensitize them to protection concerns. MONUSCO further worked to sensitize community mediators and (continued)
civilians from Shabunda, with links to Raia Mutomboki, to pass advocacy messages on the need to end child recruitment and sexual violence. As a result of these combined efforts, the armed group was effectively neutralized.

The Mission also supported local capacity building and leadership through structured community dialogue to promote social cohesion enabling participants to work together to map conflicts and agree on remedial actions. MONUSCO strengthened its community-based early warning mechanisms, conducted engagement activities, and set up a communication network composed of women, youth and state security representatives.

As a result of the Shabunda Action Plan, in addition to the progress towards accountability, there was a significant decrease of CRSV in Shabunda in the first six months of 2019.

MONUSCO and other UN actors continue to work on other identified conflict drivers for a more sustainable impact of local actions, including advocacy for increased and continued presence of state authority as well as improving the road infrastructure and communication network along the Walungu-Kigulube axis. These improvements are crucial for humanitarian and security force access to Kigulube as well as for economic development.

2.3.2 Other UN protection mandates beyond peacekeeping

Different UN actors deployed to the same country or situation will have different mandates and roles with regard to the protection of civilians, and protection more broadly, and may use different definitions or work under different parameters. To identify complementarities and areas for coordination and cooperation (see chapter 6), it is therefore useful to understand their mandates and roles. It may also be necessary to distinguish the mandates of the different actors for the benefit of host state authorities, armed actors and local communities, who may perceive all UN entities to be the same.

Some protection mandates apply both within and beyond peacekeeping and are therefore presented twice in these sections. For example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is both integrated within peacekeeping operations and has a mandate beyond peacekeeping operations.
### UN Actor | Protection Role | Source of the Mandate
---|---|---
UNHCR | Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and lead agency for the Protection Cluster | GA Resolution A/RES/428(V) (1950)
OCHA | Coordination of humanitarian action | GA Resolution A/RES/46/182 (1991)
WFP | Food as an aid to economic and social development | GA Resolution A/RES/1714(XVI) (1961)
OHCHR | All human rights of all people | GA Resolution A/RES/48/141 (1993)
UN Women | Gender equality, empowerment and the advancement of women and girls | GA Resolution A/RES/64/289 (2010)
SRSG SVC | Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a peace and security issue | SC Resolution S/RES/1888 (2009)
TOE-RoL SVC | Criminal accountability for CRSV through investigations and prosecutions | SC Resolution S/RES/1888 (2009)

### Related Reference Documents
- DPKO Guidelines on the Role of the UN Police in Protection of Civilians (2017.12)
- OCHA Protection of Civilians Aide Memoire (https://poc-aide-memoire.unocha.org)
Chapter 3: Overcoming obstacles to POC

3.1 IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CONTEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS

Peacekeeping missions operate in increasingly complex contexts. The nature of conflict is changing and lines between conflict and post-conflict operating environments have become less clear. Armed groups proliferate and violence against civilians takes many forms and is carried out by various perpetrators. Conflicts include more unconventional threats, asymmetric threats and urban warfare, as well as cyber dimensions. Underlying causes of conflict may increasingly stem from organized crime, climate change or human migration. Impunity prevails. Host state consent to the presence of a peacekeeping operation may be tenuous and various international forces with different but overlapping objectives may operate in the same areas. Peacekeeping operations must constantly recognize these new realities and their associated challenges and adapt to respond to them, including in implementing POC.

There are a range of context-specific constraints that impact the implementation of POC mandates and that should be considered when designing strategic responses. The most common challenges, as well as suggested approaches for the mission to take, are included in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Suggested Approach</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **A weak or stalled peace process** may hinder protection of civilians as it can be challenging to build a protective environment in a contested space. In this context, the mission may have limited influence and leverage in relation to the political process. | ■ Ensure the short-term protection of civilians at the tactical level while also providing ongoing long-term support to the peace process at the strategic level, for example through the good offices function.  
■ Seek additional political support from the Security Council and influential Member States and third parties to further the peace process.  
■ Develop comprehensive strategies to address threats to civilians at the local level.  
■ Where feasible, support the longer-term capacity of rule of law, security and justice institutions as part of the creation of a protective environment. |
| **Threats to civilians posed by elements of state security forces** or their proxies are one of the biggest POC challenges faced by missions.  
This may be combined with tenuous consent to the mission presence by host state authorities, manifested in threats against or other restrictions on the mission, movement restrictions (violations of Status of Forces Agreements) or attacks against peacekeepers. | ■ Engage early, where possible, and at the highest levels, with political, security and justice actors to address violations of human rights and IHL. Adopt, as much as possible, an evidence-based approach and share information and analysis of state perpetrators and violations with relevant state authorities.  
■ Prioritize early political engagement and training (in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy [HRDDP], see chapter 11.4) and support to justice institutions.  
■ Be prepared to intervene physically to protect civilians at risk, including through interposition and robust posture.  
■ As feasible, seek support from Headquarters and the Security Council in advance should use of force be anticipated to be required.  
■ Report Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) violations so that the Secretariat can seek political support from the Security Council and influential Member States and third parties on the issue.  
■ Consistently seek access to populations at risk, taking into account safety and security of peacekeepers and civilians. |
| **Lack of accountability** of perpetrators may perpetuate cycles of violence and civilians may seek protection from other actors including non-state armed groups. | ■ Use the mission’s good offices to advocate for accountability for violations against civilians by all actors, state and non-state. Such advocacy should be directed at both state authorities and leadership of non-state armed groups, who can discipline their own forces.  
■ Support the capacity of rule of law, justice and corrections institutions, including through investigation and prosecution support, and witness protection, while also ensuring that perpetrators can be securely and safely detained.  
■ Engage Member States and the Security Council on alternative accountability mechanisms, including hybrid courts, where the state is unwilling or unable to pursue accountability. |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Suggested Approach</th>
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</table>
| Complexity posed by varied and intertwined conflict drivers can result in contradictory calls for action, including by external actors. | - Develop the POC strategy in coordination with all relevant stakeholders, taking the opportunity to discuss strategic threats, listen to different perspectives and develop an agreed approach, to the extent possible (see chapter 6).  
- Use the mission’s good offices to engage authorities and armed actors in the pursuit of political solutions where feasible, to achieve a sustainable and durable peace.  
- Use the mission conflict analysis and ongoing Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) analysis to develop a strategic approach to threats to civilians that takes into account both immediate needs and longer-term solutions. |
| There may not be agreement on the best response to strategic threats. Some may prefer the pursuit of military solutions while others favour political solutions for armed groups. Host states often call for robust security action against some armed groups or agitators who may not pose serious threats of violence to civilians or may have legitimate political claims and would benefit from a political solution. |                                                                                   |
| Peacekeeping missions may be deployed alongside other international forces, which may have different mandates and objectives. This may complicate the protection activities of the mission. | - Remember that any support provided to non-UN security forces must be provided in accordance with the HRDDP.  
- Take into account the possible impact on the implementation of the POC mandate when establishing relationships between the mission and other forces, including counter-terrorism operations. Proceed with caution if the actions of those forces directly or indirectly cause threats or harm to civilians or if association with them affects the populations’ perception of the mission.  
- Use strategic communication and public information to explain the difference between peacekeeping and other forces and clarify roles. |
| Asymmetric environments and tactics often result in threats to state symbols, security forces or peacekeepers themselves, who, as a result, may focus more attention, resources and capabilities on self-protection, therefore limiting the resources that can be devoted to POC. | - Examine threats to civilians and threats to peacekeepers that may stem from the same sources. Ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers and the protection of civilians are not contradictory.  
- Engage with civilian populations and gain their trust and support. Threats to peacekeepers can be reduced if the population is a source of information on perpetrators of threats.  
- Support third-party actors, for example NGOs, to carry out protection activities such as community dialogue and reconciliation, if direct engagement and action by the mission is not possible or advisable.  
- Be careful that the mission’s presence or activities do not cause harm to civilians, for example, in contexts where peacekeeping forces are the likely target of attacks. |
### Context

Addressing **intertwined and complex threats**, including community-based violence, widespread criminality or organized criminal networks, self-defence groups, militias or armed groups can be difficult when attempting to **distinguish civilians from combatants** or when linking **local conflicts to national political processes**.

Both asymmetric and complex environments may also bring confusion to determining ‘who is who’ and, as a result, pose a risk of inadequate or unlawful and indiscriminate **action by peacekeepers against communities** associated with the threat.

The **conflict environment** within which the mission is operating may **change** over time and the mission may be slow to respond to this change.

### Suggested Approach

- Seek to identify in advance who should be considered civilians and how the mission will make tactical decisions on the ground on who to protect. This should occur when analysing particular threats to civilians as part of the interpretation of the POC mandate and the development of a POC strategy.
- Map the different actors and conflicts to determine the best leverage points for engagement at the local and national levels.
- Take steps to mitigate civilian harm when engaged in military or police operations (see chapter 11.4).
- Constantly adapt and sequence the mission’s response to the lifecycle of a conflict, from addressing immediate and urgent threats (pre-emption and response phases) to dealing with latent threats and structural conflict drivers (prevention and consolidation phases).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Suggested Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lack of decisive deterrence</strong> mechanisms by the international community, as a whole, may result in pressure and expectations on a peacekeeping mission to fulfil a role that should be a shared responsibility supported by political and diplomatic efforts.</td>
<td>- Raise at a diplomatic level the need for greater political support and engagement by Member States, the Security Council and other influential actors. Senior mission leadership and the Secretariat should lead such efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **A negative perception and lack of acceptance** of a mission by local actors, including the population, can hinder its ability to protect. This can be caused by failures to protect civilians, harm caused by peacekeepers themselves, including through sexual exploitation and abuse, or perceived partiality of the mission’s actions or motives, which is often manipulated by those wishing to discredit the mission. | - Use a strategic communications strategy to manage expectations, explain the POC mandate and the mission’s approach, and address any rumours against the mission.  
- Invest in community engagement to build acceptance and access.  
- Ensure the highest standard of conduct of peacekeepers including through zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse.  
- Acknowledge protection failures, conduct prompt after action reviews (AARs) and investigations, implement the resulting recommendations and be transparent in the process. |
| **Divergence of views between the mission and relevant Security Council Sanctions Committees and their respective Panels of Experts, where applicable, in the identification of political spoilers and the use of targeted sanctions.** There may be a disagreement about the utility and potential unintended consequences of the use of sanctions. | - Help to mitigate or pre-empt differences of opinion with close engagement and discussion between the mission and Security Council Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts.  
- Factor in possible unintended consequences in mission plans when such differences cannot be reconciled. |
| **Geographical, physical and other access constraints**, including non-permissive environments, may hamper the ability of the mission to gather information, assess threats and respond to POC threats in certain areas. | - Prioritize POC in the allocation of mission capacities and resources and make efforts to access challenging areas. The mission can also consider using technological solutions such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or relying on information from other actors who may have better access.  
- Use a POC communications strategy to help manage expectations about the POC mandate and the ability of the mission to provide protection in certain areas. |
3.2 IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS

Certain systemic issues and challenges that impact the performance of peacekeeping, as a whole, will affect the implementation of POC mandates. These constraints have been identified in various internal and external reviews and evaluations of peacekeeping and of POC and include:

- **Challenges in force and police-unit generation and recruitment of personnel.**
- **Provision of inadequate or inappropriate assets and capabilities.**
- **Gaps in strategic and joint operational planning.**
- **Poor civilian-uniformed coordination, as well as generally siloed approaches.**
- **Language barriers between the mission and local communities.**
- **Lack of strategic communications, monitoring, evaluation and accountability.**
- **Undisclosed caveats placed on force and police activities by troop/police contributing countries.**

While these challenges are broader than the POC mandate, they impact the ability of the mission to protect civilians and addressing them will set the foundation for effective POC. Many of these issues need to be addressed at the strategic level, by UN Headquarters and mission leadership, but can be supported by other mission efforts. All mission components can report upwards on challenges and constraints that affect the implementation of the POC mandate.

Bearing these systemic constraints in mind, there are certain underlying conditions that will maximize the effectiveness of the mission’s POC planning and response and help overcome, or at least minimize, such constraints. These are:

- **The operational readiness** of military, police and civilian components is essential for effective peacekeeping and the protection of civilians. Force and police unit generation, screening and recruitment of personnel, including female personnel, must be timely, ensure the right skills and capabilities, and be followed by adequate pre-deployment and in-mission training, including on POC.

- **When faced with limited or insufficient resources and capabilities,** the mission will have to **prioritize** the most serious protection concerns and **be strategic** in its use of different mission capabilities and use of partnerships.

UNMISS conducts an integrated search operation for weapons and restricted items in a POC site to create a safe environment for IDPs. (2016)
The mission should also regularly and frankly assess its capacity to protect civilians and inform the Secretariat and Security Council accordingly, including through quarterly forward-looking threat assessments, and inform other stakeholders such as the local population.

- **Leadership and decision making** are vital, and mission leaders and managers are required to be decisive in utilizing every tool available to protect civilians under threat. Mission leadership, including at the subnational level, must therefore be ‘protection sensitive’. They must be willing to be proactive, undertake politically sensitive engagement, including with host state authorities, lead internal and external communication with regard to POC actions, and ensure mission personnel are prepared and equipped to fulfil their responsibilities.

- **Strategic planning** for POC is essential and should **align POC and political imperatives**. Political communication and engagement should take a more central role in mission POC strategies. Likewise, POC should be integrated into political strategies, as well as mission strategic planning and decision making, and therefore the prioritization of mission resources.

- **Effective coordination** at strategic, operational and tactical levels is necessary to overcome and synthesize the wide array of professional perspectives and cultures brought by civilian, police and military peacekeepers, as well as humanitarian, development or state actors. Missions must avoid siloed approaches and behaviour. Better coordination helps ensure a unified understanding of threats to civilians and what constitutes appropriate POC action. Coordination also helps to **operationalize POC**, which requires joint operational/tactical planning and centralized decision making. Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) and other operational coordination mechanisms therefore require dedicated capacity and should apply a POC lens to the coordination of operations.

- Implementing POC mandates requires timely, reliable and actionable information on threats to civilians, as well as analytical tools to evaluate the information. Efficient and proactive decision making on POC requires the systematic use of **early warning, peacekeeping-intelligence, information acquisition and/or analysis and assessment** tools, capabilities and/or processes. It also requires regular and structured information sharing, POC-sensitive situational awareness and threat assessments, and integration of analysis and recommendations.
- POC tools (see chapter 9), as well as other community engagement approaches (see chapter 10), should be leveraged to **build bridges between the mission and local communities**, and to assist the mission to understand local conflict dynamics and threats to civilians.

- The mission must **address harm to civilians posed by its own presence or actions** as a priority, as it may pose a strategic challenge to other POC activities and the overall ability of a mission to operate. Harm may be direct or indirect. While mainstreaming POC, mission leaders and managers are required to systematically identify and address these protection risks (see chapter 10.2).

- **Strategic communications and influence, both internally and externally**, are also key to effective POC. When designing POC strategies and plans, missions should pay attention to armed actors and community perceptions. Mission components involved in public information or engaging with state security forces and armed groups should be trained on POC. They should also be integrated into POC planning, strategizing and information-sharing mechanisms so that messaging is standardized and engagement on POC, particularly with perpetrators of violence, is coordinated.

- **Reinforced monitoring and evaluation to assess performance** (both institutional and individual), internal accountability and mechanisms to ensure institutional memory are all required to (re)direct POC approaches and capture and integrate lessons learned and best practices into POC planning response.

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**Related Reference Documents**


- Action for Peacekeeping Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations (2018)

- Rights Up Front: A Plan of Action to Strengthen the UN’s Role in Protecting People in Crises (2013)

- Human rights due diligence policy on UN support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP) (A/67/775-S/2013/110)

- Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13)


- DPKO Guidelines on the Role of the UN Police in Protection of Civilians (2017.12)

- DPKO-DFS Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (2015.16)

Part II: Leadership, planning, coordination and strategic communication

UNMIL’s SRSG attends a UN medal ceremony. (2008)
UNMIL/Christopher Herwig
Chapter 4: Leading on POC

**WHAT**
Mission leaders and managers — at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) — must ensure that the protection of civilians is at the heart of the mission’s political strategy. They must address strategic threats efficiently, provide a strategic vision, decide on resource allocation and sequencing of efforts, and ensure that POC is mainstreamed in all plans and performance processes.

**WHY**
As a whole-of-mission responsibility and a priority mandate, the protection of civilians must be driven from the top. Within the framework of the DPO POC Policy, mission leaders and managers are accountable for the implementation of the POC mandate and must ensure that the mission takes the most effective approach to POC and that there is coherence with other mandated tasks.

**HOW**
Effective strategic leadership on POC begins with linking political and POC objectives and planning, including in command and control and operational readiness. Mission leadership must prioritize civilian harm mitigation and consider coherence with other UN actors. Leadership also requires resource management and innovation, as well as maximizing the specialist capacities of the POC unit.

**WHO**
Mission leadership is ultimately responsible for POC mandate implementation, with support from their advisers, including POC Advisers. Leaders at all levels set the expectations for their teams.

**WHERE**
Leadership on POC is exercised at mission headquarters, in dialogue with and with support from UN Headquarters, and at the field-office level.

**WHEN**
Effective strategic leadership on POC begins at mission start-up and continues throughout the lifecycle of the mission. Mission leadership must also determine when and to what extent to use security approaches and force to protect civilians.

### 4.1 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

#### 4.1.1 Human rights up front: a moral obligation and collective responsibility

The promotion and protection of human rights is an important tool for prevention of harm to civilians, as recognized by the adoption of the Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative by the Secretary-General in 2013. Human rights monitoring, analysis and reporting help to identify warning signs of crisis and conflict that, if left unaddressed, can lead to conflict, and form a strong basis for Member States, the UN system and the international community to identify solutions to address risks and prevent such crises. The HRuF initiative was established to strengthen the preventive work of the UN to utilize early warning signals to avert crises. It aims to help the UN act more coherently across the pillars of the Organization’s work to meet its responsibilities to prevent and respond to serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. It also seeks to improve the functioning of the UN system and performance of UN personnel in this regard. Coordination, information sharing, advocacy and proactive engagement with key stakeholders, including Member States, are key to HRuF.
Mission leaders and managers hold a collective responsibility to be protection-sensitive; they must respect and disseminate the core human rights values of the United Nations at all times. Mission leaders are role models for all personnel and represent UN Peacekeeping to partners. A mission’s legitimacy and credibility rely on the consistency of its support to the human rights agenda and its ability to meet protection expectations. The protection of civilians is therefore often compared to a moral imperative, one which leaders should publicly commit to and own.

4.1.2 Accountability for implementing the POC mandate

In line with the DPO POC Policy, senior mission leaders are responsible and accountable both for their own strategic actions and guidance and for ensuring that organizational and individual performance management systems are fully utilized to ensure that all relevant personnel in missions are accountable for the implementation of their tasks and responsibilities and for meeting performance expectations in the delivery of POC mandates of missions.

To ensure effective performance and accountability, senior leaders in missions with POC mandates should include a strategic objective on POC in their Senior Manager’s Compact, aligned with mandate priorities, the mission’s strategic objectives and the leader’s oversight role.

Example: POC Strategic Objective for Senior Managers Compact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Expected Accomplishment</th>
<th>Performance Measure</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fulfil leadership responsibilities to implement the mission’s POC mandate.</td>
<td>The mission effectively protects civilians through the activities of all components, within resources and capabilities, and taking into account the host government’s primary protection responsibilities.</td>
<td>Compliance of the mission with organizational and DPO policies and guidance on the protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping, including minimum requirements to implement the POC mandate:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ POC strategy reviewed on an annual basis and revised as necessary</td>
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<td>▪ POC coordination and joint operations mechanisms established and meeting regularly at all levels</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Quarterly forward-looking POC threat assessment shared with Headquarters</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ POC contingency plans prepared</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ POC military and police orders issued</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3 Core responsibilities of senior leaders

The DPO POC Policy sets out the core responsibilities of senior leaders for the implementation of POC mandates. Senior leaders should be aware of these responsibilities and implement them; a few are elaborated here.

1. Define the strategic and political approaches to POC, as well as the link to the overall mission political and communications strategy

Ensuring a strategic approach to POC requires politically led plans and actions that address strategic, operational and tactical-level threats to civilians.

Leaders should therefore define a political approach to addressing each identified POC threat. These will include: strategies to affect the intent and actions of perpetrators and spoilers, mobilizing or supporting influencers and other protection actors and managing perceptions and expectations. As part of this political approach to POC, leaders and managers will define how and when to engage with and persuade perpetrators, mobilize or support other actors and make use of strategic communication, including to denounce perpetrators.
For this approach to succeed, mission leaders may want to pay specific attention to **ensuring mission impartiality, credibility and legitimacy**. For instance, as expectations will always exceed a mission’s ability to protect, public recognition of the multiple challenges facing POC operations, and sensitization as to efforts underway to address them, is of strategic importance.

**Mission leaders should combine strategic communication and decisive action.** Activities performed by the uniformed components demonstrating the mission’s willingness to take action will convey a message about the commitment of the mission to protecting civilians. These activities are far more convincing and powerful than any press statement, media article or statement by a mission leader.

This political approach to POC should create the necessary space for overall and longer term political and stabilization strategies, aiming to address the root causes of the conflict, restore peace and security and, as a result, ensure long-term protection of civilians. In cases where the political agenda of non-state armed groups is limited or non-existent (e.g., violent extremism), the mission’s political approach may consider opening and sustaining a political space for civilians facing state failure, the absence of the rule of law, or weak infrastructure and economies that exacerbate intercommunal violence or intensify popular support for extremism.

To ensure success of a comprehensive approach to POC, or, at minimum, a coordinated approach to actions on POC, mission leaders should establish dedicated POC coordination and/or operations mechanisms aimed at dealing with emerging or actual threats and risks to civilians (see chapter 6). Response plans per threat and a liaison or engagement matrix can also assist in clarifying internal mission leads for engagement per category of external actors.
2. Plan for success: moving from outputs to outcome and impact

Mission leaders are expected to devise a vision for effective POC and integrate the strategic and political approaches to POC in the mission concept and POC strategy. Throughout the mission planning processes at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, leaders and managers should:

- Ensure the mechanisms, resources and skills are in place for joint planning at all levels;
- Order the identification of priority threats to civilians and the development of operational and tactical prevention and response, or contingency plans for each priority threat or risk identified;
- Ensure compliance with the overall strategic and political approach to POC and dissemination of the POC strategy to all staff to be used as the basis for planning POC action;
- Ensure that heads of section at all levels understand their POC responsibilities and the role of their section and build POC activities into their strategic plans in line with the mission POC strategy;
- Constantly balance and synchronize actions and resources aiming to reach short-term POC success and those aiming to ensure longer term peace and stability;
- Ensure that UN-led programmatic activities are in support of the POC mandate and POC strategic outcome and impact objectives;
- Ensure monitoring and evaluation of POC actions in line with the relevant output, outcome and impact indicators;
- Provide guidance on actions aiming at synergized and coordinated approaches with the UNCT, and humanitarian and development actors;
- Provide avenues for dialogue and engagement with national and local government actors, as well as other parties to the conflict, to mitigate risks and/or develop alternatives to conflict including conflict resolution and peacebuilding; and
- Ensure that effective early warning and information gathering mechanisms are in place alongside functional operational and tactical planning.

3. Mainstream military and police action in the mission’s planning and execution and build consensus on the use of force

Heads of missions or their representatives, advised by the heads of the military and police components, should determine when to use security action (military and police), when to use force, and to what effect. Mission leaders, as well as the military and police components, must be sensitive to the difference between use of force to protect civilians from violence by perpetrators and use of force to protect UN staff and assets from attacks.

The gradual use of force should not be seen as contradictory or an impediment to political solutions, but, rather, as an enabler to apply credible deterrence or physical prevention whenever violence against civilians occurs or is about to occur. Indeed, many situations may not require the use of security means or force. The question therefore lies more in the determination of when and how military or police action, and, as required, force, will be utilized. Mission leaders
should ensure that the military and police components are supported by a wide range of civilian actions and programmes while responding to a developing security situation.

As defined in a mission’s ROE and DUF, the use of force by peacekeeping operations must be proportional to the threat at hand and can range from a defensive presence, crowd control and the conduct of visible exercises, to the show of force and, when required, the use of deadly force (see chapter 12.4). Further details on the use of military or police components to ensure POC are contained in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—Department of Field Support (DPKO-DFS) POC Military Guidelines and POC Police Guidelines as well as the DPO Directives on the Use of Force.

Field commanders may be disinclined to act or use force if they are unclear about the vision and intent of the leadership, about the nature of the target and what is allowed or not allowed in a specific situation. Equally, the military and police components must be aware of how the use of force at the tactical level might be politicized and have negative consequences for the mission and its strategic relationships.

☑️ **Checklist: Mission leaders should therefore:**

- Be aware of constraints on the mission’s freedom of movement and act to ensure freedom of movement for the mission. It is important to create an understanding across the mission of the necessity of freedom of movement for the mission to carry out the POC mandate, to protect civilians from physical violence.
- Ensure POC strategies are concise, unambiguous and that they are consistent with the ROE/DUF.
- Clarify the scope of POC action with the military and police leadership, including defensive actions to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance. This includes clarifying the scope of proactive actions to deal with emerging threats to prevent or stop violence against civilians.
- Ensure proactive and clear interpretation of the tactical actions required and authorized under the POC mandate, as well as the conditions for the use of force, possibly through joint contingency planning, a mission-specific tactical POC handbook and table top exercises (TTX).
- Prioritize prevention before response where possible. This requires better understanding of the threats and how to affect them with different means. It also allows the mission to use the full range of capabilities available. Mission leaders and managers may therefore wish to ensure that analysis and political action always support and guide security activities, including at the tactical level.
- As a POC situation unfolds, ensure field commanders are empowered to take proactive prevention and response actions locally, as required by a tactical situation. Reassure field commanders that the use of force against a perpetrator is authorized and may be required, and that they will not face retribution should collateral damage occur, as long as they strictly comply with the ROE/DUF.
While the Democratic Republic of the Congo has seen progressive stabilization over the past years, in the East of the country civilians still face critical protection concerns. Supporting the Government, particularly the Congolese Army (FARDC) and National Police (PNC), to provide safety and security for all civilians is therefore a strategic objective.

I believe we have been able to provide closer protection to civilians by deploying, as quickly as possible, more nimble military structures, known as Standing Combat Deployments (SCD), in addition to more permanent bases in conflict-prone areas. Supporting the protection of civilians does not however, end there. The work of our uniformed personnel primarily serves to open space for civilian personnel to engage in view of working towards more sustainable solutions.

To reach our very ambitious and critical goals in terms of POC, we are therefore implementing a strategy that addresses all three aspects of the humanitarian protection concept: prevention and response, remedial action and support for the establishment of a protective environment. In this regard, we developed a robust response capacity with local actors to mitigate threats, including building community resilience and early warning mechanisms based on community protection plans.

More broadly, our POC tools include a Must-Should-Could Protect Matrix, Community Liaison Assistants, Joint Protection Teams, Community Alert Networks and Joint Assessment Missions. We will continue improving all these tools in the provinces affected by armed group activities that threaten the civilian population and cause continued suffering and population displacement.

4.1.4 Civilian harm mitigation: ensure conduct and discipline and accountability

A key POC responsibility of mission leaders is to ensure missions do not harm civilians by their presence or actions. Ensuring that the mission does not harm or negatively impact civilians is of strategic importance to ensure the acceptance of the mission in country. Sexual exploitation and abuse are strictly prohibited and must be addressed in accordance with relevant procedures. Zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse is a requirement for the effective protection of civilians. The use of force by the mission must comply with the ROE/DUF and international humanitarian law, where applicable, and must proactively minimize the potential consequences for the civilian population.

Steps to mitigate harm to civilians should be undertaken for all mission activities that could result in risks to civilians, but measures are particularly important in relation to operations that may include the use of force. Mission leaders should therefore ensure that rigorous measures are taken to prevent all instances of direct or indirect harm, including through the establishment of tools, mechanisms and processes to systematically:

- Identify how the peacekeeping operation’s presence and activities could affect civilians prior to the implementation of an activity or operation;
- Take steps to try to prevent or mitigate the harm that could result from the activity or operation;
- Track the positive and negative impact of the operation on the civilian population; and
- Take steps to integrate lessons learned to prevent or mitigate future harm.

12 Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13).
In some cases, the mission’s use of force may trigger obligations to prevent or mitigate harm under international humanitarian law. In contexts where peacekeeping operations are providing support to other armed actors, such as host state security forces or regional or coalition operations, the mission will also analyse the risks of, monitor the impact of, and take steps to mitigate the harm that those forces may cause during their operations — in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (see chapter 11.4).

Mission leaders aiming to establish rigorous measures to prevent all instances of direct or indirect harm will promote the mainstreaming of POC, human rights, child protection and gender across all components and apply a protection lens to all plans and activities conducted. Vulnerabilities vary within a community, so it is important to analyse the risk that a mission may pose to different members of a population (e.g., men, boys, women, girls, persons with disabilities, older persons, those who are economically disenfranchised and ethnic, political or religious minorities).

Ensuring proactive transparency, while respecting the safety and dignity of witnesses, victims and their families, is also of strategic importance. All harm done to civilians, directly or indirectly, should be tracked, investigated, analysed and addressed. This includes ensuring, as appropriate, that the applicable disciplinary or accountability measures are taken, and making amends for harm caused. Amends should be made even in cases where the harm was caused by operations conducted within the principles set in the ROE/DUF and the mission’s code of conduct.

4.2 OPERATIONS COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Move beyond reactive or ad hoc responses and motivate the mission to be proactive in implementing the POC mandate

Numerous evaluations point to the fact that POC responses are usually ad hoc or incident-driven. Lack of deliberate action and consistency in approach creates confusion for peacekeeping personnel and partners, and sometimes inability to implement or follow up on previous decisions because shifting major resources and capabilities requires time and resources. It is important to establish a consistent approach that focuses on early and preventive action.

Displaying a willingness to intervene under adversity and apply a proactive stance is strategic, as reclaiming the initiative will provide peacekeepers with a dominant psychological position over armed groups or spoilers, in support of host state authority and the rule of law.

Effective POC, including for physical protection, depends heavily on engaged and supportive leadership. Guidance for leading successful operations includes:

- The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) should initiate action from the top, and personally tackle the most complex and strategic POC threats, particularly through engagement and/or coordination with high-level host state officials.

- At the strategic level, should the SRSG lack time to lead all POC operations, he or she should designate and empower a dedicated senior mission lead on POC and crisis management, normally his or her deputy.

- At operational and tactical levels, the POC Adviser or Focal Point will ensure that each POC threat has a designated lead, and that appropriate response plans are developed, resourced, implemented and supported by all relevant personnel and external actors.

- When delegating authority for a threat, decision or implementation, mission leaders need to ensure that a delegate is fully informed and confident, that his or her authority is clear and accepted by all mission personnel, including partners and host authorities, and that relations with partners and host authorities are clear. Mission leaders should request regular updates from delegates.
When a situation is stalled at lower levels or is at risk of escalation, mission leaders should be prepared to intervene, take decisions, help to identify innovative solutions, and to take political action with high-level decision makers or influencers. Examples of this include contacting a relevant minister or other ranking official in the host government, reorienting a physical manoeuvre, communicating publicly on a topic, convening a political event to diffuse tensions, or leading a joint visit with state authorities to a hotspot to prevent escalation of violence and provide guidance to tactical-level actors.

2. Take the lead in strategic communications and relations with external actors to persuade or deter perpetrators

Mission leaders and managers generally act as the main interface with the host state and a range of external actors. They lead and define the mission’s positioning and outreach or engagement efforts.

Such efforts will naturally build on the POC risk analysis, which includes an assessment of the intent and capacity of perpetrators, spoilers, influencers and other protection actors. As part of the political approach to POC, leaders and managers should define how and when to engage with and persuade perpetrators, as well as how and when to mobilize or support other actors and communicate publicly to this end.

Despite its highly sensitive nature, mission leaders should not shy away from tackling violence perpetrated by host government security forces or government proxies. Rather, leaders should use the range of options at their disposal to mediate and convince, deter spoilers, support positive forces, or mobilize strategic and other external influencers. They can also leverage specific tools, including national or international accountability mechanisms, political opportunities and the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

Alongside host state partners, mission leaders and managers will also build strategic partnerships with development, humanitarian and human rights actors and/or the media to apply further pressure on perpetrators and spoilers or address broader dynamics of violence, including at the regional level.
When confronted with political and security dynamics beyond the mission’s theatre of operations, mission leaders can mobilize strategic-level support through inter-mission cooperation and coordination with regional or international actors, including UN offices and organs, neighbouring states, regional organizations and the Security Council and its mechanisms (Sanctions Committees, Panels of Experts, etc.).

3. Manage risks, ensure time-critical decision making and consistency

Certain challenges may hamper bold, robust or proactive POC decision making, such as:

| Complex POC threats and conflict dynamics | Numerous and contradicting pieces of information, analysis, recommendations or requests from staff and external actors, or insufficient reliable and integrated information available | Unknowns and dilemmas as to the consequences of decisions | Potential political, POC and security risks, including for the mission and peacekeeping personnel | Risks of accusations of excessive use of force or use of military solutions, or perceptions of partiality | Lack of time and resources |

However, most of these challenges and risks can be managed or mitigated to a certain degree by:

- **Making decisions and tasking clear and concise.** Even in complex situations, it is preferable to give clear instructions to accountable actors rather than a long list of recommended actions.

- **Consulting integrated mechanisms** (operations planning and coordination teams, POC Working Group, Humanitarian Country Team, Protection Cluster, etc.). These working-level groups can research and prepare joint options and recommendations for leadership to consider, with pros and cons, including a political, POC and security risk analysis and proposed mitigation measures for each option. Should confidentiality be required, consider assembling a small team of handpicked expert personnel.

- **Building alliances with, and support from, key stakeholders, including partners and influencers.** For instance, inform, consult and mobilize host state authorities, humanitarians, communities or key Member States on a course of action so that they may assist in building support and changing the narrative on a developing situation, the mission’s actions and associated risks.

Finally, when considering a course of action, always keep in mind the risks associated with inaction, including:

- Escalating violence related to the POC threat, leading to criticism around lack of action, as missions are often the centre of attention of the international community and media, or a scapegoat for host authorities unable or unwilling to act;

- Loss of morale amongst peacekeeping personnel and partners, who may become passive or even spoilers in the future;

- Loss of credibility with perpetrators, the Security Council and/or the public, which will in turn affect ability to operate and achieve success.

Taking risks is necessary and it may require time to build support and ensure success. Once made, decisions may require staying the course, despite short term criticism that may arise.
4. Maintain morale, encourage innovation and teamwork

To ensure maximum effectiveness, mission leaders and managers should pay specific attention to the morale of their personnel and partners. Beyond the usual challenges related to working in a peacekeeping operation, staff morale is constantly put to the test and often negatively affected by the inevitable failures to deliver fully on a challenging mandate such as POC. Further, the consequences of POC failures, when many people die, can be devastating. Mission leaders and managers are therefore advised to mobilize, sensitize, convince and ‘lead by example’ all peacekeeping and/or United Nations personnel. **Regular field visits are recommended.** Such visits also contribute to ensuring compliance with the strategic approach to POC – i.e., political, proactive, deliberate and integrated.

- **Conduct regular field visits**
- **Communicate the POC vision regularly**
- **Listen to mission staff**

Staff confidence in a mission’s vision, stance and actions are key to POC success. Mission leaders and managers have a unique responsibility to guide, support and provide the necessary feedback required to mobilize, motivate, and frame the mind-set of personnel. While sensitive decisions, particularly at the strategic level, may need to be made in closed circles, that does not prevent mission leaders and managers from **regularly communicating the POC vision** to personnel and partners. It is also essential to **listen to mission staff** and their concerns and recommendations.

- **Commend efforts and provide feedback**
- **Empower personnel to innovate and reward initiative**

Making decisions is part of the leader’s job; a leader should also determine how decisions are received by those working with and for them. To manage expectations, mitigate frustrations or criticism, and create the space or support of personnel and partners to ensure maximum effect, mission leaders should also make sure to **commend efforts and provide feedback** about reports, analysis or recommendations provided. Failing to do so, particularly for transmitted alerts and recommendations, will result in low morale, poor external support and possibly active opposition to decisions and actions.

Finally, mission leaders and managers should also **empower personnel to innovate and openly commend or reward initiative and exemplary POC actions**. This will result in enhanced motivation and will also create new and more efficient ways of operating. For instance, the establishment of community-based mechanisms and the use of technology can greatly improve the transmission of early warning information and alerts; the use of social media and community radios can help build appropriate lines of messaging and counter negative propaganda campaigns and rumours; and the use of specific international legal mechanisms can affect perpetrators’ intent.

5. Strengthen planning and coordination of operations

Mission leadership should see joint planning between the components, at all levels, as a prerequisite for effective POC. Coordination mechanisms and processes should be conceived as ways to set appropriate operational and strategic objectives for the implementation of the mission’s mandate. Mission leaders and managers should therefore ensure that adequate joint mechanisms to coordinate and plan operations are in place and that POC strategic objectives are inserted as a central aspect of broader mission analysis, operations and political engagement.

Leaders should consider **addressing silo dynamics**. Currently many missions collect, process and analyse information with a variety of disparate and uncoordinated reporting methodologies and technologies, often on an ad hoc basis. As a result, the situational awareness landscape is a picture of fragmented information streams that are vertically oriented (“stove-piped”) into single-use areas and not shared between mission components and sections. This greatly hinders decision making and makes holistic views of a mission’s environment very difficult, if not impossible.
A standardized, comprehensive and integrated approach to situational awareness, such as through mission-wide use of the Unite Aware platform, can remedy the fragmented and “stove-piped” approach to managing critical information flow in missions. Additionally, leaders should consider streamlining coordination mechanisms, as mission components and sections often wish to establish and lead their own coordination mechanism on a specific topic or thematic issue. Streamlining will also help avoid dispersion and inadequate attendance, and the resulting lack of decision making on POC. Creating a common situational understanding and enhancing and streamlining coordination requires leveraging the roles and responsibilities of various mission actors. This includes:

- **Integrated situational awareness and the coordination of operations** falls under the responsibility of the JOC in most missions. The JOC is available to support the coordination of POC operations in line with an SOP, which describes how different components relate to others on operations coordination and POC early warning, alerts and response. The POC working group or equivalent could therefore become a technical resource focused on non-kinetic POC activities (guidance, training, etc.), and/or provide technical support to the JOC or any other mechanisms responsible for operations coordination on POC.

- **Integrated threat analysis** falls under the responsibility of the JMAC. The JMAC should be tasked to systematically integrate POC into its threat and risk assessments or analysis. POC Advisers and officers, POC technical groups and other mission components should be encouraged to contribute to integrated analysis through appropriate mission-specific channels, not compete with or duplicate it. Threat and risk assessments must be shared.

- **Monitoring, investigation and public reporting on violations** of international human rights and humanitarian law falls under the responsibility of the human rights component, in coordination with child protection and women’s protection advisers. Outputs from human rights monitoring, including consolidated data, trend or pattern analysis on violations must be shared and should feed into POC threat assessments, reporting and decision making. Information on threats to civilians or relevant to early warning can and should be shared even before being corroborated/verified.

- Political affairs and public information sections should always be represented in operations coordination mechanisms to ensure alignment with **political action and public information** under the communications and influence strategy.
All mission components must acknowledge the importance of adherence to a standardized methodology, and equally how a common terminology, labelling and categorization of threats will enhance common situational understanding related to POC.

Operations coordination meetings should be held regularly and should not depend on the activation of crisis management mechanisms. This will avoid debates around the threshold of what constitutes a ‘crisis’ as well as ‘business as usual’ attitudes in the face of looming POC threats.

The individuals leading operational or tactical planning and coordination are key to POC success. Their skills must be adequate and their roles and responsibilities clear, and they should be supported by all components and partners.

Regular video teleconferencing (VTC) between mission leaders, managers and field offices (Heads of Offices and field commanders) should be held, with POC analysis and action inserted as a regular agenda item for those discussions.

6. Promote civil-police-military coordination

In UN peacekeeping, all mission components — civilians, police and military — play a role in the protection of civilians. The military and police have expert knowledge of security issues, and accumulated experience on the management of large groups of personnel, as well as on planning and conducting operations in the field. To work with the military and police components, and obtain results, it is essential to understand their ways and means (tactics, techniques and procedures). It is also essential to sensitize and train the military and police on how to implement the POC mandate and on the role of civilian mission components. Some suggested approaches include:

- Organize overall operational coordination and decision-making mechanisms around planning, operations and peacekeeping-intelligence/information-management thematic areas, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Note that integrated functions under the mission Chief of Staff (COS) are designed the same way: Strategic Planning, JOC and JMAC.

- Understand who is who and how they operate. For POC, the most relevant military officers under the commanders are, Intelligence (G/J/U2), Operations (G/J/U3), Plans (G/J/U5) and CIMIC/Human Rights/Civil Affairs (G/J/U9). They fall under the Deputy Force Chief of Staff for Operations (DCOS OPS). The most relevant police personnel for POC will be those under the Deputy Chief of Operations (Police), the chief of the police operations centre, and the police intelligence chief, if available. The military and police operations leadership are responsible for constantly following situations and threats at hand and coordinating the response on behalf of the military and police leadership.

- Respect an etiquette of engagement. Refrain from telling uniformed personnel ‘how’ to conduct an operation, but rather present to them the expected ‘effect’ and request, or exchange on, the ‘options available’.

- Understand military and police component constraints. The operational strength of the military or police component is usually limited to the largest unit capable of conducting a coordinated operation in the same area — which would normally be up to a company size (maximum 150 individuals) — and the enablers to support it. Hence, the ability to counter threats will be determined by these constraints.

- Stand by troops in difficult times. Engage commanders to give them a chance to address any concerns and challenges before considering further actions.
- **Sensitize and support** military and police colleagues, on the need to:
  - Ensure coordinated military-police security action in support of the POC political strategy.
  - Understand the strategic cost of civilian harm caused by the mission and address it as a priority. Move from an enemy-centred approach to planning to a people-centred approach and ensure broad and integrated planning of POC and security operations (for example by including state security forces in JOC and POC working groups, where appropriate). Ensure integrated analysis for POC and security threats, particularly with JMAC and the POC Adviser and POC working group.
  - Retrieve external information through engagement or in close coordination with civilian components, respecting leads inscribed in a liaison matrix, particularly for communication with national authorities, communities and humanitarian actors.
  - Engage civilian components in planning responses to POC threats, including their understanding of the perpetrators and populations at risk and potential consequences of any actions by uniformed components.
  - Understand they do not own the POC information set and need to share information on POC and security with civilian components.

- **Promote civil-police-military coordination forums** and ensure coherence between the mission and host state POC priorities and country-specific guidelines and strategies of the Humanitarian Country Team and Protection Cluster. This may involve developing SOPs on coordination and cooperation between peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, which support overarching protection principles inscribed in international human rights and humanitarian law, including for the sharing of alert and early warning information and the protection of victims and witnesses.
### 4.3 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CAPABILITIES

Some capabilities and resources are of particular importance to ensure the success of the POC mandate. They include military capabilities and human resources, but also programmatic activities and funds, geared to meet POC objectives.

**Strategic capabilities** are required to gather information and ensure physical protection through projection and deterrence. They include:

Beyond capabilities, troop or police **profile and posture** can have immense protective effects, including through presence in strategic areas, use of night operations and day and night vehicle and foot patrolling.

**Operational and tactical capabilities and resources** will contribute to operational planning and coordination, information collection, early warning and rapid response. All require dedicated capacity, funds and equipment.

- POC operations will not benefit from capacity within components and sections if they are not properly coordinated for mutual reinforcement. The creation of a **civilian position to overview planning, analysis and coordination under the mission COS** (similar to the DCOS OPS for the military or the Deputy Chief of Operations for the police) may greatly enhance operational unity of vision and action.

- Dedicated **human resources under the JOC, POC Unit and Strategic Planning Unit (SPU)** (see below) and **Heads of Offices** are necessary to ensure operational planning and coordination.

- Staff and programmes can focus on **assessing community perceptions** by monitoring community radios and conducting community perception surveys.

- **Gender, Women's Protection and Child Protection Advisers and Officers**, including focal points within the military and police, ensure gender and child protection mainstreaming.

- **Community Liaison Assistants, community outreach programmes and Community Alert Networks** all contribute to community engagement and sensitization and enable the establishment of alert networks for early warning and response.

- **Rapid response mobile teams** provide a range of skillsets to ensure rapid prevention and response to POC threats, support assistance to victims and fight impunity for criminal violence and human rights violations.

- **Joint Protection Teams and Joint Assessment Missions** (conducted with humanitarians) inform threat and risk assessments and POC planning.

- **Joint Investigation Teams** (including with host state authorities), **Prosecution Support Cells** and programmes to support national authorities and justice sector institutions, including **mobile courts**, support the rule of law and accountability for violence against civilians.

**Other programmatic activities** directly contribute to POC, including:

- **Victim and witness protection programmes**, which are generally managed by the human rights and police components, in support of the host state, and

- Stabilization funds, particularly for rapid stabilization activities, including **dialogue and conflict resolution**, **community violence reduction (CVR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)** and depollution of explosive remnants of war (ERWs) and demining.

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<th>Projection assets including mobility assets</th>
<th>Deterrence assets including combat-ready troops and formed police units (FPUs), particularly special forces, Quick Reaction Forces or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams</th>
<th>Strategic peacekeeping-intelligence and information collection capabilities, including UAVs or communications surveillance capabilities</th>
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<td>to access difficult terrains — helicopters and off-road vehicles as a priority — and enablers to enhance access (engineering capabilities)</td>
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Training Resources

Capabilities and resources for integrated training and exercises on POC are required, covering all peacekeeping personnel. Mission leaders and managers are advised to prioritize POC training and allocate the necessary resources to enable Integrated Mission Training Centres (IMTC) to perform their role in empowering all UN staff members with the right knowledge of concepts, priorities, principles and relevant tasks, roles and responsibilities for POC. Missions should coordinate training needs with Headquarters and request deployment of mobile training teams (MTTs), as needed, to increase training capacities on POC in-mission.

4.4 COHERENCE/COORDINATION WITH OTHER UN ENTITIES

Peacekeeping missions are often established in countries subject to other UN mandates related to protection. In addition to all the other UN protection actors operating on the ground (see chapter 6), several UN mechanisms/entities operate externally, potentially visiting the country or region on mission. These can include Security Council sanctions regimes, human rights special procedures, commissions of inquiry (whether mandated by the Security Council, Human Rights Council or General Assembly) and accountability mechanisms. In some contexts, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is also active. Peacekeeping operations may be mandated to support the work of such entities.

None of these mechanisms operates in a vacuum. The measures are most effective at maintaining or restoring international peace and security, promoting and protecting human rights and ensuring accountability for violations of international law when applied as part of a comprehensive strategy. Therefore, peacekeeping operations must consider how best to coordinate with such mechanisms and ensure coherence, while pursuing distinct objectives. Much of the work of these mechanisms will overlap with peacekeeping mandated activities, including in areas related to the protection of civilians. Further, many of the mechanisms receive large international media coverage when releasing statements and reports. These can impact peacekeeping operations on the ground, which, as the largest and most visible UN presence in a country, are often misconstrued as responsible.

Security Council sanctions regimes, in particular, must be implemented in coherence with the overall strategy of the Security Council, including the mandates of peace operations. Sanctions that focus on specific governmental entities and representatives or non-state actors — including armed groups and their military leadership, political sponsors, supply networks and financiers — are often used as leverage in ceasefire discussions, peace mediations and political transitions. However, sanctions can also have unintended consequences and complicate negotiations by creating additional obstacles. Moreover, while the Security Council applies sanctions with ever-increasing cognizance of the rights of those targeted, there are still human rights concerns related to their imposition and impact.

To ensure the necessary coherence, mission leadership should consult with the relevant mechanisms regularly and request mission managers to cooperate actively with entities involved with the mechanisms, including specifically in the identification of individuals and entities responsible for violence against civilians, in accordance with relevant information-sharing protocols.

4.5 PLACEMENT AND RIGHT-SIZING OF THE POC UNIT

The DPKO and DFS Comparative study and toolkit on Coordination Mechanisms in Peacekeeping Missions, published in 2012, provided the first formal assessment and overview of the role of POC Coordinators. The DPO POC Policy calls for the establishment of planning and coordination forums at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and provides for the deployment and appointment of POC Advisers and focal points to support the mission leadership in coordinating all POC activities, in support of those coordination mechanisms (see Annex I for TORs for Mission Senior POC Advisers).

13 The ICC is not a part of the United Nations; relations between the UN and the ICC are governed by a Memorandum of Understanding.
Over the years, evaluations and mission practice have both confirmed that **POC Advisers should lead small independent teams**. Embedding POC within another section has been found to be sub-optimal. Placement with mission leadership ensures connection with information and decision making. POC Advisers cannot function effectively as ‘stand-alone’ individuals at mission headquarters but require a small number of personnel in key locations. Field offices where POC Officers are based possess a strong advantage compared to those without dedicated POC presence.

The size of the team supporting the POC Adviser must be tailored to the scale and tempo of POC threats and operations in a mission. Surge capacities may be obtained from other sections or UN Headquarters when required. The Secretary-General’s report on implementation of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) recommended that “all peace operations with a protection of civilians mandate should have a senior protection of civilians adviser in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to coordinate the development of mission-wide strategies and guidance for all components, in liaison with relevant protection actors, including the humanitarian protection cluster.”

**Where to place the POC unit?**

Placement under the SRSG will secure neutral positioning for the POC unit vis-à-vis the two mission pillars, as well as proximity to high-level decision making. This includes proximity to decision makers related to the military and police and other key integrated functions and units under the mission COS — JOC, JMAC and Strategic Planning. The SRSG may, however, designate a DSRSG as POC lead to guide daily POC mandate implementation and coordination mechanisms. Such a POC lead would become the POC Adviser’s first reporting officer.

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**Related Reference Documents**

- Rights Up Front: A Plan of Action to Strengthen the UN’s Role in Protecting People in Crises (2013)
- Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Strategic Communications and Public Information (2016.11)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (2010.02)

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14 A/70/357-S/2015/682.
Chapter 5: Strategic Planning for POC

5.1 POC Strategy

A peacekeeping mission with a protection of civilians mandate must have a comprehensive POC strategy. The POC strategy can either be a stand-alone document or integrated into the mission concept. The POC strategy does not, however, function in isolation. POC objectives, indicators and plans must be mainstreamed and integrated in all mission strategic planning processes, cycles and strategies.
5.1.1 Purpose

The mission’s POC strategy will guide the mission’s strategic approach to POC, enable monitoring and evaluation of progress and identification of challenges, and serve as a tool for strategic engagement with stakeholders, including the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries. The strategy must be supported by an action plan or workplan to be translated into action. Strategies specific to different regions or threats may also be developed in regional or field offices, led by Heads of Office.

This section presents guidance on the key considerations and process for drafting and implementing a comprehensive POC strategy that will promote coherence in approach, minimize gaps, avoid duplication, support the effective and efficient use of mission resources and facilitate coordination.

Purpose of a comprehensive POC strategy:

- Establishing a benchmark of physical violence against civilians in the mission area;
- Identifying priority POC threats and the criteria for setting those priorities;
- Establishing strategic outcomes, objectives and indicators for the implementation of the POC mandate;
- Defining the mission approach to POC and key activities across the three tiers for different categories of threat;
- Defining clearly the roles and responsibilities of mission components in supporting the implementation of the POC mandate;
- Establishing a framework for mission component strategies and workplans to reflect agreed POC priorities;
- Establishing mechanisms for internal coordination and external engagement;
- Determining key documents, activities and processes to enable preparedness on POC; and
- Incorporating concise criteria and guidance to identify and set operational and tactical POC priorities and sequencing of tasks for addressing them.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

Developing a POC Strategy
UNMISS SRSG David Shearer (2017-)

The decision by the UN Mission in South Sudan to open its gates to hundreds of thousands of civilians as they fled for their lives in 2013 was one of the most noble and compassionate things the UN has ever done. Thousands of families are alive today because of that decision. But six years on, life in the camps is far from ideal: they provide the basic services needed for survival, but they are not a place where children should grow up. Yet up to 80 per cent of residents are women and children. Ninety per cent of those displaced by the conflict in South Sudan are living in other areas and we also have a duty to extend our protection to them. Meeting these protection needs and our work with humanitarian partners to help families to return and rebuild their lives when they feel confident to do so is what motivates me and all staff serving with UNMISS.

When I arrived in the Mission, we felt there was a need for an overarching strategic plan guiding our work to protect civilians both within these sites and across the country. Individual components — civilian, police and military — were all diligently carrying out their work but were operating without a collective focus on the outcome. There was an urgent need to look
beyond POC sites, to the future, and also to re-evaluate whether our protection presence across the country was making a real impact.

We needed to ask ourselves what “protection” actually meant and how our activities should evolve given the changing political and security situation. Put simply, we needed to encapsulate the 16-page Security Council resolution into a simple user-friendly guide that all staff could understand and follow with commitment.

So, we brought together the heads of all the Mission’s sections to brainstorm ways to clearly establish our objectives, the best methods of protection and how we could measure our impact. We held strategy sessions on weekends so that our team could focus away from the usual daily work pressures. Section heads then consulted with their teams, feeding back ideas from staff on the front line so that the strategy would also reflect the reality of our work in the field. We boiled down our responsibilities into two fundamental areas: protecting civilians and building durable peace. We knew the more that we could build peace, the less we would need to do in terms of protecting civilians. But if peace failed to hold, we needed to be ready to step up protection efforts.

We then took our plan to the UN Country Team, the Humanitarian Country Team and the South Sudan NGO forum so that we could build a UN system-wide approach to the protection of civilians and ensure that UNMISS and humanitarians were working together in a coherent and focused way.

The joint strategy identified four key areas of work. First, to advance the state responsibility to protect civilians by engaging with, and influencing, key political actors to set the policy and legal framework to secure the safety of their own population. Second, to foster a positive protection environment, we needed to support conflict-resolution and mediation, proactively deploy forces as a deterrent against violence, and support the legal, security and judicial systems. The third area of focus was to directly assist survivors of violations and abuses by working to investigate and publicly report serious crimes, advocate for the perpetrators to face justice and ensure that humanitarian assistance reached those in need. Finally, in situations when authorities were unwilling or unable to protect their own people, UNMISS would secure civilians in protection sites and beyond.

This new strategy means our focus is now about impact rather than on output. In other words, what makes a real difference rather than simply undertaking a series of activities. Our approach across the Mission and UN-system in South Sudan is more coherent with an increase in joint planning and activities. There is a greater sense of shared responsibility and staff are more motivated because they can see and measure the results of the efforts.

**5.1.2 Drafting process**

The process of drafting a POC strategy provides an opportunity to ensure a unified understanding of the requirements of the POC mandate, build consensus, establish priorities and expectations, and clarify roles and responsibilities. The consultation process is central to the development of the strategy. All relevant protection actors—humanitarian actors, the host authorities and the affected population—should be consulted on the development of the strategy, though their level of involvement will vary depending on the political and operational context.

POC strategies are an important tool for senior mission leadership to ensure that the mission approach to POC aligns with and is supported by the broad strategic aims of the mission including the mission’s political strategy. **Mission leadership should therefore be closely engaged in both the development and implementation of comprehensive POC strategies** (see chapter 4).
Other UN entities in the mission area with protection roles or programmes should be actively involved in the development of the strategy. The precise relationship and level of coordination on POC will vary from context to context, and may be influenced by several considerations, including:

- The specific integration arrangements in place between the mission and other UN entities;
- Any overlap between the POC mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission and the protection activities of other UN entities;
- The humanitarian coordination structure in place and presence of a Protection Cluster; and
- Plans for the peacekeeping mission to drawdown and/or withdraw, and any impact this may have on the ongoing protection work of UN entities.

To ensure effective consultations, the following issues will be determined prior to commencing the drafting process:

**Drafting office**

- Senior mission leadership should work with the POC Adviser or Focal Point to draft the strategy, remaining engaged throughout the drafting process and leading and overseeing the implementation of the strategy.
- The POC Adviser, in consultation with others, will determine who should be consulted, what elements of the draft they will be consulted on, and the consultation process and methodology.
- The POC Adviser should ensure close coordination with the mission’s strategic planning cell who can ensure overall consistency amongst strategic planning processes and insertion of POC as a priority in other relevant plans and strategies.

**Drafting timeframe**

- While sufficient time should be invested in consultations and ensuring buy-in, the strategy should be a practical, action-oriented document and the mission should aim to finalize the drafting process within three months.

**Consultation process**

- The strategy drafting process should be facilitated through the convening of a working group/task force across relevant mission civilian and uniformed components, and include external protection partners, as appropriate. Existing POC coordination mechanisms provide potential forums for the consultation process. The consultations with various stakeholders are not necessarily sequential; they may occur simultaneously.

  - **Security Council:** While perhaps not undertaken as formal consultations, it is crucial that the mission understands the Security Council’s vision and expectations on POC in advance of the strategy development. Likewise, the Council must understand the threats and risks to civilians in the mission area, the mission’s capacity to address those risks and challenges the mission faces in doing so.

  - **Troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs):** Early consultation at Headquarters with the T/PCCs during the drafting of the POC strategy will create a common understanding of the POC risks where troops and police are deployed. This consultation should ascertain possible concerns and caveats and ensure an understanding of the Council’s intent vis-à-vis the mission’s POC mandate.

  - **UN Headquarters:** The mission should seek strategic guidance and support from Headquarters when drafting the strategy, in particular regarding matters related to the Security Council mandate and the role of T/PCCs. The parameters of the POC strategy should be discussed with the regional desks and the Policy, Evaluation and Training
Division (DPET) POC Team before drafting begins and should be shared in draft for comments with the Integrated Mission Task Force and the Office of Legal Affairs.

- **In mission:** The preparation of the strategy should be consulted with senior leadership of the mission. The military, police, and relevant civilian substantive and support components must all be part of the consultation process. The mission Chief of Staff and mission planning officer should be involved to ensure the strategy is aligned with other mission planning documents. In settings where an integrated JOC and JMAC exist, these bodies should help develop appropriate analytical and mapping tools to inform the drafting process and provide appropriate situational awareness and reporting.

- **UN Country Team (UNCT):** The UNCT should be consulted through the integrated mission planning team or equivalent.

- **Humanitarian and protection actors, including UN entities and NGOs:** Consultation with these actors will facilitate effective coordination where appropriate, including with strategies of the Humanitarian Country Team, the Protection Cluster and its sub-working groups, including strategies on child protection, gender-based violence, housing, land and property-related conflicts.

- **Host government:** Early engagement with the host government (or the relevant governments, in situations of inter-state conflict or disputed territories) serves several purposes. It provides an opportunity to remind the government of obligations under international law, to clarify government roles and responsibilities in relation to the mission’s POC mandate, to assess the government’s strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis POC, to understand and manage the expectations of host state authorities and to explain the POC priorities identified by the mission and the local population. Consultations should include all relevant government agencies involved in POC, not solely law enforcement and security institutions. The political context in which the mission is deployed and the capacity and willingness of the host government to meet its obligations should be considered when determining the extent of consultation.

- **Non-state armed groups:** Engaging with non-state armed groups on POC issues may be necessary, where appropriate and security permitting, but direct consultations on the strategy itself may not be required. Engagement presents an opportunity to inform armed groups of their obligations under international law and to understand and assess their potential role in protecting civilians. The mission must determine how best to balance the opportunities and risks of engagement with armed groups, and how it will work with other protection actors to this end.

- **Local population:** Sustained dialogue with women and men from the local population is necessary to identify the threats they face, their vulnerabilities, and how the mission can support existing protection capacities. It also allows the mission to manage expectations of the mission’s POC mandate. The local population’s perception of the security situation should be one of the most important indicators in defining the success of the mission’s role in providing protection. Consultations with the local population should include groups at risk (women, youth, older persons, persons with disabilities, the displaced and minorities) and key civil society groups (traditional authorities, religious actors, human rights organizations, refugee/IDP committees, women’s groups, etc.), to take into account all perspectives on threats and possible
solutions. When consulting with the population, the mission can seek the advice of external protection partners who may have existing connections and trust established with the communities. All engagement with the local population must be in line with the do no harm principle (see chapter 10.2).

- The strategy should normally cover a one-year timeframe, at which point the strategy should be reviewed to consider whether it needs to be revised. However, significant changes in the operating environment and/or in the mission’s mandate should trigger a review of the strategy outside the usual review timeline.

- The POC strategy should be focused and concise. Long and highly detailed strategies have been less effective, particularly those which are not action oriented.

- As an internal mission document, the final strategy should be endorsed by the head of mission and the UNCT and disseminated to all mission components so that they are aware of their responsibilities. Depending on political and/or operational implications, other partners, including partner organizations and the Protection Cluster, can be provided with a copy or a summary document.

### 5.1.2 Drafting process

**TEMPLATE – POC Strategy**

**A. Purpose, scope and key principles**

1. Purpose
2. Scope
3. Key principles

**B. Strategic threat assessment**

**C. Strategic objectives, indicators and risks**

**D. POC response model and planned activities**

**E. Analysis of mission capacities, resources and national caveats**

**Annexes to POC strategy or separate SOPs:**

- Engagement and coordination mechanisms
- Preparedness activities

Based on this template, below is a suggested approach, including key elements to include:

**A. Purpose, scope and key principles**

1. **Purpose:** A succinct statement of the purpose and objectives of the strategy including any specific requirements under the mission-specific POC mandate.

2. **Scope:** This section should address:

   **Compliance:** A clear statement that compliance is mandatory for all mission staff. It should also note those aspects that may require coordination with other UN entities.

   **Temporal and geographic scope:** The timeframe of the POC strategy and the area to which it applies (normally the whole mission area).

   **References, alignment and existing strategies:** The POC strategy does not exist in isolation and must be aligned and linked with other existing protection-related strategies and planning documents, both within the mission and externally. These should be listed here. Specific attention will be given to linking and complementing priorities identified by the host
government and any existing protection strategies that may have been developed by the Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters. In integrated mission settings, the POC strategy should be explicitly linked to the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), which is designed to articulate the UN’s strategic vision in a mission context and must include POC as a priority. POC strategies should also reflect and be aligned with the military and police CONOPS, ROE and DUF.

**Review of the strategy:** Date for review of the strategy linked with other mission planning processes (e.g., the CPAS/Results Based Budget) or as a response to changes in the mission mandate and/or operating context.

3. **Key Principles:** Brief reminder of the guiding principles from the DPO POC Policy, tailored to the mission’s environment.

**B. POC strategic threat assessment**

The mission’s POC strategy must be based on a thorough analysis of the protection environment, taking into account: threats facing the population, the vulnerabilities of those populations, and the respective capacity and intent of the host state and other protection actors, including the populations themselves (see chapter 8).

At mission start-up, often coordinated by the POC Adviser, a thorough assessment of the threats to civilians should be undertaken to establish a benchmark of the level and type of threat faced by civilians within the mission area. An initial threat assessment will enable the mission to set its objectives and indicators, identify risks and external factors and monitor progress made on the effective implementation of the POC mandate.

The mission, usually via the POC coordination mechanism, should review the POC strategic threat assessment once a year along with the POC strategy, or whenever major changes occur in the strategic environment. It will inform and be aligned with the Mission Threat Assessment provided by the JMAC. The POC strategic threat assessment should:

- identify and prioritize the major actual and potential strategic threats to civilians in the mission area including a detailed analysis of the source of each threat; and
- include specific populations at risk and their vulnerabilities, based on any characteristics of the civilians that make them susceptible to those threats (for example, displacement, age, race or ethnicity, religion, gender, disability), or certain geographical features or activities that expose them to threats.

A summary of the threat assessment should be included in the POC strategy, identifying the priority strategic threats in the mission area.

The POC threat assessment presented in the mission’s POC strategy should be accompanied by a POC Threat Matrix (see chapter 8.3), which is updated regularly (weekly or monthly) and which provides a detailed overview of priority threats to be addressed by the mission at the operational and tactical levels, at any point in time.

**C. Priority strategic objectives, indicators and risks**

The POC strategy should set out the key priority objectives of the mission for the implementation of the POC mandate, both in the long term and for the period of the strategy. These could focus, for example, on reducing a threat posed by a specific perpetrator or in a specific geographical area, addressing a systemic underlying cause of threats to civilians or enhancing the capacity and willingness of the host state to protect civilians. The strategy should set out the main indicators of the achievement of these objectives and any potential risks or external factors that may impede their achievement, as well as mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating progress towards these objectives.

While the mission will focus on achieving these objectives at the strategic level, it must also be able to respond to, prevent or mitigate other ongoing or emerging threats to civilians at the tactical level in line with the POC threat assessment.

POC strategies should systematically elevate gender, child protection and the fight against CRSV to a strategic priority, with dedicated outcomes and impact indicators.
D. POC response model and planned activities

This section will present the broad approach of the mission to preventing, stopping or mitigating the POC threats and risks identified in the strategic threat assessment, across the three tiers of the POC Operational Concept (namely, protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment).

Detailed activities to respond to each threat at any point in time will be presented in the POC Threat Matrix, which will ensure that missions have an agreed multidimensional response in place for each priority threat and enable them to elaborate the roles and responsibilities of different mission components. All components and sections must thereafter align their CONOPS and workplans to reach key POC objectives set out in the strategy. Detailed roles and responsibilities of each mission component, as well as integrated POC mechanisms and tools, should be directly inserted in operational plans.

Given the variety of contexts in which missions carry out the POC mandate and the great variety in mission design and structure, there is no single way in which POC roles should be assigned. This section may articulate the general POC-related roles and responsibilities of the various mission actors, while the POC Threat Matrix should go into the details regarding who undertakes which POC activity at any point in time.

E. Analysis of mission capacities, resources and national caveats

This section should include an analysis of mission capacities and resources in relation to the identified POC risks, including how resources will be allocated and prioritized. This analysis enables the mission to manage expectations and must therefore go beyond a discussion of the physical, financial and human resources at the mission’s disposal, and include a frank assessment of what is beyond the mission’s protection capacity. It will also include an analysis of the impact of national caveats, as well as of the ability of mission personnel to undertake POC activities. For example, in situations where the contingents in a particular area do not possess the training or capacities required to address POC concerns of the local community, this should be noted. Alternative means of meeting those requirements should be identified and the necessary training coordinated, including with the support of Headquarters.

Annexes to POC strategy or separate SOPs: Engagement and coordination mechanisms

(Separate SOPs are generally preferred, so that the comprehensive POC strategy remains a short, actionable document.)

Either in an annex or separate SOPs, the mission should reflect how new or existing coordination mechanisms will be used to coordinate the implementation of the POC strategy within the mission (in mission headquarters, and at subnational levels), with humanitarian and protection actors, with the host authorities, with local communities and with non-state armed actors, as appropriate (see chapter 6 for more guidance on POC coordination mechanisms).

1. Within the mission:
   - Outline coordination mechanisms at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Participation must include military, police, civilian and mission support representatives. To ensure integration or coordination of activities with the UN Humanitarian Country Team, participation should include representatives from the humanitarian community, as appropriate (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], possibly accompanied by the Protection Cluster lead and other agencies, as relevant).
   - Determine how immediate POC activities will be coordinated during crises, including through relevant crisis coordination mechanisms (Crisis Management Teams, Crisis Centres, JOCs, Protection Working Group, etc.).

15 An SOP provides a standing instruction on how to implement a specific task, process or activity, or how to achieve a desired result. The development and promulgation of mission-specific guidance should follow the process set out in the Guidelines for the Development of Mission-Specific Guidance, available at https://ppdb.un.org.
POC lead or coordinator – While the development of the mission’s POC strategy is placed under the overall responsibility of the senior mission leadership, a designated lead amongst senior mission leaders can be appointed to oversee and guide daily POC mandate implementation and coordination mechanisms. Most missions place this responsibility in the hands of one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSGs), though protection of civilians activities should not be confined to a single “pillar” of the mission.

Protection of Civilian Adviser(s) – Mission POC Advisers or focal points support and advise mission leaders in their efforts to manage the mission’s POC activities and coordinate early warning, analysis and response, planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, and training tools and processes related to POC under the POC Action Plan.

2. With humanitarian and protection actors, including UN entities and NGOs:

- Humanitarian and protection actors should be briefed, consulted and/or involved in all aspects of the mission’s POC strategy, including sharing a common analysis of threats and vulnerabilities, and the development of response plans, advocacy or training.

- Identify existing coordination mechanisms at all levels with the humanitarian community, including the Protection Cluster and the UNCT/HCT, as well as possibly the Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) working group.

- Roles and responsibilities specific to the protection of civilians should be clearly articulated and understood between the mission and other protection actors. This is essential to facilitating effective and appropriate coordination and to distinguish between humanitarian, human rights, development, military, police, rule of law and political actions, some of which could lead to diminished space for humanitarian action. It will also clarify that humanitarian protection actors are not a substitute for mission action, as humanitarian action is likely to remain outside the scope of integration and is guided by humanitarian principles, not mission gaps or priorities.
3. **With the host authorities:**
   - Based on the mapping of the government’s strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis POC, including possible IHL and human rights violations perpetrated by elements of the host government, identify coordination or engagement mechanisms to be used to consult with the host authorities, at mission headquarters and subnational level. This should include at least Ministries of Defence, Interior and Justice.
   - This section will articulate how the mission will support the host state to assess POC threats and fulfil its primary POC responsibilities.
   - Transparency is required to foster confidence with government counterparts that the mission is there to act in support of the host authorities.

4. **With local communities:**
   - Identify mission mechanisms and approaches for engagement with local communities, establish joint early warning and information-sharing mechanisms.
   - Identify existing community protection mechanisms to be supported by the mission.
   - Engagement will not only involve the representatives of the population or traditional authorities, but also groups who are directly at risk.
   - The mission should be aware of possible risks in engaging with or assigning specific responsibilities to community actors and ensure that these risks are identified and mitigated.

5. **With non-state armed actors:**
   - Present how the mission intends to engage with nonstate armed groups on POC, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Ensure a streamlined and clear engagement process is in place — sanctioned by the mission leadership — that is consistent with any existing mechanisms and contacts the mission may have.

**Annexes to POC strategy or separate SOPs: Preparedness activities**

1. **Information gathering, sharing and analysis**
   - Information management: This annex or SOP should identify mission-wide or integrated information collection, sharing and analysis processes. This should include mechanisms to gather, analyse and map data, and disseminate POC related information.
   - The annex or SOP should also set out the principles and mechanisms for sharing sensitive information to ensure the confidentiality and informed consent for the use of information related to victims, witnesses or sources to protect their privacy and security. These mechanisms should be consistent with existing guidance, including the DPO Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence, JMAC and JOC policies and guidelines, and the OHCHR-DPKO-DPA-DFS Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions.

2. **Early warning systems and crisis response**
   - Early warning: This annex or SOP should identify or establish mission early warning systems including what role external actors, including the host authorities and local population, will play in these mechanisms.
   - Crisis response: This annex or SOP should articulate the rapid decision-making process to address POC crises, involving the relevant components. It shall also clearly state how missions will consult and coordinate with external actors in a crisis, especially with key government stakeholders.
5.2 POC PRIORITY OBJECTIVES IN CPAS

All peacekeeping operations are due to adopt the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) by July 2020. CPAS is a comprehensive, results-based reporting and performance-assessment tool to help mission leadership grapple with complex mandates and rapidly changing political landscapes and country contexts. It focuses on the most important strategic objectives (priority objectives) of a mission, as articulated by the SRSG, and tracks a mission’s performance and impact against those. It helps mission leadership to manage and assess their operations better and provides concrete data to make evidence-based decisions and more effectively tell the story of the mission and the difference it is making.

When initiating the CPAS process, missions conduct context mapping to identify drivers of change, as well as critical conditions related to how the knowledge, position or behaviour of a target population influence the drivers of change. The context mapping is then used to build the results framework, outlining the outputs, intended outcomes and intended impacts the mission aims to bring about to influence the drivers and critical conditions. A combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators is used to monitor progress and assess whether the mission is achieving the desired outcomes and impacts, and data against those indicators is collected to support analysis and reporting. The collected data is analysed and visualized through a dashboard that allows mission leadership to see where the mission is performing well and where it faces challenges, showing trends across the indicators over time.

In missions where POC is a priority mandate, priority objectives related to POC, which are informed by the POC strategy, should be included in the CPAS. Doing so will help determine and define POC success across the mission. All relevant mission components will then be expected to develop their workplans and objectives to make progress towards these goals. Mission POC advisers and focal points should be included in the context mapping exercises as well as in the development of the CPAS results framework, in particular the development of POC indicators, to ensure that CPAS accurately captures the mission’s impact on POC. The results captured by CPAS should in turn inform reviews and revisions of the POC strategy.

Example: CPAS results framework related to POC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIVERS OF CHANGE</th>
<th>IMPACT INDICATOR</th>
<th>CRITICAL CONDITIONS</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>OUTCOME INDICATOR</th>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat posed by armed groups decreases</td>
<td># of civilian casualties caused by armed groups</td>
<td>Effective presence of national security and defence forces</td>
<td>Improved capacity of Government security and defence forces to respond to imminent threats against civilians</td>
<td>% of high risk areas with presence of government forces</td>
<td>Daily patrols coordinated with government security forces across the territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of illegal checkpoints operated by armed groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training of government security forces conducted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Progress towards these objectives should be regularly monitored and reviewed by the mission. The results framework is updated on a regular basis (3-6 months depending on the mission) or whenever a significant change in context occurs. An in-depth analysis of the results should take place as part of the review of the POC strategy or regular reporting mechanisms.

Once implemented, it is expected that data and analysis generated by CPAS will be used to draft and inform the Results-Based Budget (RBB), performance reports, Secretary-General reports, and other reporting to UN Headquarters, as well as communications with external stakeholders. As a result, CPAS can be used to communicate progress and achievements towards the implementation of the POC mandate.

Strategic monitoring and evaluation of the mission’s POC activities can be initiated in mission or at Headquarters. Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009) stressed the importance of including POC indicators to measure and review progress against agreed-upon benchmarks.\(^\text{16}\) POC Advisers should be involved in the analysis of effectiveness when POC outputs are being assessed.

### 5.3 MAINSTREAMING POC IN STRATEGIC PLANNING

Once the mission has identified threats and risks to civilians and set priority objectives for the implementation of the POC mandate, it should then develop integrated prevention and response plans for each identified threat or risk. These plans should set clear objectives, expected outcomes and indicators of progress towards mitigating threats/risks. The mission should ensure overall consistency amongst strategic planning processes and insertion of POC as a priority in relevant plans and strategies, including the Mission Concept, ISF, RBB, and CPAS. All relevant mission components should incorporate POC objectives, benchmarks and outcomes into their section workplans at all levels. POC objectives should also be included in the individual workplans of all relevant staff.

\[✓\text{ Checklist: Applying a POC lens to mission planning}\]

Missions with POC mandates should ensure that their strategic planning embodies the requirements of the POC mandate and facilitates its implementation (see e.g., Annex II for guidance on developing POC responsive projects). In practice, applying a POC lens to planning requires mission planners, in consultation with the POC Adviser, to answer the following questions at the outset:

- Does the strategic objective, activity or programme being planned impact directly or indirectly on the protection of civilians?
- Is there an opportunity to enhance the protection of civilians?
- Is there a potential negative impact on the protection of civilians or the mission’s ability to protect civilians?
- Which objectives, milestones and indicators of achievement contribute to or should be incorporated to address threats to civilians?
- What is the intended POC effect of each planned activity?
- What are the POC risks associated with each planned activity?
- What are the mitigation measures in place to address those POC risks?
- What is the process to ensure continuous risk analysis as the plan unfolds?
- What capacity and processes are in place for possible contingencies that may arise and pose risks to civilians?

The role of MINUSMA SPU in Campaign ‘Folon I’ in central Mali

From 2018-19, MINUSMA reinforced the size, capacity, and skillset of its integrated Strategic Planning Unit (SPU). This enabled the SPU to focus on whole-of-mission planning, including through collaboration between POC advisers, military, police and other MINUSMA personnel. The expansion of the unit enabled more effective strategic planning as MINUSMA proceeded to implement its newly revised 2019 mandate, which included the strategic priority to support the Government of Mali in its efforts to develop and implement a politically led strategy for the Centre of Mali, including the protection of civilians.

By August 2019, the SPU consisted of four civilian officials, one police official and one military official working to enhance mission-wide collaborative planning. The SPU established new forums for integrated strategic planning and ensured that resource allocations would reflect overall Mission objectives and strategic priorities instead of individual section goals.

These improvements in integrated strategic planning helped MINUSMA to protect civilians more effectively in a coordinated manner when it launched a protection campaign in response to escalating violence against civilians in 2019 in central Mali. Together with colleagues from across the Mission’s components and under the Special Adviser for the Centre, the SPU led the planning of the campaign, which was an integrated operation. Peacekeeping troops conducted operations to improve security, while facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel to carry out activities and engage in dialogue with community members. Before and during the campaign, MINUSMA communicated with development and humanitarian actors, in part to deconflict, when needed, the activities of humanitarian actors and peacekeepers.

Going forward, stronger integrated planning will better link threat analysis and planning to operations. This will enable deterrence of violence as a result of improved early warning, an enhanced protective environment, and increased Mission efforts to avoid unintentionally harming civilians or prompting reprisals against civilians.

Transition planning

Strategic planning also includes transition planning, which is the responsibility of the entire senior leadership team under the leadership of the SRSG. It begins as soon as a mission is set up. Upon completion of the start-up phase, all missions, jointly with UNCTs, are required to develop an integrated transition calendar in collaboration with the host authorities and other national, regional and international partners. The transition calendar should indicate the timelines and key milestones for developing a detailed transition plan. The UN country and Headquarters leadership should also take steps within their respective mandates and comparative advantages to ensure that a detailed transition plan is articulated at least 24 months prior to the withdrawal or reconfiguration of the UN peace operation.17 Throughout these transition processes, it will be critical to apply a POC lens.

17 Secretary-General’s Planning Directive for the development of consistent UN Transition processes (25 February 2019).
5.4 SETTING POC INDICATORS

Measuring the effectiveness of mission POC activities is challenging. The protection environment on the ground is normally influenced by many complex factors, some of which are outside the control of peacekeeping operations, and most of which are difficult to measure. However, selecting a meaningful set of indicators for POC can help the mission to:

- Ensure relevant POC indicators within reporting frameworks (e.g., CPAS, RBB).
- Measure progress of workplans: Component, unit and team workplans should include POC indicators to measure the outcome of relevant POC activities. This will highlight areas of relative success and relative struggle for mission entities.
- Support the strategic collection of data: The framework of POC indicators will inform the mission strategic information priorities by establishing a set of data requirements for consistent information collection.
- Improve POC reporting: The indicators can serve as cornerstones of missions’ POC reports and thus provide a coherent reporting framework to keep Headquarters and the Security Council better informed of trends and challenges on the ground.
- Enhance shared understanding of POC priorities: By collaboratively identifying a set of POC indicators, missions will develop a shared understanding of POC priorities. The subsequent application of these indicators in planning documents and reporting mechanisms will reinforce this process.
- Facilitate comparison of POC implementation across missions: While the final sets of indicators and the precise terminology used will differ between peacekeeping operations, the overall progress made by missions can facilitate cross-mission comparisons and the identification of regional trends.

Selecting a balanced set of indicators

DPO has developed a set of indicators for monitoring the implementation of the POC mandate, which missions can use as a basis to develop their own mission-specific indicators, tailored to their specific context and mandate. The full list of indicators is available in Annex III. The indicators are grouped into three categories, each of which will have an impact on the prevention or mitigation of threats to civilians:

1. Capability and intent of potential perpetrators to commit violence are reduced;
2. Capacity of the host state to protect civilians is strengthened; and
3. Community level capacity to prevent and mitigate physical violence is strengthened.

The list of POC indicators developed by DPO serves as a repository to assist missions. It provides a number of Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Timebound (SMART) indicators that cover a wide range of POC-related issues, allowing missions to select those most suited to their particular contexts. In this process, it will be important to consider indicators that already exist for individual components that can be adopted, aligned and/or combined with POC indicators.

One of the greatest challenges to measuring POC performance is the ability to collect accurate and relevant quantitative and qualitative data about the impact of activities. In addition, POC action is designed to be preventive, making it particularly difficult to measure the absence of incidents of physical violence to civilians that the mission has helped to prevent. To address this challenge, it is recommended to select diverse types of indicators in order to provide a comprehensive picture.
Types of indicators for POC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Indicators</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 <strong>CAPACITY INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td>The capacity of armed actors, the host state or communities to carry out physical violence or to protect themselves from it can serve as proxy for the strength of their institutions and mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 <strong>PERCEPTION INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td>Perceptions will primarily be measured through opinion surveys, which provide a subjective view of the protection situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 <strong>SITUATION INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td>This type reflects patterns and trends of violence in an objective and typically quantifiable way.</td>
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Each of the above types of indicator alone may pose problems. Community perceptions are not always accurate. For instance, an overall improvement in the country’s economic and political situation may lead to a generally positive perception but may not account for serious violence against civilians in one part of the country. By drawing on different types of information, a diverse set of indicators can provide a more accurate and holistic assessment of progress in protecting civilians.

A final layer of distinction between indicators is the tier of mission action under the three tiers of the operational concept of POC (protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment). The selection of a balanced set of indicators from across the three tiers aligns with a whole-of-mission, comprehensive approach to POC.

Finally, POC indicators should:

- Be based on the mission threat analysis and POC strategy, as well as CPAS context mapping;
- Use disaggregated data;
- Be gender sensitive;
- Link to other actors, including the protection plans and priorities of the host state and UN Country Team;
- Be based on cooperation with humanitarian partners; and
- Remain flexible if the situation changes.

5.5 **KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING**

To improve performance, all missions should engage in organizational learning, including conducting AARs and lessons-learned studies. For example, in consultation with the mission’s Policy and Best Practices Officer (PBPO) or Best Practices focal point, the POC Adviser or Focal Point and any other relevant mission component may conduct regular reviews of protection mechanisms, processes and tools, or regular assessment of the impact of the mission’s POC activities in the most affected areas (for example, an understanding of how patrolling is aligned to threats against or vulnerabilities of civilians). Further, critical issues with POC tools, challenges or crises that have occurred should be captured by carrying out lessons-learned studies and AARs and shared with Headquarters to support organizational learning across missions and inform future strategic planning and guidance.

To the extent possible, all studies on the mission’s performance in protecting civilians should employ a holistic approach, considering and reflecting internal views, but also those of external protection actors such as affected communities, the host government and humanitarian actors.
5.6 REPORTING

Peacekeeping operations are expected to produce comprehensive reporting, in close coordination with other protection actors, on the progress being made in the implementation of POC mandates. This includes various types of reports for distinct purposes and audiences.

Reporting in-mission and to UN Headquarters is crucial for drawing the attention of senior UN leadership to the challenges facing the mission’s implementation of the POC mandate and the actions necessary to address those challenges. Such reporting includes, but is not limited to, daily, weekly and monthly situation reports and code cables. Public human rights reports issued by missions can contribute to implementing the POC mandate by influencing armed actors and others in positions of power, while also informing the international community about the situation of civilians affected by violence. Finally, the mission is responsible for providing input into various reports prepared for the Security Council, TCCs/PCCs and other Member States to inform them of developments on the ground and how the mission is addressing them.

Missions must ensure that POC is appropriately mainstreamed in mission reporting and that offices responsible for reporting have the required information. The following are some of the existing mission reporting requirements related to POC:

- Secretary-General’s country-specific reports;
- Secretary-General’s report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (every 12 months);
- Inputs to briefings to the Security Council Informal Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians;
- Public reports on the human rights situation released in accordance with the Joint Directive on public reporting on human rights by UN Peace Operations;
- Secretary-General’s thematic and periodic reporting on CAAC; and
- Secretary-General’s thematic and periodic reporting on CRSV.

At the strategic level, the reporting system should ensure that the relevant UN documents, including the country-specific Secretary-General’s reports, concisely articulate anticipated or actual threats to civilians, and detail the mission’s joint preventive or responsive actions under overall security and stability objectives, the progress made over time and the challenges faced by the mission. In addition to information on POC activities undertaken by the mission, reports should include an analysis of the adequacy of the mandate and resources to protect civilians.

Related Reference Documents

- UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013)
- DPKO-DFS POC indicators
- DPO Guidelines on Applying an A4P Lens in Reporting to the Security Council (15 July 2019)
- DPKO Standard Operating Procedures on Force and Sector Commander’s Evaluation of Subordinate Military Entities in Peacekeeping Operations (2016.02)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Knowledge Sharing and Organizational Learning (2015.13)
Chapter 6: Coordinating POC

6.1 COORDINATION WITHIN THE MISSION

In accordance with the DPO POC Policy, all missions with a POC mandate shall establish POC planning and coordination forums at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In addition to all relevant mission components (civilian, police and military), these forums should include, as appropriate, OCHA and representation from the Protection Cluster. Where relevant, other representatives of the UN Country Team and other humanitarian actors may also be included. The composition and role of coordination mechanisms will be set out in the mission’s comprehensive POC strategy. These mechanisms will serve as forums for information sharing and analysis, planning, decision making, implementation and monitoring and reporting of POC activities.

This chapter contains examples of mission coordination mechanisms on POC and their main responsibilities. **Missions should adapt these examples to their specific contexts and requirements.**
MONUSCO is one of the most complex UN peacekeeping operations and has the protection of civilians as its main pillar and the core of its mandate.

To fulfil the mandate, the MONUSCO Force interacts on a daily basis with the Mission’s civilian components — POC, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, JMAC, etc. We discuss the threats and risks for the civilian population and work together to incorporate civilian protection in the military operational plans and orders. Such coordination and cooperation is crucial for the effective use and deployment of the Force and must be continuously improved. To implement my own Directives in terms of POC, I have motivated my subordinate commanders to interact with the Heads of Field Offices and other mission civilian personnel for a rational use of our resources and effective decisions.

When patrolling, deploying Quick Reaction Forces or conducting offensive operations, POC remains the biggest concern for commanders at all levels. Working together with the POC Advisers, the Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and the Language Assistants (LAs) is also essential for the projection of the Force to interact with the local population, sensitize them and collect the necessary information to prevent attacks on civilians. In this regard, we are constantly working to improve our Early Warning and Response System including by developing a reliable network of sources amongst the local communities.

The Ebola Outbreak of 2018-19 has brought an unexpected and different dynamic to the Mission requiring our efforts to protect both the civilian population at risk and humanitarians delivering assistance to contain the outbreak and save lives of thousands of people.

In my experience here in MONUSCO, the Force cannot implement the POC mandate alone. It is required to work in close cooperation with all components of the Mission: the political leadership, POC Advisers, UN Police (UNPOL) and the civilian personnel, as well as humanitarians. Working as one mission has contributed immensely to the protection of civilians in the DRC.
6.1.1 POC coordination at the strategic level

A strategic-level body, composed of the mission’s senior management, bears overall responsibility for the development and implementation of the mission’s POC strategy. This can be achieved by including POC in the agenda of an existing mechanism, or by creating a separate body, for example, a Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P). For such an entity, the mission POC lead should ensure that secretariat support is provided, assisted by the mission POC Advisers or Focal Points.

In addition to the mission’s senior management, the SMG-P should include Country Representatives of UN entities with protection mandates. The Group should:

- Provide strategic vision and policy guidance on the POC mandate through the POC strategy
- Ensure overall consistency between various mission and integrated strategies, and place POC as a priority objective for CPAS, the ISF and the Mission Concept
- Review reports and recommendations provided by POC mechanisms at the operational and tactical levels
- Provide overall guidance on policy or operational responses to protection threats, including the use of mission assets
- Engage, consult and coordinate with national authorities on the development and implementation of the POC strategy, possibly through joint discussions and including the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Justice
- Support the implementation of the HRDDP
- Take required political action to mitigate threats of violence against civilians
- Ensure that POC is anchored in the overall political strategy of the mission
- Manage, in close coordination with Headquarters, resources and capabilities required to implement the mission’s POC mandate, including military, police and civilian deployments

6.1.2 POC coordination at the operational level

Effective protection of civilians is ultimately an operational matter requiring coordinated action from many components. Short to mid-term (1-12 months) joint operational planning is in some cases the responsibility of an Operations Planning Team (OPT), or equivalent. An OPT is placed under the mission Chief of Staff, to plan for and coordinate all joint operations by the mission, including on POC. Where the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) facilitates the coordination of operational activity, it should, in coordination with the POC Adviser, help ensure coordinated POC operations. Whichever forum is used, senior mission leadership is responsible for ensuring implementation of POC as a cross-cutting mandate.

As most mission components play a role in implementing the POC mandate, missions should also establish an operational level POC coordination forum (Protection Working Group, Joint Protection Group, Protection Taskforce, etc.), responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of the POC Action Plan. The operational POC forum is chaired and managed by the POC lead, the POC Adviser(s) or any other staff member designated by mission leadership.

For example, the Protection Working Group will normally:

- Conduct POC assessments and analysis, support POC analysis and actions taken by field offices, and prioritize POC threats across the mission;
- Coordinate POC early warning and response at the operational level, including identifying and monitoring situations where the response requires support or action from mission headquarters;
- Take decisions on rapid reactions related to POC when this has not been done at the tactical level or requires additional resources;
- Take decisions on planning, reporting, public information and training under the POC action plan;
- Contribute to mission strategic planning processes, particularly monitoring and reporting; and
- Highlight areas for consideration by the strategic-level SMG-P and develop recommendations to be presented to the SMG-P for further advice and guidance and, where necessary, elevated to the mission’s Senior Leadership Team.

### 6.1.3 POC coordination at the tactical level

At the tactical level, mission components contributing to POC mandate implementation will focus on developing situational awareness and preventing or responding to threats of violence against civilians. The latter two activities will result in the development of a local POC threat analysis through the POC Threat Matrix. When required and relevant, local POC strategies or plans may also be drafted at the tactical level for a specific geographical area: a region, province, county or territory, or an IDP/refugee camp, village or group of villages. Such local POC strategies or plans will include, at a minimum, information on the protection risks, as well as the activities, capacity and roles and responsibilities of protection actors in the area.

A **local Senior Management Group on Protection** should be established in each priority POC area to coordinate the implementation of the POC strategy and Action Plan at the regional/local level, in close coordination with the POC Adviser or Focal Point. Led by the Head of Office and composed of the relevant mission components and representatives from the UNCT, it should:

- Share information and analysis on threats to civilians;
- Take decisions on rapid reactions related to POC;
- Take decisions on planning, reporting, public information and training under the POC action plan;
- Contribute to mission strategic planning processes, particularly monitoring and reporting; and
- Highlight areas for consideration by the SMG-P and develop recommendations to be presented to the SMG-P for further advice and guidance and, where necessary, elevated to the mission’s Senior Leadership Team.

Whenever a tactical level POC coordination forum or field JOC is established at subnational level, additional dedicated POC capacity will be attached to it, as required, to support and advise the Head of Office in her/his efforts to analyse, plan, coordinate, report, monitor and evaluate the mission protection activities and support POC training activities. Commensurate with the tempo and complexity of POC activity in the area, such capacity may be established through the appointment of one or more POC Adviser(s) attached to the Head of Office, as well as through the nomination of POC focal points within all relevant mission components.

**Related coordination mechanisms**

Other coordination mechanisms within the mission area may share information to take action relevant to POC. These include:

- **Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Country Taskforce on Children in Armed Conflict (MRM CTF):** co-chaired by the mission and the UNICEF Country Representative
- **Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangement Working Group on CRSV (MARA WG):** chaired by a DSRSG or Senior WPA
- **HRDDP Taskforce:** chaired by a DSRSG, with the human rights component as secretariat
- **Rule of Law mechanisms to coordinate international support for investigations and prosecutions for CRSV**
6.2 COORDINATION WITH HUMANITARIANS AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENT PROTECTION ACTORS

Effective coordination between the mission and humanitarians is essential to the effective implementation of the POC mandate. This coordination must be based on respect for the distinct mandates, principles and approaches of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian actors. The coordination strategy and mechanisms established should be tailored to the operational context because the appropriate level of interaction, coordination and cooperation will vary. Relevant factors include the perceptions of different protection actors by the civilian population, armed actors and the host state, including questions of (perceived) neutrality and impartiality, and the specifics of the mission mandate.

In developing systems and mechanisms for coordination with humanitarian actors, missions should understand the humanitarian protection approach. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines protection as: “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e., International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law, International Refugee Law (IRL))”.\(^\text{20}\) This definition of protection is broader than the POC mandate of peacekeeping operations, which is limited to threats of physical violence against civilians. The IASC definition of protection may align with human rights and other protection mandates of the mission such as those on child protection and conflict-related sexual violence and more broadly with the women, peace and security agenda.

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Humanitarian organizations also operate within the four humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Missions should be aware that their status as political and military actors will influence the level and type of cooperation and coordination with humanitarian actors. In contexts of ongoing armed conflict, where the mission is mandated to support the host state and/or where the mission is actively involved in military operations, coordination with humanitarian actors may be more limited so that humanitarian actors preserve compliance with humanitarian principles. For humanitarian access to be sustained, it is crucial that all stakeholders perceive humanitarian assistance as neutral, impartial and independent from political activities.

The aims of coordination and interaction between the mission and humanitarian, development and other protection actors for POC can include, as appropriate:

- Timely sharing of information on threats to civilians including early warning;
- Timely sharing of analysis on priority protection locations and issues;
- Consulting and sharing POC strategies and priorities;
- Referring victims and witnesses to support systems and services;
- Developing mutual understanding of approaches and messaging;
- Contingency planning for civilian, police and military operations;
- Supporting training activities and exercises;
- Understanding and deconflicting planned protection activities and interventions;
- Addressing root causes of conflict and violence against civilians;
- Conducting joint assessment or joint protection missions; and
- Ensuring complementary and coordinated strategic communications on POC.

**VOICES FROM THE FIELD**

**Coordination with Humanitarians in a Humanitarian Disaster Context**

*Ben Majekodunmi, MINUSTAH Chief, a.i., and Deputy Chief Human Rights Section (2010-2011)*

Following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, there were major challenges with delimiting “protection.” The needs were so great, and some argued that protection was basically anything that a person needed but lacked. The media wanted a single prism through which to describe UN action in Haiti, and they found it in “protection”: in the desperate months of early 2010 they wrote critically of the lack of tents, latrines, sanitation kits, water, bedding, buckets, lights, etc., describing everything as a problem of “protection”. The media, and many humanitarian actors, pointed the finger at the “protection cluster.” In fact, there was a logistics cluster, a shelter cluster, a camp management cluster, a water and sanitation cluster and a coordination cluster, all of which were specialized in precisely these issues. In contrast, as the head of OHCHR in Haiti, head of the MINUSTAH human rights component and head of the Protection Cluster, I spent a lot of time explaining that it was unhelpful to define these issues as protection concerns, where the Protection Cluster had no skills or capacity, not least because there were other actors well-equipped to address them. Instead, I argued, the Protection Cluster’s value added lay in a different kind of protection: getting the Haitian police to address sexual violence, ensuring the courts followed up, getting MINUSTAH troops to patrol for protection, ensuring communities and women were consulted; looking at land rights issues for IDPs, and eventually grappling with the cholera epidemic.

*(continued)*
In one successful example of coordinating with humanitarians, my section led a “joint protection study” which involved MINUSTAH military and police, Haitian police and various UN entities joining to do a three-day survey in IDP camps. The teams met with women and other IDPs and asked them about their protection concerns. From concept to implementation and presentation of the report was just three weeks. One of the outcomes was that just a few days after the report was completed, the entire MINUSTAH Force was assigned as a top priority to conduct patrols in camps, on foot, with Haitian police. Tens of thousands of patrols were conducted over the course of 18 months and were credited with a major calming effect in the camps. The humanitarian community had initially rejected the proposal for patrols, but participation in the survey changed their minds. It was a huge achievement at a time when there were 1.5 million people in urban camps and a high risk of sexual and other violence.

Integrated UN presence
In conflict and post-conflict situations where a peacekeeping operation is deployed alongside a UN Country Team, the principle of UN integration applies. The aim of this ‘integrated UN presence’ is to ensure that the political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities of the UN share a common analysis and agree on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and implementing their responses. Implementation of UN integration is guided by the UN Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP). The IAP calls on the UN system to (a) develop a common understanding of the situation, (b) agree, jointly, on when, where, and how to respond, and (c) establish coordination mechanisms in the field and at Headquarters at the senior and working levels to achieve the aims and, once consensus is reached, (d) monitor and report jointly on progress toward the joint vision.

The primary purpose of humanitarian action is to address lifesaving needs and alleviate suffering, and integration with a political or peace operation may challenge humanitarian principles, so humanitarian activities undertaken by UN humanitarian actors usually remain outside the scope of integration. However, depending on the context, certain activities related to POC — such as return, reintegration and early recovery — may be included in the UN’s integrated strategic approach. Hence, the integration arrangements determined in country should be used to establish a shared analysis and broad strategic approach to POC by the mission and the UN Country Team.

The respective roles of the mission, UN entities and humanitarian actors can be determined and articulated through integrated mechanisms and tools, including the conduct of an integrated strategic assessment, an up-front risk analysis and the development of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) or equivalent.

**Humanitarian coordination structure on protection**
Interaction between the mission and humanitarian actors on POC will often be through the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) at the most senior level, UN OCHA as the secretariat to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the Protection Cluster.

The HC is responsible for leading and coordinating humanitarian action by relevant organizations in country, including protection interventions, with a view to ensuring that it is principled, timely, effective and efficient, and contributes to longer-term recovery. The leadership and coordination role of the HC entails building consensus among relevant humanitarian organizations and leading the HCT in deciding the most appropriate coordination solutions for the context.
The HCT is a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum established and led by the HC. Composition includes representatives from the UN, international NGOs and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. The HCT is responsible for agreeing on common strategic issues and priorities on protection, which are outlined in the HCT Protection Strategy and governed by the IASC Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action and the IASC Statement on the Centrality of Protection. The HC is usually supported at country level by an OCHA field office, which also acts as the secretariat to the HCT.

Protection Clusters bring together protection partners, including UN agencies, funds and programmes and NGOs, who have the necessary expertise, resources, access and capacity on protection. The capacity of a Protection Cluster is flexible and should be adequate to respond to the scale and complexity of a particular crisis. UNHCR generally leads protection clusters in conflict-induced crises. Arrangements at country-level should be dictated by operational circumstances, including the presence and capacity of protection actors.

At country level, the Protection Cluster supports the delivery of specialized and specific protection activities, undertakes regular assessments and analysis, plans and implements its cluster strategy and coordinates and contributes to robust advocacy. Additionally, the Protection Cluster supports the mainstreaming of protection across all sectors.

The Protection Cluster serves to contribute to timely and informed decision making by the HC and HCT, through an ongoing, in-depth and integrated analysis of the protection situation. As a priority, this analysis is enabled by meaningful engagement with affected persons. The Protection Cluster must also monitor and continuously assess whether and how protection risks are changing so that the HC and HCT can review protection priorities in light of the evolving operational context, and then measure progress towards collective protection outcomes.

Participation in coordination forums

Depending on the context and situation on the ground, coordination and information sharing with humanitarian actors can be achieved through participation in relevant coordination forums. Humanitarian actors can be represented in mission POC coordination forums at both mission headquarters and field office level through UN OCHA and the Protection Cluster (usually represented by UNHCR). In some situations, it may be appropriate to invite other humanitarian organizations.

Similarly, the mission participates in meetings of the Protection Cluster, normally represented by a civilian mission component, such as the POC Adviser or Civil Affairs Officers. The human rights component of a mission is a member of the Protection Cluster by virtue of its dual status and reporting lines to both DPO and OHCHR. The routine participation of uniformed personnel may not be considered appropriate in Protection Cluster meetings, although it might be useful for uniformed personnel to meet with or address the Protection Cluster on specific issues, for example, when military or police operations that could have protection consequences are being considered.

Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) platforms facilitate the dialogue between the humanitarian community and military forces. They can be exclusively composed of humanitarian actors, with a CMCoord Officer acting as interlocutor, or of both humanitarian and military actors. They are scalable and based on agreed deliverables and the prevailing dynamics in the operational area. CMCoord platforms remain humanitarian in nature and are chaired by a humanitarian actor (usually OCHA).
CASE STUDY

Solutions Working Groups in South Sudan

In 2013, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) began providing physical protection within its bases to civilians seeking protection from physical violence. By the end of April 2019, approximately 200,000 IDPs were hosted in UNMISS POC sites in Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Malakal and Wau. Over the years, coordination between the Mission and humanitarians has been key to managing and operating these POC sites.

UNMISS remains committed to providing protection from physical violence to the IDPs hosted in POC sites, yet the sites have become protracted and unsustainable. To address this, a number of Solutions Working Groups have been established with a core membership comprising UNHCR, WFP, OCHA, IOM, UNMISS and ACTED (the NGO responsible for camp management of UNMISS POC sites). Other stakeholders are invited as relevant. The leadership of the Solutions Working Groups is assumed by UNHCR acting in its capacity as Protection Cluster lead. The Solutions Working Groups operate in close collaboration with humanitarian branches of both the government and opposition (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and Relief and Rehabilitation Organization of South Sudan, respectively).

The main objective of Solutions Working Groups is to find durable solutions for the IDPs both in and outside POC sites, including supporting and facilitating the voluntary and dignified return of IDPs. As a core member of the group, UNMISS actively participates in the planning and facilitation of returns. UNMISS also provides logistical support for assessment visits; advisory support on housing, land and property issues affecting IDPs intending to return/relocate; and, as a last resort, resources in support of returns.

To date, the Bor Solutions Working Group has supported the voluntary return of some 880 IDPs, and the Malakal Solutions Working Group some 1,500 IDPs, to various locations of choice or of origin.

Information sharing and analysis

A priority objective of coordination between the mission and humanitarian actors on POC is sharing of information on threats to civilians and on responses to those threats. Information from humanitarian actors who may have access to different populations and locations can usefully inform the mission’s situational awareness and threat assessment. Information sharing on protection activities being undertaken by humanitarians contributes to the mission’s mapping of protection activities to ensure that the mission focuses on its comparative advantage: taking action where it is best placed to do so.

In sharing information, both the mission and humanitarians need to be aware about confidentiality of information from victims, witnesses and sources. It may be appropriate to develop an SOP or guidelines on sharing of information between the mission and humanitarian actors, which includes: what information can be shared, how information will be used, who will be responsible for sharing information, how and when information will be shared, as well as standards for data collection and storage.
In 2014, MONUSCO and the HCT in the DRC developed new guidance on coordination between humanitarian actors and the Mission. The guidelines were developed by a working group and endorsed by the HCT, the SRSG and the Force Commander. They aimed to provide operational guidance for constructive coordination between humanitarian actors and MONUSCO, avoid conflict between them, strengthen the coordination of activities and ensure preservation of humanitarian space and access — all while adhering to humanitarian principles.

The guidelines recognized that peacekeeping missions such as MONUSCO have a political and military mandate, which can mean that some of their positions or activities are not considered impartial by all parties in the country. For the humanitarian community, adherence to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence was the critical means by which they gained the acceptance of and access to all parties, as well as to the community they served. Doing so enabled them to achieve the primary objective of protecting the lives, the livelihoods and dignity of populations in need and alleviate human suffering.

The guidelines set out a coordination strategy of co-existence between the Mission and humanitarian actors and the relevant coordination structure, including the participation of humanitarian actors in MONUSCO coordination mechanisms and MONUSCO participation in Inter-Agency Standing Committee humanitarian clusters. They addressed distinction of activities and assets, in particular, the use of military assets and escorts, medical/casualty evacuation (MEDEVAC/CASEVAC) and information sharing.

Specifically, with regard to POC activities undertaken by both the Mission and humanitarian actors, the guidelines noted that both undertake activities that can complement each other. As with other areas of coordination, a clear distinction needed to be maintained between the two actors’ roles. At the same time, coordination between humanitarian actors and MONUSCO on POC issues was essential to ensure timely two-way information exchange and early warning, consultative analysis particularly on contingency planning before military operations, prioritization of geographical areas and thematic issues, and distinction of activities in the field, taking into account different organizational approaches and mandates.

The guidelines stated that MONUSCO and humanitarian coordination bodies would ensure regular consultation on their respective protection strategies, policies and thematic guidelines on issues of mutual relevance. MONUSCO and the Protection Cluster would share information on protection concerns and protection analyses. UNHCR, as the Protection Cluster lead, would, in particular, ensure that protection priorities were transmitted to MONUSCO through reflection in tools such as the protection matrix at the provincial level. Sharing of sensitive information concerning individual cases would be done in compliance with professional protection standards on data sharing, with principles of confidentiality, free and informed consent of the persons involved, the principles of do no harm and duty of care. UNHCR, as the Protection Cluster lead, other protection-mandated agencies/organizations (including UNICEF for child protection and child DDR-related issues) and MONUSCO would ensure the coordination of response to protection needs as per respective mandates.

*As of 2019, the guidelines have in practice been superseded. The HCT is involved in consultation with MONUSCO on strategic protection priorities as per the HCT protection strategy, in addition to consultation on operational protection with the Protection Cluster.
6.3 COORDINATION WITH HOST AUTHORITIES

The primary responsibility to protect civilians always lies with host states. UN peacekeeping operations with POC mandates support the government to protect civilians within its territory. This requires dialogue between the mission and government on protection issues. A strong coordination system ensures that threats to civilians are identified and a POC lens is brought to the engagement with national authorities, enabling the mission to understand the government’s views and priorities relating to threats and risks to civilians and its capacities to address them. Government engagement forums can also be key opportunities for the exchange of information on early warning about POC. The existence of coordinated channels with government is particularly important where the host government is unwilling to protect its own civilians or where its security forces have become an active threat to civilians.

Example: MINUSCA coordination with host state authorities

MINUSCA has progressively established POC coordination mechanisms with CAR authorities. POC planning operations are coordinated through a variety of formal and ad hoc mechanisms, including regular meetings between the SRSG and the Head of State and periodically with the Government of CAR Security Committee. Other mechanisms include:

I. A joint coordination mechanism between the MINUSCA Force, UNPOL and the Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) and internal security forces comprising:

- Weekly meetings of the Comité Conjoint Technique (CCT), under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, as well as with participation from other relevant defence and security officials;
- Weekly meetings of the Comité des Chefs d’Etat-Major (COCEM), attended by the Force Commander, the Police Commissioner, the FACA Chief of Staff, as well as the General Directors of Police and Gendarmerie; and
- A joint operations centre, the Centre d’Information et de Coordination (CIC), hosted by the Centre Operationel Commun (COC), to provide the COCEM with shared information and a capacity for coordination of security operations, through joint planning.

II. Local peace, reconciliation or security committees, with a membership tailored to the specificities of each local context (e.g., MINUSCA, local authorities, civil society, community leaders, armed groups, humanitarian actors, inter alia).

III. Coordination with judicial authorities on the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes, through, for example, the steering committee on the Special Criminal Court (SCC) mandated to investigate international crimes, which is co-chaired by the Minister of Justice and the DSRSG and includes representatives of other national ministries, the judicial service, civil society, the bar association and international donors. Further coordination occurs in the context of MINUSCA support to regular national criminal investigations, where the mission interacts frequently with national prosecutors and other judicial authorities in support of investigations and the organization of trials.

Related Reference Documents

- DPKO-DFS Policy on Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) (2014.10)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) (2014.11)
- DPKO-DFS Comparative Study and Toolkit: Protection of Civilians Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions (2012)
- Global Protection Cluster, Diagnostic Tool and Guidance on the Interaction between field Protection Clusters and UN Missions, Draft - July 2013
Chapter 7: Communicating about POC

**WHAT**

Strategic communication and influence is an important part of the POC concept, throughout all tiers. In alignment with their general communication strategies, missions should consider developing specific POC communication strategies that include dialogue, engagement, public information and advocacy in support of the mission’s strategic and political approach to POC.

**WHY**

The primary aim of a POC communication strategy is to understand, mobilize and affect the intentions, perceptions and expectations of all relevant actors to enhance the protection of civilians. Effective strategic communications also help to uphold the mission’s reputation and credibility.

**HOW**

Developing strategic communication approaches for POC begins with mapping and determining the targets, aims, types and available means of communication, as well as crafting messaging for each target.

**WHO**

Strategic communications on POC should be guided by mission leadership, with support from POC Advisers and in consultation with DPO staff at UN Headquarters. The Strategic Communication and Public Information section (SCPI) manages the mission’s communications plan and works closely with police and military Public Information Officers. All mission actors who engage with external actors on POC must be part of a coordinated approach to ensure consistent messaging.

**WHERE**

Strategic communications are managed jointly at UN Headquarters, mission headquarters and mission field offices.

**WHEN**

Strategic communication plans on POC should begin with mission start-up and should be updated regularly throughout the duration of the mission. Specific communications plans should be developed to accompany significant POC operations and will be necessary during crises.

### 7.1 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Missions are advised to proactively engage in strategic discussions with all stakeholders to enhance knowledge and understanding of POC, encourage actions to protect civilians and manage expectations. The aims of these discussions and communications are to:

- Understand and affect the hostile intent and acts of perpetrators or potential perpetrators of violence against civilians, their supporters and spoilers;
- Identify, understand, mobilize and support key influencers (including from communities, civil society, host state authorities, humanitarians, regional actors, and the international community) to affect hostile intent, mobilize protection actors, enhance the resilience of communities at risk and establish a protective environment;
- Identify, monitor, and swiftly counter hate speech, disinformation, propaganda, rumours and incitement of violence that negatively affect the security and POC situation, particularly within civilian communities; and
- Proactively manage perceptions and expectations of the mission’s POC mandate, capacity and actions, and communicate successes and challenges on POC.

All missions are encouraged to develop specific POC communications strategies, as well as action plans (see e.g., Annex IV for a Crisis Communications Action Plan). The table below outlines key targets of a mission POC communication strategy, the strategic aims of communication with them, the type of communication and the mission components likely to be involved.

### POC Communication Strategy Target Audiences

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Target Audience</th>
<th>Strategic Aim</th>
<th>Type of Communication</th>
<th>Mission Section</th>
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<tr>
<td>Host state</td>
<td>To promote and encourage primary responsibility to protect civilians</td>
<td>High-level support Sensitization Persuasion Public encouragement Denunciation</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Political Affairs Force Police Human Rights SCPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrators of violence against civilians: (Leaders and members of armed forces and groups, community-based militias and other armed actors)</td>
<td>To prevent, mitigate or stop violence against civilians To communicate that those who commit serious crimes against civilians will be held accountable</td>
<td>Dialogue Persuasion Denunciation Deterrence</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Force Police Political Affairs DDR/CVR Human Rights Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals and institutions directly or indirectly contributing to violence against civilians</td>
<td>To stop support for groups or actions that threaten civilians</td>
<td>Dialogue Engagement Persuasion</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Political Affairs Potentially in close coordination with UN and other Special Envoys, and Security Council Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other protection actors:</td>
<td>To support and encourage actions to protect civilians at risk To communicate the mission’s POC mandate</td>
<td>Dialogue Engagement Persuasion Expectation management</td>
<td>Mission Leadership Civil Affairs Political Affairs Human Rights Force Police SCPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious and community leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other international organizations or forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities at risk</td>
<td>To reassure the mission’s intent to protect To advise on possible courses of action and refer to other sources of assistance</td>
<td>Reassurance Provision of information Expectation management</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Human Rights Force Police SCPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and international media</td>
<td>To provide neutral sources of information To counter negative messaging To manage expectations and safeguard reputation of mission</td>
<td>Provision of information Peace promotion Dissuasion of conflict Expectation management</td>
<td>Mission Leadership SCPI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2014, I was appointed to work in the Central African Republic (CAR) as a Military Observer (MILOB) for MINUSCA. This was the first such duty for me outside of my home country in Yemen, and I found the conditions in CAR difficult at first. There were many dangerous environments in the commencement of the Mission, which made the position seem risky to me.

I was assigned along with six other MILOBs to the field office in Berberati. We formed the first MILOB team in MINUSCA and represented the UN for the communities on the ground there. My function was as an Intelligence Officer (G2), playing the crucial role of collecting information on threats to the population. Because the Mission was new and understaffed, I also ended up coordinating between MINUSCA forces and the local authorities, sometimes assisting in organizing reconciliation meetings to bring the Muslim and Christian communities together. At mission start-up I learned you may need to wear several different hats and fill roles creatively, as needed.

My position required that I was in communication with a variety of actors to gather information. I would regularly stop at villages while on patrol to speak to the population, but also met with religious leaders and armed groups. Each group required a different relationship and style of communication. With the population in a small village, for example, it was important to take note of their protection concerns and communicate that I was trying to understand situations from their perspective. It was about providing reassurance. That style of communication was very different from dealing with armed elements, where interactions were more about building trust and making sure they were used to our presence and understood our intentions. I recall that the work could be dangerous, especially with frequent joint patrols into areas of armed conflict, so building trust and good relations was essential. Having networks in place also allowed us to better understand the environment, plan properly and provide early warning where needed.
7.2 MAPPING THE COMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE

TOOLKIT

How to Design a Strategic Communications Strategy on POC

What is the role of strategic communication on POC?
Strategic communication in peacekeeping operations is conceptualized, planned, implemented and evaluated in alignment with the mandates, strategic objectives and intended outcomes of a mission. Strategic communication activities function to support a mission’s reputation, outreach, and advocacy goals. Specific strategies for communicating about POC can contribute to POC mandate implementation and should be part of the mission’s comprehensive POC strategy.

Checklist

☐ When designing POC communication strategies, pay attention to armed actors and community perceptions.
☐ Map the specific communication targets (armed groups, communities, host state, media, etc.).
☐ Establish profiles and influence strategies for each relevant actor or group of actors.
☐ Establish a timeline for both behind-the-scenes and public engagement or advocacy actions, including actions by all mission components and sections.
☐ Review costs and benefits of different communication means and media available.
☐ Hold regular meetings with community representatives and leaders (tribal, religious, political), as well as youth and women’s groups, community-based organizations and national NGOs at all levels. Bear in mind that leaders may not represent the experiences or perceptions of all sections of the community.
☐ Ensure that all mission actors engaging with armed actors are first trained in the POC concept.
☐ Ensure that all mission actors engaging with armed actors are integrated into POC planning, strategizing and information sharing, so that messaging is standardized and engagement on POC is coordinated.

Reminders

❖ Strategic communications should be planned pre-emptively with clearly identified goals.
❖ Effective communication should benefit a mission’s reputation, outreach abilities and advocacy goals.

Example: Mission mapping of key communication targets for POC

| International community (including troop and police contributing countries) |
| Host state government and its institutions (including state armed forces) |
| The local population (nationally) |
| Population in the vicinity of the POC threats |
| The community affected by the POC threats |
| The surviving civilian victims of violence, especially vulnerable victims |
| The instigators and perpetrators of violence against civilians |
| Political and proxy actors who may have influence with perpetrators |
| Youth (potential recruits into armed groups) |
The mission has a wide variety of channels of communications at its disposal. The efficacy of communications will depend on the degree of coordination of key messages through various media between UN Headquarters, mission headquarters and field offices. These potential channels of communication and associated activities include:

- Mission social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, YouTube, Instagram, etc.);
- Press releases;
- Radio/TV programming (mission radio/local stations);
  - Radio/video statements from key staff (including civilian and uniformed mission leadership)
  - Community focused programming to promote social cohesion
  - Interviews with moderate community voices
- Text message (immediate crisis only);
- Key leader engagements (operational and tactical);
- Local level engagements (tactical) (including via CIMIC officers and CLAs); and
- Print products (leaflets/handbills/posters).

In addition to the above direct channels of communication, the mission may utilize other activities that can serve to support, augment and amplify themes and messages. These include:

- Community outreach/sensitization training;
- Distribution of radios (longer term project);
- Promotion of mission call-in or SMS phone number (hotline);
- Assistance to and capacity building of local media; and
- Coordination with host state government and social media services (to counter disinformation).

Finally, various mission components will also have their own communication strategies and channels of access. These component-level communication strategies should also reflect agreed POC messaging.
### 7.3 PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The communication and influence strategy should set out key objectives. Each objective should include a success indicator or information on the intended effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Success Indicator</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1. DETER the continuation or escalation of violence | 1.1 Armed groups reduce number of attacks on civilians  
| | 1.2 Reduction in the number of civilian casualties |
| 2. DISSUADE retaliatory attacks | 2.1 Number of attacks on [specific group] are reduced  
| | 2.2 Increased incidents of mediation between groups  
| | 2.3 Communities in conflict are reported to be collaborating on humanitarian issues  
| | 2.4 Reduction in the number of armed self-defence groups |
| 3. REASSURE the affected population that assistance and protection will arrive | 3.1 Local population express feeling of security/safety (feel safe to travel to the market, to neighbouring villages, etc.)  
| | 3.2 Local population express belief in the mission’s ability to protect them  
| | 3.3 Decrease in criticism of UN operations |
| 4. INFORM the wider community of the measures that the mission is taking in response to the crisis | 4.1 Increase in local population ability to describe the mission mandate accurately  
| | 4.2 Increase in local population ability to identify UN activities in support of POC  
| | 4.3 National media disseminates the mission’s messages  
| | 4.4 Interviews and stories are accurately echoed in the international community |
| 5. DISCOURAGE local population from joining armed groups | 5.1 Increase in DDR participants  
| | 5.2 Increase in denunciations of armed groups  
| | 5.3 Increase in support for civil society groups |
| 6. CLARIFY misinformation or disinformation | 6.1 Increase in accurate reporting in the media  
| | 6.2 Decrease in incidents of mis/disinformation in the media |
| 7. MAINTAIN mission credibility, including by managing expectations | 7.1 Media stories reflect progress mission has made  
| | 7.2 Local populations increasingly voice support for the mission |
| 8. PROMOTE societal cohesion | 8.1 Number of attacks on ethnic group A/B are reduced  
| | 8.2 Communities A and B are reported to be collaborating on peaceful dispute resolution |
| 9. COUNTER enduring narratives that exacerbate violence | 9.1 Increased reporting on ethnic/religious communities co-existing in peace |

Once the POC communications strategy is developed, missions may consider the following actions:

- Conducting regular analysis of perceptions and objectives of key stakeholders (including government, humanitarian community, armed groups, international media, national and community level or social media, civil society, population) to inform the approach to engagement.

- Establishing a UN communication group or equivalent to help align or coordinate public information action with the UN Country Team and liaise closely with the Protection Cluster and existing NGO advocacy forums to reinforce and coordinate communications on POC, as appropriate.

- Depending on the context, and particularly in times of POC crisis, pursuing joint communication efforts with the host government and other international actors, such as through joint press conferences or joint visits to the field with the press, and aligning press lines and messaging accordingly.
Ensuring coordinated and standard messaging per communication target:

- Agreeing standard press lines and talking points or creating a ‘frequently asked questions’ (FAQ) on POC, and ensuring all sections understand the mission’s mandated POC tasks and responsibilities, strategy, priorities and limitations;
- Using perception analysis, community opinion surveys and monitoring or use of social media to inform messages and communication strategies;
- Designating components or sections as focal points for each target (e.g., the Public Information Office for media and social media, Political Affairs for political actors, DDR/Political Affairs for armed groups, Civil Affairs for communities and civil society, Human Rights for victims and witnesses). The focal point should not vet or prevent meetings by other components, but rather ensure coordinated engagement for a specific target and accompany meetings as applicable and appropriate;
- Ensuring that senior managers and leaders, or a person designated by them, lead sensitive or important engagement efforts; and
- Developing and distributing written documents with key messages (e.g., the POC strategy, a community sensitization booklet on POC, media booklets).

Investing in new technologies, particularly for the monitoring and use of social media, as armed actors and spoilers often use social media to implement swift and efficient influence campaigns.

Moreover, the mission must:

- Ensure coherence and consistency of assessments and figures used in public reporting related to POC (press release, Secretary-General reports, etc.) and
- Recognize that the mission may expose civilians to risk through engagement or by communicating information on specific individuals or communities to an audience that uses the information in a detrimental or way, including a state organ. If this is a possibility, it is necessary to develop specific risk assessments and prevention and mitigation measures on the protection of partners (humanitarians, civil society, community representatives, etc.) or other informants, witnesses and victims.

The planning of communication and influence actions should take into account the appropriate timing, balancing and synchronization with other protection activities and their potential negative impact. For example:

- Denunciation through advocacy and public reporting related to human rights violations and impunity should be planned and sequenced so as not to jeopardize an ongoing mediation or reconciliation effort;
- Sharing detailed information on POC-related incidents or threats with certain actors or through public information may expose the identity of victims or witnesses and, indirectly, result in violence against civilians; and
- While engaging with armed groups and militias, a fine balance must be reached to ensure protection messages and red lines are clearly communicated while maintaining a positive engagement on political dialogue, DDR or CVR.

Missions should consider developing a liaison matrix to identify who within the mission will lead on engagement with key leaders in various target groups. The matrix can include the activity or means of communicating, the key messages and related considerations. In designating lead components within the mission, the value of military-to-military and police-to-police dialogue should be emphasized. Uniformed personnel often respond best to those with similar backgrounds, training and experience. This can be much more effective than having civilian staff engage armed actors, but it is critical that POC messaging be well coordinated between uniformed and civilian components of the mission.
7.4 LINES OF COMMUNICATION

7.4.1 Key messages

Depending on the target of a POC related message and whether the message is to be public or private, the message will vary. Below are examples of standard lines/topics which could be utilized:

- Provide factual and impartial information on the POC context:
  - Current or potential threats and risks and
  - Populations and areas at risk of violence, with messages on specific protected categories of civilians: refugees, internally displaced persons, women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities, humanitarian personnel, journalists, human rights defenders, peacekeepers, etc.

- Insist on the need to put an end to continuing violence against civilians as an immediate priority.

- Emphasize the primary obligation of the national authorities (or armed groups, when international humanitarian law is applicable) to protect civilians.
  (Note - Should government authorities be partial in their actions or government forces commit large-scale human rights violations, the mission may favour taking a visible distance.)

- Highlight the role of other protection actors, including local communities, political leaders, donors, the international community and humanitarian and development actors.

- Condemn violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, incidents of physical violence against civilians, threats to civilians and all incitement to violence against civilians.

- Promote the fight against impunity by stressing the need to bring to justice, in accordance with applicable international law, individuals who incite violence or commit crimes, gross violations of international human rights law or serious breaches of international humanitarian law.

- Encourage authorities and state security forces to take a firm stance on impunity, both within their ranks and by taking actions to deter or arrest perpetrators of violence.

- Advocate a reward and punish (i.e., ‘carrot and stick’) political approach to armed groups and spoilers, supported by the establishment of clear POC-related ‘red lines’ (e.g., attacks against civilians, conflict-related sexual violence, expansion of territory, occupation of schools and hospitals).

- Underline the importance of parties to the conflict committing to political settlements and actions to transform the conflict environment and address the root causes of instability.

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**TEMPLATE – Liaison Matrix for planning and tracking POC communications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target audience</th>
<th>Activity/means</th>
<th>Message</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Mission component</th>
<th>Release authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To whom the communication is aimed</td>
<td>What activity or means of communication will the mission use to engage/communicate with the intended audience</td>
<td>What key messages are being imparted</td>
<td>Include any related activities, risks or issues to consider when designing or conducting the activity or message</td>
<td>Who will lead the communication</td>
<td>Who in the mission will authorize the action or communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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- Acknowledge, express concern about and outline mitigating measures for risks to civilians posed by peacekeepers.

- Present the mission’s POC mandate, plans, successes and challenges:
  - Explain the mission’s approach to POC, including the whole-of-mission mandate and emphasis on prevention. Take time to explain POC activities that may not be high-profile or obvious, such as support to the rule of law or dialogue and engagement activities.
  - Manage expectations. Focus on what the mission can do (prevent and stop strategic threats, etc.) and cannot do (prevent or intervene in every situation of violence against civilians, etc.). Highlight effects rather than a list of actions.
  - Welcome external support.
  - Recognize failures and limitations and explain what is being done to address them.
  - Showcase success stories.
  - Present a people-centred approach.
  - Provide concrete and recent examples of successful joint protection actions implemented with national and local authorities or with humanitarian and development partners.

- Share specific messages with communities:
  - Appreciate their views, both to help secure civilian communities in the short term and to guide the mission’s efforts to address the root causes of the threats.
  - Present the mission’s early warning and alert mechanisms and/or staff dedicated to community engagement (e.g., CLAs).
  - Provide examples of possible mission POC actions (e.g., the intensification patrols along certain axes, or on market days or to secure access to fields and other livelihood activities).
  - Explain human rights, child- and women-protection activities and the activities of police, justice and corrections components.

- Respond, where necessary and appropriate, to media broadcasts spreading hate speech or inciting violence, attacks on civilians or atrocity crimes.
I have been serving in MONUSCO since August 2018, which is about when the current Ebola outbreak began. Where I was deployed in North Kivu, Ebola and armed groups, such as the Mai Mai and the ADF, were the biggest threats to civilians. The armed groups were actually attacking the Ebola Treatment Centres and humanitarians providing medical assistance. It was difficult to collect information about the attacks, even afterwards, to try to understand who was perpetrating the attacks and why? The Mission prioritized collecting information in this situation, and due to my experience in the field and because I speak Swahili, I was assigned to this duty.

In March 2019, I was deployed to the town of Butembo, where there was a lot of insecurity and attacks by the Mai Mai against Ebola facilities and health workers. The first thing I did was build my network. I focused on establishing relationships with local authorities, community leaders, the Local Protection Committees created to deal with issues concerning security and with military personnel. On any given day, I would be visiting a hospital to interview a young man suspected of being Mai Mai, speaking to local leaders about the insecurity in the area, visiting the prison to talk to detainees and meeting with armed groups at night.

All the while, we were working in very challenging circumstances. In an Ebola outbreak you must always carry hand sanitizer, be careful about shaking hands or other contact and abide by early UN curfews. The risks were high. Because armed groups would not agree to meet near town or during daylight, I had to be creative. I would remove my UNPOL uniform and travel by local motor taxi at night to meet armed groups.

Eventually, with a lot of effort and the cooperation of local civil society, local authorities and religious leaders, we were successful in negotiating the opening of a hospital that the Mai Mai had previously closed down. We were able to explain to them the importance of fighting Ebola. Attacks in other areas decreased as well.

Based on my good relationship with one particular armed group, they even accepted to come in from the forest where they hid, surrender their weapons and rejoin civilian society. I connected them with our MONUSCO DDR team, and they are no longer threatening the security of civilians in the area.

7.4.2 Countering misinformation and disinformation

Responding to misinformation and disinformation is an important communications activity. Failing to do so leaves an information vacuum where misunderstanding and false beliefs can develop. In many mission contexts, this may augment conflict and/or pose a challenge to mission credibility. Often the distribution of mis/disinformation can be a driver of conflict and may worsen the threats to civilians if not challenged.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISINFORMATION</th>
<th>DISINFORMATION</th>
<th>HATE SPEECH</th>
<th>CRITICISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>False or misleading information that is not necessarily intended to deceive the recipient.</td>
<td>False or misleading information that is specifically intended to deceive the recipient in support of malicious ends.</td>
<td>Statements that are intended to demean and brutalize another, often supporting or encouraging violent actions.</td>
<td>The expression of disapproval of someone or something on the basis of perceived faults or mistakes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The POC communication and influence strategy should distinguish between mis/disinformation that is about the mission and that which is intended to provoke violence against civilians. However, both are important and the options for response are similar. All cases of suspected misinformation and disinformation should be analysed as soon as possible to determine the appropriate response.

**Misinformation and disinformation response options**

**Directly Refute**
- This approach contests the details of the issue explicitly. This technique should be used sparingly, and reserved for extreme situations, when the pressing need to address the issue outweighs the amount of time and effort required to do so. Additionally, beware of the risk of legitimising a source by responding to it.

**Indirectly Refute**
- This is an attempt to counter the main issues without reference to the original claims, accomplished through clear and timely communication of core themes and messages.

**Restrain**
- When using restraint, the mission does not respond and therefore does not ‘fuel the fire.’ Yet remaining silent must be balanced with the risk of allowing mis/disinformation to flourish in an information vacuum. Factors to consider include the gravity of the information/allegation, the reach of the message and the potential for the message to compound other negative messages.

**Restrictive Measures**
- These are efforts to deny access to or stop the spread of the mis/disinformation. This may take many forms, ranging from engaging with media sources directly, the government and/or the media platforms, to ensure that disinformation — particularly hate speech — is minimized.

**Conditioning/Sensitization**
- These are measures to educate potential recipients prior to exposure to false information. This may take the form of community outreach or information campaigns to caution the local population about the nature and content of potential disinformation. Conditioning and sensitization should be conducted in line with indirect refutations of known/pre-existing incidents of mis/disinformation.

**Expectations Management**
- Ensuring that all stakeholders, particularly the local community, are aware of the mission’s POC mandate and its capacity to implement that mandate is critical. Failure to live up to unreasonable expectations can negatively affect the credibility of the mission. The mission should ensure that adequate human and material resources are provided to allow the mission to engage in proactive and ongoing expectations management.

**Themes to Avoid**
- Messages that may imply that the mission is the primary provider of security;
- Messages that would impugn the impartiality of the mission (e.g., favouring one ethnic group over another);
- Only blaming one group for threats to/attacks on civilians when there is more than one entity perpetrating violence against civilians;
- Speculations on the outcome of human rights or other investigations;
- The use of inappropriate or non-culturally relevant approaches;
- Comments on the national policy of UN troop contributing countries; and
- Other non-UN operations.
Related Reference Documents

- DPKO-DFS Policy on Strategic Communications and Public Information (2016.11)
- UNCG Communicating together in times of crisis: Standard Operating Procedures for the UN system (2010)
- DPI Social Media Guidelines (2011)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in UN Peacekeeping (2014.08)
- UNDG UN Communications Group at the country level: Basic Operating Model (March 2006)
- DPKO Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (December 2003), Chapter IV (for more on countering misinformation/disinformation)
Part III: Identifying and Prioritizing POC Threats and Risks

Armed attacks in Mali lead to at least 18 people killed by shooting and burning. (2019)

UN Photo/Marco Dormino
Chapter 8: Identifying and Prioritizing POC Threats and Risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHAT</th>
<th>WHY</th>
<th>HOW</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The identification and assessment of threats to civilians forms the basis of all POC planning and action. The mission should have processes in place at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to identify, analyse and prioritize POC threats and risks. These processes should consider threats faced by different groups of civilians, their potential severity and impact, the motivations of perpetrators and the capacity and intention of other protection actors.</td>
<td>In order to determine actions to protect civilians and take a strategic approach to POC, it is necessary first to identify and prioritize threats against civilians. POC is a whole-of-mission responsibility and it is important to have a common understanding among mission components of the threats faced by civilians and their prioritization.</td>
<td>To identify and prioritize POC threats and risks, missions should take into account a variety of types and topics of information. The analysis process involves identifying civilians at risk, considering the capacity and intent of other protection actors and evaluating the risk associated with the threats. A POC Threat Matrix, as well as trends analyses, can be helpful.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>WHERE</th>
<th>WHEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The identification and prioritization of POC threats and risks is a process led by the POC lead or POC Advisers that involves all mission components (civilian, police and military), and will often require engagement with the UN Country Team, host state authorities, communities at risk and humanitarian actors. POC coordination mechanisms should be leveraged in this process.</td>
<td>The identification of threats to civilians is often done at tactical level, by mission field offices and at bases. Further analysis and prioritization is normally done at field offices and mission headquarters, with support from UN Headquarters.</td>
<td>The process of identifying and prioritizing POC threats is done continually as the situation on the ground changes. It should also form part of the drafting of the POC strategy. Forward-looking threat assessments should be developed quarterly and shared with Headquarters.</td>
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8.1 WHICH POC THREATS AND RISKS TO CONSIDER

Consider all sources of violence against civilians. Peacekeeping operations with POC mandates are deployed into a broad range of contexts, including armed conflict, post-conflict and situations other than armed conflict. The operational context and threats to civilians may vary significantly between different geographical areas within a mission. The threats to civilians that the mission should take into account when identifying POC threats may include:

- Threats posed by non-state armed groups (including ‘irregular’ and non-traditional armed groups such as those engaged in violent extremism);
- Threats from host state defence and security forces, other state actors and their proxies;
- Threats from foreign state security forces, including regional forces;
The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping

- Threats based within communities, including intercommunal violence, housing-, land- and property-related conflicts and from self-defence groups;
- Threats emanating from organized crime and organized criminal groups; and
- Threats from actions of the mission itself.

**Consider all threats of physical violence against civilians.** This includes violence that is occurring and violence that has the realistic potential to occur. It includes:

- Direct and indiscriminate attacks (attacks targeting civilians or those which do not distinguish between civilians and combatants);
- Attempts to kill, torture, maim, rape or sexually exploit, forcibly displace, starve, pillage, abduct or arbitrarily detain, kidnap, disappear or traffic persons;
- The recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups; and
- Harm associated with the presence of explosive ordnance including mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices.

Missions are not expected to prevent or intervene to stop all instances of violence. Peacekeeping missions are required to protect civilians within their capabilities in areas of responsibility. However, they may have to focus their resources on **strategic threats**, in particular **violence that may result in mass civilian casualties or lead to broader instability**. Missions should intervene to stop physical violence against civilians taking place in proximity of a mission presence, regardless of the level of violence. Failure to respond to these threats undermines the credibility of the mission with the local population, perpetrators and other stakeholders.

**Example: Assessing and prioritizing threats**

Many missions facing large-scale violent attacks on civilians by armed groups or serious intercommunal violence will also face a situation of general lawlessness and instability. Criminal groups may take advantage of the security vacuum to commit violent acts against the civilian population. While the mission should identify and take all threats into account in its analysis, it will normally decide to prioritize those threats that have the highest impact on the civilian population and the stability of the country in general — in this case, large-scale attacks by armed groups. In response to these prioritized threats, the mission should develop a comprehensive strategy using a tailored combination of civilian, police and military capabilities and the priority use of mission resources. At the same time, although violent criminal activities may not be the highest priority, the mission can recognize the threat and consider implementing a response focused on Tier III using existing programmatic activities of the mission to support the capacity of host state authorities (in particular, police and justice institutions). These ongoing programmatic activities should be considered with a ‘POC lens’ (see chapter 5), to ensure that they are designed to maximize their POC impact.
8.2 POC THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

As part of the threat assessment and prioritization process, missions should assess existing and likely threats, communities at risk, mission capacity, the capacity of other protection actors and the comparative advantage of the mission. Priority strategic threats should be agreed by mission leadership and detailed in a POC Threat Matrix, which should be regularly reviewed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Threats to civilians will be evaluated on an ongoing, daily basis by COBs and TOBs. However, a strategic and comprehensive POC threat assessment and prioritization process should normally be undertaken by the POC coordination forums/mechanisms established by the mission (see chapter 6). These mechanisms should include representatives from all relevant mission components and, where appropriate, the UN Country Team, and ensure that relevant factors (political, security, gender, human rights, etc.) are taken into account when assessing and prioritizing threats to civilians.

8.2.1 Assess threats

Missions should take into account a variety of types and topics of information to ensure a comprehensive threat assessment. Proper integration of the various types of information into the POC threat assessment depends on adequate information sharing amongst relevant components responsible for collecting or analysing the information. Types of assessments and topics to take into account include:

Political assessments: A relapse into conflict by the parties to a peace or cease-fire agreement, including violence accompanying key milestones of the peace process, will generally have the highest impact on the security of civilians and potentially widespread security repercussions. Therefore, it is important to include an assessment of the political situation into POC threat assessments. These political assessments will normally be the regular work of the Political Affairs Section and/or conducted as part of an integrated analysis conducted by the JMAC. They may include assessments of:

- Internal and external threats to a political or peace process and the motivations behind those threats;
- Changes in leadership, coalitions or alliances that may lead to instability;
- Changes in political/military dynamics;
- Upcoming triggers or events, for example elections, anniversaries or key dates; and
- Implementation and monitoring of peace agreements.

Security assessment: Ongoing monitoring and analysis of the general security situation – including its impact on the civilian population and threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers – should be part of regular mission security processes and procedures. This includes the use of mission peacekeeping intelligence in line with the DPO Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence.21 Security information and assessments may be provided by the Force, the Police, JOC, UNDSS, JMAC and UNMAS and can include information on:

- Current, recurrent and potential perpetrators of threats to civilians and/or peacekeepers;
- Underlying causes of security threats (e.g., ethnic or religious conflicts, housing, land, property and natural-resource conflicts, historical grievances, political manipulations, revenge attacks, regional security dynamics, presence of other forces that may threaten civilians or be targets for other armed actors);
- Likely hotspots and triggers; and
- Possible presence of explosive ordnance, including threat of improvised explosive devices, as well as unsecured weapons and ammunition.

Perpetrator analysis: Missions should analyse the nature, deployments, modus operandi, capacity, motive and intent of actual and potential perpetrators of violence. They should also assess the opportunity for a threat to take place (i.e., time, location, terrain and weather conditions, or other factors that allow a perpetrator to inflict violence). All relevant mission components will contribute to the process but the JMAC and the Force U2 branch (Intelligence), and in some missions, the Police Analysis Units, will have specialist analytical skills and access to information. Such analysis must be shared with POC coordination mechanisms.

21 DPO Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence (2019.08).
Human rights, child protection and CRSV monitoring: Monitoring of violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law can provide information and analysis on the gravity, intensity, pattern and scale of physical violence affecting different groups of civilians, as well as information on perpetrators. It can also enable analysis of historical trends, early warning and impact. Information and analysis from human rights monitoring, the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations of children’s rights (MRM) and the Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements on CRSV (MARA) should be fed into POC threat assessments to ensure that threats, including to children and of CRSV, are integrated. Analysis of threats to civilians should take into account early warning indicators of CRSV\(^{22}\) and potential mass atrocities, such as a patterns of violence, increased use of hate speech, increased reports of SGBV, incitement to hatred or violence, and build-up of weapons.\(^{23}\) The mission’s Women’s Protection Advisers should contribute information and analysis on CRSV and the human rights component on indicators of mass atrocities (see chapter 8.5).

Analysis of institutions: A POC threat assessment should consider an analysis of institutional weakness that may exacerbate conflict and violence, as well as an assessment of the functioning and potential shortcomings in the criminal justice chain, including the capacity to investigate and prosecute conflict-related serious crimes and detain perpetrators securely, safely and humanely. This analysis will provide information on the ability and willingness of the justice system to respond to serious crimes committed against civilians, to restore law and order and deter future violations. It should include an analysis of national capacity to provide the necessary protection and support to survivors/witnesses. This analysis can be provided by the rule of law components, with support from the human rights component.

Analysis of the mission’s own actions: In identifying and analysing threats to civilians, missions should take into account possible threats caused by the mission’s own actions. This could include possible harm to civilians caused by military and police operations, potential harm caused by mission presence or partnerships or reprisals for engaging with the mission. Missions should also be conscious of threats caused by confusion of the mission with other international and regional forces operating in the area.

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**TEMPLATE – Analysis of Threats and Perpetrators**

**Nature, identity, profiles**
Perpetrators of violence against civilians include elements of national and international security forces, non-state armed groups, criminals and other civilians.

**Motivation, interest or intent**
Violence against civilians may be strategic and systematic, opportunistic or even accidental; indiscriminate or targeted at an individual or group; motivated by power, ideology or identity (cultural, ethnic, tribal or religious), fear, survival or greed.

**Structure, capabilities and resources, preparedness**
Command and control; human, material and financial means; supply lines.

**Presence and deployments**
Location(s); size; specialized capacities; availability of reinforcements.

**Relations**
Political, security, economic and social supporters and allies; affiliation and clients; relationship with the mission.

**Mode of action or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)**
Patterns of attacks or other forms of violence (including attacks on specific categories of civilians such as women, children or IDPs, etc.); movements of potential perpetrators; access to weapons.

**History**
Monitoring of violations of international law will provide further information on the gravity, intensity, pattern and scale of physical violence affecting civilians and enable trend and impact analysis.

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\(^{22}\) See, e.g., UN Action Matrix on Early Warning Indicators for CRSV, available at https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/127367/2601654.

Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO): This document, developed by humanitarian actors, presents a comprehensive analysis and shared understanding of the impact of a crisis to inform humanitarian advocacy and response planning. The HNO outlines key protection threats faced by the affected population of a crisis, including concerns related to child protection, GBV, housing, land and property, mines and displacement, as well as gaps in the local and humanitarian protection capacity to respond effectively to the protection risks.

8.2.2 Identify civilians at risk

See chapter 2 above for guidance on the factors to take into account when defining and identifying civilians to be protected under the POC mandate. As part of the threat assessment process, missions should identify which civilians are at risk from each threat. In assessing threats, the mission should develop a nuanced understanding of the impact of a conflict on different parts of the civilian population.

When identifying priority populations to be protected, missions should seek early-warning information through monitoring, as well as engagement and consultations with civil society organizations and communities. Civilian mission components will often be the main conduit for community engagement, in close coordination with humanitarian partners, but military and police components should also seek to build relationships with local communities (see chapter 10). Where deployed, Community Liaison Assistants may assist the military or police component in this regard (see chapter 9).

Assessing vulnerabilities: While all civilians may be victims of physical violence and therefore require protection from it, missions should pay specific attention to individuals or groups most at risk of violence. These can include girls and boys, women, men, minority groups, refugees, IDPs, persons with disabilities, the wounded and older persons, as well as professionals such as human rights defenders, medical personnel, teachers, journalists and humanitarian personnel. The level of vulnerability of an individual or group will vary, including with time or a specific operational context. Moreover, each different group may be vulnerable to specific threats and risks. For example, women and children, as well as men in detention, may be particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, young men may be more vulnerable to arbitrary detention or execution, and children may be more vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups or harm from unexploded ordnance. IDPs and refugees may be more vulnerable to militarization or infiltration by armed elements, attacks against camps and settlements and/or severe restrictions of movement that effectively prevent them from accessing safety during violence. Assessing the level and nature of vulnerability to violence of different categories of civilians will enable better responses to their specific protection needs.

To facilitate the identification of civilians at risk, missions should ensure the consolidation and consistency of information related to incidents affecting the security of civilians. Reports of incidents should be gathered in one place, using a database such as the Unite Aware Incidents application (formerly known as “SAGE”) or other mission data collection arrangements. All reports should include, at a minimum, disaggregated data on the number of killings, rapes and other incidents affecting the security of civilians, per area, gender and age category. Information collection and analysis should include data on mission responses to POC threats in addition to POC trends and patterns.
8.2.3 Assess capacity and intent of other protection actors

UN peacekeeping missions operate alongside a range of other protection actors. There are situations where the mission may not be the best-placed or most appropriate actor to respond to a particular threat, including, where the host state has the capacity to respond, or situations when the presence of the mission itself creates a risk to civilians, or where other actors have more capacity, influence or acceptance. In assessing risks to civilians, it is necessary to map all protection actors and their capacity and intent to protect.

The other protection actors that the mission should take into account include: communities themselves, state authorities and security forces, international security forces, national and international civil society, religious leaders, human rights, humanitarian and development actors. In some cases, non-state armed actors may also play a protection role.

In assessing the capacity and intent of other protection actors, the mission should consider several variables, particularly those related to:

- Their presence or ability to reach the area where civilians are at risk;
- Their capabilities relative to the threat;
- Their neutrality and relationship with/acceptance by the population at risk;
- Any legal or policy constraints they may face;
- Their potential to cause harm (intentionally or unintentionally);
- Their willingness to take action to protect civilians; and
- Their willingness/readiness to coordinate/cooperate with the mission.

8.2.4 Evaluate the risk associated with threats to civilians

This diagram shows how to evaluate the risk associated with threats to civilians, by considering both the likelihood of the threat materializing and the impact on the population if it does. The red zone poses the highest level of risk to civilians. Other risks may be likely but have a smaller impact (yellow) or be less likely but have a more serious impact should the threat materialize (orange).

\[
\text{Risk} = \text{Likelihood} \times \text{Impact}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKELIHOOD</th>
<th>INSIGNIFICANT</th>
<th>MINOR</th>
<th>MODERATE</th>
<th>MAJOR</th>
<th>SEVERE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost Certain</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once POC threats have been identified, the mission should evaluate the level of risk faced by the civilian population for each threat. This is an assessment of the likelihood of the threat occurring and the actual or potential impact of that threat on the civilian population. In assessing the impact, the mission should take into account the scale, gravity, intensity, regularity or systematic nature of violence. Assessment of impact should also take into account the impact on specific groups more likely to be affected. Assessment of likelihood and impact should consider any pattern of threats or incidents or past records of a similar nature that could act as early warning signs for the commission of atrocity crimes.
Both likelihood and impact are a result of the capacity, intent and opportunity for the perpetrator to inflict violence, combined with the vulnerability of the civilians to the threat. They are also a result of the presence, capacity and intent of protection actors, who play a deterrent role.

POC risks should be jointly assessed regularly at tactical, operational and strategic levels so that the mission has a common and up-to-date operational picture.

The mission should continue to keep threats under review in case either the likelihood or impact increases or decreases.

The following criteria can be used to evaluate the impact and likelihood of POC threats, with comparisons necessarily varying between and within missions depending on the context:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT OF THE THREAT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong></td>
<td>A significant number of civilians, including women and children, will be directly affected by physical violence including, but not limited to: direct or indirect loss of lives; CRSV; serious injury; severe internal displacement; elevated food insecurity; destruction or loss of civilian assets/infrastructure required for civilian survival; or the imposition of conditions that prevent food supply or urgent humanitarian assistance, especially medical assistance. And/or will have a direct destabilizing impact on the conflict/peace process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM</strong></td>
<td>Some civilians, including women and children, will be directly affected by physical violence, including, but not limited to injuries, internal displacement, or food insecurity. There may be some repercussions for civilian assets/infrastructure required for civilian survival. Food supply or urgent humanitarian assistance, especially medical assistance, can be disrupted. And/or may have some destabilizing impact on the conflict/peace process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW</strong></td>
<td>A small number of civilians, including women and children, will be directly affected by physical violence. Food security and humanitarian assistance will be able to continue. Unlikely to itself have a destabilizing effect on the conflict/peace process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKELIHOOD OF THREAT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong></td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and actions to prevent the threat are not used or are ineffective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM</strong></td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians is motivated and capable, but actions to prevent the threat may impede the successful materialization of the threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOW</strong></td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians lacks motivation or capability, or actions to prevent the threat are in place and/or can impede the threat from materializing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**8.2.5 Prioritize situations to address**

Some POC mandates refer to protection from imminent threats of physical violence (see chapter 2). The term ‘imminent’ does not imply that violence is guaranteed to happen in the immediate future. A threat of violence against civilians is imminent from the time it is identified until such time that the mission can determine that the threat no longer exists. Actions or behaviours that appear to be preparatory to a hostile act can inform the determination of whether a threat is imminent.
In order to develop a strategic response to threats to civilians, missions should prioritize threats that pose the highest level of risk to civilians and utilize mission resources accordingly. The mission will then need to examine other categories of threat and decide which to prioritize or whether there are less resource-intensive preventive actions to take than physical protection (e.g., advocacy). Priority medium- to long-term POC threats must be incorporated into the mission POC strategy and other mission strategic planning documents.

When deciding whether and how to respond to a specific POC threat, the mission should take into account:

- The nature of the threat and risk to civilians associated with it;
- The ability and willingness of the host state to respond to the threat;
- The mission’s ability to address the threat, unilaterally or jointly with other protection actors;
- The comparative advantages and expected impact the mission may have in mitigating or eliminating the threat; and
- The possible negative consequences of the mission’s actions or inactions. A mission’s actions can lead to direct or indirect harm to civilians, possible political fallout or retaliatory attacks. A failure to act can also result in civilian harm, a loss of legitimacy and diminished ability to deter. Both action and inaction may result in heightened insecurity for peacekeepers and/or civilians.

8.3 POC THREAT MATRIX

The process of conducting a POC threat and risk analysis will result in a priority list of threats to be addressed. These can be organized in a POC Threat Matrix, a tool to identify and prioritize POC threats easily.

At the operational and tactical levels (normally a mission field office), a POC Threat Matrix should be developed that will identify key POC concerns over a time period from a few days to a few months. The POC Threat Matrix should be developed and regularly reviewed by the POC coordination forum and approved by the Head of Office and relevant
heads of military and police components. The process should ensure that relevant factors (political, security, gender, human rights, etc.) are taken into account when assessing and prioritizing threats to civilians. The matrix should prioritize situations to address and indicate the required contribution of relevant mission components and necessary resources.

A POC Threat Matrix shall as much as possible:

- List and prioritize the short- to medium-term POC threats based on their probability of occurrence and potential impact on civilians;
- Map specific populations at risk and vulnerabilities affecting them;
- Map specific locations where the probability of occurrence of a threat and its potential impact on civilians are identified as the highest;
- Map other protection actors (presence, resources, intent and actions);
- List and monitor implementation of all short and medium term activities conducted to prevent, pre-empt or respond to all priority POC threats;
- Identify available mission capacities and resources; and
- Flag gaps in response and recommend corrective action.

While the POC Adviser or Focal Point may take the lead in coordinating and drafting the POC Threat Matrix, it must be a consultative and collaborative process in which the threats to civilians are agreed and prioritized by all relevant actors. A draft of the matrix should always be presented for consultation with relevant mission components/sections and UNCT and humanitarian partners when the content directly relates to their programmes or areas of expertise.

Missions face high expectations of their POC response but limited resources and capabilities. Therefore, mission decision makers should articulate and communicate clear, realistic and achievable objectives for each of the priority threats identified in the POC Threat Matrix.
Hotspot and blind-spot mapping may contribute to the development of the POC Threat Matrix. Mission POC coordination mechanisms can then continue ongoing mapping exercises of potential hotspots where threats to civilians have arisen or are likely to arise. At the same time, they may map blind spots where the mission does not have a presence or easy access to information (yet) as to where threats may arise.

**Example: MINUSCA hotspot map**

8.4 QUARTERLY FORWARD-LOOKING REPORTING

In accordance with the DPO POC Policy, peacekeeping missions with POC mandates are expected to provide UN Headquarters with brief, quarterly forward-looking assessments of threats to civilians in their areas of operation. Forward-looking threat and risk assessments will enable the mission to anticipate and prevent violence before it occurs or, at a minimum, mitigate its impact on civilians. They will also better enable UN Headquarters to keep the Security Council and other key political actors informed of escalating risks to civilians and strengthen preventive diplomacy and early action.

The forward-looking threat assessments will rely on the POC threat and risk assessments and POC Threat Matrix already created by the mission; these should be subsequently refined and/or updated according to the outlook of the succeeding three months (i.e., these are dynamic assessment tools for present and future resource deployment).

**Form:** Assessments should normally be delivered to UN Headquarters via confidential code cable. However, if the mission believes that a confidential code cable is not a suitable vehicle for frank reporting, alternative formats can be considered.

**Length:** Assessments should be brief and succinct, approximately 2-5 pages.

**Sources/process:** Inputs should be drawn from across the mission, including the civilian, police, military and support components. With the POC Adviser or Focal Point in the drafting lead, existing mission processes or forums should be leveraged to produce the report to the extent possible, for example relying on information shared through the JOC, JMAC, POC working groups, hotspot/threat mapping, Unite Aware Incidents or related
mechanisms. Mission actors may engage with humanitarians and other partners in developing the analysis, but formal consultations are not required for this report.

**Content:** Assessments should examine threats to civilians in the area of operations, identifying current threats and outlining possible threats over the next quarter. The report should indicate the likelihood of a threat materializing and the expected impact of that threat should it materialize. These threats may or may not be in areas where the mission is present or has access.

**Frank reporting is strongly encouraged.** Assessments should focus on analytical and trends-based reporting rather than technical and incident-based reporting. As a quarterly report, the assessment horizon should look approximately three months ahead. The mission is free to organize such analysis geographically, thematically or in any manner that suits the context.

### 8.5 INTEGRATING INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL MASS ATROCITIES

The commission of mass atrocities (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing) are some of the gravest threats to civilians that a peacekeeping operation may encounter. Throughout the process described above of identifying and analysing threats to civilians, it may be useful for missions to identify and monitor specific early warning and other indicators that could point to the possibility of the preparation or commission of atrocity crimes. As the mission produces its POC threat and risk assessments, POC Threat Matrix and forward-looking reporting on POC threats, indicators of potential mass atrocities should be integrated, as relevant.

Considering incidents and threats through the lens of atrocity prevention may help missions to understand better the nature and potential impact of a threat to civilians, allowing them to determine the likelihood of whether atrocity crimes may be committed and whether particular groups are being systematically threatened. This may be particularly useful in situations where civilians face the risk of atrocity crimes in the absence of current violence or open armed conflict. Some actions taken by state actors — such as the adoption of measures or legislation that affect or deliberately discriminate against particular groups or imposition of severe restrictions on the presence or movement of NGOs, international organizations or media — or non-state actors may constitute early warning of atrocity crimes, regardless of whether populations are experiencing active conflict.

When applying an atrocity-prevention lens, incidents at the local level (such as grievances between particular ethnic groups) should not be viewed in isolation from national-level events (such as sudden changes in government). The interdependence of these dynamics may trigger the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes. Considering these together will enable analysts to more easily anticipate where and when those risks may be escalated.
A forward-looking approach to atrocity prevention assists actors in reframing analysis and information gathering to identify patterns of behaviour that may precede mass atrocity crimes. This long-term pattern recognition allows protection actors to understand several crucial variables and influences, specifically:

- Who is vulnerable?
- Which factors intensify their vulnerabilities?
- Where atrocities may take place?
- What triggers escalation?
- How to protect civilians before atrocities take place?
- How to deter perpetrators from committing crimes?

How can this lens be utilized in the field?

Through tools such as the UN’s Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, developed by the Office of the Special Advisers to the Secretary-General on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, protection actors can develop their awareness of the political and societal conditions that may increase the likelihood of atrocities or trigger their commission. The Framework of Analysis lists 14 risk factors for mass atrocity crimes and provides various indicators that may help analysts in identifying when those risk factors may be elevated in a given situation. Once analysts have identified the likelihood of atrocities being perpetrated, they can convey these risks to tactical and strategic decision makers via the products described above (threat assessments and threat matrices, including forward-looking reporting). Equipped with such analysis, those leaders can determine appropriate preventive action, including support to and coordination with national mechanisms for the prevention of genocide, as appropriate.

Mission analysts should use their understanding of the baseline status quo within the mission area of responsibility to determine which of the 14 risk factors and related indicators are most relevant to their specific context. By measuring changes in those indicators against the baseline they can assess whether the likelihood of atrocities taking place is increasing.

Although the inventory in the following box is not exhaustive, it presents pertinent indicators to be included.

### Enabling circumstances or preparatory action for the commission of atrocity crimes

*Events or measures, whether gradual or sudden, which provide an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes, or which suggest a trajectory towards their perpetration*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling circumstance</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased inflammatory rhetoric, propaganda campaigns or hate speech targeting protected groups, populations or individuals</td>
<td>Increases in dangerous speech are quantifiable when looking at media reports or while participating in community engagement. Inflammatory rhetoric is particularly dangerous when linked with other indicators such as acts of incitement or hate propaganda and politicization of past grievances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of people or their property based on affiliation to a group or increased politicization of identity</td>
<td>Acts used to single out a particular group — as well as politicization of group differences — are warning signs of potential mobilization along these inter-group differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of large quantities of arms or ammunition or of other objects that could be used to inflict harm</td>
<td>Acquiring large quantities of arms may increase the capacity to commit atrocities. In a situation of armed conflict or recent conflict there may be a baseline availability of personnel, arms and ammunition, an increase in which may be used to perpetrate atrocities. It is important to measure fluctuation in those resources, such as sudden acquisition of arms or large-scale movement of troops or combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased attacks against life, physical integrity, liberty or security of members of protected groups, populations or individuals — or increased serious acts of violence against women and children</td>
<td>Increasing violations against vulnerable populations is a sign of perpetrators disrespecting international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as a growing willingness to commit acts that may constitute atrocity crimes. Those assessing the risk of atrocity crimes should look for a pattern of increased attacks in a particular area or at specific times that could be associated with potential triggering factors like elections, commemorative or religious events, or seasonal changes.</td>
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</tbody>
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Triggering factors are events or circumstances that, even if seemingly unrelated to atrocity crimes, may seriously exacerbate existing conditions or may spark the onset of atrocity crimes. An adequate early warning assessment should be mindful of all such events or circumstances and consider their potential impact, even if they appear to be unrelated to more direct or structural risk factors. One way of doing this is by creating an annual calendar, mapping relevant events that have proven to increase tensions in the past. This way appropriate action can be considered ahead of the events to mitigate tensions and avoid escalation, and the mission can increase its monitoring of identified risk factors.

Potential triggering factors:
- Sudden deployment of security forces or commencement of armed hostilities;
- Spillover of armed conflicts or serious tensions in neighbouring countries;
- Abrupt or irregular regime changes, transfers of power or changes in political power groups;
- Onsets of seasons or cultural/religious periods/holidays/observances;
- Acts of incitement or hate propaganda targeting particular groups or individuals;
- Census taking, elections, pivotal activities related to those processes, or measures that destabilize them; and
- Other annual events that may increase tensions between groups, such as cattle fairs or religious events.

Related Reference Documents
- DPO Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence (2019.08)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) (2015.03)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) (2015.04)
- DPKO-DFS Joint Mission Analysis Centre Field Handbook (2018.03)
- SG’s Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (May 2019)
- DPKO-DPA Aide Memoire on Engaging Non-State Armed Groups for Political Purposes: Considerations for UN Mediators and Missions (12 May 2017)
Chapter 9: Using Tools for POC

Changing operational variables, actors and dynamics affect POC threats and risks. As situations change, mission personnel must remain current in their understanding of these threats and risks so that they can anticipate, act and adapt effectively. This requires the mission to have effective tools for information gathering and analysis, early warning and response.

Without tools and systems to provide information, analysis and early warning, missions will be unable to implement timely and effective responses.

A mission’s early warning system should be focused at the tactical and operational levels, seeking to identify specific threats in defined areas and producing short to medium-term predictive analysis. Many of the tools available to missions rely on engagement with local communities.

POC coordination mechanisms, with guidance from POC Advisers, often develop a mission’s information gathering, analysis and early warning and response tools. Many of the tools are managed by Civil Affairs, Human Rights, JOC and JMAC.

Tools for information gathering and analysis, early warning and response are developed at both mission headquarters and field offices but usually implemented in mission field offices.

Tools for information gathering and analysis, early warning and response should be developed as early in the mission lifecycle as possible, but also need to adapt and evolve along with the changing dynamics on the ground. Innovations are always timely.

9.1 EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

POC threat and risk assessments rely on the constant collection and analysis of information relevant to POC. Particularly in dynamic contexts, missions must maintain situational awareness to inform planning and timely response to threats to civilians. A structured early warning system will help the mission gather and analyse information on threats to civilians in a timely manner and thus enable the adoption of proactive measures to prevent credible threats against civilians. Early warning contributes to better resource allocation, facilitates a comprehensive, whole-of-mission approach to POC and enhances early action and prevention. See Annex V for an SOP on early warning.

The purpose of an early warning system is to ensure that:

- The mission understands the indicators, signals, necessary conditions and triggers that make violence against civilians likely to occur;
- There is a process in place for collecting, sharing and corroborating early warning information within the mission and/or with external actors;
- Situations requiring urgent action can quickly be escalated, responded to, and referred to the attention of mission leadership, where necessary; and
- Situations requiring longer-term action, deployment of mission assets or resource allocation can be referred to the POC planning and coordination mechanisms.
9.2 TOOLS FOR INFORMATION GATHERING, EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE

Peacekeeping missions have developed a range of tools to facilitate situational awareness, particularly related to the integrated identification and analysis of threats to civilians. Most of these operate at the tactical level, at field offices or within COBs and TOBs, and generate primary assessments of threats to civilians. These tools provide information that will directly inform threat assessments, analysis and response, and which should also be combined with information and analysis from POC coordination mechanisms, as well as broader political and contextual analysis, to inform strategic decision making at the operational and strategic level. Below are some examples of these tools, which can be adapted as appropriate in various mission contexts.

Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs)

Community Liaison Assistants are national Civil Affairs officers who are deployed alongside military and police field commanders to support and enhance the missions’ engagement with communities. CLAs normally speak the local language and are able to build relationships with local communities. As such, they can support the military and police components to interact with local authorities, communities and other relevant actors in the field and perform a range of tasks, including information gathering, threats or needs assessments, conflict mediation, contributing to the mission’s early warning system activities, local-level protection planning, coordination of and follow up on field visits and patrols/operations and strengthening the resilience of local communities.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

The Role of a CLA

Khalil Ngobozoua, MINUSCA CLA (2015-)

When I was initially recruited to MINUSCA in 2015, I had limited knowledge of the crisis that had spread across my native Central African Republic (CAR). After some months serving as a Community Liaison Assistant (CLA), when I had come to understand the mandate and purpose of MINUSCA, I began to understand how the work of the peacekeeping operation was helping to protect civilians. As a CLA, I initially thought that my work would be limited to organizing and communicating with communities. What I have come to understand, however, is that I have been able to play a key role in the protection of communities as well, mostly by engaging with them, setting up Community Alert Networks (CANs) and by working with the uniformed components of the Mission to ensure we have local level early warning. In my experience, the work of a CLA is important for POC in connecting the local population to the Mission. Several times I have accompanied the Force to translate between them and locals, but also to explain cultural aspects foreign troops might not understand. Being able to increase the levels of communication between the communities and the Force has made a real difference, especially in the perception the population has of the troops. Sometimes I’ve found the role of a CLA presents risks, because you might need to interact with armed groups as well. These interactions are important, though, as they help us anticipate threats and understand the motivations of armed elements. I find that CLAs are indispensable for the protection of civilians within a peacekeeping operation. Our work helps to reinforce protection initiatives and bridge gaps that might exist between the Mission and the local community.

“… I have been able to play a key role in the protection of communities as well, mostly by engaging with them, setting up Community Alert Networks (CANs)…”
Community Alert Networks (CANs)

Community Alert Networks (CANs) are a tactical level early warning tool. They are human and/or technology-based communication systems to reinforce the capacities of communities to protect themselves, by enhancing and organizing their means of communication. They aim at providing early warning information on threats to communities or individuals at risk of violence and can assist tactical level mission presences (including COBs and TOBs) to triangulate information and prevent or respond to threats. A CAN is able to facilitate and enable a community at risk to contact the closest mission presence and alert them to likely impending threats.

Community Liaison Assistants and Joint Protection Teams (see below) can assist military components to design CANs for the area of responsibility of a particular base. This can include assisting with the identification of i) reliable focal points and sources of information within the community, including community-based groups and civil society organizations, and ii) processes and material and/or technology required to transmit information and alerts. For example, alerts can be transmitted through noise (whistles, kitchen equipment in an IDP camp, etc.), transport (motorcycles, bicycles, etc.) or technology-based means (phone/SMS, satellite phones, HF radios, etc.).

**TOOLKIT**

**How to set up a Community Alert Network (CAN)**

**What is a Community Alert Network (CAN)?**

A CAN is a network of individuals from the local communities, for example one from each village, who alert the mission when the population is facing a violent threat. The network can rely on mobile phones or other ways to communicate. CANs are usually set up by CLAs. If there is no CLA in the area, one can be assigned on a short-term basis to set up the CAN.

**Checklist**

- Identify communities/villages at risk.
- Identify an individual who can serve as the community focal point to alert the mission about threats.
- Determine the best means of communication. For example, provide a mobile phone, or phone credit or establish a free hotline number.
- Where mobile phones do not work, consider other options. For example, the focal point can travel to a neighbouring town to place the call or can use a system of relaying the information by messengers on motorbike from one village to the next.
- Be clear about what kinds of threats the mission can respond to, and what the mission can and cannot do. For example, how long a response will take, whether it would be a police or military response, etc.
- Maintain the network by staying in contact.
- Routinely check and maintain the equipment required.
- Keep a record of alerts that come in, the mission’s response and the results.

**Reminders**

- Be creative. Use the community’s available tools for communication.
- Do no harm.
- Manage expectations.
- The CAN should focus on early warning before violence occurs.
Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)

Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) are multi-disciplinary teams deployed to hotspots to analyse protection needs and recommend preventive and responsive interventions to address them. JPTs are comprised of mission civilian, police and military components and possibly, state officials and/or humanitarian agencies. The teams deploy to a location where civilians may be at risk to provide detailed analysis on the threats to civilians in the area and to support comprehensive activities to protect civilians by all components. In particular, a JPT provides analysis on political, security and social dynamics in an area, particularly to identify threats of violence and communities at risk and to propose recommendations for appropriate protection strategies through Community Protection Plans (CPPs) (see below); establishing early warning mechanisms, including CANs, to enable rapid response; establishing coordination mechanisms with local authorities or communities; and addressing specific protection needs, including protection against sexual violence and grave violations against children. JPTs can also work with the military and police components to develop appropriate risk mitigation measures for the conduct of military and police operations. See Annex VI for an SOP on JPTs.

TOOLKIT

How to Conduct a Joint Protection Team (JPT) Mission

What is a Joint Protection Team (JPT)?

A JPT is a mission team, including civilian, police and military personnel, that conducts field visits. Usually coordinated by Civil Affairs or Human Rights, the purpose of a JPT is to identify threats, inform responses to threats, build ties and improve relations between the mission and local communities, lower tensions and enhance early warning. The JPT should serve to combine civilian and uniformed personnel capabilities to enhance the mission’s capacity to protect.

Checklist

Before the mission:

☑ Work with other components and sections in the duty station to identify areas of risk.

☑ Determine if the JPTs will be strategic and preventive, deployed along priority axes or responsive to specific incidents or trends.

☑ Utilize existing information/sources to gain as comprehensive an understanding of the situation as possible before departure (e.g., CANs, local sources, previous patrol reports, JMAC analysis, human rights monitoring, etc.).

☑ Build terms of reference (TORs) that clarify the objective, duration, participating entities and their responsibilities and logistical arrangements for the JPT.

On mission:

☑ Establish or maintain coordination mechanisms between local communities, local authorities and the mission’s nearest military presence.

☑ Analyse local dynamics for protection planning purposes.

☑ Work with mission military commanders to develop or update community protection plans.

☑ Ensure smooth and safe functioning of CANs.

☑ Engage with local authorities and armed actors on the ground to promote respect for human rights and mitigation of harm to civilians.

After the mission:

☑ Make concrete recommendations for mission action at local level and, where necessary, national level to improve the protection of civilians in the area.

Reminders

⚠ Do no harm.

⚠ Military should participate substantively and not just for escort security.
In May 2014, the village of Fatua (in the Lubero territory of North Kivu province, DRC), was burned and looted, including homes, schools and the local health centre. In the incident, several women were raped, and more than 10 civilians killed. The violence was the result of fighting between the FDLR and the NDC/R, two rival armed groups responsible for recurrent human rights abuses and violence against civilians in the area since 1998. Due to the ongoing instability, MONUSCO had visited the area before.

Following this specific incident, MONUSCO deployed a Joint Protection Team (JPT) mission for a week. The JPT was composed of Human Rights Officers (including myself), Child Protection Officers and Civil Affairs Officers, escorted by the Force. Our objective in visiting the village was to reassure the population of MONUSCO’s continuous protection, to understand the protection concerns of the population and to investigate the attacks.

When we arrived, we found a village completely deserted. All the villagers had fled for safety. But then, two days after we arrived, villagers began gradually trickling back to the village. They were timid, but seemed reassured by the presence of MONUSCO. They continued to arrive throughout the week, motivated to return from the bushes and hills where they had been hiding. With the troops providing security, our civilian presence and engagement with the community was also able to build the confidence of the population. We investigated the incidents and assessed the protection needs of the community. We met members of the Local Protection Committee (LPC) and the Community Alert Network (CAN) and held a capacity-building session with human rights NGOs. We updated all these actors with mobile telephone numbers of our MONUSCO sections, so that they could easily reach us to provide early warning.

Soon the villagers had returned to their routine livelihood activities. Following our JPT mission, the health centre, which had been destroyed, was refurbished with equipment, medicine and personnel by the local health authorities. On subsequent visits to the area, we were able to see the community recovering.
Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs)

Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs) are composed of mission civilians and humanitarian or development actors, aimed at assessing and recommending responses to protection and humanitarian or development situations, including for the protection of civilians.

**TOOLKIT**

**How to Conduct a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)**

**What is a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM)?**

A JAM is a protection field visit usually consisting of mission civilian personnel and members of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) or relevant NGOs. Where appropriate, government authorities may also be included. Similar to a JPT, the purpose of a JAM is to jointly conduct an assessment to identify threats, inform responses to threats, improve relations with local communities, lower tensions and enhance early warning. A JAM will also consider the humanitarian situation.

**Checklist**

- Take the same steps as for a JPT (see above), but factor in consultation with UNCT and relevant NGO colleagues, as well as government actors, where relevant, prior to departure to determine priorities and TORs.
- Ensure that information is shared among mission and humanitarian and development team members, as appropriate.

**Reminder**

⚠️ Humanitarian actors may be wary of participating jointly with uniformed colleagues, especially military. Discuss options to best preserve any necessary humanitarian distinction.

**Community Protection Plans (CPPs)**

At the tactical level, each mission base or field presence is expected to have a Community Protection Plan (CPP), which provides an overview of the security situation, threats to the civilian population, priority communities at risk of violence and actions planned or required to address POC risks. Depending on the composition of the base or field presence, CPPs will often be drafted by the field Commander (UNPOL/Force) and CLA, with support from civilian components, in consultation with local communities.

**TOOLKIT**

**How to Develop a Community Protection Plan (CPP)**

**What is a Community Protection Plan (CPP)?**

A CPP is a plan developed by the mission for the protection of a particular population or area, taking into account the specific dynamics and context of the community. CPPs are normally developed jointly by uniformed colleagues and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), with the support and guidance of Civil Affairs. An effective CPP should include a CAN or a network of CANs, as well as information on key community leaders, effective forms of mitigation relevant to local populations and a strategy for engagement with the local population as well as potential perpetrators.

**Checklist**

- Undertake a robust mapping of the community. Take into account drivers of conflict, historical context and grievances, key leadership, spoilers, minority groups, youth and women’s representation and the network of relations that exist between major actors.
- Engage all relevant actors in the community in the consultation process.
- Include the best means of communication with each relevant local actor in the CPP.
Identify likely threats, possible triggers, preventive action and planned responses to protect civilians.

Identify vulnerable individuals and infrastructure (e.g., schools and medical facilities).

Establish locations for locals to meet military or police escorts, or “safe areas” where the population can seek refuge.

Establish a CAN or a series of CANs to function as part of the overall CPP.

Share the plan with the local community so that they know what to expect of the mission.

**Reminders**

- Consult with women’s organizations when creating a CPP.
- Update the CPP periodically.
- Be realistic, do not overpromise the protection the mission can provide.

### 9.3 Casualty Recording

Another tool missions can use to contribute to information gathering and analysis, early warning and response for POC is casualty recording. Casualty recording is the process of systematically and comprehensively recording and verifying information on individuals killed and injured in a specific set of circumstances. The systematic recording of casualties is useful for POC for the following purposes:

- To provide a detailed understanding of the nature and severity of threats to civilians as well as changes over time;
- For ‘real-time’ prevention and protection such as identifying harmful practices and supporting decisions on the deployment of UN forces;
- For informing evidence-based advocacy with the host state and with perpetrators of violence to bring about a change in their behaviour;
- For planning appropriate responses, including military and political engagement;
- For pursuing accountability;
- For peacebuilding purposes, including community reconciliation; and
- To inform strategic planning and reporting and monitoring and to evaluate the implementation of the POC mandate.

For these purposes to be served, casualty recording must be based on a methodology that is systematically and consistently applied. The roles and responsibilities of those involved must be agreed upon and understood in the mission. While human rights components are generally responsible for verifying and analysing casualty information and for generating casualty figures, the information and analysis resulting from casualty recording must be regularly shared with the POC Adviser and POC coordination mechanisms. Where the mission cites casualty figures externally, it should be clear and consistent about the source and methodology of those figures.

Casualty recording is usually conducted by the mission human rights component as part of their mandate on human rights monitoring, investigating and reporting. Gathering and verifying information on casualties to produce timely and reliable information and analysis requires not only available resources and a degree of expertise but also a robust methodology and the building up of a network of sources over time. This work is very challenging due to the nature of the perpetrators, the remote locations where incidents occur combined with poor infrastructure and access, and/or a paucity of sources.

In most situations, reports on casualties stem from a wide range of sources, including new and traditional media, NGO and other civil society actors, government actors, as well as through early warning or Community Alert Networks.
It may not be possible to verify such reports immediately but any information relevant to casualties received by mission personnel should be documented and immediately shared with the human rights component for verification and follow-up. The verification process is critical to ensuring that information and analysis on casualties is reliable, credible and can serve as an effective basis for decision making and engagement.

Other mission actors such as the JOC or POC Advisers may collate information on casualties or seek to aggregate available information to produce an initial database of incidents affecting the security of civilians, for example in Unite Aware Incidents. This can inform POC threat assessments and planning, and tentatively identify trends in violence. Such information can also form a baseline for when further investigation by Human Rights Officers is possible.

OHCHR’s Guidance on Casualty Recording explains what casualty recording is and why it is carried out. It sets out key considerations for peace operations when deciding whether to start casualty recording, as well as the basic steps to establish such a system. For the most part, it is based on UN best practices and a review of casualty recording systems within and outside of the UN. It can be applied in a range of contexts, including non-conflict settings, whether by the UN, authorities, civil society or other relevant actors. The Guidance aims to contribute to generating more data and reporting of casualties, including pursuant to Security Council mandates and the Sustainable Development Goals.

Non-UN actors, including government agencies and civil society, may also be engaged in casualty recording. The Standards for Casualty Recording have been developed by civil society and seek to promote and standardize best practices, principles and criteria for casualty recording efforts.

When considering whether to institute casualty recording, a mission must consider relevant contextual and organizational factors.

Contextual factors: Is casualty recording suitable and possible in the context?

- Is there a deteriorating, crisis, armed conflict or protracted situation in which individuals are killed or injured in incidents that are not merely isolated and sporadic acts of violence or singular criminal acts?
- Is information on incidents involving casualties available or potentially available across the country or the area to be covered?
- Are there different types of sources on incidents involving casualties?

Organizational factors: Is casualty recording appropriate and feasible?

- Will casualty recording help bring about the desired POC impact?
- What sources and what information can the mission access?
- Does the mission have sufficient resources to dedicate to maintaining consistent casualty recording?

27 SDG 16.1.2 on conflict-related deaths and 16.10.1 on the killing of media personnel, trade unionists and human rights advocates.
28 Available at http://www.everycasualty.org/standards-v1.
How to Conduct Casualty Recording

What is casualty recording?
Casualty recording is the process of recording and verifying information on individuals killed and injured, often in a conflict setting, or otherwise as a result of violence. Where information on individuals killed and injured is not available, information can be recorded on incidents that reportedly result in casualties. Casualty recording usually involves using a database to store and manage information, but it can be as simple as keeping lists or tables, where resources are limited, as long as the information is securely stored and managed, and confidentiality and informed consent can be fully respected.

Checklist
- Define who is a ‘casualty’: Identify the legal framework, assess what information is available, set the boundaries of who will be included/excluded.
- Standardize data categories: Identify and define terms to be used.
- Verify information: Set out how to verify information, including the types of sources to be used.
- Identify minimum data and disaggregation required.
- Develop and use appropriate and secure information management tools.
- Apply a standard of proof: Set out the standard of proof to be applied in deciding whether the information is sufficient to believe that the casualties occurred as described.
- Establish internal quality control: Set out methods for quality control of information; clarify roles and responsibilities for quality control.
- Determine how and when information will be used and how it will be presented.
- Measure progress: Periodically review the context and determine the impact/outcomes of casualty recording.

Reminders
To strengthen the data:
- Ensure accuracy and precision
- Preserve impartiality
- Uphold objectivity
- Ensure transparency about methodology

To protect cooperating persons by reducing any possible negative repercussions:
- Respect confidentiality
- Ensure informed consent
- Do no harm

9.4 NEW TECHNOLOGIES
New technologies are constantly developing that provide new tools for the collection and analysis of information and contributing to the mission’s situational awareness. As technological developments will likely outpace the revision of this handbook, the points herein are provided only as indicative examples of how technology can be used by missions in implementing the POC mandate. DPO and individual missions must continually innovate to stay abreast of the possibilities and best utilize new technologies.
As of 2019, the Unite Aware (UA) platform of IT applications (formerly the Situational Awareness Programme) is being piloted and rolled out as the flagship for situational awareness in peacekeeping missions. The UA platform is an overarching, umbrella technology platform that:

- aggregates and processes critical data and
- presents that data to decision makers and mission leadership, via fit-for-purpose technical tools, including wide-screen visualization, reporting and analysis instruments.

Specific applications that should prove useful in support of POC mandate implementation include:

- **Unite Aware Incidents** can track incidents and events directly related to the protection of civilians and gather them into a central database repository;
- **Unite Aware Maps** (formerly the “MCOP”) provides a visual, geospatial presentation of fixed and variable mission data, such as locations of key infrastructure and assets, incidents, patrol plans, etc.; and
- **Unite Aware Dashboards** can provide custom views of data, such as on the number of killings, rapes and other incidents affecting the security of civilians, disaggregated as appropriate (per area, gender, age, etc.).

To facilitate the identification of civilians at risk, missions should ensure the consolidation of a consistent set of information related to incidents affecting the security of civilians, including location, date and time, actors involved, nature of the incident and numbers of individuals affected. This can be coordinated by the POC Adviser or via the POC coordination mechanisms, or in some missions, may be managed by the JOC or JMAC. Reports of incidents should be gathered in one place, though this needs to be harmonized or aligned with any casualty recording the mission is conducting (see chapter 9.3). Drawing on UA (when available) or other platforms, missions should consider the use of analysis tools to understand incident data better and to draw out patterns, dynamics and trends that may not be apparent from an anecdotal or qualitative approach to analysis. Potential tools (in the absence of UA) could include geospatial and geographic information system (GIS) tools, including satellite imagery and digital mapping, and data analytics technologies and dashboards (e.g., “Microsoft PowerBI” and “Google Analytics”). Such analytical tools will usually be managed by the JMAC, though the POC Adviser and coordination mechanisms may also find them useful.

One tool that missions can use to collect critical information to feed into such analytical platforms is the operation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, also referred to as “drones”). UAVs are multipurpose remotely controlled flying platforms that can have different capabilities depending on available accessories (e.g., thermal-imaging cameras). Often operated by military and police components, UAVs are able to capture detailed, high-resolution imagery of areas. Such imagery can be used to locate objects or elements, analyse terrain, measure distances and areas or obtain the exact coordinates of a location or incident. UAVs can create a multiplier effect when the mission has insufficient human and transport resources to reach all areas and can help the mission to see and gather information from areas that are difficult or dangerous to access. UAVs can be particularly useful for monitoring and assessing a situation in remote, hard to access or hostile areas, as the drone operator can receive data remotely without being physically present in a conflict area. UAVs can be controlled not only by the operator, but in some cases, directed automatically by artificial intelligence. The information gathered by UAVs can contribute to POC mandate implementation by improving situational awareness, tracking the movements of armed groups and actors, as well as displaced populations, and assisting investigation of POC incidents.
CASE STUDY

MONUSCO Use of UAVs

In early June 2019, MONUSCO received information about the sudden escalation of inter-ethnic conflict between the Hema and Lendu communities, near Bunia, Ituri province. According to preliminary data, dozens of people were killed, and thousands forced out of their homes who had to take refuge in surrounding villages.

In response, MONUSCO deployed a joint mission to immediately investigate the events. As part of the joint mission, the police component organized crime unit deployed a forensic expert who was also a specialist in the use of drones. Arriving in the area, the team faced unprecedented opposition from Lendu community leaders and undisguised hostility. The community leaders firmly rejected the Mission’s calls to stop violence against civilians. Conducting the investigation was difficult due to what was perceived as an immediate threat to the lives of the joint mission members.

In this situation, using drones was the only possible means to study the inaccessible locations where the Hema victims were allegedly killed. With the drones, UNPOL was able to conduct a survey of extensive areas, up to 12 hectares in 15 minutes. The imagery of the area was then used to search for bodies, graves and evidence, as well as for subsequent analysis of the terrain at the crime scene for when access was possible, in particular by counting burned houses, measuring distances and areas and obtaining the exact coordinates of the evidence found. During crime scene analysis, items found by the team included dead bodies, mass graves, parts of ammunition for firearms (bullet casings) as well as edged weapons.

MONUSCO promptly transferred the evidence obtained during the investigation to the national armed forces, which initiated a large-scale military operation against the armed group affiliated with the Lendu. As a result of the operation, the attacks on civilians ceased for the time being, and thousands of displaced people were able to return home.

Finally, as discussed in previous chapters, social media is a critical technology for strategic communications. Monitoring of social media can also serve as a tool for situational awareness and can contribute to regular analysis of perceptions and objectives of key stakeholders, or to access or “crowdsource” local perceptions of critical issues. Moreover, armed actors and spoilers often use social media to coordinate their activities and secure resources, including through the trafficking of persons and weapons and recruitment of new members, as well as to carry out influence campaigns or encourage negative popular sentiments. Monitoring of social media can be done manually, if regular, or can employ technology to mine, track and analyse the available data more efficiently for sentiments and trends, in addition to potentially warn of or flag critical incidents. UN missions have most recently employed “Dataminr” and “Crimson Hexagon” programs to monitor and conduct analysis of social media, but a wide range of social media analysis tools are available and continually improving in scope and accuracy.
MINUSMA Radio Mining and Analysis

In Mali, a country of 18.5 million people with an internet penetration of only 10%, 80% of the population uses radio as the main source of information. Radio serves as a vital platform for public discussion, information sharing and news. Mali has one of the strongest community radio networks in Africa, which remains a popular way for Malians to voice their needs, concerns and opinions, particularly in rural areas. In 2019, MINUSMA, the Office of Information and Communication Technology, UN Global Pulse and DPO Office of Military Affairs launched an 18-month pilot project to verify whether it is possible to conduct analysis of public discussion on the radio in local languages. Building on existing open-source peacekeeping intelligence and strategic communication capabilities, the analysis of radio content presented an opportunity to take the pulse of populations that are excluded by the digital divide and contribute to early warning systems for POC.

The project makes public radio broadcasts machine-readable using “Qatalog”, a speech recognition and transcription technology, that transforms radio content into text. Tracking public conversation from radio will help the Mission expand the scope of sentiment analysis in Mali to remote areas, improve situational awareness and identify trends amongst larger groups and communities. Analysing radio data can aid in understanding critical issues affecting the population, such as an outbreak of violence and related responses, according to the perspectives of members of local communities. This helps the Mission to make more informed decisions around policy and interventions on POC.

In Phase I of the project, recordings of all relevant radio stations are converted into text automatically using keyword analysis (what-when-where). Radio content and data is then prepared for analysis to inform the mission on issues relevant to the MINUSMA mandate. The project aims at developing a radio data collection infrastructure in Mali, an integrated data storage application for collecting and automatically transcribing data for different languages and an application providing a keyword-based analysis of radio content, as well as SOPs for the use of the collection and analysis applications.

Related Reference Documents

- DPKO-DFS Civil Affairs Handbook (2012.02)
- DPKO-DFS Survey of Practice on Community Liaison Assistants in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (November 2016)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in UN Peacekeeping (2014.08)
- DPO Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence (2019.18)
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Monitoring and Surveillance Technology in Field Missions (2010.34)
- OHCHR Guidance on Casualty Recording (2019)
Chapter 10: Working with Communities on POC

WHAT

Peacekeeping operations should take a people-centred approach to POC, that understands the protection needs of communities based on their own perceptions and analysis of the threats and necessary responses. The response to physical threats to civilians must take into account and support existing community self-protection mechanisms, as appropriate.

WHY

Peacekeeping operations are deployed for a finite period and are not themselves a sustainable solution to conflict. They can, however, support sustainable solutions and durable peace by supporting and building local capacity and addressing root causes of conflict. Engagement with the civilian population is also vital for mission situational awareness.

HOW

Community engagement for POC takes place through regular and routine activities by all mission components as well as dedicated activities that seek to understand protection threats faced by the population. When engaging with the population on POC, particular efforts should be made to engage with all community members (including women, youth, minority groups, different religious and ethnic communities, people with disabilities, older persons, etc.) and not just community leaders. All community engagement must be undertaken with a ‘do-no-harm’ approach. The mission should also consider the roles of other protection actors conducting community engagement, so as not to create duplication or confusion.

WHO

Civilian, police and military components will all engage with civilians as part of their regular work, usually at the tactical level. Civilian sections, especially Civil Affairs and Human Rights, will have a particular role to play in community engagement, as will CIMIC Officers and Individual Police Officers engaged in community-oriented policing activities.

WHERE

Community engagement is primarily conducted at mission field offices, though some may be directed from mission headquarters.

WHEN

Community engagement should begin early for a mission to understand the environment and threats to civilians and should continue regularly throughout the lifecycle of a mission.

10.1 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Community engagement should be the cornerstone of all POC efforts. Missions must engage communities from the earliest stages of mission planning and start-up, throughout the lifecycle of the mission, to drawdown and closure. Community engagement should not be left only to civilian components like Civil Affairs, Human Rights, DDR/CVR and Strategic Communications and Public Information; uniformed components also have a role to play. Without adequate national staff, including Community Liaison Assistants, efforts to engage communities will be extremely difficult. The establishment of adequate national staff posts, and the recruitment and retention of strong national colleagues, including women, will determine the mission’s success with community engagement.
Peacekeeping operations engage with communities for several distinct, yet inter-related reasons. These can include:

- Situational awareness and understanding;
- Understanding the perceptions of threats faced by communities and vulnerable populations, and their protection needs;
- Understanding communities’ means of self-protection, conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques;
- Gathering information on potential threats faced by peacekeepers;
- Awareness raising and sensitization on the mission mandate;
- Understanding perceptions that communities have of the national, state and local actors and institutions responsible for and involved in protecting their rights and resolving conflicts;
- Understanding perceptions that communities have of the mission and encouraging mission acceptance by the local population; and
- Implementing projects, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), and undertaking community-based activities.

For more on these topics, see chapter 7 (Communicating about POC), chapter 8 (Identifying and Prioritizing POC Threats and Risks), chapter 9 (Using Tools for POC), chapter 11 (Operational Planning for POC) and chapter 12 (Responding to POC Threats).

For engagement with communities to be effective, missions must be clear and transparent about their objectives. Each engagement will have a specific purpose or purposes and these will involve different approaches and activities, though these may overlap. Effective community engagement also requires sustained physical proximity, or, at minimum, sustained communications; one-off or ad hoc engagements have limited impact. Missions must also be mindful that community engagement is a bilateral activity, relying on two-way communication (i.e., it is a dialogue). Activities should focus as much on listening to communities as spreading messages. While community engagement is a powerful tool in the protection of civilians, it must not only be viewed as a means to an end. It also cannot occur in a vacuum, and must be coupled with engagement with duty bearers, such as perpetrators, potential perpetrators and local and national authorities.

While community engagement by all mission components is to be encouraged, it must be undertaken carefully, as there are several risks involved. Engagement with the peacekeeping mission may stigmatize or even endanger communities, where an armed actor considers such engagement to be a threat. Further, engagement by peacekeeping personnel to provide protection to a community can undermine communities’ own capacities for self-protection. Networks and mechanisms established or supported by international actors may not be sustainable. The provision or expectation of protection by the mission may also create perverse incentives for communities, for example to stay in a place that is dangerous. Finally, supporting community self-protection approaches or mechanisms can expose communities to risk. Missions should carefully consider all these risks before engaging communities.

Community engagement activities can be conducted across all three tiers (protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment) and along all four phases (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) of POC. Mission activities engaging communities may include:

- Establishing Community Alert Networks and other early warning and alert systems;
- Supporting reconciliation and conflict management at the local level;
- Supporting community engagement and advocacy with potential perpetrators;
- Supporting community monitoring and reporting on violations of human rights and IHL;
- Supporting other local initiatives to prevent and respond to threats to civilians;
- Supporting community-led physical protection mechanisms such as flight to a safer area;
- Supporting the restoration of state authority, including building confidence between local communities and state authorities;
- Supporting witness and victim protection measures before, during and after investigations and prosecutions of serious crimes, as well as the provision of psycho-social support;
- Planning and implementing quick impact projects (QIPs);
- Sensitizing on the reintegration of ex-combatants to restore a climate of confidence between communities;
- Using CVR projects to provide vocational training for youth at risk to prevent them from joining armed groups; and
- Gathering information from affected communities on which areas may be contaminated by explosive hazards and working with the communities to develop programmes that prioritize areas for clearance and effectively reach populations with risk education.

Ensuring that community engagement is culturally and gender sensitive

Community engagement should be conducted in a manner sensitive to gender, diversity and culture. Local traditions and customs may not themselves be sensitive to gender and diversity, so a balance must be struck among these considerations. The following recommendations should be considered to ensure that interactions respect these principles:

- In consulting local communities and gathering information on perceptions, needs and concerns, it may be necessary to undertake additional separate consultations with different individuals, groups or identities (e.g., youth, elders, women, informal community leaders). This can allow those whose voices are often excluded from the public realm to be heard. It may also be prudent to match interlocutors with community
members, as for example, women may prefer to talk to other women, whether uniformed or civilian.

- While respecting and working with local structures and representatives, be careful about exacerbating power dynamics already at play within a community. Take care in selecting the mission’s interlocutor from the community and how they are perceived by the entire community, including women and vulnerable groups.

- Data gathered from community engagement should be disaggregated according to age, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc., as and when relevant to the context, conflict or planned intervention.

- In conducting a conflict analysis, those engaging with communities should consider how diversity and gender identity have featured in the conflict and develop an understanding of the experiences, priorities and grievances of different groups.

- When implementing reconciliation and conflict resolution programmes or activities, consider traditional conflict mitigation and management mechanisms.

- In supporting the development of political space and the restoration and extension of state authority, it is important to support the participation of women and cultural/ethnic minorities in civil administration, including their appointment as community or government leaders, as much as possible.

- Protection of civilians analysis should consider how issues of gender and diversity interact with risk and vulnerability and think about the role different groups play in early warning and prevention.

- It is useful to map organizations or networks that represent minorities or marginalized groups and assess the key issues on which they are engaged, the role they play in decision making and the level of influence or capacity they have.

- In the implementation of QIPs, missions should consider supporting projects that feature marginalized groups as beneficiaries or implementing partners, as one aspect of building confidence in the mission, mandate and peace process. Projects themselves should, where possible, be sensitive to gender and diversity issues.

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**What to DO**

- Ensure the safety and security of interlocutors.
- Know the mission mandate.
- Listen.
- Respect dignity and confidentiality.
- Obtain informed consent.
- Think of creative community outreach options.
- Report information received to the appropriate mission components and mission POC coordination mechanisms.
- Collect disaggregated data/information that is sensitive to the different experiences of women, girls, men and boys.
- Know referral arrangements for survivors of human rights violations, including sexual violence, to appropriate sources of support within and outside the mission, including specific mechanisms for children.
- Work with local NGOs and communities but understand that ‘civil society’ is not always representative of the whole community.
- Consider possible consequences of actions for local communities.
- Work together as civilian and uniformed components for a coordinated approach to community engagement.

**What NOT to do**

- DO NOT impose mission resources for protection where communities are effectively managing their own protection.
- DO NOT impose subjective (personal) judgements regarding communities’ needs.
- DO NOT engage in activities that may harm local communities.
- DO NOT interview or investigate victims and witnesses unless mandated and appropriately trained.
- DO NOT share details of victims of human rights violations with authorities.
- DO NOT take pictures of child victims.
- DO NOT act on behalf of victims without informed consent.
- DO NOT be discouraged if help is not immediate, or the mission is unable to help.
- DO NOT casually spend time with children.
- DO NOT give money, food or employment to children.
10.2 DO NO HARM

Peacekeeping operations should be particularly aware of the potential risks to civilians caused by their own actions, including from the impact of their military and/or police operations or activities, as a result of mission deployment and placement, or in the form of reprisals against those engaging or cooperating with the mission. Missions must take actions to mitigate these risks. When interacting with civilians, missions should follow a do-no-harm approach, including undertaking a risk assessment of the effects of the mission’s actions on the community.

Harm may include direct harm through conduct and discipline incidents, including sexual exploitation and abuse, or civilian harm resulting from a security operation. Even operations that are aimed at protecting civilians may result in unintended harm through, for example, the displacement of civilians or armed groups and resulting consequences, including reprisals against civilians.

Harm can also be indirect, due to proximity to the mission, or following the deployment or redeployment of a base, community engagement, the use of key infrastructure (transport, public services including schools, hospitals, water sources, etc.), local recruitment, the choice of contractors, a car accident or staff behaviour (cultural insensitivity, etc.).

Particular attention should be paid to how and where meetings are organized, ensuring a safe space for persons in vulnerable situations or at-risk, ensuring informed consent, maintaining confidentiality of information shared by partners, and taking extra precaution in the collection, storage and reporting of information. All reported allegations of intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the mission should be properly documented and reported through established internal channels.

Before engaging with communities or individuals, missions should conduct risk assessments and implement risk mitigation measures. Possible risk mitigation measures to ensure adequate protection of sources and interlocutors may include:

- Assess the level of threat and risk of harm to the informant and other cooperating persons before, during and after establishing contact with them. If an assessment concludes that the safety of the cooperating individual(s) cannot be ensured or there is insufficient information to make an informed determination about risks to their safety, do not seek information from or engagement with the individual(s).

- Choose the most appropriate and safest method to establish contact with the interlocutor. For example, determine if contact should be established directly or through a third party/intermediary.

- Consider minimizing the interlocutor’s exposure. For instance, establish direct contact in a manner that may seem coincidental.

- Consider developing secure methods of communication to keep in touch.

- Choose the safest place to obtain/gather the information. For example, determine if the interaction with the source should be visible or discreet. Protect his/her identity.

- Guarantee confidentiality and security of information. If there is a risk of endangering the informant(s), information should not be disclosed or should only be disclosed in a manner that removes the risk (i.e., providing information on a general pattern without revealing specific details; ensuring that only trusted intermediaries are used). In individual protection cases, the requirement of confidentiality also includes the confidentiality of information on the protective measures taken, including any support given by partners external to the field presence.

- Ensure informed consent.

- Always take into account the knowledge, views and needs of cooperating persons by involving them in the risk and threat assessment and the choice of measures to be taken to ensure their safety.
Do not raise expectations. Upon establishing contact and before proceeding, inform interlocutors of the limitations in guaranteeing protection.

Consider providing the persons with useful contacts in the community that could offer different types of assistance (e.g., protection networks) and/or of local authorities, if these can be trusted, in case there is a risk of reprisals as a result of the interaction.

Map the capacity and/or commitment of the local authorities to respond to protection concerns, to contribute to informed decisions.

Make use of the resources available in the community by facilitating contact with local protection networks.

Only share information on personal details of sources, victims and witnesses in line with relevant information sharing and reporting protocols (consult human rights and child protection personnel for further guidance). Identifying information can include photos and names, but also ages, locations and descriptions, especially in remote areas or where the details are unique.

Where peacekeeping personnel are unsure about whether engagement can be conducted safely, or where they consider that the mitigating measures listed above might prove insufficient, peacekeeping personnel should refrain from engaging with local communities, sources and interlocutors.
10.3 COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING

In addition to other community-based tools such as CLAs and CANs (see chapter 9), community-oriented policing (CoP) is a specific tool aimed at designing more resilient, sustainable protection strategies to ensure the improvement and quality of lives of the people in the longer term.

CoP is the consultative systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime, while at the same time helping to restore and nurture public acceptance of state services, especially policing. Utilizing CoP, UNPOL leverages community partnerships to prevent and detect crime as well as build a protective environment for communities.

In a post-conflict situation, state police services are not usually omnipresent. CoP therefore prioritizes educating people about measures they may take to protect themselves, such as avoiding high-crime areas, securing their housing, land and/or property and establishing neighbourhood watch/crime awareness programmes.

CoP is a mutually beneficial strategy – police build greater trust, accessibility and respect, while at the same time reducing the fear of security forces that may grip a society in a conflict or post-conflict context. CoP provides state police with better access to information on crime and improved moral support and respect for their activities, while communities start to understand and appreciate state services better, thereby improving the state’s legitimacy and governance.

CoP can also be used to support community dialogue and efforts to strengthen intercommunal relationships and facilitate stability and reconciliation, thereby reducing longer term protection issues.

The four core elements to any community-oriented policing strategy are:

- Consulting with communities,
- Responding to community needs,
- Mobilizing communities, and
- Solving recurrent problems.

In consultation and coordination with other mission components, UNPOL should consult and engage with traditional community leaders as well as the communities themselves to ascertain their protection needs. UNPOLs need to ensure that such interactions and engagements are undertaken in a safe and respectful manner so as not to expose women, men, girls and boys to additional threats, risks or harm. UNPOL, together with local communities, can then design their strategies to respond to the protection needs identified. Most often, if the protection concerns are localized, and include non-military threats, UNPOL may be able to respond, including through the leveraging of host state police capacities. While high visibility and effective response may be effective deterrents, UNPOL may also train community members to patrol the communities or to keep watch to supplement the deterrent presence of the police. Undertaking coordinated and regular awareness programmes on sexual and gender-based violence, as well as gender equality in the context of human rights and gender mainstreaming in the community, can lead to a reduction in gender-based crimes. Similarly, promoting awareness about rights and duties of individuals and creating community-police partnerships can contribute to preventing conflicts and improving the overall security situation.

Beyond any short-term physical protection requirements, CoP can support and mobilize communities to establish or re-establish structures or mechanisms – like CANs or neighbourhood watch/crime prevention schemes — that more systematically address longer term and recurrent protection issues.
The majority of my work in UNAMID has been interacting with communities inside of internally displaced persons (IDP) sites in Central Darfur. In addition to daily foot patrols conducted inside the sites, I’ve led a number of sensitization efforts and capacity building projects, including setting up English classes. The goal of community-oriented policing in this sort of setting is to maintain stability, and often that requires developing a good relationship with community leadership so that you can combat criminality and keep the environment organized.

Community-oriented policing requires a close relationship between the police and the population, so that we as police can understand what threats the community is facing. Community-oriented policing is also especially important when there are spontaneous demonstrations from the population. When that happens, it’s necessary to calm the situation as quickly as possible, or it can quickly escalate and become dangerous. In the past, I’ve been able to calm demonstrations by communicating directly with authority figures from the population with whom I’ve already developed good relations. Your investment in relationship building can be really beneficial in these situations.

Outside of public demonstrations, there are several recurrent challenges I’ve faced in my role in UNAMID, which include:

- **Language barriers** – Communication is the most important tool for the police inside of IDP sites, but we haven’t always had a great supply of Sudanese Language Assistants available to help us interact with communities. Another obstacle I’ve found is that some Language Assistants don’t always seem to tell the full truth of the community’s experience, either due to cultural issues or because they disagree with an opinion.

- **Expectation management** – The majority of the IDPs we work with are not familiar with the purpose of the mission or the role we’re playing for their protection. Often their expectation is that we’ll bring them money or material assistance. It’s especially important to manage these expectations because they can have direct impact on the willingness of communities to share important information.

- **Patrolling challenges** – Normally in order to conduct a patrol, there should be an armed military escort present. Given the harsh conditions in Darfur, however, vehicles often break down and poor roads can make it almost impossible to reach certain far-off locations. We’ve also found that when we conduct a patrol to an IDP site, we’re often informed that criminal elements fled the site as soon as they saw our vehicles coming.

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**Related Reference Documents**

- DPKO-DFS Civil Affairs Handbook (2012.02)
- DPKO-DFS Peacekeeping Practice Note: Community Engagement (March 2018)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Engagement with Civil Society (2017.06)
- Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13)
- Guidelines on the Role of the UN Police in Protection of Civilians (2017.12)
Part IV: Operational Readiness and Response
Missions should ensure that they have the necessary capacity and resources available to implement the POC mandate, and that staff are prepared through the necessary training and understand the necessity of coordination. All mission operations and activities can be designed in a way that is sensitive to the POC mandate. Effective planning for POC operations entails readiness for crises. Yet, critical situations can arise that even early warning systems may not fully predict. Hence, operational planning includes designing crisis management mechanisms and activation procedures that can address both anticipated and unanticipated critical situations.

The protection of civilians is a priority mandate and thus should be given primacy in decisions regarding the allocation and use of available capacity and resources. As missions must protect civilians from potential harm caused by the mission’s own actions, including unintended consequences of mission activities or operations, the planning and execution of military or police operations must involve civilian harm mitigation. Without sufficient preparedness, missions will not be able to manage crises.

POC should be integrated into all mission planning, preparedness and coordination at the operational level as well as the planning of operations by uniformed components. Mission-specific SOPs and guidance, training, scenario and table top exercises (TTXs), contingency planning and AARs will all contribute to preparedness. Situations of threats to civilians should be built into crisis management protocols, planning and rehearsals.

Mission leadership are responsible for ensuring that all mission personnel are trained and prepared to implement their tasks and responsibilities under the POC mandate. Mission support should ensure that the necessary resources and capabilities are available for implementing the POC mandate. While military and police operations will be planned and executed by uniformed personnel, this should be done in consultation with civilian staff who can help to apply a POC lens and identify possible consequences for civilians and appropriate mitigating measures. In the case of POC crises, POC Advisers support mission leadership. When mission crisis response mechanisms are activated, JOCs facilitate the crisis response process.

Preparation for POC is done at both mission headquarters and mission field offices, with support from UN Headquarters as needed.

Preparation for POC in the mission should begin at mission start-up, with regular review of available resources and capabilities. Integrating POC in operations occurs before, during and after security operations. Crisis management processes should be activated, as necessary, when the mission is faced with significant and/or large-scale threats to civilians.
11.1 INTEGRATING POC INTO OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Effective mechanisms for regular and ongoing information sharing and coordination of activities are crucial for the protection of civilians. Missions are advised to establish action-oriented and integrated coordination mechanisms and processes in support of decision making, planning and coordination of all operations. These mechanisms and processes should involve all relevant mission components.

POC coordination mechanisms (see chapter 6) and early warning systems (see chapter 9) established by the mission can support the planning and monitoring of operations to help identify and mitigate existing or arising threats to civilians. It is therefore essential for the role of POC and early warning mechanisms to be included in mission SOPs on operations planning, coordination and crisis management. Missions should consider establishing SOPs or guidance on the following:

- Mission integrated operational planning and coordination forums, including crisis coordination mechanisms;
- A liaison and key leader engagement matrix, to ensure streamlined coordination and engagement with other actors;
- An early warning, alert and rapid response process;
- The use of public information and influence in support of operations;
- Support to the state and relations with communities for the planning, coordination and conduct of operations;
- Standard responses to and decision-making on POC situations that mission components may encounter at the tactical level;
- The conduct of contingency planning exercises, including through rehearsals and drills; and
- Monitoring and evaluation of operations, including on POC.

11.2 RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES

At the strategic level, during the start-up phase of a mission and on a regular basis, it is essential to undertake a detailed joint assessment of the resources, personnel and capabilities required to adequately plan for and implement the POC mandate. This assessment can help to inform budget processes, Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) and strategic planning for POC.

Matching the mission's POC strategy against its resources and capabilities is an exercise that should be conducted regularly. Whenever the mission identifies gaps which limit the mission’s ability to implement the POC mandate, it is obligated to refocus its existing resources, appeal for additional support and inform Headquarters and the Security Council of any strategic shifts required by the gap in resources. The following list, while not exhaustive, includes options that the mission could consider in addressing the gaps:

**At Mission level:**
- Reprioritize objectives/activities
- Explore mobilization of resources available to other protection actors, where practical
- Redeploy resources and staff as required (e.g., to areas at risk)
- Mobilize additional resources, such as through the creation of trust funds or groups of friends
- Conduct drills and trainings with host state entities and other protection actors

**At Headquarters level:**
- Inform the Security Council and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly about the identified gaps
- Discuss with T/PCCs the need for additional and/or specialized resources/capabilities
- Increase targeted training on POC and the legal obligations of parties to conflict, to raise knowledge and awareness, in pre-deployment and in-mission training
Whatever the resources available, at all times, the mission must be able to:

- **Produce early warning analysis and receive alerts** of imminent threats or ongoing incidents of violence against civilians. Capacities used to do so may include call centres, databases, CANs, or UAVs (see chapter 9).

- **Plan for and rapidly deploy** (or redeploy) personnel and equipment necessary to conduct priority POC activities. Contingency and capacity planning are required to deploy temporary resources in priority POC areas. Whenever possible and relevant, rapid response mechanisms, for example Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), joint or integrated protection teams, mobile courts, joint investigation teams and prosecution support cells must be used to respond to or prevent emerging POC crises. When relevant and appropriate, UN or government agencies will be included in those integrated mechanisms.

- **Request and obtain Headquarters support** for temporary deployment of backstopping or surge capacity.

Missions may use a Resources and Capabilities Matrix (see format below) to systematically identify and monitor critical resources and capability gaps. This can be a particularly useful exercise at key moments such as the renewal of a mission’s mandate.

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**TEMPLATE – POC Resources and Capabilities Matrix**

This matrix charts the resources and capabilities within a mission according to the objectives and activities of the mission-wide POC strategy. It also identifies critical gaps that may hinder the mission in effectively implementing its POC mandate. The criticality of the gap is rated according to the following index:

- **RED** signifies that the mission is unable to implement key POC mandate tasks because of the lack of adequate resources.
- **ORANGE** signifies that the mission is able to implement a POC mandated task but not optimally and effectively because of insufficient/inadequate resources.
- **GREEN** signifies that the mission does not experience any significant resources gap related to the POC mandated task.

**TIER 1: Protection through Dialogue and Engagement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>EXISTING RESOURCES</th>
<th>CURRENT CAPABILITIES</th>
<th>GAPS (LACK OF EFFECT)</th>
<th>GAP CRITICALITY</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased willingness and capacity of the Government of X, in particular the State security forces, to fulfill its primary responsibility to provide security and protection for civilians</td>
<td>Advocacy towards, and dialogue with, GoX to ensure better understanding and implementation of the state’s responsibility to protect civilians</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support the development of GoX policies and strategies on the protection of civilians</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote improved conduct of national security forces in locations where civilians are at risk of physical attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping

Mission footprint

As POC is a priority mandate, locations that are deemed to be strategic priorities for POC, or where risks to the security of civilians are highest, should be prioritized when determining the mission footprint and deployment. The mission should also ensure a minimum level of projection, redeployment or temporary deployment capacity to be able to respond to emerging threats to civilians. Due consideration needs to be given to the size, nature and number of deployments, as they have an important impact on POC.

Extended field presence:
Multiple deployments enable the enhancing of situational awareness and reduce the delays in alert and response, often important in remote and inaccessible areas. They also have psychological deterrence and reassurance impacts on the perpetrators and victims of violence. Finally, they enable civilians to seek physical protection in the vicinity of mission compounds.

Limited field presence:
A small number of field locations will be cost-effective and enhance the projection capacity of mission military and police components available to respond to unfolding situations, due to reduced time and capabilities spent on management and supply logistics. This may be more appropriate where the ability to surge a response to crisis is more critical than regular presence.

11.3 TRAINING

Prior to arriving in the mission, all personnel should have received pre-deployment training on a wide variety of topics, including POC. Pre-deployment training for uniformed personnel is the responsibility of each Member State, while pre-deployment training for civilian personnel is conducted by the Integrated Training Service (ITS) of DPO. The Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTM) represent the essential knowledge required by all peacekeeping personnel — civilian, police and military — to function effectively in a UN peacekeeping operation. The CPTM curriculum includes training on cross-cutting themes and priorities such as conduct and discipline, sexual exploitation and abuse, human rights, gender mainstreaming, conflict-related sexual violence and POC. There is also a standard United Nations Comprehensive POC (CPOC) training package that should form the basis of pre-deployment training on POC.

The CPOC materials demonstrate the complex linkages between protection tasks and provide training and guidance on how to prevent, deter and respond to interrelated threats. The CPOC training package includes a scenario-based exercise (SBE), which can be conducted in either a Command Post Exercise (CPX) or a TTX, and is designed to reinforce the knowledge acquired during the CPOC modules, use the knowledge gained to solve a scenario based on events encountered in UN peacekeeping missions and incorporate POC considerations into existing decision-making planning methods. For uniformed personnel, Specialized Training Materials (STMs) are available on POC, human rights, child protection, gender and conflict-related sexual violence. Training on STMs should begin with CPTM and CPOC to ensure a shared understanding of the basic principles, guidelines and policies to ensure coherence in the implementation of the mandate. Mission senior leadership training includes SBEs that focus on integrated responses to issues such as crisis management and protection of civilians.

While personnel will receive some POC training prior to deployment, it is important to supplement this with mission- and context-specific training once they arrive in mission, utilizing both SBEs and TTXs. It is recommended that all missions with POC mandates conduct POC training at least twice each year, ideally immediately following troop and police rotations. In-mission training can be particularly effective when civilian, police and military personnel are trained on POC together.

29 A/RES/49/37 OP 47.
31 Available at https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community/training/CPOC.
As part of this training, all personnel (civilian, police and military) should be trained on the POC mandate, principles, roles and responsibilities, mechanisms and processes for POC planning, including information sharing, threat assessment, monitoring and evaluation and coordination. Mission senior leadership should likewise engage in TTXs and scenario-based trainings on crisis management. It is crucial to conduct early discussions and exercises on possible POC situations which may arise in the particular mission and the corresponding mission stance to be able plan and act decisively and efficiently.

In-mission training on POC will be organized by the Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) with content support provided by the POC Adviser(s) and relevant substantive sections in mission. Training may include SBEs, simulations, TTXs and other forms of exercises, including on child protection and conflict-related sexual violence. Such exercises can promote an integrated approach and ensure understanding on what to do to protect civilians at risk of violence. Additionally, upon identification of training need(s), missions can request a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to be deployed for a limited duration to provide operational training guidance or technical advice.

Whenever possible, missions should extend or integrate POC trainings to benefit other protection actors, including national authorities and humanitarian partners. Partnerships with peacekeeping training schools can also amplify the POC trainings that missions develop specific to their contexts.

### 11.4 CONDUCTING POC-SENSITIVE POLICE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

#### 11.4.1 Evaluate the risk associated with POC threats

All peacekeeping activities have the potential to impact the protection of civilians, regardless of intention or planned use of force. Accordingly, planning for police and military operations must integrate POC considerations as standard practice.

The mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Directive on the Use of Force (DUF) should provide the overall direction on the conduct of protection-sensitive military and police operations and the gradual use of force, including to protect civilians or minimize collateral damage.
In accordance with the DPO POC Policy, when engaged in military or police operations, missions are to anticipate, prevent, track, minimize and address collateral damage and other direct and indirect harm, including negative consequences for the safety and security of civilians or civilian objects and infrastructure. They should also take efforts to mitigate harm to civilians before, during and after the planning and implementation of operations.

When operations are being conducted in support of non-UN security forces, the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) provides a framework for missions to identify and mitigate any risk that the mission would support forces who may be involved in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The HRDDP risk assessment can contribute to and reinforce the overall risk assessment of the planned operation.

Force Commanders (FC) and Police Commissioners (PC) must present major security operation plans as they are being developed, for review and approval by the SRSG and DSRSG(s) in advance of the operation. To this end, a proposed decision-point format to conduct analysis and develop mitigation measures for political, POC and security risks posed by security operations is suggested below.33

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**TEMPLATE – SRSG/DSRSGs Security Operations Brief**

**I. Information Brief**

a. **Target Analysis**
   - i. What
   - ii. Why
   - iii. Where
   - iv. Who
   - v. When (immediate, when ready, contingency, etc.)

b. **Legal/Mandate Basis**

c. **Impact Analysis**
   - i. Political (Pros and Cons)
   - ii. Socio-economic (Pros and Cons)
   - iii. Protection of Civilians (Pros and Cons)
   - iv. Security (Pros and Cons)

**II. Decision Brief**

a. **Force Commander’s Assessment and Intent**

b. **Options**
   - i. Option 1
     1. Outline
  2. Pros and Cons
  3. Potential Collateral Damage
   - ii. Option 2
     1. Outline
  2. Pros and Cons
  3. Potential Collateral Damage

c. **Force Commander’s Recommendation**

d. **Consultation**
   - i. UN Headquarters
  ii. National/Regional Partners

**III. Action Brief**

a. **Tasking**
   - i. Force HQ
  ii. Police Component
  iii. Civilian Pillars
  iv. Director of Mission Support
  v. Head of Office

b. **Communication**
   - i. What
  ii. When
  iii. To Whom
  iv. By Whom

c. **Operational Security**
   - i. Timeline for release of information/coordination/action

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33 This suggested template adapts existing decision brief templates (see e.g., DPKO-DFS United Nations Force Headquarters Handbook, November 2014, p 66), to consider POC impacts of operations, the whole-of-mission approach and the need for strategic communications.
11.4.2 Coordinated and comprehensive approach

Military and police operations to protect civilians often seek to provide security to the civilian population by affecting the intent or capacity of perpetrators of violence or by deterring or mitigating the impact of any acts of violence. To be effective and sustainable, these actions must be conducted as part of a comprehensive strategy.

To ensure success and lasting impact, military and police operations to protect civilians should be shaped and implemented under a whole-of-mission prevention and response plan for each priority threat identified, including contingency plans as required. Joint planning between civilian, police and military components is key to ensuring that actions under Tiers I and III are aligned, coordinated and mutually reinforcing with military and police deployments and operations to provide physical protection under Tier II. Such actions include key leader engagement, dialogue and reconciliation, public information, DDR/CVR, building host state capacity and the fight against impunity.

Missions with POC mandates are advised to establish a regular joint operations planning team, composed of uniformed and civilian personnel, at mission headquarters, accompanied by tactical operations centres at the sector or field-level. In some missions, joint or integrated operations planning teams are in charge of shaping and sequencing operations to address priority threats in their areas of responsibilities. They agree on coordinated and mutually reinforcing operations conducted by mission components and sections. These operational planning forums are generally coordinated by a mission leader or a designated crisis or operations coordinator, and aim to support decision making by the mission leadership to:

- Identify priority threats to be addressed in the area of responsibility, including POC threats;
- Define the main objectives; milestones; tasks and roles and responsibilities; allocation of capabilities; and
- Conduct an analysis of political, POC and security risks (including risks related to inaction) for each line of operation.

Coordination offices, including the Offices of the SRSG, Chief of Staff (COS) and DSRSGs, the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs), Strategic Planning Units (SPUs) or POC teams, and also police and military planners, are all well placed to contribute to the secretariat of integrated planning teams and ensure coordination, monitoring and evaluation of their implementation.
Tactical-level planning teams, co-chaired by the head of offices and sector commanders, develop and own detailed prevention and response plans for each threat in their area of responsibility. Dedicated tactical-level field teams composed of relevant sections are also useful to engage various groups, assess, analyse, sensitize and monitor POC threats and risks and implement POC risk mitigation measures. Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), DDR/CVR and other civilian staff also support operations at the tactical level.

11.4.3 POC planning checklist for operations

To integrate POC throughout military and police operations, some of or all the following actions are essential.

- Consult all components and ensure that the proposed operation, objective, targets and timing are in line with the mission concept, concept of operations (CONOPS), campaign plan and relevant strategies (political, strategic communication, stabilization, DDR/CVR, POC, etc.).

- For joint or coordinated operations with non-UN security or defence forces, consult the human rights component on the implementation of the HRDDP.

- Include POC objectives and criteria for success, for example:
  - A significant reduction in the number of human rights violations and other incidents of violence against civilians occurring during or after the conduct of operations;
  - Affect capacity of a significant number of armed groups/a significant amount of a single armed group (including detainees or individuals and groups included in DDR processes);
  - Reduce the misuse of and demand for weapons, and create conditions for future disarmament operations (e.g., a gun-free zone is created, unwanted weapons and ammunition are collected, a basic weapons-management capacity in the community is created);
  - Clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from combat areas, particularly those endangering civilian populations;
  - No forced displacement of the population and in case of displacement, the voluntary, safe, dignified, sustainable return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees;
  - A POC and humanitarian response is activated in the event of displacements; or
  - Deployment of representatives of state authority, including state security forces, compliant with international human rights and humanitarian law, and the restoration of the rule of law in areas freed from armed groups.

- Identify political, POC and security risks related to the conduct of the operation including through proactive and targeted information gathering and consultations before the operations.

- Agree on mitigation measures for each risk identified, in close consultation with civilian colleagues, and, as applicable, humanitarian, civil society and/or government partners.

- Develop a communication plan to conduct influencer outreach (e.g., key leader engagement) and public information actions in support of the operation.

- Ensure scenario planning and develop contingency plans, possibly coordinated with humanitarian actors.

- As applicable, ensure regular meetings with the UN Country Team and NGOs to enable information sharing, humanitarian contingency planning and rapid humanitarian response related to the operations.

- Conduct joint evaluations or AARs of the impact of operations and capture lessons learned and best practices for future reference.
11.4.4 POC and political risks from military operations

Risks of conducting a military operation must be identified as part of the operation planning process. Such risks may include:

- In the case of joint operations with national security forces:
  - The operational goals stated by national security forces may differ from the reality. Real or underlying motives may, for instance, include political or economic gains (e.g., operation to support an ethnic group against another);
  - They may only have limited training on human rights and IHC standards and limited ability to implement them;
  - The identity and overall composition of the units of national forces may pose a threat to populations in the planned operations area;
  - The existence of parallel chains of command within the state security forces; and
  - Movement of national security forces may leave security vacuums and/or cause population displacement.

- The nature and identity of targets may pose a specific risk. For example, a community-based militia’s links to the local population may make it difficult to distinguish between fighters and civilians, may put the civilian population at risk from opposing forces and may damage trust between the civilian population and the mission.

- Military operations may cause civilian displacement, and/or impact on civilian livelihoods, health and education.

- Military operations may cause armed group displacement, which may put other groups of civilians, in other areas, at risk, or result in clashes with other armed groups.

- Children and youth may be at higher risk of recruitment and exploitation.

- There may be a heightened risk of sexual violence when potential perpetrators are on the move following a military defeat.

- Defeated armed actors who flee may seek revenge on the civilian population.

- Armed actors on the move may use schools as bases or take supplies from hospitals.

- Civilian populations may be subject to reprisals if they are considered to have supported military operations, state security forces or the mission.

- Explosive remnants of war after the operations may pose a threat to civilians.
11.4.5 Mitigation measures

To mitigate the identified risks, targeted measures should be taken at various stages of operations.

BEFORE operations

- Where the mission may be bound by IHL, planning of operations in accordance with the applicable law, including IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities.
- Implementation of the HRDDP (conduct risk assessment process, necessary engagement, etc.), if the operation is to be conducted in support of or jointly with state security forces.
- Sensitization and screening of national and local authorities and security forces taking part in the operation:
  - Screen national security forces for presence of children;
  - Screen the commanders involved in the operation (in line with the HRDDP);
  - Assess the resources and capabilities of state forces, including communications;
  - Ensure sensitization on IHL principles, specifically distinction, proportionality and precaution, to both the chain of command and forces at the tactical level;
  - Consult and liaise with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other relevant humanitarian organizations (on IHL applicability, applicable principles and training, including on detention and access to detainees, management of victims and corpses, evacuations and medical assistance); and
  - If applicable, support a DDR process or CVR activities to enhance the indirect impact of joint operations on the capacity of an armed group.
- Monitoring of actual presence of state security forces on the ground and of possible human rights violations committed by the supported units:
  - Send joint teams, including representatives of the government and/or state security forces (military prosecutors, etc.) to sensitize field commanders and/or visit villages in and surrounding the operations area;
  - Monitor the humanitarian consequences or impact of the joint operations (displacement, humanitarian needs, etc.); and
  - Encourage joint missions with and analysis from the Protection Cluster.

- As much as possible, consultation with the population and humanitarian community to understand their views, inform a POC risk analysis and potential mitigation measures, and to give them prior notice.
- As required, creation of the conditions for the safe evacuation (‘safe corridors’) of populations and villages most at risk.
- UN Force and Police deployment in areas where civilians are at risk.
- Establishment of measures to ensure that key supply routes benefiting populations are not blocked.
- Assessment of opportunities for children to leave armed groups and preparation for assistance to be provided (including the establishment of communication mechanisms with partners).
- Assessment of risks of sexual violence and preparation of referral pathways.
- Use of information operations to remind all actors about the requirements of international humanitarian and human rights law and the protection of civilians.
- Preparation of contingency plans for mission bases or offices to protect civilians.

DURING operations

- Placement of a Quick Reaction Force on standby, where available.
- Planning of areas for protection of the population, ready to be activated by all field bases.
- Deployment of mixed teams or Human Right Officers to monitor and report on violations (see e.g., Annex VII for TORs for a Joint Monitoring Mechanism).
- Facilitation of flight of the civilian population.
- Establishment of temporary or permanent weapons-free zones or areas jointly or in coordination with local authorities, armed groups, ex-combatants and local communities.
- Placement of emergency joint teams on stand-by to react and investigate major POC developments, situations and locations.
- Constant care to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with the applicable rules, including IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities.
AFTER operations

- Support to possible DDR triage (vetting for detainees, or children associated with armed forces) or other processes.
- Support police, justice and corrections activities to restore civilian authority.
- Support to and coordination with CVR initiatives.
- Support to humanitarian action: access and area security (escorts as a last resort), as requested and within capacity.
- Holding battalions to be readily deployed in critical areas at risk of retaliation/redeployment of the armed group.
- Preparation of long-term forces deployment plans to preserve the gains of the operations.
- Fast-tracking of any other environment building activity meant to promote stabilization of areas freed from threat, including state building, civil society support, access to services or return and resilience activities.
- Rapid mine action response to address assessment and potential clearance of mines, unexploded ordnance or improvised explosive devices and to deliver risk education to civilians to reduce threats.
- Deployment of Human Right Officers to investigate allegations of violations, report on violations and advocate for accountability.
- Support to accountability processes for alleged violations, including supporting investigations and prosecutions, and reparations to victims.

Fast-tracking of any other environment building activity meant to promote stabilization of areas freed from threat, including state building, civil society support, access to services or return and resilience activities.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

Civilian Harm Mitigation in Military Operations
Koffi Wogomebou, MINUSCA Senior POC Adviser (2017-)

In my experience, POC is about coordination and when it’s done well, it can save lives. One example from my time in MINUSCA was when the Force was planning an intervention called “Operation Sukula”, which aimed at reducing the influence of criminal gangs operating within the PK5 area of Bangui. Given that this operation was going to take place in an urban setting and that it might result in significant fighting, I knew it would be important to work closely with the Force to ensure civilian harm mitigation measures would be taken.

- First, I consulted the Force and convinced them the operation should be conducted in the very early hours of the morning, when fewer civilians would be present on the streets.
- Then, I introduced into the Force plan the establishment of a humanitarian corridor, so that schools and some areas near the airport were identified and secured for humanitarian passage and assistance.
- The next step was to build contingency plans, and in order to do so, we worked with humanitarians so that they could be well-positioned in case there was an instance of mass displacement from PK5.
- Finally, before the operation started, we ensured that any individuals who had been collaborating with MINUSCA to provide information were secured, that any threats against them were identified, and if necessary, that they were temporarily removed from the area. This last step required significant collaboration with Human Rights Officers.

In the end, Operation Sukula lasted for several hours. When I realized that the operation had not finished and daylight was approaching without the military goal having been met, I advised the Force that civilian causalities could occur if it continued. The Force was receptive and stopped the operation at that point. Coordination is the key for the protection of civilians and in this instance, working closely with uniformed colleagues at every step enhanced our mutual ability to ensure civilian protection, mitigate civilian harm and avoid an escalation of the situation to an emergency.

34 The principle of ‘last resort’, requires the following key criteria to be met: (1) unique capability — no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) timeliness — the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) clear humanitarian direction — civilian control over the use of military assets; (4) time-limited — the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.
Using the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy to Enhance POC in MONUSCO

In MONUSCO, a Secretariat has been established to oversee the Mission’s implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). As part of its function, the Secretariat promotes the broader role and impact of compliance with the HRDDP, in particular, for the implementation of the Mission’s POC mandate.

The development and use of mitigating measures as part of the HRDDP risk assessment allows support to be provided to the DRC defence and security forces and has a direct impact on the reduction of human rights violations. Where violations have occurred [by those forces], accountability has been enhanced. The Mission has achieved this by developing tailored, concrete, action-oriented and realistic mitigating measures for identified risks. These mitigating measures were developed through a collaborative process between the advisers within the HRDDP Secretariat and the mission component providing support to the state security/defence forces.

Typically, this process ensures that support can be provided as far as possible and that the proposed mitigating measures are tailored to the identified risk. It also ensures that the mission component providing support takes ownership of the mitigating measures in place and that there is a continuous monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the mitigating measure, with adjustments when required. When high risks have been identified in relation to the human rights records of specific units or officers, or in relation to specific threats in the local context, the Secretariat has elaborated and proposed robust mitigating measures, specifically tailored to the identified risks, to be strictly implemented as a prerequisite for the support to be provided. (For example, this could include close monitoring of the behaviour of an officer/unit with immediate withdrawal of support for the whole operation in case of failure to strictly adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law).

Applying HRDDP through the development and use of mitigating measures has yielded results in the field. There has been a noted decrease in human rights violations perpetrated by the DRC armed forces participating in joint military operations, likely related to the monitoring presence of the MONUSCO Force.

HRDDP processes have also been instrumental in the establishment or renewal of “follow-up committees” (Comités de suivi), which gather representatives of MONUSCO, national defence and security forces, the judicial system and civil society at the provincial level to follow up on cases of human rights violations attributable to the national police or armed forces. These committees have played a positive role not only in the fight against impunity through advocating with the judicial authorities for remedial actions to be taken, but also as an effective platform to discuss and address POC-related issues. By including the establishment of Comités de suivi as a mitigating measure as part of the HRDDP process, the HRDDP Secretariat has advocated for them to be functional in every province.

Other examples of mitigating measures aimed at minimizing the risk of human rights violations and with a positive impact on POC include the systematic joint planning of all MONUSCO Force/DRC armed forces operations for which support is provided in order to ensure a common understanding of rules of engagement; joint patrolling and synchronized deployment; the elaboration of civil-police-military POC contingency plans; regular meetings between the Force and the DRC armed forces including a joint evaluation of progress on joint operations; timely reporting of human rights violations; and the signature of an action plan for the fight against sexual violence by non-UN security forces.
11.4.6 Contingency plans

Contingency plans for a military operation should be developed jointly by civilian, police and military mission components and where appropriate, host state authorities, and UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. The process should identify and analyse the direct and indirect negative consequences of the operation and identify mitigating measures before, during and after operations. Scenario and tabletop exercises should be regularly conducted to test contingency plans.

Example: Contingency plans scenario

A risk was identified that during the course of operations that, in the case of armed group movement away from the area of operations, the armed group might pillage, loot and commit human rights violations, including forced recruitment and sexual violence, which, in turn, may prompt civilian displacement. There were, however, mitigating and preparatory measures that could be taken by each component, as well as reactive measures, should the risk materialize. These are outlined in the table below.

**SCENARIO:** Armed group movement away from the area of operations

**RISK:** Analysis suggests that the thrust of the operations will ensure that the current concentration of the armed group moves towards the North. This area includes vulnerable populations in two IDP sites. During this movement, the armed group may pillage, loot and commit human rights violations including forced recruitment and sexual violence and may prompt civilian displacement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>MITIGATING AND PREPARATORY MEASURES</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REACTIVE MEASURES IN RESPONSE</th>
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</table>
| Armed group will have been put under pressure by the operations and is likely to be hungry and in need of resources. The IDP sites may be at particular risk of pillage and looting (and possible sexual violence). There is a risk of forced recruitment and abduction of civilians, including children, to carry looted items. | **Force/Civil Affairs:** Identify vulnerable areas and plan for daily patrolling to areas where civilians are at risk. Advocacy/planning with local authorities to ensure they are aware of possible armed group movement. **CA/WPA/CP:** Coordinate with UNHCR to ensure sensitization of IDPs on the civilian character of IDP camps. Coordinate with OCHA to ensure that information on protection threats and possible population movements is shared with emergency response actors. **UNPOL:** Plan with national police to ensure they are aware of their role in ensuring protection of IDP sites. Ensure that child protection-centred police activities are conducted. **Civil Affairs:** Update the CAN Map, outlining the villages in possible areas of risk; Conduct targeted sensitization on the CAN number. Agree rapid information sharing mechanism with OCHA and humanitarian partners in case of threat to IDP sites. **Human Rights:** Prepare rapid deployment teams to be on standby to investigate any reports of serious human rights violations quickly. **Rule of Law:** Support national judicial authorities to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed against civilians, including CRVS, such as through mobile courts. | **Force:** Dispatch Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to respond to any urgent incidents. Continue to conduct patrols to secure the main routes, to prevent banditry/armed robbery, in consultation with local population (including women) about areas of risk. **UNPOL:** Support national police to secure IDP sites. **Civilian sections:** Monitor and report human rights violations through networks, including CAN. Launch JPT/human rights investigation mission if security situation allows. Inform humanitarian organizations of any relevant protection or security risk and concerns and ensure coordination between humanitarians and the mission in respect of the necessary response. **DDR:** Deploy as widely as possible during operations to continue passing messages of surrender and providing opportunities for surrender. **Child Protection:** Verify and receive any child surrenders and investigate any reports of child recruitment. **CP/WPA/DDR:** Be involved in screening of surrenders to ensure appropriate treatment of children and women | (continued)
### Example: Contingency plans scenario (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>MITIGATING AND PREPARATORY MEASURES</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REACTIVE MEASURES IN RESPONSE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child Protection:</td>
<td>Coordinate with UNICEF to intensify preventive messages and identify closest verification centres for child surrenders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WPA:</td>
<td>Coordinate with partners to assess the local capacities in terms of response to sexual violence, particularly the availability of Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kits in health centres, and ensure their supply where necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR:</td>
<td>Conduct increased sensitization for disarmament through leaflets, radio and other messaging.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCPI:</td>
<td>Prepare responsive lines for any media enquiries about the operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force:</td>
<td>Prepare bases in the area of operations with local protection and contingency plans for possible civilian displacement and have identified locations for protection of civilians.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS:</td>
<td>Consult on potential explosive ordnance contamination.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CA/WPA/CP:</td>
<td>Coordinate with UNHCR to ensure sensitization of IDPs on the civilian character of IDP camps. Coordinate with OCHA to ensure that information on protection threats and possible population movements is shared with emergency response actors.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed group movement prompts civilian displacement towards mission bases or IDP sites.</td>
<td>Force: Activate local protection plan and provide physical protection for civilians fleeing. Provide protection to civilians at identified locations being aware of possible revenge attacks by armed groups. Monitor armed group movement in the area. Alert CP to any unaccompanied children.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civilian sections: Launch JPT/JAM.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>All mission sections: Monitor population movement around the IDP sites and report back on concerns. Advise humanitarians of concerns around armed group infiltration of IDP camps and consider mechanisms for protecting the civilian nature of the camps.</td>
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### 11.4.7 After Action Review

Reflecting DPO’s commitment to organizational learning, an After Action Review (AAR) should take place after all operations, to consider their effectiveness and impact and identify lessons learned for future operations. To ensure POC considerations are taken into account, the AAR should include:

- Community perceptions;
- Metrics established during the planning process;
- Feedback from the POC Adviser; and
- Feedback from humanitarians and other protection actors

An AAR should be conducted in consultation with the mission’s Policy and Best Practice Officer (PBPO), as well as the uniformed Best Practices Focal Points, and include stakeholders involved in the planning and conduct of the operation. It may take place over an hour, or multiple days, depending on the scope of the operation and the AAR. The mission PBPO can provide further background and guidance on considerations for the conduct of an AAR, as well as relevant templates.
In addition to conducting and recording AARs, it is essential to share the lessons learned at the mission level, to ensure all components are able to incorporate the lessons in their activities, and to ensure that in-mission training, briefings and contingency plans are regularly updated accordingly.

**Example: After Action Review of MINUMA's POC campaign January - March 2019**

On 28 January 2019, MINUSMA launched a wide Campaign for the Protection of Civilians (CPOC) in Koro and Bankas Cercles also known as Campagne FOLON 1, which ended on 16 March 2019. The objectives of this mission were to:

(i) Support the work of MINUSMA's civilian components in the implementation of the UN Strategy on Central Regions of Mali with the view to reverse the intensification of inter- and intra-communal violence and strengthen engagement with grassroots communities;

(ii) Show MINUSMA's presence to enhance its visibility and promote a better understanding of the mandate; and

(iii) Deter violence and secure a protective environment with the view to enhancing the protection of civilians.

The main achievements of this operation were:

- MINUSMA increased its footprint in hotspots for the first time ever. The campaign enabled the Mission to have better situational awareness in certain conflict zones, collect information and establish a stronger network for better understanding of the local conflict dynamics as well as perform a more accurate analysis of the situation on the ground.

- MINUSMA was further able to establish and/or reactivate six local reconciliation committees on social cohesion and reconciliation to facilitate local ownership of and inclusion in the process.

- MINUSMA was able to bring together the Fulani and Dogon communities around the same table, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and the involvement of traditional mediators resurfaced as the main means and ways to reach sustainable and enduring reconciliation in the central region.

- The CPOC also facilitated the conduct of four human rights investigations of incidents involving both the Fulani and Dogon community, with the view to establishing the facts surrounding the incidents. This reinforced the vision of MINUSMA's impartiality in such investigations and contributed to the fight against impunity.

- In line with the “One UN” spirit and respect for humanitarian principles, the CPOC also provided the opportunity to reinforce coordination and collaboration with the humanitarian actors operating in the region through the temporary deployment of a CMCoord Officer.

- The participation of international journalists in the campaign was an added value as it allowed the affected communities to voice their concerns as well as their appreciation of MINUSMA's stabilizing efforts. The CPOC also facilitated a better understanding of MINUSMA's mandate and an opportunity for reinforcing trust and confidence and demystifying existing biases against MINUSMA.

The lessons learned included the importance of addressing conflicts at the grassroots level, the need to enhance preparedness of both civilians sections and uniformed components by devising clear priorities, the need to conduct systematic pre-mission and post-mission debriefings between the MINUSMA force and civilian sections and that it is essential to keep the momentum and footprint to deter violence and maintain MINUSMA's positive image with local communities.

**11.5 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND POC**

Where possible, missions should seek to identify threats to civilians before they occur and take preventive action to stop those threats from materializing. Early warning systems, good situational awareness and information sharing, as well as coordinated contingency planning will help missions to respond quickly when threats to civilians emerge. **POC coordination, including the coordination of operations relating to threats to civilians, should be a regular and ongoing activity of the mission and should not depend on the activation of crisis management mechanisms.**
However, peacekeeping missions operate in complex, large and fast-moving environments and, for a range of reasons, are not always able to anticipate or prevent threats to civilians. In such situations, and when faced with significant and/or large-scale threats to civilians, the mission will often respond to the threat with its crisis management protocols.

**Crisis:** An incident or situation, whether natural or human-made, that due to its magnitude, complexity or gravity of potential consequence, requires a UN wide coordinated multi-disciplinary response, and includes two or more of the following:

a) presents an exceptional risk to the safety and security of UN personnel, premises and assets;
b) presents an exceptional threat to the effective functioning of a UN mission or other field presence;
c) presents an exceptional threat to the effective implementation of the mandate of a UN mission or other field presence;
d) may have a significantly negative humanitarian impact; or
e) may give rise to serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.

**Crisis management:** Decision making in support of the identification, prioritization, coordination and execution of crisis response activities.

**Crisis response:** The spectrum of activities undertaken to respond to a crisis situation.

While mission crisis management mechanisms will deal with a broader range of situations than threats to civilians, it is important that situations of such threats are built into crisis management protocols, planning and rehearsals.

**Building POC into mission crisis management framework**

Mission-specific crisis management frameworks will establish the mission approach to crisis situations, including by setting out roles and responsibilities, authority and decision making, coordination mechanisms, and communications (internal and external).

Crisis management systems will normally contain many of the same requirements as those required for the effective implementation of the POC mandate, including joint analysis, planning, coordination and information sharing between mission, civilian, police and military components and coordination with other key actors including the UN Country Team, humanitarians and the host state.

The four stages of crisis management, set out below, apply to crises involving threats to the civilian population, although proactive activities to prevent, deter and pre-empt threats to civilians should take place alongside the preparedness and enhanced monitoring stages, aiming to prevent threats to civilians reaching the need for crisis response.
In accordance with mission crisis management protocols, the mission JOC and JMAC will play an important role in ensuring that the mission has the necessary situational awareness of the potential crisis. However, in relation to threats of violence to civilians, this should be in cooperation with the mission POC Adviser or Focal Point and POC coordination mechanisms. Where the potential crisis is not necessarily directly related to threats of violence to civilians, the POC Adviser and POC coordination mechanisms will still provide valuable perspective to evaluate inadvertent impact to civilians.

When establishing mission crisis management frameworks, missions should ensure that there is clarity on when and how situations of threats to civilians are managed within the mission crisis framework. This should also take into account factors relevant to a POC-related crisis. These include:

- The need to understand threats to civilians from the perspective of the civilian population, including the specific threats faced by specific populations including women, men, girls, boys, different ethnic and religious groups, persons with disabilities and IDPs;
- Ensuring that analysis of the situation considers both threats to the civilian population and threats to the safety and security of peacekeepers and possible links between the two;
- The importance of coordinating with other protection actors, including the host state and humanitarian actors, who may have different mandates and approaches, remaining mindful that coordination with humanitarians should respect humanitarian principles; and
- The importance of communication with the civilian population, including to inform them of the mission mandate and measures being taken to respond to the crisis.
Certain critical tasks for crisis management have been identified as necessary for the mission to be able to effectively respond to crises involving threats to civilians:

- Establish functioning protection and early warning/response systems, involving civilian, police and military components, to share and confirm information and make recommendations for response and prioritization.
- Assess threats and vulnerabilities and map civilians and civilian infrastructure at risk.
- Identify and engage with perpetrators or influential actors who may be able to intervene to prevent or stop ongoing violence or threats of violence.
- Use information operations and public information to prevent or mitigate violence or attacks on civilians.
- Adjust deployment of military and/or police patrols, in consultation with civilian components, based on the results of early warning indicators and other information suggesting a rising threat to civilians.
- Deploy specialized teams, including human rights investigators, joint protection teams, sexual and gender-based violence experts, community-oriented policing or mine action experts with physical protection, if required.
- Know the referral and support mechanisms for civilians in need of medical, psychological or legal support, in particular for children and support to victims/survivors of sexual violence (such as provision of PEP kits).
- Establish or support witness- and victim-protection measures during any investigation and prosecution of serious crimes.
- Ensure that rules of engagement, including the use of up to deadly force or temporary detention of hostile individuals to protect civilians, are clearly understood by military and police units.
- Contribute to the security of civilians, through military and police action, at Protection of Civilian sites, IDP/refugee camps, sites and settlements, or other areas where civilians are gathering and/or seeking protection from current or potential threats, in coordination with civilian authorities running the sites and other relevant protection actors (such as UNHCR/Protection Cluster).
- Ensure clear military and police guidance and contingency plans are in place for managing or supporting the protection of civilians who seek protection within UN premises in coordination with civilian components and the UN Country Team.
- Implement procedures, if necessary, at the field office or base level, for the temporary protection of civilians seeking security at UN premises, including screening and disarming procedures, temporary shelter, sanitation and feeding and safe return of civilians after the crisis.
- Ensure mission personnel (civilian, police and military) are equipped, trained and empowered to intervene in Tier I protection of civilians through dialogue and engagement.
- Ensure mission personnel (civilian, police and military) are equipped, trained and empowered to intervene in Tier II protection of civilians through provision of physical protection.
- Ensure mission personnel (civilian, police and military) are trained and empowered to intervene in Tier III protection of civilians through establishing protective environments.
- Following threat or violence, support the return to stability and normalcy in conjunction with the host state and the UN Country Team.
Coordination within the UN system

In situations that require a UN system-wide coordinated and multi-disciplinary response, coordination between UN entities will be in accordance with the United Nations Crisis Management Policy, which sets out roles and responsibility for UN-wide crisis response, both in the field and at Headquarters. The senior-most UN official in country is responsible and accountable for coordinating UN crisis management efforts in-country. It is vital that coordination efforts and arrangements between the mission and other UN actors ensure a shared understanding and coherent approach between all actors.

- DPKO-DFS Policy on Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement (2015.16)
- UN Crisis Management Policy (March 2018)
Chapter 12: Responding to POC Threats

Once threats to civilians have been identified, analysed and prioritized, a peacekeeping operation must identify strategic response activities using, as appropriate, the full range of tools and capabilities available.

Determining the appropriate POC response in a coordinated and structured way at the strategic, operational and tactical levels ensures that all relevant mission components are engaged and understand their roles and responsibilities. It is also important to ensure that the tools of different mission components are mutually reinforcing in response to threats to civilians. An organized strategic response also allows for easier and more consistent communication with relevant stakeholders including host states, communities at risk and humanitarian actors.

Responses should be planned at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, as appropriate, and can engage all civilian, police and military personnel. Mission leadership should oversee and advise on the overall strategic approach of the mission, with support from POC Advisers.

Responses to POC threats should be undertaken at mission field offices and mission headquarters, with support from UN Headquarters as necessary, depending on the imminence, impact and type of threat.

Across the four response phases, missions can adopt various approaches and activities to respond to threats to civilians. Depending on the threats and context, different responses may be appropriate. Missions should utilize and balance the different options available.

12.1 COMPREHENSIVE AND POLITICAL APPROACH TO POC

In accordance with the DPO POC Policy, a peacekeeping operation should take a comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians. This involves jointly planned and coordinated action between uniformed and civilian components.

A comprehensive approach to POC relies on a detailed threat assessment (see chapter 8), which includes analysis of the intent, interests, resources and capabilities of perpetrators, the related risks to civilians and possible opportunities to affect hostile intent. The mission will then jointly develop response strategies that identify and integrate civilian, police and military responses appropriate to the nature of the threat and which address both immediate protection needs and the root causes of the threat to civilians. While the overall mission POC
strategy and identification of strategic priorities will be developed at the strategic level, the detailed response to specific threats will often be developed at operational or tactical level under the leadership of the head of field office and sector commander.

In their comprehensive approach, peacekeeping missions are recommended to take a political approach to POC — that is, one which strategically aligns POC with the broader political context and aims of the mission. A political approach to POC should aim to:

- Understand and reduce/negate the hostile intent and capacity of perpetrators of violence against civilians;
- Mobilize influencers and other protection actors; and
- Manage perceptions and expectations from the population.

This approach may require a range of activities under the three tiers of the POC operational concept in accordance with the type and imminence of the threat.

**CASE STUDY**

**MONUSCO Tailored Strategies for Specific Armed Groups**

In MONUSCO, tailored strategies for dealing with armed groups have been developed that respond to the complex and diverse environment throughout the country. These strategies identify the role of different mission components, in line with broader mission analysis, of the advantages, disadvantages and challenges of engaging with the particular armed group or using a specific approach. Based on political engagement at all levels, the strategies aim to provide MONUSCO with a more effective way of clarifying and operationalizing protection priorities and prioritizing the primacy of politics.

One example is the strategy implemented in Ituri regarding the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI). The process has been driven largely from the bottom up by MONUSCO’s Stabilization and Support Unit (SSU), aligning the work of all sections through a community-based approach. A key element of the strategy has been to link MONUSCO’s military operations and civilian activities with political initiatives at the local, provincial and national levels.

At the local level, MONUSCO staff worked with civil society and government partners to engage the armed group in dialogue. Based on the dialogue, local government officials created a roadmap for demobilizing the FRPI. Political officials at higher levels within the Mission identified and engaged high-level political key influencers and spoilers with links to local communities and the conflict to ensure national and regional political buy-in. Further efforts are underway to embed protection analysis and threat data within these tailored strategies.
Peacekeeping missions operate in dynamic conflict and political environments. Threats to civilians will vary and change over time and this requires balancing efforts and mandated tasks over the lifecycle of a mission, adjusted to the specific threat at hand. Should a mission face a high level of instability, protecting civilians may require securing communities at risk, facilitating their access to humanitarian assistance and mitigating or stopping ongoing hostile acts as a priority. Should a mission operate in a context where violence has subsided or no clear threat to civilians is identified, its POC efforts can focus on preventing and eliminating POC threats sustainably by addressing root causes and/or preventing the relapse of violence through environment building (i.e., stabilization or peacebuilding activities). Often missions will face different conflict environments within the same country and will need to tailor their approach to different threats in different geographical areas, based on customized local protection plans. At all times, missions must ensure full respect for international human rights law, and where applicable, international humanitarian law, and must implement the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. They must also mitigate possible harm to civilians posed by the mission’s presence or actions.

Peacekeeping operations are necessarily temporary measures. They will eventually go through transition processes resulting from the drawdown or withdrawal of the peace operation, or a transition from a peacekeeping operation to a smaller peacekeeping mission, special political mission or UN Country Team (UNCT). In many cases, a transition will mark progress away from conflict and towards sustaining peace. In such situations, host state authorities will have been supported and given the capacity to effectively assume their primary protection responsibilities. In other cases, the transition may not coincide with such success. Here it will be necessary for the mission to articulate the protection concerns that will remain following the mission’s drawdown or departure, in order to inform the Security Council of the impact. In any transition, the mission will need to coordinate with other protection actors to determine what protection functions of the mission may be continued via other means, and where there may be gaps.
12.3 POC PHASES AND POTENTIAL ACTIONS

Actions by the mission to address threats to civilians are implemented along four phases: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) response and (iv) consolidation to either eliminate a threat or mitigate the risk to civilians. These phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently. Each phase involves actions across all three tiers of the POC operational concept (protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment).

Activities and objectives undertaken along these phases will vary according to the specific content of each country-specific mandate and nature of each threat. The mission approach may apply to a specific geographic area and can be framed around core protection objectives. Short term actions will focus on putting a stop to violence and limiting the effects of violence on civilians while longer term action will focus on preventing violence and promoting accountability of perpetrators.

Prevention and consolidation phases
In a context or area where the overall security environment is stable and where threats to civilians are distant, unlikely or subsiding, a mission must focus on further stabilizing the situation, addressing the root causes of the conflict and leading the way to sustainable peace. Efforts to these ends can include:

- Preventing the resumption of conflict, including threats to civilians, through monitoring of and support to the peace process;
- Securing the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of IDPs and refugees;
- Enhancing community resilience, through support to humanitarian, early-recovery or development assistance;
- Supporting the efforts of civil society and national human rights institutions in performing their monitoring roles to prevent violations and ensure respect for human rights;
- Conducting stabilization and peacebuilding activities, including to durably eliminate and mitigate potential threats to civilians; and
- Building the capacity of the host state in support of the protection of civilians and the rule of law.

Pre-emption and response phases
In a context or area where the peace process is disrupted, or there is no peace to keep; where violence against civilians is frequent or highly likely; where the state lacks capacity or willingness to protect populations; and/or where elements of the state security forces themselves pose a threat to civilians, a mission must address the immediate causes of the conflict and focus on restoring security, in priority areas, for the civilian population. Efforts to these ends encompass:

- Deterring and mitigating threats to civilians, including through public messaging, direct engagement and credible deterrence, supported as required by security operations;
- Securing communities at risk, key civilian assets, services and livelihoods;
- Facilitating access to humanitarian assistance; and
- Conducting early stabilization activities in prioritized POC areas.

Prevention:
To prevent violence by non-state armed groups or state security forces, intercommunal violence, serious crimes or other situations that may lead to violence against civilians, there are many direct and indirect supportive actions that a mission can take, including:

- Promoting human rights, including gender equality, women’s and children’s rights, by:
  - conducting public information campaigns;
  - training state security forces on human rights and IHL; and
  - training local communities and civil society on monitoring human rights.
Supporting the extension of the state and its authority across its territory and along its borders, by:
- promoting good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, particularly the criminal justice chain and prison security.

Ensuring a visible presence of UN military and police components, particularly in areas at risk where the state security forces are not present, by:
- assuring the population of the mission’s intent to protect them from physical violence; and
- establishing community engagement and alert mechanisms.

Monitoring and investigating violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, including conflict-related sexual violence and grave violations against children, by:
- advocating for respect for international human rights and humanitarian law with potential perpetrators; and
- seeking accountability for violations at the national and international levels.

Mitigating political, economic, identity, community or housing, land or property-related conflicts that may escalate into physical violence, by:
- the provision of good offices;
- supporting the establishment of conflict resolution or statutory, traditional or transitional justice mechanisms; and
- alerting the national authorities of those risks.

Monitoring and addressing vulnerabilities, by:
- supporting access to justice for vulnerable and marginalized groups;
- disseminating information on rights and potential risks (including explosive ordnance and other explosive hazard risk education);
- supporting community-based protection mechanisms, such as traditional justice mechanisms;
- building capacity of civil society, particularly women’s organizations, and media; and
- supporting and securing as necessary the provision of humanitarian assistance.
- Marking, fencing and clearing areas contaminated by explosive ordnance, developing improvised explosive-device threat-mitigation strategies, and ensuring safe and secure weapons and ammunition storage and management.
- Ensuring the inclusion of and subsequent implementation of international human rights, child protection, women's protection and gender standards in peace agreements.
- Monitoring, controlling and addressing illegal trafficking and the presence of small arms.
- Supporting the establishment and protection of key infrastructure, including roads, transport and communications in remote and inaccessible areas.
- Coordinating and cooperating with humanitarian and development actors to promote income-generation activities for youth in areas where conflict may arise.
- Consulting women and promoting their participation in the design and implementation of gender-sensitive activities to respond to their protection needs.
- Strengthening capacity of the state and civil society to promote gender equality and women's rights through their empowerment.
- Supporting local peace agreements and ceasefires.

The mission can also take action towards preventing violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law, as well as to prevent and minimize collateral damage and other direct or indirect lawful harm caused by state security forces, UN and other international security forces, as applicable, by:
- Ensuring that relevant national, UN and other international security forces are sensitized to, and receive adequate training on applicable international human rights law and international humanitarian law standards, as well as criminal responsibility of public servants, including security sector officers, for human rights violations and the commission of crimes;
- Supporting national authorities in establishing or strengthening the criminal justice chain (including military justice) to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate individuals responsible for serious crimes and human rights violations; and
- Establishing monitoring, reporting, control and accountability mechanisms to track, prevent and address violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and all other casualties caused by state and international security forces.

Pre-emption:
When likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated, proactive measures are required to mitigate or eliminate the threats before violence occurs. This requires deterring a party or person(s) from committing acts of violence against civilians, or affecting their capacity to do so, including through the threat or use of force. **Activities under the prevention phase should continue to be implemented, particularly in areas under threat.**

To ensure a sustainable impact, pre-emption activities should preferably, and as appropriate, be conducted in support of state authorities, by mobilizing or persuading them to act. Measures may include:
- Public information on POC and human rights reporting, as well as proactive engagement and advocacy with potential perpetrators of violence and third parties that may positively influence the actions of perpetrators. Engagement will aim at sensitizing them on their obligations under international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law and about existing accountability mechanisms.
- Increased political engagement and use of good offices functions to mediate, calm tensions and engage local, national and international intermediaries and influencers who may de-escalate a rise in tensions.
Actions to mobilize, persuade and support state authorities to extend their presence and ensure rule of law and public order in the area(s) under threat, particularly by applying the required accountability, conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms.

Security operations, whether conducted unilaterally, in coordination, or jointly with the host authorities. These can entail credible deterrence actions or engaging in offensive operations to prevent violence against civilians. Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the alternatives to the use of force. Those may include (but are not limited to) deception, psychological methods, negotiation, rapid deployments and reinforced military and/or police presence and patrolling, the protection of key sites, facilities (including prisons), areas or goods, cordon and search operations, counter improvised explosive device (IED) activities, interposition and show of force and/or the manoeuvre of larger forces to demonstrate resolve. To enhance impact, all security operations should be implemented in support of and/or in close coordination with judicial or non-judicial accountability processes conflict-resolution processes and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and/or security sector reform (SSR) mechanisms.

Proactive engagement, advocacy and support to relevant state and international institutions to help them identify, take action against and/or apprehend members/personnel who have perpetrated violence against civilians. Particularly, the mission will aim to reinforce prevention mechanisms in the area under threat and ensure relevant state authorities investigate and take action to punish perpetrators in areas most affected by human rights violations or instances of disproportionate collateral damage.

Consistent implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP), which will further strengthen the POC mandate implementation and provide peacekeeping operations with leverage to influence behaviour and establish harm-mitigation measures.

Response:
Whenever physical violence against civilians has materialized, missions should aim immediately to stop aggressors from conducting hostile acts.
To ensure a sustainable impact, activities should preferably, and as appropriate, be conducted in support of state authorities, by mobilizing or persuading them to act. Measures, in addition to those already described in the prevention and pre-emption phase, may include:

- Urgent engagement with parties to the conflict at local and national level, calling for a halt to hostilities, and use of intermediaries and influencers to promote peace.

- Actions to further mobilize, persuade and support state authorities to extend their presence and ensure human rights, rule of law and public order in the area(s) affected by violence, particularly by applying the required conflict resolution, judicial, DDR or SSR mechanisms and by providing any additional training or expert advice, as required.

- Direct action targeted at perpetrators to affect their intent or capacity, including through security operations and the gradual use of force to stop ongoing violence or control and disperse assemblies of potential perpetrators.

- Should the mission lack the capacity or political space to stop aggressors, the provision of direct physical security to civilians at risk or accompaniment and provision of security to their movement to more stable areas, with due regard for their expressed wishes.

- Use of force, in accordance with the military ROE and the police DUF, including to apprehend and temporarily detain hostile persons or groups and, where appropriate, hand them over to the national authorities. 35

- Actions to collect, register and preserve evidence of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, other serious crimes, including sexual violence, as well as grave violations of human rights, for subsequent criminal investigation and prosecution of alleged perpetrators at national or international level.

In 2000, I was deployed as Human Rights Officer to UNAMSIL. At that time, the POC mandate was relatively new and almost invisible. One day, together with other human rights colleagues and peacekeeping troops, I went on a field visit to Makeni, headquarters of the rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), six months before their disarmament. It was the first time civilian peacekeepers were deployed in this area where many human rights violations had occurred and continued, including mass enslavement and rape of women and girls, killings and enforced disappearances.

“We realized immediately how dire the situation was, as detained members of the RUF were subject to torture and inhumane treatment.”

When we reached Makeni, we approached the RUF headquarters and could hear the screams of a man being tortured. We realized immediately how dire the situation was, as detained members of the RUF were subject to torture and inhumane treatment. We tried to intervene to obtain the release of the man, but we were threatened. We immediately went to the Commander of the UN battalion deployed to the area and informed him we needed troops to return to Makeni to show force and try to get the detainees released. We were all aware that the credibility of the UN was at stake as the civilian population expected us to protect them.

Together with the UN troops, we returned to the RUF headquarters and negotiated for the release of the detainees, including the man who was being tortured. The involvement of the UN military was fundamental not only to showing force, but also for providing immediate medical care to the torture victim. In the following months, we engaged the community who provided us with information on more detention centres and cases of torture. We continued negotiating the release of detainees from these centres, as well as the release of enslaved women who we helped transport back to their homes.

We were only three civilian staff deployed to this region, but working together with the military component, who had the will to enforce the mandate, we were able to make a difference and protect civilians.
I was deployed as POC officer in Unity State, when the crisis in South Sudan erupted in mid-December 2013. In Bentiu, we didn’t expect the scale of the crisis. While we’d made many of the necessary preparations for a crisis based on the extensive UN guidance on POC, in retrospect I often think about what more we could have done better in those first weeks for civilians seeking protection. One surprise was that while our planning had focused on the South Sudanese civilian population, they were not the only ones who came. Humanitarians and foreign nationals likewise sought protection at the UNMISS base.

As of the early evening of 20 December, I was OIC State Coordinator responsible for handling the crisis. By then, thousands of civilians had arrived at our base for protection. I held an open air “town hall” to inform UN personnel what we knew so far and what our preparations were. There were many people I didn’t recognize and I found out that they were humanitarian or NGO partners based in town who had come to our base for protection. In the days that followed, we did a number of extraction missions for such partners, refugees, contractors, and foreign nationals who had businesses or charities in town. This meant that the humanitarian actors to whom we were supposed to handover over responsibility for the IDPs within 72 hours were now on our base and in the process of evacuation. UNMISS was left to fill the void.

In the morning of 21 December, while at the gate surveying the situation, an older Eritrean man approached to talk to me, and I realized how many foreign nationals had entered the POC site that night. The diversity of the population meant that evacuations were a priority and by 5 January, we had evacuated 1,500 foreign nationals despite intimidation from the authorities and roadblocks. This was only possible due to the support of the Deputy Chief of Staff who was coordinating and advocating with the embassies in Juba, our Kenyan Senior Military Liaison Officer who was instrumental in getting the Kenyan Government’s support for flights and our Aviation/MovCon team who drove the evacuees to the airstrip and coordinated the passengers and assets.

“One surprise was that while our planning had focused on the South Sudanese civilian population, they were not the only ones who came.”

12.4 USE OF FORCE FOR POC

Graduated force can be applied along a continuum of three broad levels beginning with physical authoritative presence, progressing to non-deadly force and finally the use of deadly force. Depending upon the nature of the threat, peacekeepers sometimes may not have enough time to embrace gradual application of force and may have to act immediately by resorting to deadly force to avoid greater harm. The authorization to use force without following graduated procedures, which is reflected in mission-specific ROE and DUF, applies where the attack or threat of an attack comes so unexpectedly that even a moment’s delay could lead to the death of, or serious bodily injury to, oneself, other United Nations personnel or other persons who are under the protection of the peacekeeping mission.

Under the POC mandate, the use of proactive force is authorized against any source of physical violence as soon as a credible threat against civilians has been identified: The protection of civilians is not limited to defensive actions to secure civilians once an attack is underway. However, the use of force should be part of
a comprehensive engagement that aims to affect the intent of a perpetrator through both persuasive and coercive means. Following a political approach to POC, missions should consider political and community-based approaches, and leverage security means to support and provide credibility to a robust comprehensive engagement. Nonetheless, missions should be prepared to use force to protect civilians where required, including through proactive military and police operations when this is considered to be the most appropriate and effective response.

The use of force in furtherance of POC mandates may involve UN peace operations temporarily detaining individuals who pose a threat to civilians. The deprivation of liberty in such situations gives rise to significant legal and practice issues, however, as it is not part of established criminal law processes. As peacekeeping mandates have become more robust and the nature of the tasks increasingly complex, issues concerning detention within peace operations are arising more frequently and in circumstances that are ever more challenging. In addition to implementing the DPKO-DFS Interim Standard Operating Procedures on Detention in United Nations Peace Operations (2010) — which sets out the procedures for handling, questioning, search, transfer, handover and/or release of detained persons — mission-specific guidance may be required to ensure that persons detained by United Nations personnel are treated in accordance with international norms and standards and to reduce the risks that may arise to the UN in connection with the detention of persons by peace operations.

When deciding on the balancing of civilian, police and military actions under the three tiers, and particularly when considering the use of robust measures against elements of state security forces or proxies, the mission will have several considerations. Beyond its legal authority and mandate to use force against any source of violence against civilians, a mission will need to take into account all the circumstances, including the operational consequences of any intervention.

An early discussion between mission leaders and managers, as well as military and police planners, in consultation with civilian components and the POC Adviser, should clarify the general parameters:

- What should the military and police posture look like?
- What will be the POC circumstances and triggers, or red lines (both proactive and reactive) for the conduct of military or police operations?
- What is the adequate balancing and sequencing of political, security and environment-building POC action to effectively address the threats identified in the context, including violence committed by state security forces?
- What are the contingency plans, internal guidance documents and training exercises to be developed to ensure readiness to use security action with a POC lens?
- What are the relative roles of the police and the military for POC?
- What further actions will ensure adequate understanding, leadership, intent and accountability of contingents to ensure POC success?

12.5 RESPONDING TO DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENTS AND THREATS

12.5.1 Modes of protection action

The political and operational approach taken by the mission to POC, informed by the degree of willingness and capacities of the parties to protect civilians, determines what modes of actions are most appropriate at any point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action to ensure compliance and cooperation of perpetrators of violence</th>
<th>Action to support other protection actors including communities, civil society and local authorities</th>
<th>As a last resort, where responsible authorities are unwilling or unable to take appropriate action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robust engagement</td>
<td>Capacity building (or sensitization)</td>
<td>Substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Denunciation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
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</table>

This section sets out some standard threat categories and proposed response models. However, the approach of each mission will vary and be tailored to the specific operational theatre, either at the mission-level or for different areas of the country where the threat may vary. Many situations or risks of violence against civilians may not fall clearly under a specific threat category, or may overlap threat categories, and will require further joint analysis to identify the right triggers for effective POC action.

12.5.2 Political violence

Threats to civilians may be caused or exacerbated by the actions of national, regional or international political or economic actors or groups who fuel conflict by organizing violence through state actors, non-state armed actors or community-based individuals or groups. This may take the form of arbitrary arrests or violent repression by state security forces, negative activities by traditional or new armed groups, or politically driven fuelling of intercommunal violence. In response, the mission can focus on curbing manipulation of conflicts by investigating and analysing the links between spoilers and actors of violence, denouncing such acts publicly and mobilizing influential national or international actors to apply pressure to stop or arrest perpetrators.

Politically fuelled violence may be of concern before, during and after elections, anniversaries or milestones in a political/peace process. Most of these potential flash points can be predicted in advance and the mission will be able to implement comprehensive preventive activities and prepare contingency plans. Analysis should identify any potential links between electoral/political violence and other conflict issues such as community conflict, armed group activity or ethnic/religious violence. There are several possible foci for preventive activities, such as:

- Advocacy, training and mentoring of state security forces on methods/approaches to mitigate unrest or potential unrest without excessive use of force;
- Facilitating dialogue, engagement and conflict resolution between groups who may come into conflict;
- Engaging the mission’s good offices function to facilitate the peace process and high-level political agreements; and
- Enhanced human rights monitoring and reporting.

Contingency plans should identify key flash-point areas and issues, and plan for an escalation of response(s) should the situation deteriorate. This response should include actions by civilian and uniformed components. While it may be most appropriate to focus on dialogue and engagement with key leaders, the response plan should include the possibility of the use of force to respond to serious threats of violence against civilians.

37 For example, companies or organized crime groups.
How to Protect Civilians in an Election Context

What to consider in an election context?

Whether or not support to elections is within the peacekeeping mission mandate, local and national elections often take place in contexts where peace operations are deployed. During election periods, tensions can run high, and contentious political support groups may resort to forms of violence that threaten civilian populations. UNPOL will often be best placed within the mission to provide protection to civilians in such contexts, either directly or through support to state actors.

Checklist

- Before and during an election period, remain abreast of political dynamics and seek forward-looking analyses. Consult Political Affairs, Electoral Affairs, Human Rights and JMAC.
- Map critical dates, political leaders and priority zones for potential election-related tensions and violence.
- Engage with authorities to advocate respect towards peaceful demonstrations and to restrict the use of lethal force. Provide capacity building to these ends, including human rights and public-order management training for national police, where appropriate.
- Engage with local communities, and, where necessary, create Community Alert Networks (CANs). Build community capacity to raise election-related concerns with local authorities.
- Where applicable, provide support to the government security plan and establish a show of presence (not a show of force).
- Develop a network of mission staff, primarily Human Rights Officers, to deploy to potential hotspots and monitor the situation, including any election-related violence.
- Conduct TTXs, including with Headquarters, to ensure preparedness for all potential scenarios.

Reminders

- Violence can erupt during the campaigning period, on voting day(s) or after results are announced.
- Providing protection in an election context should be a police activity, not a military activity. Deploy FPUs where available. QRFs should be on standby as needed.
- Election violence often occurs in an urban setting. The mission may need to adapt operations to reflect this, particularly where the mission’s usual POC activities and responses are in more rural areas.

12.5.3 Violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups

When confronted with threats or ongoing attacks against civilians by a non-state armed group (NSAG), to prevent or stop the violence a mission can focus on affecting the intent, presence and capacity of the NSAG. Immediate proactive engagement, advocacy and deterrence should be aimed at the leadership of the NSAG and its political or financial backers. This may be accompanied by actions to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate elements of the NSAG following a thorough vetting process, including through integration in state security forces and community violence reduction programmes, as applicable. Specific measures may be required to safeguard the mission’s impartial stance and image. Security operations, in support of or in parallel to government action, may also be conducted to deter or put an end to hostile activity by the NSAG, including through the use of force, when and as required. The mission will investigate human rights abuses and may also detain, in support of or jointly with host authorities, key perpetrators of serious crimes, including leaders of the NSAGs.

Motivational approaches that incentivize the cessation of violence, such as reward and punishment (i.e., ‘carrot and stick’) may be beneficial. One option is to condition the benefits of a peace settlement — for instance DDR and SSR, including integration into state security forces — on a display of goodwill and immediate cessation of all forms of violence against civilians, particularly grave violations against women and children, and possibly handing over those responsible for such violations. Coercive methods can be applied in the form of public messaging or security
operations. However, individual armed-group leaders, who have committed war crimes or mass atrocities, may not be eligible for peace dividends. In such a context, mobilizing strategic influencers and supporters of the group may elevate the level of pressure to deter further violence and accept unconditional rendition, or at least obtain the handover of the perpetrators of grave violations.

The reward and punishment approach is, however, generally unfit to address asymmetric threats, in which case the mission may want to adopt a community-based approach. This involves building strategic partnerships with external actors — including local authorities, state security forces, media, civil society and humanitarian and development agencies — with an aim to 'win the hearts and minds' of local populations (i.e., to sway the popular opinion with emotional/intellectual appeals). The expected effects of this approach include a reinforcement and promotion of popular trust and support for the actions taken by the mission, through a greater use of and support to non-military solutions. Enhanced popular support and trust will in turn uproot the threat from local communities, as the latter will reduce their active or passive support to the group and possibly reject negative elements, as well as facilitate the reintegration of defectors and returnees.

12.5.4 Community-based violence

When confronted with localized threats of intercommunal violence, the mission may take action to promote community dialogue and reconciliation at the local level, in close coordination with host authorities (particularly local leaders), humanitarian organizations and other political or conflict resolution actors, including women and youth. Military and police components can support as required through presence, deterrence or more robust action.

Should the mission be faced with self-defence groups, vigilantes, community-based militias, gangs or any other group of armed individuals that cannot be considered as a formal armed group under IHL (see chapter 2), the mission may aim to ensure close monitoring, sensitization and control of said groups. Missions can envisage taking active measures as required, such as security operations, community violence reduction programmes or other activities to ensure strict compliance with applicable international and domestic law.

In all areas affected by community-based violence, the mission could deploy rule-of-law actors, including through support to national police, justice and corrections systems, to ensure law and order.
Intercommunal Dialogue to Address Communal Conflict
Guang Cong, UNMISS Director of Civil Affairs Division (2016-)

In South Sudan, one of the leading sources of civilian casualties and displacement is local communal conflict. These conflicts are generally driven as a consequence of resource-based competition, deep-seated ethnic animosities and lack of enforcement of the rule of law. All these were further exacerbated by the political violence between the government and a main opposition party in 2013 and renewed fighting in 2016. In UNMISS Civil Affairs, we facilitate the prevention, mitigation and resolution of communal conflict, and support initiatives to promote reconciliation and social cohesion, including support to rapprochement and confidence-building events between the parties to the revitalized agreement of the resolution of conflict in South Sudan.

As Director of UNMISS Civil Affairs Division, I invoked a number of strategic approaches to overcome the challenges of limited resources and address the sustainability of our interventions. One approach I used was to address key drivers of the communal conflicts including conflict between pastoralists and farmers — a leading conflict driver at the subnational level that often claims more civilian lives than the ongoing armed conflict.

For instance, to regulate cattle migration between Western and Eastern Lakes, Gok, Amadi and Terekeka States, I initiated a dialogue process between the bordering communities of these states in February 2017. As the initiative progressed, several key stakeholders from these states visited Aweil State, bordering Sudan, to witness the best practices from cattle migration regulatory mechanisms between the pastoralists from Sudan and the host communities from South Sudan. Subsequently, we held a series of conferences in various conflict hotspots, which led to the adoption of a five-state cattle migration agreement in August 2017 and established a Joint Border Peace Committee/Court (JBPC) consisting of traditional leaders. The cattle migration agreement and JBPC were both officially endorsed by the governors of each of the five states.

Recognizing the positive impact of this mechanism for intercommunal dialogue, I organized a follow up conference in Western Lakes States in March 2019 and extended the scope of the agreement to include Jonglei State, making it a six-state agreement.

“I invoked a number of strategic approaches to overcome the challenges of limited resources and address the sustainability of our interventions.”

12.5.5 Violence perpetrated by state security forces

When confronted with threats of or ongoing physical violence to civilians posed by state security forces and their operations, the mission may take the necessary unilateral, or joint with the host state, mitigating measures to stop violence and prevent further occurrences. The mission may consider activities including human rights monitoring and investigations, reporting, political engagement, capacity building or advocacy. The latter may include high-level political engagement to dissuade state security forces from using violence against civilians as a tactic, actions to promote accountability for violations of human rights and IHL and communications to the government that the mission will use force against government security actors to protect civilians.

The mission can draw on available measures to promote accountability and combat impunity by identifying perpetrators of violations and enabling their prosecution by strengthening justice systems. The mission can also provide training on international humanitarian and human rights law, and other capacity building support (including, for instance, the development or dissemination of a Code of Conduct, ROE or DUF; effective command and control mechanisms; guidance to ensure civil-military coordination or mitigate collateral damage), in consultation, as appropriate, with the ICRC and the Protection Cluster.
Particular efforts could be made to: sensitize state security forces on the need to ensure proactive transparency and public information for allegations of misconduct or breaches of international law; conduct independent investigations, supported by the mission, as needed, and shared with relevant domestic accountability mechanisms; communicate the results of investigations and, should the allegations be confirmed, ensure disciplinary sanctions or legal accountability and provide reparations to the victims or their families.

CASE STUDY

MONUSCO’s Prosecution Support Cells Programme

MONUSCO’s Prosecution Support Cells Programme in the DRC has operated as part of the Mission’s Justice Support Section since 2011 and has successfully contributed to the implementation of the Mission’s mandate to support national efforts to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes fueling the conflict, including those committed by state security forces. This includes perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including CRSV. Many emblematic cases that have been investigated, prosecuted and tried through the national military justice system have involved serious crimes committed against the civilian population, including mass murder, rape, kidnapping, slavery of women and girls, as well as cases of child recruitment. These have resulted in the trial and imprisonment of senior officers in the national army, as well as those from armed groups.

The programme combines the political leverage and technical and logistical support of MONUSCO with the programmatic support of UNDP, while also strengthening coordination and partnerships between a variety of UN and non-UN actors, including international non-government organizations (INGOs). Through the expertise provided by investigation and prosecution advisers, deployed as Government Provided Personnel (GPPs) from different countries, the programme incorporates support to the Congolese authorities for investigations, mobile hearings and trials conducted in remote and insecure areas where atrocities have been committed and where courts barely function or exist. With support of other partners, the programme also includes victim and witness support/assistance, particularly for cases of CRSV, and capacity building training.

In situations where state security forces pose threats of physical violence to civilians, particularly where such violence is imminent or ongoing, the mission may also intervene to physically protect civilians. This can include assisting civilians to escape the threat, interposition between civilians and the threat, or the use of graduated force, depending upon the circumstances and balance of forces. There is a risk that such intervention may result in withdrawal of host state consent. However, the mission has a responsibility and obligation to intervene and stop violence against civilians by state security forces, including through the use of force.

12.5.6 Violence perpetrated by international security forces

When confronted with threats of physical violence to civilians posed by international security forces and their operations, the mission can take mitigating actions similar to those used with state security forces, including monitoring, reporting, political engagement, advocacy, capacity building and technical assistance. The mission can identify perpetrators of violence and advocate for their prosecution through available measures to promote accountability and combat impunity,
either in country or with the state of origin. Further, the mission can provide training on international humanitarian and human rights law and other capacity building support. All those actions will aim to address the causes and eliminate intended or unintended consequences of actions by international security forces. Such actions should be taken in close coordination with the ICRC and the Protection Cluster, as appropriate.

For international forces, as in the case of state security forces, particular efforts should be made to sensitize them on the need to ensure proactive transparency and public information for allegations of misconduct or breaches of international law. This should entail conducting independent investigations, supported by the mission, as needed, and shared with relevant domestic accountability mechanisms. The results of investigations should be communicated and, should the allegations be confirmed, disciplinary sanctions or legal accountability ensured, including provision of reparations to the victims or their families.

Missions can regularly engage state and international partners to align their goals and efforts and communicate concerns about possible harm caused by these international actors. As required, the mission may also support them to apply a POC lens to all plans and activities conducted to ensure their presence and actions do no harm but rather contribute to POC.

The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), applicable to most forms of support provided by the mission and other UN entities to non-UN security forces, may further strengthen the POC mandate and provide the mission with leverage to influence behaviour as it provides, inter alia, for the formalization of measures to reduce the risk that national or international security forces who are recipients of UN support commit grave human rights violations.

**Specific efforts should also be made to identify and mitigate all risks posed to civilians by the presence and actions of the mission itself (see chapters 10.2 and 11.4).**
12.6 BUILDING NATIONAL AND LOCAL PROTECTION CAPACITIES

As states have the primary responsibility to protect civilians, many mission activities are devoted to supporting host state authorities to fulfil their responsibility. Such activities can include security sector reform, as well as capacity building — of state security actors, criminal justice actors and national human rights commissions — on a wide array of topics and skills. A key aspect of this approach is strengthening of the rule of law through fighting impunity and strengthening criminal accountability for serious crimes. Capacity building of law enforcement and judicial actors includes strengthening or enhancing the capacity to undertake investigations, to establish and operationalize mobile courts or specialized criminal courts, to create witness- and victim-protection measures and programmes on compensation and rehabilitation of victims; and assisting in restoring, extending and strengthening justice and corrections state functions. Mission uniformed components often work together with state counterparts to support them with capacity building and training, help them plan and implement security operations according to international standards, and emphasize the need to prioritize the protection of civilians in their guidelines and operations. All support to state security forces must be in compliance with the HRDDP.

**VOICES FROM THE FIELD**

**Support to Mobile Courts**

Elena Ikumapayi, MINUSMA Associate Judicial Affairs Officer (2016-)

I am part of the MINUSMA Justice and Corrections team in Gao, a region in northern Mali. We focus our efforts on advancing the peace process by supporting the effective restoration and extension of State authority and rule of law. Where rule of law institutions are weak, or the population does not trust the judiciary, communities are more prone to violence.

In some locations of Mali, there are limited or no rule of law institutions. Judges are often unwilling to remain in remote areas due to insecurity. For people in these areas, access to justice is both costly and dangerous, as they must travel far along insecure roads to reach the nearest available court. In early 2019, I helped organize a mobile court hearing to address this problem. In this location, the judge had been absent for seven years. MINUSMA provided logistical, advisory and security support to facilitate the judge’s visit.

On the first day, the judge heard eight cases, both civil and criminal, and resolved several other legal files. One of the civil cases involved a land dispute between two communities. The dispute had not yet turned violent, but tensions were high between the communities. The hearing and decision by the judge seemed to resolve the tensions. At the end of the hearing the parties agreed to be bound by the judge’s decision and expressed their intention not to appeal. When we followed up in the subsequent weeks, local authorities informed us that the decision seemed to be respected and there had been no further problems between the communities.

On the second day, the judge held an open dialogue with the population to sensitize them about the rule of law and the progressive return of state authorities. Until he could return to the area full time, he encouraged the population to contact him directly, particularly if they had information that would help in the fight against impunity. As we left the area, many people thanked us for facilitating the visit and mobile court, though it was clear they were hungry for more.

On this occasion, I witnessed first-hand the potential of a present justice system to diffuse possible sources of communal tension. Some participants said that when justice is close to them, it makes them more willing to forgive. By addressing resource-based drivers of conflict, justice may reduce the risk of violent POC incidents.
POC activities at the local level often include support to social cohesion and reconciliation activities; enhancing community protection capacities; and building capacity of civil society, journalists and human rights defenders. Activities at the local level must be implemented in coordination and consultation with local communities to address the different protection needs of women, men, girls and boys and to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness as POC tools.

Care must be exercised in determining when it is appropriate to support community protection capacities. Such capacities, or self-protection measures, can be any activities undertaken by local communities to mitigate, deter or avoid threats, including threats of physical violence against civilians. These can include self-defence groups, neighbourhood watch or patrols, alert networks, advocacy with state authorities to seek protection, conflict resolution, adopting coping mechanisms such as only moving in groups, displacement, negotiation with perpetrators and cooperation with perpetrators. Communities may or may not view these activities as self-protection measures; in many instances, communities may just instinctively implement them as methods of survival. Self-protection mechanisms that involve the use of force, such as self-defence groups, may evolve into predatory entities, morphing from protectors into perpetrators of violence against civilians. Mission support to community protection capacities must, as a priority, consider the principle of do no harm, as well as the sustainability of the support and approach. In cases where support to community protection capacities is undertaken by NGOs, the mission should take care not to duplicate, but rather, to complement such efforts, as appropriate.

- DPKO Guidelines on the Role of the UN Police in Protection of Civilians (2017.12)
- DPKO-DFS Civil Affairs Handbook (2012.02)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Engagement with Civil Society (2017.06)
- DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Police Capacity-Building and Development (2015.08)
- UN Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts (29 July 2013)
- DPKO-DPA Aide Memoire on Engaging with Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) for Political Purposes: Considerations for UN Mediators and Missions (12 May 2017)
- DPA Policy Directive on Preventing and Mitigating Election-related Violence (FP/01/2016)
UNMIL’s all-female FPU serves as role models for Liberia’s women and girls, triggering a fourfold increase in the number of Liberian women applying to become police officers. (2008)
13.1 POC, GENDER EQUALITY AND THE WPS MANDATES

Normative framework

Several Security Council resolutions on POC feature directives on gender integration, highlighting the need for specific protection provisions for women and specialized gender training. The Women, Peace and Security Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2242 (2015) specifically identify the need for peacekeeping missions to integrate women’s needs and gender perspectives into their work, while Resolution 2122 (2013) specifically calls on missions to address the security threats and protection challenges faced by women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings.

DPO policies

Meaningful integration of the WPS priorities is a guiding principle of the DPO POC Policy. The 2018 Gender Policy also prioritizes gender integration in all aspects of POC. It notes the need for holistic gender and protection analysis that identifies the specific capabilities, roles and responsibilities of women, as well as the gender dimensions of risks and vulnerabilities because women and girls are the main targets of CRSV. The Gender Policy also calls on POC stakeholders to ensure women’s full participation in all decision-making processes.
13.2 GENDER INTEGRATION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION

The POC mandate extends to all civilians in the mission’s area of responsibility, thus peacekeeping personnel must have a nuanced understanding of the full range of threats faced by the diverse members of the civilian population to respond adequately. This includes recognizing how gender shapes individuals’ vulnerability, their capacities to respond to threats and the various type of threats they may encounter. An inclusive approach to information gathering and analysis can help to broaden this contextual understanding and facilitate more responsive and effective interventions. A gender-sensitive approach also means recognizing the varied gendered roles in peace and conflict. Women and girls can be a driving force for violence, whether as active supporters or perpetrators of violence. They also play critical roles in de-escalating conflict and promoting security and stability.

Without taking gender into consideration, POC activities may overlook certain forces underlying or driving threats, as well as valuable resources for strengthening local protection mechanisms.

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

Integrating a Gender Perspective into POC

Tawah Blamah Flomo, UNMIL National Civil Affairs Officer (2008-2016)

I was assigned to Margibi County as a Civil Affairs Officer. It was just around the time the Government was beginning efforts to decentralize government institutions. In time, government institutions became more visible in the county. But as I participated in meetings of local organizations, I saw that women and youth in the districts and townships did not know much about the functions of government institutions. In most instances, when violent crimes were committed, the perpetrators of violence were not apprehended because the victims did not know how to get justice. As a result, there was increasing gender-based violence because of the impunity, and also increasing mob violence as communities took matters into their own hands.

To improve the knowledge of citizens on the functions of government institutions, and particularly their role in protection of the population, I engaged the County Communication Bureau Officer from the Ministry of Information. To raise awareness, in 2010, we crafted a radio programme named “Local Government and You.” This radio programme was hosted by the Communication Officer and was held every Tuesday at 8:00PM. I listened every Tuesday to enable me to provide feedback to the host and gather information for further awareness around the county. Some Ministries were repeat guests on the show due to high demand from women’s groups and citizens concerned with protection issues.

The radio programme brought relief to women who now understood the different steps and channels to report gender-based violence and rape cases. Women’s organizations started getting more vocal in engaging local authorities like the Gender Office, Ministry of Health, police, County Superintendent and the court on prolonged GBV cases where justice was stalled. I heard from women’s groups that they understood the different government actors and who to engage or advocate with due to the radio programme.

“In most instances, when violent crimes were committed, the perpetrators of violence were not apprehended because the victims did not know how to get justice.”
13.3 GUIDANCE FOR GENDER-RESPONSIVE POC

Implementing the WPS mandate is a priority across all POC plans, policies, activities, analysis and reports. General gender integration guidance for all POC activities includes:

- Ensure that situational awareness contains a nuanced understanding of gender. A gender perspective exposes differences in status and power and how these shape immediate needs. Threats to women and girls are often less visible than threats to men and boys but can impact the conflict, as a whole. Direct engagement with local people, including women and girls, is the most effective way to strengthen situational awareness.

- Prioritize women’s meaningful participation in all programmes, not just ‘gender’ programmes, from planning through to implementation. Often engagement with women is tokenistic and fails to recognize the valuable contextual knowledge that women offer.

- Address women’s and girls’ protection issues beyond CRSV. Women and girls face protection risks that extend well beyond sexual violence. In a conflict, hostilities can disproportionately affect women and girls when residential areas are impacted. Women political leaders, media personnel and human rights defenders often face targeted threats and attacks. Other protection risks include abduction and forced marriage, domestic violence, enforcement of dress codes, lack of access to sources of livelihood, denial of housing, land or property and restrictions of movement. Protection actors, including the human rights component and members of the Protection Cluster, may be best placed to address risks that extend beyond threats of physical violence.

- Gender integration is the responsibility of all peacekeeping personnel, not just female personnel. Women peacekeepers are not the only conduit for engaging with local women, nor are they primarily responsible for supporting gender integration. The WPS mandate is the responsibility of everyone, in the same way that the POC mandate applies to all personnel.
Gender integration does not necessarily require new programmes or approaches; much can be easily incorporated into existing POC efforts. The following are strategies for each of the three POC tiers:

| Tier I: Protection through dialogue and engagement |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------|
| **Strategies**   | **Strategies**                                               |
| Strengthen women’s involvement in mediation, dialogue and conflict resolution, as mediators, delegates in negotiating parties, etc. | Implement dedicated protection activities based on the needs of and risks faced by women and girls (for example, in response to CRSV early warning indicators). Working with women and girls, especially marginalized and vulnerable groups, will lead to a clear understanding of how threats are gendered and how best to design and implement effective protection mechanisms. Activities may include: |
| Bolster women’s participation in early warning. Women can be valuable sources of information of early warning systems. Other measures, such as dial-in radio programmes for women to report threats and ensure the community is informed of risks, can help to foster women’s active participation and benefit the whole community. | Creating safe spaces in camps for women and girls; |
| Undertake public information campaigns to promote women's rights and help strengthen the capacity of state and civil society in promoting gender equality and women’s rights. For example, sensitization campaigns can be conducted on the types of protection issues women frequently face and strategies to decrease their likelihood of occurrence, such as promoting women's participation in measures to combat sexual violence or the creation of mechanisms for the recourse to justice. | Tailoring protection activities to women’s and girls’ mobility patterns and economic activity (e.g., firewood patrols, water-route patrols, field and market patrols); |
| Engage with women and women’s organizations to understand better what specific protection issues women face in a given context. When local male authority figures speak on behalf of their communities, they often fail to address women’s issues. Women may be reluctant to share their perspectives in mixed-gender settings, especially if they are not normally expected/empowered to share their opinions publicly. | Providing a security umbrella for women’s rights defenders and organizations working on women’s rights or GBV; and |

| Tier II: Provision of physical protection |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------|
| **Strategies**   | **Strategies**                                               |
| Support gender integration and women’s participation and leadership in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Work across other functional components to ensure gender perspectives are addressed, for example, in the reintegration of ex-combatants as well as in the restoration of rule of law and accountability for victims and supporting host government efforts towards women’s inclusion in decision-making roles in post-conflict governance institutions. | Establishing JMAC perpetrator profiling systems that include patterns of attacks against women and girls, as well as sex and age disaggregated tracking of civilian casualties. |
| Ensure that women’s and girls’ needs are considered in creating the conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable or local integration of refugees and IDPs, in coordination with national authorities and humanitarian partners. | Consider how engagement and advocacy with women and girl supporters and potential perpetrators of violence can contribute to efforts to prevent violence. |
| Build capacity of national authorities to promote and respect human rights, including women’s rights and prevent, respond, investigate and prosecute CRSV. | Consider how engagement and advocacy with women and girl supporters and potential perpetrators of violence can contribute to efforts to prevent violence. |
| Ensure tailored victim- and witness-protection measures for female victims and witnesses, especially victims/survivors of CRSV. | |
Gender must further be integrated along the four POC phases (prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation) either to eliminate a threat or to mitigate the risk to civilians, including women and girls, associated with it.

**Checklist: Guiding Questions for Gender-Responsive POC**

- How have women, girls, men and boys been affected differently by the conflict and/or by displacement? Have women, girls, men and boys been affected by specific events such as the destruction of infrastructure and health-care systems, separation of families, etc?
- How do gender norms, roles and dynamics shape the vulnerabilities of women, girls, men and boys? Do these norms, roles and dynamics affect how women, girls, men and boys are targeted?
- What are the basic needs of women, girls, men and boys (e.g., food, health, shelter, water and sanitation, education) in the displaced and host populations?
- What are the different coping mechanisms currently used by women, girls, men and boys? What resources and support structures are they utilizing and are they sustainable?
- Are women and men equally involved in planning and implementing protection programmes?
- Do women, girls, men and boys all have access to early warning systems? Are they actively contributing to reporting? What barriers might be preventing their participation?

**CASE STUDY**

**UNAMID Women Protection Networks**

UNAMID has established 48 Women Protection Networks in the IDP camps across the five Darfur states. The Women Protection Networks serve multiple roles:

- Receive timely information concerning women’s protection needs to inform appropriate protection measures;
- Raise awareness among IDPs on women’s rights and the fight against sexual and gender-based violence in the IDP camps;
- Strengthen the strategies for the protection of women by encouraging dialogue between women, IDPs, camp leadership, UNAMID, UN agencies and the state security apparatus;
- Create a forum in which IDP women discuss their protection needs and share with the camp leadership and other protection actors for action; and
- Ensure that mechanisms for referring gender-based violence victims/survivors to service providers are in place.

Improved communication between IDP women and the camp leadership about women’s protection concerns led to targeted patrols and escorts by the UN military in collaboration with the IDP women leaders. There was also an improved response to sexual gender-based violence issues, especially referrals, as these networks refer SGBV survivors to relevant service providers. Most importantly, Women Protection Networks are critical in signaling early warnings in and around the camps.

Mainstreaming these networks into the Ministry of Health and Social Development would further help to ensure their sustainability, as well as improve cooperation with security forces to act on reported incidents.
13.4 WPS INDICATORS RELATED TO POC

DPO has developed a set of indicators for the WPS mandate which also measure the results and impact of POC-specific mission actions. These indicators should be integrated together with other POC indicators in the relevant reporting and evaluation mechanisms of the mission, e.g., CPAS, RBB, etc.

Core indicator (to be deployed across all missions)
- Number and percentage of formal local early warning mechanisms where women make up at least 30% of active members in the area of responsibility (AOR).
- Number of mission-led (meaning: time or financial resources committed) initiatives that are aimed at strengthening the capacities of women’s civil society organizations working on conflict prevention.
- Number of gender-responsive operations by the UN military and/or police, or alternatively “Female Engagement Teams,” carried out to protect civilians.

Potential elective indicators (intended for selective use, as applicable to each mission mandate)
- Percentage of IDPs and refugees who have returned in a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable manner (disaggregated by sex and age).
- Percentage of displaced people referred to UNHCR who have meaningfully accessed services as demonstrated by UNHCR registration and receipt of at least one form of UNHCR or partner assistance (e.g., shelter, cash, etc.) (disaggregated by sex and age).
- Number and percentage of women and girls receiving benefits through reparation programmes (disaggregated by type of benefits received).

Reach indicators (encouraged as much as financial, staff time and security constraints allow)
- Percentage of people (disaggregated by sex) who report feeling safe leaving their homes during the day and night (general population survey).
- Percentage of people (disaggregated by sex) living in refugee or IDP camps, sites or settlements, who report feeling safe leaving their homes during the day and night.

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- DPO Gender Equality and Women, Peace and Security Resource Package
- DPKO-DFS Policy on Gender Responsive United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2018.01)
- DPO’s Compendium of Women, Peace and Security Indicators

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38 This chapter has incorporated Chapter Ten on Protection of Civilians from the DPO Gender Equality and Women, Peace and Security Resource Package.
14.1 ADVICE AND SUPPORT

Proactively advise and support mission leaders, do not replace them.

- Remember the SRSG is ultimately responsible for and the owner of the POC strategy, not the POC Adviser. Act in support of mission leaders and managers, to guide and encourage.

- Wherever the POC Adviser is embedded, the Adviser’s role is to support all mission leaders and managers towards POC success, maintaining a view to promoting the POC strategic approach.

- Focus on the mission’s overall interest, not the interest of the pillar, office or unit alone.

- Align all actions with those of the designated POC lead amongst mission leadership. Regularly update and accompany the POC lead, and clear important moves and initiatives with the POC lead. This will provide more weight and momentum to POC actions.

- Liaise with internal and external high-level leaders in consultation with and with the consent of the POC lead. Do not risk jeopardizing relations with the POC lead and creating confusion by acting independently.

- Stay particularly connected to all special assistants, advisers and other staff working alongside mission leaders and managers, as well as those of external partners (ministries, embassies, UN agencies, etc.).
Establish a liaison matrix with all leadership offices to clarify who within the mission will lead relations with each external actor, and therefore enable mission leaders to guide and control engagement.

Prepare and regularly update standard and specific talking points for all key internal and external engagements on POC. Beyond the POC lead, also share these with other leaders and managers, preferably through their assistants and advisers.

14.2 OPERATIONS AND IMPACT

Focus on POC operations and impact, rather than process.

- Developing the POC strategy, contributing to strategic reporting and accomplishing or taking part in other processes as a member of the Office of the SRSG or the Office of the DSRSG will take time. The primary day-to-day focus of the POC Adviser should aim to support the POC lead on preparedness, planning and coordination of POC operations.

- Focus efforts on finding solutions to strategic POC threats (outcome and impact), while supporting tactical-level colleagues in addressing ongoing situations and more imminent threats, including through POC Officers and POC technical group members.

- Conduct regular visits to the field. This is the best way to stay connected with actualities and conditions; remember the purpose of POC and support operations. Encourage the POC lead to do the same, even for short visits, every few weeks. Involve, accompany or mobilize other mission leaders and managers, as well as host authorities and civil society/humanitarian actors, when possible.

- Support the bottom-up flow of both information and recommendations on situations; triangulate and share these with Protection Working Group (PWG) members, mission leaders and managers, as required. Provide feedback and share information with field offices on all POC-related topics — Heads of Offices are further removed from mission and UN headquarters and they need background information on the operational or strategic dynamics on POC to operate effectively. In turn, they will recognize the efforts and involve/share with the POC Adviser more.

- As much as possible, leverage process and non-kinetic activities (development of the strategy, high-level visits, SG report, etc.) in support of POC operational objectives.

- Make use of training sessions and workshops as opportunities for colleagues to improve operations, while providing them with on-the-job support and guidance, together with mission leaders, managers and/or PWG members. Formats can include:
  - Exercises on real situations, including TTXs or workshops to develop or review tactical POC plans per threat; and
  - Training events that include a workshop aspect, to create a mutual-learning environment for/from trainees and improve guidance and processes (review tactical POC handbook, local POC-related operational plans, coordination and early warning mechanisms, etc.).

- Ensure all programmatic and planning activities undertaken by the mission and other UN Country Team members are integrating POC indicators. Every UN programmatic section and agency could report periodically against those indicators in line with the Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy and Guidelines.

- Keep a log of POC actions and operations, failures and successes, to be shared as required.

- Promote joint civilian-police-military capacity or efforts to capture lessons learned from various POC operations and/or undertake AARs and capture best practices, which can be shared with UN Headquarters and other missions. They should also regularly be inserted into pre-deployment and in-mission training modules. As POC is most successful with a context-specific approach, rotating personnel and staff require a detailed knowledge of the terrain to ensure readiness.
14.3 COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

Promote internal and external cooperation and coordination.

- Focus coordination actions and forums on the specific POC outcomes or impacts for which they are intended. Although the direct focus may be consensus building and support for the mission’s POC actions, this will be better accomplished by stressing desired outcomes or impacts and proposing cooperation towards achieving the desired effect.

- Prioritize feedback and follow-up on commitments. Teamwork attitudes are contagious and generate success.

- Mobilize others to achieve POC success, which cannot be achieved alone. As much as possible, inform and involve mission leaders, managers, PWG members, field colleagues and partners in all endeavours.

- Reinforce appropriate processes and respect roles and responsibilities. Do not duplicate the responsibilities of others — rather support them and promote their leaders. Particularly, support JMAC to ensure POC analysis, support JOC to ensure the inclusion of POC-related developments in ad hoc and integrated reporting and the facilitation of coordinated operations, respect the roles of human rights, child protection, women’s protection, police and justice colleagues in monitoring and investigating violations, etc.

- Dedicate time to the military and police, including the respective Chiefs of Staff, DCOS OPS, and planning, intelligence and operations officers. Assist them in understanding and liaising with civilian components, communities and other external actors, including through the liaison matrix.
The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping

VOICES FROM THE FIELD

Establishing POC in a Start-Up Mission
Damian Lilly, UNMISS Senior Protection of Civilians Adviser (2012-2014)

In January 2012, I joined UNMISS as the Senior Protection of Civilians (POC) Adviser to the SRSG. The mandate of UNMISS was only six-months old and the Mission was still in start-up phase when I arrived. The Mission was immediately thrown into a POC crisis with the outbreak of intercommunal violence in Jonglei state, and POC quickly became the priority of UNMISS. As the Senior POC Adviser, I was responsible for working with the different components and sections to establish the POC architecture of the Mission. Senior leadership set the tone by clearly articulating that protecting civilians was a key mission-wide responsibility.

I spent a significant amount of time with the civilian, police and military components explaining the POC operational concept and their respective roles to implement it. The POC Working Group provided the forum to translate this mandated task into an operational reality. I facilitated the process of developing UNMISS' POC strategy, which prioritized those threats to civilians to which the Mission would respond with key interventions. We then rolled-out POC trainings for all relevant personnel in UNMISS bases across the country. I was also able to develop coordination mechanisms with humanitarian actors within the context of the Protection Cluster.

A key challenge we faced early on in the Mission was the scenario of civilians seeking protection at UNMISS bases. By 2012, it was a regular occurrence when violence broke out. Given the frequency of such instances, I was tasked by the SRSG with developing guidance for such situations.

“By 2012, [civilians seeking protection at UNMISS bases] was a regular occurrence when violence broke out. Given the frequency of such instances, I was tasked by the SRSG with developing guidance for such situations.”

Promote the link between mission headquarters and field offices:

- Do not decide on specific areas and situations for POC focus. Rather, support the responsibility of Heads of Offices and field commanders and ensure regular communication with them (through established and/or informal channels).
- Promote and support direct engagement between field offices and mission leaders and managers (via VTCs, phone calls, field visits, Heads of Offices conferences, etc.).

Promote cooperation between mission and external actors:

- Become familiar with the relevant protection actors on the ground. Reach out to them and coordinate, to the extent appropriate, the sharing of protection analysis and, more broadly, information sharing.
- To ensure sustainable impact, involve national civil society and host state actors, as appropriate, in regular internal meetings and trainings. Should the context warrant it, establish dedicated mechanisms or take part in their mechanisms (state security committee, joint operations centres, civil-military coordination forums, etc.). Conduct joint trainings with other actors for state security forces and relevant ministry staff.
14.4 CONTINUOUS LEARNING

Aim to improve the quality of work and build knowledge and skills.

- Seek feedback and inputs from mission leaders and managers on the support provided or required from the POC Adviser and POC team.
- Support and promote lessons learned, AARs, institutional memory processes and innovation.
- Build knowledge and skills, particularly of:
  - Concepts and legal frameworks (IHL, IHRL, refugee law, IDP Guiding Principles, child protection, WPS, mass atrocity prevention, humanitarian protection, etc.);
  - Protection-related mechanisms at the strategic level: UN Security Council (POC, CAAC and WPS debates, the Informal Experts Group on POC, sanctions regimes and mechanisms), ICC, Human Rights up Front;
  - Humanitarian actors with a key role in protection;
  - DPO (and DOS) policies, guidelines and SOPs, as well as DPET’s activities; and
  - Professional skills such as conflict resolution, planning, advocacy, capacity building, etc.

See Annex I for TORs of Mission Senior POC Advisers.

Part VI: Scenarios and Annexes

UNMISS’s UNPOL lead a security sweep of a POC site. (2014)

UN Photo/Isaac Billy
Civilian, police and military personnel may all face the following scenarios and must be prepared to respond accordingly and in line with DPO policy and guidance. However, Force contingents and FPUs are the most likely to encounter some (or all) of these situations, as they are often deployed to the most remote locations and areas of insecurity and may have to make quick decisions on the ground in response to threats to civilians.

A mission-specific tactical POC handbook can be a useful tool to provide mission-specific contextual guidance. The tactical handbook can list “Do’s and Don’ts” for contingent and FPU commanders, in line with the mission ROE and DUF and actions catered for in the DPKO/DFS military and police POC Guidelines. The tactical handbook should clarify both collective and individual protection measures to be considered, for instance to protect individual witnesses and victims; protect civilian communities when the mission is itself a target; distinguish civilians from perpetrators when confronted with community-based violence; or act when state security forces commit violence against civilians, when IDPs are trapped in a fighting area or flee and seek shelter at a military base, etc. The tactical POC handbook should incorporate and be aligned with the guidance in this Handbook.

**15.1 CIVILIANS SEEKING PROTECTION AT A MISSION BASE OR PREMISES**

Civilians at risk may seek the direct physical protection of a peacekeeping mission by gathering outside or seeking entry to UN premises. In anticipation of such, all bases (however temporary) of UN peacekeeping missions must have contingency plans in place to provide physical protection in both scenarios, in consultation with relevant partners including, as appropriate, the host state, the UN Country Team and humanitarian actors. In order of priority, physical protection should be provided:

1. On non-UN premises, including in camps or settlements or with host communities;
2. In areas adjacent to or close to existing mission premises, identified for that purpose; or
3. In extremis, including due to a lack of preparedness or where the mission has insufficient military or police capacity to secure a site outside the mission compound, within existing premises. A decision to provide physical protection within UN premises must be taken by the head of mission, in consultation, if time permits, with the Under-Secretary General DPO (USG DPO). This option shall be enabled for the minimum duration possible, normally for the extent of the threat, and the decision to relocate IDPs shall lie with the mission leadership, acting in close consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

**What to DO**

- Always have a contingency plan ready for such occurrences and ensure that civilians are protected according to the base Community Protection Plan.
- Stop the advance of armed actors so that they do not threaten civilians who are gathered around or in the base.
- Make security arrangements in and around the protection site. If required, extend the security perimeter to provide protection. As a last resort, open the gates to provide temporary shelter to civilians and establish a secure space for them within the compound, separate from UN staff accommodations or offices.
- Ensure the civilian nature of any site where civilians are gathered. Separate fighters from civilians because armed actors, or potential perpetrators, should not be allowed to enter the site or pressure civilians to stay or leave. Disarm combatants and require them to remove any uniforms before entry to seek protection, if the mission decides to extend such protection.
What to DO (continued)

- Use CLAs, national staff or interpreters to understand the concerns of the protected population.
- Consider possible scenarios of community tensions and further violence among the protected civilian population. Make special considerations for the protection of ethnic, religious or other minorities. These may include, in some cases, separate areas for those who may be at risk of violence.
- In cases of crimes or acts of violence committed within the site, make special provision for the separation of individuals suspected of such acts.
- Treat civilians in a humane and dignified manner and observe the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Cater for the special needs of women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable populations.
- Inform Force headquarters, Police headquarters and the Head of Office, and request additional support, possibly through a Joint Protection Team, for identifying and assisting with collective or individual protection needs.
- Engage with the Protection Cluster members for the provision of further protection and humanitarian assistance in the event civilians continue to seek physical protection on or near the base for an extended period.
- If necessary, conduct patrols to facilitate civilians to gather firewood, water or food. Such patrols and their timing should be consulted with the community.
- Consider joint patrols with the national gendarmerie or police, including during night-time hours. Do not expose the civilians to additional risk when doing so, for example if the national authorities pose a threat to the community — real or perceived.
- Identify alternative safe sites in coordination with relevant authorities and in consultation with humanitarian actors and the protected community. Consultations with communities close to where the relocation is envisaged are also important to ensure acceptance. Access to these areas should be safe and perceived to be safe by the community.
- Facilitate access to information for members of the community, particularly so they can assess the situation of their own security.
- Control the spread of rumours, inflammatory language or propaganda.

What NOT to do

- DO NOT force civilians to leave the base perimeter or force them to stay.
- DO NOT allow political meetings or military activities such as recruitment in the vicinity of the base.
- DO NOT provide direct humanitarian assistance to civilians, except last resort drinking water, medical and food assistance.
- DO NOT conduct military armed patrols or operations inside the area where the civilians are protected, except in cases of imminent threat to the population. UNPOL will primarily ensure security within the site.
- DO NOT ignore civilian communications: use CLAs or interpreters to engage the affected population.
- DO NOT forget protection needs in non-daylight time.
- DO NOT automatically separate ethnic or religious groups, as this may further entrench divisions or hostility.

15.2 INDIVIDUAL CIVILIANS SEEKING UN PROTECTION

During periods of heightened political tension and civil unrest, individuals or small group of individuals may seek physical protection at bases or premises of peacekeeping missions, or otherwise request protection from the mission, due to a targeted threat against their person. Such individuals may include human rights defenders, victims and witnesses of human rights violations, community workers, journalists, lawyers, civil society representatives or other
What to DO

Before providing physical protection, and where time permits, consider alternative methods of reducing the threat. Such measures may include, for example, measures to prevent and address intimidation and reprisals for cooperation with the mission, advice and guidance on self-protection measures and documentation and reporting of cases. In certain cases, protection can be provided through the static deployment of armed units outside the individual’s residence or the regular patrolling of its environs.

Manage expectations of what protection the mission can provide to an individual. Usually this is limited, and will not include, for example, relocation.

With consent of the individual, refer the case to other protection actors who may be able to facilitate the protection sought.

Where an individual seeks entry to the mission’s base for protection, seek instructions from the senior UN official on site before admitting the individual. However, in case there is an imminent threat to their physical integrity, life or liberty, these individuals shall be admitted into the base premises without delay.

Conduct an initial interview to ascertain and document the request. Use best judgment and provide temporary/limited protection or assistance at the reception/gate, as necessary to secure the individual's physical integrity, subject to further consultation with a Human Rights Officer.

Require the individual to disarm and remove any uniform before allowing entry.

Thoroughly search the individual for weapons or other contraband. The search should preferably be conducted by personnel of the same gender as the individual.

If an individual, whether armed or unarmed, claims to belong to an armed movement or to have deserted from an armed movement, immediately inform the individual of his/her status according to international humanitarian law. Seek guidance from the mission Legal Adviser.

Refer individuals or groups interested in joining the DDR programme to the mission’s DDR section.

Where refuge is granted to individuals or small groups subject to an imminent threat of death or serious injury, it should be for the shortest period of time necessary to defuse that threat.

Always allow access to the base to children under threat and contact mission Child Protection Advisers/Officers immediately.

What NOT to do

DO NOT report the individual's request for protection to anyone outside the mission, including local authorities, without voluntary, informed consent of the individual.

DO NOT interview a victim or witness of human rights violations about their experience in the absence of a Human Rights Officer.

DO NOT make assumptions about the risk the individual faces without sufficient inquiry.

DO NOT admit armed or uniformed individuals into the UN premises.

DO NOT admit additional individuals into UN premises in locations where there is neither current fighting nor threat of physical violence.

DO NOT hand over to local authorities any individual admitted onto the peacekeeping base for protection purposes, unless a valid warrant of arrest is provided and written assurances are provided that the individual(s) concerned will be treated in accordance with national and international humanitarian and human rights law. DO NOT hand anyone over without explicit authorization of the senior UN official on site.
15.3 SECURING IDP, REFUGEE AND RETURNEE SITES, CAMPS OR SETTLEMENTS

Civilians in IDP, refugee and returnee camps, sites and settlements may be at particular risk of violent attacks. Displaced individuals may also be at risk if they are hosted within local communities or in urban areas. Displaced populations should be identified as a vulnerable group as part of the threat assessment process, and specific communities within the displaced population, for example women, children, young men, people with disabilities, older persons and minorities, should be identified as targets of particular threats, depending on the specific context. Where peacekeeping personnel are called upon to provide protection to displaced populations or are involved in securing sites comprised of displaced populations, they must take care to take these threats into consideration.

What to DO

☐ Undertake a comprehensive effort, including civilian, police and military components, to assess the threats facing displaced populations and plan for their protection. Consult with representatives of the IDPs/refugees, and, when applicable, the humanitarian actors responsible for the management of the IDP/refugee sites, such as UNHCR and the Protection Cluster. Consider the specific needs of women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities and minorities in the assessment.

☐ Liaise closely with UNHCR, the Protection Cluster and other protection actors on the ground for updated protection analysis.

☐ Consider deploying a Joint Protection Team or other tool to provide in-depth analysis and recommendations for the protection needs of a particular site or hosting area.

☐ Coordinate (through the appropriate mission component), with IDP/refugee representatives, national police and military, as well as UNHCR and camp management partners to establish security arrangements in and around the site(s) and maintain its civilian and humanitarian character (i.e., prevent infiltration of armed elements and the presence of arms/weapons).

☐ Assess and address potential explosive ordinance threat in areas of IDP/refugee sites.

☐ Establish a Community Alert Network with IDP/refugee representatives and relevant actors.

☐ Ensure that women are included among community representatives and/or make accommodations to ensure they can express their concerns directly, rather than via male representatives. (In some contexts, this could include holding separate meetings with just women, so that they can feel comfortable to share their concerns with UN and/or humanitarian actors coordinating the site.)

☐ Implement a Community Protection Plan.

☐ UN military personnel may only provide security outside of the IDP/refugee sites and should intervene inside the site only when civilians are under imminent threat of physical violence.

☐ UN police personnel may enter the IDP/refugee site, in coordination with civilian components of the mission and the IDP/refugee community, in consultation with UNCHR and local authorities and/or camp management.

☐ If necessary, conduct patrols to facilitate civilians’ gathering of firewood, water or food, or access to markets or services. Such patrols and their timing should be in consultation with the community, UNHCR, local authorities and/or camp management.

☐ Ensure that fighters are identified and separated from the civilian population and that they are not present inside or in the vicinity of IDP/refugee sites, or in public sites such as schools or churches. This may require advocacy with the host state and/or leadership of non-state armed groups.

☐ Ensure that civilians do not carry weapons or arms within or near the site.

☐ Uniformed components should seek support from civilian sections or CLAs for communication (including translation, if required), and engagement with and sensitization of the local population, local authorities and humanitarian actors.
What NOT to do

☐ DO NOT provide security to an IDP or refugee site automatically. They may not be at risk of violence and full-time protection of the site will hamper capacity to address priority POC threats.

☐ DO NOT force civilians to leave the sites or force them to stay.

☐ DO NOT provide direct humanitarian assistance to civilians, except last resort clean drinking water, medical and food assistance. Alert UNHCR and the Humanitarian Country Team if specific needs are unmet.

☐ DO NOT conduct military patrols inside the IDP/refugee site, except when faced with an imminent threat to the population. UNPOL and national police patrols may take place, in coordination with civilian components of the mission and humanitarian actors, such as UNHCR.

☐ DO NOT ignore civilian communications. Use CLAs or interpreters to understand the population’s concerns.

☐ DO NOT forget protection needs in non-daylight hours.

15.4 SECURING CIVILIANS CLOSE TO CONFLICT ZONES

 Civilians close to conflict zones are at particular risk of both direct and indiscriminate attacks. They should be a high priority for the mission’s POC response plans, taking the following into account.

What to DO

☐ Identify in advance civilians at risk of both direct and indiscriminate attack.

☐ Carry out advocacy and sensitization activities with potential perpetrators to prevent attacks on civilians and urge compliance with international humanitarian law, when applicable.

☐ Identify and support existing community self-protection mechanisms.

☐ Engage with host state authorities (civilian, police and military) to understand and support their plans for protecting civilian populations at risk.

☐ Always intervene to prevent and stop violence against civilians under direct threat, no matter the source of the threat. Intervention can include dialogue and engagement with perpetrators and influencers or direct physical protection, usually by uniformed components.

☐ Military components may interpose themselves, establish weapons-free areas or conduct patrols, including foot and night patrols, wherever possible and appropriate.

☐ Assess further risks to the populations caught in the conflict zone. Coordinate with UNMAS and other relevant actors to consider risks of explosive ordnance, including mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices.

☐ Consult the population and inform them of measures the UN will take to protect them.

☐ If requested, consider relocating/evacuating the population, in consultation with the Protection Cluster.

☐ If necessary, conduct patrols to facilitate civilians to gather firewood, water or food. Such patrols and their timing should be consulted with the community.

☐ Always provide objective information on the security situation and potential threats to the civilian population and avoid raising false expectations of protection.
**What NOT to do**

- DO NOT force civilians to leave the location or force them to stay.
- DO NOT provide direct assistance to civilian populations, including IDPs, except last resort drinking water, medical and food assistance.
- DO NOT ignore civilian communications just because they are in a language that you do not understand. Use CLAs or interpreters.
- DO NOT ignore protection needs during night-time.

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**15.5 CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH OR HELD BY ARMED GROUPS OR FORCES**

UN personnel, particularly uniformed personnel, may encounter children or young people, who appear to be children, in the presence of armed groups or forces. Such children may be associated with the armed group or force, or may be children in military custody, detained, or held as prisoners of war. UN personnel who come across such cases must proceed cautiously. Mission Senior Child Protection Advisers and Child Protection Officers, in coordination with DDR/CVR components, are the experts and first port of call in situations where children may be at risk, including where children face general protection risks. Where time allows, they must be consulted before taking any action. Missions may devise specific SOPs or protocols, including Force/Police Child Protection Directives, on how to respond to children associated with armed groups. In the absence of such specific guidance, the following is general advice to follow.

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**What to DO**

- Remind national military or police personnel and armed groups that using children, including as combatants, labour and/or sex slaves, is a grave violation under national and international law.
- Intervene, seek the release of recruited children and their timely transfer to child protection actors, and deter child recruitment, where possible, after consulting with child protection specialists in the mission.
- At the same time, consider the repercussions the intervention could have on other children who may still be with the group.
- Report all information immediately to Child Protection Advisers/Officers or the Head of Office.
- Document the activity, if possible. Handle any information, photos or evidence that confirms identity with the utmost confidentiality.
- Patrol in communities and locations (e.g., near schools and other children-centred facilities) that are vulnerable to threats against children.
- House children (or potential children) at mission military bases only as a temporary protection measure while awaiting Child Protection or DDR personnel to facilitate solutions.
- Every person under the age of 18 is considered a child. If their age is in question, consider them children and refer them to Child Protection or other child protection actors.
- Remind all personnel of their obligation to observe the zero-tolerance policy for any form of sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Remember children associated with armed forces or armed groups benefit from a special protection and assistance measure and should be considered as victims.
**What NOT to do**

- **DO NOT** take photos of the children under any circumstances.
- **DO NOT** attempt to verify the age of youth in the presence of other members of the armed group.
- **DO NOT** ask children about any violations they may have experienced or are experiencing in the presence of the armed groups with which they were found.
- **DO NOT** ask children directly whether they have been physically or sexually abused. This violates their privacy. Allow Child Protection Advisers/Officers to handle such queries and follow-up investigations.
- **DO NOT** interview a child without the presence of Child Protection or UNICEF personnel.
- **DO NOT** deny access to the UN base for children who are under threat.
- **DO NOT** hand children associated with armed actors over to authorities outside of the mission. In accordance with child protection standards, children that were associated with armed actors must be handed over to Child Protection, DDR representatives or to UNICEF for family reunification and reintegration.
- **DO NOT** further stigmatize children associated with or perceived to be associated with armed forces or groups.

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**15.6 SEXUAL VIOLENCE BEING COMMITTED OR IMMINENT**

UN personnel, particularly uniformed personnel, may encounter ongoing or imminent acts of sexual violence. Sexual violence can be committed against women, men, girls and boys, and can be perpetrated by armed and unarmed actors. Most missions will have dedicated capacity on the prevention and response to sexual violence. This can be through the Senior Women’s Protection Adviser or other dedicated staff working on CRSV. The input of specialists should be sought on threat assessment, analysis and response planning and, if a situation of sexual violence arises, they will lead on the development of prevention and response strategies and referral pathways for survivors. Missions may devise specific SOPs or protocols, including force- or police-specific guidance, on how to respond to sexual violence. In the absence of such specific guidance, the following is general advice to follow.

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**What to DO**

- **Uniformed components must intervene and/or deter the sexual violence from occurring, whether the perpetrator(s) is armed or not.**
- **Remind the attacker/perpetrator and accomplices that they are violating national and international law and the consequence of the crime.**
- **Bring the victim(s)/survivor(s) of sexual violence to safety and, with the victim/survivor’s informed consent, refer them to relevant services and/or CRSV actors, for example, medical and psychosocial services, women’s protection, human rights, POC or child protection, as relevant. Likewise, take all efforts to ensure the safety and welfare of the victim/survivor’s family or witnesses, as relevant.**
- **Document the event as thoroughly as possible with names, location, and weapons used. If the perpetrator(s) belong to military, police, gendarmerie or another uniformed authority, ensure to obtain the rank, unit and any other pertinent identification information. Documentation should not involve interviewing victims/survivors or witnesses, which requires expertise.**
- **Report the occurrence of sexual violence encountered directly by UN personnel immediately, including to the Head of Office, Women’s Protection Advisers and Human Rights Officers. Do not report any identifying information regarding the victim/survivor or witnesses without their informed consent.**
What NOT to do

- DO NOT interview or question the sexual assault survivor/potential victim. Only trained professionals such as Women’s Protection Advisers or Human Rights Officers should conduct such interviews.
- DO NOT retraumatize, further stigmatize, or otherwise endanger the victim/survivor.
- DO NOT express bias or prejudice regarding the victim(s)/survivor(s) of sexual violence.

15.7 SEXUAL VIOLENCE HAS ALREADY OCCURRED

UN personnel, particularly uniformed personnel, may encounter a situation where sexual violence has already occurred. Sexual violence can be committed against women, men, girls and boys, and can be perpetrated by armed and unarmed actors. In such cases, UN personnel should proceed with caution, and immediately contact the mission’s dedicated capacity on CRSV. Missions may devise specific SOPs or protocols, including force- or police-specific guidance, on how to respond to sexual violence. In the absence of such specific guidance, the following is general advice to follow.

What to DO

- Remember that the health and welfare of the victim(s)/survivor(s) is the foremost priority, together with protecting the victim/survivor’s identity and confidentiality. This also includes the victim/survivor’s family or witnesses.
- As soon as possible, contact the mission’s sexual violence focal point(s), including women’s protection, human rights and, where relevant, child protection officers. Only share information about the case with informed consent of the victim/survivor.
- Inform the victim(s)/survivor(s) about the possibilities for immediate medical assistance (for instance in local healthcare centres) and psychosocial assistance. If the victim(s)/survivor(s) decline assistance, do not force them or coerce them to obtain it.
- Inform the victim(s)/survivor(s) that chances of transmission of sexually transmitted diseases are considerably reduced if the victim/survivor receives adequate medical support (including PEP Kits) within 72 hours.

What NOT to do

- DO NOT ask the victim(s)/survivor(s) directly if he/she/they have been raped.
- DO NOT conduct interviews with the victim(s)/survivor(s) (except human rights, child protection or specialist personnel working on CRSV).
- DO NOT express bias or prejudice regarding the victim(s)/survivor(s) of sexual violence.
- DO NOT force a victim/survivor to obtain assistance against their will, such as seeking medical treatment or counseling.
- DO NOT visit the family, the house, a treating doctor or an assisting NGO that is linked to the victim(s)/survivor(s). They might unintentionally be put at risk.
- DO NOT take any action related to sexual violence without first consulting with the mission’s Women’s Protection Adviser or sexual violence focal point.
- DO NOT release the names, photos or details of the victim/survivor(s) of sexual violence crimes in reports or in meetings with local officials. Confidentiality of the victim/survivor(s) is paramount.
Annex I: TORs for Mission Senior POC Advisers

Responsibilities

Within the delegated authority, the Senior Protection of Civilians Adviser will perform the following roles and duties:

Advisory:

- Ensure that senior Mission leadership is regularly updated on current and emerging threats against civilians;
- Ensure that a comprehensive approach is adopted on all matters pertaining to Protection of Civilians (POC) in order to effectively leverage resources within the Mission for POC objectives as defined in the Mission-wide POC strategy;
- Provide advice to the senior Mission leadership on ways in which the Mission can assist and build the capacity of the National Authorities to fulfil their POC responsibilities;
- Provide support to relevant components and sections, including military and police, to ensure that POC concerns are adequately reflected in Mission operations, particularly as concerns civilian-military planning processes; and
- Ensure overall compliance of the Mission’s POC efforts with relevant United Nations or DPKO and DFS policies and guidelines.

Coordination and Communication:

- Oversee the development and implementation of the Mission-wide POC strategy and related in-Mission guidance and operational plans;
- Support senior Mission leadership in establishing sustainable coordination structures in order to strengthen cooperation with relevant protection actors, particularly civil society, local communities and the Government authorities at the national and local levels;
- Ensure close coordination with relevant POC partners in the development and implementation of the strategy, both civilian and uniformed personnel, particularly colleagues working on child protection, sexual violence, as well as humanitarian colleagues, focal points for human rights, civil affairs, etc.;
- Provide POC inputs to Mission planning and performance systems;
- Provide Secretariat support to Mission POC coordination structures;
- Coordinate and facilitate information sharing with the Protection Cluster, other security actors that may be present in the Mission area, and other such arrangements;
- Assist in the development of an effective POC communications strategy, in close coordination with the public information office and the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator; and
- Provide support as required and undertake other tasks as may be appropriate to the specific context and tasks vis-à-vis POC.

Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting:

- Coordinate the establishment/monitoring of early warning tools and processes, including through community liaison and alert systems;
- Lead or join joint POC assessments with other relevant actors; and
- Work with the relevant staff in the Mission to conduct and support after action reviews and lessons learned studies on the Mission’s POC efforts.

Training:

- Assess the training needs on POC issues in the area of responsibility, and design and support the delivery of tailored POC modules with relevant Mission components, including military and police, in close consultation with the IMTC and the POC Coordination Team in DPKO/DFS; and
• In cooperation with the IMTC and other Mission components, ensure adequate training and sensitization on POC for local communities, humanitarian, development or security partners and Governmental institutions.

Management:

• Act as the first or second reporting officer for and coordinate the actions of all staff dedicated to POC coordination within the Mission.

Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting:

• Coordinate the establishment/monitoring of early warning tools and processes, including through community liaison and alert systems;
• Lead or join joint POC assessments with other relevant actors; and
• Work with the relevant staff in the Mission to conduct and support after action reviews and lessons learned studies on the Mission’s POC efforts.

Competencies

Professionalism: Shows pride in work and in achievements; Demonstrates professional competence and mastery of subject matter; Is conscientious and efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results; Is motivated by professional rather than personal concerns; Shows persistence when faced with difficult problems or challenges; Remains calm in stressful situations; Takes responsibility for incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work.

Teamwork: Works collaboratively with colleagues to achieve organizational goals; Solicits input by genuinely valuing others’ ideas and expertise; is willing to learn from others; Places team agenda before personal agenda; Supports and acts in accordance with final group decision, even when such decisions may not entirely reflect own position; Shares credit for team accomplishments and accepts joint responsibility for team shortcomings.

Planning and Organizing: Develops clear goals that are consistent with agreed strategies; Identifies priority activities and assignments; Adjusts priorities as required; Allocates appropriate amount of time and resources for completing work; Foresees risks and allows for contingencies when planning; Monitors and adjusts plans and actions as necessary; Uses time efficiently.

Leadership: Serves as a role model that other people want to follow; Empowers others to translate vision into results; Is proactive in developing strategies to accomplish objectives; Establishes and maintains relationships with a broad range of people to understand needs and gain support; Anticipates and resolves conflicts by pursuing mutually agreeable solutions; Drives for change and improvement, does not accept the status quo; Shows the courage to take unpopular stands; Provides leadership and takes responsibility for incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work; demonstrates knowledge of strategies and commitment to the goal of gender balance in staffing.

Managing Performance: Delegates the appropriate responsibility, accountability and decision-making authority; Makes sure that roles, responsibilities and reporting lines are clear to each staff member; Accurately judges the amount of time and resources needed to accomplish a task and matches task to skills; Monitors progress against milestones and deadlines; Regularly discusses performance and provides feedback and coaching to staff; Encourages risk-taking and supports creativity and initiative; Actively supports development.
Annex II: Guidance on Protection of Civilians 
Responsive Projects

Background
Following up on Code Cable XXXX dated XXX which encourages the Mission to prioritize the allocation of QiP resources to communities experiencing high insecurity and protection of civilians (POC) threats, and complementing DPKO/DFS QiPs Guidelines and Policy and the Mission’s QiPs SOP and Programmatic Orientations, the Protection of Civilians (POC) Unit has identified the need to develop guidance for the Mission pillars submitting project proposals for funding through other available funding mechanisms.

Depending on the type of intervention and scope of activities, some projects have clear and direct POC dimension, while others affect POC indirectly or to a very limited extent only. The guidance provides a means to categorize the Mission’s project outputs based on their “POC relevance” and expected contribution to the Mission’s protection mandate.

Intent
This guidance note is intended to help measure the extent to which projects contribute to the Mission’s POC mandate implementation. The POC rating enables the Mission to more effectively track and monitor the allocation of financial resources to POC activities and therefore, the level of integration of POC-related activities into the Mission’s projects and programmes.

Mission projects intend to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement, inclusive dialogue, State authority restoration, support to the reconstituted National Defense and Security Forces, and return of basic social services among communities most affected by the conflict, with a particular view to improving the security situation, reinforcing social cohesion, reviving productive activities and restoring basic social services. This especially includes the following financing mechanisms: (i) the Quick Impact Projects (QiPs), (ii) the Trust Fund (TF), (iii) Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), (iv) Programmatic Funding as well as projects and activities financed via DDR/SSR programmes such as Community Violence Reduction (CVR) projects.

With regards to POC, projects need to focus on areas marked by the highest levels of threats of physical violence against civilians, as identified by the regional POC working groups, co-chaired by the Heads of Office and the Sector Commanders and participated by relevant sections and the humanitarian community.

By addressing threats at their origin, projects shall be implemented across four operational phases: prevention, pre-emption, response and consolidation, as prescribed by the strategic approach to POC1:

(i) prevention: where no clear threat to civilians has been identified (longer term)
(ii) pre-emption: where likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated (short term)
(iii) response: where threats to civilians are imminent or occurring (short term), and
(iv) consolidation: where violence against civilians is subsiding (longer term)

The phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order and may be undertaken simultaneously or independently.

The prevention and consolidation phases are of particular importance for project planning and implementation: Where the threat to civilians is latent or has been significantly reduced, mission approaches will focus on prevention and consolidation including supporting and building the capacity of host state institutions to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities to protect civilians. Activities may focus on support to the peace process; human rights monitoring, reporting and investigation; supporting resilience and community cohesion through dialogue and reconciliation and addressing root causes of conflict; disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-combatants, institution-building of security, rule and law and criminal justice entities including through security sector reform and enhancing accountability for serious crimes. In areas where violence has ended or reduced, where appropriate it will include securing the return of refugees or durable solutions for IDPs2; undertaking community-oriented policing; clearance of explosive ordinance including mines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices, and enhancing community resilience though support to humanitarian, early-recovery or development assistance, stabilisation and peacebuilding activities, the promotion and protection of human rights and the fight against impunity.

2 In line with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs.
POC rating

Assigning a POC rating to project outputs helps ensuring that the respective minimum requirements with regard to POC are fulfilled, and moreover, determining the scope and type of POC mainstreaming activities needed to guarantee that any project is — within its interventions and scope of activities — as POC-responsive as possible.

All projects should:

• Address identified threats or underlying sources of conflict, as assessed in regional POC analysis;
• Enable protection measures undertaken by state actors;
• Be based on documented evidence, as stated in regional POC analysis and action plans;
• Be implemented in POC geographical hotspots.

Depending on its POC-responsiveness, every project output should therefore be assigned a POC rate scoring as follows (the rating system is qualitative rather than quantitative):

2. PoC is the central focus of output or significant attention to POC

1. Some/limited attention to POC

0. No attention to POC

2 – POC is the central focus of output or significant attention to POC

In order to receive a “significant” rating, projects must:

• be designed to facilitate dialogue with identified perpetrators or potential perpetrators of intercommunity violence;
• address conflict resolution, reconciliation and mediation between communities in conflict;
• strengthen social cohesion
• support the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding
• protect civilians through public information, including by increasing access to information.

Or

• be designed to help create a protective environment for civilians.

This includes projects directed at:

o supporting the redeployment of the constituted defense and security forces;
 o mitigating tensions over resources by increasing access to resources;
 o preventing criminality;
 o addressing the underlying causes of conflict;
 o strengthening the rule of law, including through the promotion and protection of human rights and justice;
 o community infrastructure projects.

Projects being rated as POC significant will be included in the corresponding regional POC action plans as response to an identified threat in a prioritized geographical area.

1 – Some/limited attention to POC

Some contribution to POC is expected as a result of this output, but not as a primary objective. Activities under this output are primarily focused on other issues but have a small POC component. If possible, one indicator is assigned to this output that includes a POC target and baseline.

0 – No attention to POC

No contribution to POC is expected as a result from this output. The output is POC-blind.
Coordination Mechanisms

In order to assure that a maximum of projects are contributing to POC and that such projects are included in their corresponding regional POC action plan:

- Assure participation in the regional POC WG meetings where regional POC threats and priorities are discussed under the leadership of the HoO, and action plans including all Mission activities that will address the identified POC threats are designed.

- In the case that a project already approved/being implemented responds to a threat identified during the regional POC WG meeting, signal it during the meeting, so that the project can be included in the regional response plan.

- In addition, regional POC WGs should always discuss new projects to address identified threats. Regional POC officers will be asked to raise the question during each regional POC WG meeting.

- POC Unit participates as an observer in the Trust Fund PRC, regional QIP LPRC and PAC meetings.

- Projects to be implemented in Mission Headquarters location will be considered as contributing to POC as long as they are signaled in any of the regional POC action plans or recommended by the regional POC working groups as contributing to POC in the field.

- QIPs and CVR SOPs will be reviewed to reflect all the above measures.
## Annex III: POC Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Possible Data Source</th>
<th>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease in the number of violations of cease-fire agreements by conflict parties (at national and/or local level)</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Political Affairs Force JOC (Child Protection) (SWPA)</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and perpetrator (armed groups / State security forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1</td>
<td>Tier I</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of recorded casualties (violent deaths and injuries) among civilians per 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Human Rights Force JOC POC UNMAS</td>
<td>Tailor to context, specific type of agreements Disaggregated by region, perpetrator, type of incident/tactic and victim profile (including age, gender and social group) Requires appropriate and dedicated resources to be measurable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.1</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of civilian casualties attributed to land mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including IEDs, per 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Human Rights Force JOC POC UNMAS</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and victim profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.2</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of mass casualty incidents of physical violence against civilians</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Human Rights Force JOC POC</td>
<td>“Mass casualty” incidents are defined as incidents of 100 casualties or more Disaggregated by region, perpetrator and victim profile (e.g. if specific social group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2.3</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
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Expected accomplishment A: Capability and intent of potential perpetrators to commit physical violence are reduced
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tier</th>
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<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of recorded incidents of violations of IHL and IHRL related to the rights to life and physical integrity committed against the civilian population per 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Human Rights JOC Police / Force POC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator and victim profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.5</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of recorded victims of conflict related sexual violence, per 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>WPAs Human Rights</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator, type of violation and victim profile</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Data must be gathered in a safe and non-harmful manner by qualified personnel only</td>
<td>Cooperation with experts from the HCT is critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.6</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of grave violations against children (differentiate between verified and unverified), specifically ■ killing or maiming ■ recruitment or use of children as soldiers ■ sexual violence ■ attacks against schools and hospitals ■ denial of humanitarian access ■ abduction of children</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>MRM database</td>
<td>Child Protection Human Rights WPAs JOC MRM Taskforce</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator, type of violation and victim profile</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>In line with MRM database, disaggregation by verified and non-verified information is useful</td>
<td>Data must be gathered in a safe and non-harmful manner by qualified personnel only</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with experts from the HCT is critical</td>
<td>In this context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Possible Data Source</td>
<td>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.7</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the recorded number of civilians killed as a result of inter- or intra-communal violence per 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Human Rights JOC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator and victim profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.8</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of incidents of inter- or intracommunal violence</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Human Rights JOC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, social group and conflict trigger/source</td>
</tr>
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<td>Include information about changes in frequency and scale of incidents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Define inter- and intra-communal violence at mission level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.9</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in area newly contaminated by landmines, improvised explosive devices (IED) or explosive remnants of war (ERW)</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and perpetrator (if possible)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Area measured in km2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Newly” contaminated refers to contamination during the reporting period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.10</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of new IDPs and refugees recorded, i.e. displaced during the reporting period, as well as decrease in their proportion of the total population</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>Humanitarian Protection Cluster (incl. IOM, OCHA and UNHCR)</td>
<td>ODSRSRG/RC/HC (HC supported by OCHA)</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region of origin/displacement, gender, age and social group (if data available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.11</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the total number of IDPs and refugees recorded, as well as decrease in their proportion of the total population</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>Humanitarian Protection Cluster</td>
<td>ODSRSRG/RC/HC (HCT: UNHCR, IOM)</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region of origin/displacement, gender and social group (if data available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Possible Data Source</td>
<td>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.1</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of armed elements that voluntarily lay down their weapons</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>DDR SSR</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and perpetrator, and where applicable, within displaced camps or settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.2</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of children released from armed groups as well as from national security forces (distinguish between verified and unverified)</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>MRM database</td>
<td>Child Protection DDR</td>
<td>In line with MRM database, disaggregation by verified and non-verified information is useful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.3</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the size of occupied territory from which armed groups withdraw (and number of [villages/communities] affected)</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Force JOC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and perpetrator; Measured in km²; Unit of analysis to be established on a context-specific basis; Timetable of when to measure to be established on a context-specific basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.4</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of schools and hospitals previously occupied by armed groups or armed forces that are vacated (distinguish between verified and unverified)</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>MRM database</td>
<td>Child Protection Force</td>
<td>In line with MRM database, disaggregation by verified and non-verified information is useful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.5</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Decrease in the total area contaminated (i.e. during the reporting period) by landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including IEDs</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region; Area measured in km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Possible Data Source</td>
<td>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.6</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Decrease in the number and proportion of persons who think that armed groups have the intention and capabilities to carry out physical violence against civilian communities</td>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>Perception survey</td>
<td>Civil Affairs POC External Actors</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, gender and age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3.7</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the proportion of girls and women interviewed who report feeling safe to leave their house alone during the day/night</td>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>Perception survey</td>
<td>Civil Affairs POC External Actors</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and age</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Expected accomplishment B: Capacity of the host State to protect civilians is strengthened**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Possible Data Source</th>
<th>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2.1.1 | Tier I | Increase in the number of [initiatives] to protect civilians that are being implemented by national and sub-national governments | Capacity | Civil Affairs Political Affairs Human Rights SSR RoL | Disaggregated by entity responsible for initiative and level (national, regional, local)  
Indicate nature of “initiatives”, and consider formulating individual indicators for each type or level of initiative |
| 2.1.2 | Tier I | Increase in the number of mechanisms created and functionally operational to prevent and address conflict-related sexual violence (at community, local and national level) | Capacity | WPAs Human Rights SSR | Disaggregated by region and age (adult or juvenile)  
Indicate nature of established mechanisms, disaggregated by responsible entity (national, regional, local) |
| 2.2.1 | Tier II | Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where effective alert systems are in place | Capacity | Civil Affairs | Disaggregated by region  
Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”  
Mission to determine the appropriate unit of analysis (community, county, region) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Possible Data Source</th>
<th>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of effective rapid responses taken by host authorities following alerts of protection threats, i.e. where impending or ongoing violence was stopped</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Force Police JOC POC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by response actor (and mission component)</td>
<td>Include details about specific alert network put in place to ensure early warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the average time it takes host authorities to respond to alerts of protection threats</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Force Police JOC POC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator and victim profile</td>
<td>Reflect on factors that influenced the response time such as access (security and mobility related) or otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Response time” defined as the time from the alert is received to the time action is taken OR the time from the alert is received to the identified threat is neutralized</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of violent attacks against civilians that did not result in civilian casualties following rapid response to early warning</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Force Police JOC POC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by response actor (and mission component), region, and targeted victim profile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.5</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number of incidents of vigilantism or mob violence</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents</td>
<td>Human Rights Police</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator profile and victim profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.6</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the area where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have been removed by host authorities</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region with distinction between areas where contamination may pose a threat to civilians vs. where there is no threat</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of cases of violations of IHL and the rights to life and physical integrity (including conflict related sexual violence and grave violations against children) that are reported to national law enforcement agencies, and which result in an arrest and prosecution</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights Police SSR Justice Child Protection WPAs</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, perpetrator and victim profile National records need to be verified to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the proportion of persons who express increased trust in the host Government to address security concerns, by 100,000 population in the country</td>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>Perception survey</td>
<td>Civil Affairs POC</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and profile of respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the proportion of members of the national security and defence forces that are vetted according to international standards and the number of perpetrators of IHL or IHRL violations that are effectively excluded from service</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights SSR</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region of deployment, social group and gender National records need to be verified to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.4</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of corrective actions taken by the host State in response to violations of IHL and IHRL committed by national security and defence forces</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights SSR Justice Police Force</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and perpetrator Include details of action taken, and indicate number of (i) arrests, (ii) investigations, (iii) prosecutions, (iv) condemnations, (v) sanctions or other disciplinary measures etc. National records need to be verified to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
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<td>Possible Data Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3.5</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of members of national security and defence forces trained in explosive hazard mitigation and management</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>UNMAS Police SSR</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region of deployment and gender, National records need to be verified to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.6</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Effective implementation of a strategic plan to improve operational and institutional capacity in the security sector, including the existence of functioning civilian oversight mechanisms</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Affairs SSR Human Rights</td>
<td>Include details of plans and mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.7</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Effective implementation of a mechanism to prevent the recruitment of children in the national security and defence forces</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Child Protection Human Rights Force Police SSR</td>
<td>Include details of mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.8</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Necessary elements are in place for building the capacity of national security and defence forces to protect civilians, including curricula, institutional architecture and training capacity</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights Police Force SSR</td>
<td>Include details of system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.9</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of international human rights instruments ratified by the host State</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Include details of specific treaties, National records need to be verified to the extent possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Possible Data Source</td>
<td>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3.10</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the percentage of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and treaty body recommendations that have been fully implemented and are enforced</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.11</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number of national laws that are implemented and enforced in line with international child rights standards and treaties</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>National records</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Include details of national laws in question as well as the applied international standards and treaties</td>
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**Expected accomplishment C: Community level capacities to prevent and mitigate physical violence are enhanced**

| 3.1.1 | Tier I | Increase in the number and proportion of disputes that are referred by victims to dispute resolution mechanisms (traditional/informal or institutionalized/formal), and which are thereby settled peacefully | Capacity/Perception | Perception survey? | Human Rights  
                        | Civil Affairs  
                        | Police  
                        | Justice  
                        | SSR | Disaggregated by region as well as the gender and social group of parties to the dispute  
                        | Include details about the nature of the "mechanism" (traditional/informal or institutionalized/formal) and the nature of the dispute (land, housing, property, migration etc.) |
| 3.1.2 | Tier I | Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where effective dispute resolution mechanisms are in place (traditional/informal or institutionalized/formal) | Capacity |                      | Human Rights  
                        | Civil Affairs  
                        | Justice  
                        | SSR | Disaggregated by region  
<pre><code>                    | Disaggregated by the nature of &quot;mechanism&quot; |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Possible Data Source</th>
<th>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3</td>
<td>Tier I</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where women make up at least 30% of active members in dispute resolution and/or justice mechanisms (traditional/informal or institutionalized/formal) and have appropriate influence over proceedings</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Perception survey?</td>
<td>Human Rights Civil Affairs Gender WPAs</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where effective community based early warning/alert systems are in place</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Perception survey?</td>
<td>Civil Affairs WPAs</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region as well as social group, age and gender of membership Include information on whether early warning mechanisms include early warning indicators on CRSV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of local early warning mechanisms where women make up at least 30% of active members</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Perception survey?</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Gender</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region and the size of the population serviced by the committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Increase in the proportion of people who report feeling safe per 100,000 population</td>
<td>Perception</td>
<td>Perception survey</td>
<td>Civil Affairs External Actor</td>
<td>Disaggregated by gender and age (minors, youth, adults)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4</td>
<td>Tier II</td>
<td>Decrease in the number and proportion of inter- or intracommunal disputes that result in violence, per 100,000 people</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>Perception survey?</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region Define inter- and intracommunal violence at mission level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Tier</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Possible Data Source</td>
<td>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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| 3.2.5 | Tier II | Increase in the number and proportion of people who express an enhanced level of trust toward members of [other social groups], per 100,000 people | Perception   | Perception survey    | Civil Affairs, External Actor                                 | Relevant “social groups” to be defined on a context-specific basis  
Could be measured through a composite of indicators such as: Proportion who feel comfortable having someone from another ethnic group marry someone from their households  
Relevant “social groups” to be defined on a context-specific basis  
Could be measured through a composite of indicators such as: Proportion who feel comfortable having someone from another ethnic group marry someone from their households  
Relevant “social groups” to be defined on a context-specific basis  
Could be measured through a composite of indicators such as: Proportion who feel comfortable having someone from another ethnic group marry someone from their households |
| 3.3.1 | Tier III | Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where accessible, legitimate and human rights-based transitional justice mechanisms are in place | Capacity     |                       | Civil Affairs, Human Rights Justice                           | Disaggregated by region and social group  
Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”  
Mission to determine the appropriate unit of analysis (community, county, region)  
Disaggregated by region and social group  
Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”  
Mission to determine the appropriate unit of analysis (community, county, region)  
Disaggregated by region and social group  
Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”  
Mission to determine the appropriate unit of analysis (community, county, region)  
Disaggregated by region and social group  
Disaggregated by the nature of “mechanism”  
Mission to determine the appropriate unit of analysis (community, county, region) |
| 3.3.2 | Tier III | Increase in the number of violations that are referred to and effectively addressed by transitional justice mechanisms | Capacity     | Perception survey?    | Human Rights, Civil Affairs, Justice                           | Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile |
| 3.3.3 | Tier III | Increase in the proportion of civilians who report good knowledge of, access to and trust in transitional justice mechanisms | Perception   | Perception survey     | Human Rights, Civil Affairs, Justice                           | Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile  
Disaggregated by region and victim profile |
| 3.3.4 | Tier III | Increase in the proportion of daily activities that have resumed (e.g. markets that have re-opened; agricultural fields again being tended to; school enrollment) | Situation    | SAGE/ Unite Aware - Incidents     | Civil Affairs                                               | Disaggregated by region and social groups  
Missions to determine the most relevant measure of daily activities  
Disaggregated by region and social groups  
Missions to determine the most relevant measure of daily activities  
Disaggregated by region and social groups  
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Missions to determine the most relevant measure of daily activities  
Disaggregated by region and social groups  
Missions to determine the most relevant measure of daily activities |

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<th>Tier</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Possible Data Source</th>
<th>Possible Component Responsible for Monitoring and Reporting</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3.5</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of [counties] where the civilian population has received mine risk education (MRE)</td>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Protection Cluster</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, social group, gender and age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.6</td>
<td>Tier III</td>
<td>Increase in the number and proportion of refugees that have returned voluntarily following external displacement</td>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>ODSRSG/RC/HC (HC supported by OCHA)</td>
<td>Disaggregated by region, social group, gender and age</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex IV: Crisis Communications Immediate Action Plan

The following outlines the process to address specific PoC incidents. The intent of this process is to ensure that the Mission is able to actively communicate accurate and timely information in response to a potential, occurring or recent PoC violation.

Approach

PoC Crisis response communications can be divided into 5 distinct phases:

Phase 1. **Initial Assessment.** Determine the significance and the severity of the event in order to determine what, if any, response is required.

Phase 2. **First with the Truth.** While the Mission’s understanding of the situation may be developing, it is important to start communications as soon as feasibly possible in order to prevent an information vacuum which may be filled with mis/disinformation.

Phase 3. **Coordinated Response.** As further information becomes available and the Mission is able to determine a more detailed and coordinated response to the event, communications may develop further activities that are specific to the situation and the planned response.

Phase 4. **Post-Event Assessment.** Initial communications activities should be assessed in terms of their penetration within the designated audience, as well as the initial response to the communications efforts. Realignment of themes, messages and activities may occur at this time.

Phase 5. **Continuation of activities.** While crisis communications are a distinct element within the overall communications plan, the associated activities must continue and be incorporated into the rhythm of preexisting communications efforts.

Process

In line with the above phases approach to crisis communications, and in order to ensure that the Mission’s communications remain coherent during and in the aftermath of a crisis, the following approach will be utilized.
Phase 1 – Initial Assessment

Point of Entry: The Mission may become aware of a potential PoC Crisis through a variety of means, including, PoC representatives, RJOCs, MDSF, media monitoring (including social media) and operational reporting. Once sufficient information is available to suggest the possibility of a PoC crisis, key PoC personnel must be informed: These include:

1. The Senior Protection of Civilians Advisor
2. The Force Commander or FCOS
3. The Police Commissioner
4. The Mission Spokesperson
5. The Mission Chief of Staff

IE Assessment: Once the key personnel are informed, a decision must be made to whether or not the Mission must respond in the information environment. The trigger criteria include:

1. Is this a PoC incidence?
2. Is it a threat to the Mission’s credibility?
3. Is it likely to garner media attention?

If the answer is yes to any of the trigger criteria, the event can be plotted on the following matrix to determine if a response is required or not:

If a response is NOT required, the situation should be monitored, and events reported through normal reporting channels. Information concerning the event should be communicated to stakeholders in case the situation escalates and requires a response.

If a response IS required, a crisis communication Working Group should be convened as soon as possible.

Phase 2 – First with the Truth

Crisis Communications Working Group (CCWG). The CCWG is the body that determines the appropriate Mission communications response to PoC Crisis issues and will include the pertinent communications stakeholders from the Mission and its constituent components. The initial meeting is indented to develop a common understand of the situation, determine the Mission’s ability to respond in the information environment, and determine the appropriate initial (pre-approved) themes and messages.

The initial meeting should occur as soon as possible after it has been determined that a Mission response is required. The duration of the meeting should be as short as possible to facilitate the timely conduct of crisis communications.
Phase 3 – Coordinated Response

Once the initial communications and associated activities have been coordinated and conducted, and additional information has been garnered on the event in question, a second Crisis Communications Working Group will be held. The purpose of the second CCWG is to refine messaging and activities based on new information and conduct more in-depth coordination of future activities. Additionally, participants may be required to coordinate and deconflict activities, or to capitalize on specific capabilities/personalities. The approach to the second meeting is much more deliberate and considered than the first meeting, as it will dictate a much more definitive response to the crisis.

Phase 4 – Post-Event Assessment

The situation must be continuously monitored and assessed post incident with a view to ensuring that the Mission’s themes, message and activities are creating the desired effects. The measures of effectiveness articulated in the main body of this document may serve as the basis of a post-conflict assessment, while considering other information that may assist. In certain circumstances, this may necessitate the establishment of additional Crisis Communications Working Groups to realign themes, messages and activities, considering both an assessment of the Mission’s communications as well as any additional information that becomes available.

Phase 5 – Continuation of Activities

As the overall situation develops, the lessons learned, including updates and changes to messages and activities, must be incorporated and reflected in the overall PoC response plan. Where applicable, a post-event working group should be set up in order to create a common understanding of the Mission’s response to the crisis, with an emphasis on the speed, coordination, efficacy of Mission communications efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendance</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| TBC        | • TBC | • Designation of the lead spokesperson for communications. Of note, during the initial phases of a crisis, the Mission should speak with one voice until the details of the situation have become better defined and communication guidance and direction has been propagated to stakeholders.  
• Initial condemnation of the attack (initial pre-approved messages) |
Annex V: SOP on Early Warning and Rapid Response

United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
Ref. MINUSCA 2019

Standard Operating Procedure

Early Warning and Rapid Response

Approved by: SRSG Mankeur Ndiaye
Effective date: 1 May 2019
Contact: Protection of Civilians Unit
Review date: 1 May 2020
A. PURPOSE

1. The aim of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to provide guidance on implementing an effective Early Warning and Rapid Response (EWRR) process that ensures an adequate Mission response to plausible, possible and imminent physical threats to civilians in the Central African Republic (CAR). The SOP aims to facilitate the rapid verification and dissemination of early warning (EW) information and rapid decision-making by relevant actors on responses to prevent and/or respond to protection of civilian (POC) threats.

B. SCOPE

2. This SOP applies to all MINUSCA military, police and civilian personnel, from HQ to Temporary Operating Base (TOB) level. Compliance by all personnel is both mandatory and a priority.

3. POC threats encompass all threats against the physical integrity of civilians, particularly grave violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, be these related to criminality, inter-communal conflict, non-international armed conflict, and threats from State, non-state or international security forces.

4. This SOP does not apply to any activity outside of the Mission mandate or area of operations.
C. RATIONALE

5. This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) addresses the steps required for the Mission to maintain an effective Early Warning (EW) system, including information gathering and the issuance of alerts, as a preventive measure and response to serious and credible threats against the civilian population, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2387 (2017). Additionally, Brigadier General (Rtd) Ferdinand Amoussou’s report (January 2018), whose recommendations were analyzed by MINUSCA’s Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P) (February 2018) and an action plan to implement the General’s recommendations was subsequently adopted by the Mission to respond to these recommendations. Actions included improving EW and rapid reaction mechanisms.

6. The EW system is necessary to help the Mission adopt timely and preventive measures and actions required to prevent possible and credible threats of attacks against the physical integrity of civilians in the Central African Republic (CAR). EW contributes to better resource allocation, and provides a more comprehensive, whole-of-mission approach to implementing the POC mandate. Accordingly, EW is thus a critical tool for enhancing the Mission’s capacity to protect civilians from a prevention perspective.

D. PROCEDURES

Early Warning and Rapid Response Procedures

7. The early warning and rapid response process is composed of five (5) phases detailed below (see also graph in Annex 1). Phases A to C apply to the analysis of both non-imminent and imminent POC threats. Phase D is specific to the response to non-imminent POC threats and Phase E to imminent POC threats. Phase F – on review and evaluation – applies to both non-imminent and imminent POC threats.

PHASE A – BACKGROUND CONFLICT AND POC RISK ASSESSMENT

8. The following background conflict and POC risk assessment will facilitate the identification of EW:

8.1. Local Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA): The Head of Office (HoO) or the POC Focal Point (POC FP) as delegated by the HoO, in collaboration with the sections and components in a Field Office (FO) - including Political Affairs Division (PAD), Civil Affairs Section (CAS), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), United Nations Police (UNPOL), and the Military (G2) - must carry out and share a PCIA with all Military, Police and civilian staff involved in Phases A to F of the EWRR process. The PCIA will be shared at the beginning of every fiscal year, and no later than 15 June of each year.

8.2. **Content of local PCIA:** PCIA s should include a (i) mapping of social, political and economic tensions and conflicts including those related to gender-based violence, transhumance, and natural resources; (ii) mapping of stakeholders involved or affected by tensions and conflicts, i.e. State actors, non-state armed actors, and other actors, including MINUSCA, UN Country Team (UNCT), international cooperation stakeholders, NGOs, local leaders, youth, protection and women organizations; and iii) the principal POC risks and opportunities linked to the different tensions and conflicts.

8.3. **Community Protection Plans (CPPs)**: CPPs provide an overview of the security situation and of perceived threats to the civilian population in an FO’s area of responsibility. They identify communities at risk of violence and outline actions and resources required to address identified POC risks. As such, CPPs provide useful background for POC EW. CPPs are drafted by the Civil Affairs Section (CAS) with the contribution of Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) and inputs from community members, local authorities and the local/sector Commander via the local/sector Senior Management Group on Protection (SMG-P). They are updated biannually and must be adopted by the HoO no later than 1 May for the first semester, and 1 November for the second. The HoO bears the primary responsibility, with support from the POC Unit when requested, for the process leading up to the adoption of CPPs. The CPPs must be shared with the DSRSG- P, the DSRSG-RC/HC, the POC Unit, CAS, PAD, and the Human Rights Division (HRD).

**PHASE B – EW INFORMATION COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT**

9. The collection, triangulation and verification of EW information related to threats against the physical integrity of civilians should proceed as follows:

9.1. **Step 1: Share MINUSCA contact information with POC local stakeholders:** To ensure MINUSCA receives EW information in a timely manner, the HoO must update and share a list of MINUSCA contact information with key POC stakeholders. Contact information must be updated every six months. The HoO can delegate these responsibilities to the POC Focal point (POC FP).

9.2. **Step 2: Gather and channel EW information:** Each Military, Police and civilian component/section has its own information gathering mechanisms, as per its mandate and capacities. All uniformed or civilian MINUSCA personnel receiving information related to any kind of physical threat against civilians or UN staff must immediately transmit this information to the local/sector JOC/ Early Warning and Response Cell (EWC – see paragraph 8.1) for action. The HoO must be copied to ensure follow-up. Uniformed components transmitting the information must in addition copy their hierarchy.

9.3. **Step 3: Assess the reliability of the information source:** Upon receiving information, the local/sector JOC/EWC will be responsible for immediately assessing the reliability of the information source. When assessing reliability, the local/sector JOC should use the following terms: totally reliable, usually reliable, rather reliable, rarely reliable, and non-reliable. Definitions of these terms are specified in Annexes 2 and 3.

9.4. **Step 4: Assess the reliability of the EW information:** In addition to assessing the reliability of the source, the local/sector JOC/EWC will also be responsible for immediately consolidating, de-conflicting, triangulating, and verifying the information. The local/sector JOC/EWC must also immediately share this assessment with HQ/JOC and JMAC. Upon receipt, JMAC must immediately analyze the information and share the results with the local JOC/EWC.

9.5. **Step 5: Establish an Alert or an Early Warning (EW):** If the information is triangulated and validated by the local JOC/EWC, it becomes an early warning (EW). Non-confirmed or non-triangulated information should be called an alert. EWs have priority over Alerts on any resource allocation. The implication of assessing info as EWs or alerts is to allow the receiver to know the type of information that s/he is dealing with.

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2 See MINUSCA Community Protection Plan template, June 2015.
3 Community Protection Plans must be drafted following the most updated CPP template. This template is produced, updated and shared by Civil Affairs Section. Please see Annex 7 for the template.
4 POC stakeholders are identified by the local/sector SMG-P. They can include State representatives, UNCT, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), international and local NGOs, religious leaders, traditional leaders, Community Alert Networks (CAN) focal points and other civil society members.
PHASE C – EW POC THREAT ASSESSMENT

10. Each EW or alert will undergo a POC threat assessment conducted as follows:

10.1. **Step 6: Assess the impact on civilians:** The local/sector JOC/EWC, with support of the POC FP and other sections/units/divisions when relevant, will assess the impact that the threat reported in the EW or alert would have on civilians should it materialize. Impact assessment must be based on the scheme presented in Annex 4. Assessment will be shared with JOC/EWC, HRD, PAD, CAS, JMAC and POC unit at Bangui level.

10.2. **Step 7A: Assess impact on children:** The Child Protection Unit at HQ level, when relevant, will contribute to FOs in the assessment of the impact that the threat reported in the EW or alert would have on children should it materialize. Assessment must be based on the scheme presented in Annex 4. Assessment will be shared with JOC/EWC, HRD, PAD, CAS, JMAC and POC unit at Bangui level.

10.3. **Step 7B: Assess impact on women:** The Women Protection Unit at HQ level, when relevant, will contribute to FOs in the assessment of the impact that the threat reported in the EW or alert would have on women and girls should it materialize. Assessment must be based on the scheme presented in Annex 4. Assessment will be shared with JOC/EWC, JOC at Bangui Level, HRD, PAD, CAS, JMAC and POC unit at Bangui level.

10.4. **Step 8: JOC/EWC to assess the likelihood of the threat:** The local/sector SMG-P will assess the likelihood of the occurrence of the threat as “high”, “medium”, or “low” following guidance in Annex 5.

10.5. **Step 9: Establish the priority level of the threat:** The JOC/EWC will classify alerts and EWs as being, (i) a non-imminent threat against the physical integrity of civilians, or (ii) an imminent threat against the physical integrity of civilians. The local JOC/EWC will assign the priority level to each alert or EW using the scheme presented in Annex 6.

Note: Steps 1 to 9 are common for both non-imminent threat response (Phase D), and imminent threat response (Phase E). Each phase has its own additional different steps (10 to 12 for phase D, and steps 10 to 16 for Phase E).

PHASE D – RESPONDING TO A NON-IMMINENT THREAT AGAINST THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF CIVILIANS

11. If an EW alert is classified as a non-imminent threat, the following steps must be implemented:

11.1. **Step 10: Non-imminent threat: Decision-making on response to threat:**
   11.1.1. The sector/local JOC/EWC must share all information pertaining to the POC threat with the HoO and Bangui JOC.
   11.1.2. The POC FP must present the threat to the members of the local/sector SMG-P at the next regular meeting as part of the POC Priority Matrix.
   11.1.3. Local/sector SMG-P members, under the leadership of the HoO, will decide on the most effective actions to be taken to counter the threat. Action points will designate individual responsibilities and deadlines. The first responses will always be at FO level. Decisions will also be incorporated into the Early Warning Matrix to be followed up at the next local/sector SMG-P.
   11.1.4. The POC FP will be responsible for updating the Early Warning Matrix and sharing the alert with JOC who must update SAGE platform. The information uploaded on SAGE must include information on casualties, as well as threats to women and children.

12. **Step 11 Non-imminent threat: Implementation of response to threat:** Civilian sections and Military and Police components will implement the agreed actions according to agreed-upon deadlines. Implementation of actions should be reported once the action is completed, or if obstacles arise, to the HoO, POC FPs, the local/sector JOC/EWC, and JMAC. The HoO is responsible for ensuring actions are taken as agreed.

13. **Step 12 Non-imminent threat: Continuous assessment of the ongoing threat:** The local/sector JOC/EWC will update the local/sector SMG-P on the evolution of the threat, including on the response actions taken. The JOC/EWC will transmit an updated assessment of the threat to the HQ JOC, JMAC, and the POC Unit via daily or weekly reports, as appropriate. Steps 10, 11 and 12 will be continuously implemented until the threat has disappeared.
PHASE E – RESPONDING TO AN IMMINENT THREAT AGAINST THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF CIVILIANS

14. If an EW or alert is classified as an imminent threat, the following steps must be immediately implemented:

14.1. **Step 10 Imminent threat:** Immediate dissemination of EW or alert: Local/sector JOC/EWC will immediately transmit EW or alerts to the HoO, the local/sector commanders of the Force and UNPOL, the FO POC FPs, the POC Unit and the HQ JOC.

14.2. **Step 11 Imminent threat:** Activate emergency meeting of local/sector SMG-P to decide on rapid response: The HoO will convene an emergency local/sector SMG-P. Local authorities, UNCT, ICRC, national/international NGOs, and other relevant stakeholders can be consulted for information gathering, or invited to the SMG-P, as needed. Under the leadership of the HoO, participants will decide on actions5 to immediately protect civilians/UN personnel from the imminent threat. Decisions on response will be taken at the FO-level, with decisions transmitted immediately to the HQ JOC. Senior Mission Leadership may at all times endorse or modify FO-level decisions. Response decisions will be integrated into the Early Warning Matrix by local/sector JOC/EWC, in coordination with JMAC, if present.

14.3. **Step 12 Imminent threat:** Local JOC/EWC to issue an EW Flash Report: After a decision on response is taken by the emergency local/sector SMG-P, the local/sector JOC/EWC must immediately issue an EW flash report containing details on the incident and the response. An EW flash report should be sent to HQ, FCOS, JOC, JMAC, POC Unit, DSRSG-P and DSRSG-RC/HC.

14.4. **Step 13 Imminent threat:** Local/sector SMG-P to share EW with external partners where relevant: The local/sector SMG-P may decide to share the EW or alert with relevant partners, stakeholders and other coordination structures as needed to ensure a more effective response to the threat. The local/sector SMG-P may also choose to communicate the EW or alert to the civilian population to allow individuals and communities potentially exposed to threats to take actions to avoid or reduce risks.

14.5. **Step 14 Imminent threat:** Updating the Early Warning Matrix: The local/sector JOC/EWC will update the Early Warning Matrix and share it with the POC Unit at HQ. Information relevant to the EW pertaining to women and children will be systematically uploaded and updated in SAGE by JOC.

14.6. **Step 15 Imminent threat:** Implementation of rapid responses: The HoO will be responsible for the immediate implementation and coordination of the local/sector SMG-P’s rapid response decisions. Should the response include the use of uniformed personnel, the HoO will work with the local commanders of the Force and UNPOL in the implementation and coordination of the response. Military and police components do not require specific or additional orders, such as FRAGOs, to implement local/sector SMG-P rapid response decisions to protect civilians.6 Failure by any component or section of the Mission to translate EW into rapid response could lead to investigations by the Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU).

14.7. **Step 16: POC risk and impact assessment:** To prevent any civilian, military and/or police actions from inflicting disproportionate or to negatively impact on the civilian population, the HoO, via local/sector SMG-P, must conduct a rapid POC risk assessment, in consultation with JMAC/U2 where present, highlighting potential negative impacts and/or collateral damage on the civilian population, and must design a corresponding harm mitigation and response strategy before the implementation of any operation. Strategies must be shared with the POC Unit before the start of the operation.

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5 Rapid responses include but are not limited to: patrolling, robust patrolling, setting up of UN checkpoints, establishment of buffer zones, political dialogues, negotiations of ceasefires and local peace agreements, as relevant.

6 The UN Security Council authorizes MINUSCA, including the Force, to conduct robust actions, including the use of Urgent Temporary Measures (UTMs), patrolling, and the use of force even beyond self-defense, to effectively protect civilians.
PHASE F – REVIEW AND EVALUATION

17. **Step 17: Conduct an evaluation of the implementation of the EWRR process:** The local/sector SMG-P or the national Protection Working Group (PWG) will decide if an evaluation of the implementation of the EWRR is necessary. Accordingly, the SMG-P will decide on the tool to be used to review the implementation of the EWRR process in the response to a specific threat. These tools include After Action Reviews (AAR), impact evaluations and Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs). Evaluation reports will be shared along the reporting lines defined in the SOPs of each tool, and with PWG members. The AAR will focus, inter alia, on: (i) translating early warning into rapid response; and (ii) actions and decisions of the HoO, local/sector Commander (UNPOL and Force), and the local/sector SMG-P. AAR findings will be taken into consideration by the HoO, Sector Commander and Sector Police Commissioner (SPC) to

Local Coordination Mechanisms

18. **Early Warning and Response Cell:** The HoO is responsible for establishing an Early Warning and Response Cell or “Field JOC”. The local/sector JOC/EWC is responsible for, (i) collecting, consolidating, triangulating and verifying information on POC threats; (ii) disseminating alerts and/or EWs related to POC threats; (iii) updating and uploading the POC Priority Matrix; (iv) sharing the Priority Matrix with the POC Unit; and (v) all the other responsibilities assigned to it in this SOP. The EWC/Field JOC is coordinated by the HoO, who can also delegate tasks to the EWC/Field JOC. The EWC is composed of at least 3 representatives from substantive FO sections and representatives of Military Observers, military, police, security, and Director of Mission Support (DMS).

19. **Prioritization of Resources**

19.1. Security Council Resolution 2217 (April 2015) states that POC must be given priority in decisions about deployments and allocation of resources. Only MEDEVAC, CASEVAC and military operations have priority over EW rapid response activities. Accordingly, DMS and all related financial, administrative and support offices/sections/units will prioritize the implementation of rapid responses, including but not limited to:

19.1.1. Responding to all rapid response related requests with the maximum priority, and in the shortest time frame, fully understanding that the unpredictability and/or urgent nature of rapid responses will often mean that not all administrative deadlines, including the processing of MOPs, will be met in a timely manner.

19.1.2. Assigning/requesting resources, speeding processing times, and facilitating flight assignation.

19.2. The HoO is responsible for coordinating with local/sector SMG-P participants and with the DMS and POC FPs to organise all logistic needs for the implementation of rapid responses. ODMS and UNDSS are instructed to rapidly and effectively facilitate all the necessary permissions, logistics, equipment, material and resources for the implementation of the rapid responses.

**F. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

20. **ALERT:** Information related to threats against the physical integrity of civilians that has not been confirmed or has not been totally triangulated.

21. **COMMUNITY ALERT NETWORKS (CANs):** The CANs reinforce the capacities of communities to protect themselves, by enhancing and organizing their means of communication. They aim to provide early warning information related to threats of violence and can help in the triangulation of information and prevention of threats materializing. Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), EWC/JOC, and all POC FPs must build relationships with CAN focal points to improve information flow and triangulation, including identification of reliable focal points and sources of information within the community, for example community-based groups and civil society organizations.
22. **COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANT (CLA)**: A CLA is a national Civil Affairs staff member collocated with military and police contingents, to support interactions with local authorities, communities and other relevant actors in the field. CLAs perform a range of tasks, including information gathering, threat or needs assessments, contributing to EW activities, local-level protection, planning and coordination of and follow up on field visits, MINUSCA patrols and operations, as well as strengthening the resilience of local communities against protection threats.

23. **EARLY WARNING**: A serious and credible threat from non-state armed actors (including but not limited to self-defense groups, armed groups, and criminal gangs) and/or State authorities that puts at risk the physical integrity of civilians, including human rights violations and IHL infractions. EW differs from simple reporting such as flash reports. These reports generally refer to physical violence, human rights violations and/or IHL infractions which have already taken place. The EW mechanism focuses primarily on gathering, sharing and responding to information on possible incidents that have the potential to directly impact civilians and their physical integrity. Each EW requires a rapid response to be carried out to prevent such violence from occurring.

24. **RAPID RESPONSE**: Rapid response to imminent threats are plans, projects, programs, or actions, agreed upon at the local/sector SMG-P, which must be carried out/activated/implemented, to prevent, preempt, or effectively respond to threats against the physical integrity of civilians, in the area of responsibility at local level. Rapid reaction includes: (i) anticipation, prevention, deterrence, use of Urgent Temporally Measures (UTMs); and/or (ii) effective response, including but not limited to the use of force beyond self-defense, as defined within the MINUSCA POC Strategy 2018. Rapid response is an active obligation of each FO under the joint responsibility of HoO, local/sector Commander and Police Commander.

**G. REFERENCES**

25. **Normative or superior references**

   - DPKO and DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping, 2015
   - DPKO and DFS Protection of Civilians Military Guidelines, January 2015
   - DPKO and DFS JOC Policy and Guidelines, May 2014
   - DPKO and DFS JMAC Policy and Guidelines, March 2014
   - DPKO-DFS Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy, 2017
   - SG’s Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification and Handling, February 2007
   - Improving Conflict Early Warning Systems for United Nations Peacekeeping

26. **Related procedures or guidelines**

   - MINUSCA Protection of Civilians Strategy, February 2018
   - MINUSCA IOM Information Flow to JOC, November 2014
   - MINUSCA SOP on Crisis Management, 2014
   - MINUSCA SOP on Information sharing and follow-up action on human rights violations for MINUSCA Military, Police and Correction components (TBC)
   - MINUSCA Operation of Sector Joint Operations Centres (SJOC), 2017
   - MINUSCA SOP ON JOC AND FJOC

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7  See MINUSCA TORs and Aide-Memoire for Community Liaison Assistants, July 2015.
H. CONTACT

27. For any additional information and/or training on this SOP please contact MINUSCA Senior POC Advisor
MINUSCA-POC-UNIT@un.org

I. HISTORY

28. This SOP was drafted by the POC Unit in the period from February to July 2018. Draft versions were shared with all
military, police and civilian members of the PWG, including representatives from the UNCT, and with the Strategic
Planning Unit (SPU) for inputs and contributions. This version was endorsed by the SMG-P on 20 July 2018. A final
version was circulated on Oct 2018, and cleared by DSRSG-P on December 2018.

29. A previous version of this SOP was drafted in 2015 by the POC Unit. It was consulted with the PWG and endorsed by
the SMG-P on 5 May 2016 but was never adopted as a Mission document.

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:

[Signature]

APPROVAL SIGNATURE (SRSG):
Mankeur Ndiaye,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DATE OF APPROVAL
## Annex 1: Diagram of phases of information flow


![Diagram of phases of information flow](image)

## Annex 2: Source reliability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIABILITY OF THE SOURCE</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A  Totally reliable</td>
<td>No doubt. Past information. Source has always been reliable. History of constructive relationship with the source, developed into mutual trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B  Usually reliable</td>
<td>Some doubt but past information of source has proved reliable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C  Rather reliable</td>
<td>Usually some doubt on past information. Source is reliable in moderate number of cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D  Rarely reliable</td>
<td>Real doubt, past information generally not reliable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E  Non- reliable</td>
<td>Great doubt on past information. Source has proved to be unreliable; can still provide credible info.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F  The reliability cannot be estimated</td>
<td>Reliability cannot be determined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 3: Information reliability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sure accuracy</td>
<td>Substantiated by independent sources &amp; agrees with other information on subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed-coherent</td>
<td>Gives indication of accuracy; agrees with other information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable-relevant</td>
<td>Neither confirmed nor contradicted; not in disagreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubtful</td>
<td>Believed to be unlikely, but possible; not contradicted, not in disagreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-probable</td>
<td>Contradicted by other data, illogical within itself &amp; in disagreement with body of information on subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The truthfulness cannot be estimated</td>
<td>Truth cannot be judged at the time because of lack of knowledge on subject.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex 4: Impact of the threat on civilians, women, children and girls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT OF THE THREAT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>If the threat against physical integrity materializes, a significant number of civilians, including women and children, will be directly affected by violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or International Human Rights Law (IHRL), including, but not limited to: direct or indirect loss of lives; impairments to physical integrity; severe internal displacement; elevated food insecurity; gender-based violence; or serious injury; destruction or loss of civilian assets/infrastructure required for civilian survival; or the imposition of conditions that prevent food supply or urgent humanitarian assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>If the threat against physical integrity materializes, some civilians, including women and children will be directly affected by infractions to IHL, or violations to IHL/IHRL, including, but not limited to internal displacement, food insecurity, gender-based violence, or injuries; there may be some repercussion on civilian assets/infrastructure required for civilian survival. Food supply or urgent humanitarian assistance can be disrupted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>If the threat against physical integrity materializes, a few (civilians), (women), (children), (girls) will be directly affected by IHL/IHRL violations. Food security and humanitarian assistance will be able to continue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Annex 5: Likelihood of the threat emerging

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIKELIHOOD OF THE THREAT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and actions preventing the threat from being materialized are not used or ineffective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians is motivated and capable, but actions to prevent the threat from being implemented may impede the successful materialization of the threat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>The agent generating the physical threat against civilians lacks motivation or capability; or actions to prevent the threat are in place and/or can impede the threat from being exercised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Priority level of the threat

Priority level of the threat is an assessment conducted by evaluating simultaneously the likelihood of the threat and the impact of the threat, as shown below.

Annex 7: Community Protection Plan

Community protection plan template is presented below in French, to facilitate activities at field level.
• Population
• Composition ethnique et pourcentage de la population par ethnie
• Confessions religieuses et pourcentage de la population par rapport à chaque confession
• Quelques rappels historiques et grandes dates de l'histoire assez contemporaine de la zone

1.1 Politique
Items à intégrer :
• Partis politiques/ les lister/ les représentants et leurs contacts/ les plus influents et leur pourcentage au sein de la population éventuellement
• Les rapports entre leaders de partis politiques (bonne cohésion ou tensions)/ les alliances
• Activités et rôle des partis politiques dans le développement communautaire et la consolidation de la paix/ Y a-t-il des élites politico-administratives dans la zone ? Quel est leur rôle (spoiler ou builder)
• Démembrement des femmes et jeunes des partis politiques/ leur contact/ leur niveau d'influence/ leur principaux problèmes/ forces et faiblesses.

1.2 Administrative
Items à intégrer :
• Présence des structures de l'Etat/ lesquels/ dans quel état/ fonctionnent-ils/ qu'est ce qui fonctionne bien et qu'est ce qui fonctionne mal ? avec quels moyens
• Perception de la population du rôle de l'Etat et de ses représentants locaux/ doléances/ difficultés/ quels en sont les responsables/ sont-ils compétents, dynamiques et progressistes ou le contraire etc.
• Agenda politique de l'Etat est-il bien suivi/accepté dans la zone ou alors il y a d'autres agenda politique des ou certains partis politiques dans la zone/ qui joue le jeu de qui

1.3 Sécuritaire
Items à intégrer :
• Présence Police et gendarmerie dans la zone/ commandant et contact/ chaine de commandement/effectifs/ zone de couverture/lieu du QG/ équipements/force et faiblesses/ capacité d'intervention/ comment et où perçoivent-ils leur salaire/ lieu de résidence (baraque ou au sein de la population)
• Perception de la population (racket des populations et barrages, exactions ?)
• Présence FACA/ commandant et contact/ chaine de commandement/ effectifs/ zone de couverture/lieu du QG/ équipements/ perception de la population (racket des populations et barrages, exactions ?)/ force et faiblesses/ capacité d'intervention/ comment et où perçoivent-ils leur salaire/ lieu de résidence (baraque ou au sein de la population)
• Force négative dans la zone/ leaders et leurs contacts/ chaine de commandement/ effectifs/ lieu du QG/ zone d'intervention/ équipements/ perception de la population auto-défense, exactions, viols ?/ force et faiblesses/ capacité d'intervention/ principales activités menées par cette force pour survivre/ a-t-elle des revendications politiques/ est-elle partie des accords de Brazzaville et du forum de Bangui/ vit-elle dans la brousse ou vit-elle au sein de la population/ ses rapports avec les forces gouvernementales dans la zone et les autorités politico administratives de la zone / Mode opératoire
• Autres groupes d'auto-défense dominants dans la localité
• Force internationale ?
• Qui contrôle la zone ? Force gouvernementale ou force négative/ Rappel historique des forces sécuritaires en présence pour mieux comprendre la situation actuelle/
• Y a-t-il de refugies et des déplacés dans la zone ? Pourquoi/ nombre/sites/cause de ces déplacements/Quel type d'assistance des humanitaires/ rapport avec la population locale/ rapport avec les groupes négatifs

1.4 Économique
Items à intégrer :
• Principale activité génératrice de revenus des populations et pourcentage
Ressources minières/qui exploite/ou/ source de tension ?/part de revenus reversés localement/ à qui et comment ?/
Ressources naturelles/ qui exploite/ou/ source de tension ?/part de revenus reversés localement/ à qui et comment ?
Ressources naturelles/ qui exploite/ou/ source de tension ?/part de revenus reversés localement/ à qui et comment ?
Activités commerciales/ qui a le monopole/ indiquer les principaux commerçants/ source de tension ?/lale
mairie collecte-t-elle une taxe/ à qui/ quand et comment ?
Commune d’élevage ?/ problème de transhumance/ conflit entre agriculteurs et nomades ? ou, quand, comment cela se gère, y a-t-il des comités locaux de gestion de ces conflits/ diriges par qui/ ces personnes sont –elles crédibles ? Tensions actuelles ?
Y a-t-il localement une structure de l’État pour accompagner et encadrer la population pour les activités de développement économique/agro-pastoral/commerce/artisanat

1.5 Dynamiques sociales
Organisation sociale
Présence de la société civile/ force /faiblesses/ leadership/difficultés et succès
La société civile influence-t-elle positivement la bonne marche des affaires dans la zone/oui ou non
pourquoi/ quel pouvoir d’association de femmes et leur rôle dans la participation de la gestion des affaires
communautaires association de jeunes/ rôle/ niveau d’influence/ listes et associations sectorielles/ rôle/
association, École et lycées et hôpitaux/ listes/ contact/ nombre d’enseignants/nombre d’enseignants/ comment se soignent les personnes malades localement ou il faut parcourir des distances/
combien/ a vélo à moto/ quel est le niveau du plateau de l’hôpital dans la zone/ combien de médecins/infirmiers
Groupes vulnérables nécessitant une attention particulière et communautés ou il y a des tensions vives

2. Identification des acteurs clés (incluant un répertoire)
Mapping des acteurs et mécanismes de coordination existants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nom</th>
<th>Titre</th>
<th>Localité</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Description</th>
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3. Besoins identifiés en matière de protection (par ordre de priorité)
Établir un tableau par besoin/menace identifié.

Les Risques de Protection
Risque = Menace + Vulnérabilité x Temps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quelle est la menace ?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qui est vulnérable à cette menace ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quels sont les impacts de cette menace ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui sont les auteurs ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quels sont les lacunes ?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Plan d’action et recommandations
RÉALISABLES, PRÉCIS, MESURABLES, DÉLIMITÉS DANS LE TEMPS, PERTINENTS
N.B. toujours inclure le pourquoi de la recommandation (dans l’optique des TDRs des ALCs) et son objectif

5. Suivi et évaluation
- Élaboration d’un plan de suivi et d’évaluation
- Élaboration des enquêtes et échantillonnage
- Rapports d’avancement
- Rapport final de de monitoring
Annex VI: SOP on Deploying Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)

United Nations

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

Ref. MINUSCA 2019

Standard Operating Procedure

Deploying Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)

Approved by: SRSG Mankeur Ndiaye
Effective date: 1 May 2019
Contact: Protection of Civilians Unit
Review date: 1 May 2020
A. PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is to provide guidance on planning, implementing and evaluating Joint Protection Teams (JPTs). JPTs are ad hoc, multidisciplinary and cross-sectional teams, tasked to assess possible, potential, existing or continued protection of civilian (POC) threats in zones where the Mission does not have a permanent presence and to develop recommendations for senior Mission leadership on how to respond to these threats.

B. SCOPE

2. This SOP applies to all MINUSCA military, police and civilian personnel. This SOP does not apply to activities outside of the Mission’s mandate or area of operations.

C. RATIONALE

3. MINUSCA adopted an action plan in February 2018 to implement the recommendations of the Special Investigation conducted by Brigadier General (Rtd) Ferdinand Amoussou (January 2018). Actions included the revision and adoption of a new POC Strategy for the Mission, which was adopted in April 2018 within which JPTs are a key tool. Experience in Central African Republic has shown that JPT Missions that are deployed in a timely manner constitute a critical element to the Mission’s efforts to effectively prevent and respond to threats against the physical integrity of civilians as JPTs can contribute to improving early warnings (EW) and support decision-making for the Mission.

4. JPTs are designed to help the Mission develop more timely and comprehensive analysis of POC threats in areas where MINUSCA is absent. They also seek to facilitate the rapid elaboration of responses to POC threats, with special consideration to threats affecting women, children and vulnerable populations. As opposed to single-section or single-purpose missions, JPTs allow a more comprehensive, whole-of-mission approach to implementing the POC mandate. JPTs are thus a critical tool for enhancing the Mission’s capacity to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to serious and credible threats against the civilian population, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2448 (2018). They are also one of the Mission’s most important POC preventive tools. Facilitating their effective and speedy deployment is thus a priority for all Mission leadership and staff.
D. KEY PRINCIPLES

5. The principles which guide the United Nations Peacekeeping protection approach are inscribed in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) Policy on the Protection of Civilians (Ref. 2015.07) and MINUSCA's approach is aligned with this Policy. The Mission’s approach is also guided by context-specific mandated tasks and principles as indicated below. (See Annex 1 for additional principles)

5.1. Promote respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: All actions, tasks and activities of the Mission shall take into consideration principles of respect for human rights, international humanitarian law, and other relevant international norms.

5.2. Gender: Strategies, activities and tasks must include a gender perspective, as mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325/2000, and related resolutions.

5.3. Confidentiality: All JPT mission reports, pictures, depositions and information are classified as confidential. A copy of all information from JPTs must always be sent to the POC Unit.

5.4. Engaging with non-state armed groups: all JPT members must follow the SOPs on “Engaging with non-state Actors”.

5.5. Awareness of environmental impact: All Mission personnel participating in JPT missions should lead by example in taking specific actions to demonstrate environmental awareness, sustainability management, recycling, and hazard and waste control, as well as follow the Environment Policy and Guidelines for MINUSCA, 2016.

E. PROCEDURES

DEPLOYMENT MODALITIES AND OBJECTIVES

6. JPTs are deployed on an as needed basis. JPTs can be part of Field Office’s (FO) annual or monthly workplans, and also can be deployed on an emergency basis. All components and sections within an FO should include JPT missions in their monthly and annual workplans, when relevant, based on an assessment of POC needs, contingency plans, and security situation in their area of responsibility (AOR). Planning must be flexible enough to allow effective response to changes in the context and in the nature of POC threats.

7. JPTs are to be implemented in zones where: (i) civilians are exposed to significant physical security risks/threats; (ii) possible or likely POC threat(s) have been identified via early warning POC coordination mechanisms; (iii) the Mission does not have a regular physical presence. JPTs can also be exceptionally deployed to Permanent Operating Bases (POBs) and Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs), when capacities on the ground are insufficient to assess threats against civilians.

8. The more specific objectives of a JPT are to:

8.1. Assess the risks, vulnerabilities, and exposure of civilians to threats against their physical integrity, with specific attention to women and girls;

8.2. Assess local political and social dynamics, including those linked to armed group presence and activity, for protection planning purposes;

8.3. Make recommendations for the Mission’s preventive and protective responses to the threats identified against the physical integrity of civilians, with specific attention to women and girls;

8.4. Make recommendations and provide information to the UNCT, humanitarian partners, national authorities and communities on risks, threats and vulnerabilities and how to respond to them, as needed;

8.5. Contribute to establishing or supporting preventive protection structures, including but not limited to community protection plans (CPPs) and information exchange networks on protection between communities and the Mission;

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1 JPTs, which are under the lead of Field Offices or POC unit in Bangui, differ from Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs), which are under the lead of the Civil Affairs Section. While JPTs are preventive or mitigative measures in response to POC threats, JAMs seek to assess specific issues such as humanitarian, security, protection, development, human rights or other socio-political aspects in a specific area.

2 JPTs need to be prioritized over all other Mission activities including, but not limited to, UNHQ and other international visits and deployment of staff.
8.6. Work with all UN components including the Force, UNPOL, and humanitarian actors as needed, to identify protection needs, including protection against sexual violence and any other gender-based violence (GBV);

8.7. Promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) by all parties to the conflict and all other violent actors.

9. In line with UNSCR 2448 (2018) that states that POC must be given priority in decisions about deployments and the allocation of resources (para.37), Mission Support will prioritize JPTs within operational exigencies. Only MEDEVAC, CASEVAC and military operations will have priority over JPTs. Accordingly, Mission Support and all other related financial, administrative and support offices/sections/units must prioritize JPTs by:

9.1. Responding to all JPT-related requests as a priority, understanding that the unpredictability and/or urgent nature of JPTs often means that some travel documents – except for MOPs – will not always be submitted in a timely manner.

9.2. Assigning and making available requested resources, including logistical and flight arrangements.

IMPLEMENTATION PHASES

10. JPTs are implemented in three phases: before, during and after deployment. The steps involved in each phase are specified below:

Before the mission

11. Activating a JPT: The decision to launch a planned or an emergency JPT can be made either at HQ or at Field Office level. At HQ level, the decision is made by the DSRSG-P, or the DSRSG-RC-HC, based on recommendations by the SMG-P, the Protection Working Group (PWG), the Human Rights Division (HRD), the Civil Affairs Section (CAS), or the Field Office Coordinator’s Office. At the field level, the decision is made by the Head of Office (HoO) in close consultation with the local SMG-P and CAS.

12. Decisions to activate a JPT must specify the JPT mission leader, the participating sections, the zone of deployment, and the main objective(s) of the mission. Also, the decisions must be directly and immediately communicated to (i) participating sections; (ii) the POC Unit at Bangui level; and (iii) Force Headquarters (FHQ) both at HQ and field level.

13. The JPT mission leader is an international staff appointed by the POC unit and approved by the PWG when the JPT is being activated at Bangui Level, or by the HoO and approved by the local SMG-P when activated at the field.

14. During the JPT, the JPT mission leader will serve under the oversight of the relevant HoO for JPTs decided at the FO level or by the FOC for JPTs decided at the HQ level. Although JPT members should consult Mission components as required, decision-making on the conduct of the JPT will be taken by the JPT mission leadership under the supervision of the relevant HoO or FOC, who will consult as required with Senior Mission Leadership.

15. Selecting JPT participants: In addition to the “JPT mission leader”; JPTs need to be composed of at least two or more “mission experts”; one Force representative with substantive responsibilities; and one UNPOL representative with substantive responsibilities. JPT participants are international staff selected/appointed by Section Chiefs of participating units/divisions. National staff may be nominated to join JPTs the mission under agreement of PWG (Bangui) or SMG-P (FO). Military and UNPOL substantive participants from Bangui are appointed by the FC and the PC respectively, and by the Force and UNPOL sector commanders at field level (LFC and LPC).

16. The following considerations need to be followed when selecting participants:

16.1. The JPT mission leader and civilian mission experts must be international staff from substantive sections. They must come from at least three (3) of the following sections or units: CAS, HRD, POC Unit, Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC), Political Affairs Division (PAD), Women Protection Unit (WPU), Child Protection Unit (CPU), Security Sector Reform Section (SSR) or the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDR);

16.2. Selection of participants will be based on the nature of the threats to be assessed and the objectives of the JPT to be achieved. Any JPT mission likely to directly or indirectly document IHL violations must ensure participation of staff able to compile a case file enabling judicial follow-up;
16.3. POC Focal Points, as experts in POC, must be given priority in the composition of JPTs as “mission experts”. POC Focal Points can join JPT missions in zones falling under their AOR or any other AOR, as needed;

16.4. Other PWG members, including OCHA or Protection Cluster members may participate where relevant;

16.5. JPTs should have participants of both genders and aim for gender parity, where possible.

17. Participation of GoCAR in JPTs: GoCAR representatives, including members of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), Internal Security Forces (ISF), or civilian authorities may be invited to participate in a JPT. Previous authorization is required from the local SMG-P or by the PWG Secretariat. Applying the principle of impartiality and observing the UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is mandatory in these cases. Covering expenses of GoCAR representatives will be decided on a case by case basis, after consultation with the DMS. In cases where a JPT has GoCAR participants, it will be referred to as a “JPT+” to distinguish it from a standard JPT.

18. Elaborating the Terms of Reference (TORs): A JPT’s TORs must be elaborated using the template in Annex 2. JPT mission leader has the responsibility to draft the TORs, which will be adopted by the PWG at Bangui level, and by the local SMG-P at field level. TORs serve as memos for Mission’s administrative procedures.

19. Arranging logistics, assets and equipment for JPTs: Each JPT participant is responsible for processing and obtaining all travel documents and permissions to participate in the JPT, including MOPs, security clearances and other travel documents/authorizations. Participants should consider requesting group MOPs/security clearances to expedite the process. The JPT Mission leader is responsible for coordinating with all JPT participants and for liaising with POC Focal Points, HoOs, and ODMS to arrange all additional JPT requirements and logistics. The JPT Mission leader may delegate this as appropriate, but remains responsible overall. ODMS and UNDSS must rapidly facilitate all the necessary permissions, logistics, equipment, and resources for JPT missions.

20. Pre-deployment planning and briefings: The JPT leader will convene JPT participants and coordinate with the HoO and UNDSS of the zone where the JPT mission will be implemented at least 48 hours ahead of departure in order to:

20.1. Receive briefings on safety and security;

20.2. Review objectives and goals; background and context; and estimated duration of the mission;

20.3. Assign roles and responsibilities, including for reporting;

20.4. Agree on mission agenda;

20.5. Identify the local actors with whom the JPT will engage. Team members should ensure that meetings are planned with women and women groups/organization representatives to take into account their perspectives and needs.

21. Coordination with the Mission Intelligence Coordination Mechanism (MICM): When planning JPTs, the JPT Mission Leader is encouraged and authorized to task the MICM to receive strategic intelligence aimed at supporting and informing operational planning. This intelligence-sharing process will help ensure a whole-of-Mission approach and improve situational awareness to implement the JPT.

22. Coordination with UNDSS: UNDSS is ultimately responsible for determining whether security conditions are appropriate for a JPT mission to take place. UNDSS may hold, stop or cancel any JPT mission at any time for security reasons.

3 This includes, but is not limited to:
- Prioritizing issuance of communication and any other related equipment from MINUSCA stock for JPT travel;
- Authorizing JPT members to carry up to 50 kilos of luggage/cargo on MINUSCA flights, when transporting; (including but not limited to) personal protective equipment, food, water, first aid kits, vehicle/road equipment, and/or communication equipment;
- Prioritizing JPT passengers and material/cargo over all other passengers and material/cargo, except for those related to MEDEVAC, CASEVAC and military operations;
- Facilitating with priority vehicles and their equipment at FO level, which meet UN security and safety standards for the duration of the JPT mission.
23. Issuing orders/FRAGOS for military escorts to JPT missions: If required per UNDSS road security classifications, once informed of the activation of a JPT, FHQ will issue orders/FRAGOS to escort the JPT mission. All JPT-related orders must indicate that the escort is an “operation mission”. They are therefore not subject to the limitations of other types of military missions. Orders must be flexible and specify that JPT itineraries can be adapted in the course of the mission based on decisions by the civilian mission leader in consultation with the Force escort leader.

**During the deployment**

24. **Security:** Every JPT member is responsible for his/her own security and health. JPT participants will join the JPT mission only if they are willing to follow all security instructions. The JPT leader has the faculty to hold, stop or cancel a JPT mission before the start of the JPT mission when logistics or the conditions of UN assets required for the mission, including UN vehicles and communications equipment, are not available, or do not meet the minimum UN security or safety standards. The JPT leader is also responsible for the following tasks:

24.1. Regularly liaising with UNDSS, U2/G2, JOC, JMAC, PWG/SMG-P members, and HoO to obtain the most accurate and updated security, humanitarian and political information; and adapt the planning of the mission accordingly.

24.2. Briefing JPT participants on security developments. S/he may delegate this responsibility to one of the JPT members.

24.3. Organizing regular radio checks to confirm the whereabouts of each member of the team.

24.4. Making sure that the team complies with the security restrictions established by UNDSS.

25. **MINUSCA military escorts:** If required per UNDSS road security classifications, the Force is responsible for providing security to the JPT mission once in the field and outside of MINUSCA premises. The assigned units are commanded by a “military escort leader”, who has the highest military authority in his/her team. The military escort leader is responsible for implementing the order/FRAGO and is therefore accountable for all decisions taken, including those related to POC. The military escort leader has the authority to stop, hold or cancel a JPT mission only for security reasons, and after consultation with the JPT leader and UNDSS.

26. **Coordination between the JPT leader and escort leader:** The JPT leader and the military escort leader will coordinate before and during the implementation of the mission to agree on agendas including travel times, routine/security stops, and communication. MINUSCA military escorts cannot abandon or leave behind UN civilian staff in the field under any circumstances. Doing so must be reported to HQ/FHQ for investigation.

27. **Communications:** Each JPT member will carry his/her own Tetra Radio handset. These – and the mobile VHF radios fitted in any UN vehicle – should be switched to the channel agreed with UNDSS and the Force escort leader to maintain contact with UN Base. UNDSS will be responsible for checking that Tetra Radios and radios in vehicles are functional. The JPT leader will be responsible for checking that JPT staff are trained and able to use such communication equipment. At least one person on the JPT must carry a satellite phone and have at least two contacts at the closest FO/TOB and two others at MINUSCA HQ.

28. **Parallel activities during JPT missions:** Implementing the JPT’s TORs is the priority for all JPT members. Only when time permits can JPT members conduct parallel activities, investigations or meetings related to the workplans of their respective components. In this case, they must inform and coordinate with the JPT leader. JPT members are not required to remain physically together at all times. They may split up to work on different tasks, whether related to JPT objectives or to parallel activities, based on previous agreement with the JPT leader, and according to security assessment from UNDSS and JPT mission leader.

29. **Modifications to JPTs during the mission:** Given the nature of JPT missions and the evolution of threats against civilians, some JPT missions may have to be modified while they are being carried out. Modifications usually involve a change in timing or destinations. When a modification is required, the JPT leader will communicate with his/her Head of Section, the POC Unit at Bangui level, or the relevant HoOs, who will immediately transfer the request to ODMS, to issue immediate amendments to MOPs, TRIPs, and other security authorizations. Major modifications such as the extension of the JPT by a day or more, or significant deviations from the planned route require approval HQ and / or Chief Security Authority (CSA), according to current procedures. All authorizations may be given verbally but must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Decisions will be coordinated and shared with FHQ (U3, and U35), and the military escort leader, and copied to POC unit.
30. Protection of civilians in the course of a JPT: If the JPT mission encounters a POC situation or is under attack, the military escort has the obligation to: (i) secure the safety of the UN staff according to their military capacity; (ii) proceed to the protection of civilians respecting the Rules of Engagement (ROE). If the military escort is asked to Medevac a civilian who is not part of the JPT mission, the decision to Medevac will be jointly made by the JPT leader and the military escort leader according to the Amendment to the SOP CASEVAC / MEDEVAC PLAN July 2016 (2018).

31. Post-mission de-briefing: Within 24 hours of the JPT’s return to base, the JPT leader will have a de-briefing meeting with all the participants of the JPT, to cross-check findings, agree on key messages and follow-up actions, and facilitate completion of the joint JPT report.

32. Post-mission reporting:

32.1. Summary report: Within 48 hours of the return to base, the JPT leader will submit an advance summary report of no more than two pages to POC senior advisor with copy to the HoO, the DSRSG-P and the DSRSG-RC-HC for their comments. JPT participants and the POC Unit will be in copy.

32.2. Final report: The final report must be submitted no later than one week after the circulation of the summary report. The JPT report should be sent to, the DSRSG-P, the DSRSG-RC-HC, relevant HoOs, local SMG-P members, JPT participants, and the PWG at Bangui level. A template JPT report is at Annex 3 indicating the required content of the final report. Report assessments and recommendations must always take into consideration the specific needs and the impact of the armed conflict on both genders, highlighting the specific impact on women and girls.

32.3. Information sharing with POC coordination mechanisms: The local SMG-P and/or PWG in Bangui may invite the JPT mission leader to present the JPT findings and discuss possible recommendations with their respective members. An emergency SMG-P / PWG may be called by the POC Unit for this purpose.

33. JPT recommendations: Before finalizing recommendations, JPT Mission Leaders must ensure that JPT recommendations are specific, achievable, realistic (consistent with mission realities), timely, and take into account Field Office and state institution capacities. JPT reports should clearly specify which Sections are responsible for implementing recommendations, distinguishing between Field Office and Bangui-level actions as appropriate. HoOs and the local SMG-P members will adopt and issue instructions based on JPT recommendations in their AOR. Recommendations requiring HQ-level decisions or actions can be referred to the POC Unit in Bangui for referral to the Mission Senior Leadership or PWG members as relevant.

34. Implementation, monitoring and evaluation: All Field Offices, through the SMG-P, are responsible for maintaining records as to the number of JPTs conducted, for the purpose of year-end performance reporting. The local SMG-P is also responsible for tracking and following-up on the implementation of endorsed JPT recommendations concerning their AOR through a JPT Tracking Matrix, and periodically report on the same to the POC Unit. The POC Unit will consolidate JPT details, including findings and recommendations, from field level and will inform PWG, SMG-P (at Bangui and local level), on progress of implementation as requested. After Action Reviews (AAR) of JPTs will be conducted as and when needed and as decided by any JPT participant.

35. Confidentiality and external communications: JPT members will not share their reports, findings, opinions and recommendations with media or any other external actors, except when receiving direct authorization from their section/unit director. All media and external inquiries must be referred to the Mission’s Spokesperson.

F. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

36. The JPT leader is the highest civilian authority in the JPT mission. All JPT leaders must be fully aware of: (i) the Mission’s POC mandate; (ii) the Mission’s gender mandate and related gender issues; and (iii) security management.

37. With the support of civilian and uniformed JPT members, the JPT leader will be responsible for:

37.1. Mapping key civilian and military actors and the political, social and economic context, in the area(s) where a JPT is deployed;
37.2. Analyzing POC threats, including ethnic, land, natural resources and other issues that may be the cause or lead to local conflicts, in cooperation with the local communities and local authorities, local humanitarian actors and civil society organizations;

37.3. Liaising with humanitarian actors, local leaders and communities to contribute to the development or the implementation of community protection plans;

37.4. Contributing advice and analysis to develop context-specific civil and military protection responses according to threats identified. These should be captured in the Sector/Office POC Flashpoint Matrix;

37.5. Reporting protection concerns to the relevant coordination mechanisms in order to identify potential complementary protection activities where needed;

37.6. Ensuring regular information sharing on protection issues;

37.7. Ensuring clarity around and coordination of roles and responsibilities within the JPT team, including inter alia no duplication in interviews with victims/witnesses.

37.8. Presenting the draft report and final report of the mission.

JPT leader has the authority to delegate these responsibilities to other JPT mission participants, according to their unit/division/section/agency of origin, after direct consultation with them. Detailed roles and responsibilities are presented in Annex 4.

G. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

COMMUNITY LIAISON ASSISTANT (CLA): A national staff member managed by CAS and collocated with military and police field commanders, to support interactions with local authorities, communities and other relevant actors in the field and perform a range of tasks, including information gathering, threat or needs assessments, contributing to MINUSCA’s early warning system activities, local-level protection planning and coordination of and follow-up on field visits and MINUSCA patrols and operations, as well as strengthening the resilience of local communities against protection threats.

EARLY WARNING: A serious and credible threat, whether from non-state armed actors (including but not limited to self-defense groups, armed groups, and criminal gangs) or State authorities, that risks threatening the physical integrity of civilians, including human rights violations and IHL infractions. Early Warnings differ from simple reporting such as flash, situational, or periodic reports which generally refer to physical violence, human rights violations and/or international humanitarian law infractions which have already taken place. Early Warning focuses primarily on gathering, sharing and responding to information on possible eventualities that have the potential to directly impact on civilians and their physical integrity. Each Early Warning requires an Early Response, which must be carried out/activated to prevent such violence to take place, via anticipation, prevention, and deterrence measures (including Urgent Temporary Measures - UTMs), and/or taking an effective response, including the use of force.

RISK: The potential for the materialization of the threat of physical violence against an individual or a community. Risk analysis can be presented as an equation that takes into consideration two opposing forces: the threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and time exposure analysis against the crisis prevention and management capacities.

\[
\text{Risk} = \frac{\text{Threat} \times \text{Vulnerability} \times \text{Time exposure}}{\text{Crisis management and Self-protection capacities}}
\]

THREAT: A plausible, possible or potential cause of an incident or accident that may result in a direct or indirect threat to the physical protection of civilians.
H. REFERENCES

Normative or superior references

- DPKO-DFS Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy (2017)
- MINUSCA Political Strategy (2018)
- MINUSCA Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategy (2018)
- MINUSCA SOP on Early Warning and Rapid Response (2018)
- MINUSCA SOP on Engaging with non-state actors (2017)

Related procedures or guidelines

- MINUSCA amendment to the SOP CASEVAC / MEDIVAC plan (2018) July 2016
- MINUSCA Sequenced Priority Objectives Matrix (19 April 2018)
- Special Representative of the Secretary General's (SRSG) Directive (February 2018)
- OHCHR Policy on Engagement in Relation to de facto Authorities and non-State Armed Groups (23 February 2018)
- Framework for Cooperation between MINUSCA Force and Human Rights Division (April 2018)
- Environment Policy and Guidelines for MINUSCA (January 2016)

I. CONTACT

38. For additional information and/or training on this SOP, please contact MINUSCA Senior POC Advisor at:
   MINUSCA-POC-UNIT@un.org

J. HISTORY

39. In 2018 POC unit was tasked by DSRSG-P, following Amoussou’s report, to lead a consultation process between
    MINUSCA’s military, police, and civilian units/areas/divisions, and with UN humanitarian agencies, on the best way to
    implement protection mission in the field. Consultations took place during the first semester of 2018, and drafting
    process during the second part of the year. PWG was the main deliberative and consultative body, and results were
    presented for review to the SMG-P at Bangui level. DSRSG-P validated and approved the exercise and final text. This is the
    first issuance of an SOP for JPTs in MINUSCA. Previous SOP drafts were circulated in 2015 but never became final texts.

APPROVAL SIGNATURES:

[Signature]

APPROVAL SIGNATURE (SRSG):
Parfait Onanga-Anyanga
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

DATE OF APPROVAL:
ANNEXES

Annex 1: Additional Principles


2. Accountability for failure to protect: The “Accountability for implementation of the protection of civilians mandates (addendum to 2015.17 DPKO-DFS policy on the protection of civilians)” states that Missions with a POC mandate must evaluate and account for individual and collective performance. Moreover, failure to protect may constitute an act of misconduct.

3. The principles of ‘Do no harm’ and harm mitigation: The Mission’s approach to POC will be guided by periodical Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA), to ensure that there is no negative impact on civilians, including through secondary effects. Due consideration will be given to identifying and mitigating all harm, i.e. lawful or unlawful negative consequences to the physical integrity, safety and security of civilians, in particular women and children, associated with actions by peacekeepers. The Mission shall also advocate for and support POC risk mitigation mechanisms for national and international security forces, with a specific focus on national forces including the implementation of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) on UN support to non-UN security forces. The do no harm principle must also extend to the protection of witnesses, sources and all other civilians that engage with the JPT missions.

4. Zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse: The POC strategy is built upon the strict respect for the UN’s Zero Tolerance Policy, regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel. The prevention and punishment of SEA is a priority consideration for all actions undertaken by the Mission, and an intrinsic part of the POC strategy.

5. IHL responsibility of all armed groups: Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), including but not limited to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, State and non-State parties to armed conflicts have a range of obligations designed to protect civilians, including the rules of distinction, proportionality and precaution in and against the effects of attack. Moreover, all parties have the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need. The Mission will pro-actively remind all parties of their obligations under IHL, including with respect to children, the prohibition of committing grave child rights violations, and call for serious violations of IHL, to be investigated and prosecuted, and refer where appropriate, for national or international judicial follow-up.
Annex 2: Template TORs for JPTs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activation of JPT decided by:</th>
<th>(State coordination mechanisms or person that decided on the JPT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dates of mission:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Area of deployment:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Team composition:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Civilian Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Military Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Police participants</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Other participants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Background info. on the zone of the JPT (provided by JOC/UNSS):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Responsibilities of Mission leader:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Before the mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. During the mission</td>
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<td>3. After the mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Present “Summary report” (within 48 hours) of end of the mission and final report, no later than one week.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission objective(s) and expected results:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Objective 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Expected Result 1</td>
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<td>- Objective 2:</td>
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<td>- Expected Result 2</td>
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<td>- Objective 3:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Expected Result 3:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliverables, responsibilities and deadlines:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mission summary report” (within 48 hours) of end of the mission sent to POC Unit and DSRSGs</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mission final report, no later than one week</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>Approved by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CC: DSRSG-P, DSRSG-RC-HC, DMS, POC Unit, PHQ (LU, Li33), Head of Office, Mission Leader, JPT members.
1. **Area of implementation of JPT**

2. **Team composition:**
   a) Team Leader
   b) Civilian Staff
   c) Military Staff
   d) Name and Rank of Escort Leader

3. **Mission Objectives**

4. **Summary of findings**

5. **Key civilian and military local actors, meetings and visits conducted**

6. **Assessment of the local political, military and social dynamics**

7. **Identification of protection needs, threats, and vulnerable groups**
   a) Human Rights violations (as needed)
   b) Child rights violations (as needed)
   c) Displaced persons (as needed)
   d) Women (Mandatory by UNSCR 1325/2000)
   e) IDPs (as needed)

8. **Local coping mechanisms**

9. **Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation #1 (example)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>(S.M.A.R.T. methodology)</td>
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<td>Objective of the recommendation</td>
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<td>Problem or threat addressed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead section</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level at which action should be taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deadline and follow-up</td>
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation #2 (example)</th>
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<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>(SMART)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objective of the recommendation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problem or threat addressed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level at which action should be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadline and follow-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   [add as many recommendations as needed]

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Annex 1: Pictures of the JPT mission

Annex 2: TOR of the JPT Annex

Annex 3: Maps of the zone
Annex 4: Additional Roles and responsibilities

1. Human Rights Division (HRD) officers, will in particular be responsible for:

   • Identifying on-going and risks of human rights violations, including sexual violence, recommending preventive and responsive measures and contributing to the development of community protection plans;
   
   • Assess the need to dispatch a human rights investigative team to the concerned area before a JPT (past human rights violations can signal a need for future protection) or after a JPT (because HRD finds out during a JPT that a lot of human rights work needs to be done in the same area)
   
   • In cases of human rights violations being imminent or ongoing and requiring urgent and immediate action, advising on immediate protection measures in close coordination with other JPT members and MINUSCA field commanders in the area.
   
   • Engaging on advocacy on specific human rights cases and situations with alleged perpetrators — when appropriate — and relevant authorities to ensure both the respect of human rights and appropriate action to put an end to violations;
   
   • Identifying the nature, cause and patterns of human rights violations and consult with the local population, the local authorities and the community leaders to recommend measures to prevent or mitigate such threats in the medium/long term, including through the establishment of a protective environment and the strengthening of rule of law;
   
   • When possible and relevant, supporting the referral of victim(s) of human rights violations to a competent local organization and/or to the relevant judicial authority in situ or upon return from the mission;
   
   • In cooperation with the Women Protection Adviser and in support of UNICEF, referring cases of sexual violence to competent local organizations responsible for the delivery of medical, psychosocial and legal assistance. In the absence of such organization, refer the case(s) to one of the partner NGOs with capacity and means to assist the victims. Refer the cases to justice upon completion of the mission if there is no legal representation in the locality of the JPT, if the victim consents;
   
   • Establish procedures to ensure that CLAs, the field commanders and other MINUSCA actors promptly refer human rights cases and situations to HRD and CP for timely follow up including interviews and investigations; and
   
   • Contributing to monitoring and evaluating the impact of the JPT, its recommendations, and the activities suggested.

2. Women Protection Advisors will in particular be responsible for:

   • Identifying the most vulnerable groups, communities and areas that may require protection measures (with particular regard to the prevention of sexual violence and gender based violence (SGBV));
   
   • Ensuring that adequate referral for assistance is provided to victims of SV and that field staff, JPT members and other actors are familiar with the referral of SV victims for assistance;
   
   • Collecting information on the response (medical, psychosocial, legal and reinsertion) provided to SV incidents and identify gaps, for further follow-up and action by relevant actors;
   
   • Listing State local institutions and non-State institutions (CBOs, CSOs, NGOs) as well as assessing their capacities to respond to SV incidents, to provide advice on capacity-building requirements and to advocate with relevant actors to fill the identified gaps;
   
   • Supporting the HRD officer(s) in collecting information on allegations of recent and past SV incidents in the area;
   
   • Consulting local communities, MINUSCA bases, CLAs and relevant staff whether Early Warning Indicators on SV (EWIs) were observed and whether any community-based protection mechanisms on SV/ Emergency Plans are in place in the area;
   
   • Making recommendations for the Community Protection Plan and to the JPT findings to respond to SV threats, through proposing measures aimed at preventing SV incidents, closing protection gaps, and ensuring minimum service provision for victims of SV; and
   
   • Following up on the JPT recommendations regarding SV and the suggested activities.
3. Child Protection (CP) officers will in particular be responsible for (principles of ‘do no harm’, confidentiality and anonymity are to be maintained and promoted at all times):

- Identifying POC threats concerning children as well as communities where children are at higher risk (boys and girls) of POC threats, particularly of recruitment and use by armed groups and forces, and at risk of rape or sexual violence, abduction, and killing and maiming;
- Recommending preventive and remedial measures for specific violations such as children used by forces and armed groups;
- Collecting information on allegations of grave child rights violations, notably the violations noted in UN Resolution 1612, by all parties to the conflict;
- Ensuring that children victims of grave violations such as maiming, recruitment and sexual violence, are interviewed by a CPO or CP partner, and are immediately referred to medical and psycho social support;
- Sensitize parties to the conflict on the release of children associated with armed groups and the prevention of recruitment, sexual violence, killing, maiming, denial of humanitarian assistance, targeting and use of schools, hospitals and other civilian localities
- Advocate with parties occupying schools and hospitals to vacate these civilian institutions immediately, and contact relevant partners to ensure that there are no IEDs before civilians can use the buildings once again;
- Follow-up with UNICEF and other child protection actors as needed, in particular for the referral of victims;
- Contributing to monitoring and evaluating the impact of the JPT, its recommendations, and the activities suggested; and
- Undertaking CP awareness raising activities when possible with the local community, community and women leaders.

4. JOC staff contribute to the work of the JPT by:

- Maintaining the JPT and military escort leader briefed on relevant information for the implementation of the JPT both prior and during the mission.

5. JMAC staff contribute to the work of the JPTs by:

- Carrying out in-depth analysis and research on conflict dynamics in the area of the JPT mission, including on armed group presence and activity, conflict drivers related to intercommunity and ethnic relations, land usage, and natural resource exploitation and their implications for protection, and sharing that information with the JPT mission leader.

6. The Police component will in particular be responsible for:

- Assessing the security situation and POC threats;
- Assessing action by MINUSCA police field commanders, based on the POC Handbook for peacekeepers;
- Collecting, analyzing and reporting all relevant information pertaining to the restoration of state authority, with a focus on the presence, capability, activities, and structure of parallel police;
- Interacting with the National Police and Gendarmerie, local authorities and populations;
- Jointly with HRD and CP officers, following up on the HRV committed by local actors;
- Monitoring and assessing the deployments of CAR’s police, and setting up indicators to measure their impact;
- In coordination with UNHCR and UNICEF, training the police officers responsible for securing IDP sites, and protecting women and children victims of sexual violence;
- Interacting with domestic police officers, and other representatives of the state in the framework of the preparation of local contingency plans, and in close coordination with the rest of the JPT team;
- Providing technical expertise in support to the activities of the JPT, including investigations and establishing early warning networks;
- Identifying the main economic actors, interests, and (illegal) commercial routes in the area of deployment of the JPT.
7. The Military component, other than military escorts will in particular be responsible for:

- Providing technical expertise in support of the establishment of early warning networks and appropriate military prevention and response measures;
- Assessing action by MINUSCA military field commanders, based on the POC Handbook for peacekeepers;
- Collecting, analyzing and reporting all relevant information pertaining to the restoration of state authority, with a focus on the presence, capability, activities, and structure of the FACA;
- Interacting with the FACA, local authorities and populations;
- Jointly with HRD and CP officers, following up on the HRV committed by local actors;
- Monitoring and assessing the deployments, behavior and impact of the FACA;
- In coordination other JPT members, contribute to training the FACA as required;
- Interacting with state officials re. preparation of Community Protection Plans, in close coordination with the CLA and the rest of the JPT team;

8. Civil Affairs staff, including Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs):

- Placed alongside field commanders in priority areas of deployment to act as intermediary between the force and the local community, authorities and other key actors. In the context of JPTs, CLAs are responsible to:
  - Use their existing contacts and analysis in order to inform mission planning and protection response.
  - Share the existing community protection plan for the AOR with relevant MINUSCA substantive sections participating in the JPT. During the JPT mission, JPT members will provide inputs to the plan, in agreement with the field Commander and the CLA.
  - support and coordinate information sharing between MINUSCA, local authorities and communities and humanitarian actors on the JPT;
  - Coordinate the establishment of communication networks and fora to increase POC results through interactions with local communities. This should refer to CLA guidelines where their responsibilities are clearly expressed.

9. Protection of Civilians Unit:

- Support PWG and or local SMG-Ps with the drafting of initial TORs for the JPT mission.
- Provide coordination support to the JPT mission leader before, during and after deployment of the mission.
- Provide specialized advice to the JPT mission leader on possible threats against the physical integrity of civilians and their communities and appropriate responses.
- Provide feedback to JPT mission reports.
Annex VII: TORs for Joint Monitoring Mechanism

18 March 2014

Background

On 11 March 2014, SMGP-NK approved the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Mechanism tasked to monitor ongoing military operations in North Kivu with respect to the protection of civilians. Composed of civilian, military and UNPOL representatives, the Mechanism will ascertain the consequences of joint MONUSCO/FARDC military operations on the protection of civilians, with particular regard to population displacement and human rights violations (including violations committed by armed groups), and monitor the behavior of the FARDC in respect of MONUSCO’s conditionality policy. The Joint Monitoring Mechanism will report to the SMGPP and will make timely recommendations for immediate action. It will report to the HoO and SMGP-NK. Contingency planning and risk analysis before operations will be developed by the Contingency Planning Task Force.

Membership

SMGP-NK has agreed that the membership of the Joint Monitoring mechanism will be composed of: UNJHRO (leader), CAS, UNPOL, CPS, NKB and SVU with a focal point designated from each section. The mechanism will operate as a standing committee based in Goma but with travel to the areas of operations or nearby locations during and after operations, as security allows.

Mandate

The mandate of the Mechanism during and after military operations is as follows:

a. To monitor the impact of military operations on civilian populations and recommend appropriate action, including for ensuring protection after the end of operations,
b. To monitor FARDC and MONUSCO conduct during operations and prevent / minimize human rights violations against civilians,
c. To liaise with the Contingency Planning Taskforce to provide ongoing and timely protection input to ongoing operations planning,
d. To conduct on the ground advocacy with FARDC troops on human rights and the protection of civilians,
e. To refer cases of children associated with armed groups to CPS for action,
f. To monitor any support provided by MONUSCO to the FARDC within the framework of its conditionality policy and the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP),
g. To alert the HoO to possible breaches of the conditionality policy and the HRDDP,
h. To report allegations of Human Rights Violations (HRVs) and breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), for follow up action by relevant sections including recommending human rights investigation missions, and
i. To assess local capacities and mobilize local and international partners working for POC.
Methodology

The methodology to be used by the Joint Monitoring Mechanism will include:

- The appointment of a focal point for the mechanism by each concerned section,
- Weekly meetings in order to share information and coordinate activities, with additional ad hoc meetings as operations dictate,
- Establishment of a stand-by team ready to deploy within 24 hours,
- Deploying immediately after any joint military operation whether or not human rights violations are reported,
- Liaison with Contingency Planning Task Force before, during and after operations,
- Field visits to areas of operations (including missions of over five days),
- Where necessary, use of military transportation by civilian team members,
- Use of existing tools and networks (CLAs, CAN, human rights networks, humanitarian partners) to gather information,
- Drafting joint reports and making recommendations to military and civilian section. All reports will be reviewed and approved by HoO before dissemination, and
- Fortnightly updates to SMGP-NK.

Division of Tasks within JMM team

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| JHRO | Team Leader  
Advocacy with FARDC on human rights issues  
Identifying and documenting human rights violations and on-going risks of human rights violations and recommending preventive and responsive measures  
Assessing the need to dispatch a human rights investigative team to the concerned area after operations  
Engaging on advocacy on specific HR cases and situations where appropriate  
When possible and relevant, supporting the referral of victim(s) of human rights violations to a competent local organization and/or to the relevant judicial authority in situ or upon return from the mission |
| SVC-U | Analysis of sexual violence trends in area of operation (no investigation of individual cases)  
Analysis of capacity of service providers  
Monitoring behavior of FARDC regarding SV, to be shared with JHRO  
Follow-up with Humanitarians for emergency service delivery (PEP kits)  
Follow-up with Protection Actors for development of Protection mechanisms |
| CAS | Assessment of displacement and population movements in field of operations and consequent protection risks  
Analysis of other local issues relevant to protection during operations including ethnic, land, natural resources and other issues  
Liaison with humanitarian actors, local leaders and communities |
| UNPOL | Interacting with PNC to monitor and document human rights violations and assess risks to the protection of civilians  
Reporting and following up HRVs committed by the PNC  
Assessing the security situation and logistical conditions of the deployment of PNC elements  
Collecting, analyzing and reporting all relevant information pertaining to the restoration of state authority after operations |
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| **CPS** | • Document cases of children associated with armed groups  
• Document cases of grave violations against children committed by FARDC, MONUSCO and armed groups including occupation of schools for military camps  
• Follow-up with humanitarians actors dealing with children associated to armed groups  
• Advocate for evacuation of injured children  
• Ensure protection and release from detention of captured child soldiers by FARDC in the field and at Goma level |
| **NKB** | • Key liaison point with FARDC before, during and after operations  
• Identify specific military risks to the protection of civilians  
• Ensure the provision of logistical support to JMM team on the ground |
### Annex VIII: List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOI</td>
<td>Board of Inquiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Community Alert Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Comite Conjoint Technique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Centre d'Information et de Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Community Liaison Assistant</td>
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<td>CMCoord</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO – AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Centre Operationel Commun</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCEM</td>
<td>Comite des Chiefs d’Etat-Major</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Community-oriented Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS-JOC</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Joint Operations Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Performance Assessment System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPOC</td>
<td>Comprehensive Protection of Civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Community Protection Plan</td>
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<td>CPTM</td>
<td>Core Pre-deployment Training Materials</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict-Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CVR</td>
<td>Community Violence Reduction</td>
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<td>DCOS OPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Operational Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPET</td>
<td>Policy, Evaluation and Training Division</td>
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<td>Department of Public Information</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>Department of Peace Operations</td>
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<td>DPPA</td>
<td>Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSRSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUF</td>
<td>Directive on the Use of Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>FACA</td>
<td>Forces Armees Centrafricaines</td>
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<td>FAQ</td>
<td>Frequently Asked Questions</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri</td>
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<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>GPP</td>
<td>Government-Provided Personnel</td>
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<td>HC</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Country Team</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations</td>
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<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<td>Human Rights Due Diligence Policy</td>
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<td>Human Rights up Front</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IMTC</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Training Centre</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>JOPT</td>
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<td>Joint Protection Team</td>
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<td>Language Assistant</td>
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<td>Local Protection Committee</td>
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<td>MARA</td>
<td>Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical / Casualty Evacuation</td>
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</table>
MILOB – Military Observer
MINUJUSTH – United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURCAT – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSCA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MRM – Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
MRM CTF – Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism Country Taskforce
MTT – Mobile Training Team
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NSAG – Non-State Armed Group
OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR – Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUB – United Nations Operation in Burundi
OPT – Operations Planning Team
PBPO – Policy and Best Practices Officer
PC – Police Commissioner
PEP – Post-Exposure Prophylaxis
PIO – Public Information Office
PNC – National Police (of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
POC – Protection of Civilians
PPDB – Policy and Practice Database
PWG – Protection Working Group
QIP – Quick Impact Projects
QRF – Quick Reaction Force
RBB – Results-Based Budget
ROE – Rules of Engagement
Rol – Rule of Law
SBE – Scenario-Based Exercise
SCC – Special Criminal Court (in the Central African Republic)
SCD – Standing Combat Deployment
SCPI – Strategic Communication and Public Information
SG – Secretary-General
SGBV – Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SMART – Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Timebound
SMG-P – Senior Management Group on Protection
SOFA – Status of Forces Agreement
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
SPU – Strategic Planning Unit
SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR – Security Sector Reform
SSU – Stabilization and Support Unit
STM – Specialized Training Materials
SUR – Statement of Unit Requirements
SVC – Sexual Violence in Conflict
SWAT – Special Weapons and Tactics
T/PCC – Troop / Police Contributing Country
TOR – Team of Experts (on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict)
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TTX – Tabletop Exercise
UA – Unite Aware
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN – United Nations
UNAMID – African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCG – United Nations Communications Group
UNCT – United Nations Country Team
UNDSS – United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA – United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS – United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI – United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
UNPOL – United Nations Police
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
USG DPO – Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Peace Operations
UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
VTC – Video Teleconferencing
WFP – World Food Programme
WPA – Women’s Protection Adviser
WPS – Women, Peace and Security