Lesson 3.5j

AOE-UN MPKI support to UN MDMP
Content

• MPKI support to UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

• Phase 1 brief

• Mission Analysis

• COA Development, Analysis and Selection

• Production of the OPORD
Learning Outcomes

• Explain how MPKI products such as AOE supports the staff

• Explain why the Phase 1 brief is important

• Explain how MPKI supports the UN MDMP by phase
Receipt of Mission Brief

- What do we already know?
- Collection assets and mapping products available
- Initial Commander guidance
  - PIRs/SIRs to initial IAP
  - Mission specific planning begins
- Start mission-specific AOE
Phase One Brief – why is it relevant?

Orders Process

- Receipt of Mission Brief
  - Phase 1 IPOE (constant analysis)
    - Cmdr. Initial guidance
      - WARNO 1

- Phase 2
  - Mission Analysis
    - Mission Analysis Brief
      - WARNO 2

- Phase 3
  - COA development
    - COA brief

- Phase 4
  - COA analysis and selection
    - Decision Brief for Cmdr.
      - ‘Test the plan’ & WARNO 3

- Phase 5
  - Production of the OPORDER

Peacekeeping Military Intelligence Support Process

- • What do we know already? What does the AOE tell us? (own / other & higher level INTEI)
- • Start Mission-specific AOE
  - What collection assets are available and can we task them?
  - What are the Initial PIRS/CCIRS/IRs?
  - What mapping products are required / available?

- Complete Mission-specific PKMI ACOA
  - Draft (short) Intelligence Estimate
  - Draft initial IAP
  - Deliver Phase 1 Brief to Comd & Staff; Distribute Short Intelligence Estimate
  - Warning Order 1 – Situation environment paragraph

- • PKMI contribution to mission analysis
  - Confirmation of PIRs
  - Warning Order 2 – Deliver the ‘Situation’ paragraph
    - PKMI support to planning groups
    - Confirm and develop Most Likely and Most Dangerous Actor Courses of Action (ML/MDA COA)
    - Update IAP and OE situation as required
    - Give Support to Commander’s own forces COA brief

- • Support COA analysis and selection (relevant threat / influencing actors)
  - Update situation and IAP as required;
  - Support Commander’s decision brief from PKMI perspective
  - Consider PKMI actions required during Mission execution
  - Provide PKMI contingencies to ‘test’ the plan
  - Warning Order 3 (if used) – Intelligence / situation paragraph

- • PKMI guidance on control measures and de-confliction of acquisition and (other)
  - operational activities (e.g. Recce force or other collection assets may require
    extraction prior to H-hour)
  - Draft OPORDER – Situation para, intelligence annex and support to wider staff
    branch annexes (e.g. ISR, logs, CIMIC, and communications)
  - Support to Mission Rehearsal – raise scenario’s and contingencies to confirm
    plan and responses
Phase One Brief

• Informs / situates commander and staff prior to planning

• AOE foundation – ‘Golden Thread’ products:
  – Physical, human, information terrain analysis
  – Actor evaluation
  – Situation integration with assessed ML/MD COAs
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Topic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Scope. Overview of what the Phase 1 Brief is going to cover and what briefing aids are going to be used.</td>
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<td>02</td>
<td>Intelligence foundation. What intelligence the brief has been based on and inform the Commander of any intelligence gaps that are pertinent to the Mission.</td>
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<td>03</td>
<td>Key assumptions and outputs. Inform the Commander of the key deductions and judgements you have identified from conducting AOE.</td>
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<td>04</td>
<td>Ground in general. The Physical Terrain. Orientate the Commander and Planning Staff to the ground including weather effects.</td>
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<td>05</td>
<td>Ground in detail. The Mission Specific Physical Terrain in more detail. Depending on the type of mission to be conducted (Defensive / Offensive), inform the Commander of the specific ground detail that will affect his/her mission including any key infrastructure.</td>
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<td>06</td>
<td>Human and Information Terrains. Factors that are pertinent to the mission are likely to include:</td>
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<td>• Tribal and ethnic laydown</td>
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<td>• Displaced persons and refugees</td>
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<td>• NGOs</td>
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<td>• Key leaders</td>
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<td>• Pattern of life</td>
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<td>• HN armed forces</td>
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<td>• Infrastructure (Sewage, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuge, Medical, Security, Other)</td>
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<td>• Information environment – social media trends (supportive/resistant to UN presence), media reporting, local communication capabilities</td>
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<td>07</td>
<td>Threat Evaluation. Analysis of all threat actors that are pertinent to the mission, to include:</td>
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<td>• Threat actor assumptions</td>
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<td>• Threat actor organisations and hierarchies including Key Leaders</td>
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<td>• Threat actor TTPs</td>
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<td>• Threat actor equipment and capabilities</td>
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<td>• Strengths and Weakness and Centre of Gravity Analysis</td>
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<td>08</td>
<td>Situation Integration. How will the threat actors and human factors affect the mission when considered in relation to the physical environment? To include:</td>
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<td>• Actors’ Courses of Actions. Most Likely and Most Dangerous.</td>
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<td>• Updated Intelligence Acquisition Plan based on known intelligence gaps</td>
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- **Include Vital Intelligence**
- **Physical Terrain Analysis**
- **Human and Information Terrain Analysis**
- **Actor and Threat Actor Evaluation**
- **Situation Integration**
Phase One Brief – Summary

• Mission specific
• Not telling the Commander all you know
• No more than 45 minutes
• Focus on situation integration and not the ground
• Know audience
• Keep it simple
• Remember the ‘Golden Thread’ products
Example of a Phase One Brief
UNMMIG deploys in three conflict affected areas (sectors west, east, and north) of GARLAND, for the duration of its mandate to ensure: a safe and SECURE environment for all civilians in its area of operations; to FACILITATE the freedom of movement of humanitarian aid convoys; to MONITOR and report on violations of ceasefires, and of human rights violations; and, where possible, to ASSIST the government in the re-establishment of State authority.

**Sector East mission** is to establish a TOB south west of BINGA to DISRUPT IK freedom of movement, REASSURE local population and IDPs so to establish SECURE environment and ASSIST Government of GARLAND.
Scope – Part One

• Vital Intelligence
• Key Assumptions and outputs (if applicable)
• Analysis of the Operating Environment
  Ground in General
  Ground in Detail
• Information Terrain
  GSM/Radio coverage
  Local media – TV and Radio – are they supportive of UN?
  Use of social media
  Local communication systems/meetings.
• Human Terrain Analysis
  Tribal/Ethnic Laydown – if important
  Key actors: NGOs, Key Leaders, Refugees etc.
  Pattern of life – If applicable
  HN Armed Forces
Scope – Part Two

• Actor Evaluation
  Locations/organisations/capabilities/TTPs
  COWARD
  SWOT/COG

• Situation Integration
  • ML / MD COA

• Event Overlay NAI/ TAI

• Recommended PIRs
  Updates to IAP
  Known intelligence gaps

Analysis - So what?
Vital intelligence

- SIGINT report 2245Z03MAY19_003 suggests increased IK movement of arms and ammunition into caches within BINGA.

- HUMINT report 0935Z01MAY19-002 states that IK have conducted public speeches in the IDP camp stating that UN forces are the enemy of GARLAND and should be forced to leave immediately.

- HUMINT report 0718Z29APR19_001, which has not been corroborated and is assessed as C3, states that coercion activity of local civilians to join the IK cause has increased.

- **Key assumptions based on current intelligence:** It is assessed the any UN activity within the vicinity of BINGA will result in an armed / kinetic IK response.
Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE)
ROBOT or OCOKA are helpful but break the terrain down logically.
Restricted Terrain
Ground in general – Known Routes / Avenues of Approach
Ground in detail – Mission specific
Ground in detail – Mission specific
Information Terrain
How do population communicate?
How robust is this network?
How secure is it?
How does it affect our mission?
Human Terrain
Human Terrain – Mission specific

Ethnographics Sector East

Tribal Breakdown

Tutu
Eri
Abu
Sunka
Nimba

Human Terrain – Mission specific
Where could the actor get its support?
Which areas are permissive to UN?
Any complexities that could affect our mission? Movement through the town e.g. pattern of life activity? Situation within IDP camp? HN Security Force laydown?
How does it affect the mission? What pertinent detail is included here?
Actor Evaluation – Mission specific

- Known locations? Are they assessed locations?
- Known numbers?
- How old is the data that forms the basis of that assessment?
What is the important data? Who is important and why?
How does the leader maintain control and deliver orders?
Has this organisation changed due to the success of UN missions?
<table>
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<th>Capability</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Weapons + Equipment</th>
<th>Asymmetric TTPs</th>
<th>Reinforcement / Logistics</th>
<th>Dispositions / Doctrine</th>
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</table>
| Little is known about its key leaders, but the ‘Nimr’ (NFDK) is known to be the overall military leader. | Katibats – operating in respective clan areas | **Small Arms – AK variants.**  
   **Sophisticated Sniper capability SIEDs** | Hit and run ambush attacks against host nation security forces | Each Katibat has a religious and military leader. | Standard insurgent / guerrilla TTPs. |
| religious leaders to deliver propagandistic sermons targeting its enemies | IK has a decentralized leadership model, with key leaders – of which little in known - based in Abusir; Katibats don’t operate as a single entity – each comprises sub-groups. | **use females in SPBIEDs**  
   **SVBIEDs** | IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF. | Support from population who believe in their ideology. | Unlikely to surrender |
| Limited campaign given size of grouping | | | IK asymmetric attack capabilities have increased as a result of the recent influx of combat-hardened Jihadist fighters from the 6th Continent. | | |
| No evidence of capability to conduct a spectacular attack. | | | | | |

**Key Takeaways**
- Excellent COMSEC
- IK not capable of large-scale conventional operations against UNMIGAR or the GAF.
Key Takeaway
RPG-7 could be used in SA role (800m range). Threat to UN aviation and light-armour.
IK – SWOT – Mission specific

Strengths

• COMSEC
• Local knowledge
• Decentralized Leadership
• Reputation and propaganda

Opportunities

• Weak Host Nation Security Forces
• Expanding Links with the AWF
• Lack of formal economic opportunities
• Structural causes of the conflict

Weakness

• Requirement for religious justification
• Physical Terrain
• Local support not guaranteed
• Composition
• Capability

Threats

• Deployment of UNIGAR
• Coalition between regional partners
• International CT operations

Centre of Gravity: Support of the population
Situation Integration
IK will conduct harassment ATTACKs and widespread DISRUPTion activity in order to ISOLATE UN forces.

**Intent/Purpose.**
DISRUPT UN activity without becoming decisively engaged. UNDERMINE UN presence within the Sector.

**IHI:**
- ⚫ Weapons caches;
- ⚫ Sniper rifles

**Weaknesses**
- VHF radios can be intercepted.

**Strengths**
- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

**MSN.** Conduct small arms ATTACK on UN bases IOT REINFORCE their IO campaign.

**Endstate.** UN being forced to increase security at its bases makes UN a static force, unable to deploy to more than a handful of urban areas. IK increases its control to more areas of Sector west.

**Tactical Functions:**
1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – Sniper rifles (U/K variant) and AK47 variants.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
6. Sustainment – Use of population and hides to secure lethal aid.
IK will conduct a complex ATTACK using SIEDs in order to NEUTRALISE UN forces.

Intent/Purpose.
NEUTRALISE UN forces in the Sector to undermine UN presence in GARLAND.

MSN. Conduct a complex ATTACK on UN base IOT SECURE FOM and undermine UN forces.

Endstate. UN being forced to withdraw from sector. UN ability to provide security undermined. IK secures total control of sector.

I & W:
- Increased coercion activity within IDP camps.
- Increase in facilitation of IED components;
- Staging of IED facilitators/SMEs into the AO.

IHI:
- IED SMEs

Weaknesses
- VHF radios can be intercepted.

Strengths
- Ability to blend in with population.
- Cover provided to East iot support withdrawal.

Scheme of Manoeuvre:

Shaping:
- Coercion of vulnerable IDPs.
- Facilitation of SIED and influx of IED expertise into the AO.
- Staging into urban area prior to conduct of attack.

Decisive:
- Use of SIEDs to breach UN TOB perimeter. Followed by ground attack in force.
- Use of VHF radios to control the attacks and as back-up should SIED not be victim operated.

Sustaining:
- Securing of TOB before withdrawal in order to maintain critical capability.
- Increased messaging and propaganda will follow shortly after attack claiming responsibility undermine UN credibility.
- Replenishment of IED components.

Tactical Functions:
1. C2 – decentralised command structure. Use of VHF.
2. Info & Int – Population support base
3. Firepower – IED vests, AK47 variants.
5. Protection – OPSEC and COMSEC
• Explain to Commander the pertinent NAIs and TAIIs – what are they identifying or trying to affect? Which COA?
• NAIs / TAIIs to be recorded in IAP
• Must have detailed description
Priority Intelligence Requirements

• Where are the IK bed down locations within urban areas?
• What support do they have from the local population / delegation / security forces?
• What vulnerabilities does IK’s C2 have to intercept?
• Critical Intelligence Gap
• What is the level of IK influence within the IDP camp?
• What is IK’s IED capability?
Verbal Briefs – Tips

• Remove distractions
• Follow formats, avoid scripts
• Determine time to brief- stick to it
• Identify and arrange aids
• Pertinent information only
• Briefer- experience more important than rank
• Eye contact
• Rehearse – this is vital
Mission Analysis

- MPKI contribution to mission analysis
- PIR confirmation
- Warning Order 2 –Situation paragraph – if change / update from Warning Order 1.
COA Development

- MPKI supports planning team
- Confirm Actor’s COAs
  - Most Likely
  - Most Dangerous
- Update IAP and OE situation
- Supports own forces COA brief
- Inputs from Phase One Brief / continuous AOE
COA Analysis and Selection

- Supports COA analysis and selection (relevant threat/actors)
- Consider MPKI actions required during mission execution
- Provide MPKI contingencies to “test” the plan
- Draft situation paragraph for WARNO 3

**Phases:**
- **Phase 1:** IPOE (constant analysis)
- **Phase 2:** Mission Analysis
- **Phase 3:** COA development
- **Phase 4:** COA analysis and selection
- **Phase 5:** Production of the OPORDER

**Key Points:**
- Receipt of Mission Brief
- Mission Analysis Brief
- COA brief
- Decision Brief for Cmndr.
- Test the plan & WARNO 3
- Mission Rehearsal
Production of the OPORD

- MPKI guidance on control measures
- De-confliction of acquisition and operational activities
- Draft situation paragraph, peacekeeping-intelligence annex
- Supports staff branch annexes
- Supports Mission Rehearsal – raise scenarios and contingencies (Red-teaming / war-gaming)
Takeaway

• PKI support for the MDMP provides inputs to be integrated during all phases of the planning process.

• The Phase One brief is the MPKI cell’s moment to situate and inform the Command and Staff prior to the conduct of planning.

• An updated peacekeeping-intelligence picture and ‘testing’ of the potential COAs will inform planning and shape the COA Brief.

• The role of the MPKI staff during mission rehearsal is to raise realistic and relevant scenarios involving the physical, information and human terrains to test the plan and ensure that it is viable in relation to possible contingencies.