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Preface

We are delighted to introduce the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Unit Manual on Special Forces—an essential guide for commanders and staff deployed in peacekeeping operations, and an important reference for Member States and the staff at United Nations Headquarters.

For several decades, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved significantly in its complexity. The spectrum of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping includes challenging tasks such as helping to restore state authority, protecting civilians and disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants. In today’s context, peacekeeping missions are deploying into environments where they can expect to confront asymmetric threats from armed groups over large swaths of territory. Consequently, the capabilities required for successful peacekeeping missions demand greater improvement.

UN peacekeeping operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. While deployed in the context of a political framework supporting a peace agreement, or in the context of creating the conditions for a return to stability, peacekeeping missions may require military units to perform challenging tasks involving the judicious use of force, particularly in situations where the host state is unable to provide security and maintain public order.

To meet these complex peacekeeping challenges, military components often play a pivotal role in providing and maintaining a secure environment. Under these circumstances, the proper deployment of UN Special Forces can contribute decisively towards successful achievement of the Mission’s mandate. To date, UN Special Forces have deployed to peacekeeping operations in MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ONUB in Burundi, UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali.

As the UN continues its efforts to broaden the base of troop contributing countries, and in order to ensure the effective interoperability of all UN Special Forces units, there is a need to formalize capability standards. Together with the seminal work of military experts from numerous Member States, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have produced this Manual as a means of enhancing the preparation, operational readiness and efficiency of UN Special Forces. In recognition of the work already done, and in anticipation of future improvements, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Member States who volunteered and devoted so much of their time, energy and expertise in the creation of this Manual. The result is a document that captures and consolidates the relevant dimensions of UN Special Forces into a single, convenient reference.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will continue to refine and update this Manual ensuring its relevance in the ever-changing operational environment. In the meantime we have every expectation that this document, especially with the concerted efforts of its intended readers, will contribute immensely to improving and enhancing our collective performance in the pursuit of peace.

Hervé Ladsous  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Peacekeeping Operations

Ameerah Haq  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Field Support

Purpose

This first edition of the United Nations Special Forces Manual provides field commanders and their staffs a guide for planning and conducting UN Special Operations in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations. What is more, the Troop Contributing Countries, United Nations Headquarters and Mission staff will find this Manual an essential reference as they plan for, generate and employ Special Forces for UN Missions.

Not all Missions require the use of Special Forces. Should appropriate UN authorities decide to involve them in peacekeeping operations, this manual describes how Special Forces could influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process. Special Forces have various capabilities, including the use of force, to be employed in UN Peace Operations. Reconnaissance, military assistance, long range patrolling and information collection are non-lethal capabilities that go beyond the use of force—which in peacekeeping is always a measure of last resort. If force must be used, UN Special Forces can provide a calibrated, precise, proportional and appropriate capability.

United Nations Special Forces have unique capabilities that contribute to the Mission’s overall efforts in preventing the expansion of armed groups, neutralizing and disarming negative elements beyond the ability of conventional forces acting in a traditional peacekeeping role. The provision of UN Special Forces, fully integrated into the Mission’s overall operational plan and acting in consonance with the Mission’s conventional forces, adopts a more proactive approach in fulfilling mandated tasks while protecting civilians and supporting the establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces within the host state.

This manual describes standardized Special Forces capabilities and organizational structures tailored to United Nations peacekeeping requirements. Typical Special Forces tasks, organization and command and control have been modified to reflect the unique structure, principles and operating environment of UN peacekeeping Missions. Amongst the UN modifications to national practice is the size of a typically deployed UN Special Forces contingent—currently a company-equivalent in existing UN Missions. This manual reflects this current company-sized UN Special Forces contingent, and makes provisions for the possibility of future, more demanding, Mission requirements by providing a description of a UN Special Forces battalion-equivalent—commonly called a Task Force—should that capability be required. Thus, this manual not only reflects the current level of UN Special Forces deployed capability, but also lays the foundation for a higher capability standard that may be required in the future. Having codified both current and future standards, this document should now serve as a more accurate and flexible basis for developing UN Special Forces Statements of Unit Requirement and help Troop Contributing Countries in preparation of their contingents.

Also modified is the UN Special Forces command and control structure within the Mission’s overall military component. Under national use, Special Forces are a strategic asset centrally reporting to national level authorities. In current UN operations, UN Special Forces are
a Force-level asset under direct command of the Force Commander/Head of Military Component. This centralized UN approach enhances the control of UN Special Forces for the Missions in which they are deployed.

The intent of this Manual is not to attempt to override the national military doctrine of individual Member States or Troop Contributing Countries, nor impose requirements on national training, operations or structures. This Manual does not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures, which remain the prerogative of individual Member States. Nor is it the intent of this Manual to serve as an instrument for unit selection. Indeed unit structures will be adapted, ultimately, in accordance with any Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated between the UN and a Troop Contributing Country. Instead, this Manual serves as a complement to existing or emerging Troop Contributing Countries’ military capability, and preparation for the enhanced performance achieved through interoperability with other Troop Contributing Countries participating in the peacekeeping operation.

This Manual is primarily written at the operational level. It is based on UN guidance reflecting lessons learned, feedback from field missions and input from peacekeeping practitioners in UN Special Operations peacekeeping. Workshops conducted by interested Member States and Troop Contributing Countries produced the original draft that was finalized after extensive coordination within DPKO and DFS. The result is a most comprehensive body of thought on UN Special Forces that is especially designed to assist contingents in the re-orientation of their units from a national military focus to an integral part of a unified UN peacekeeping operation.

LTG Nyamvumba (center), Force Commander, UNAMID, visiting UN Special Forces patrol in Jebel Marra area, Darfur.
Scope

Discussed within is an overview of Special Operations in the UN context, to include the distinguishing nature of both Special and conventional force operations. The concept of UN Special Operations is examined in terms of principles, modes of operation, and decision criteria for missions. Capabilities and tasks are analyzed in terms of what tasks are appropriate—and what tasks are not. Sample organizations are provided and explained, as are planning and command and control implications when operating as an integral part of the Mission’s conventional force effort. Support to UN Special Forces is examined in depth, to include the support requirements the contingent is expected to provide for itself and those available from the Mission. Finally, training and self-evaluation are discussed covering pre-deployment through field operations. Of particular interest to many will be the annexes that explain generic capabilities and equipment requirements.
Chapter 1

Overview: United Nations Special Forces

1.1 Definition of UN Special Operations

1.1.1 UN Special Operations are military activities conducted by specifically designated, organized, trained and equipped forces, manned with selected personnel using unconventional tactics, techniques, and courses of action. These activities may be conducted across a wide range of UN peacekeeping operations but always in compliance with peacekeeping principles and ethos, and always within the context of the Mission’s mandate. UN Special Operations are conducted independently or in conjunction with conventional forces to facilitate the achievement of the desired end-state. UN Special Operations may complement—but must not compete with, nor be a substitute for conventional operations.

1.1.2 Politico-military considerations may require the acceptance of a degree of political or military risk, which may not be afforded by conventional force operations. When that capability is required, UN Special Operations can deliver strategic or operational-level results.

1.1.3 The principle of legitimacy is critical to the success of any UN Mission. Deployment of UN Special Forces can potentially raise questions amongst those who oppose peace. They may seek to exploit a perception that UN Special Forces employment is excessive and exceeds the UN mandate. UN Mission commanders must be aware of this challenge and be prepared to communicate the legitimate use of UN Special Operations both prior to and during UN Special Forces employment. Mission commanders should emphasize that the UN employs Special Forces to counter specific belligerent threats and actions.

1.2 The UN Special Forces Task Force or Group Framework

1.2.1 A UN Special Forces unit is a Mission force multiplier providing the Head of Military Component/Force Commander a technologically advanced and high-readiness asset. UN Special Forces often gain results disproportionate to their actual numerical strength. It is more accurate to view such an organization as a battalion-level “task force” or “task group” at company level.

1.2.2 The UN Special Forces Task Force or Group framework is modular and flexible, allowing for tailored organizational structures optimized to meet Mission requirements. A UN Special Forces Task Force or Group, as described in this manual, provides a wider range of options for designing the appropriate level of command and control necessary for the conduct of UN Special Operations.
1.3 Characteristics of UN Special Forces

1.3.1 In any decision to employ a UN Special Forces unit, it is crucial that a commander is aware of the nature and limitations of UN Special Forces and uses them appropriately. UN Special Forces are not “better” under all circumstances. UN Special Operations differ from conventional operations in the desired/delivered effects, the degree of political risk, operational techniques, modes of employment, courses of action and dependence on detailed/relevant operational intelligence. Each country’s Special Forces has its own merits, strengths and limitations – these must be understood and considered in order to leverage unique capabilities.

1.3.2 The main characteristics of UN Special Forces include the fact that they are:

- **Strategic Assets.** UN Special Forces are a strategic asset creating effects that support achievement of strategic and operational-level objectives.

- **Integrated in their Command and Control.** UN Special Forces require a responsive and unambiguous command and control structure. To create the greatest synergistic effect and unity of effort, and in order to achieve full operational integration\(^1\) and control, the Force Commander and Force Headquarters retain Operational Control (OPCON) over UN Special Forces employment.\(^2\) If dictated by operational necessity, integrating and controlling Special Forces in a UN Mission can be accomplished by subordinating UN Special Forces units to the sector level under Tactical Control (TACON), while retaining OPCON at the Force level through the Force Commander.

- **Task Organized.** UN Special Forces are task organized for the operational environment and designated tasks. While UN Special Forces are generally composed of land-based forces, air and maritime special task forces may be deployed as UN Special Forces where the requirement for such capabilities is identified in the Statement of Force Requirement. The Statement of Force Requirement is derived from an estimate of the environment, threat, mandate, missions and tasks.

- **Reliant on Effective Enablers.** Dedicated and effective enablers, such as air support or tactical attack helicopters, are vital for high UN Special Forces effectiveness. Where it is not possible for these enablers to be integral to UN Special Forces, it is highly recommended to co-locate UN Special Forces units with aviation and air assets (rotary- or fixed-wing) to provide transportation, resupply, air-to-ground fires and intelligence support. At the very least, it will be necessary to define formally pre-planned affiliation between the UN Special Forces and relevant enablers in the appropriate Statement of Unit Requirement.

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\(^1\) In accordance with the supported/supporting relationship principle.

\(^2\) In MONUSCO, although one Special Forces Coy has been physically deployed in each of the three brigades, they are retained under OPCON of the Force Commander and operations are planned and tasked through a Special Forces Task Force Headquarters.
• **Small, Precise, Indirect Applications; Discreet, Autonomous Operations:**

  o **Small:** The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for limited periods of time) of UN Special Forces units provide the Force Commander additional options for a military response that may not entail the risk of escalation normally associated with inherently larger or more visible conventional forces.

  o **Precise:** UN Special Forces provide a highly accurate tool for the UN mission across the whole spectrum of their activities to include UN Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance. UN Special Forces engage through direct or indirect application specifically limiting negative consequences and collateral effects. To achieve this precision, UN Special Operations require detailed planning, mission preparation and rehearsals including enablers.

  o **Discreet:** UN Special Forces deployment and UN Special Operations are generally discreet in order to protect mission execution and operators. In UN Special Operations planning and execution, the Force Commander must balance discretion and the potential operational risks of information sharing.

  o **Autonomy and Deep Operations:** UN Special Operations are often conducted theatre-wide at extended distances from supporting operational bases. This requires the ability to operate with greater autonomy and self-sufficiency in smaller elements.

  o **Light Footprint:** The small size, unique capabilities and self-sufficiency (*for limited periods of time*) allow UN Special Forces to have a light footprint relative to their potential effects. Nevertheless, they require support from other units (e.g. general support, intelligence, air and transportation support, fire support, medical support, etc.).

• **Of High Operational Mobility and Momentum.** High operational mobility is a necessity for UN Special Forces missions. They need rapid ground and air mobility with the full support of UN helicopters and tactical aircraft. High momentum and rapid execution allow UN Special Forces to concentrate precisely tailored military power at the right place and time providing security through speed, and thereby mitigating risk.

• **Risk Mitigation.** The small size, unique, flexible, versatile capabilities and self-sufficiency (again, *for limited periods of time*) of UN Special Forces units provide a wider range of options for applying a UN military response that may help mitigate the risk of escalation normally associated with the employment of larger or more visible conventional forces.

• **Complementary With Conventional Forces.** UN Special Forces may complement, but must not compete with, nor be a substitute for conventional forces. UN Special
Operations can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations by conventional forces, and may include combined or interagency operations.

1.4 Differences and Complementary Characteristics of UN Special and Conventional Forces

1.4.1 In contrast to the UN Special Forces characteristics described above, conventional forces are characterized by relatively larger numbers of personnel, a medium or large footprint, full spectrum operations, heavy logistic support and relatively heavier firepower. Conventional forces generally have greater capability in ground mobility and ballistic protection (armored vehicles, mechanized vehicles, etc.), numerous field Headquarters and layered command and control levels (e.g., Force Headquarters, Forward Force Headquarters, division, brigade, battalion and company).

1.4.2 Depending upon the operating environment and mandated tasks, UN Special Forces contrast with conventional forces in the nature of UN Special Forces techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence.

1.4.3 Generally, conventional forces provide comprehensive environmental and mission capacities, such as air coordination, airspace management, air defence, operational space management, legal advice (through the legal advisor at Force and sector headquarters levels), force protection, military police, personnel recovery, ground and air safety and counterintelligence, amongst other capacities.

1.5 UN Special Operations in the Spectrum of Peacekeeping

1.5.1 In the context of broader operating environments for UN peacekeeping, and in line with the Mission’s mandate, UN Special Operations may be conducted across a vast array of military operations within the spectrum of peacekeeping normally covered by conventional peacekeeping activities. These activities might encompass different peacekeeping situations involving UN Special Forces in pursuit of a strategic end-state.

1.5.2 UN Special Forces missions may include a suitable combination or all of the principal tasks of Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance, depending on the circumstances of each operation. While UN Special Operations missions may range from small unilateral actions to large-scale activities of a Combined and Joint nature, they are tailored to contribute to the accomplishment of defined political and strategic objectives.

1.5.3 UN Special Forces activities can also contribute to the achievement of peacekeeping mandates across the various stages of the Mission. This ranges from the very early stages of a Mission, when UN Special Forces can help establish the conditions necessary for the Mission’s full deployment, to stabilization and protection of civilian activities, and finally to peace consolidation and early peacebuilding, when UN Special Forces can provide advanced training and capacity development to the host country’s armed forces.
Chapter 2

Employment Concept for UN Special Forces

2.1 Employment Principles

2.1.1 The following interlinked principles are crucial for optimal employment of UN Special Forces:

2.1.2 Participation in Planning at All Levels. Formal arrangements for UN Special Forces representation at Force and sector headquarters levels are essential. At the Force Headquarters level, a Special Forces advisor cell ensures appropriate UN Special Forces employment. The Commanding Officer and key staff of the UN Special Forces Task Force or Group will need to be intimately involved in the planning, conduct and control of actual operations.

2.1.3 Early Presence. Upon receiving a UN peacekeeping operation mandate, and before the bulk of UN Forces have deployed, UN Special Forces might be deployed as part of an early forward UN presence to initiate military and civilian liaison, conduct area assessments, augment an early command, control and communications capability, or to advise friendly forces. Such a presence can contribute to the shaping of the theatre. Moreover, this principle offers the Head of Mission/Special Representative of the Secretary-General (HOM/SRSG) and the Force Commander additional means for developing an increased understanding of emerging situations and challenges and, if required, facilitates the establishment of conditions for the initial deployment of other UN Forces.

2.1.4 High-Value Tasks. UN Special Forces bring unique and tailored capabilities to the Force Commander. These critical capabilities are designed to achieve strategic or operational effects by performing specialized tasks leading to the accomplishment of strategic- and operational-level objectives with high pay-off value. UN Special Forces should not be committed to military tasks more suitable for conventional forces.

2.1.5 Access to Intelligence. UN Special Operations need to be planned deliberately and with great precision. UN Special Forces rely on up-to-date and time-sensitive intelligence to ensure that plans are optimized precisely for the situation in the intended target area. Access to timely, detailed, tailored and fused all-source intelligence is essential for successful operations.

2.1.6 Chain of Command and Control. UN Special Forces require centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations. UN Special Forces are commanded at the highest appropriate level, i.e. at operational Force and sector level headquarters to ensure UN Special Forces are employed in the optimal manner. It is essential that the plans, orders, and procedures

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3 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of UN Special Forces organizations and command and control.
4 Mandated support to other military forces is subject to United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.
5 As seen in MINUSMA’s All Source Information Fusion Unit.
driving UN Special Forces employment are clear so that the commander’s intent is understood, even for complex operations. It is imperative that UN Special Forces command and control be closely integrated with the Force command and control through appropriate liaison, communication and information systems.

2.1.7 **Security.** Security is essential for success, ensuring protection of deployed teams and individual operators and minimizing political risks. UN Special Operations planning is often compartmentalized and planning staffs are deliberately kept small. Intelligence, counterintelligence and operational security should be integrated throughout the planning and execution of UN Special Operations to enhance security and achieve surprise (when needed). This requires a high degree of mutual trust between the different teams while controlling the flow of information throughout the organization.

2.1.8 **Military Rules of Engagement and Use of Force Directives for UN Special Forces.** At the beginning of a Mission, a technical directive is issued by UN Headquarters to each uniformed component. This directive provides specific instructions governing the use of unarmed and armed force in pursuit of the Mission’s mandate. For the military component, the directive is known as the Rules of Engagement. The Force Commander/Head of the Military Component is responsible for ensuring that UN Special Forces personnel are appropriately trained, familiarized and comply with the spirit and technical elements of the Rules of Engagement.

2.2 **Modes of Operation.** Political and military considerations often shape UN Special Operations, requiring either overt or more discreet modes of operation. Whether overt or discreet, security is paramount because it prevents an adversary from gaining essential information about the type, techniques, strength and capabilities of the forces involved in the operation.

2.3 **Mission Criteria**
The following questions should be asked when determining the advisability of UN Special Forces employment:

- **Is It Permissible?** The UN Special Forces mission must be in accordance with the UN mandate and the operation’s legal framework, including UN Rules of Engagement. Rules of Engagement formulation should consider specific UN Special Forces missions.

- **Is It Appropriate?** The mission must have aspects requiring the special skills and capabilities of UN Special Forces in order to be fully consistent with the operational-level commander’s objectives. To fulfill this requirement and avoid inappropriate employment, UN Special Forces staff must be involved in the planning of each phase of the operation.

- **Is It Feasible?** When an operation is deemed appropriate, it must be analysed to determine if it can be accomplished by the UN Special Forces assets available with support from the Mission. Furthermore, UN Special Forces elements must have adequate training, skills, planning and rehearsal time. Planning must consider and incorporate enabler support that enhances the operation’s feasibility.
• **Is It Sustainable?** In order to sustain UN Special Forces, consideration must be given to the duration, distance, environment and anticipated consequences. This requires special attention to information/intelligence, combat service support, medical support, routes, resupply, survival, recovery and communications.

• **Is It Justifiable?** The expected outcome should justify the risks faced when employing UN Special Forces. Commanders should recognize the high value and limited numbers of UN Special Forces and ensure that the benefits of success measure favourably when balanced with the risks. Risk assessment should take into account potential adverse effects on UN diplomatic and political interests, and the impact of losing UN Special Forces personnel, units and equipment.
Chapter 3

Capabilities and Tasks of UN Special Forces

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 UN Special Forces offer the Force Commander an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives and perform tasks creating strategic- and operational-level effects not normally delivered by conventional forces.

3.2 Main Capabilities

3.2.1 Prior to deployment in the Mission area, a UN Special Forces unit must achieve the required capability standards to meet the anticipated challenges. Having met these standards gives the UN Special Forces unit confidence that it can execute its tasks effectively. Knowing that its Special Forces unit is fully qualified provides UN leaders the assurance they need that Special Operations are feasible with the personnel and equipment available.

3.2.2 Categorization of UN Special Forces elements by the troop contributing country facilitates the deployment of a fully mission-capable UN Special Forces unit. To qualify as part of a UN Special Forces, a Troop Contributing Country’s Special Forces element should possess at least some of the following capabilities (See also Annex A):

- Conduct the three principle UN Special Forces tasks of Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance across the spectrum of military operations within a peacekeeping context;
- Ingress and egress into and out of the operational area;
- Sustain tactical operational elements in hostile areas;
- Conduct UN Special Operations by land, air and sea (including riverine operations) as relevant for responding quickly to emerging threats across the entire area of responsibility;
- Provide direction and information to deployed elements;
- Conduct mission planning;

6 Depending upon the nature of the generated Special Forces capability (land-, air- or maritime-based) and mission environmental requirements.
• Interface with other cultures and societies;

• Collect information by operating specific intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets including unmanned aerial systems;

• Cooperate closely with enablers including utility/attack helicopters and other aircraft;

• Provide and operate secure communications and information systems.

3.3 Principal Tasks

3.3.1 Special Reconnaissance

• UN Special Forces conduct Special Reconnaissance to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Special Reconnaissance provides specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information in support of the Force intelligence collection process. It may complement other collection methods where constraints are imposed by weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures, or the unavailability of other systems.

• Special Reconnaissance allows for sustained, targeted observation in hostile, denied, or sensitive territory. UN Special Forces can provide timely information by using its own analysis capability.

• UN Special Forces may conduct Special Reconnaissance tasks separately, cooperatively, supported by—or in support of conventional forces. UN Special Forces may use long-range reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and collection methods, and are generally augmented by collection conducted by UN conventional forces, host nation and other friendly forces. By carrying out these actions, UN Special Forces conducting Special Reconnaissance enhance the effectiveness of the Mission’s information analysis cell (including the All Source Information Fusion Unit where available). Activities within Special Reconnaissance may include:

  o **Environmental Reconnaissance.** Includes operations to collect information and report on operationally critical aspects of the environment such as hydrography, geology, geography, meteorology, oceanography, infrastructure, communications and logistics.

  o **Threat Assessment.** Whenever possible, threat assessments should be based on accurate and timely intelligence. Special Reconnaissance can assist the different levels of command in determining which elements of an adversarial force represent a threat to friendly operations. Special Reconnaissance also provides the

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7 As deployed in MINUSMA.
option to observe for sustained periods, providing the ability to interpret actions or behavior that may pose a threat.

- **Specific Assessment.** Operations conducted to identify, locate, and assess a specific objective and the environment in its vicinity to determine the most effective and appropriate course of action (such as continuing observation, influence operations, employing force, etc.). A specific assessment includes the risk of collateral damage should appropriate authorities decide to use force against the identified objective.

### 3.3.2 Special Tasks

- **Special Tasks** are precise operations limited in scope and duration conducted by UN Special Forces in order to acquire, disrupt, recover, neutralize or disable designated high-value and high-payoff objectives. Special Tasks differ from conventional action in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision used to create a specific effect. Special Tasks usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. Special Tasks are focused on specific, well-defined objectives of strategic and operational significance, or the conduct of decisive tactical operations. UN Special Forces may conduct Special Tasks independently, with support from conventional forces, or in support of conventional forces in the same area of operations. Special Tasks include:

  - **Assigned UN Special Operations.** These operations are designed to achieve specific, well-defined, and often time-sensitive results (in consonance with the Mission mandate). They are sometimes beyond the effective action capabilities of conventional force elements. Such operations typically involve actions against critical objectives primarily with surgical operations; interdicting lines of communication or other systems; or neutralizing adversary facilities or capabilities. Assigned UN Special Operations include identifying, tracking and locating objectives and landing sites for attack helicopters, and fire control for aircraft and indirect fires.

  - **Recovery Operations.** Operations conducted to search for, identify, locate, secure and recover personnel, sensitive equipment or critical items (e.g. UN observers, VIPs, isolated or threatened UN soldiers or personnel with designated status) to the security of the UN Mission from contested or adversary-controlled areas. Recovery Operations require the maintenance of UN Special Forces units on high readiness status, able to respond rapidly throughout the area of responsibility, including hostile territory. Recovery Operations may be extended to include the recovery of aircrew and passengers in the case of an aircraft crash, if no other adequate capability is available.

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8 Given authorization by the appropriate political authorities at the strategic level. Refer also to MONUSCO lessons learned.

9 As seen in lessons learned from MINUSMA and MONUSCO.
o **Hostage Rescue Operations.** Hostage Rescue Operations require unconventional techniques, skills and equipment and require close synchronization and coordination with conventional forces and enablers. In adherence with UN Security Management System Policies and Guidelines (*Security Policy Manual*, Chapter 4, section U, “Hostage Incident Management” and UNSMS Guidelines on Hostage Incident Management), Hostage Rescue Operations should not be conducted even if the capability is available in the UN Special Forces Task Force, unless such action has been deemed essential in order to save lives by the relevant authority in UN Hostage Incident Management. UN Special Forces, should be trained on the appropriate tactics and techniques and can assist, on exceptional occasions, in a Hostage Incident Management response for the safe and secure release of hostages, following a decision of the Designated Official and approval of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security.

o **Opposed Boarding Operations.** Defined as maritime or riverine interdiction of vessels or platforms, opposed boarding operations, if authorized, have a potential threat level requiring a highly deliberate process, accurate planning and expert execution.

### 3.3.3 Military Assistance

- **Military Assistance** is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence friendly assets through organized training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations, sometimes within the context of wider Security Sector Reform where mandated and subject to United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. The range of Military Assistance includes, but is not limited to, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and capability building of friendly security forces. UN Special Forces is the appropriate tool to perform Military Assistance to selected host nation special units. Military Assistance activities may include:

- **Training.** Activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment and integration of land, air, and maritime skills, provide assistance to designated leaders, and provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus enabling a nation to enhance its own military capability. While training is not strictly a Military Assistance task, UN Special Forces may have language skills and cultural knowledge that could prove essential. Moreover, UN Special Forces’ high training standards and tactical expertise can assist the Mission in training other elements of the UN Force. Training of this type may include the development of tactical SOPs or other specialized instruction suitable to the environment and threat.

- **Advising.** Activities improving the performance of designated actors by providing advice and knowledge to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

- **Mentoring.** Activities conducted by small teams of subject matter experts working closely with supported local units. Mentoring provides direction and guidance to
3.4 Other Tasks

3.4.1 Liaison and Engagement. In order to gain situational awareness and a better understanding of the operating environment, and to collect information where appropriate and commensurate with the mandate, UN Special Forces can liaise and engage with various appropriate factions in the area of responsibility. The information available from various host actors can not only be vital in supporting UN Special Operations, it will also support the overall Mission. The assignment of capable liaison officers is especially relevant in supporting Military Assistance tasks. Liaison and engagement are important for information monitoring and improve situational awareness. Force protection may be enhanced in remote areas by contacting indigenous elements. Information gathered must be integrated into the Mission’s intelligence process/cycle in order to develop Joint intelligence preparation of the Mission area and support the operations planning process.

3.5 Air\textsuperscript{10} and Maritime Tasks

3.5.1 UN Special Operations are primarily conducted to create desired effects on the ground. Occasionally, there may be requirements for special air and maritime\textsuperscript{11} capabilities depending on the Mission and mandate.

3.5.2 General Military Aviation in Support of UN Special Forces. UN aviation assets are used to augment the airlift, fire support, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of UN Special Forces. These resources offer a vital capability enabling the UN Special Forces commander to address the full range of Mission threats, environments and requirements. UN military aviation assets will probably not be specialists in UN Special Operations. However, these aviation assets can, with appropriate training and briefing, be included in UN Special Operations, thus offering high operational responsiveness and effectiveness. While such integration can be resource intensive, at the very least UN Special Forces should be co-located or affiliated with such enablers and the arrangement codified under UN Headquarters-generated Statements of Unit Requirements and Mission SOPs. When possible, officially formalizing the affiliation of selected military aviation units with UN Special Forces ensures their critical availability at short notice.

3.5.3 UN Special Forces Air Operations

- Conducted by dedicated UN Special Forces air units (when authorized), this capability can support each of the UN Special Forces principal tasks. As part of Military Assistance, special air operations can provide advisors to host/friendly nations to bolster failed or emerging air capabilities. Under Special Reconnaissance, dedicated special air operations conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance using highly specialized

\textsuperscript{10} Including rotary-wing aviation.
\textsuperscript{11} Refer to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Military Unit Manuals on Aviation, Maritime and Riverine Operations for details on the principles of employment in those environments.
aerial platforms. Under Special Tasks, special air operations provide enhanced air transportation and specialized air to ground force protection, primarily in support of UN Special Forces.

- **Special Air Missions.** The primary mission of UN Special Forces air units is enhanced air mobility—specialized air transportation activities for UN Special Forces via fixed- or rotary-wing. Other special air activities may include insertion and extraction of UN Special Forces, personnel recovery, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) for UN Special Forces.

3.5.4 **UN Special Forces Maritime Operations.** UN Maritime Special Operations are conducted in coastal, riverine and maritime environments. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed and precision, for example:

- Insertion/extraction by water (sea or internal waters) for land and other UN Special Operations.

- Recovery or protection of ships and maritime oil installations.

- Opposed boarding and search of vessels and platforms.

- Coastal reconnaissance.

3.6 **Inappropriate Tasks**

3.6.1 UN Special Forces should *not* be routinely used for Personnel Security Detachment tasks.

3.6.2 UN Special Forces should *not* be designated as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). QRF is a task better suited for appropriately composed and trained infantry units. However, with support from helicopters and infantry or light armored units, UN Special Forces could form the advance element of a stronger QRF, reacting quickly and facilitating the commitment of follow-on forces.

3.6.3 UN Special Forces are *not suitable* as a reserve force since UN Special Forces have the potential and specialized skills to shape disproportionally the overall operational environment. Nevertheless UN Special Forces, placed directly under the Force or sector commander, may offer an additional quick, mobile and highly skilled force available for suitable UN Special Operations tasks.
Chapter 4

Organization of UN Special Forces

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 This chapter builds upon UN Special Forces principles, characteristics, capabilities and tasks covered previously, describes the UN Special Forces company-level organization currently in use, and provides a recommended UN Special Forces organization, command and control arrangement, and role and function for various UN Special Forces elements that should be applied at any point in the future should the UN ever have the need for a Special Forces structure beyond the company level.

4.1.2 This chapter approaches the subject of UN Special Forces organization as a subordinate element of the Mission’s overall military component, and describes in outline the requirements regarding individual operators, units and sub-units, staff and advisors at Force Headquarters level. This chapter describes the interrelationship between UN Special Forces and conventional forces, and reflects the relevant lessons and best practices within and beyond the UN experience.12

4.2 Organization

4.2.1 In peacekeeping operations, UN Special Forces are part of the Mission’s military component (along with other military units and branches such as aviation, riverine and engineer units), and work in close coordination with UN civilian substantive and support components and the UN police.

4.2.2 Currently deployed UN Special Forces are based on a company-level organization. The currently-deployed UN Special Forces company is approximately 150 persons including a 4 person headquarters, 5 special forces detachments of roughly 22 persons each, and a support platoon of 36 persons. The structure, number of detachments/sub-units and personnel of this organization are adjustable based on Mission requirements. See the chart below:

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12 UN Special Forces have traditionally been deployed as Force or sector assets and have often been designated “Special Forces Companies,” usually without dedicated representation at Force Headquarters. The lack of dedicated representation, however, is changing as commanders increasingly recognize the importance of totally integrating and controlling Special Forces depends on a better understanding of their capabilities and limitations. Modern day peacekeeping operations have adopted broader Special Forces organizations that are better integrated with the Force and Sector Headquarters.
Current UN Special Forces Company Organization

Approximately 150 Persons Total

(Actual numbers and organization are tailored to specific Mission requirements.)
4.2.3 Should future UN Mission requirements so dictate, a UN Special Forces organizational model beyond the company-level can be based on a UN Special Forces battalion-equivalent—commonly called a Special Forces Task Force (see the charts below) that includes a UN Special Forces Headquarters with specific liaison elements and company-level UN Special Special Forces Task Groups. Like the current UN Special Forces organization, the UN Special Forces Task Group is composed of one or more detachments. Each detachment is composed of a number of UN Special Forces Teams. Together, the UN Special Forces organization serves at the operational and tactical levels and is led by a UN Special Forces Headquarters at the Force Headquarters. These terms, UN Special Forces Task Force, Group, Detachment and Team will be used throughout the remainder of this manual.
UN Special Forces Generic Task Force Organization

Task Force Commander serves as SF Advisor and reports directly to the FC/HOM or Sector Commander.

General Description:
- TF Headquarters
- Special Operations Task Force
- Service Support Group
- Air Group
- Liaison Component

Configuration (as required):
- Special Tasks Team
- Reconnaissance Team
- Military Assistance Team
- Combat Support Team (Heavy Machine Gun, Mortars, etc.)

Configuration:
- Task Force (TF)
- Group
- Special Operations Task Detachment
- Service Support Detachment
- SF Detachment
- Service Team
- Logistical Team
- Medical Team
- Transport Team
- Catering Team
- Signals Team
- Logistics Team
- Maintenance Team

Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) Headquarters

160

Group

12/1/5

SF Det

1/1/2

Team

0/1/5

Service Team

1/1/2

Logistics Team

0/1/5

Medical Team

2/1/8

Catering Team

0/1/4

Transport Team

0/0/8

Signals Team

0/1/5

Configuration (as required):

- Medium Lift Helicopters
- Attack Helicopters

(Note: Similar arrangements when riverine and/or maritime assets are deployed)

xx = Total Numbers

Note: Numbers provided for example purposes only. Actual numbers are tailored to the requirements of specific missions and locations.
UN Special Forces Headquarters

SF Task Force Commander

Deputy TF Commander

COS

J1 - Human Resource

J2 - Intelligence

J3 - Operations

J4 - Logistics

Tactical Operations Center

SF Staff

SF Staff

SF Staff

SF Staff

SF Staff

SF Staff

J5 - Plans

J6 - Signals

J7 - Training

J8 - Engineer

J9 - CIMIC

SF Planning & Liaison Element

SF C2 Coord Element

SF Liaison Team

SF Air/Maritime or Riverine Liaison Element

Liaison Component

Force Commander

DCOS Dept

Sector HQ

Mission Level

JOC

JMAC

DMS

JLOC

ISS

UN Police

Note: Actual numbers and organizational elements are tailored to the specific requirements of each mission and location.
4.2.4 UN Special Forces Task Force

- **UN Special Forces Headquarters.** The UN Special Forces Headquarters is a Joint, Force-level headquarters command and staff organization serving as the UN Special Forces tool at that level. The UN Special Forces Headquarters’ role is to prepare, plan and execute UN Special Operations at the Force-level. It is co-located with the Force Headquarters and the Force Commander/Head of Military Component. Regardless of the size of UN Special Forces presence, UN Special Forces operations are fully integrated and controlled into the overall plan, and are under the overall command of the Force Commander/Head of Military Component. This command and control structure ensures UN Special Forces’ full operational control and integration with the Mission’s conventional forces. Generally speaking, the UN Special Forces Headquarters is built around a framework unit, with other UN Special Forces contributors also providing staff officers. Its size depends on the mission, the theatre, threats and the number of units under it. Its commander serves as the Force or sector commander’s UN Special Forces Advisor. The Task Force structure is flexible and includes, as required and in alignment with the Force’s overall structure various command and control, planning and liaison functions (see the remainder of this chapter for further details).

- **UN Special Forces Task Group.** The Task Group is a company-equivalent and the main operating unit within UN Special Forces. The Task Group is a multipurpose organization, able to conduct Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks, Military Assistance and other missions. A Task Group is a self-sustaining, task-organized unit, generally composed of UN land and/or maritime/air Special Forces. A Task Group includes a command element and is able to plan and conduct operations. While they are generally constituted by a single nation’s personnel, a Task Group may be composed of detachments from multiple troop contributing countries. Task Group strength can range from 50 to 160 personnel.

- **UN Special Forces Task Detachments.** UN Special Forces Task Detachments within a Task Group represent the lowest UN Special Forces tactical level combat element with a tactical command element included. A detachment is able to deploy by air, land, sea or internal waters and can conduct UN Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance missions. Even when the Task Group is composed of multiple troop contributing countries, UN Special Forces detachments should generally remain comprised of a single nation’s personnel to preserve the utmost tactical requirement for unit coherence. Detachment strength is between 20 and 50 personnel. A detachment can be generic or specialized for Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks or other missions or tailored to environmental and/or mobility requirements such as air, water, mountain, etc.

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13 Since it typically provides the preponderance of personnel and equipment, a Special Forces framework unit is normally responsible for providing part of the command and control, support and CIS capabilities for the Special Forces Headquarters.
14 Also referred to as “Special Forces Companies” in UN peacekeeping operations.
15 This Manual deliberately refrains from prescribing specific numbers and tactical organizations in recognition of the fact that each nation’s Special Forces tends to be uniquely organized. The focus, we believe, is best centered on capabilities and tasks delivering effects.
- **UN Special Forces Air/Maritime Task Detachments.** Wherever possible, one UN Special Forces Task Detachment should include integral air assets such as tactical fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and boat support provided by the UN Special Forces Air and Maritime Task Detachments. At higher echelons, an entire UN Special Forces Air Task Group and UN Special Forces Maritime Task Group can be placed in support of the Task Force.

- When such organic assets are not available, at a minimum co-location or affiliation with the Mission’s conventional air assets should be arranged and reflected in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Statement of Unit Requirement and Mission OPORDs/SOPs, thereby officially formalizing their affiliation with UN Special Forces and ensuring availability on short notice.

- **UN Special Forces Teams.** UN Special Forces Teams are the core operational elements of UN Special Operation Task Detachments. They are specialized and able to conduct UN Special Forces principal missions. UN Special Forces team strength is approximately 6 to 15 personnel.

**UN Special Forces Generic Organization**

This structure applies if an Air Detachment is required and available as part of the UN Special Forces Task Group. Alternatively, an entire Special Ops Air Group can be placed in support of the Task Force. The Maritime Task Group may include a Riverine Detachment, if required.
4.3 Command and Control

4.3.1 Command and Control Authority

- The Force Commander exercises Operational Control (OPCON) over all military personnel in the Mission, including UN Special Forces. OPCON allows the Force Commander to assign separate tasks to units and sub-units of the military component as required within the Mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the senior national officer of the affected unit/sub-unit who is responsible for administrative control of the unit/sub-unit. Consequently, UN Special Forces remain under OPCON of the Force Commander and only he can place them under Tactical Control (TACON) of another commander.

- The troop contributing country retains administrative control over non-operational, administrative issues concerning its deployed military personnel and units. Administrative control is exercised by a senior national officer of a contributed military contingent within a Mission area. This administrative control authority is limited to matters such as personnel management, supply and services. Military personnel assigned to serve under OPCON shall not act on national direction or instructions if those instructions may result in actions contrary to UN policies or adversely affect Mission mandate implementation.

- The Force Commander has the UN authority to employ UN Special Forces throughout the Mission area and, as such, UN Special Forces must prepare for Mission-wide commitment. Currently, the UN deploys company or platoon-sized Special Forces units that must be fully integrated into the Mission’s conventional operations. In the case of this rather limited UN Special Forces presence, the Force Commander may deem it appropriate to subordinate the UN Special Forces unit to one or more sector commanders. If, in the future, Mission requirements make it necessary to have a battalion-sized UN Special Forces Task Force, the UN Special Forces Task Force Commander would be delegated TACON of all UN Special Forces sub-units deployed. In those Missions with a rotary- or fixed-wing UN Special Forces Air Task Group or Maritime Task Group, these highly valuable and scarce assets would also be kept OPCON to the Force Commander and TACON to the UN Special Forces Task Force Commander.

- The principle command and control arrangement for UN Special Forces in peacekeeping operations is centralized. However, Mission circumstances may require the reconfiguration of the UN Special Forces command and control structure into a more decentralized or delegated manner. In such cases, the UN Special Forces unit remains OPCON to the Force Commander but it or its sub-units may be placed in whole or part under TACON of a sector/brigade commander. It should be noted that TACON of UN Special Forces units must not be delegated below the sector/brigade level, and only for limited periods of time or the duration of a particular operation.

- When placed under decentralized command and control, the UN Special Forces parent unit maintains a technical and functional link with its detached UN Special Forces sub-
units that are under TACON to the sector/brigade commander. This technical and functional link ensures the appropriate and effective use of UN Special Forces at the sector level and maintains operational security. The UN Special Forces parent unit systematically deploys liaison officers to all relevant headquarters to facilitate the link between sector/brigade-level TACON and Force Commander-level OPCON of UN Special Forces units.

- **4.3.2 Integrating UN Special Forces with UN Conventional Forces.** The full integration and control of UN Special Forces into the Mission’s overall command and control structure is key to the success of both Special and Conventional Operations. UN Special Forces command and control must be clear, unambiguous, tailored and task organized for each peacekeeping mission. Regardless of whether the UN Special Forces unit is company or battalion sized, the intent is to ensure full UN Special Forces operational integration, command and control under the overall Mission plan. The most effective way of ensuring that integration is by having the UN Special Forces parent unit commander co-locate with the Force Headquarters and maintain liaison with each sector/brigade headquarters.
Typical UN Decentralized C2

SRSG/HOMC

DMS

JLOC+Mission Support
(Includes Aviation & Mission Air Operations Center)

Special Ops Liaison Element
Air/Maritime/Riverine/
Logistical/Medical Support

Special Ops Advisor Cell

FC
Force Headquarters

Special Ops Planning & Liaison Element

Operational Control

Special Forces Task Force

Special Ops C2 Element

Tactical Control

Special Forces Task Group

Special Forces Detachments

JOC/JMAC

Sector Headquarters

Special Forces Task Group

Special Forces Detachments

Task Groups may be placed in whole or in part (such as select Detachments) under TACON of a Sector
4.3.3 **Key Principles for the Command and Control of UN Special Forces**

- UN Special Forces expertise must be involved from the beginning of the planning phase of each peacekeeping operation.

- The chain of command must authorize a direct link between the UN Special Forces Task Force and the Force Commander.

- The UN Special Forces Task Force must liaise with the Force Headquarters, any forward Force Headquarters, Sector Headquarters and with all appropriate units when operations require joint participation of conventional units and UN Special Forces. Conventional forces Headquarters must integrate those liaison elements and internally develop staff capacity for integrated planning, conduct and support of UN Special Operations.

- The principles and procedures for cooperation between UN Special Forces and conventional forces must be understood by all headquarters, particularly between the Task Force and Force Headquarters.

- Synergies with conventional forces must be developed, but specific UN Special Forces communications, information systems and combat service support (CSS) must remain UN Special Forces-embedded to ensure UN Special Forces Task Force autonomy and responsiveness. UN Special Forces-owned communications and information systems and CSS must be ensured prior to deployment.

- Intelligence/information sharing must occur between UN Special Forces (Task Force and Group) and conventional forces (Force Headquarters, sector/brigade headquarters, battalion headquarters) and civilian and police components. An intelligence/information fusion center\(^\text{16}\) is a good solution for that purpose.

4.3.4 **UN Special Forces Task Force Commander and the Force Commander/Head of Military Component**: At the operational level, the Task Force Commander is responsible to the Force Commander for making recommendations on the proper use of UN Special Forces. The Task Force Commander is responsible for planning and conducting UN Special Operations in support of the Force Commander.

4.3.5 **UN Special Forces Advisor**: The UN Special Forces Advisor is a special staff officer designated to facilitate the integration of UN Special Forces into the UN Force from the start of mission planning through operations in the field. When there is no UN Special Forces Advisor within the Force Headquarters, the UN Special Forces Task Force Commander will assume this advisory function. He conducts coordination with other Force Commander advisors to include legal, medical, public information and provost marshal. When there is no UN Special Forces Task Force present, the Chief of the UN Special Operations Planning and Liaison Element (SOPLE) can be dual-hatted to fulfill this role.

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\(^{16}\) Such as the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in MINUSMA.
4.3.6 UN Special Forces Task Force Composition: The Task Force must be composed of experienced Special Operations staff officers. The Task Force is built upon an agreed UN Special Forces “framework unit,” sometimes augmented by staff personnel from various troop contributing countries including non-UN Special Forces personnel when required.

- The Task Force commander is normally a full colonel or equivalent rank, Special Forces-qualified and, if possible, has UN Mission experience. He is generally provided by the Task Force framework unit’s troop contributing country.

- The Task Force is organized into cells from J1 to J9 as relevant, and staff officers are Special Operations and Joint experienced.

- The Task Force framework unit is in charge of specific combat service support (see Chapter 5, Support for UN Special Forces).

4.4 UN Special Forces Planning

To ensure full integration into overall Mission operations, UN Special Forces planning takes place within the context of the Integrated Assessment and Planning Process and the UN Military Planning Process.

4.4.1 Integrated Assessment and Planning Process

- The UN Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) process defines the minimum, mandatory requirements for conducting integrated assessments and planning in conflict and post-conflict settings. In these settings, it is assumed that an integrated UN presence is either in place or being considered, and the policy outlines the responsibilities of UN actors in the IAP process. By integrating the assessment and planning process, the UN maximizes its individual and collective impact in peace consolidation. UN Special Forces analysis and planning takes place within the Military Planning Process (MPP), and thereby contributes to the overall IAP process.

- While full integration is not always possible, common strategic objectives for peace consolidation can be reached between the UN’s political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, human rights and development entities. These entities can share a common analysis, and the agreed upon strategic objectives then serve as a starting point for planning and implementing responses in conflict and post-conflict settings. The IAP process applies from the very beginning of Mission planning and analysis, through the establishment of the Integrated Task Force, and concludes with the Mission’s withdrawal as directed by UN Headquarters.

- In practice, the IAP provides for joint conduct of strategic assessments, articulation of a common UN vision and priority establishment. The IAP also establishes responsibilities supporting peace consolidation, considers the relationship of UN activity, if any, to national plans and priorities, integrates organizational and operational mechanisms in the field and at UN Headquarters and integrates monitoring and reporting. The military
The perspective enhances the IAP Mission analysis and planning at UN Headquarters (and later in the field) through the Military Planning Process.

4.4.2 Military Planning Process

- The Military Planning Process (MPP) is a logical process facilitating the timely planning and complex decision-making required by peacekeeping operations. The MPP is an assumption-based method that analyses known information and deduces unknown information using risk-managed assumptions. The MPP is designed to serve as a comprehensive process forcing planners to consider the full scope of determining factors before presuming a military solution. It is critical that planners follow the process sequentially, understand the risks associated with the assumptions they make and refrain from shaping their analysis to suit a predetermined course of action.

- **MPP Phases**: There are five distinct phases of MPP at both UN and Force Headquarters levels:
  - Analysis of the Operational Environment.
  - Mission Analysis.
  - Course of Action Development.
  - Course of Action Analysis and Decision.
  - Production of CONOPS, Force Requirements and Rules of Engagement.

- **UN Headquarters Level**: The MPP provides planning guidance by developing strategic and operational plans for military components of current and future peacekeeping operations. This guidance is a product of close coordination with partners within the UN system, and delivers comprehensive military peacekeeping solutions with a high probability of success. UN Special Forces-specific input for UN Headquarters-level planning is incorporated through the UN Special Forces focal point at the Office of the Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters.

- The MPP is most commonly used to establish the military concept of new missions, to review the military operations of current missions after a significant change in circumstances, or to develop contingency plans in response to developing crises. Under the MPP, the following products are prepared before any further operational or tactical planning:
  - Operational Estimate.
  - Concept of Operations.
  - Statements of Force/Unit Requirements.
  - Rules of Engagement.
• **Force Headquarters Level:** At this level, the MPP’s main product is the Force Operations Order (OPORD)\(^ {17} \) which incorporates the CONOPS, Force Requirements and Rules of Engagement issued earlier by UN Headquarters, and the parameters within which the Force Commander and his staff may formulate their military options. The CONOPS and Force Requirements do not prescribe how a Force Commander is to conduct operations, but they do provide the structure, concept and strategic intent to ensure the Force Commander is meeting Security Council goals. UN Special Forces-specific input for Force Headquarters level planning is provided by the UN Special Forces Advisor.

• **Operating Unit Level:** There are no prescribed UN planning processes at the operating unit level (company and below for UN Special Forces). However, UN Special Forces conducts its own operator-level planning under Task Force guidance in line with overarching UN values, principles and guidelines. The Task Group typically follows its standard national military planning process and produces unit-level OPORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), based on the Force OPORD and other relevant directives.

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**Phases of the Military Planning Process**

- Phase 1 – Analysis of the Operating Environment
- Phase 2 – Mission Analysis
- Phase 3 – Course of Action Development
- Phase 4 – Course of Action Analysis and Decision
- Phase 5
  - At UN Headquarters Level – Production of CONOPS, SFR/SUR, and ROE
  - At Force Headquarters Level –

**Note:** Phase 1 is ongoing throughout the process. Each Phase is reviewed as the process progresses.

\(^ {17} \) See also, *Military Planning Process, Guidelines for Use by Field Missions*, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs. December 2009.
4.5 Planning and Liaison

4.5.1 UN Special Operations Planning and Liaison Element

- The Task Force must dedicate personnel to joint, integrated and parallel analysis planning with the Force Headquarters. These liaison officers form an element that contributes to the Force’s operations planning in close coordination with the UN Special Forces Task Force.

- The planning and liaison element coordinates with the Force Headquarters to facilitate intelligence sharing and synchronization of UN Special Operations with other operations. The planning and liaison element coordinates with the mission support component, particularly through the Joint Logistics and Operations Center (JLOC). If applicable, the element prepares the UN Special Operations Annex of the Force Operations Order (OPORD), endorsed by the Task Force Commander and validated by the Force Commander.

- The element plays a key role in establishing support arrangements for UN Special Operations pursuant to the support concept, where critical aspects of UN Special Operations are described and procedures established for logistical support, security, communications, transportation, supply, general services and medical support.

4.5.2 UN Special Operations Liaison Element for Aviation Support

- Where necessary, the Task Force will designate personnel to coordinate with relevant command and control Headquarters and civilian support services, in particular aviation support.

- Aviation support capacities may include peacekeeping military air units, including tactical fixed-wing aircraft as well as utility, observation and attack helicopters placed OPCON\(^{18}\) to the Force Commander/Head of Military Component. Aviation support can also include a transportation cell in the Field Operations Support unit managing Mission aviation (including military transport helicopters), movement control and MEDEVAC/CASEVAC arrangements. Under this arrangement, aviation support is placed under the authority of the Director/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS)\(^{19}\).

- The aviation support liaison element may be collocated with the military air component headquarters, or with the DFS headquarters, depending on the chain of command deployed for UN Mission air assets. The aviation support liaison element should also establish a link with the Mission Air Operations Centre (MAOC) responsible for airspace coordination.

\(^{18}\) See definition in, 2008-4, Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations, March 2009.

4.5.3 **Special Operations Command and Control Liaison Element**

- The Task Force Special Operations Command and Control liaison element coordinates with conventional forces Headquarters in order to synchronize and deconflict operations.

- The command and control liaison element should be collocated with the appropriate conventional force Headquarters (sector, battalion, Maritime Force, etc.), especially when UN Special and conventional forces are conducting integrated operations, and when UN Special Operations are launched within a conventional force area of operations.
Force or Sector Headquarters Plug-In Points and Main Functions

**Force or Sector Commander**

**COS** is the Key Staff Operational Integrator

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**As required / relevant to:**

- DMS/CMS, JLOC, JMARC, JOC
- Relevant Cells under DCOS PET, DCOS OPS and DCOS OPS SUPPORT

- Conducts liaison and parallel planning with relevant cells of Force and Sector Headquarters.
- Contributed to SF planning for the UN Force, facilitating close coordination between the SF Task Force/Group and the Force or Sector Headquarters.
- Liaises with Force or Sector Headquarters to facilitate intelligence sharing, supports the synchronisation of SF with other operations. Establishes the SF Annex of the OPORD, submits Annex to SF TF Cdr and validated by Sector/Force Commander and DPKO.
- Participates in building SF support as described in the Mission Support Plan. Critical topics for SF are described and procedures are established for logistical support, security, communications, transportation, supply, general services and medical support.

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**As required / relevant to:**

- Military Air Component Headquarters,
- Or with the DFS/DMS/CMS Headquarters

- Depending on the chain of command deployed for UN Mission air assets.
- Liaison Element will establish a link with the Mission Air Operations Centre, which is responsible for coordination of air space.

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**As required / relevant to:**

- Relevant conventional force Headquarters (Sector, Battalion, Force,

- Permanent or temporary, to liaise and develop synergy with conventional force Headquarters in order to synchronize, deconflict and coordinate operational efforts.
- Deployed when SF and conventional forces are conducting integrated operations and when SF are launched in the conventional force Area of Operations.
4.6 Cooperation Between UN Special and Conventional Forces: Command and Control Implications

4.6.1 In order to achieve the needed level of coordination between UN Special Forces and conventional forces, certain basic principles must be applied:

- Integrate UN Special and conventional forces in the early planning stages;
- While tasking UN Special and conventional forces, first determine the permissibility, appropriateness, viability, feasibility and justifiability of proposed missions;
- Establish a robust coordination process between UN Special and conventional forces;
- Establish a clear chain of command for UN Special Forces and deploy (permanently or temporarily) a UN Special Forces advisor (typically the UN Special Forces Task Force Commander) with the Force Commander, and UN Special Operations liaison elements for planning, air, maritime, and command and control at all relevant levels of command;
- Tailor UN Special Operations liaison teams to the Mission by experience, rank, number of personnel, communications and information system assets, etc.);
- Develop mutual knowledge and common understanding between UN Special and conventional forces, ideally before deployment and at least prior to any field engagement regarding capabilities, limitations, planning processes, command and control structure and processes, mobility, fire power, interoperability, survivability, risk management and operational/personnel security.

4.6.2 Supporting/Supported Principle

- It is important to clarify the relationship between UN Special and conventional forces when both are committed in the same operation. In line with best practices, the relationship is defined as one playing a supporting role for the other. In a UN Special Operation, conventional forces play a supporting role to the UN Special Forces. In most such cases, a UN Special Operation requires some form of conventional force support essential to accomplish the mission, including reinforcement, reserves, firepower, maneuver units, etc.
- In a conventional force operation, UN Special Forces may be in the supporting role. In either supported or supporting roles, UN Special Forces often acts within a different timetable and space framework than conventional forces, but always acts in full integration with the Mission’s overall effort. In every case, interoperability and knowledge of UN equipment must be ensured.
Chapter 5

Support for UN Special Forces

5.1 The UN Mission Logistical Framework

5.1.1 Logistics support, including Combat Service Support (CSS), in a UN Mission is provided by the Director or Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The DMS/CMS is assisted by a senior military logistician. The Mission Support Plan is published under the authority of the DMS/CMS. The Mission Support Plan is the authoritative basis for the planning and management of logistics support in the UN Mission.

5.2 Combat Service Support In UN Special Operations

5.2.1 UN Special Forces generally operate in hostile and austere environments and always with small units, deployed deep into the Mission area of responsibility, potentially in isolation from other UN Forces and far from any logistical base. As such, UN Special Forces units should not expect to live in hard-walled accommodations *when on operations* during their deployment, and should expect to provide for themselves most, if not all, of their life support requirements. The UN will make every effort to meet the life support provisions stated in the applicable statement of unit requirements and MOU as described below in this chapter. However, operational necessity will require UN Special Forces units, more than any other type of unit, to be self-sufficient and “survive by their wits” as they are trained to do.

5.2.2 A specialized CSS arrangement is therefore essential to support UN Special Operations and could include specific CSS capabilities and procedures such as airdrop, air resupply, caches, riverine resupply, local resupply, etc. The CSS arrangement must be well prepared and planned during the early stages of Mission planning, and for each UN Special Operation once deployed.

5.2.3 UN support to Special Forces includes, but is not limited to, logistics, rations and fuel, strategic deployment movement of Contingent Owned Equipment and personnel from the home country to the Mission area, as well as support to in-theater movement of medical capabilities beyond level I, including CASEVAC capability.

5.3 UN Support Process: From Pre-Deployment to the Mission Area

5.3.1 The role of DFS in supporting UN military units is encompassed in the Mission Support Concept. See also the UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) for further discussion of unit-level support structures, categories of support capabilities, engineering support, Contingent Owned Equipment and the MOU, National Support Elements, the Letter of Assist, administrative policies and the critical issue of Contingent-Owned Equipment and personnel movement.
5.3.2 As with any military unit in UN peacekeeping, troop contributing countries must take advantage of the various opportunities existing prior to deployment to ensure the best possible preparation of personnel and units. The troop contributing country reconnaissance (the UN authorized field visit for key commanders and staff prior to unit deployment) and the subsequent Pre-Deployment Visit (PDV) by UN peacekeeping experts to the troop contributing country, both serve to assist and advise in deployment preparation and support.

5.3.3 Unique Equipment, Self-Sustainment and Reimbursement for Contingent-Owned Equipment

- Major equipment, if not in the Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) Manual, will be treated as “special case” equipment if the situation requires. Maintenance of this equipment is a troop/police contributor responsibility if the equipment is under wet lease. In accordance with the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual, any special minor equipment or consumables not covered by the standard self-sustainment rates can be handled as “unique equipment.” These items will be handled through bilateral, special case arrangements between the troop/police contributor and the UN.

- While most Contingent-Owned Equipment items and scales would be as covered in the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual, UN Special Forces operational requirements vary significantly in certain aspects, such as the scale of issue of night vision devices and High Frequency communications (see Annex B). The additional costs to the troop contributing country for these extraordinary requirements may be reimbursed as negotiated with UN Headquarters.

5.3.4 The UN Mission and Contingent-Owned Communications and Information Technology Systems

- A UN Special Forces Task Force (battalion equivalent)-specific communication and information technology system is deployed by a UN Special Forces framework unit down to each UN Special Forces Task Group (company equivalent) and liaison cell to ensure adequate security as required for UN Special Operations. The Task Force’s internal communications and information systems are provided by each troop contributing country.

- Nevertheless, equipment for communications between the Mission Headquarters and the Task Force, as well as between the Task Force and its deployed Task Groups, is also provided as UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE). UNOE ensures that UN Special Forces has integral secure military grade communications within the Mission communications network.

5.4 CASEVAC and Medical Support

5.4.1 For comprehensive guidance on medical operational, logistical and administrative guidelines for Member States, UN Headquarters and field Missions, the Medical Support Manual

5.4.2 In addition to a host of other essential information, the Medical Support Manual provides information on the command and control structure for integrating medical support in field Missions, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures, pre-deployment medical screening requirements, entitlements to medical care in field Missions and certification requirements for field Mission medical professionals.

5.4.3 **UN Special Forces Casualty Evacuation:** UN Special Forces often operate in small numbers deep into adversary-held territory making Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) operations both critical and challenging. To mitigate these challenges, UN Special Forces CASEVAC requires detailed planning and training, pre-arranging for dedicated evacuation resources and providing enhanced medical capability.

5.4.4 **Detailed CASEVAC Planning and Training:** During the planning phase of each operation, special attention is given to CASEVAC capabilities, procedures and timing with the UN Special Operations Advisor to the Force Commander/Head of Military Component (typically the UN Special Forces Task Force/Group Commander) and UN Special Operations Planning and Liaison Elements coordinating to ensure seamless medical support. UN Mission MEDEVAC/ CASEVAC assets and Level II/III Hospitals will provide specific medical support and train with the Mission’s UN Special Forces contingent. MEDEVAC/ CASEVAC training is aimed at interoperability with enablers, such as air assets, and other components such as the Quick Reaction Force. When conventional CASEVAC assets are not available or appropriate, alternate UN Special Forces-oriented/dedicated CASEVAC is arranged using unconventional assets and procedures. UN Special Forces CASEVAC typically involves UN Special Forces units making use of local casualty extrication means and modes, including the use of locally sourced vehicles, aviation and maritime assets. These unconventional CASEVAC procedures are arranged in advance of any UN Special Operations mission.

5.4.5 **Dedicated CASEVAC Resources:** UN Special air activities for the extraction of UN Special Forces personnel, including CASEVAC, must be planned in advance using dedicated resources to include extrication means, medical teams and the necessary liaison component. UN Special Forces CASEVAC in deep operations require dedicated aviation assets, intelligence support, local/national liaison capability, logistics support, supplies, infrastructure and related force protection, ground transportation, sustainment, maintenance, medical support and UN Mission-specific Communications and Information Technology Systems (CITS). Aviation support capacities may include peacekeeping military air units, including tactical fixed-wing aircraft as well as utility, observation and attack helicopters. Aviation planning support can also be provided by transportation cell in the Field Operations Support unit managing Mission aviation (including military transport helicopters), movement control and MEDEVAC/CASEVAC arrangements. Under this arrangement, aviation support is placed under the authority of the Director/ Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). Dedicated resources must be planned for and obtained in advance. Due to the characteristics of UN Special

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Forces, the potential isolation of small UN Special Forces detachments and responsiveness/flexibility of UN Special Forces operational deployments, careful consideration must be given to the suitability, availability and appropriateness of relying on host nation support.

5.4.6 **Enhanced CASEVAC Medical Capability:** UN Special Forces units will have their own integral aeromedical evacuation teams capable of stabilizing casualties while awaiting CASEVAC and during transportation to the next level of medical care. Each UN Special Forces Task Detachment (platoon equivalent) may also be configured to include a dedicated UN Special Forces medical team as required. Beyond the UN Special Forces contingent’s responsibility to provide its own Level I Hospital, more comprehensive medical support is provided by the UN mission. The UN Mission’s medical branch must have the necessary flexibility to adequately stock medical supplies and support UN Special Forces units that have a relatively high mobility and more limited footprint on the ground. The ability to evacuate UN Special Forces casualties to Level II and III Hospitals must be pre-arranged and verified before each UN Special Operation mission.

5.5 **Troop Contributing Country Support**

5.5.1 Logistical support for UN Special Forces units is the responsibility of the Troop Contributing Country, except where otherwise provided by the UN Mission or host nation. As UN Special Forces Task Groups (company equivalent) are normally nationally formed, each Task Group must include a logistics and support element, primarily dealing with national support and integrating support from other sources such as the UN Mission or host nation.

5.6 **UN Mission Support**

5.6.1 Overall logistical support for UN Special Forces units is coordinated through the Task Force. For that, the Task Force must liaise with both the Force Headquarters logistical structure (DCOS Operations Support, U-4 LOG, U-1 PER) and the Integrated Mission Component Support Structure (Joint Logistics Operations Centre – JLOC, and DMS/CMS).

5.6.2 Operations planning will determine the specific logistics requirements and the associated logistics command and control structures for each operation when UN Special Forces is committed.

5.6.3 Resupply of deployed UN Special Forces units in remote areas is planned and executed as an operational task using aircraft and specific operational security procedures, if required.

5.7 **What to Expect: Typical Logistical Support for Special Forces in a UN Mission**

5.7.1 **General**

- The following discussion of logistical support for UN Special Forces is for illustrative purposes only. However, it reflects real-world examples providing a realistic understanding of the logistical support a UN Special Forces contingent is expected to bring to, and that which it can expect from, a UN Mission. Actual logistical support
requirements are articulated in the Statement of Unit or Force Requirement and the troop contributing country MOU. Arrangements for logistical support are provided in the UN’s *Generic Guidelines for TCCs Deploying Military Units to the UN Peacekeeping Mission*, and in the UN’s *COE Manual*. Subject to the terms of troop contributing country MOU negotiations, the UN Special Forces contingent is required to be self-sustainable with integral support and maintenance elements, and to sustain its operations at the permanent and temporary deployment locations.

- Emphasis on the different levels of logistical support that can be expected between permanent and temporary deployment locations is, quite literally, a vitally important distinction. Given the unique nature of UN Special Operations, UN Special Forces must be fully prepared to live and function with what they can personally carry or transport when they are on “temporary” operational deployments. “Temporary” is a relative term and can mean 20-30 days or more away from the UN Special Forces “permanent” deployment site in the Mission area. As such, when on temporary, operational missions, UN Special Forces must be prepared to self-sustain with individual 1-man tents, water purification, food rations and man-packable equipment.

- A full description of the requirements and standards for all self-sustainment categories are contained in the *Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual*. At a minimum, the UN Special Forces contingent must be self-sustaining in its permanent deployment site (or temporary/deployment site if so stated) according to the following standards:

**5.7.2 Accommodations**

- **Initial Accommodation:** The UN Mission will prepare green field sites under austere conditions at the deployment location. The contingent will need to deploy with sufficient tentage for all accommodations, storage, offices, ablutions, and workshop, etc. Water sources will be arranged by the UN Mission; the contingent will deploy sufficient water purification units to produce and consume its own purified water. The Mission will provide Field Defense Stores (FDS) and additional FDS kits for use in mobile operations.

- **Permanent Accommodations:** The UN Mission will strive to provide hard wall accommodations after the initial six-month period in Contingent-Owned Equipment tentage; failing which the UN Mission will pay a penalty rate of reimbursement until prefab accommodations can be provided.

- **Deployable Accommodations:** The contingent must deploy with a sufficient quantity of tentage necessary for short term operational and tactical deployments.

- **Tentage Structure:** Tentage must include flooring and the ability to heat and cool as appropriate; and netting at doors, windows and inner/outer fly of tents. Double layered tents with metal pipe frames are recommended, due to conditions in the field. It is also recommended to mount the tents on cement or wooden foundations to ensure their stability. Deployable accommodations noted in the paragraph above are excluded from this requirement.
5.7.3 **Ablutions:** The Mission will strive to provide ready-to-use field ablutions with running water and waste management at the initial campsite. The contingent must deploy with its own field ablutions (field latrines and showers) to use for subsequent operational/tactical deployments.

5.7.4 **Catering:** The contingent must be self-sustainable in catering. Upon deployment, the Mission **may not** provide a hard wall structure for the kitchen and consequently, the contingent must be prepared to deploy with a fully mobile kitchen (e.g., kitchen trailers). The contingent must have cooks, clean and healthy kitchen facilities and equipment to include, but not limited to, deep freeze storage capacity for up to fourteen days, cold food storage capacity for seven days, dry food storage, hot dishwashing capability, mobile cold storage devices, dishes and cutlery. The contingent must be able to support all its organic units and personnel (including augmented personnel) with deployable kitchen equipment whilst operating in the field.

5.7.5 **Communications:** The contingent must provide its own mobile and secure communications down to the independent unit, section or team level and be able to communicate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with the brigade, sector or Force Headquarters in the Mission language, typically either French or English.

- **Satellite communications** are the preferred way to support UN Special Forces operations over long distances.

- **High Frequency (HF)** communications are mandatory and must have a minimum range of 250 km. The contingent must install its own HF base stations and antennae with at least 2 sets of HF radios (as primary and backup) manned by its own qualified operators for effective radio communications with the brigade headquarters, other contingents and its own elements operating outside the Very High Frequency (VHF) and/or the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) area of coverage. The capability to communicate from the equivalent of platoon to company to battalion to brigade headquarters must exist for all UN Special Forces elements. The contingent element operating beyond the effective VHF communications range must be equipped with at least two sets of HF radios (primary and backup) staffed by qualified operators for effective radio communications with appropriate Headquarters.

- **VHF/UHF**: VHF/UHF Communications (air-to-air to ground) is mandatory and must have a range of at least 30 to 35 kilometres to facilitate CASEVAC.

- **Telephone:** The contingent must provide, install and operate its own switchboard and telephone network down to its sections within the area of responsibility.

5.7.5 **Office Support:**

- **Office Space:** Office workspace must be inside tentage, but when and where possible, hard-wall structure may be provided for brigade and battalion headquarters.
- **Office Furniture and Equipment:** The contingent must be self-sustainable to meet all its needs in terms of office furniture, equipment, supplies and computers (including electronic data processing, reproduction equipment and required software).

5.7.6 **Electrical:** The contingent must be self-sustainable electrically, and must supply a stable power supply down to section level, including observation posts and other elements.

5.7.7 **Light Engineering:** The contingent must have light utility and general engineering support capability in order to enhance the contingent's infrastructure. The contingent must be self-sustainable and have, at minimum, the capacity to handle the following tasks:

- Field-defensive construction for the contingent
- Limited construction of light structures
- Minor electrical repair and replacement
- Minor repair to plumbing and water systems
- Maintenance of all necessary tools, supplies and workshop equipment
- Deliver the aforementioned capacities by means of mobile support throughout the area of responsibility

5.7.8 **Laundry and Dry Cleaning:** The contingent must have a cleaning unit with sufficient laundry facilities for all military and personal clothing, including dry cleaning of operationally required specialist clothing. All laundry and dry cleaning equipment must be kept hygienic and in good repair with ample spare parts.

5.7.9 **Fire Detection and Alarm:** The contingent must have automatic fire detection and alarm equipment.

5.7.10 **Basic Fire Fighting:** The contingent must have the capability to conduct basic firefighting in both accommodations and work areas.

5.7.11 **Field Defence Stores:** The UN will provide identification and Field Defence Stores. There is typically no need for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection.

5.7.12 **Observation:**

- **General Observation:** The contingent must have the capacity to observe 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with section-level handheld binoculars and magnifying night vision equipment.

- **Night Observation:** Night vision goggles/equipment must be capable of passive and/or active infrared (IR), thermal or image night time line of sight observation. Night vision goggles/equipment must be capable of detecting human-size objects within a range of
1,000 meters. The contingent must be capable of conducting fire missions in support of manoeuver unit night time patrols using integrated and/or individual night vision devices.

- **Global Positioning System:** The contingent must have the capacity to acquire an accurate geographic fix on its own locations with Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment and laser range finders.

5.7.13 **Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Capabilities:** For the contingent’s own safety, an EOD capability must be provided to all deploying elements.

5.7.14 **Miscellaneous General Stores:** At a minimum, the contingent must be self-sustainable in terms of bedding, furniture, morale and welfare equipment and amenities.

- **Bedding:** The contingent must provide bed linens, blankets and/or sleeping bags, mattress covers, pillows and towels to all personnel.

- **Furniture:** The contingent must provide a bed, mattress, nightstand, table light and a locker to all personnel.

- **Morale and Welfare:** The contingent must provide TVs, DVD players, music systems, satellite TV systems, a library, games, exercise equipment and internet cafe(s) with 5-10 personal computers (for a company-sized unit) for the morale and welfare of its personnel. So as not to interfere with the Mission’s official computer and internet network, the contingent must contract with a civilian internet service provider for its own dedicated morale and welfare network.

5.7.15 **Initial Provisioning and Self Sufficiency**

- **Water:** The contingent must deploy with bottled water for a length of time agreed during MOU negotiations. Within the first seven days, the contingent is expected to install its own water purification plant to produce bulk-treated water from a UN-provided water source.

- **Rations:** The contingent must deploy with rations for a length of time agreed during MOU negotiations. The UN Mission will provide rations thereafter. The contingent must have the capacity of establishing storage such as reefer trucks and containers for fourteen days of rations and fourteen days of combat ration packets, or for a duration agreed during MOU negotiations.

- **Supply:** The contingent is required to deploy with fully self-sufficient stocks of supply items and spare parts for maintenance of its major and minor equipment. The contingent must be fully self-sufficient for all other supply categories (except fuel) for the first 90 days after deployment, and must maintain stock levels of at least 45 days of repair parts for all types of supplies at any given time during its operations. Resupply of consumables and spare parts is a contingent responsibility.

- **Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL):** In the majority of UN Missions, the contingent must be prepared to employ only diesel fuelled vehicles, equipment and machines as
diesel is normally the only type of fuel available. The UN will deliver fuel to the existing fuel distribution points from the first day after the contingent’s deployment. The contingent is required to collect its POL from the distribution points. Beyond the fuel distribution points, the contingent must provide self-delivery. The contingent must have the capacity to establish bulk storage facilities for fourteen supply days of diesel. The contingent should also have the capacity to distribute diesel to its vehicles and generators.

- **Medical:** The contingent must be prepared to deploy with one medical level I hospital. Contingent personnel must be trained in administering basic immediate first aid and have the appropriate medical equipment. Additional, higher level medical facilities will be deployed in the Mission area of responsibility to provide levels II and III care. Level IV medical care will also be available, sometimes outside the Mission area.
Chapter 6

Training of UN Special Forces

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Military peacekeeper training is a national responsibility. What is more, training, regardless of subject, is a command responsibility at every organizational level. Military commanders and supervisors at each level have a legal and moral obligation to ensure their personnel and units are properly trained to accomplish their missions.

6.1.2 UN Special Forces units are normally regular (single troop contributing country) or composite units (multiple troop contributing countries) trained by their national training programs. National training is ideally within the parameters set by the UN in consultation with member states. Peacekeeping training is administered to a unit already capable of undertaking a full range of UN Special Forces tasks, but that may need re-orientation from national standards to familiarity with the UN’s command and control and field operations system. The UN peacekeeping logistical system, for example, with its integrated framework of different components operating under a shared mandate and objectives, typically differs from the national framework in which the military operates its own logistical system.

6.1.3 This chapter is designed to assist military commanders and supervisors in their professional obligation to maintain the training and operational readiness of the personnel under their supervision. Various tiers of training through which military personnel engage prior to and during Mission deployment are also explained. An overview of the suggested methodology for training a UN Special Forces unit during the pre-deployment, induction and on-going phases noting the various steps, timings and standards that are currently in practice is discussed, including generic training requirements that are mission and task-oriented and not necessarily UN peacekeeping unique. The intent is to provide a convenient reminder to commanders and supervisors of general topics requiring their attention. These topics will require greater levels of detail for self-evaluation, either through national training standards or those standards provided by the UN, where appropriate. To meet the need for greater detail in UN-appropriate training, specialized training materials (STMs) for this manual are being developed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide UN peacekeeping training standards for troop contributing countries participating in UN operations.

6.2 Phases

6.2.1 Training for Peacekeeping can be divided as follows:

- Pre-Deployment Training
  - Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) refers to generic, specialized and mission-specific peacekeeping training delivered by the Troop Contributing Country that is based on
UN principles, policies and standards and takes place prior to deployment to field operations. For UN Special Forces, this is an essential phase through which, in addition to training on generic UN Special Forces individual and collective skills, the UN Special Forces should become proficient in Special Operations in a UN peacekeeping context. If the UN Special Forces Task Force is based on a framework unit, other troop contributing countries should be integrated into the unit’s PDT with a particular focus on employment of enablers, especially air assets and intelligence.

- Developing cultural awareness of both local and partner troop contributing countries improves interoperability and requires dedicated resources.

### In-Mission Training

- **Induction Training.** Induction training is a national responsibility under the direct responsibility of the UN Special Forces contingent commander. Induction training refers to training delivered to UN Special Forces on arrival in peacekeeping missions and is intended to supplement Pre-Deployment Training. Induction Training should consist of a short, 4-6 day orientation. In keeping with unique requirements for UN Special Forces, induction training may be designed to include detailed briefs and training on the local geographical, cultural and threat environments, challenges, relevant SOPs and other pertinent topics.

- **Ongoing Training.** Ongoing training refers to any training or learning activity undertaken subsequent to induction. For UN Special Forces this phase may include the check-zero of weapons, Rules of Engagement training and similar practical preparations specific to the Mission area, area familiarization, and maintenance of standards or remedial training (e.g. live-firing exercises, scenario-based exercises, etc.). Joint training in the mission area is required to attain interoperability and synergy, particularly with tactical enablers such as aviation and support assets. Scenario-based exercises are preferred whenever feasible, including cooperation with conventional forces, UN Mission Combat Service Support and enablers (Aviation, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, QRF, etc.).

### Approach

6.3.1 Training for UN Special Forces will vary according to national doctrine, equipment, organization, and experience. A troop contributing country reconnaissance in the Mission area of responsibility by the incoming UN Special Forces Task Force and/or Group commander(s) and staff is always recommended as an excellent means of ensuring the availability of Mission-specific content for pre-deployment training. The Task Force/Group advance party will therefore assess UN mission training facilities.

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21 Using troop contributing country and international peacekeeping training centres if available, thus developing cultural awareness.

22 Such training is delivered by selected UN Special Forces contingent training officers or key leaders who have already undergone a Training-of-Trainer (ToT) course organized by the Mission’s Integrated Mission Training Cell (IMTC) prior to induction training.
6.3.2 **Training Characteristics:** There are fundamental training requirements that should be observed when preparing to deploy to a peacekeeping mission:

- Training should be realistic. Every effort must be made to replicate in-Mission conditions and situations that the unit might face.

- Training should be Mission-specific. The Mission’s unique circumstances require particular mental and physical preparation.

- Training should ensure that forces are operational, capable and interoperable with other UN forces once deployed.

- Collective training should be focused on interaction with different mission elements, mission partners and other actors present in the area of operations, including enablers such as air, riverine and maritime assets.

- Training methodology should be primarily hands-on practical exercises.

- Training should focus heavily on applicable Mission Rules of Engagement and the Protection of Civilians as a priority mandate task.
6.3.3 **Suggested Training Program.** The following is a suggested training program for UN Special Forces individual (commander, staff and key leaders) and collective (staff and troops) training:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home Country</th>
<th>Mission Area</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Deployment</strong></td>
<td><strong>In-Mission Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Organization of the Task Force and/or Group (Special Forces Advisors and Liaison Elements included)</td>
<td>Training on UN peacekeeping principles, environment and structure, practices, capabilities and skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reinforcement on basic / common Special Forces capabilities and skills</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 to 3 weeks (or as required)</td>
<td>1 to 2 weeks</td>
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23 Relevant reference training materials can be downloaded from [http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org](http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org).
6.4 Standards

6.4.1 Common Standards: At a minimum, UN Special Forces personnel are required to observe and comply with existing UN training standards (see UNIBAM).

6.4.2 UN Special Forces Specific Training Standards: Training standards regarding UN Special Forces specific skills will be in accordance with national requirements. Each troop contributing country must guarantee that UN Special Forces units committed have at least achieved the basic UN Special Forces training standards for level 1 and aspire to level 2 of the listed UN Special Forces generic capabilities (see Annex A, UN Special Forces Generic Capabilities) for Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance tasks.
Chapter 7

Self-Evaluation of UN Special Forces

7.1 Introduction. Self-evaluation plays a key role in achieving and maintaining operational readiness. In UN peacekeeping operations, troop contributing countries mainly conduct their own evaluations to assess and monitor the state of individual and collective training, and to check the maintenance and performance of equipment. By conducting self-evaluation, troop contributing countries can authoritatively determine how well their personnel, units and equipment perform according to mandated tasks, and consequently take troop contributing country-appropriate action to make any necessary improvements. In this way, troop contributing country self-evaluation contributes to higher states of operational readiness.

7.2 Operational Readiness and Self-Evaluation

7.2.1 As one of the most versatile and effective assets of the military component in peacekeeping missions, UN Special Forces are expected to execute mandated tasks in highly challenging and complex environments. Self-evaluation of individual and unit readiness helps monitor operational readiness and is primarily conducted through practical checks and scenario-based exercises that are the responsibility of the contingent commander.\(^2\!

7.2.2 In the Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) phase, the UN Special Forces Task Force or Group commander sets his goals and conducts an initial self-evaluation to determine any gaps and deficiencies in capabilities. Any shortcomings are remedied through further training and other measures, and refined through consideration of the results of reconnaissance in the Mission area, if applicable (such as prior to deployment of the first unit). Re-evaluation can then take place during PDT.

7.2.3 Self-evaluation must also take place during the In-Mission training phase. In this phase, the unit is immersed in Mission-specific requirements, realities and the applicable rules of engagement. This self-evaluation must be designed within the context of Mission requirements, operating parameters and environment.

7.3 Self-Evaluation Checklists

7.3.1 Operational Readiness of UN Special Forces can be evaluated based on distinct parameters such as organizational interoperability, specific equipment, required UN Special Forces capabilities, UN Special Forces skill levels, the capability to perform mission essential tasks and other mission tasks, standards achieved in training, administrative and logistical standards, etc. Self-Evaluation should address the different levels of command to include individual, team, detachment, group and task force. In full coordination with Task Force/Group troop contributing countries (in the case of multi-troop contributing country units), the Task Force/Group

\[^2\] See UNIBAM, Operational Readiness and Self-Evaluation, for generic evaluation topics/methodology and on obtaining UN Headquarters and Mission evaluation assistance.
Commander has a key role in ensuring coherence amongst the various UN Special Forces units regardless of their country of origin.

### 7.3.2 Self-Evaluation Checklists

**Generic Self-Evaluation Checklist: Pre-Deployment**

The following self-evaluation criteria will assist in determining UN Special Forces operational readiness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Self-Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Command and Staff.</strong> Is the staff integrated, trained and capable of planning, organizing, coordinating and directing the multifaceted operational and non-operational tasks in the peacekeeping environment?</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td><strong>High Standards of Fitness.</strong> Are all Special Forces personnel physically fit and mentally robust for the Mission environment?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Basic Special Forces Skills.</strong> Are all personnel trained and capable of performing basic Special Forces skills for offensive and defensive, day and night, all-weather operations at the Individual, Team, Detachment and Group levels in accordance with national standards prior to deployment in the Mission area?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Generic Peacekeeping Skills and Knowledge.</strong> Are all personnel trained on and sensitized to the generic policy guidelines and directives of conducting UN peacekeeping operations? Do they demonstrate a clear understanding of these guidelines and directives?</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Situational and Cultural Awareness.</strong> Are Special Forces units and individuals aware of local and partner cultures and traditions?</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Special Operations Skills.</strong> Are all Special Forces units trained, equipped and organized to plan, command, control and execute Special Operations tasks in a UN peacekeeping context?</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Organization.</strong> Is the Task Force/Group organized into task-oriented elements with support structure as per the Statement of Unit Requirements? Are advisors and liaison officers designated and properly trained for their liaison task with FC/FHQ and conventional units?</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Leadership.</strong> Is the chain of command capable, responsive and accountable to deliver in a peacekeeping environment?</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td><strong>Capabilities.</strong> Does the Task Force/Group maintain required standards in core capability functions of C3, mobility, firepower, tactical information, interoperability, civil interaction, logistical sustainment and force protection? Are the main Special Forces capabilities Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance integrated and well balanced in the Task Force/Group?</td>
<td>Evaluate as per Annex A</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td><strong>Training With Enabling Assets.</strong> Are Special Forces units prepared to operate with and adapt to relevant enablers?</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td><strong>Resources.</strong> Is the Task Force/Group in possession of the required number of personnel, arms, ammunition, equipment, accessories, spares, unit stores and expendables as per the MOU and Statement of Unit Requirements?</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td><strong>Equipment Management.</strong> Does the Task Force/Group maintain a minimum serviceability state of 90% and have the capability to organize preventive maintenance and repair/recovery in situ?</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td><strong>Weapons, Instruments &amp; Vehicles.</strong> Are all weapons zeroed, instruments calibrated, vehicles maintained and inspected and certified for correctness and functionality as per required standards?</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td><strong>Logistics.</strong> Are the Special Forces Task Detachments configured for independent and self-sustained logistics capability (food, water, medical, accommodation, transport, hygiene and sanitation, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td><strong>Medical.</strong> Do all personnel meet the requisite medical standards and have they been inoculated as per mission requirements? Can they conduct combat lifesaving (battlefield first aid) skills for themselves and others as required?</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td><strong>Integrity.</strong> Are Special Forces members aware of applicable UN rules, regulations and code of conduct and have they demonstrated the highest standard of professionalism and integrity?</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><strong>Morale and Motivation.</strong> Are Special Forces members well motivated to operate in a complex, restrictive, multinational and multi-dimensional environment and maintain high morale?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Welfare.</strong> Does the Task Force/Group maintain high standards of troop welfare as per national standards and mission requirements?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td><strong>Legal.</strong> Do Special Forces personnel and commanders clearly understand the responsibility to adhere to, promote and protect the legal framework for UN Peacekeeping with specific reference to Status of Forces/Status of Mission Agreements, ROE, human rights and humanitarian law, other relevant international legal statutes and host nation laws?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td><strong>Evaluation.</strong> Has the Task Force/Group carried out a formal self-evaluation? Have shortcomings been rectified and have troop contributing country authorities certified the unit to be fit for deployment in the mission on time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Generic Self-Evaluation Checklist: In-Mission

In addition to the factors mentioned in the preceding table, the following criteria will be useful for further evaluation of operational readiness in the Mission area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Self-Evaluation Criteria</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Performance and Evaluation.</strong> Does the Task Force/Group plan, command, control, execute and evaluate all mission essential tasks effectively as per peacekeeping norms, mission objectives and UN guidance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Readiness for Rapid Mobilisation.</strong> Is the Task Group (and its detachments and teams) postured to deploy within the designated Notice-to-Move timelines for the conduct of Special Operations? Are the C2, planning and liaison mechanisms capable of ensuring rapid mobilization of Special Forces elements?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>On-The-Job Training.</strong> Does the chain of command institute measures for on-the-job training of all personnel to maintain qualitative performance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>In-Mission Training.</strong> Is the Task Force/Group carrying out periodic in-Mission refresher, task-oriented and mission-specific training as per IMTC guidelines and is this training incorporated with key enabler units, including aviation and unique equipment and technology.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Equipment Management.</strong> Does the Task Group maintain a minimum serviceability state of 90% and does it organize preventive maintenance and repair/recovery in situ?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Conduct and Discipline.</strong> Does the Task Force/Group continue to maintain high standards of conduct and discipline for all ranks?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td><strong>Outreach and Engagement.</strong> Has the Task Force/Group been able to establish (where relevant) good rapport and effective interface with the local population through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Quick Impact Projects?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td><strong>Shortcomings.</strong> Has the Task Force/Group taken remedial/corrective actions on shortcomings in performance or wasted resources observed by the Task Force/Group, COE Team or Mission leadership?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex A

Generic UN Special Forces Capabilities

Introduction

The following capabilities will assist planners and other key personnel at UN Headquarters, the troop contributing country and UN Special Forces Task Force/Group in ensuring the proper deployment of a fully mission-capable UN Special Forces contingent. The required UN Special Forces tasks will be designated in the Statement of Unit Requirement. Deploying UN Special Forces unit capabilities must correspond to these tasks, and participating troop contributing countries are responsible for providing UN Special Forces personnel fully capable of meeting these requirements. Level 1 capabilities listed in the following charts are required. Level 2 capabilities are considered highly desirable and those troop contributing countries whose Special Forces units do not meet these capabilities should aspire to do so.

It is incumbent upon commanders and subordinate leaders to conduct frequent readiness evaluations of UN Special Forces personnel to maintain full mission capability. A self-evaluation should be performed during the Pre-Deployment Training phase, which will likely be demonstrated during the DPKO/DFS Pre-Deployment Visit (PDV). Self-evaluation is equally important throughout In-Mission Training, and should certify the serviceability and availability of mission-specific equipment, as well as required training levels in each Task Force/Group.

As for the UN Special Forces as a whole, collective self-evaluation may be effectively assessed during a 6 to 8 day exercise based on the specific Mission environment. This collective exercise should require the application of most of the capabilities, organization and skills presented in this Annex. For further information, see this Manual’s Chapter 7, Self-Evaluation of UN Special Forces.
# Capabilities of the UN Special Forces Task Force/Group Headquarters

## Level 1 (Required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>At the Task Force Headquarters Level:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Advise the Force Commander on UN Special Operations (through the designated UN Special Forces Advisor or Task Force Commander).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Command subordinate Task Groups, and provide appropriate staff planning, control and evaluation of UN Special Operations, especially regarding the three principal tasks of Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks, and Military Assistance, as well as other tasks across the spectrum of peacekeeping military operations, in compliance with the UN mandate, polices, principles and practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Provide liaison teams at the appropriate levels using lightweight and reliable equipment, including secure communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Coordinate the provision of UN Special Forces-supporting enablers (e.g., aviation assets, etc.).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**At the Task Group Level:** Common, fundamental Level 1 Task Group capabilities mandatory for all Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance missions.

1. Self-sustain (to include ammunition and other supplies) with own personnel and equipment (and limited self-recovery capability) for a 6 to 8 day mission in an austere environment.

2. Enter and depart the operational area by day and night, in all weather conditions, on foot, by vehicle or using available enabler assets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Provide sniper capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ensure internal and long-range secure communications linked with the Task Force Headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Provide own local transportation for personnel and supplies in the home base area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Deploy into hostile areas using light transport and rotary-wing aircraft with all mission-specific required equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conduct limited civil military tasks and interface with other cultures and societies, in coordination with the substantive civilian component of the UN Mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capabilities of the UN Special Forces Task Force/Group Headquarters**

**Level 1 (Required)**

**Special Reconnaissance, capable of conducting:**

10. Environmental reconnaissance, threat and target assessment, post-strike reconnaissance for extended periods (up to 15 days) with minimal external support.
| Level 1 | 11. Long-range and discreet patrols of up to 15 days in order to monitor hostile remote areas and/or border regions. |
|        | 12. Optical surveillance of targets by day and night, in hostile areas and under adverse weather conditions for missions of 6 to 8 days. |
|        | 13. Detect moving personnel with specific Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets out to 5000 meters. |
|        | 14. Recce/establish landing sites to allow conventional reinforcements by land, air and maritime. |

**Special Tasks, capable of conducting:**

15. Assigned UN Special Operations against critical targets and the interdiction of lines of communication.

16. Operations to neutralize adversary facilities and capabilities; and identify, track and locate targets and landing sites for UN aircraft or indirect fires.

17. Rescue or extract mission or other designated personnel (not including hostage rescue).

**Military Assistance, capable of providing:**

18. UN Special Forces partner and liaison teams to train and advise (when authorized) relevant host nation security forces.
## Capabilities of the UN Special Forces Task Force/Group Headquarters

### Level 2 (Highly Desired or Aspirational)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 2 capabilities apply to all Task Group missions Special Reconnaissance, Special Tasks and Military Assistance where the requirement for that level of capacity is specified.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the Task Force Headquarters Level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Deploy and establish a competent Task Force Headquarters around a Combined and Joint staff structure within a multinational, composite UN Task Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Plan and coordinate the employment of key enabler skills such as aviation, indirect fires, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the Task Group Level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Reconnaissance, capable of conducting:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Target surveillance using remote sensors, optics and persistent ISR (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles), as available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>20. Long-range and discreet patrols in adversary territory for up to 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Special Tasks, capable of:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Direct terminal guidance control of precision-guided munitions (air-to-ground and indirect fires), consistent with the procedures of the nation providing the support and while minimizing collateral damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Disrupting lines of communication in depth against adversary locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Hostage rescue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B

Generic UN Special Forces Equipment Requirements

Introduction

The UN Special Forces Task Force (battalion equivalent) and Group (company equivalent) are highly adaptable in their force composition and equipment profile. Specific mission requirements and organization demand flexibility when adapting established troop contributing country Special Forces structure. For example, additional equipment requirements may emerge because of the special liaison and communications cells the Task Force/Group requires to fulfill its responsibilities at Force/sector headquarters\(^{25}\) levels. See the discussion of UN Special Forces organizations in Chapter 4\(^ {26}\) of this Manual.

Equipment requirements will also vary as the UN Special Forces contingent configuration depends on many factors including the number of concurrent and designated tasks to be executed, the size of the element conducting these tasks, and the specific UN Special Forces capabilities and skills required. Furthermore, equipment requirements will be dictated by the Mission mandate and objectives, current and future threat analyses, operational environment, terrain imperatives and the geographical spread/separation of the deployment. Issues of mobility, firepower and force protection make additional demands on UN Special Forces equipment requirements.

Purpose

This annex describes a basic equipment profile for UN Special Forces, adaptable to Mission-specific requirements and established troop contributing country tables of equipment. Given the highly variable Mission and environmental requirements, recommendations on specific numbers of equipment are deliberately avoided. Instead, the focus is on identifying the most likely requirements for the various levels of UN Special Forces structure, and highlighting the desired scales of issue for key equipment.

Equipment Profile

Items such as those required for conventional forces, including basic engineer equipment, transportation, water storage/treatment, petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) storage, miscellaneous stores, Level I Hospital equipment and supplies, generators and electrification stores, etc. remain as per the scales of issue described in the UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) and are not further described herein.

The suggested details of UN Special Forces arms, instruments, equipment and stores (see Appendix 1 to Annex B) are produced with reference to the UNIBAM Volumes I and II,

\(^{25}\) There may be a liaison or command element tasked by the Task Force/Group for the sector level headquarters, where required.

\(^{26}\) The organization in Chapter 4 is a suggested organization for planning and preparation purposes at UN Headquarters, field Missions and troop contributing countries. Actual force configuration will be based on the Statement of Unit Requirements, MOU negotiations and Mission-specific operational imperatives.
2012 and the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual of 2011. These equipment details are laid out by category with likely requirements for the various UN Special Forces levels. Recommended scales of issue have been arrived at after due deliberation on best practices and Mission operational and logistical requirements, and after considering the likelihood of UN Special Forces companies/groups and detachments being called upon to operate independently for extended periods in outlying areas. Nonetheless, the equipment and scales of issue suggested in the following tables are for reference only and do not replace the authorizations described in the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual. Furthermore, troop contributing countries have the flexibility to adapt or modify the requirements during the MOU negotiation stage, based on the Statement of Unit Requirements.

On occasion, unique and essential Mission requirements may demand highly sophisticated and specialized UN Special Forces equipment, such as but not limited to radars; sensors; unmanned aerial vehicles; tactical local area networks; tagging, tracking and locating equipment; and biometric and forensics equipment or stores that are not part of the current Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual. Such specialized equipment may be provided by troop contributing countries, the UN or third country assistance per agreement, with reimbursement discussed separately while negotiating the MOU.

The following charts contain listings of what is meant primarily to be Contingent-Owned Equipment. If immediately unavailable from the troop contributing country, some items may be procured over time while the UN provides them on an interim basis through UN-Owned Equipment support or third country assistance.
TABLE OF EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ARMAMENTS &amp; ACCESSORIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Personal Weapon (up to Light Machine Gun and/or Under Barrel Grenade Launchers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sidearm (Pistol)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Crew-Served Machine Gun up to 10 mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Portable Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launcher / Rocket</td>
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</table>

<sup>27</sup> May include elements at sector headquarters level where applicable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Platoon Mortars (up to 60 mm)</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td>May be deployed as required and appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Automatic Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td>May be deployed as required and appropriate, could be vehicle-mounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sniper System</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Up to 12.7 mm, complete, including spotting scope, rangefinder and match grade ammunition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Rifle Scope (Day)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Rifle Scope (Night)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Alternatively, IR laser with NVD combination may be used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Flare Gun / Signal Device</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>With white and various coloured flares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Range Finder</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
<td>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>High Mobility Light Tactical Vehicles</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>MPV/MRAP/APCs Wheeled</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Mobile Command Post</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ammunition Scales</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Mainstay of ground mobility for Special Forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Assorted Explosives &amp; Stores</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT / INSTRUMENTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Compass</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Night Vision Devices</td>
<td>空白</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>IR Lasers (gun mounted)</td>
<td>空白</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Binocular/ Spotter Scope Tripod Mounted</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Night Observation Device Tripod Mounted</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>GPS Man-Portable</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>GPS Vehicle-Mounted</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
<td>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters²⁷</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Enhanced Electronic GPS Tracking System</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>VTC System</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Surveillance Radars</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Sensors</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>UAVs</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Digital Camera</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Video Camera</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Search Light</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Flood Lights</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Thermal Imaging System</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
<td>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Satellite Phone</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Tactical Local Area Network</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>Exchange EPABX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Cell Phones&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>UHF/VHF Radios</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>HF Radios (preferably Multi-band radios)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Ground-to-Air Radio</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>29</sup> Cell Phones under troop contributing country arrangements and where communication infrastructure is available in the mission area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>Stun (Distraction) Grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>Team Field Trauma Kits</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>Tagging, Tracking, and Locating</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.</td>
<td>Infiltration and Exfiltration Equipment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>Recce / Surveillance Systems</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52.</td>
<td>Safety Equipment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>Tactical Breaching Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SPECIAL EQUIPMENT (Applicability varies with Mission / Tasks / Environment)**

- Adequate for sustained operations and continuous training.
- May be deployed as required and appropriate, including, but not limited to laser designators, centrally held at Task Group level for distribution as required.
- Including, but not limited to climbing / rappel and fast ropes, harnesses, gloves, tie down straps, karabiners, ladders, hooks, etc.
- Including, but not limited to weatherproof magnified camera systems, photo / video.
- Including, but not limited to water safety equipment, ballistic entry shields, personal harnesses and ropes, etc.
- Including, but not limited to hammers, crowbars, rakes, breaching charges, bolt...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERIAL</th>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Portable Temporary Accommodation / Tents</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>Individual Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Level IV Plated Body Armour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>Ballistic Helmets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>Megaphone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.</td>
<td>Marker Panels / Devices</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>Biometrics and Forensics System Equipment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>Camouflage Nets</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62.</td>
<td>IED/Cell Phone Jammer</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERIAL</td>
<td>NOMENCLATURE</td>
<td>LIKELY REQUIREMENT AT LEVEL OF:</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Task Force Force/Sector Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Task Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Task Det</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Forces Team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual (all levels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(portable/manpack)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.</td>
<td>SCUBA Gear</td>
<td>![ ]</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminology</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deep Operations</td>
<td>Operations in areas beyond the control of friendly forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Tasks (ST)</td>
<td>ST is a precise operation limited in scope and duration conducted by UN Special Forces in order to acquire, disrupt, recover, neutralize or disable designated high-value and high-payoff targets. ST differs from conventional action in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision used to create a specific effect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Value or High-Payoff Targets</td>
<td>Designated strategic targets that significantly alter and contribute to the success of the Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAP (Integrated Assessment and Planning) Process</td>
<td>Previously known as the IMPP, the IAP is a joint vision for peace consolidation. The realignment of relevant UN operations and activities, based on common priorities, form the foundation for all planning entities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military Assistance (MA)

MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence friendly assets through organized training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations, sometimes within the context of wider Security Sector Reform (SSR) where mandated and subject to the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

Operational Control

The authority granted to a military commander in a United Nations peacekeeping operation to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location (or a combination), to deploy units concerned and/or military personnel, and to retain or assign Tactical Command or Control of those units/personnel. Operational Control includes the authority to assign separate tasks to sub-units of a contingent as required by operational necessities, within the Mission area of responsibility, in consultation with the Contingent Commander and as approved by United Nations Headquarters. The Force Commander/Head of Military Component exercises Operational Control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the Mission. See UN Policy - Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1 March 2009.

PSD (Protection and Security Duty)

The protection and security of designated personnel and/or infrastructure that could include escorts and personal protection.

Riverine Operations

See Special Forces Maritime Operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Forces Teams</th>
<th>This is the most basic unit of the Special Forces Task Force and Group. It replaces the Special Forces Section in traditional UN Special Forces operations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Advisor</td>
<td>The Special Forces Advisor is the primary advisor to the Force Commander/HOMC on all Special Operations. In most Missions, the Special Forces Advisor is also the Special Forces Task Force/Group Commander. The Special Forces Advisor leads and commands the Special Operations Advisor Cell located in the Force Headquarters and coordinates and plans all Special Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Command and Control Liaison Element</td>
<td>This element coordinates and integrates all Special Operations and support plans between the Task Force/Group and the sector headquarters. It is usually assigned specific liaison roles for Special Operations to be conducted in the Force sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Air Operations</td>
<td>Specific air support for Special Operations that may include the projection of Special Forces using rotary- and fixed-wing air support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Maritime Operations</td>
<td>Specific maritime support for Special Operations that may include the projection of Special Forces from mothercraft and tactical support to Special Forces operations in coastal, riverine, and maritime environments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Special Operations Liaison Element
The Liaison Element coordinates and integrates all Special Operations and support plans between the Task Force/Group and other elements within the Mission Headquarters. It is usually assigned specific liaison roles in the JMAC, JOC, DMS, JLOC and UN Police.

Special Operations Planning Liaison Element
The Planning Liaison Element coordinates and integrates all Special Operations and support plans between the Task Force/Group and other elements within the Force Headquarters. It is usually assigned specific liaison roles in the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) offices.

Special Forces Task Detachment
This is a platoon-equivalent subunit of the Special Forces Task Group.

Special Forces Task Force
This is the battalion-equivalent of a Special Forces unit. The Task Force is typically commanded by a colonel and consists of subordinate Task Groups and Detachments.

Special Forces Task Group
The Special Forces Task Group (a company-equivalent) consists of subordinate detachments, teams, Operations Center and Logistics Support Center. The Task Group is the main operating unit of the Special Forces Task Force.

Special Forces Task Force/Group Framework
UN Special Forces have traditionally been deployed as Force or sector assets and have often been designated “Special Forces Companies,” usually without dedicated representation at Force Headquarters. That practice, however, is changing to adapt to emerging challenges and in recognition of the need for better Special Forces integration into overall Mission operations. Modern day peacekeeping operations have adopted broader Special Forces organizations better integrated with the Force Headquarters.

Special Reconnaissance
UN Special Forces conduct SR to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.
Tactical Control

The detailed and local direction and control of movement or manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. As required by operational necessities, the Force Commander/Head of Military Component may delegate the Tactical Control of assigned military forces to the subordinate sector and/or unit commanders. See UN Policy on Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1 March 2009.
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Annex D

References

These documents may be obtained at:


UN Special Forces embark on Operation Eagle Eye to rescue abducted UNAMID troops.