Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization

Following is the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization [A/61/1 & Corr.1], *dated 10 August 2006, submitted to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. The Assembly took note of it on 2 October* (**decision 61/504**).

Chapter I
Introduction

1. In this, my tenth and last annual report, I have sought to provide an overview of the Organization's main achievements and challenges during the past 12 months in the light of the critical developments in the decade since I took office at the beginning of 1997. I have also subsumed in a single report both the work of the Organization as such and the progress made in implementing the Millennium Declaration, which in previous years has been the subject of a separate report.

2. The report is arranged under headings that readers will recognize as corresponding to the four main sections of the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit of September 2005, which in turn followed the structure of my "In larger freedom" report: development; peace and security; human rights, rule of law and humanitarian affairs; and strengthening the United Nations. To these I have added a fifth, "global constituencies", to cover an area that has not previously been classified as central to the Organization's work but has become increasingly important—and will, I believe, become even more so as the new century advances.

3. Over its lifetime the United Nations has changed from being principally a conference-servicing Organization to become a truly global service provider working on the ground in virtually every corner of the world to improve the lives of people who need help. This transformation has occurred in a dramatic way during the past decade. More than 70 per cent of our $10 billion annual budget now relates to peacekeeping and other field operations, compared to about 50 per cent of a budget less than half that size 10 years ago. Over 50 per cent of our 30,000 civilian staff now serve in the field. The number of humanitarian offices increased from 12 offices with 114 staff members in 1997 to 43 offices with 815 staff members in 2005. Human rights work at the country level has grown significantly; in 1996 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was present in 14 countries, and currently OHCHR-supported human rights personnel are deployed in over 40 countries. We have been called upon to support over 100 national elections. In addition, the Millennium Development Goals have become an operational template for use by Governments and peoples around the world to advance the well-being of all. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) is leading the charge to combat existential threats such as HIV/AIDS by bringing together the efforts and resources of 10 United Nations system organizations to the global AIDS response, and the UNAIDS secretariat works on the ground in more than 75 countries.

4. If any one phenomenon can be said to have dominated the decade we have just lived through, it must surely be globalization. This term has been variously defined, but to me it conveys above all an era in which international relations are no longer almost exclusively about relations between nation-States, but also relations among people of different nationalities who interact with each other in a whole host of ways as individuals or as members of self-constituted groups across national boundaries, indeed across continents and oceans, often without needing to refer to the State at all. While the United Nations is constituted by Member States, these "non-State actors" on the international stage form new global constituencies with which the United Nations is increasingly called upon to interact.

5. The United Nations is having to learn how to work with global business and global civil society in all their manifold forms. The Organization must encourage partnerships with these vital actors to promote desirable changes and deliver growth, security and services, especially in the field.

6. But while nation-States are no longer the sole players in international relations, they are still the most important. And they face collective challenges that no single State can solve by itself.

7. Certainly, the State has not withered away or become redundant. On the contrary, the role of the State as regulator (though not administrator) of economic activity and mediator between different interest groups becomes all the more important as society becomes more complex. The more deadly weapons proliferate, the more essential is the State's monopoly on the means of coercion. To convince oneself of this, one has only to look at those unhappy countries where States are weak or are said to have failed. Many of them are countries that the United Nations knows all too well, since it is often where States are weak or have failed that we are summoned to assist.

8. That, too, is an important change. Our founders conceived of the Organization as working mainly to preserve the peace *between* States. They even forbade the Organization, in Article 2.7 of its Charter, a living document that remains vitally relevant today, to intervene "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state", though with the sensible reservation that this principle should not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII when the Security Council takes action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.

9. In recent years the Council has made use of this reservation many times, because it has found that breaches of the peace and acts of aggression most often begin *within* States, yet swiftly develop into threats to the peace of a whole region, if not the whole world. Thus the United Nations comes increasingly to see the security of its Member States as inseparable from that of the populations who inhabit them and are represented by them. That is why the world's heads of State and Government felt it necessary, at last year's historic summit, to reaffirm that "each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity", and to affirm that the international community also has the responsibility to take timely and decisive action for this purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it.

10. States, in short, are the servants and instruments of human beings, and not the other way round. Once this fundamental principle is understood and accepted, it becomes easy to see why the three cardinal purposes of the Organization—development, security and human rights—are so indissolubly interconnected.

11. In order to develop and prosper, human beings must be able to look to the State for security and protection and be able to exercise their individual rights—not only civil and political but also economic, social and cultural—under the rule of law.

12. Likewise, human beings can feel truly secure only if they enjoy economic as well as political or military security and if they can be confident that their basic rights and human dignity will not be violated.

13. Human beings will enjoy meaningful human rights only if they can escape from grinding and degrading poverty and if they can rely on a strong and just State—one in which their views and interests are truly represented—to protect them from violence and crime.

14. In carrying out its mission on all three fronts, one of the Organization's greatest assets is its idealistic and courageous staff, many of whom serve in situations of hardship and danger. During the past decade United Nations personnel have been increasingly targeted in places of strife and conflict. Our mission to build a safer, better world for all people is no longer a guarantee of protection. The United Nations has suffered a real loss of innocence in recent years. Consequently, we have had to learn how best to advance our mission to help others without excessively endangering our own.

15. But our commitment must never change. The United Nations, founded in the name of "We the peoples", must be able to advance their interests effectively in all three areas—development, security and human rights. Indeed, my millennium report "We the peoples" and my 2005 report "In larger freedom" reflect my own vision of this global responsibility, which has underpinned my tenure as Secretary-General. This report shows how the Organization has sought to do so in the past year and in the light of the past 10 years. I believe there is much in it that we can be proud of. But I am also fully conscious of the alarming extent to which, on all three fronts, our capacities fall short of the challenges we face. That is why I am convinced that the task of strengthening the United Nations is no mere bookkeeping exercise, but an imperative that

directly concerns the interests of all Member States and should, much more than it appears to do at present, engage their urgent attention.

Chapter II
Development

Internationally agreed development goals and the Millennium Development Goals

To spare no effort: the millennium promise

16. In the Millennium Declaration of 2000 (General Assembly resolution 55/2), world leaders set forth a bold and inclusive new vision for humanity. Pledging to channel the fruits of globalization to benefit all people, leaders committed themselves "to spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty". Since 2000, the United Nations, together with eminent voices from Government, civil society, business and science, has given spirit to this commitment in a manner that many would have deemed impossible only a few years ago. The result has been dramatically increased global attention for the full one sixth of humanity who still live in the most extreme form of poverty, measured as income of less than one dollar per day.

17. Such political momentum offers the opportunity to build on the world's considerable recent development successes. As highlighted in the statistical annex to the present report, from 1990 to 2002, the developing world's proportion of people living in extreme poverty dropped from 28 per cent to 19 per cent, driven mostly by gains in eastern and southern Asia. Average child mortality rates in developing countries fell from 95 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 79 in 2004. More than 1.2 billion people gained access to improved sanitation over the same period. From 1991 to 2004, average net primary enrolment ratios in developing regions increased from 79 per cent to 86 per cent.

18. But progress has been uneven and the ongoing levels of human deprivation remain staggering. Each year, more than 10 million children die before their fifth birthday, mostly from preventable causes. Women in the developing world are more than 45 times more likely, on average, to die during pregnancy and childbirth than women in the developed world. More than 800 million people remain chronically undernourished. Half the developing world still lacks access to sanitation, a fifth has no access to safe water, and slum populations are growing steadily. The environment on which livelihoods depend is suffering degradation in all developing regions. The world missed the international goal for gender parity in education by 2005, and the epidemic of violence against women remains a scourge on humanity.

19. Prior to the Millennium Declaration, the foundations for tackling these challenges were consolidated through the major conferences and summits of the 1990s. At the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, world leaders committed themselves to a new global partnership to achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. The Monterrey Consensus reasserted each country's primary responsibility for its own economic and social development through sound governance and policies to fully mobilize domestic resources. These national efforts were to be supplemented by the commitment from developed countries to provide improved access to international markets, more and more effective, stable and predictable official development assistance and private capital flows and a better international architecture to prevent and manage financial crises. As an essential contribution to this process, developed countries also pledged to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income as official development assistance and to pursue innovative sources of financing for development. Increased national responsibility was also to be accompanied by a greater voice and greater representation for developing countries in international economic decision-making. In the same year, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, Member States focused on the implementation of sustainable development goals and added partnerships as a major new dimension to achieving those goals. The Summit reinforced the Millennium Development Goals by agreeing to specific, time-bound sustainable development targets, including particular targets for Africa.

20. In implementing this vision of global partnership, many developing and developed countries are leading by inspirational example. But many of them, despite their best efforts, simply remain too poor to make the investments needed to escape the trap of extreme poverty. It is these countries that require the most urgent international support if we are to fulfil the promises of the Millennium Declaration.

21. Recent global political debates have rightly shifted the emphasis from principles to practicalities. In January 2005, the Millennium Project presented to me its report entitled *Investing in Development: A*

Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, stressing the need for practical measures and the feasibility of major success. I welcomed the analysis and the recommendations of the Millennium Project. In March of the same year, I submitted to the General Assembly my report entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", which set out a strategic vision for collective action to achieve universal freedom from want, as well as freedom from fear and the realization of dignity for all. Both reports stressed that breakthrough action was required at all levels if implementation were to proceed at a scale commensurate with countries' development needs. Other Secretariat reports, such as the *Report on the World Social Situation 2005* and the *World Economic and Social Survey 2006*, have focused on the growing inequalities that are emerging both within and among countries and that make it challenging, but all the more imperative, to reach the Millennium Development Goals.

2005—a year of commitments

22. As the first major checkpoint since the Millennium Summit, 2005 saw a number of important commitments to a global development agenda, culminating at the 2005 World Summit. All Member States emphasized the vital role played by the major United Nations conferences and summits in shaping a broad development vision and in identifying commonly agreed objectives, and strongly reaffirmed the Millennium Development Goals as the shared, time-bound, integrated and measurable framework for development cooperation. For the United Nations system, it has been extremely encouraging to see the Goals gain political momentum with each passing year. Citizens around the world are rightfully calling upon their Governments to be ever bolder in following through on the Goals. As a result, international development efforts have regained ambition, fusing the possibility for success with a heightened sense of urgency.

23. At the 2005 World Summit (see General Assembly resolution 60/1), Member States agreed to a practical framework for decade-long action when they committed to embedding the global goals into the country-level processes where operational and budgetary decisions are made. In particular, Member States agreed to adopt, by the end of 2006, comprehensive national strategies to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals, supported by the global partnership for development agreed in Monterrey. Member States also committed to launching "quick-impact initiatives", immediate steps that can save and improve millions of lives within the span of only a few years. These include actions to distribute anti-malaria bed nets, free of charge, to eliminate user fees in basic education and health and to expand school meal programmes using locally produced food.

24. World leaders further agreed to several other important targets at the 2005 World Summit. I am therefore recommending the incorporation of these commitments into the set of targets used to follow up on the Millennium Declaration. This includes: a new target under Millennium Development Goal 1: to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies and our national development strategies; a new target under Goal 5: to achieve universal access to reproductive health by 2015; a new target under Goal 6: to come as close as possible to universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS by 2010 for all those who need it; and a new target under Goal 7: to significantly reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. The existing target on developing decent and productive work for youth, now under Millennium Development Goal 8, would be encompassed by the new target (under Goal 1). Technical work to select the appropriate indicators would be undertaken by the Inter-agency and Expert Group on Millennium Development Goal Indicators. In this work, the system will be able to build on the Ministerial Declaration on Employment Generation and Decent Work adopted at the 2006 session of the Economic and Social Council, which calls for the development of 10-year action plans and assigns the Council a clear role in monitoring progress in its implementation.

25. As emphasized in Monterrey, commitments can be implemented only if backed by adequate international financing, another realm of significant breakthroughs in 2005. The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative endorsed the cancellation of debts to the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for those countries that completed the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. Worth approximately $50 billion in face value, this debt relief is projected to save qualifying countries more than $1 billion per year in debt-servicing payments over the coming decade. This agreement marks unambiguous progress and highlights the need for relief for other deserving countries too.

26. Of much greater quantitative importance for development finance, 16 of 22 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee have now either met the official development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income or set timetables for doing so by 2015. In May 2005, the 15 Development Assistance Committee members that are members of the European Union each agreed to meet a minimum target of 0.51 per cent of gross national income by 2010, en route to 0.7 per cent by 2015. Admirably, Member States that joined the European Union after 2002 set a development assistance target of 0.33 per cent of gross national income by 2015. The Group of Eight summit held in Gleneagles, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, built on this momentum with an agreement to augment total annual development assistance by $50 billion by 2010, with half of the increase directed to Africa. An increasing number of donors are meeting the target to provide at least 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of their gross national income to assist the least developed countries, and official development assistance to least developed countries has thus increased sharply in recent years. Innovative sources of financing have also been explored and various initiatives are being implemented.

2006—translating commitments into action

27. If history judges 2005 for its promises, then 2006 must be judged on implementation. Are we on course to look back, in 2015, and say that no effort was spared? So far the record is mixed. The words of 2005 have yet to have a direct impact on the lives of the poor people they are meant to help. Nor have they produced the implementation breakthroughs required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The challenges remain most pressing in Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, where the proportion of people living in extreme poverty is essentially unchanged since 1990 and the absolute number has increased dramatically.

28. There has been progress, however. For example, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative has followed a prompt timetable towards completion; international malaria control efforts are gathering speed, backed by increased donor assistance; momentum is under way to launch the African Green Revolution agreed upon at the 2005 World Summit; and recent global commitments have also prompted new notions of investment scale-up to tackle broader development priorities. To ensure that Member States can respond to their countries' development priorities, last year I personally wrote to all Heads of State and Government offering United Nations assistance and support. I am heartened to note that the United Nations country teams are currently helping many countries to prepare and implement Millennium Development Goal-based national development strategies.

29. Putting the Millennium Development Goals into action, the United Nations has collaborated with Governments and other stakeholders to support so-called millennium villages throughout Africa. The project began with a single village in Sauri, Kenya, in August 2004 and has expanded to 12 sites in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Among other successes, the villages are transforming themselves from areas of chronic hunger, tripling their crop production in a short time. Using scientific technology and understanding the agro-ecological zones of the areas, villagers are now able to sell their produce in nearby markets.

30. Thanks to efforts by the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and others, progress is being made to slow the spread of infectious diseases and provide assistance to those suffering from them. Aid is increasing throughout Africa and other areas to provide insecticide-treated mosquito nets, which can save as many as 20 per cent of children who would otherwise die from malaria. Policies regarding artemisinin-based combination therapy for malaria are now in place, helping to stem the burden of resistance to former malaria treatments and helping many to overcome the disease. A large campaign to eradicate polio over the past decade has nearly been completed, with only four polio-endemic countries left. It is suspected that transmission of the disease could be halted throughout the world by the end of 2006, with the possibility of the world being certified polio-free by the end of 2010.

31. From the work of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to ensure that policies to attain the Millennium Development Goals reach out to indigenous people to the likely conclusion of the first ever convention on protection and promotion of the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities this year, progress towards policy implementation is evident. Another key issue from the 2005 World Summit—how to realize the great potential of migration to advance worldwide development—will be addressed at the forthcoming high-level dialogue in the General Assembly. This offers a unique opportunity for the Organization to move policies towards economic and social progress for migrants and their countries of origin and destination.

32. The Economic and Social Council has been called upon to play a critical role in the systematic follow-up and monitoring of progress of various

programmes. The annual ministerial reviews can become the major mechanism for strengthening accountability for international commitments to the Millennium Development Goals and the other agreed development goals. The Council's high-level development cooperation forum will provide a global platform where all will be able to discuss key policy issues that affect development cooperation in all its forms. I trust that the Council will rise to this major challenge.

33. In spite of these advances, progress remains much too incomplete. Most fundamentally, international financial commitments remain inadequate in terms of timing, volume and quality for achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. Many of the new promises will take years to materialize, so it is difficult for low-income countries to begin real investment scale-up. Aggregate official development assistance reached a record high of $106 billion in 2005, up from $69 billion in 2003, but only a small fraction of this nominal increase actually represented additional finance to support real ground-level investments in the countries that need them most. Even multilateral debt relief yields little immediate gain for qualifying countries, since benefits are backloaded and additional financing is still necessary to ensure that multilateral development banks are adequately resourced to finance scale-up programmes. It therefore remains as important as ever for developed countries without timetables for achieving the 0.7 per cent aid target to set them as soon as possible. Moreover, aid delivery mechanisms require dramatic improvement, building on the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

34. Another cause for concern is the suspension of negotiations of the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Round. Developing countries require greater market access and support for capacity development in order to develop the long-term competitiveness that sustains economic development. Following the Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, China, in December 2005, which produced few areas of agreement and little momentum, the talks were stalled in July 2006. In the coming months, leadership will be required from all sides, particularly the developed countries, if negotiations are to be saved. It is also important that the Aid for Trade Initiative endorsed at Hong Kong be pursued.

35. The costs of delay and inaction are borne globally, not just locally. One need only consider the challenges posed by emerging diseases such as avian influenza to understand the shared and urgent global interest in supporting practical development steps in all countries. We must recognize the nature of global trust at stake and the danger that many developing countries' hopes could be irredeemably pierced if even the greatest anti-poverty movement in history is insufficient to break from "business as usual". As we move towards implementation in 2006 and beyond, we still must spare no effort.

HIV/AIDS

36. In the 25 years since the first cases of AIDS were reported, AIDS has killed more than 25 million people, orphaned 15 million children and exacerbated hunger and poverty. It has become the leading cause of death among both men and women aged 15 to 59, and women now represent 50 per cent of people living with HIV worldwide. After a tragically late and slow start, the world's response has gathered strength. The adoption of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS in June 2001 marked a watershed moment when the world recognized the challenge posed by AIDS and pledged to take action.

37. A great deal of progress has been achieved since then. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established in 2002 to provide low- and middle-income countries with additional financing. More domestic and international resources have been mobilized. The prices of some AIDS medicines have been greatly reduced and the "3 by 5 Initiative", launched by UNAIDS and WHO, has helped to generate a substantial increase in the number of people receiving antiretroviral treatment. Yet, the pace of the epidemic continues to outstrip current efforts. An estimated 38.6 million people worldwide were living with HIV in 2005. An estimated 4.1 million people became infected with HIV and an estimated 2.8 million lost their lives to AIDS. The global impact of AIDS has already been so devastating that the *Human Development Report 2005* of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) concluded that the HIV/AIDS pandemic had inflicted the single greatest reversal in human development.

38. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, world leaders committed to a massive scaling up of HIV prevention, treatment and care with the aim of coming as close as possible to the goal of universal access to treatment by 2010 for all who need it. The impact is starting to be seen in some areas, with trends in national HIV prevalence showing recent declines in two sub-Saharan African countries, namely Kenya and Zimbabwe, in urban areas in Burkina Faso and Haiti, nationally in Cambodia and Thailand and in four states in India. More than 1.3 million people were receiving antiretroviral therapy in low- and

middle-income countries by December 2005, and in sub-Saharan Africa the number of people receiving treatment increased more than eightfold (from 100,000 to 810,000) between 2003 and 2005 and more than doubled in 2005 alone. The number of people receiving antiretroviral therapy in Asia increased almost threefold, to 180,000, in 2005.

39. In response to the request of the General Assembly contained in its resolution 60/224, UNAIDS and its co-sponsors helped to facilitate inclusive country-driven processes to develop practical strategies for moving towards universal access. The report entitled "Towards universal access: assessment by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS on scaling up HIV prevention, treatment, care and support", provides a summary of these country-driven processes and contains practical recommendations on setting and supporting national priorities; ensuring predictable and sustainable financing; strengthening human resources and systems; removing the barriers to ensure affordable commodities; protecting the AIDS-related human rights of people living with HIV, women and children and people in vulnerable groups; and setting targets and accountability mechanisms.

40. The high-level meeting and review of progress on HIV/AIDS, which was held in New York from 31 May to 2 June 2006, provided world leaders with an opportunity to assess progress made in achieving the targets set out in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and to strengthen the global response against the epidemic. In the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: five years later, Member States: *(a)* committed to taking specific actions to scale up nationally driven, sustainable and comprehensive AIDS responses—including the full and active participation of civil society—towards the goal of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support by 2010; *(b)* recognized the UNAIDS estimate that $20 billion to $23 billion would be required annually by 2010 to fund sufficiently scaled-up responses; *(c)* committed to setting up ambitious national targets and costed national plans; and *(d)* agreed to focus on the key drivers of the epidemic, in particular gender disparity, challenges for young people and stigma and discrimination.

41. The HIV/AIDS epidemic demands an exceptional response. Among the main challenges ahead are the need to work more closely and openly with populations most affected by HIV and AIDS, such as men who have sex with men, sex workers and injecting drug users, and moving from short-term emergency response to a longer-term response that recognizes the exceptionality of AIDS and is integrated with national development planning and implementation. We need an ambitious and balanced strategy of both prevention and treatment and adequate urgent funding. A real difference can be made in a very short time.

The special needs of Africa

42. World leaders made an unprecedented commitment in the Millennium Declaration to recognize and provide for the special needs of Africa. The need for urgent and concerted action was compelling, as Africa continues to suffer more than its share of the hardships caused by violent conflict, poverty and disease.

43. It must be recognized, however, that encouraging developments have taken place in Africa during the past 10 years. The number of democratically elected national Governments in Africa has increased significantly, and economic growth in some African countries is relatively strong and sustained. There has been a marked resolve by African leaders to take control of the continent's destiny. The Organization of African Unity has been transformed into the African Union, which continues to strengthen its peacekeeping and mediation capacities and its peer-review mechanism, and implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is moving ahead.

44. Yet major challenges remain. Sub-Saharan Africa lags behind the rest of the developing world in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. About half of the world's armed conflicts, and the vast majority of United Nations peacekeepers, are in Africa. There is a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many countries.

45. Providing support for the development of Africa has become a top priority of the United Nations. Regional actions and international initiatives have further strengthened impetus for progress in conflict resolution, economic growth, consolidation of democracy and implementation of NEPAD. With a recent agreement, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative has helped Nigeria to shift approximately $1 billion a year from debt servicing to poverty-reduction programmes. Ghana and the Netherlands recently launched a partnership to support Ghana's nationwide school meals programme using locally produced food. Many African countries are preparing 10-year education plans, while Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania continue to show the benefits for primary-school enrolment of abolishing user fees for education. Earlier this year Zambia cancelled fees for basic rural health services and Burundi introduced free medical care for mothers and children.

46. The Africa Fertilizer Summit held in June 2006 in Abuja mapped out a common strategy for the continent to achieve food self-sufficiency and launch the rural economic transformation required to overcome extreme poverty. African leaders set targets for 2007 and 2008 en route to a 2015-based plan of action to help farmers move to higher-yielding land practices, with increased use of improved seeds, fertilizers and irrigation.

47. Meanwhile, the Millennium Project launched the Millennium Villages initiative, which aims to identify how recent global commitments can be translated to Government- and community-led development efforts to further the Millennium Development Goals. Ten countries so far are partnering with UNDP in the initiative.

48. The United Nations system offered further assistance in a wide range of areas. The independent panel of experts that I established two years ago has submitted its second report on the theme "From commitments to results: moving forward NEPAD implementation". The report includes a number of proposals for advancing the NEPAD agenda.

49. In 2005, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa released a report entitled "Resource flows to Africa: an update on statistical trends". The report found that while official development assistance remained the main external resource flow to Africa, remittances from Africans working abroad had overtaken foreign direct investment in the period 2000-2003. Consequently, public policy should aim to facilitate an increase in remittances, in particular by reducing the cost of transfers so as to achieve the key objective of greater resource flows to households in Africa.

50. Other contributions of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa include a conference organized in collaboration with the Government of Sierra Leone on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and stability in Africa in Freetown, in June 2005. It brought together African practitioners and their international partners to share experiences and ideas about ways to improve the design, operation and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to better promote sustainable peace on the continent. A similar round table of experts was convened in Cairo in June 2006 on the theme "Natural resources and conflict in Africa: transforming a peace liability into a peace asset" in an effort to promote socially responsible and economically sound resource management in post-conflict countries in Africa.

51. In the years ahead, the United Nations must respond even better to Africa's needs and aspirations. This is consistent with the Organization's ideals, and the people of Africa deserve nothing less.

Ensuring environmental sustainability

52. In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to address pressing issues regarding environmental protection and socio-economic development. Over 100 world leaders signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity, endorsed the Rio Declaration and adopted a strategic plan for preventing environmental degradation and achieving environmental sustainability in the twenty-first century, the so-called Agenda 21. The Commission on Sustainable Development was created to monitor and report on implementation of the Earth Summit agreements. Five years later, in 1997, the General Assembly met in special session in New York to reaffirm the Earth Summit compact and review the implementation of Agenda 21 by countries, international organizations and civil society.

53. During my tenure, I have seen a greater understanding among Governments that human security is also threatened by environmental degradation. The continuing increase in the number of ratifications of major multilateral environmental agreements shows the growing commitment of countries to address global environmental issues. Ensuring environmental sustainability is one of the main pillars of the global fight against poverty, and it is essential for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The United Nations has been active in seeking ways to improve and sustain the environment.

54. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, which I launched in 2001 and a report on which was released in March 2005, highlighted the urgency of making more progress towards environmental sustainability. It found that 60 per cent of the world's ecosystems, such as drylands, forests, fisheries and even the air we breathe, are being degraded or used unsustainably. The United Nations system must continue to help countries to integrate environmental concerns effectively into national policy frameworks for development and poverty reduction. The Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity-building, adopted by the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), is aimed at strengthening the capacity of Governments of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to achieve their environmental goals and targets, as well as the environment-related development goals agreed internationally, thus enhancing the environmental sustainability of their countries' develop-

ment. UNEP, UNDP and their relevant partners are intensifying their activities as envisaged in the Bali Strategic Plan.

55. At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders decided on a number of measures aimed at protecting our common environment, including a call for a more coherent institutional framework to address the environmental challenges of today. While the General Assembly has started its consideration of these matters, I have established the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence that will present its proposals on how to ensure and enhance coordination of United Nations activities in the areas of development, humanitarian affairs and the environment. In the meantime, UNEP and UNDP, two of the main implementing agencies of the Global Environment Facility, have integrated their respective poverty and environmental projects into the Poverty and Environment Initiative, which was announced at the "Environment for the Millennium Development Goals" high-level event during the Summit in September.

56. Action on climate change is particularly urgent, and implementing a global response to it is a priority of the United Nations. The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005 represented a historic moment in the international response to climate change. Yet this is just one step. There is a need to build a stronger international consensus for setting goals beyond the first Kyoto commitment period of 2008-2012. As at July 2006, 164 countries had ratified the Protocol, representing over 60 per cent of emissions from industrial countries. The wider United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change remains the multilateral framework for action.

57. A major challenge for all countries in the years ahead is the development of new and sustainable energy sources. Governments, businesses and communities around the world have an important role to play in this endeavour and in the broader effort, in the words of the Millennium Declaration, to free all of humanity from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoiled by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for human needs.

Chapter III

Peace and security

Conflict prevention and peacemaking

58. The United Nations was founded on a commitment to prevent war and to strengthen means for conflict resolution. The Millennium Declaration reaffirmed that preventing deadly conflicts and protecting people from violence is a priority of the Organization. We continue to be reminded of the importance of peacemaking and attempting to prevent conflict before it develops. Early action to address the root causes of potentially violent conflict, as well as diplomatic initiatives to bring parties together to bridge their differences, are less costly than waiting until conflicts erupt or run their destructive course.

59. During the past decade, the Organization has begun taking prevention more seriously. Efforts to live up to the Charter and the Millennium Declaration have brought improvements around the world. In Africa, the United Nations has been instrumental in peacemaking, as well as in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Cameroon, Nigeria and elsewhere. In Europe, United Nations-mediated final status talks on Kosovo are under way, and in Cyprus United Nations efforts have been aimed at encouraging a resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement. In Asia, the United Nations has been lending support to reconciliation efforts in Iraq and peace processes in Nepal. In Central Asia I initiated the establishment of a regional United Nations centre for preventive diplomacy, an initiative that enjoys the support of five countries in the region. In the Americas, the General Assembly discontinued its annual review of Central America in 2005, marking the end of over 20 years of successful United Nations peacemaking efforts in the region. Meanwhile, conflict-prevention activities are under way in the Andean region and in Guyana. In countless other cases, through development programming, good offices and other means, United Nations officials shore up fragile situations and help national counterparts to avoid the scourge of war.

60. The Organization has seen institutional progress in peacemaking over the past decade. I warmly welcomed the decisions of the 2005 World Summit with respect to conflict prevention and mediation and can report several steps towards implementation of those decisions. A dedicated mediation support capacity is being established within the Department of Political Affairs, which will serve as a repository of lessons and experiences and will offer more systematic support to United Nations mediators and to mediation partners outside of the United Nations. There has also been important normative, political and institutional progress in the area of conflict prevention. Unfortunately, however, we still have a long way to go to ensure that effective preventive action is taken when the opportunity arises. At the systemic, structural and operational

levels, more understanding, resources, cooperation and will are needed to make armed conflict less viable and less likely.

Peacekeeping

61. Over the past decade, we have been reminded that United Nations peacekeeping plays a crucial role in securing States and individual political freedoms. Missions such as those in Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Balkans have been central to my tenure. When I became Secretary-General, the United Nations had fewer than 13,000 troops deployed worldwide and was recovering from the setbacks of the early 1990s. Today 65,500 troops and military observers, 7,500 police and more than 15,000 international and local civilian personnel serve in 15 peacekeeping operations and 3 special political or peacebuilding missions, in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The annual budget for United Nations peacekeeping has increased from approximately $1 billion in 1997 to approximately $5 billion today—totaling 0.5 per cent of global military spending. In 1997 military and police personnel were drawn from about 70 countries versus over 100 countries currently. In 1998 4 out of the top 10 contributors of troops were developing countries, whereas today all 10 are developing countries.

62. The past year has witnessed the successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and support for the organization of fair and largely calm elections from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Burundi and Haiti. In the particularly challenging environments of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, peacekeeping operations have facilitated complex transitional political processes.

63. But the year has also brought harsh reminders that the risk of failure is high. We withdrew our peacekeepers from Sierra Leone in December 2005. However, while we pulled our last soldiers from Timor-Leste in May 2005, within just one year an international force had returned to the country as it slipped back towards violence. Meanwhile, progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was tempered by violent incidents in the eastern part of the country, which highlighted the challenging and often hostile environment in which our peacekeeping operations take place.

64. The transformation of United Nations peacekeeping is not only numerical. Our traditional role of monitoring ceasefires remains very important, but we have become deeply engaged in facilitating political processes to give countries and territories emerging from conflict the opportunity for legitimate Government. This has been particularly important in, for example, Kosovo, where the United Nations has served as the interim administration and is now leading the political process to determine Kosovo's future status. In addition, in 2005 alone, over 50 million registered voters had the chance to participate in elections and referendums overseen by United Nations peacekeeping missions. Because we recognize that voting alone does not bring stable politics, we are increasingly engaged in helping Governments to reform their security sectors and in providing social services to all. In Liberia and Haiti, our missions are also paying particular attention to the way in which State services are provided and, together with partners, assisting national authorities to enhance the accountability of Government finances.

65. Building these capacities requires significant resources. Over the past year I have been grateful to the Security Council for strengthening the mandates of our missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti and for permitting the transfer of personnel from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire and from Burundi to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I recall my earlier statements that fulfilling complex mandates requires the highest-calibre civilian staff, drawn from across the United Nations system, other multilateral organizations and Member States. This year, we made important progress in approving and staffing the initial operating capability for a standing police capacity. We must continue to work to get the best professionals, civilian and uniformed, in the field on the shortest possible notice.

66. But building peace takes not only strong personnel but time. Observing the setback in Timor-Leste, we have been reminded that, while the concerns of the Organization's financial and personnel contributors must always be taken into account, it is important that the international community does not withdraw too hastily from conflict-scarred countries. I am hopeful that the new Peacebuilding Commission, which has, with the support of the two Governments, identified Burundi and Sierra Leone for attention, will play an important role in coordinating the rebuilding of post-conflict societies.

67. We also need strong partners. This year we have continued to develop our relationships with other international organizations. I welcome the European Union's decision to provide a standby force to support the United Nations Operation in the Congo during national elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and am grateful to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union

and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for their continued collaboration in ensuring stability and political progress in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the United Nations has made marked progress in cooperating with the African Union, as demonstrated by the joint United Nations-African Union assessment mission to Darfur, Sudan, in June. This allowed the two organizations to develop a consolidated plan for strengthening the current African Union Mission in the Sudan and to provide recommendations for the transfer from that mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the region.

68. Yet we must also recognize that, in spite of this cooperation and considerable effort by the international community, the Government of the Sudan has yet to approve a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur. Alongside the constraints placed on the operations of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea by the Government of Eritrea and the request of the Government of Burundi that the United Nations Operation in Burundi withdraw, this is a potent reminder that we can build peace and stability only where there is sustained local political support and raises very hard questions about why we sometimes fail to win that support from parties when we need it most. The answers are primarily political. The parties to a conflict may not always perceive an effective peacekeeping operation as being in their interest. There are also often misperceptions about the agenda of our peacekeeping operations. However, once the parties have recognized that United Nations peacekeeping has no other goal than that of promoting international peace and security, we must ensure that our peacekeepers meet the highest standards and that the necessary resources are made available.

69. We have recognized that we sometimes lose local support because of our operational failings, most obviously in the case of sexual exploitation and abuse, which we have worked hard to eradicate in recent years. We also accept that we lose credibility when we lack the full range of resources necessary to address multiple challenges, such as localized violence by politically motivated spoilers and organized crime. Too often, our stature is eroded by disenchantment with the often slow processes of development or institution-building. Our own morale also suffers badly in these circumstances.

70. But we must understand above all that the deployment of peacekeepers, under direct United Nations command or otherwise, will bring real peace only where the international community maintains close involvement in finding political solutions with local actors and in creating conditions for effective reconstruction and development. At a time when our peacekeeping forces are so overextended, and often taking significant risks, it must be remembered that their presence can ease dialogue and succeed only where there is political will, and cannot act as an easy long-term alternative to it.

71. As we approach the end of my term of office and as we continue to search for a settlement to the great crises of our time, such as those in the Middle East and the Sudan, it is crucial that we continue to muster the political will that can translate our investment of financial and human resources into peace.

Peacebuilding

72. In the course of the past decade, ever more focus at the United Nations has been devoted to post-conflict peacebuilding—that is, in the aftermath of conflict, the restoration of State authority, the revitalization of State-society relations and of civil society and the reconstruction of the institutional foundations of economic and social development.

73. The track record of peacebuilding efforts is decidedly mixed. By some counts between a third and half of those countries that emerge from war relapse into it within five years. This phenomenon was illustrated in recent years by the relapse into violence in Haiti and a resurgence of tension in Timor-Leste, in both cases requiring the return of international peacekeepers. In these and similar cases, too little had been done to re-establish the institutional and economic conditions that can sustain political competition within a framework of constitutional order and law.

74. That peacebuilding often fails is not a source of surprise. The political fractures, social and economic inequalities, resource scarcities and other tensions that generate conflict are exacerbated, not diminished, by war. The mere fact of the signing of a peace agreement does not signify an end to these sources of conflict; peace agreements are at best merely a long-term road map for overcoming them. Implementation of those agreements and the wider process of restoring political and economic relationships is the harder part of the battle.

75. A source of surprise, no; but a source of deep concern, certainly. For not only does relapse into war squander national and international investments in peacemaking and recovery, the fighting that occurs after the collapse of a peace agreement is sometimes far more deadly than in earlier rounds, as parties' belief in the prospects of reconciliation is shattered, the possibility of power-sharing seems more remote, and thus a winner-take-all mentality

pervades. In such circumstances parties often commit to total war and the mass killing it can entail.

76. Parties themselves are often conscious of this risk, and thus sometimes take the necessary tough decisions to forge the necessary political compromises, build the necessary institutional restraints and make the necessary sacrifices to restore the populations' faith in the prospects of recovery and lead people away from war. Where peacebuilding succeeds it is always the leadership of domestic actors that is the essential ingredient of success. No amount of international engagement can substitute for domestic political leaders shouldering their responsibilities and leading their people towards peace and development.

77. Domestic leadership is the essential condition of peacebuilding, but it is rarely a sufficient condition. Rather, substantial international support has often made a crucial difference. Indeed, notwithstanding important failures, the fact is that over the past decade international assistance for the implementation of peace agreements and for wider peacebuilding processes has made a critical contribution to an overall decline in the level of civil war in the world—an achievement of historic significance.

78. And when peacebuilding efforts have succeeded—as they have in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Cambodia, Rwanda and Eastern Slavonia and show every sign of doing in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia—they show the United Nations system at its best and in all of its facets.

79. The United Nations is first and foremost, of course, a membership organization. And peacebuilding highlights this not only because of the irreducible role of national leadership, but also in that the major contributors to peacebuilding efforts are Member States—both regional Governments that can vitally help to stabilize emergent national authorities and donor Governments that provide the bulk of financial resources to the reconstruction process and an additional layer of political support.

80. The United Nations is also a network of capacities. Some of these, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and UNDP, play central roles in economic and institutional reconstruction, while others, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), OHCHR, the World Food Programme and UNICEF play vital roles in humanitarian and social recovery.

81. The United Nations is also a source of operational capacity. The deployment of such capacities—particularly in the form of peacekeeping operations, which are now routinely structured to integrate within them all of the various aspects of United Nations operational engagement—has proved vital to helping parties overcome their divisions, provide a secure space within which they can resolve tensions and serve as a channel for resources for the rehabilitation of State and social infrastructure.

82. Bringing all of these roles together has been a major challenge in the past decade. But it is precisely this role that the Peacebuilding Commission was established to play. By creating a forum that links the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council; by bringing a wider range of States, especially regional actors and the major financial and troop contributors, into the deliberations of the Security Council; by creating a body with an interest in long-term, sustained engagement beyond the normal period of a peacekeeping operation; by creating a forum in which the United Nations system as a whole, including the international financial institutions, can meet with a core set of the most engaged Member States; and, most importantly, by creating a platform for national authorities to set out their own vision and their own priorities for reconstruction—in all of these ways, the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission holds the promise of more effective, more reliable peacebuilding results.

83. The Peacebuilding Commission has been slow to start and has yet to show its full promise. But good things take time, and we should not be discouraged by the fact that this new body is still trying to find effective ways of working. The creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office and the establishment of a Peacebuilding Fund will add critical tools to its repertoire. Over the next decade, I anticipate that the Peacebuilding Commission will be at the core of the work of the United Nations and the international community in peacebuilding—rightly recognized by the 2005 World Summit as a vital role for the Organization.

Combating terrorism

84. The threat of terrorism to international peace, security and development has taken on new importance during the past 10 years. Consequently, the international community has taken a number of important steps to provide a solid legal basis for common actions against terrorism, including the adoption of 13 universal instruments and their protocols and amendments, the latest of which—the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism—was opened for signature during the World Summit in September 2005. In the Millennium Declaration world leaders resolved

to take concerted action against international terrorism. At the World Summit they strongly condemned, for the first time, terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. I trust that the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism will be forthcoming.

85. United Nations counter-terrorism activities have expanded dramatically in order to address the growing challenge of terrorism. The milestone Security Council resolutions, 1267(1999), 1373(2001), 1540(2004) and 1624(2005), and expert groups that support the three counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies have made States more responsible for taking practical steps to prevent terrorist financing, travel and access to weapons of mass destruction, as well as the incitement of terrorism. A remarkably wide array of organizations, departments and agencies in the United Nations system, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, WHO and many others, are actively involved in different aspects of preventing and combating terrorism.

86. However, the increasing demand by Member States for technical assistance in implementing universal instruments and the corresponding need for coordination among the growing number of United Nations entities involved in countering terrorism have demonstrated the need for a comprehensive, coherent and consistent counter-terrorism strategy.

87. At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders welcomed my identification of the five elements of a counter-terrorism strategy that I set out in Madrid in March 2005 and agreed to develop them further to fashion a strategy that makes the international community stronger and terrorists weaker. In addition, they requested that I submit proposals to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of United Nations activities in this regard.

88. In April 2006 I submitted my report entitled "Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy". My proposals stem from the fundamental conviction that no cause, no matter how just, can excuse terrorism. These proposals are focused around five main elements: dissuading groups from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack; deterring States from supporting terrorist groups; developing State capacity to prevent terrorism; and defending human rights in the context of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

89. Throughout the report I have highlighted operational actions to enable Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector—all using their comparative advantages—to work together to counter terrorism while respecting the rule of law and human rights. Over the years, the international community has come to realize that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing ones. The importance of a culture of peace and the fact that terrorism does not emanate from any particular region, ideology or religion—nor is it directed only at certain groups of countries or people—have also become increasingly clear. In this regard, efforts to promote a dialogue among civilizations serve an increasingly useful purpose.

90. I am confident that the United Nations system has vital contributions to make in many aspects of counter-terrorism—from promoting the rule of law and effective criminal justice systems to ensuring that countries have the means to counter the financing of terrorism to strengthening capacity to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological materials. Biological terrorism in particular poses a formidable challenge and acutely requires new thinking on the part of the international community. For this reason I proposed in my report the need for a multi-stakeholder dialogue in order to ensure that advances in biotechnology are not used for nefarious purposes. We must also never forget that victims are the true face of terrorism: protecting their rights, ensuring that their voices are heard and providing assistance to facilitate their reintegration are of utmost importance. While the primary responsibility for this lies with individual States, the relevant United Nations entities can help.

91. To achieve these goals, I am taking steps to institutionalize the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force that I created one year ago, which brings together 23 United Nations system entities that address different aspects of terrorism, to ensure overall coordination and coherence in United Nations counter-terrorism efforts. I am also establishing a focal point in the Secretariat to help coordinate a civil society campaign to counter terrorism, and I have suggested the creation of an informal group of United Nations technical assistance providers, donors and recipients to exchange information and coordinate efforts.

92. I am pleased that the General Assembly has used my recommendations to foster discussions on a global counter-terrorism strategy. The adoption of such a strategy will enhance operational measures to counter terrorism and will mark a historic step, bringing together all 192 Member States to demonstrate their resolve—and ability—to defeat this scourge. I trust that agreement on a strategy will be forthcoming without delay. All States—large or small, strong or weak—are vulnerable to terrorism and its consequences. They all stand to benefit from a strategy to counter it.

Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

93. The elimination of weapons "adaptable to mass destruction" has been on the United Nations agenda since 1946. Over the past decade, we have witnessed at first rising and then diminishing expectations concerning weapons of mass destruction. In 1995, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. A year later, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was signed. In 2000 the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted new political commitments to advance the treaty's aims. In 2005 Member States had two opportunities to strengthen the foundations of the treaty, first at the Review Conference in May and then at the World Summit in September. On both occasions, failure to reach consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament sent a terrible signal of a growing international rift on what is potentially the most dangerous threat to international peace and prosperity. At the same time, the world has made remarkable progress in forging a global taboo against chemical weapons. Since its entry into force in 1997, membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention has grown to 178. The treaty is the first to provide for a robust international system to verify the destruction of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Since 1995, membership in the Biological Weapons Convention has grown to 155 with the addition of 21 parties. However, concerns persist over the lack of means to verify compliance and the need to expand membership even further.

94. Today the United Nations continues to play an active and influential role in efforts to stem the proliferation of lethal weaponry. In several major speeches this year, I have drawn attention to my overriding concern that the international community is presently facing two very divergent courses. One path, that of active engagement by all Member States, can take us to a world in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons is restricted and reversed through trust, dialogue and negotiated agreement. The other more dangerous course could lead to a world of fearful instability where such weapons are the currency of international relations and in which non-State actors acquire the means to carry out terrorism with potentially catastrophic consequences.

95. If ever there was a time to break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations and bring disarmament back into the limelight of the international agenda, I believe that it is now. At such a moment, we should remember what the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has achieved. With near-universal membership, it has entrenched a norm against nuclear proliferation. The success of the treaty, the global support it enjoys and its resilience too often pass unacknowledged.

96. I have also drawn attention to the need to resolve two specific issues of concern. The continuing impasse on the Korean peninsula is especially disappointing given the agreement reached in September 2005 in the Six-Party Talks, which included a set of principles for a verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula. The Islamic Republic of Iran, for its part, needs to enable IAEA to assure the world that its nuclear activities are exclusively peaceful in nature. In both cases, there is a need for solutions that are not only peaceful, but that buttress the integrity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

97. While there has been some progress towards disarmament, nuclear weapons worldwide still number in the thousands, many of them on hair-trigger alert. Moreover, new missile testing in 2006 underscores the absence of a multilateral instrument regulating missiles. If we want to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, then there must be a more concerted international effort to build a common understanding of the most immediate nuclear threats. The debate between those who insist on disarmament before taking further non-proliferation measures and those who argue the opposite is in my view self-defeating. Both are essential for security.

98. During a visit to Geneva in June 2006, I was heartened by the fact that the Conference on Disarmament appeared much readier than it has been in recent years to move forward on a programme of work. For the first time in a decade, the Conference is working to an agreed schedule, with particular efforts to reflect the security concerns of all States. In Geneva, I acknowledged the importance of proposals from China and the Russian Federation on preventing the weaponization of outer space and called attention to the elements of a ground-breaking instrument for halting the pro-

duction of fissile materials for weapons purposes proposed by the United States of America. I hope that these steps represent the beginnings of a new period of productivity.

99. IAEA continues its outstanding work of verifying and assuring compliance with the practical aspects of implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Director General, Mohamed El Baradei, on behalf of the Agency was further evidence of the indispensable role that he and the Organization currently play.

100. I am also pleased to report that in April 2006 the Security Council renewed its resolution 1540(2004), requiring all Member States to enact and enforce effective national legal and regulatory measures, inter alia to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

101. In my April 2006 report "Uniting against terrorism", I emphasized the likely devastating impact of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological terrorist attack. In that report I suggested that bioterrorism—the misuse of biological agents and toxins by non-State actors—was one of the most important under-addressed threats relating to peace and security. I therefore proposed a forum that would bring together key biotechnology stakeholders to provide momentum for a global initiative to minimize the dangers of misuse of biotechnology.

102. The proliferation of small arms continues to pose a serious threat to peace and security in many regions of the world. These weapons may be small, but they cause massive destruction. In 2001 Member States made a commitment to urgently address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. I am encouraged by the General Assembly's adoption in December 2005 of an international tracing instrument to identify and trace illicit small arms. However, I am disappointed that the 2006 United Nations conference to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms ended without agreement on further measures. Still, it did succeed in drawing the issue to the attention of the international community, which clearly remains committed to the Programme of Action as the main framework for measures to curtail the illegal trade in those weapons.

103. The various challenges we presently face have never been greater, more varied or, in many respects, more dangerous. They will demand a shared level of commitment, innovative thinking and practical action on the part of all Member States if we are to prove ourselves equal to the challenge. My vision for the United Nations of the twenty-first century is one in which we are increasingly determined to move forward on three fronts—security, development and human rights—simultaneously. These issues are all inextricably linked precisely because they depend upon and reinforce one another. We cannot afford to fail.

Chapter IV

Human rights, rule of law and humanitarian affairs

Rule of law

104. The United Nations was established in the aftermath of a terrible war to ensure that relations among nations would be grounded in international law, including human rights and the dignity of the human person. "Rule of law" is the core concept at the heart of the Organization's work and mission. Those principles apply at the international level as well as within States. Indeed, the Millennium Declaration reaffirmed the commitment of all nations to the rule of law as the all-important framework for advancing human security and prosperity.

105. At the international level, the most striking development over the past decade has occurred in the area of international criminal justice. The International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda established by the Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively marked the first generation of tribunals since the International Military Tribunal established in Nuremberg. They demonstrated the collective will not to allow grave violations of international law to go unpunished. It will be important to continue to ensure that the two tribunals work effectively and efficiently to complete their work. I encourage Member States to cooperate fully with them and to surrender indictees to them upon request.

106. One of the greatest and possibly most lasting achievements of the tribunals was to make the vigorous prosecution of such crimes an accepted practice. Indeed, those groundbreaking efforts contributed to the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia. In the development of the new tribunals, the Organization applied important lessons learned from the experiences of the first two. Both of the second-generation tribunals, unlike their predecessors, provide for the participation of national judges and prosecutors and the application of national as well as international law.

107. As 2005 came to a close, the Security Council, in its resolution 1644(2005), requested me to begin a process aimed at the establishment of a

tribunal of an international character for Lebanon as a result of the bombing on 14 February 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other persons. As we move towards the establishment of this tribunal, the Secretariat will ensure that it applies the highest standards of international justice as it carries out its work. In addition, in Burundi, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1606(2005), the Secretariat is undertaking an approach that combines judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms through discussions with the Burundian authorities regarding the legal framework for both a truth and reconciliation commission and a tribunal. In these efforts, the Secretariat will seek to build on the lessons learned from the previous tribunals.

108. The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 was the realization of a long effort to end impunity and undertake through the rule of law that those who commit the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes will no longer be beyond the reach of justice. This important step demonstrated the international community's commitment to a permanent and universal mechanism to ensure that as regards those most serious of crimes, impunity will not be tolerated. One hundred Member States have become parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Importantly, the Statute provides for action by national legal authorities before the exercise of international jurisdiction. Since 2004, the Court has opened investigations into situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and Darfur, the latter being referred to the Court by the Security Council. One suspect alleged to have committed war crimes, a Congolese national, was arrested and transferred to the Court in March 2006. In October 2005, the Court's pre-trial chamber unsealed arrest warrants for five senior leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Uganda since July 2002. Extending the participation of Member States in the International Criminal Court will be a further challenge in the area of international justice.

109. Justice, especially transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, is a fundamental building block of peace. In the face of pressures to the contrary, the international community should ensure that justice and peace are considered to be complementary requirements. Indeed, we must never choose between justice and peace, even if it is not possible to pursue both goals in parallel. This is particularly important because it remains our firm position that there should be no amnesty for international crimes.

110. As I pointed out in my report of 23 August 2004 to the Security Council on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, the rule of law, in this context, refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Many parts of the United Nations system work to varying extents on expanding the rule of law, including transitional justice. We have tried, at least in the area of peacebuilding, to ensure coherence and effectiveness in our efforts. As a result, I am encouraged by the recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, which will assist States to ensure that in troubled areas of the world the rule of law is upheld.

111. The rule of law should also apply in the work of the organs of the United Nations. I am pleased that the Security Council has recently renewed its commitment to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists, for removing them and for granting humanitarian exceptions.

112. In 2004 I spoke to the General Assembly about the need to restore and extend the rule of law throughout the world. I characterized it as a framework in which rather than might making right, right would make might. I warned that the rule of law was at risk around the world, with laws being disregarded in too many quarters. The United Nations as a collective, and each of its Member States individually, must commit to ensuring that at all levels and in all situations we adhere to and promote those legal principles that constitute our Organization's foundation.

Human rights

113. Over the past decade, we have seen a significant and welcome elevation of the importance of human rights in the work of the Organization. The Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome reaffirmed the basic premise that human rights formed a central pillar and were the shared responsibility of the United Nations system as a whole.

114. Mainstreaming all human rights, including the right to development, has been central to the series of United Nations reform efforts I have initiated since 1997. It has been an important focus of the work of OHCHR in strengthening the linkages between the normative and operational work of the United Nations system. Progress has been made in

this regard across the system in many areas. Building on this progress, I argued in my 2002 and 2005 reports on United Nations reform that more focused attention was needed to support Member States in their efforts to build stronger national systems for the promotion and protection of human rights. The 2005 World Summit gave unprecedented political backing to strengthening the capacity of the High Commissioner and her office to integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into national policies.

115. At the World Summit, Member States accepted my suggestion that, in order to establish human rights at its proper level within the system, they should create a Human Rights Council, directly elected by the General Assembly, to work alongside the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. In March 2006 the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing the Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights. One of the features of the Council is that it will review, on a periodic basis, the fulfilment of the human rights obligations of all countries through a universal periodic review mechanism. On 9 May 2006, the 47 members of the Council were elected, and they committed to fully cooperating with the Council and to upholding the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights. Together with many other dignitaries, I addressed the opening of the first session on 19 June 2006. Among the important actions taken, the Council adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It also decided to establish two intersessional open-ended intergovernmental working groups: one to develop the modalities of the universal periodic review mechanism and the other to formulate concrete recommendations on the issue of reviewing and, where necessary, improving and rationalizing all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities in order to maintain a system of special procedures, expert advice and a complaint procedure.

116. The 2005 World Summit Outcome represented a clear and unambiguous acceptance by all Governments of the collective international responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. For the first time ever, Member States expressed a willingness to take timely and decisive collective action for that purpose, through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to do it. The decision represents a renewal of the United Nations promise of "never again", but we must match our rhetoric with a real willingness to take action.

117. Following my report "In larger freedom", the High Commissioner for Human Rights released her plan of action (May 2005), presenting an overall vision for the future direction of OHCHR. In early 2006, she launched her first biennial strategic management plan, which articulates how OHCHR aims to implement the vision in the plan of action and provides a comprehensive overview of the areas of work on which OHCHR will focus and the resources that will be required. In the autumn of 2005, the General Assembly supported the implementation of the new plan by resolving to double the regular budget of the Office over five years. In the biennium 2006-2007, this means an additional 91 posts and a further $20 million in available funding.

118. The plan of action calls for attention to be paid to a range of implementation gaps on the ground and points to the need for concerted action by OHCHR and the United Nations system to work with countries to close those gaps for the effective protection and realization of human rights. The "action 2 programme" I established as a follow-up to my 2002 report "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change", is led by OHCHR with participation by the United Nations Development Group and Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs agencies. As country-level implementation of action 2 intensifies, increased attention will be needed to direct the wider efforts of the United Nations system at the country level to ensure that they effectively contribute to greater development of national capacity for more effective and sustainable protection of human rights.

119. The treaty bodies made progress in harmonizing their working methods and considering means to assist States parties to fulfil their substantive commitments and meet their reporting obligations. Guidelines for a common core document now exist and are available for States parties to use. In March 2006, the High Commissioner prepared a concept paper that elaborated on the proposal in the plan of action for a unified standing treaty body. It provides a basis on which options for reform could be explored.

120. Special procedures mechanisms fulfilled an important role in the protection of human rights. In the period from September 2005 to June 2006 they undertook fact-finding missions to over 40 countries. During the same period they sent over 900 communications to 125 countries in all regions of the world, covering almost 2,500 individuals.

They also undertook a number of ground-breaking studies in thematic areas related to their mandates.

121. In line with my reform programme and the High Commissioner's plan of action, OHCHR is enhancing its country engagement efforts and increasing its field operations. In 2005, OHCHR opened three new offices, in Nepal, Guatemala and Uganda.

122. The OHCHR office in Nepal has a broad mandate to protect and promote human rights, including by conducting monitoring activities throughout the country. During the demonstrations and protests in April 2006, OHCHR monitoring teams throughout the country documented events, helped deter violence and visited over a thousand people who were detained. With regional offices around the country and monitoring on the street, OHCHR was uniquely placed to contribute to the protection of human rights on the ground.

123. Against the background of violent incidents that took place in Timor-Leste in April and May 2006, the Government of Timor-Leste requested the United Nations to establish an independent commission to review the incidents. I then asked the High Commissioner to establish and support an independent special commission of inquiry for Timor-Leste. The commissioners began their work in Timor-Leste in July 2006 and will report to me by October 2006.

124. In my 2005 report "In larger freedom", I argued that together with development and security, human rights formed the third pillar of the Organization's work. The cause of human rights has entered a new era—an era of implementation. The reforms adopted in the past year, as well as those still under way, reflect this evolution and will better equip the United Nations to fulfil the promise of the Charter.

Democracy and good governance

125. The last decade has witnessed substantial progress for democratic governance. Today more Governments have been chosen by competitive elections than at any time in history. This symbolizes important gains in human rights, freedom and choice. Inclusive public participation and competitive multi-party elections are essential for empowering the poor and for building lasting peace settlements, although they are not sufficient by themselves.

126. The past year witnessed several landmark elections in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations played a key role in providing assistance with elections in Afghanistan, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia and Palestine—registering voters, administering polling places, facilitating the establishment of electoral laws and strengthening independent electoral commissions. One important outcome of the first legislative elections for the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga ("House of the People") in Afghanistan in September 2005 was the election of 68 women. The United Nations mounted its most ambitious programme ever when aiding elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, costing an estimated $432 million. The Democratic Republic of the Congo had not held a multi-party election since 1965 and the country was emerging from an extended period of crisis. The complicated political and electoral situation in Côte d'Ivoire led to a new form of United Nations electoral support: the appointment of a High Representative for Elections to facilitate solutions to electoral disagreements.

127. The United Nations has also assisted dozens of countries that have requested advice or support with more routine electoral administration processes, such as training of professional electoral officials, assisting with electoral dispute resolution, advising on electoral system design, supporting voter education programmes, training journalists in campaign coverage and assessing the costs of registration and balloting.

128. Despite these positive developments, many important challenges remain. Organizing inclusive and competitive elections is only one step—though a necessary one—in building democracy. Elections raise expectations that governing institutions and processes will be responsive to the needs and concerns of all citizens, including the poor and marginalized. To fulfil these hopes, work at the United Nations has gradually shifted during the past decade from a traditional emphasis on public administration towards challenging new issues in democratic governance.

129. To strengthen the efforts of Governments, civil society and non-governmental actors and regional and international organizations that are striving to build and consolidate the pillars of democracy, the World Summit decided in September 2005 to establish the United Nations Democracy Fund. The Fund has attracted $49 million in pledged or contributed funds. The Fund will finance projects designed to empower civil society, strengthen the rule of law, increase popular participation and ensure that people are able to exercise their democratic rights.

130. The United Nations works today with countries to ensure that parliaments are effective and representative, human rights are respected, judges are fair and impartial, the media are inde-

pendent and free and decision-making is responsive to local concerns. Democratic participation and Government capacity-building need to go hand-in-hand. If people vote but experience no real improvement in their daily lives, then they may become disillusioned. If Governments are strengthened but are not accountable to the people, then this process may benefit the few and not the many. This long-term twin challenge lies at the heart of the work of the United Nations on strengthening democratic governance.

131. To achieve these ends, the United Nations provides a wide range of services, policy advice and technical assistance designed to strengthen justice systems and human rights, parliamentary representation, local governance and decentralization, public administration reform and anti-corruption efforts, gender equality, e-governance and access to information, civil society and public opinion. In these programmes, the United Nations collaborates closely with many partners and donor organizations, as well as with parliamentary networks, civil society organizations and other entities.

132. Parliaments can play a critical role by linking citizens and the State, as well as by reducing conflict. The United Nations has worked to strengthen these institutions in more than 50 countries, especially in West African and Arab States. Decentralizing governance is also important for delivering services and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Improving communities and reducing poverty requires public sector management to be efficient and responsive and for corruption to be eradicated.

133. The International Conference of New or Restored Democracies, working with the United Nations, is a forum especially suited to supporting democracy among approximately 120 countries from the developing and developed world. The sixth conference will take place in Doha in October 2006, the first time it will have been held in the Arab world. Together with the Conference, the Community of Democracies also works with the United Nations to widen acceptance of democratic governance within the international community.

134. The last decade has seen important advances in building effective democratic institutions in many countries, including in some of the poorest nations in the world. The United Nations has contributed substantially towards those developments. Yet in many places the quality of democratic governance continues to need further strengthening and in some, democratic progress has stalled and even moved backwards. Unless international commitment and support is maintained well after polling day, elections may generate empty promises and democratic governance and human development may fail to be sustained.

Humanitarian affairs

135. Humanitarian assistance serves as a tangible demonstration of the United Nations commitment to save lives and alleviate suffering by providing urgently needed help to communities devastated by violent conflict or natural disaster. Emergency relief aid serves as the first rung on the ladder of development, helping vulnerable populations survive catastrophes as they move towards ever-greater self-reliance. In the past 10 years, the humanitarian community has provided assistance and protection to tens of millions of civilians, who tragically continue to be the primary victims of conflict and civil strife. Multiple crises now occur simultaneously across the globe, with humanitarian access and insecurity a growing challenge, especially in fragile or failing States. In 1996 the United Nations issued 13 consolidated appeals totalling $1.8 billion to assist 17 million people in crises around the world. Ten years later, consolidated appeals sought $4.7 billion to fund 18 humanitarian programmes serving 31 million people in 26 countries.

136. As part of my reform programme in 1998, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in an effort to strengthen the coherence and overall effectiveness of humanitarian action. The mandate was expanded to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. In the past decade, the United Nations has intensified interagency coordination, improved field-level coordination and bolstered resource mobilization efforts.

137. As I noted in my report "In larger freedom", no country, weak or strong, can remain isolated from or immune to threats of man or nature that transcend borders. Now more than ever we need a revitalized, effective and accountable United Nations that is capable of meeting the humanitarian challenges ahead. To that end, in 2005 the United Nations launched a comprehensive reform of the global humanitarian system that is already demonstrating life-saving results for some of the world's most desperate and destitute communities.

Humanitarian achievements

138. In 2005 the United Nations embarked on a series of reforms aimed at strengthening the global humanitarian system to ensure a more predictable, coordinated, efficient and effective response.

In March 2006 I launched the Central Emergency Response Fund, one of the first reform proposals announced at the 2005 World Summit, marking a critical improvement of the capacity for humanitarian response by the United Nations. To date, more than 40 donors have pledged $264 million to the new Fund, which upgrades the former Central Emergency Revolving Fund with a grant facility of up to $450 million added to the $50 million loan component already in place.

139. Using the Fund, United Nations agencies can now jump start relief operations in the earliest days of a crisis when most lives are on the line and timely resources are most needed. The Fund also redresses some of the current inequities in humanitarian funding by dedicating one third of its resources to core, life-saving activities in chronically neglected crises. Launched five months ago, the Fund has provided more than $100 million to 10 organizations for more than 150 projects in 20 countries, the majority of them in Africa. Most importantly, the Fund has helped save lives and alleviate the suffering of millions.

140. The second element of reform addresses the need for improved accountability and predictability of response. With humanitarian resources stretched; multiple, simultaneous crises on several continents; and ever-more aid actors in the field, response coordination is not a luxury but a necessity. The newly launched "cluster leadership" provides more systematic predictability by clearly identifying roles and responsibilities within United Nations agencies in nine key areas of response, from relief to early recovery, to help fill gaps in assistance needs.

141. The third element of humanitarian reform underscores the need for strengthened United Nations country-level representation, as endorsed by the Economic and Social Council and reaffirmed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

Humanitarian response: results

142. In 2005, the world saw the number of natural disasters increase in frequency and severity. Bracketed by the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004 and the South Asian earthquake in October, United Nations humanitarian agencies were stretched to their limits in providing emergency assistance to all those in need.

143. To meet global relief and protection requirements, in 2006 the United Nations issued a consolidated humanitarian appeal for $4.7 billion to fund 18 programmes serving 31 million people in 26 countries. By mid-year, the appeal was 35 per cent funded. The 2005 consolidated appeal sought nearly $6 billion to assist 30 million people in 29 countries, and 67 per cent was funded by year's end.

144. Last year, United Nations humanitarian agencies provided food aid to 97 million people in 82 countries, including 6.5 million in the Sudan; vaccinated over 30 million children in emergency situations against measles; supported hundreds of health facilities; provided access to shelter, suitable land, safe drinking water and sanitation to hundreds of thousands of people; created hundreds of emergency education facilities; provided protection and assistance to some 20 million refugees and displaced persons; and supported child protection activities in some 150 countries.

Natural disasters

145. While recovery from the tsunami tragedy and efforts to "build back better" proceeded apace, humanitarian actors struggled to cope with an 18 per cent increase in the number of large-scale natural disasters in 2005; 157 million people were affected and 92,000 killed in those disasters. As always, poor communities were at greatest risk—and least able to withstand—nature's destructive potential.

146. Floods, droughts and windstorms accounted for more than 96 per cent of those affected by natural disasters in 2005. Twenty-seven tropical storms, thirteen of which became hurricanes, devastated populations in twelve countries, killing more than 1,000 people and displacing hundreds of thousands.

147. Earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunamis were the deadliest natural hazards last year. The worst of these tragedies occurred in October 2005 when a massive earthquake in South Asia killed more than 73,000 people, injured 69,400 and left 3.3 million homeless. Despite unprecedented logistical challenges and harsh Himalayan weather, relief efforts assisted upward of 3 million people with winterized shelter, medical care, food, water and sanitation.

148. In the Horn of Africa, recurring cycles of drought have exacerbated food insecurity and affected 15 million people. In April 2006, I launched a regional appeal for the Horn of Africa addressing both immediate needs for more than 8 million people as well as underlying causes of vulnerability. Of the $855 million requested, less than 40 per cent of this emergency appeal has been met.

Refugees and displaced persons

149. As 2005 drew to a close, the world saw the number of refugees decline for the fifth straight year, while the number of new refugees was the low-

est in nearly 30 years. Globally, there are now 12.7 million refugees registered by the United Nations (of whom 4.3 million are Palestine refugees in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic). In Afghanistan, Burundi and Liberia, hundreds of thousands of people who had been forced from their homes have been able to return to their countries.

150. Sadly, however, there has been a significant rise in the number of internally displaced persons. Worldwide some 23 million people remain displaced as a result of violence and armed conflict. Millions more have been displaced by natural disasters.

Complex emergencies

151. Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan and northern Uganda, among others, continue to claim hundreds of thousands of lives, deprive people of land and property, destroy livelihoods, and foment instability. Regional spillover of localized conflicts in Chad and northern Uganda pose challenges to humanitarian operations, as do the issues of access and security.

152. In Darfur, currently the world's largest relief operation, some 13,000 aid workers are struggling to assist 3 million destitute people—half of Darfur's population—despite daily acts of hideous violence and harassment. In large pockets of Western and Northern Darfur, limited access threatens to sever the humanitarian lifeline for hundreds of thousands of civilians. Overall funding is insufficient to the region's massive humanitarian needs.

153. Humanitarian needs are also acute in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 3.9 million people have perished from hunger and disease during the country's civil war. Some 1,200 people continue to die each day—a silent tsunami death toll every six months. Despite these grim statistics, only 51 per cent of the country's $212 million humanitarian appeal was funded in 2005.

154. As we see all too plainly in Darfur, aid cannot be a substitute for political solutions or remain an excuse for political inaction. We must address both symptoms and causes of crises if we are to staunch the world's haemorrhage of human suffering.

The road ahead: humanitarian challenges

155. Significant progress has been made in strengthening our global humanitarian system. However, we need to focus more attention on protecting civilians and establishing safe access to asylum. Thousands of women are still raped and violated as a matter of course, and defenceless civilians continue to be killed. We need earlier conflict mediation efforts, increased access for humanitarian workers and, most importantly, well-trained and -financed peacekeepers with strong mandates to protect civilians.

156. Funding inequities remain as persistent as they are pervasive; some neglected crises receive barely 20 per cent of funds required. We also need to improve the speed of humanitarian funding so that monies arrive when they can do the most good. Currently, United Nations emergency "flash appeals" receive on average only 16 per cent of funds during the critical first month of a crisis.

157. Humanitarian crises exact a terrible toll on children, who are at grave risk of violence, exploitation, abuse and recruitment into fighting forces. Each year hundreds of thousands of children die from malnutrition, hunger and preventable disease.

158. In the last decade, the number of people affected by disasters was three times higher than in the 1970s. As our climate changes we need to strengthen our disaster risk reduction and preparedness measures, drawing on inter-agency early warning and contingency planning efforts.

159. The need for a reformed, strengthened global humanitarian system has never been more apparent or necessary. We need to work together, harnessing the world's generosity, strength and attention, to tackle the most pressing humanitarian challenges of our day. The Millennium Development Goals represent a shared vision of how to tackle some of these challenges. Our generation has no more worthy goal and no more important aspiration. Let us seize this opportunity. Lives depend on it.

Chapter V
Strengthening the United Nations

The intergovernmental machinery

160. As I have said on several occasions, as the world changes, the United Nations must continue the process of renewal and adaptation. The effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument of its members' collective will is one that is of vital importance for people around the world who look to the Organization for help in defeating poverty, preserving peace, easing humanitarian emergencies and protecting human rights. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, Member States clearly recognized that all the principal organs of the United Nations were in need of reform. At the

2005 World Summit they reaffirmed their commitment to a more efficient and effective United Nations, including with a call for a strengthened intergovernmental machinery.

Security Council

161. I have always maintained that no reform of the United Nations will be complete without the reform of the Security Council. The Council should be more representative of today's geopolitical realities and more efficient and transparent in its working methods. The Millennium Declaration called for an intensification of Member States' efforts "to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects". At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders stated that Security Council reform was "an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations". Enhancing the Council's legitimacy through such reform will enable it to better fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world.

162. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which I commissioned to recommend practical measures for ensuring effective collective responses to global security challenges, proposed two models for an equitable enlargement of the Security Council. In my report "In larger freedom", I urged the membership to consider the options and reiterated the need for reform of the Council's working methods. Member States responded actively, by taking initiatives and engaging in debate on both the expansion of the Council and on possible ways to improve the Council's methods of work.

163. There is broad support within the membership on the need for reform of the Security Council. It is important to find common ground for action on this fundamental piece of overall United Nations reform. Indeed, decisions on such reform, taken sooner rather than later, will ensure that the United Nations machinery to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and security will remain relevant and credible to meet today's and tomorrow's challenges.

General Assembly

164. The Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit Outcome reaffirmed the General Assembly's central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. In recent years much has been achieved on improvement of the Assembly's working methods. For example, presidents of the Assembly are now elected several months in advance of the opening of the session, as are the Main Committee chairs and bureaux, thereby dovetailing the transitions between sessions and ensuring the maximum passage and retention of institutional memory. Progress also continues to be made on shortening the agenda, on institutionalizing interactive discussions and question periods with senior Secretariat officials on specific programmes, mandates and activities and on working to ensure maximum coordination and minimum duplication in the subjects and areas covered by different bodies.

165. However, much remains to be done to increase the Assembly's effectiveness and its contribution to the Organization's activities. I am encouraged to see that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the General Assembly has devoted a number of general debates and thematic meetings to these issues during the current session.

166. While everyone agrees on the need for General Assembly revitalization, there remain contending views on the ways in which this goal might best be achieved. Some Member States focus on the rationalization of the Assembly's working methods, while others advocate a more substantive reinforcement of its role and authority, I continue to believe that many of the elements of these approaches and others could contribute to the greater effectiveness and efficiency that so many Member States wish to see the General Assembly regain.

Economic and Social Council

167. In my report "In larger freedom", I called for a revived role for the Economic and Social Council in shaping, implementing and coordinating the development agenda. During the course of its work, the Council has initiated various relevant initiatives to promote coherence and harmonization, however more could be done to enhance its functions of coordination, policy review and policy dialogue in the economic and social areas mandated by the Charter.

168. At the 2005 World Summit, world leaders recognized the need for a more effective and efficient Economic and Social Council. In response to my proposals to revamp the unique functions of the Council, they agreed to strengthen it by reconceiving its function of serving as a platform for high-level dialogue on global economic and social affairs but also assigning some new functions. In particular, Member States decided to establish a high-level development cooperation forum, to be held every two years, for the purpose of reviewing trends in development cooperation, promoting greater coherence in the various development interventions and better linking the normative and operational

work of the Organization. Member States further agreed to hold every year an assessment of progress in the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, at the ministerial level. I am confident that these functions will contribute to our efforts to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the area of development. In order to allow the Council to respond effectively and efficiently, world leaders also agreed to review and adapt its methods of work.

169. In the follow-up to the World Summit, the President of the General Assembly launched a negotiating process to define the details of the decisions made by world leaders. A draft resolution was tabled by the co-chairs and informal consultations have been held. Member States will resume consultations at the end of August, and I am confident that a final agreement can be reached expeditiously. The strengthening of the Economic and Social Council has long been needed. It is my hope that a strengthened Council will be able to assert its leadership in driving a global development agenda and providing direction to the efforts of the intergovernmental bodies of the Organization working in this field.

The Secretariat

170. Reforming the United Nations has been a priority of mine since I assumed office in 1997. In the past 10 years I have proposed and implemented numerous ideas and changes to bring the United Nations up to best international practices. This has included changes to work programmes, structures and systems, at headquarters locations and in the field. Much of my reform agenda has been implemented, however, not all the reforms were accepted by Member States. Understanding that the Organization needs to continue to improve, in March 2006 I released a final reform package in my report "Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide". Much of the agenda contained in the report will be for my successor to implement over the coming years. It is my hope that the Organization will continue to move towards enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.

171. The 1997 reform package included a number of changes to the Secretariat structure, most notably the creation of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs from three existing departments and the consolidation of two programmes into the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (now the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). The Centre for Human Rights was also merged into the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Three important new structures were introduced to improve United Nations management: the post of Deputy Secretary-General was created, a cabinet in the form of the Senior Management Group was established and four sectoral committees were formed to bring coherence to the work of the United Nations on peace and security, humanitarian affairs, development and economic and social affairs. In 2002 I proposed a second major reform package, which contained proposals for a major overhaul of the Department of Public Information and the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services (now the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management). In 2005, two senior management committees were created to improve executive decision-making and a Management Performance Board was established to improve senior managerial accountability.

172. Efforts to improve the overall efficiency of the Organization also moved on several other fronts. Approximately 1,000 staff posts were permanently eliminated in the 1998-1999 budget. In the 2004-2005 budget cycle, nearly 1,000 reports and activities were consolidated or discontinued and resources were redeployed to higher-priority areas of work. Asked to do more with less, the Organization has had in fact only very limited real growth in its regular budget. Much has been invested in information technologies since the late 1990s. One visible benefit is that all United Nations official reports and publications can now be retrieved for free through the Official Document System, which is available over the Internet. The United Nations website provides extensive materials in multiple languages, making up-to-date information and images available through multimedia sources. Open debates of the Security Council are now webcast along with other important meetings.

173. More broadly, following the findings of an internal staff survey and in response to reported shortcomings in the management of the oil-for-food programme, I introduced at the beginning of 2005 a series of measures to strengthen accountability and improve ethical conduct. In particular, an Ethics Office was established in December 2005, which is now administering new policies of protection for reporting of misconduct and financial disclosure. The Ombudsman, whose office was established in 2002, has been facilitating the informal resolution of disputes between United Nations staff and management. At the request of the General Assembly, I have also commissioned a multidisciplinary panel to analyse and review all aspects of the existing internal justice system. The panel will report to the Assembly at its sixty-first session.

174. Reforms on procurement were initiated in 1999, and the United Nations has undergone significant transformation since then. To ensure more effectiveness, annual procurement plans now are posted on the United Nations website, which, in addition to providing advance information, allows vendors not registered with the Procurement Division to register and participate. Furthermore, all purchasing requirements are now posted on the website, progress on a transaction can be traced and details of the awards are posted in accordance with international standards. These and other procurement reform efforts were validated by an independent review conducted by the United States National Institute of Government Purchasing in mid-2005. Following a revelation of criminal misconduct concerning a United Nations procurement official, later that year I ordered a comprehensive review of internal and financial controls. The General Assembly approved emergency funding in July 2006 to increase the professional capacity in this area. Further reforms are to be discussed by Member States at the sixty-first session of the Assembly.

175. The budgeting system has been transformed from one focusing on a detailed description of inputs and resources to one that identifies intended outcomes and measurable indicators of achievement. The long-range planning cycle has been reduced from four years to two and a duplicative intergovernmental review eliminated. In addition, the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations have been updated and consolidated to delegate more authority but make managers more accountable. In the reform package set out in "Investing in the United Nations", I propose more comprehensive strengthening of the financial management and budgetary processes.

176. My latest reform proposals recognize the need for an integrated and mobile global workforce that draws on and develops the experience and talent existing both at Headquarters and in the field. A host of improvements to the United Nations system of managing its people has been introduced in recent years. First, a new web-based recruitment system for hiring, reassigning and promoting staff to ensure greater transparency in advertising vacancies was put in place in 2002. Managers are now empowered to select their own staff, subject to appropriate checks and balances. Second, incentives to encourage staff mobility between duty stations and functions were introduced. Training and learning programmes for all staff are now more widely available. Third, a new performance appraisal system was introduced. Finally, a number of "staff-friendly" benefits were introduced to bring the United Nations in line with major corporations offering similar incentives, including the introduction of flexible working hours, telecommuting possibilities and paternity leave entitlements. However, more can and should be done, and I have appealed to Member States for a significant infusion of resources for this purpose.

177. Facing a sharp escalation in threats against United Nations personnel, the staff security procedures were reviewed, first in 2000 and again in 2003, following the tragic loss of 22 United Nations staff in Baghdad. In late 2004 I recommended a major overhaul of the United Nations security system. This included a request for a sizeable increase in resources allocated for protection of staff and proposals to strengthen and clarify the chain of command. A new Department of Safety and Security was subsequently created, consolidating functions previously performed by separate offices. It now provides timely, professional advice on security-related matters, including through more thorough threat and risk assessment. The new department is responsible for the security of some 100,000 United Nations staff and 300,000 dependants in 150 duty stations throughout the United Nations system, many of which are in crisis and post-conflict risk situations.

The mandates of the Organization

178. In 1954, Dag Hammarskjöld conducted the first review of mandates, at the request of the membership. Since then there has been no other attempt to review the mandates adopted by Member States to guide the work of the Organization. I therefore proposed in my report "In larger freedom" that Member States undertake a review of all mandates older than five years to see whether activities concerned were still genuinely needed or whether the resources assigned to them could be reallocated in response to new and emerging challenges. I stressed the need for "a capable and effective" Secretariat that could change in response to changing needs of the Organization. I underlined that Member States had a central role to play in ensuring that the Organization's mandates stayed current.

179. In September 2005 at the World Summit, world leaders responded by requesting the General Assembly and other relevant organs to review all mandates older than five years originating from resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs in order "to strengthen and update the programme of work of the United Nations". They further requested me to facilitate this process with analysis and recommendations. In response to that request, I provided an analytical framework for review of the

Organization's mandates in my report "Mandating and delivering: analysis and recommendations to facilitate the review of mandates". That report addressed key challenges in the mandate generation cycle, including the lack of evaluative information on the effectiveness of mandates, burdensome reporting requirements, overlap between and within organs and the gap between mandates and resources. The report also made recommendations in relation to each of the Organization's programme priorities. It was supplemented by an online inventory of mandates, designed to facilitate Member States' review.

180. The General Assembly began reviewing its mandates through a series of informal consultations, which also saw the participation of senior programme managers. Member States responded to the recommendations in my report and provided additional proposals of their own aimed at strengthening the programme of work of the Organization. The Assembly also authorized an ad hoc working group to review in the first stage of the exercise mandates older than five years that have not been renewed. Work is ongoing, and the Secretariat will continue to assist and facilitate the exercise throughout the process.

181. Concurrently with the consultations in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council have begun the process of reviewing their own mandates. The review of the Economic and Social Council has been following a process similar to that in the Assembly. The Security Council has focused on an initial set of mandates for its first phase. As I have mentioned on several occasions, the review of mandates is a historic opportunity to renew and strengthen the work of the Organization. Member States should seize this opportunity to ensure that our Organization can respond effectively to today's needs.

Cooperating with regional organizations

182. Over the past decade there has been a significant increase in the range of partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations in such areas as peacekeeping and peacemaking, strengthening good governance and the rule of law, promoting respect for human rights and responding to humanitarian emergencies. I have stressed the importance of a new vision of global security that draws upon the resources and legitimacy of effective regional and global institutions that are both flexible and responsive to the complex challenges of today's world.

183. To support those efforts, I have engaged the heads of regional organizations in regular exchanges of views on issues of common concern. The high-level meetings with the heads of regional organizations and other intergovernmental organizations have now been made an annual event so that we can focus on practical cooperation on key issues and follow up more effectively. At the sixth high-level meeting, which I convened in July 2005, we established a standing committee to provide overall guidance to the process of creating a more structured relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations so a genuine agreement based on comparative advantages can be realized.

184. At the World Summit last September, world leaders supported a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter, and resolved to expand cooperation with such organizations through practical means, such as formalized agreements between their respective secretariats. The implementation process will be reported to the seventh high-level meeting, which I will convene in September 2006. Also, a report capturing the past, present and future of our evolving joint work is being submitted to the Security Council for its meeting on 20 September under the presidency of Greece. This is an important opportunity to consolidate institutional relationships and look to the future.

185. Our joint working groups have also decided to enlist the support of the United Nations University's comparative regional integration studies programme to study the organizational, operational and resource capacities of partner organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. Meanwhile, I have moved to ensure that the Secretariat itself is adequately resourced to service the strengthening partnership.

System-wide coherence

186. The fragmentation of the United Nations system and the consequent inability of United Nations support to generate maximum impact at the country level has been an issue of concern to Member States for many years.

187. In response to this concern, I have introduced several important initiatives, which together have made a significant difference in the way the United Nations works, especially at the country level. Four Executive Committees were established in 1997—on development, humanitarian affairs, peace and security, and economic and social affairs—to provide a forum where United Nations departments and programmes could discuss specific issues on a regular basis and plan more coherent ap-

proaches to each issue. As they began to be effective, most of the specialized agencies asked to join, resulting in greatly increased communication and understanding among the various entities working on those issues.

188. At the same time, as I noted earlier, I established a cabinet structure, the Senior Management Group, wherein the heads of the key departments of the Secretariat could interact and, by inviting the chairs of the four Executive Committees, provided a link to the wider United Nations system. The Policy and Management Committees are enhancing decision-making at the most senior level.

189. These Headquarters coordination and decision-making mechanisms have complemented the pre-existing United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, which I chair twice a year, bringing together the heads of all United Nations entities to further cooperation on a range of substantive and management issues.

190. While addressing the need for better coordination at Headquarters, I have also focused most of my efforts on country-level coordination. The resident coordinator system has been improved, including through an expanded United Nations Development Group and a toolkit that includes operational tools and procedures agreed upon across the development agencies, thus providing for much more coherent action at the country level. Furthermore, the humanitarian coordinators can count on strong technical support and guidance, an emergency fund at his or her disposal and agreed leadership roles to play to ensure a fast and effective humanitarian response. Progress has also been made in ensuring synergy and coherence between the activities of peacekeeping operations and country teams, both during and after the mission period, through the establishment of a post under the Special Representative of the Secretary-General charged with bridging the two United Nations presences in the field and leading joint planning at the country level.

191. At the 2005 World Summit, leaders called for stronger system-wide coherence across the United Nations system and in particular across development-related organizations, agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system. To this end, the Summit Outcome specifically invited me "to launch work to further strengthen the management and coordination of United Nations operational activities", while continuing ongoing efforts to strengthen the governance, management and coordination of the Organization.

192. In February 2006, I created a High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence. The Panel brings together 15 eminent persons, whose extraordinary experience and authority are a measure of the importance that I attach to the Panel's work and are a reflection of the wish of all Member States to create a more coherent and effective Organization.

193. The objective of the Panel is to propose recommendations that will lead to a revitalized United Nations system that is better equipped to help achieve the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. In particular, the Panel's aim is to help create a United Nations system that provides more effective support for plans and priorities defined at the country level to address development, humanitarian, environmental and other critical challenges, including gender issues, human rights and sustainable development. The Panel is expected to deliver its recommendations to me by September 2006 to allow for a formal presentation to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session and possible implementation in 2007.

194. In order to ensure the engagement and commitment of all key stakeholders, the Panel has undertaken a broad consultative process including country, regional and thematic consultations, as well as meetings with Member States and United Nations organizations and hearings with civil society organizations. Moreover, the work of the Panel is enriched by research, analysis and insights from inside and outside the Organization, and takes into account other complementary United Nations reform efforts.

Chapter VI
Global constituencies

Strengthening ties to civil society

195. Since the early 1990s, and particularly during my term as Secretary-General, the relationship of the United Nations with civil society has greatly deepened and expanded. This has been the case even though the United Nations is and will remain an intergovernmental organization, where decisions are taken by its Member States. This process of increasing engagement with civil society and other non-State actors has strengthened both the institution and the intergovernmental debate and has been part of the ongoing process of modernization and institutional change that the Organization has undergone in the past decade. As I wrote in "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all", the goals of the United

Nations can be achieved only if civil society and Governments are fully engaged.

196. Civil society has been a key partner of the United Nations since its inception, whether at the country level delivering humanitarian assistance or at the global level participating in debates in the Economic and Social Council. But in the past two decades or so, there has been an enormous transformation in the nature and importance of the role of civil society, at the national level and in the international arena, including at the United Nations. The growth of civil society at the international level has paralleled the globalization process. Globalization, and the technologies that partly propelled it, has led to a broadening of horizons, the multiplication of global issues, a widening of interests and increased opportunities for participatory democracy.

197. Where once representative democracy was at the core of democratic forms of governance, today participatory democracy is increasingly important. Representative democracy is under stress in many countries, as demonstrated by low turnouts for elections and disillusioned citizens. The ability of civil society organizations to represent the interests of citizens, to interact directly with Governments and to participate directly in policy debates at the national and international levels contributes to the legitimacy of democratic ideals.

198. Where once large intergovernmental meetings and conferences were mainly the realm of Governments, today it would be unthinkable to stage such events without the policy perspectives, unique advocacy and mobilization of civil society. The engagement of civil society has clearly enhanced the legitimacy, accountability and transparency of intergovernmental decision-making. A recent example is the global mobilization of civil society around debt, trade and aid issues and the Millennium Development Goals by the Global Call to Action against Poverty in 2005.

199. Where once agendas were set by Governments, today civil society has brought new issues to the table and has been instrumental in, for instance, the establishment of the International Criminal Court and the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

200. Where once governance was limited to Governments, today various non-State actors, including civil society, are part of various governance structures. Recent examples are the Programme Coordinating Board of UNAIDS and the Internet Governance Forum, which will have its first meeting from 30 October to 2 November 2006 in Athens.

201. Where once monitoring and enforcement were largely the role of Governments, today civil society has an important role in making sure that commitments are implemented, for example in timber certification, the fight against child labour, corporate social responsibility and human rights.

202. Where once checks and balances in democratic societies were largely the domain of national parliaments, today civil society plays its part.

203. Given the increasing importance of civil society, the United Nations has found several ways to engage with it. Many United Nations entities, including funds, programmes and specialized agencies, consult with civil society on a regular basis through various mechanisms, such as forums, hearings, consultations, advisory committees and the like. This is, of course, critical given the fact that civil society has become an essential partner for different kinds of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding operations of the United Nations. The number of operational activities of the United Nations where civil society has played an increasingly important role has expanded, and now also includes such areas as electoral support and conflict prevention.

204. In July, the High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment that I appointed in February and the High-level Group for the Alliance of Civilizations held hearings with civil society in Geneva.

205. Throughout my term as Secretary-General, I have consistently encouraged a deeper relationship between the United Nations and civil society. I have myself actively engaged with civil society on many occasions—including at the major United Nations conferences and summits, during my travels and at Headquarters. One recent example is my visit to Darfur in March 2005, where I met with representatives of non-governmental organizations, who work in Darfur under very dangerous circumstances, to underline the crucial role of non-governmental organizations in the international community's efforts there.

206. The exponential growth in both numbers and influence prompted me to establish a Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, chaired by the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to assess and draw lessons from interactions between the United Nations and civil society and recommend ways to improve them. The Panel submitted its report in June 2004 and I presented my response to it in September of the same year.

207. The Panel argued very convincingly that the United Nations must become an even more

outward-looking organization. That means using its unique convening power to reach out to diverse constituencies, especially where such actors command great expertise or resources relevant to a particular issue. Facilitating the participation of different stakeholders in relevant debates of global significance can only enhance the quality and depth of policy analysis and implementable outcomes, including in the form of partnerships. In that way, the United Nations will expand its global reach and influence, ensuring that its decisions will be better understood and supported by a broad and diverse public.

208. Unfortunately, the Member States have not taken any formal action on the Cardoso Panel's recommendations and my response to them. Nevertheless, a number of actions have been taken. For example, the United Nations Development Group is strengthening the capacity of United Nations resident coordinators to engage with civil society at the country level. A number of country offices have appointed a civil society focal point in the United Nations country team to strengthen engagement of the United Nations system with civil society, pursuant to my recommendations. Work is also under way to establish a trust fund to support the country teams in their work with civil society.

209. In addition, at the intergovernmental level, the General Assembly has held four informal interactive hearings with representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations and the private sector. The first one was held during the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit, and three additional ones were held in 2006 as inputs to the high-level meetings to review the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, on the midterm comprehensive global review of the implementation of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010 and on international migration and development. These hearings have been an important innovation for interaction between civil society and the Assembly.

210. The President of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly appointed in May 2006 the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia and Norway as his personal advisers on the relationship between Member States and civil society, including non-governmental organizations. The advisers conducted a series of consultations with non-governmental organizations, Member States and United Nations staff. The President sent their report to all Member States on 7 July 2006.

211. The report acknowledges that there are clear differences in expectations between Member States and civil society on the relationship between them. Yet, it suggests that there is sufficient ground to explore better interaction and more meaningful inclusiveness, for example, through meetings between the President of the General Assembly and civil society at the beginning of his or her term or at other key moments, and between the chairs of the Main Committees of the Assembly and civil society.

212. Civil society is now such a powerful force in the world that the United Nations will have to continue exploring new mechanisms and formats for engaging with it. As we move forward on this together, it is important that we collectively address some Member States' lingering concerns about, and sometimes mistrust of, civil society. Our civil society partners must ensure that they comply scrupulously with the responsibilities and obligations that accompany their rights at the United Nations and continue to improve their overall transparency and accountability to others. I am aware that many civil society organizations, associations, networks and bodies are rising to these challenges in a variety of creative ways, and this bodes well for the future.

213. One other area that requires attention is the frequent underrepresentation of civil society from developing countries at United Nations meetings. Establishing a better regional balance would require changes both within civil society and by Member States. International civil society organizations, for example, could make more of an effort to include organizations from developing countries in their networks, choose citizens from developing countries as their representatives at the United Nations and base their headquarters more often in developing countries. Member States could help by generously supporting travel and related expenses of participants from developing countries in United Nations events. At the same time, we should use modern communication technologies to explore how civil society organizations from different regions can make contributions to global policy debates and discussions without having to be physically present.

Engaging the business community

214. For the first time in over 60 years of United Nations history, we are making business and other social actors vital partners in pursuit of our goals. This new relationship has had two fundamental implications for the work of the Organization.

215. First, it has furthered progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals, ultimately improving the lives of the poor by facilitating support in critical areas, ranging from simple advocacy of United Nations goals to the

provision of humanitarian assistance and the formation of partnerships in information technology, microcredit and health. Hundreds of projects in support of the Millennium Development Goals have resulted from this engagement, including those initiated under the Growing Sustainable Business for Poverty Reduction initiative, which aims to stimulate profitable foreign investment in the world's poorest countries to foster sustainable economic opportunities on the ground.

216. Second, new forms of engagement with businesses also advance United Nations reform by providing the Organization with exposure to improved management practices and better ways of leveraging its moral authority and convening power, thus becoming a powerful catalyst for institutional innovation across the system.

217. At the centre of these efforts is the Global Compact, which I launched in July 2000. It is the world's largest corporate citizenship initiative today, with over 3,000 participants from more than 100 countries, over half from the developing world. Through learning, dialogue and partnership projects, the Global Compact has brought about far-reaching changes. The alignment of corporate activities with broader United Nations goals has also brought about significant improvements in governance and capacity-building for suppliers and small enterprises. By advocating universal principles as an integral part of business strategies and operations, global markets have become more robust and inclusive.

218. Through the Global Compact Office, many United Nations organizations have found a new entry point for engaging businesses and improving their own ability to work with the private sector. The Organization itself, through the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund and the procurement process, is internalizing the Global Compact's principles, thus gaining credibility and ethical strength. Overall, these changes are bringing greater efficiency and innovative ways of leveraging institutional advantages throughout the Organization.

219. The other main entry point for the business community is the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP), which has provided vital support to a wide array of United Nations programmes, generated nearly $1 billion in new resources for United Nations causes, and has evolved into the United Nations Office for Partnerships. While our engagement of businesses is firmly rooted in the understanding that the goals of business and the United Nations are very distinct, there are increasingly overlapping objectives. Nonetheless, this cooperation requires clear rules of engagement in order to protect the United Nations while forging partnerships that advance practical implementation. Today, the Organization has in place integrity measures and policy frameworks to define the rules of engagement. The Global Compact Office has spearheaded many of these developments, and I am confident that it will continue to lead this promising reform from within the Organization. It is my hope that Member States will continue to support these efforts and that engagement with the business community and other societal actors will continue to evolve as an integral part of organizational change to make the United Nations fit for the twenty-first century.

Chapter VII

Conclusion

220. The themes of good governance and accountability run through this report like golden threads. The Member States need to be well governed and accountable to their citizens if they are to nourish economic and social development, if they are to achieve lasting security and if they are to uphold human rights under the rule of law. The Organization, for its part, can become stronger and more effective only if it is better managed and more clearly accountable to the Member States.

221. Let me conclude by observing that these principles are also valid for the global order. The United Nations is not a world government, and therefore ensuring good governance and accountability at the global level is not simply a matter of improving the efficiency of the United Nations. It goes far beyond that. It is a matter of ensuring that governors are responsible to the governed and that world Powers remember their responsibility to those whose lives may be transformed, for better or worse, by their decisions.

222. That implies a need for greater accountability and transparency, and fairer representation, in all global institutions. More than that, it implies that all global institutions need to be transformed into an effective expression of an emerging global community, underpinned by shared values, held together by bonds of human solidarity and inspired by mutual respect and understanding among people of different cultures and traditions. If we continue to move in this direction, the human species will not simply survive on this small planet but will in fact thrive. The fact that the destinies of all the world's inhabitants are so closely interlinked will no longer be simply a reality, but indeed a source of hope.

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Statistical annex
Millennium Development Goals, targets and indicators, 2006

				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
GOAL 1 | Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger																			
TARGET 1 - Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day																			
Indicator 1. Population below $1 purchasing power parity per day (percentage)[a]																			
	1990		27.9	2.2[b]	44.6	11.3	33.0	39.4	19.6	2.2[b]	19.6	0.4				0.4			
	2002		19.4	2.4[b]	44.0	14.1	14.1	31.2	7.3	2.4[b]	7.3	2.5				1.8			
TARGET 2 - Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger																			
Indicator 4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (percentage)																			
	1990		33	10	32	11	19	53	39	11									
	2004		28	9	30	7	8	47	28	8									
Indicator 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (percentage)																			
	1990-1992		20	4	33	13	16	25	18	6	15	7[c]	4[c]	16[c]	<2.5[c]		22	38	23
	2001-2003		17	4	31	10	12	21	12	9	12	7	3	20	<2.5		19	36	19
GOAL 2 | Achieve universal primary education																			
TARGET 3 - Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling																			
Indicator 6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education (primary-level enrolees per 100 children of enrolment age)[d]																			
	1991	81.2	78.8	80.6	53.0	85.8	97.7	72.2	92.3	79.7	74.4	88.8	91.0	84.1	96.4		52.1	51.7	66.5
	2004	87.0	85.8	94.0	64.2	94.9	94.1	89.3	92.9	82.9	79.6	90.9	90.1	91.8	95.6		69.0	69.4	82.8
Indicator 8. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds (percentage)																			
	1990	84.3	80.9	66.3	67.4	92.7	95.5	61.5	94.3	80.1	73.5	99.2	99.8	97.7	99.7		56.3	65.0	84.8
	2000-2004[e]	87.2	85.0	84.3	73.1	96.0	98.9	72.2	96.2	91.3	72.8	99.7	99.7	99.8	99.3		63.7	70.3	85.3
GOAL 3 | Promote gender equality and empower women																			
TARGET 4 - Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015																			
Indicator 9a. Ratio of girls' gross enrolment ratios to boys' gross enrolment ratios in primary education																			
	1991	0.89	0.87	0.82	0.84	0.97	0.93	0.76	0.96	0.83	0.92	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.99		0.79	0.82	0.96
	2004	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.89	0.97	1.00	0.91	0.97	0.89	0.91	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99		0.88	0.86	0.95

				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
Indicator 9b. Ratio of girls' gross enrolment ratios to boys' gross enrolment ratios in secondary education																			
	1999	0.92	0.88	0.93	0.82	1.07	0.95	0.74	0.97	0.79	0.93	1.03	1.05	0.96	1.01		0.77	0.81	1.05
	2004	0.94	0.92	0.97	0.79	1.08	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.80	0.93	0.98	0.99	0.96	1.01		0.81	0.81	1.04
Indicator 9c. Ratio of girls' gross enrolment ratios to boys' gross enrolment ratios in tertiary education																			
	1999	0.97	0.78	0.69	0.69	1.12	0.55	0.63	0.99	0.82	0.67	1.20	1.27	0.89	1.19		0.57	0.73	1.15
	2004	1.03	0.87	0.93	0.63	1.17	0.81	0.70	1.04	0.89	0.90	1.28	1.32	1.02	1.27		0.63	0.83	1.25
Indicator 10. Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 years old																			
	1990	0.91	0.88	0.73	0.80	1.00	0.96	0.72	0.97	0.81	0.87	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		0.72	0.80	0.97
	2000-2004[e]	0.93	0.91	0.87	0.88	1.01	0.99	0.79	0.99	0.92	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		0.80	0.86	1.00
Indicator 11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector																			
	1990	35.9		20.1	32.4	38.3	37.9	13.1	37.3	16.6	28.4	48.5			43.4				
	2004	39.1		20.3	35.0	43.2	41.2	17.3	38.3	20.1	37.3	51.1			46.4				
Indicator 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (single or lower house only, percentage)																			
	1990	12.4	10.4	2.6	7.2	11.9	20.2	5.7	10.4	4.6	1.2				15.4		7.3	14.0	14.4
	2006[f]	16.6	15.3	7.0	16.2	20.4	19.5	12.8	15.8	7.6	3.2	10.8	11.0	10.6	21.1		15.6	16.3	17.8
GOAL 4 | Reduce child mortality																			
TARGET 5 - Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-5 mortality rate																			
Indicator 13. Under-5 mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births)																			
	1990	95	106	88	185	54	48	126	78	69	87	50	28	83	12	29			
	2004	79	87	37	168	31	31	90	43	58	80	44	20	78	7	17			
Indicator 15. Proportion of 1-year old children immunized against measles (percentage of children aged 12-23 months who received at least one dose of measles vaccine)																			
	1990	73	71	85	56	76	98	58	71	80	70	85			84	93			
	2004	76	73	94	65	92	85	62	81	88	48	98			92	96			
GOAL 5 | Improve maternal health																			
TARGET 6 - Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio																			
Indicator 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel																			
	1990	47	43	40	42	72	51	30	38	60		99	99	97		96			
	2004	58	56	71	46	88	79	36	68	66		99	99	99		96			

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				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
GOAL 6 | Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases																			
TARGET 7 - Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS																			
Indicator 18a. HIV prevalence (estimated adult, 15-49, percentage)																			
	1990		0.37	<0.1	2.7	0.3	<0.1	0.1	0.1	<0.1	<0.1		<0.1	<0.1	0.2				
	2005		1.1	0.1	5.8	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.5	<0.1	1.5		1.1	0.2	0.5				
Indicator 18b. HIV prevalence (percentage of adults living with HIV who are women)																			
	1990			<20	54	33	<20	<20	<20	<20	<20		<20	<20	<20				
	2005			22	59	34	27	28	33	<20	59		31	27	28				
Indicator 19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex (percentage of population 15-24 that used a condom during last high-risk sex,[g] 1998-2004; number of countries covered by the surveys provided in parentheses)																			
Women					27 (26)			51 (1)											
Men					43 (25)			59 (1)						54 (3)					
Indicator 19b. Percentage of population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge[h] of HIV/AIDS (percentage, 1998-2004; number of countries covered by the surveys provided in parentheses)																			
Women					24 (34)			21 (1)	18 (3)					6 (5)					
Men					31 (18)			17 (1)											
Indicator 20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14[i] (number of countries covered by the surveys provided in parentheses)																			
1998-2004					0.85 (39)														
TARGET 8 - Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases																			
Indicator 22a. Population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention measures (percentage of children under 5 who sleep under insecticide-treated bed nets)																			
1999-2004					4														
Indicator 22b. Population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria treatment measures (percentage of children under 5 with fever who are appropriately treated)																			
1999-2004					37				3										
Indicator 23a. Incidence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (number of cases per 100,000 population, excluding HIV infected)																			
	1990	122	149	59	148	98	116	173	272	68	203	51	48	60	28				
	2004	128	151	49	281	59	102	166	217	50	166	108	104	117	16				
Indicator 23b. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (number of deaths per 100,000 population, excluding HIV infected)																			
	1990	28	35	5	38	14	25	45	67	11	53	9	9	9	3				
	2004	23	27	4	56	8	16	31	36	8	29	17	17	17	2				
Indicator 24a. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (percentage)																			
	2000	28	29	82	36	43	30	15	39	27	13	11	3	36	22				
	2004	53	54	83	47	58	63	51	65	26	26	22	13	46	44				

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				Africa			Asia					CIS								
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
Indicator 24b. Proportion of tuberculosis cases cured under DOTS (percentage)																			
	2000	82	82	88	72	81	94	83	86	81	76	76	68	78	77				
	2003	82	83	86	72	83	93	86	86	83	67	72	62	76	76				
GOAL 7 | Ensure environmental sustainability																			
TARGET 9 – Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources																			
Indicator 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest (percentage)																			
	1990	31.3		1.3	29.2	49.9	16.5	14.0	56.3	3.3	68.3	38.6	46.6	3.9	30.4				
	2005	30.3		1.5	26.5	46.0	19.8	14.2	46.8	3.5	63.4	38.6	46.7	3.9	30.8				
Indicator 26. Area protected to maintain biological diversity (percentage of total territorial area, including terrestrial and marine)																			
	1990	8.7	9.0	3.5	10.5	12.8	10.4	4.8	6.1	4.0[j]	1.2	6.5	7.3	3.0	12.4		8.5	9.0	2.0
	2005	11.6	12.2	4.7	11.2	17.7	14.4	6.0	9.5	18.7[j]	1.6	7.7	8.6	3.9	16.3		9.5	11.6	3.4
Indicator 27. Energy use per $1,000 GDP (consumption of kg oil equivalent)[k]																			
	1990	235	266	164	360	167	419	245	203	250		658[l]	625[l]	985[l]	216	415	258		
	2003	212	218	165	363	162	219	201	211	287		531	519	627	189	261	260		
Indicator 28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita, in metric tons)[m]																			
	1990	4.0	1.6[n]	1.9[n]	0.8[n]	2.4[n]	2.4[n]	0.8[n]	1.0[n]	4.7[n]	1.4[n]	13.2[n]	12.6[o]	7.2[o]	12.6[p]				
	2003	4.0	2.2[n]	2.8[n]	0.7[n]	2.4[n]	3.4[n]	1.2[n]	1.7[n]	5.8[n]	1.4[n]	8.1[n]	9.1[n]	5.1[n]	12.9[p]				
Indicator 28b. Consumption of ozone-depleting substances (CFC in millions of ODP tonnes)																			
	1990		113.4	9.1	8.9	32.6	41.8	2.5	16.1	6.1	0.04	105.9	104.5	1.4	514.7	3.5	1.0	1.5	
	2004		63.4	4.3	3.9	13.6	22.9	7.1	8.2	4.2	0.02	0.7	0.5	0.2	1.9	0.6	2.7	0.9	
TARGET 10 - Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation																			
Indicator 30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural (percentage)																			
1990	Total	78	71	89	49	83	71	72	76	85	51	92			100				
	Urban	95	93	95	82	93	99	90	93	94	92	97			100				
	Rural	64	60	82	36	60	59	66	68	70	39	84			99				
2004	Total	83	80	91	56	91	78	85	82	91	51	92			99				
	Urban	95	92	96	80	96	93	94	89	97	80	99			100				

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				Africa				Asia					CIS								
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
	Rural	73	70	86	42	73	67	81	77	79	40	80			95				
Indicator 31. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural (percentage)																			
1990	Total	49	35	65	32	68	24	20	49	81	54	82			100				
	Urban	79	68	84	52	81	64	54	70	97	80	92			100				
	Rural	26	17	47	24	36	7	8	40	55	46	63			99				
2004	Total	59	50	77	37	77	45	38	67	84	53	83			99				
	Urban	80	73	91	53	86	69	63	81	96	80	92			100				
	Rural	39	33	62	28	49	28	27	56	59	43	67			98				
TARGET 11 - By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers																			
Indicator 32a. Access to secure tenure (slum population in millions)																			
1990		721.6	660.9	21.7	101.0	110.8	150.8	198.7	49.0	28.6	0.4		9.2	9.7	41.8		81.9	46.5	5.7
2001		924.0	860.1	21.4	166.2	127.6	193.8	253.1	56.8	40.7	0.5		8.9	9.8	45.2		140.1	47.3	7.3
Indicator 32b. Access to secure tenure (percentage of urban population living in slums)																			
1990		31.6	47.0	37.7	72.3	35.4	41.1	63.7	36.8	34.4	24.5		6.0	30.3	6.0		76.3	48.4	24.0
2001		31.6	43.3	28.2	71.9	31.9	36.4	59.0	28.0	35.3	24.1		6.0	29.4	6.0		78.2	56.5	24.4
GOAL 8 | Develop a global partnership for development																			
TARGET 12 - Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system																			
TARGET 13 - Address the special needs of the least developed countries																			
TARGET 14 - Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States																			
TARGET 15 - Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term																			
Indicator 33a. Net ODA to all developing and least developed countries (annual total assistance in billions of United States dollars)																			
1990			52.7														15.2		
2004			106.5[q]														23.5		
Indicator 33b. Net ODA, to all developing and least developed countries (percentage of OECD/DAC donors' gross national income)																			
1990			0.33														0.09		
2004			0.33[q]														0.08		
Indicator 34. Proportion of bilateral, sector allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services - basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation (percentage)																			
1995-1996		8.1																	

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				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
	2003-2004	16.0																	
Indicator 35. Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC donors[r] that is untied (percentage)																			
	1990	67.6																	
	2004	91.3																	
Indicator 36. ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national incomes (percentage)																			
	1990																	6.5	
	2004																	7.3	
Indicator 37. ODA received in small island developing states as a proportion of their gross national incomes (percentage)																			
	1990																		2.8
	2004																		1.1
Indicator 38a. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value, excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty (percentage)																			
	1996		52														67		
	2004		75														81		
Indicator 38b. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value, excluding arms and oil) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty (percentage)																			
	1996		53														77		
	2004		75														79		
Indicator 39a. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products from developing countries (percentage)																			
	1996		9.8														4.3		
	2004		8.4														3.4		
Indicator 39b. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on textiles from developing countries (percentage)																			
	1996		8.1														5.7		
	2004		5.7														1.5		
Indicator 39c. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on clothing from developing countries (percentage)																			
	1996		14.5														11.4		
	2004		10.4														2.5		
Indicator 40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product																			
	1990														1.90				

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				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
	2004[s]														1.16				
Indicator 41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity (trade-related technical assistance/capacity-building as a percentage of total sector allocable ODA)																			
	2001	4.0																	
	2004	3.6																	
Indicator 42a. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC completion points																			
	2000	1			1														
	2006	18			14	4													
Indicator 42b. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points (but not completion point)																			
	2000	21			17	4													
	2006	11			11														
Indicator 42c. Total number of countries that have yet to be considered for HIPC decision points																			
	2000	16																	
	2006	9			7				2										
Indicator 42d. Total number of countries eligible for HIPC																			
	2000	38																	
	2006	38																	
Indicator 43. Debt relief committed under HIPC (to countries that have reached their decision or completion point, in billions of United States dollars, cumulative)																			
	2000	34																	
	2006[t]	59																	
Indicator 44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services																			
	1990		16.4	39.8	11.5	20.5	4.7	17.7	16.7		14	3.9[u]	3.9[u]	3.5[u]		9.4	16.8		
	2004		7	10.9	5.8	14.6	0.9	14.7	9.2		1.2[v]	5.5	5.6	4.4		8.9	8.2		
TARGET 16 - In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth																			
Indicator 45. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years																			
	1995	12.1		33.9	18.0	14.2	7.2	9.4	9.7	20.8	7.9	19.4			15.8				
	2005	13.7		34.5	18.3	15.2	7.8	11.3	17.0	23.6	6.6	18.1			13.8				
TARGET 17 - In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries																			
TARGET 18 - In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications																			
Indicator 47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers (number of telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population)																			
	1990	10.1	2.3	2.9	1.0	6.4	2.4	0.7	1.4	10.0	3.4	12.5			45.4	13.8	0.3	2.3	7.3

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				Africa			Asia					CIS							
		World	Developing regions	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Latin America & Caribbean	Eastern	Southern	South-Eastern	Western	Oceania	All	Europe	Asia	Developed regions	T.C. of South-Eastern Europe	LDC	LLDC	SIDS
	2004	46.4	31.7	27.6	8.2	50.0	54.1	8.4	27.4	52.5	10.1	57.1			130.1	73.8	3.2	7.4	37.8
Indicator 48a. Personal computers and Internet users (number of personal computers per 100 population)																			
	1990	2.5	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.0	0.3			11.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	3.9
	2004	13.0	4.9	2.6	1.6	9.0	6.9	1.7	3.5	10.8	6.5	9.6			55.9	8.1	0.8	1.3	13.3
Indicator 48b. Personal computers and Internet users (number of Internet users per 100 population)																			
	1990	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	2004	13.7	7.0	6.3	1.8	11.9	10.3	3.4	7.4	10.5	4.7	8.9			51.4	16.5	0.7	1.4	12.9

Source: United Nations Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the Millennium Development Goal Indicators and Millennium Development Goal indicators database (http://mdgs.un.org).

Abbreviations: CDIAC, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (United States of America); CFC, chlorofluorocarbons; CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States; DOTS, directly observed treatment strategy; GDP, gross domestic product; HIPC, heavily indebted poor countries initiative; LDC, least developed countries; LLDC, land-locked developing countries; ODA, official development assistance; ODP, ozone-depletion potential; OECD/DAC, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee; SIDS, small island developing States; TC, transitional countries.

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Notes

Given the limited space available, indicators for which no new data are available are not presented here, with the exception of indicator 32, Proportion of households with access to secure tenure, which is the only indicator to monitor the target. Also, indicator 14, Infant mortality rate, is not presented because trends can be assessed by the indicator on child mortality. The complete statistical annex, including all indicators used in monitoring progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, is available at http://mdgs.un.org.

Except where indicated, regional groupings are based on United Nations geographical regions with some modifications to create to the extent possible homogenous groups of countries for analysis and presentation. The regional composition adopted for the 2006 reporting of Millennium Development Goal indicators is available at http://mdgs.un.org under "Data".

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprises Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Europe, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Asia. "Developed regions" comprises Europe (except CIS countries), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States of America. Developed regions always include transition countries in Europe unless the latter are presented separately as "transition countries of south-eastern Europe".

Indicator 1

[a]Estimates by the World Bank in May 2006. High-income economies, as defined by the World Bank, are excluded.

[b]Combined estimates for North Africa and Western Asia.

Indicator 5

[c]Data refer to the period 1993-1995.

Indicator 6

[d]The net enrolment ratios in primary education correspond to school years ending in the years displayed.

Indicators 8 and 10

[e]Data refer to the latest literacy estimates and projections released by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics for the period 2000-2004.

Indicator 12

[f]As at 1 January 2006.

Indicator 19a

[g]Percentage of young women and men aged 15-24 reporting the use of a condom during sexual intercourse with a non-regular sexual partner in the past 12 months among those who had such a partner in the past 12 months.

Indicator 19b

[h]Percentage of young women and men aged 15-24 correctly identifying the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner) who reject two common local misconceptions and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit the AIDS virus.

Indicator 20

[i]Ratio of the current school attendance rate of children aged 10-14 both of whose biological parents have died to the current school attendance rate of children aged 10-14 both of whose parents are still alive and who currently live with at least one biological parent.

Indicator 26

[j]The figures from 1995 to 2005 are due to the establishment of a new large protected area in Saudi Arabia.

Indicator 27

[k]Data are not directly comparable with earlier series because constant price GDP has been rescaled to year 2000 international (purchasing power parity) dollars.

[l]Figures are for years other than that specified.

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Indicator 28

[m]Total CO_2 emissions from fossil fuels (expressed in millions of metric tons of CO_2) includes CO_2 emissions from: solid fuel consumption, liquid fuel consumption, gas fuel consumption, cement production and gas flaring (CDIAC).

[n]Based on data provided by CDIAC.

[o]Based on data provided by CDIAC. The 1990 rows show 1992 data for CIS countries.

[p]Based on the annual national emission inventories of annex I countries (with the exception of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, which are included under CIS) that report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; non-annex I countries do not have annual reporting obligations. In order to assess trends for annex I countries as a group, the aggregate figures for 2003 include data referring to a previous year for countries where 2003 data were not available. Data refer to 2002 for Poland. Emissions/sinks from land-use change and forestry are excluded.

Indicators 33a and 33b

[q]Data are preliminary and are for 2005.

Indicator 35

[r]Based on only some 40 per cent of total ODA commitments from OECD/DAC member countries, as it excludes technical cooperation and administrative costs, as well as all ODA from Austria, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United States that do not report the tying status of their official development assistance.

Indicator 40

[s]Preliminary data.

Indicator 43

[t]As at March 2006.

Indicator 44

[u]Data are for 1994.

[v]Data are for 2003.