Chapter II

Africa

During 2006, the United Nations maintained its strong commitment to promoting peace, stability and development in Africa through six UN political missions and offices and seven peacekeeping missions, supported by some 60,000 military personnel. The Organization faced tremendous challenges in helping the countries in conflict situations and those in transition to post-conflict peacebuilding in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa to return to peace, stability and prosperity. The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the United Nations Office for West Africa continued to bring a regional perspective to issues facing the continent, promote conflict prevention and raise awareness about subregional problems, in particular, youth unemployment and migration. The United Nations worked closely with the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development to assist African Governments in improving security, ensuring humanitarian access, energizing peace processes and promoting economic and social development.

Central Africa and the Great Lakes region continued to be affected by the activities of militias, local warlords and international companies illegally exploiting the region's natural resources, in violation of UN sanctions. In January, the Security Council, in a ministerial-level debate on the Great Lakes region, discussed improving cooperation between the United Nations and African organizations, such as the AU, particularly in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. At the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (Nairobi, Kenya, 14-15 December), the region’s Heads of State and Government signed the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the four-year transitional process concluded with the successful holding of elections that led to the installation of the National Assembly and the inauguration of Joseph Kabila as President. The Security Council, in January, re-established the Group of Experts monitoring the embargo on the illegal exploitation of resources, as numerous violations of the embargo had been uncovered. The peace process continued in Burundi, where the Government and the last major rebel group, the Palpehutu-National Liberation Forces, concluded a peace agreement in June, and a ceasefire agreement in September. Burundi, in view of significant improvements in the security situation, requested the United Nations to establish an integrated peacebuilding office, which the Council endorsed. One of the region’s most devastating conflicts, opposing Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, came closer to a solution, with the signing on 26 August, in Juba, the Sudan, of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. To help the parties reach a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General named former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano as his Special Envoy to help deal with the issue. The Central African Republic was increasingly drawn into the crisis affecting Chad and the Darfur region of the Sudan. Forces opposed to Central African Republic President François Bozizé appeared to have forged links with rebels fighting against Chad’s President Idriss Déby Itno. At the same time, the crisis in Darfur had spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic, with both countries accusing the Sudan of supporting armed groups increasingly active in their territories. The Tripoli Agreement signed on 8 February and the 26 July N'Djamena Agreement between the two countries did not defuse the crisis. The Security Council, in August, requested the United Nations Mission in the Sudan to establish a political and military presence in Chad and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic.

In West Africa, while progress was made in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the region faced other significant challenges, such as illicit cross-border trafficking, institutional weaknesses, slow economic recovery, difficulties in security sector reform, demilitarization, demobilization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The peace process in Côte d’Ivoire was impeded by political stalemates, disagreements and missed deadlines for the completion of crucial tasks, as well as violent demonstrations and inflammatory statements. Having missed the 31 October deadline for the holding of presidential elections, regional leaders extended the political
transition period for another year and addressed the ambiguities that had plagued the previous transition period. In Liberia, the inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first elected woman Head of State, and the installation of a new Government marked the completion of that country’s two-year transitional process. The new Government tackled the issues of corruption and governance reform and took measures to enhance transparency and accountability. With the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and other regional and international actors, the country made substantial progress in restoring its administrative authority over the entire country and in controlling all areas of economic activity. Similarly, events in Sierra Leone were dominated by efforts to further consolidate peace and stability and prepare for elections in 2007. The transition from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, established to support the Government in consolidating peace, building national capacity and preparing for those elections, was successfully completed. However, youth unemployment, rampant corruption, dire economic conditions and tension along the borders, especially with Guinea, were potential threats to stability. A significant development during the year was the apprehension and transfer of former Liberian President Charles Taylor into the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown, and later to The Hague, the Netherlands, to stand trial. Guinea-Bissau continued to be polarized by political tensions, especially in the new National Popular Assembly. Dialogue initiatives aimed at reconciling the different factions and political groupings were launched, with the support of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. The strained political situation even risked jeopardizing the disbursement of funds pledged by donors, as political stability was a precondition for such disbursement. The mandate of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, which assisted in consolidating peace and promoting national reconciliation, was streamlined to highlight its mediation and good offices functions. Cameroon and Nigeria continued to cooperate peacefully to advance progress in implementing, through the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, the 2002 International Court of Justice ruling on the land and maritime boundaries between them.

However, the political landscape in the Horn of Africa was not so encouraging, as the region continued to be affected by complex, interlocking conflicts. While the Sudan took positive steps to implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, areas of the country were still plagued by armed militias, disagreements over borders, disputed oil revenues and the escalating crisis in the Darfur states. The crisis in the Darfur region continued to deteriorate, and although AU-mediated talks in Abuja, Nigeria, culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May, only the Government and one of the Darfur rebel groups signed the pact. The AU, in January, endorsed a transition from its Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping operation, which the Security Council approved in resolution 1663(2006) of 24 March. However, the Sudan did not support the idea, citing threats to its sovereignty. On 31 August, the Council expanded the mandate and increased the troop strength of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan by up to 17,300 international military personnel, to be deployed to Darfur. That was also rejected by the Sudan. On 16 November, agreement was reached on the deployment of a hybrid AU-UN force in Darfur. That was endorsed by the AU, Sudan’s Council of Ministers and the Security Council. In Somalia, the year opened on a promising note, with the January signing of the Aden Declaration, brokered by Yemen, to end differences between the President and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament. The Transitional Federal Government and Parliament relocated to Baidoa, 140 miles northwest of Mogadishu, and the Parliament held its first session in February. That same month, however, there was a dramatic shift in Somalia’s complicated clan-based balance of power, with the emergence of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), whose aim was to combat the rapid advance of the Union of Islamic Courts, accused of supporting and harbouring foreign terrorism suspects. ARPCT and Islamic Courts fighters engaged in fierce battles in Mogadishu, and by June, the Courts had routed ARPCT and established their authority in central and southern Somalia. A sense of law and order returned to Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years. By contrast, the Transitional Federal Government barely held control of Baidoa. The Courts expanded the territory under their control, taking the strategically important port city of Kismayo and had flanked Baidoa by late October. The Security Council, on 6 December, endorsed the request for a joint peace operation to be deployed by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development and the AU. However, the military build-up by both sides came to a head on 24 December, when skirmishes threatened the Transitional Government seat in Baidoa and provoked the full force of the Government, backed by Ethiopian troops. The
Courts militia retreated to Mogadishu, which fell to the Transitional Government/Ethiopian coalition on 28 December, and then to Kismayo, which fell soon after. Despite diplomatic initiatives by the United States and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, the Ethiopia and Eritrea stalemate in the demarcation of the border between them remained. The situation in the buffer zone, the Temporary Security Zone, and adjacent areas turned tense in mid-October, when Eritrean defence forces entered the Zone in Sector West. The situation was exacerbated by Eritrean restrictions on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, including a continued flight ban on the Mission’s helicopters, which greatly curtailed its capacity to monitor the Zone. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which failed to advance its demarcation activities, announced, on 27 November, that, because of impediments in fulfilling its mandate, it planned to demarcate the border on maps, leaving the two countries to establish the physical boundary and to reach agreement on border demarcation within one year. If no agreement was reached, the locations established in its 2002 delimitation decision would take effect. Both countries rejected the Commission’s proposal.

The deadlock in the search for an agreed political solution to the long-standing conflict concerning the governance of the Territory of Western Sahara continued, with no hope of an early breakthrough. The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy intensified his efforts in exploring with the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para La Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario), the best way to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council call upon the parties to enter into open-ended negotiations without preconditions, rather than just extending the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

In other matters, Mauritius complained that, 38 years after its independence, it still was not able to exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The United Kingdom, maintaining that the Territory was British, reiterated the undertaking that the Territory would be ceded when no longer required for defence purposes and it would liaise closely with Mauritius at that time.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly discussed the issue of cooperation between the United Nations and the AU. The two organizations signed a declaration entitled “Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the ten-year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union”.

Promotion of peace in Africa

In 2006, the United Nations continued to identify and address the root causes of conflict in Africa and consider ways to promote sustainable peace and development on the continent. The Security Council held debates on the situation in the Great Lakes Region (27 January) and the consolidation of peace in West Africa (9 August). It heard briefings by the African Union (AU) Chairman (31 May) and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs on the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (15 September), the Darfur region of the Sudan and northern Uganda (22 November).

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, established in 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 93] to monitor the implementation of Council recommendations relating to its role in conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, continued to contribute to the Council’s work by promoting a better understanding of ways to address crises on the continent.

The New York-based Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), headed by Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana), continued to facilitate global intergovernmental deliberations on Africa, in particular on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) [YUN 2001, p. 900], and to assist the Secretary-General in improving the coordination of UN system support to Africa. The Geneva-based Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), continued to contribute, as part of the Secretary-General’s good offices function, to the promotion of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, closely monitoring the situation there and striving to resolve conflicts in the region.

On 15 November [A/61/580-S/2006/897], China, the Congo and Ethiopia transmitted to the Secretary-General the Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Beijing, 4-5 November), as well as the speeches made on 4 November at the Summit’s opening ceremony by China’s President, Hu Jintao, Congo’s President Denis Sassou-Nguesso and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. The meeting, which brought together representatives from 48 African countries, adopted the Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2007-2009).
Security Council consideration. On 27 January, the Security Council held an open meeting on the situation in the Great Lakes Region (see p. 121) and on 9 August an open debate on the consolidation of peace in West Africa (see p. 173).

On 31 May [meeting 5548], AU Chairman, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo, briefing the Security Council on armed conflict in Africa, expressed his organization’s gratitude to the Council for its tireless efforts and determination in supporting peace and security on the continent. He said that the Secretary-General’s 1998 report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa [YUN 1998, p. 66] remained relevant, providing a broad strategy of prevention, and taking into account all the dimensions of the violent crises on the African continent. Most of the current conflicts were at least three years old. However, the tragic case of Somalia, the situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the crisis in northern Uganda and the situation in Western Sahara, had unfortunately lasted because they had not been dealt with appropriately, nor had there been commitment or mutual confidence on the part of the principal protagonists. On the other hand, conflicts that had been among the worst on the continent, such as in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, had been settled in an encouraging way. However, to manage some post-conflict situations, sustained international support was needed to prevent a relapse into conflict.

As to current conflicts, scenarios developed by the international community should make it possible to end them, such as those in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC and the Darfur region of the Sudan. In Darfur, there was a framework for a transition towards a UN operation, with a strong African component, following the accord reached in Abuja on 5 May. The partnership between the United Nations and the AU should be strengthened. In implementing that partnership, Africa had the tools in the area of conflict prevention, in particular the AU Peace and Security Council and the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. The common will was to put an end to those intolerable situations by making the best use of all the means that the partnership between the two organizations provided.

On 15 September [meeting 5525], Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, briefed the Council on his trip to assess the humanitarian situation in the DRC and northern Uganda. He called on the Council to bolster its commitment to ending two of the worst conflicts. The United Nations and the Congolese Transitional Government had made much progress in increasing security and holding successful elections, but not enough on the issue of impunity. Sexual abuse had become a cancer, while military and civilian authorities were still not accountable for crimes against civilians. More than 1,000 raped women had been treated so far that year in South Kivu alone, and it was not known how many more had suffered in inaccessible parts of the province. Expressing concern about the impact of operations by the armed forces on civilians, he said more than 500,000 people had been newly displaced in eastern DRC, following Government operations against militia groups. Too often, civilians who had fled the fighting were then victimized by the armed forces, accusing them of supporting the militias. The only long-term solution was to form one competent national army with the exclusive right to bear arms. While the humanitarian situation had improved, there were still insufficient resources to meet the country’s overwhelming needs, including the some 1.6 million internally displaced persons who had returned home the previous year. The Council had to show its commitment to the country by maintaining the strength of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and keeping pressure on the Government to end impunity and promote the rule of law.

Turning to northern Uganda, he said that the picture there was more promising than it had been in years. Security had increased dramatically since the start of negotiations between Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Juba, southern Sudan, earlier in the year. The improved security would allow conditions in the camps for internally displaced persons to improve and preparations to be made for the return of more than 1.5 million people. On 26 August, the two sides signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and the Government of South Sudan asked for UN assistance, including the provision of monitors. The question of impunity and International Criminal Court indictments against LRA leaders were discussed with internally displaced persons in Uganda and the parties in Juba, who all expressed concern that the indictments could threaten progress in the talks that were going on. However, there could be no impunity for mass murder and crimes against humanity, he said, and the parties should look at different solutions for meeting local needs for reconciliation, as well as universal standards of justice and accountability.

Briefing the Council on 22 November [meeting 5571] on his visit to Darfur and northern Uganda, Mr. Egeland said that Government forces, mili-
tias, rebels groups and Chadian armed opposition groups continued to spread fear and terror throughout much of that region. The Government’s failure to protect its citizens, even in areas where there were no rebels, had been shameful. The United Nations had also failed to live up to its pledge to protect civilians where Governments manifestly failed to do so. The rampant insecurity, proliferation of arms and banditry on roads had taken their toll on the delivery capacity of an increasingly beleaguered humanitarian community. Humanitarian workers were being harassed, attacked and killed. If that trend continued, there would be a dramatic escalation of human suffering and loss of life beyond anything had been witnessed so far. Referring to an agreement reached in Addis Ababa regarding the deployment of a hybrid United Nations/African Union peacekeeping mission (see p. 290), he said that the agreement could mark a historic turning point, but he feared that time was being lost in talks on the intricacies of the accord, rather than on the immediate deployment of a more effective force with a more proactive mandate.

As to the Juba peace talks between Uganda and LRA, he said that, except for small incidents, the cessation of hostilities had been respected, allowing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons to start returning to northern Uganda. He had met with LRA leader Joseph Kony and had urged him to move towards a speedy end to the conflict, ensure the assembly of the LRA forces in the agreed areas and release abducted women and children. The mediation efforts by the Government of Southern Sudan should be supported by continued funding. Continued UN political assistance to the mediation was also necessary.

**Office of the Special Adviser on Africa**

In 2006, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), established by General Assembly resolution 57/7 [YUN 2002, p. 910], continued to enhance international support for Africa’s development and security through its advocacy and analytical work, assist the Secretary-General in improving coherence and coordination of UN system support to Africa, and facilitate global inter-governmental deliberations on Africa, in particular relating to NEPAD [YUN 2001, p. 900]. Analytical work undertaken by OSAA during the year focused on the contribution of the private sector to the implementation of NEPAD, assessing, among other things, ongoing private-sector participation by both African and non-African firms and constraints to such participation. The Office provided research, logistical and administrative support for the second report of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Panel on International Support for NEPAD [A/61/138]. The Office convened an expert group meeting on natural resources and conflict in Africa (Cairo, Egypt, 17-19 June), which focused on improving natural resources management in post-conflict countries in Africa, and another on the participation of Africa’s youth as partners in peace and development in post-conflict countries (Windhoek, Namibia, 14-16 November), which devised strategies and mechanisms to include youth as key actors in rehabilitation, reconciliation and rebuilding of war-torn communities. It organized a panel discussion on institutional challenges in implementing NEPAD (New York, 12 October), coinciding with the General Assembly debate on NEPAD, at which experts presented policies and strategies that had been successful in addressing such challenges.

**Implementation of Secretary-General 1998 recommendations on promotion of peace**

**Report of Secretary-General.** In response to General Assembly resolution 60/223 [YUN 2005, p. 158], the Secretary-General submitted an August report [A/61/213] on the implementation of the recommendations contained in his 1998 report on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa [YUN 1998, p. 66]. The report examined conflict prevention and peacemaking, progress in countries with UN peacekeeping missions, post-conflict peacebuilding, cross-cutting issues, building African capacity and enhancing cooperation. Updating developments since his follow-up report on the subject [YUN 2005, p. 157], he said that, while prospects for peace in a number of African countries had improved during the year, the root causes, such as extreme poverty, gross inequalities and weak State capacity continued to cause conflict. They were exacerbated by other factors, such as external support for repressive regimes, exclusionary Government policies and small-arms proliferation. Religion, ethnicity and economic conditions also mobilized people to engage in violent action, while forsaking civil responsibility.

Increased and concerted action was needed to prevent simmering crises from escalating and ensure that the hard-won peace in countries emerging from conflict was irreversible. Greater efforts were required to address youth unemployment, the impact of HIV/AIDS, the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the illegal flows of small arms. Cooperation between the United Nations and African re-
regional organizations was vital to strengthen African peace support and early-warning capacity.

Of concern were several developments that could undermine the achievements and investments made, such as unconstitutional takeovers, efforts to prolong terms in public office, attempts to disqualify opposition members, incitement to hatred and attacks for political and electoral gain. African States and regional organizations should be alert to those problems and send a clear message that they would not be tolerated.

Progress was made in several countries with UN peacekeeping missions. As at 31 May, Africa hosted 75 per cent of total UN peacekeeping forces. Over 63,000 troops, police and civilian personnel were deployed in seven peacekeeping missions, which had expanded their operations to include peacebuilding activities. To support the transition from conflict to peace, the World Bank was engaged in 17 conflict-affected African countries, providing some $3.1 billion in grants and loans for 64 projects and raising over $1 billion through multi-donor trust funds.

The Secretary-General stated that peace would remain fragile if the living conditions of ordinary people, particularly the youth, were not improved. Peace consolidation strategies should involve realistic plans for economic recovery, appropriate policies, such as preferential trade, aid agreements and debt relief, as well as measures to promote land reform, reduce massive unemployment and better manage natural resources.

The Secretary-General called upon African Member States to assist those African countries emerging from conflict in devising natural resource and public revenue-management structures to transform those resources from a peace liability to a peace asset, and the international community to assist them by providing adequate financial and technical assistance. He urged African leaders to continue to spearhead normative and regulatory innovations and enact policies providing incentives to domestic and international investors. The role of the media was critical, and better training for journalists, the promotion of ethical standards and adequate pay should discourage hate media and promote responsible journalism. He called for regional alertness, and urged States, African regional organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund) and development partners to assist African countries emerging from conflict to introduce better economic and employment opportunities to prevent a relapse into conflict.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION**

On 22 December [meeting 84], the General Assembly adopted resolution 61/230 [draft: A/61/L.41/Rev.1 & Add.1] without vote [agenda item 62 (b)].

**Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa**

The General Assembly, 
Recalling further the 2005 World Summit Outcome, through which world leaders reaffirmed their commitment to addressing the special needs of Africa, 
Recalling the creation by the Economic and Social Council, by its resolution 2002/1 of 15 July 2002, of ad hoc advisory groups on African countries emerging from conflict, 
Recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, 
Stressing that the responsibility for peace and security in Africa, including the capacity to address the root causes of conflict and to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner, lies primarily with African countries, while recognizing the need for support from the international community, 
Recognizing, in particular, the importance of strengthening the capacity of African regional and subregional organizations to address the causes of conflict in Africa, 
Noting that despite the positive trends and advances in Africa, the conditions required for sustained peace and development have yet to be consolidated throughout the continent, 
Noting also that conflict prevention and the consolidation of peace would benefit from the coordinated, sustained and integrated efforts of the United Nations system and Member States, and regional and subregional organizations, as well as international and regional financial institutions,
Reaffirming the need to strengthen the synergy between Africa’s economic and social development programmes and its peace and security agenda,

Recognizing the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission as a dedicated mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for peace and sustainable development,

Underlining the need to address the negative implications of the illegal exploitation of natural resources in all its aspects on peace, security and development in Africa, and underlining also that the illicit trade in natural resources is a matter of serious international concern, which can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflicts and the illicit trade in and proliferation of arms, especially small arms and light weapons,

1. Takes note of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations contained in his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, including recent efforts in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding undertaken by African countries, African regional organizations and the United Nations system;

2. Welcomes the progress made in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict and in post-conflict peacebuilding in a number of African countries;

3. Also welcomes the determination of the African Union to strengthen its peacekeeping capacity and to take the lead in peacekeeping operations in the continent, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and in close coordination with the United Nations, through the Peace and Security Council, as well as ongoing efforts to develop a continental early warning system, enhanced mediation capacity, including through the establishment of the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force;

4. Urges the United Nations and invites other development partners to increase their support for the African Union in order to enhance its capacity and effectiveness in the planning, deployment and management of peacekeeping operations and the advanced training to African peacekeepers, and urges the donor community to replenish the Peace Fund of the African Union;

5. Welcomes the commitment of international partners to support and strengthen African capabilities in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa, including through financial and technical support for further development of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and in this regard welcomes the continued support of the European Union to the African Peace Facility, initiatives by members of the Group of Eight, such as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme of France, the new initiative for consolidating peace in Africa under the Tokyo International Conference on African Development framework by Japan and the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the United States of America, and also welcomes the successful convening of the first Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which resulted in the adoption of the Declaration of the Beijing Summit and the Beijing Action Plan;

6. Encourages further contributions by the partners, including through the existing forums of cooperation with Africa, to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa by strengthening the capacity of African regional and subregional organizations to address the causes of conflict in Africa and the capacity for the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts, peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding;

7. Calls for a holistic and coordinated approach at the national, regional and international levels to identify causes of each conflict situation as a means to improve the effectiveness of conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Africa;

8. Stresses the critical importance of a regional approach to conflict prevention, particularly with respect to cross-border issues such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, the prevention of illegal exploitation of natural resources and trafficking in high-value commodities and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, and emphasizes the central role of the African Union and subregional organizations in addressing such issues;

9. Welcomes efforts to enhance practical cooperation, within the framework of an effective partnership, between the United Nations and the African Union in the realm of conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa, and in this context urges the United Nations system and the international community to increase, coordinate and sustain their efforts aimed at assisting African countries in addressing the full range of causes of conflict in Africa;

10. Stresses the importance of effectively addressing challenges which continue to hamper the achievement of peace and stability on the continent, inter alia, youth unemployment, the devastating social, economic and political impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons;

11. Notes with concern that violence against women everywhere continues and often increases, even as armed conflicts draw to an end, and urges further progress in the implementation of policies and guidelines relating to protection of and assistance to women in conflict and post-conflict situations;

12. Calls for the enhancement of the role of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding;

13. Notes with concern the tragic plight of children in conflict situations in Africa, particularly the phenomenon of child soldiers, and stresses the need for the protection of children in armed conflicts, post-conflict counselling, rehabilitation and education;

14. Recognizes the important role of the good offices of the Secretary-General in Africa, and encourages the Secretary-General to use mediation as often as possible.
to help to solve conflicts peacefully, taking due consider-
ation of the work performed by the African Union and
other subregional organizations in that regard;
15. Welcomes the strengthening of the United Na-
tions peacemaking support capacity through the estab-
lishment of the Mediation Support Unit within the De-
partment of Political Affairs of the Secretariat as well as
the launch of United Nations Peacemaker, a Web-based
knowledge-sharing and operational tool;
16. Invites the United Nations and the donor com-
community to increase efforts to support ongoing regional
efforts to build African mediation and negotiation capa-
city;
17. Welcomes African-led initiatives to strengthen
political, economic and corporate governance, such as
the African Peer Review Mechanism, encourages more
African countries to join this Mechanism process as soon
as possible, and calls upon the United Nations system
and Member States to assist African Member States and
regional and subregional organizations in their efforts to
improve good governance, including the rule of law and
the holding of free and fair elections;
18. Recognizes the role that the Peacebuilding Com-
mission can perform to ensure the national ownership
of the peacebuilding process in countries emerging from
conflict and that nationally evolved priorities are at the
core of international and regional efforts in addressing
the root causes of the conflicts in the countries under
consideration, and calls for the full engagement and com-
mitment of all relevant actors to the work of the Peace-
building Commission with a view to addressing identi-
fied critical peacebuilding priorities and issues through a
coherent, holistic and inclusive peacebuilding process;
19. Calls upon the United Nations system and invites
Member States to assist African countries emerging from
conflict in their efforts to build national capacities of
governance, including the rehabilitation of the security
sector, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegra-
tion of ex-combatants, provision for the safe return of
internally displaced persons and refugees, the launch of
income-generation activities, particularly for youth and
women, and the delivery of basic public services;
20. Stresses the importance of creating an environ-
ment conducive to national reconciliation and social and
economic recovery in countries emerging from conflict;
21. Takes note of the conclusions of the Expert
Group Meeting on “Natural Resources and Conflict in
Africa: Transforming a Peace Liability into a Peace As-
et”, held in Cairo from 17 to 19 June 2006, calls upon
African Member States and regional and subregional
organizations to assist African countries emerging from
conflict in devising national natural resources and public
revenue management structures, and urges the interna-
tional community to assist in this process by providing
adequate financial and technical assistance, as well as
by renewing commitment to efforts aimed at combatting
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of those
countries;
22. Notes the positive role the media can play in
conflict prevention and resolution, welcomes decision
EX.CL/Dec.215 (VII) of the seventh ordinary session
of the Executive Council of the African Union, held
from 28 June to 2 July 2005, as adopted by the Assem-
bly of Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the Pan-African Television
Channel as a vehicle to mitigate the sociocultural causes
of conflict in Africa, and calls upon the international
community to increase efforts to support the establish-
ment of such a channel and to discourage hate media and
promote responsible journalism;
23. Decides to continue to monitor the implementa-
tion of the recommendations contained in the report of
the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the
promotion of durable peace and sustainable development
in Africa;
24. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the
General Assembly at its sixty-second session a progress
report on the implementation of the present resolution;
25. Also requests the Secretary-General to include in
the aforementioned progress report concrete proposals
for possible United Nations actions and plans in support
of the goal of achieving a conflict-free Africa by 2010.

African peacekeeping capacity

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Opera-
tions, at its 2006 substantive session (New York, 27
February–17 March [A/60/19], continued discussion
on the enhancement of African peacekeeping ca-
pacities. The Special Committee reiterated its sup-
port for the development of a joint action plan for
addressing the systemic constraints identified by
African Member States, including in the areas of
common doctrine and training standards, logistical
support, funding, and institutional capacity for plan-
ning and managing peacekeeping operations within
the au and subregional organizations. The Special
Committee called for better coordination among
donors, the matching of expectations in partner-
ships and a deeper understanding of African needs.
Given the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in
African capacity-building, there was a need for ef-
ective coordination of support to the au. The Spe-
cial Committee stressed the importance of the au
lead and ownership of its 10-year capacity-building
plan, including donor coordination. Noting that the
2005 World Summit [YUN 2005, p. 47] had supported
the development and implementation of a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the au, the Special
Committee expressed support for that effort as it
related to African peacekeeping capacities and wel-
comed the proposal for a new organizational entity
in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as
the focal point for all contacts between the Depart-
ment and other regional arrangements.
Central Africa and Great Lakes region

In 2006, Central Africa and the Great Lakes region continued to be affected by the activities of militia groups. The Central African Republic witnessed the strengthening of rebel movements in the north, and in Chad, rebel groups launched increasingly coordinated attacks against the army. Meanwhile, local warlords and international companies continued the illegal exploitation of the region’s natural resources, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in violation of a UN embargo.

However, the region also made noticeable steps towards the resolution of long-standing conflicts. Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) signed, in August, an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. In Burundi, the Government and the last major rebel group, the Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (PNL), signed a peace agreement in June, and a ceasefire agreement in September.

In January, the Security Council held an all-day ministerial-level debate on the Great Lakes region. It discussed, among other topics, improving cooperation between the United Nations and African organizations, such as the AU, particularly in peacekeeping and conflict prevention, and preparations for the second summit of the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region.

The four-year transitional process in the DRC concluded with elections that led to the installation of the National Assembly on 22 September, and the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila on 6 December. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was instrumental in ensuring a peaceful electoral process, with the assistance of a European Union (EU) special force. The Council continued to address problems affecting the DRC, including activities of irregular fighters, particularly the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda, as well as the connection between neighbouring countries’ concerns and interests in the DRC and violations of the arms embargo. In January, the Council re-established the Group of Experts to monitor the embargo, and, in July, extended by another year its arms embargo against militia groups in the DRC.

In Burundi, negotiations between the Government and PNL, the last major rebel group, hosted by the United Republic of Tanzania and facilitated by South Africa, resulted in the conclusion of a peace agreement in June, and a ceasefire agreement in September. In view of significant improvements in the security situation, Burundi requested the United Nations, in May, to establish an integrated peacebuilding office. The mandate of the United Nations Operation in Burundi expired on 31 December, and the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi was to be launched on 1 January 2007.

One of the region’s most devastating conflicts, opposing Uganda and LRA, came closer to a solution, with the signing on 26 August, in Juba, the Sudan, of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. The brutal insurgency waged by LRA since 1987, had caused the deaths of some 100,000 people in northern Uganda and the displacement of up to 2 million more. In an effort to bring about a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General, in December, named former Mozambican President, Joaquim Chissano, as his Special Envoy to help deal with the LRA issue.

The Central African Republic was increasingly drawn into the crisis affecting Chad and the Darfur region of the Sudan. Forces opposed to Central African Republic President François Bozizé appeared to have forged links with rebels fighting against Chad’s President Idriss Déby Itno. Attacks by those forces in the north increased in intensity and became an armed rebellion against the Government. In October-November, members of a coalition of three rebel movements took control of four northern cities, but were later expelled by a Government counter-offensive. The Central African Republic accused the Sudan of supporting the rebellion, an accusation the Sudan denied. The conflict created a humanitarian crisis, with thousands of displaced people crossing into Chad and Cameroon to flee the violence. At the request of the Government, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUC) for another year.

The crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic, with the two countries accusing the Sudan of supporting armed groups increasingly active in their territories. The Tripoli Agreement signed on 8 February by Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno and Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, and the 26 July N’Djamena Agreement between Chad and the Sudan did not defuse the crisis. The Security Council, in August, requested the United Nations Mission in Sudan to establish a political and military presence in Chad and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic. The Secretary-General dispatched an assessment mission to the two countries, and, in December, reported to the
Council that conditions on the ground did not permit the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, but only of a robust monitoring and protection mission.

At the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (Nairobi, Kenya, 14-15 December), Heads of State and Government signed the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. The 11 countries committed themselves to cooperating in the areas of security, democracy and governance, economic development and humanitarian and social welfare.

**Security Council ministerial meeting**

On 4 January the United Republic of Tanzania, in its capacity as Security Council President, announced the holding of an open debate on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region. On 18 January [S/2006/27], it submitted to the Secretary-General a concept paper on the subject as a basis for discussion during the debate, scheduled for 27 January. According to the paper, the debate would focus on finding ways of implementing and coordinating the various regional and international initiatives for peace and stability in the region. It would highlight the search for effective means of applying broader UN peace and security initiatives for Africa to the Great Lakes region; identifying strategies for linking UN initiatives on conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding with those of the Great Lakes region; and implementing resolutions 1625(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 155], 1631(2005) [ibid., p. 94], 1649(2005) [ibid., p. 97], as well as the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission [ibid., p. 94]. Topics should also include ways to strengthen democracy, good governance and the rule of law and provide protection and humanitarian assistance to civilians, including refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees. The outcome should, among other things, lead to the creation of a mechanism for enhancing cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

On 27 January [meeting 5359], during the Security Council’s consideration of the subject, Council President Asha-Rose Migiro said that the Great Lakes peace initiative was embodied in the Dar es Salaam Declaration adopted in November 2004 at the first International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region [YUN 2004, p. 116] and was the foundation for building a framework for realizing enduring peace, democratic governance and respect for human rights, economic cooperation and sustainable development. Collective political will was needed to prevent and resolve conflicts, consolidate peace and build democratic governance institutions. The region faced residual and new challenges and needed to consolidate its achievements and mobilize international community support to accomplish its objectives. The countries of the region were working to create mechanisms to strengthen mutual confidence and trust as a basis for peace and stability and were committed to developing arrangements to deepen cooperation and sustain peace and security. They had embraced democracy and good governance, not only as intrinsic values, but as necessary for their peaceful coexistence and development. The desirability of a regional approach in that endeavour could not be overemphasized.

Congo’s Foreign Affairs Minister said that recent developments indicated that progress was being made in terms of peace and security in the region. In Burundi, the transition had led to democratic, free and transparent elections. The political transition in the DRC was proceeding favourably, and everything should be done to stop the armed groups in the east of the country from jeopardizing the process. The DRC, Rwanda and Uganda should pursue efforts to ease tension and establish relations of trust, which would in turn help resolve the problems of the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons, eliminate the presence of armed groups in neighbouring States and curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources. In that spirit of mutual trust, his Government was facilitating the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees and members of the former armed forces of Zaire to their countries of origin.

The DRC said that, in December 2005, the Congolese people had voted overwhelmingly for a draft constitution. The electoral law had been discussed and would soon be adopted by Parliament, and efforts were under way to bring together troops from various warring factions to create an integrated army. Unfortunately, on 23 January 2006, eight Guatemalan members of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) were killed in Garamba National Park, while pursuing armed groups. That tragedy strengthened the DRC determination to eliminate all armed groups creating insecurity along the eastern border. Although relations with neighbouring States had improved, some of them continued to harbour criminals, and the DRC had requested their extradition, in accordance with Council resolutions. The Council should exert pressure on such countries to cease their support of the militias. As the country prepared to elect the future leaders of its
institutions, it expected of all neighbouring States an attitude of solidarity so that no outside threat would disrupt the process.

Rwanda said that the prospects for peace, stability and prosperity were better than at any other moment since the 1994 genocide [YUN 1994, p. 282]. However, the unimplemented aspects of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement [YUN 1999, p. 87] should be addressed. One key impediment to peace still remained: the presence of genocidal forces and other armed groups in the region, whose sole purpose was destabilization. Until the people of the region were free of the fear, tyranny and attacks of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), LRA, FNLA and other armed groups sowing desolation in eastern DRC and the rest of the region, the emerging peace would continue to be fragile. Rwandans wished to know why the Security Council had not ended the threat posed by those forces, and why the Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 138] and the Group of Experts established under resolution 1596(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 142] had not yet seriously tackled the flow of arms and supplies to those groups.

Uganda said that progress in peace initiatives indicated that the prospects were greater than ever for transforming the Great Lakes into a region of peace, prosperity and cooperation. However, the biggest obstacle remained the problem of the negative forces, especially the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), FDLR, the People’s Redemption Army (PRA) and LRA, which continued to cause untold suffering to civilian populations. The LRA, based in southern Sudan and the Garamba National Park in the DRC, had caused thousands of deaths and tremendous suffering to people in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. For too long, the Ugandan defence force had single-handedly fought against the LRA in a two-track policy combining military pressure and political negotiations. Although the military campaign had not completely eliminated the LRA threat, it had severely weakened it by reducing its ranks from 3,000 to between 500 and 600 through defections and capture. The Government had also embarked on peace initiatives to resolve the conflict through a negotiated political settlement. The 2000 Amnesty Act and its implementing Amnesty Commission had sought to accommodate those who renounced rebellion and promote reconciliation. More than 2,000 LRA rebels had taken advantage of the amnesty. The Government had initiated or supported major efforts for a negotiated peace settlement since 1994, but the lack of a political agenda by LRA and pressure from its external backers had made such efforts fruitless.

South Africa lauded the progress made, including the recent agreement between the DRC and Uganda to manage LRA activity in Haut-Uele, Orientale Province, and the subsequent elimination of LRA activity in the DRC; the agreement between the two countries to create a Ugandan Amnesty Commission Office in North Kivu to help disarm and repatriate Ugandan combatants; and the success of the DRC and MONUC in dealing with Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC) elements active in Kilo and Mongwalu, as well as the efforts of the DRC and Uganda to disarm and repatriate those MRC elements that had relocated in Uganda. Nevertheless, several issues of concern remained, such as the presence of FDLR and Mai-Mai forces in Kivu, which was a serious threat to regional stability, the integrity of the DRC transition to peace and the regional demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation process.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions and the statements by its President on the Great Lakes region of Africa and concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi, in particular resolutions 1649(2005) and 1650(2005) of 21 December 2005,
Recalling also its resolution 1625(2005) of 14 September 2005 on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, particularly in Africa,
Recalling further its resolution 1631(2005) of 17 October 2005 on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and General Assembly resolution 59/213 of 20 December 2004 on cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of all States in the region, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,
Reiterating its condemnation of the genocide in Rwanda of 1994 and the armed conflicts which have plagued the Great Lakes region in the past decade, and expressing its profound concern at the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law resulting in widespread loss of life, human suffering and destruction of property,

Aware that the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in those resources and the proliferation of and trafficking in arms is one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great
Lakes region, and especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Expressing its deep concern at the devastating impact of conflict and insecurity on the humanitarian situation throughout the Great Lakes region and their implications for regional peace and security, especially where arms and armed groups move across borders, such as the long-running and brutal insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, which has caused the death, abduction and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians in Uganda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Welcoming the efforts undertaken by the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission comprising Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda as a significant contribution to heightened dialogue between the countries of the Great Lakes region,

Recalling its previous resolutions that reaffirmed the importance of holding an international conference on peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region, and recognizing the continued ownership of the process by the countries of the region with the facilitation of the United Nations, the African Union, the Group of Friends of the Great lakes Region and all others concerned,

Taking note with satisfaction of the holding of the first International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 19 and 20 November 2004,

Recognizing the “Good-Neighbourly Declaration” adopted on 25 September 2003 by the representatives of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda and the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region adopted on 20 November 2004 by the first summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region,

Recognizing also the significant achievements and progress in the peace processes in the Great Lakes region, the recent installment of a democratically elected Government in Burundi and progress in the transition to democratic institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Expressing its gratitude to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the United Nations Operation in Burundi for their significant contribution to peace in the region,

Paying tribute to the donor community for the assistance it is providing to the countries in the region, and encouraging it to maintain that assistance,

Welcoming General Assembly resolution 60/1 of 16 September 2005 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome and, in particular, the commitment to address the special needs of Africa,

1. Commends the positive role played by the Secretary-General, the African Union, the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region and other stakeholders in organizing and participating in the first summit of the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region;

2. Urges the countries of the Great Lakes region to continue their collective efforts to develop a subregional approach for promoting good relations, peaceful coexistence and peaceful resolution of disputes as envisaged in the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region, and encourages them, in partnership with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and other stakeholders, to finalize the preparations for the second summit, to be held in Nairobi, including a clear focus on peace and security issues, with a view to adopting a security, stability and development pact for the countries of the Great Lakes region;

3. Calls upon the countries of the region to agree on confidence-building measures based on effective and concrete actions;

4. Encourages and supports the countries of the Great Lakes region, individually and collectively, in strengthening and institutionalizing respect for human rights and humanitarian law, including respect for women’s rights and protection of children affected by armed conflict, good governance, rule of law, democratic practices as well as development cooperation;

5. Encourages the development of the prevailing goodwill and relations among the countries of the region which have positively influenced the successful transition in Burundi and the course of the ongoing democratic transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

6. Urges all States concerned to take action to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to take appropriate measures of international cooperation and judicial assistance in this regard;

7. Expresses its support for the efforts of States in the region to build independent and reliable national judicial institutions in order to put an end to impunity;

8. Strongly condemns the activities of militias and armed groups operating in the Great Lakes region, such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération and the Lord’s Resistance Army, which continue to attack civilians and United Nations and humanitarian personnel and commit human rights abuses against local populations and threaten the stability of individual States and the region as a whole, and reiterates its demand that all such armed groups lay down their arms and engage voluntarily and without any delay or preconditions in their disarmament and in their repatriation and resettlement;

9. Stresses the need for the States in the region, within their respective territories, to disarm, demobilize and cooperate in the repatriation or resettlement, as appropriate, of foreign armed groups and local militias, and commends in this regard the robust action of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, acting in accordance with its mandate, in support of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the eastern part of the country;
10. Underscores the fact that the Governments in the region have a primary responsibility to protect their populations, including from attacks by militias and armed groups, and stresses the importance of ensuring the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers to people in need in accordance with international law;

11. Calls upon all States in the region to deepen their cooperation with a view to putting an end to the activities of illegal armed groups, and underlines the fact that these States must abide by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of their neighbours;

12. Urges the international community, non-governmental organizations and civil society to increase humanitarian assistance to civilians affected by displacements and violence from years of protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes region;

13. Commends the efforts of the United Nations missions in the region, in accordance with their respective mandates, to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel, to enable delivery of humanitarian aid and to create the necessary conditions for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to make recommendations to the Security Council, as appropriate, on how best to support efforts by States in the region to put an end to the activities of illegal armed groups, and to recommend how United Nations agencies and missions—the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Operation in Burundi—can help, including through further support for the efforts of the Governments concerned to ensure the protection of, and humanitarian assistance to, civilians in need;

15. Calls upon the countries of the region to continue their efforts to create conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation and safe and durable integration of refugees and former combatants in their respective countries of origin, and in this regard, calls for commensurate international support for refugees and reintegration and re-insertion of returnees, internally displaced persons and former combatants;

16. Also calls upon the countries of the region to reinforce their cooperation with the Security Council Committee and the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004) in enforcing the arms embargo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to combat cross-border trafficking in illicit small arms, light weapons and illicit natural resources as well as the movement of combatants, and reiterates its demand that the Governments of Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi take measures to prevent the use of their respective territories in support of the activities of armed groups present in the region;

17. Urges the Governments concerned in the region to enhance their cooperation to promote lawful and transparent exploitation of natural resources among themselves and in the region;

18. Welcomes the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, and underlines its potential importance to the work of the Council in this region;

19. Invites the international community, including regional organizations, international financial institutions and relevant bodies of the United Nations system, to support and complement the peacebuilding and development initiatives required to sustain peace, security and stability in the countries of the Great Lakes region;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Second International Conference on Great Lakes Region

The second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was held on 14 and 15 December, in Nairobi, Kenya. Organized under the auspices of the United Nations and the AU, the summit meeting was preceded by meetings of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee (February, Central African Republic; 22 September, New York; 11 December, Nairobi, Kenya). In January [S/2006/46], the Secretary-General had submitted to the Security Council a report on the preparations for holding the Conference.

The Conference was attended by the Heads of State and Government of the 11 countries comprising the region (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). The Conference adopted the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, by which the leaders pledged to translate into reality the priority political options and guiding principles of the Dar es Salaam Declaration, adopted at the first Conference in 2004 [YUN 2004, p. 116]. The objectives of the Pact were to provide a legal framework governing relations among States of the region, implement the Dar es Salaam Declaration and the mechanisms of the Pact and create conditions for security, stability and sustainable development among the States. It contained protocols on non-aggression and mutual defence; democracy and good governance; judicial cooperation, prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination; illegal exploitation of natural resources; the specific reconstruction and development zone; prevention and suppression of sexual violence against women and children; protection and assistance to internally displaced persons; property rights of returning persons; and management of information and communication. The Pact also contained a Programme of Action and established a Special Fund for Reconstruction and Development and a Regional Follow-up Mechanism, which would in-
include a Conference secretariat to be headed by an Executive Secretary. Liberata Mulamula (United Republic of Tanzania) was nominated to the post of Executive Secretary.

**Security Council consideration.** The Security Council, on 20 December [meeting 5603], was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Ibrahima Fall, who heralded the pact as substantive and forward-looking. The region, he said, had turned a page of despair and opened a new chapter of regional and national destiny, managed by Governments and non-governmental actors. There was a commitment to ratify the Pact speedily and respect its spirit and letter, reflected in the decision to immediately establish the political follow-up mechanisms and the Conference secretariat. It was also reflected in the decision to establish the secretariat headquarters in Burundi, with Liberata Mulamula as the first Executive Secretary, and to institutionalize the special fund for reconstruction and development, to which the United Republic of Tanzania had pledged $500,000 and the DRC $1 million. The collective political will had been evident both in the outcome and the preparatory process, through the inclusion of non-governmental actors, including young people, women, civil society, the private sector and religious organizations.

He said that development partners welcomed the signing of the Pact and believed that the Conference had the potential to promote peace, security and development in the region. Canada, the co-chair of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, reaffirmed the Group’s support for the establishment of the Regional Follow-up Mechanism and funding for it until June 2007. Other partners pledged financial and other support.

The Executive Secretary designate, in his address to the Council, appealed for the extension of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes until March 2007, as requested by the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee at their February meeting in Bangui, in order to provide the new Conference secretariat with technical support and allow a smooth transition of responsibilities.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 20 December [meeting 5603], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/57 on behalf of the Council:


The Council congratulates regional leaders on the signing of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region and welcomes their commitment to its implementation.

The Council further welcomes the decision to establish a Regional Follow-up Mechanism, to include a Conference Secretariat headed by the first Executive Secretary, Ms. Liberata Mulamula, of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the decision to establish the offices of the Conference Secretariat in Bujumbura.

The Council pays tribute to the joint African Union/United Nations Secretariat, the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region co-chaired by Canada and the Netherlands, the United Nations lead agencies, the African Union, the European Union, the African Development Bank and the international community for their support and assistance to the International Conference process.

The Council also pays tribute to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, for their support, commitment and effective facilitation of the process leading to the convening of the Second Summit and the signing of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development.

The Council supports the request of the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee to extend the mandate of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a final period of three months, until 31 March 2007, with a view to ensuring regional ownership of the Follow-up Mechanism and completing successfully the transition to the Conference Secretariat.

The Council appeals to the countries of the region, the Group of Friends, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the international community to consider providing assistance to the Conference Secretariat and the Special Fund for Reconstruction and Development in the Great Lakes Region to support implementation by the parties of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development.

**Office of the Special Representative for Great Lakes Region**

On 15 March [S/2006/192], the Secretary-General notified the Security Council that the mandate of his Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, Ibrahima Fall, would expire on 31 March, but given his involvement with preparations for the second International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (see p. 124), he intended to extend the Special Representative’s mandate until 30 September.

On 29 March [S/2006/193], the Council took note of that intention, and encouraged the Special Representative to focus on three priorities—assist the countries of the region to convene the Summit and include a clear focus on peace and security; facilitate adoption of a security, stability and development pact; support the core countries so that the planned, regionally-led follow-up mechanism was fully operational by the time of the Summit; and transfer residual UN responsibilities to the core countries.

On 4 October [S/2006/811], the Secretary-General notified the Council of his intention to extend further the mandate of the Office of the Special Representative until 31 December to finalize
preparations for the Summit. That extension had been requested by the International Conference’s Regional inter-Ministerial Committee, meeting in New York on 22 September. On 13 October [S/2006/812], the Council took note of the Secretary-General’s intention.

On 31 January [A/60/585/Add.1], the Secretary-General had informed the General Assembly that the estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Representative for the period 1 January to 31 December would amount to $2,151,200.

In its March report [A/60/7/Add.37], the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) recommended acceptance of the Secretary-General’s proposal, which the General Assembly approved in section I of resolution 60/255 of 8 May (see p. 1618).

In November [A/60/525/Add.3 & Corr.1], the Secretary-General proposed resource requirements in the amount of $2,064,200 (net) for the period 1 January to 31 December 2007. ACABQ, in its December report [A/61/640 & Corr.1], recommended a 10 per cent reduction in resource requirement for all special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly or the Security Council, which the Assembly approved in section VII of resolution 61/252 of 22 December (see p. 1614).

Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions

The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa held its twenty-fourth ministerial meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, from 25 to 29 September [A/61/502-S/2006/796], with all Committee members (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, drc, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe) participating. The Committee, reviewing the geopolitical and security situation in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the drc and Chad, noted that overall developments in those countries continued to be positive. Despite a few armed confrontations and a worrying humanitarian and human rights situation, steady progress was achieved in the peace processes, with multiparty elections held in Sao Tome and Principe, the drc, Chad and Gabon. However, the fragility of those processes, as seen once again in the drc, required that the parties, the other countries of the subregion and the international community redouble their efforts to usher in a new era of development.

The Committee also considered the impact of the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan on member countries of the Committee and appealed to the international community to ensure that the borders between Chad, the Central African Republic and the Sudan were properly secured and that assistance to refugees and displaced persons was increased. It encouraged the steps taken to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, and acknowledged the necessity of the subregional approach to stabilize the area. It called for the early convening of a subregional conference to examine ways of solving cross-border problems.

Concerned by the aggravation of trans-border crime, the Committee encouraged member countries to continue to tackle such crime and develop a concerted subregional approach.

The Committee welcomed progress made in programmes for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants, including child soldiers, particularly through the collection and destruction of arms. It expressed concern over the lack of funds for launching and executing those programmes in the countries that were emerging from conflict and urged donors to provide substantial support. The Committee urged member countries to redouble their efforts in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and appealed for more international support to combat the phenomenon.

The Secretary-General, in response to General Assembly resolution 60/87 [YUN 2005, p. 645], submitted a September report [A/61/365] on the Committee’s activities since the submission of the previous report in July 2005 [ibid., p. 164]. He noted that, in recent years, financial support for the Committee, most of which was voluntary, seemed to be waning, resulting in its inability to fully implement its programme of work. However, the Committee continued to play an important role in promoting peace and security in the region. Committee member States needed to assume full ownership of its activities. In that regard, it was critical that the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa of the Economic Community of Central African States and its structures, in particular its early-warning mechanism, became operational, and that the capacity of the Community’s secretariat be strengthened, so that it could spearhead implementation of the Committee’s declarations, decisions and recommendations.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The transitional process in the drc, in the context of the 2002 Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo [YUN 2002, p. 125], came to a close with the holding of elections that led to the installation of the National Assembly on 22 September and the inauguration of President Joseph Kabila on 6 December. The transition and election preparations were supported by the International Committee in Support of the Transition, composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as well as Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, South Africa and Zambia, the EU and the AU, and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

A Security Council mission visited the country ahead of the elections. MONUC was instrumental in ensuring a peaceful election process, supported by a 1,000-strong European reserve force. Throughout the year, MONUC backed efforts by the Congolese army to bring rebel forces under control.

The Council re-established the Group of Experts monitoring the embargo against militia groups in the DRC. It extended the embargo by another year, and expanded the sanctions to political and military leaders recruiting children, and directed attention to the militias’ illegal exploitation of natural resources to fund their activities. The Council extended MONUC mandate until 15 February 2007, which was instrumental in ensuring peaceful elections and bringing a measure of stability to the country. Tragically, eight Mission peacekeepers were killed on 23 January in combat with the Ugandan rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and another on 28 May during a confrontation between militias and UN-backed soldiers from the national army.

In May, as requested by the Council, the Secretary-General submitted his proposals on disarming foreign combatants in the DRC. Thousands of foreign combatants still plagued the eastern part of the country, particularly the Rwandan Hutu rebel Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Burundian rebel Forces nationales de libération (FNL), and the Ugandan rebel groups, LRA and the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU).

In March, in Kinshasa, DRC authorities arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) militia leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, after the ICC Prosecutor issued an arrest warrant. Mr. Lubanga, the first person to be tried by the Court, was commander-in-chief of the Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (FPLC) in 2002-2003 in the Ituri district in the north-eastern DRC. The ICC Prosecutor, on 28 August, formally charged him with recruiting child soldiers. Hearings began on 9 November.

Political developments and MONUC activities

Attack on peacekeepers

In his March report on MONUC [S/2006/390], the Secretary-General said that the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), on 18 January, had deployed its Guatemalan special forces unit to the Garamba National Park, after it received information about the alleged presence there of elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), including the militia leader, Vincent Otti, for whom the International Criminal Court had issued an arrest warrant. On 23 January, while approaching a militia camp, the unit came under heavy fire by suspected LRA elements. Eight troops were killed and five injured.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 25 January [meeting 5356], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/4 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council condemns with the utmost firmness the attack against a detachment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which occurred on 23 January 2006 in the national park of Garamba, resulting in the death of eight Guatemalan peacekeepers and the severe wounding of five others. It offers its condolences to the families of the victims and to the authorities of Guatemala. It commends the dedication of the personnel of the Mission, who operate in particularly hazardous conditions.

The Council considers this aggression to be an unacceptable outrage. The peacekeepers were involved in an operation against suspected elements of the Lord Resistance Army reported to be present in the park of Garamba. The Lord Resistance Army has conducted a long-running and vicious insurgency in northern Uganda which has caused the death, abduction and displacement of thousands of innocent civilians in Uganda, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council calls upon the Government of National Unity and Transition immediately to take all necessary measures to bring to justice those responsible for this attack.

The Council also condemns with the utmost firmness the recent seizure of villages in the area of Rutshuru, North Kivu province, by insurgent elements. It expresses its concern at atrocities and human rights abuses which have been reported in this context. It considers all such actions to be a serious threat to the peace process and to the transition, and demands that they cease immediately. It stresses the need for unreserved commitment to the integration process of the armed forces, in the spirit of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed at Pretoria on 17 December 2002.

The Council underlines the importance of the electoral process not being disturbed and in this regard encourages ongoing efforts for community reconciliation. It also stresses in this context the importance of early adoption of the electoral law under discussion in the Parliament, and of respect
for the timetable drawn up by the Independent Electoral Commission.

The Council reaffirms its commitment to respect the national sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It expresses its solidarity with the Congolese people and its support for the Government of National Unity and Transition. It calls for the prompt extension of State authority throughout the Congolese territory.

The Council reiterates its call upon States in the region to deepen their cooperation with a view to putting an end to the activities of illegal armed groups, and reaffirms that any recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of a State is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council reaffirms its full support for the Mission, and urges the Mission to continue to fulfil its mandate with determination.

**Electoral preparations**

**Report of Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/390] that the constitutional referendum in December 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 190] and the promulgation of the electoral law on 9 March 2006 were important steps towards the holding of democratic elections. The electoral law established 169 electoral constituencies, a two-round system of presidential elections and a mixed system of simple majority and proportional representation for the election of the 500 National Assembly deputies. Registration of candidates began on 10 March, and some 213 parties and coalitions presented candidates, with some 24 of them having a nationwide base. On 16 April, the Independent Electoral Commission published the final list of candidates for the presidential elections, 33 of whom were cleared by the Commission and the Supreme Court, and the provisional list of 9,406 candidates for the legislative elections, 1,305 of whom were women. Some 10,500 candidates would run in the Provincial Assembly elections, on the basis of which the Senate and the provincial governors would be chosen. On 30 April, the Commission set 30 July as the date for the first round of presidential and legislative elections.

The elections, in which 25.5 million voters would cast their ballot for the first time in 45 years, were the largest and most challenging electoral processes ever conducted with UN support. The Secretary-General expressed concern at reports regarding limitations on civil liberties, widespread misuse of public funds, endemic corruption, arbitrary detention of political party members and increasing intimidation of the media, which threatened to undermine the transparency of the elections.

In view of the importance of the electoral process to peace and stability, the Secretary-General visited the country from 21 to 24 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 4 to 17 March and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 18 to 28 March. The Secretary-General urged the Congolese leaders to rise above short-term interests and work for the unity and stability of the country.

The Independent Electoral Commission and MONUC prepared an integrated operational plan for the elections, highlighting the need to spread the UN presence to the 166 territorial capitals and cities and requiring the deployment of additional MONUC staff. The Commission planned to open some 50,000 polling stations to ensure that voting was completed in one day. MONUC continued to enhance the population’s understanding of the electoral process through its public information outlets, including Radio Okapi, and by targeting women and youth. The Mission planned to deter armed challenges to the electoral process and provide a safe environment for the vote. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project provided support to the electoral process, and as at 29 March, had spent or committed $219,250,770 for election-related activities.

**Authorization of EU force**

On 12 April [S/2006/219], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the United Nations remained concerned about the possibility of violence during and after the electoral period. On 27 December 2005, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno had requested the European Union (EU) to consider making available a force reserve that could be deployed, if necessary, to support MONUC during the electoral process. On 28 March, the EU Council conveyed that organization’s willingness to provide such support, subject to Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Secretary-General felt that deploying such a force would contribute to the DRC efforts in ensuring the successful holding of elections.

The DRC had informed the Security Council, on 30 March [S/2006/203], that the country’s Supreme Defence Council had endorsed the establishment of an EU force, known as EUPOL R.D. Congo.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


*The Security Council,*

**Recalling** its previous resolutions and the statements by its President on the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

**Commending** the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the successful holding of a referendum on the Constitution that entered into force on 18 February 2006,

**Underlining** the importance of elections as the foundation for the longer-term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and the establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

**Commending** the efforts of the Independent Electoral Commission to prepare for the holding of the elections, and expressing its appreciation for the unprecedented and outstanding logistical support provided to the Commission by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

**Stressing** the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring security during the period encompassing the elections,

**Commending** the donor community, in particular the European Union, for the assistance that it is providing to the electoral process and in the interest of a successful outcome to the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encouraging it to continue its support,

**Welcoming** the additional assistance that the European Union is providing in the context of the forthcoming elections by temporarily reinforcing its European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa to support the coordination of relevant units of the police forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

**Taking note of** the request expressed in the letter dated 27 December 2005 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Presidency of the European Union,

**Taking note also of** the response to that letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria on behalf of the Council of the European Union, dated 28 March 2006,

**Welcoming** the intention of the European Union to deploy a force to support the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the electoral period in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as expressed in the above-mentioned letter dated 28 March 2006, which stated, inter alia, that this force would not substitute for the Mission or the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in their tasks, and which noted the assessment that the capabilities of the Mission in certain parts of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should enable it to address possible difficulties without support from the European Union,

**Considering** that the current mandate of the Mission will be subject to renewal by 30 September 2006, and expressing its intention to extend it for a further period beyond this date,

**Determining** that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

**Acting** under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


2. **Authorizes**, for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of EUFOR R.D. Congo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. **Notes** that EUFOR R.D. Congo will comprise advance elements concentrated in Kinshasa and other elements held outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo (an “over-the-horizon” force) with the appropriate capacity;

4. **Decides** that the authorization for the deployment mentioned in paragraph 2 above shall not exceed the term of the mandate of the Mission and will be subject, beyond 30 September 2006, to the extension of the mandate of the Mission;

5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to inform the Council of the decision to be taken by the Congolese authorities on the definitive timetable for the holding of the elections;

6. **Stresses** that EUFOR R.D. Congo is authorized immediately to take all appropriate steps, including the deployment of advance elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to prepare its full operational capability;

7. **Invites** the European Union to take all appropriate steps with a view to the well-coordinated disengagement of its force following the completion of its mandate;

8. **Decides** that EUFOR R.D. Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks, in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations:

   (a) To support the Mission to stabilize a situation, in case the Mission faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities;

   (b) To contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

   (c) To contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa;

   (d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR R.D. Congo;

   (e) To execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger;

9. **Notes** that decisions to engage EUFOR R.D. Congo on the tasks mentioned in paragraph 8 above will be taken by the European Union upon request by the Secretary-
General, or, in emergency cases, in close consultation with the Mission, to fulfil tasks mentioned in paragraphs 8 (b), (c), (d) and (e) above;
10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003) of 28 July 2003 and paragraph 1 of resolution 1596(2005) of 18 April 2005 shall not apply to supplies of arms and related materiel as well as technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by EFOR D.R. Congo;
11. Requests the European Union and the Secretary-General to ensure close cooperation during the preparation of the establishment of EFOR D.R. Congo and for the duration of its mandate, and until its full disengagement;
12. Urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the European Union to conclude a status-of-forces agreement before the deployment of advance elements of EFOR D.R. Congo as referred to in paragraph 6 above, and decides that, until such an agreement is concluded, the terms of the status-of-forces agreement for the Mission dated 4 May 2000 shall apply mutatis mutandis between the European Union and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in respect of EFOR D.R. Congo, including possible third-country contributors;
13. Requests all Member States, in particular those in the vicinity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to provide all necessary support to facilitate the swift deployment of EFOR D.R. Congo, and in particular to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of its personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for its exclusive and official use;
14. Authorizes the Mission, within the limit of its capacities, to provide all necessary logistical support to EFOR D.R. Congo, on a cost-reimbursement basis;
15. Requests the European Union to report regularly to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the Council on the implementation of the mandate of EFOR D.R. Congo;
16. Calls upon all Congolese parties to demonstrate their full commitment to a democratic process by ensuring that the upcoming presidential and legislative elections are free, fair, peaceful and transparent;
17. Calls upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to do its utmost to ensure that the presidential and parliamentary elections are held in accordance with the timetable of the Independent Electoral Commission;
18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Temporary ONUB redeployment

On 30 March [S/2006/206], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after consulting with the DRC, MONUC and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), he intended to temporarily redeploy to the DRC, one ONUB infantry battalion, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers until 31 December 2006. The battalion, which would operate in the central area of Katanga Province, would carry out the mandate entrusted to MONUC by the Council in resolution 1291(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 123] and subsequent resolutions on the DRC. The military observers would be deployed in teams to various areas of the DRC in the context of the increased military observer capacity required during the election period. Related costs would be covered from within the ONUB and MONUC budgets.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region, in particular resolution 1650(2005) of 21 December 2005,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,
Congratulating the people of Burundi for the successful conclusion of the transitional period and the peaceful transfer of authority to representative and democratically elected government and institutions,
Taking note of the letter dated 30 March 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Recalling that the current mandates of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will expire on 1 July 2006 and 30 September 2006, respectively,
Noting that, although there has been an improvement in the security situation since the completion of the transitional period, factors of instability remain in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to redeploy temporarily a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers from the United Nations Operation in Burundi to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, until 1 July 2006, in accordance with resolution 1650(2005), and with the intention to renew such authorization according to future decisions by the Security Council concerning the renewal of the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
2. Decides also to remain actively seized of the matter.

Role of foreign combatants

On 1 May [S/2006/274], the DRC transmitted to the Security Council a 27 April communiqué from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on a skirmish that took place that day between elements of the Second Commando Battalion of the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) and suspected elements of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). MONUC had dispatched military observers to the site and opened an inquiry, the DRC said, adding that, according to the MONUC spokesperson, “Following verification, MONUC believes that reports that Ugandan troops had entered the DRC appear credible”.

The confrontation took place near Adau, 17 kilometres south-west of Aba, in the Haut-Uélé, in Orientale Province. For some time there had been reports of a concentration of Ugandan Army forces along the common frontier to augment surveillance on the movements of LRA groups in the Garamba National Park.

The DRC stated that LRA elements were just as much of a threat to the DRC as to Uganda. FARDC and MONUC were working to track those armed gangs. The DRC would not allow foreign troops to cross its borders for any reason whatsoever, while it deplored the loss of human life, it could not tolerate the violation of its borders. A protest note had been delivered to the Ugandan Embassy in Kinshasa.

Report on foreign combatants (May). The Secretary-General, in a May report [S/2006/310], submitted pursuant to resolution 1649(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 187], presented to the Council a comprehensive and integrated strategy for disarmament, repatriating and resettling foreign combatants operating in the DRC. In 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 105], MONUC estimated the likely maximum number of foreign combatants in the DRC at approximately 17,500. Following UN-led repatriation operations, more than 13,000 combatants and their dependants were repatriated to their countries of origin—Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The current number of foreign combatants was estimated at between 8,000 and 9,000, with about 5,000 in North Kivu and 3,000 to 3,500 in South Kivu. Of those, most belonged to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), with perhaps as few as 600 to the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) and a small handful to the Burundian Forces nationales de libération (FLN). In the absence of political or ceasefire agreements with the foreign armed groups, nearly all the combatants and their dependants who had left the DRC were repatriated by MONUC.

As part of its strategy towards foreign armed groups, MONUC continued to conduct joint operations with FARDC against them, and strengthened the capacity of FARDC and the police to provide security. It had also put in place political, military, socio-economic and justice-related incentives. MONUC believed that the way to resolve the foreign armed group problem was to support and sustain a long-term coordinated and comprehensive effort by the DRC to extend State authority to the entire territory of the country as early as possible and enforce law and order, as well as establish good relations with its neighbours. The Secretary-General strongly encouraged closer cooperation between Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and MONUC to resolve the problem, in particular the FDLR issue. To do so, FDLR hard-line political and military leaders, including rank-and-file elements, would have to be isolated. Other elements of the proposed strategy included strengthening the exchange of information on FDLR, and targeting their supply/resource lines through local and international mechanisms; establishing and publishing a list of FDLR members accused of serious crimes; broadening Security Council sanctions; and strengthening border control and immigration mechanisms. The robust but voluntary MONUC approach to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration was dictated in part by its desire to minimize further bloodshed in the DRC, where an estimated 4 million people had died because of the armed conflict. Following recent consultations, it had become generally accepted that implementation of a comprehensive and integrated strategy for addressing the issue depended primarily on the Governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi taking full responsibility, with the assistance of the international community. The Secretary-General urged Member States to encourage their mining and trading companies to abide by transparent business practices, and to take action to prevent arms embargo violations and the illegal exploitation of DRC natural resources.

Report of Secretary-General (June). In his June [S/2006/390] report on MONUC, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1635(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 186], the Secretary-General said that tensions with Uganda increased following the incursion of LRA elements into the DRC. On 25 April, MONUC reported an incursion into the country by elements of the Ugandan People’s Defence Force.
Meanwhile, the security situation in Ituri remained generally stable, despite continued militia activity. Between March and May, joint FARDC and MONUC operations were conducted to contain militias and force them to disarm. MONUC, in consultation with the transitional Government, developed an overall political-military strategy to address the activities of militias remaining in Ituri. With UNDP, it developed an action plan to facilitate the extension of State authority there and alleviate the immediate economic and social needs of the population. In North Kivu, MONUC launched operations that successfully cleared Rwindi and Kibrizi of rebel elements. It also engaged local communities in conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts. In South Kivu, a joint FARDC-MONUC operation in late February against FDLR elements in Bunyakiri territory caused the splintering of their hierarchy. Some 1,000 Rwandan combatants migrated from South Kivu to North Kivu, reducing the number of FDLR forces in South Kivu to some 2,500. In Katanga, following MONUC sensitization efforts in March, and agreement with the FARDC regional command, elements from the main Mayi-Mayi group led by Kyungu Mutanga, known as Gédéon, surrendered to MONUC in April and began disarming in May. Gédéon himself surrendered on 12 May.

Serious human rights violations by FARDC against civilians continued to be reported, particularly following military operations in Ituri and Katanga. While steps were taken to fight impunity, including the sentencing by a military court in Équateur of seven FARDC officers to life imprisonment for committing mass rapes, concerns persisted as to the capacity of the military and judiciary authorities, in view of interference from politicians and military officers, to address impunity and hold trials for serious human rights violations. While the authorities cooperated with the International Criminal Court in arresting former Ituri militia leader, Thomas Lubanga, and transferring him to the Court’s headquarters in The Hague, several dangerous Ituri militia leaders were released. Efforts of military judicial authorities to investigate alleged crimes remain blocked by the lack of resources and political will. Progress on human rights promotion and protection was mixed. While the amnesty law was promulgated in January, only 58 convicted prisoners had been granted amnesty for war crimes. No political prisoner had been released.

**Security Council mission to DRC**

On 30 May [S/2006/344], the Security Council President informed the Secretary-General that the Council had decided to send a mission to the DRC from 10 to 12 June, headed by Jean-Marc de La Sablière (France).

The mission’s report [S/2006/434] summarized its findings in relation to the political and electoral process, security issues and governance and made a number of recommendations. Regarding the elections, the mission encouraged the Congolese authorities and stakeholders to ensure that the announced date of 30 July was respected. Any dialogue among the parties aimed at defusing the tense political atmosphere should not lead to further delays in implementing the electoral calendar. Political parties should carry out the electoral campaign in an atmosphere of calm and tolerance, focusing on programmes addressing the interest of the population and avoiding hate language, incitement to ethnic hatred and exclusion. The transitional authorities should ensure equitable access for all parties and candidates to the media, which should remain impartial. The security services should guarantee the independence of journalists and the security of the electorate and candidates, curbing acts of intimidation and violence.

Regarding security sector reform, the mission recommended that efforts aimed at reforming and restructuring the army, including the integration of coherent units and the administrative reform of the military command structure, should be pursued urgently. More systematic efforts were needed to put an end to impunity within the military and police by bringing to justice alleged human rights violators and relieving high-ranking officers showing leadership deficiencies of their duties. The international community should increase its support for security sector reform.

Regarding governance, the mission recommended that the authorities should strive to meet International Monetary Fund and World Bank requirements for resuming assistance to them. The continuing functioning of the State and its institutions, including transparent and responsible economic management, in the period between the holding of the first polls and the establishment of the elected Government, was critical. The Government should address the prevalence of sexual violence, including by ending impunity within the armed forces.

**Security Council consideration.** The Security Council considered the mission’s report on 16 June [meeting 5466] and 6 July [meeting 5482]. The head of the mission, Ambassadour de La Sablière, in his briefing to the Council on 16 June, said that the mission, the seventh to the DRC, which took place just prior to the 30 June elections, had shown the
Council’s resolve to give the Congolese people its fullest support for truly successful elections. Their success would affect the stability of the whole region and possibly the continent, owing to that country’s location, size, population and natural resources.

Although violence persisted in the east, in Ituri, with armed groups in Kivu still not fully controlled, it was not likely to significantly disrupt the elections. The police training programmes for the elections, involving some 50,000 police officers, had been well run, making it possible to keep the army’s role to a minimum and only in some unstable areas. Moreover, the EU standby reserve force was ready to intervene in support of MONUC. The Congolese people, who had registered to vote in a great national movement, had considerable expectations, and it was important for them to see a lasting change. The mission stressed the need to ensure that the gains achieved be built upon by the legitimacy provided by the elections. Winners should be generous and losers should accept the choice of the voters. The main priorities were the swift establishment of an integrated and professional army, properly equipped and paid; the settlement of the vexing problem of armed groups in the east; and the improvement of the country’s administration.

During the 6 July briefing, Ambassador de La Sablière told the Council that the mission had come away with the understanding that conditions had been met to allow for the holding of the elections. Nevertheless, members of the mission were concerned about the deterioration of the political atmosphere, particularly regarding messages of division and exclusion being broadcast by the media. The elections were not an end in themselves and the mission underlined the importance of the period to follow.

The DRC said it agreed with all of the mission’s recommendations. Mission members undoubtedly understood that an unequivocal consensus was emerging in favour of concluding the peace process as soon as possible. The elections were the right path towards resolving the country’s eternal problem of government legitimacy. Messages of hate and exclusion should be expunged from the electoral campaign. The Congolese people had clearly expressed their wish to see an end to the transition through the selection of leaders of their choice. The security situation, particularly in the east of the country, remained disturbing, and the decision of the Council and the EU to substantially increase their presence was a welcome development. The DRC would do everything possible to ensure that the elections took place in a calm atmosphere.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,
Reaffirming its commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its support for the process of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed at Pretoria on 17 December 2002,
Underlining the importance of elections as the foundation for the longer-term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Taking note of the fact that the election of members of the National Assembly and the first round of the election of the President of the Republic are scheduled for 30 July 2006,
Paying tribute to the donor community for the assistance they provide to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular to the electoral process, and encouraging them to maintain it,
Recalling the importance of the security sector reform for the long-term stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the contribution brought by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform and other international partners in this field,
Reiterating its serious concern regarding the continuation of hostilities by militias and foreign armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and at the threat they pose to the holding of elections,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 2006 and the recommendations contained therein,
Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to extend until 30 September 2006 the increase in the military and civilian police strength of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorized by resolutions 1621(2005) and 1635(2005);
2. Underlines the temporary character of the increase referred to in paragraph 1 above, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps with a view to downsizing or repatriating this additional strength by 30
September 2006, as long as their presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would no longer be vital to the successful conduct of the electoral process;

3. **Calls once again upon** the transitional institutions and all Congolese parties to ensure that free, fair and peaceful elections take place, that the timetable for polls developed by the Independent Electoral Commission is scrupulously respected and that security forces exercise restraint and remain impartial while providing security for the electoral process, and to respect the right of every candidate to conduct a campaign;

4. **Calls upon** all Congolese parties to refrain from incitement to hatred and violence;

5. **Recalls** that the Mission has the mandate, as set out in paragraph 7 of resolution 1565(2004), within its capacity and without prejudice to carrying out tasks stipulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 1565(2004), inter alia, to provide assistance to the transitional government and authorities in order to contribute to their efforts, including those carried out with the support of the European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform, with a view to taking forward the security sector reform;

6. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

**July elections and their aftermath**

**Report of Secretary-General (September).** In his September report on MONUC [S/2006/759], the Secretary-General said that the first democratic elections in more than 40 years in the DRC were held on 30 July. During the preceding weeks, political and civil society leaders raised concerns about the conduct and organization of the elections, especially the concern expressed on 30 June by the main political parties about an alleged lack of impartiality and transparency, particularly regarding the number of supplementary ballot papers and the publication of the voters list. To strengthen confidence in the electoral process, MONUC facilitated the establishment of an International Committee of Eminent Persons, chaired by former Mozambican President Joachim Chissano, which met for the first time on 28 July.

The electoral campaign, launched on 29 June, took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere. However, it was marked by clashes between supporters of candidates in Kinshasa, Kindu and Mbandaka, misconduct by national and local authorities, unequal access to the media by some candidates, politically biased coverage and intimidation of journalists. On 27 July, a confrontation at a political rally between the security guards of Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba and the police resulted in four people reportedly being killed and 17 injured.

The 30 July elections took place in a generally peaceful and orderly manner. Some 70.5 per cent of the more than 25 million registered voters partici-...
The Council notes that the electoral campaign and the voting process took place largely in a calm environment. It deplores the incidents which occurred in recent days, in particular in Kinshasa, Mbuji Mayi and Mweka. It endorses the opinion of the International Committee in Support of the Transition, which welcomed, in this context, the work of the National Police forces.

The Council urges all political actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to work to ensure that the electoral process proceeds in a free, transparent and peaceful manner, in accordance with the agreed timetable. The Council calls upon political leaders to refrain from making inflammatory speeches.

The Council underlines that those elections will mark the completion of a long period of rule by transitional institutions and the start of democratic rule. The people who will be destined to lead the country will bear the important responsibility to provide long-term foundations for the restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and the establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**Election results.** Provisional results of the elections were announced on 20 August, said the Secretary-General in his September report [S/2006/759]. President Kabila won 44.8 per cent of the votes, followed by Vice-President Bemba (20.3 per cent), Antoine Gizenga (13.6 per cent) and Nzanga Mobutu (4.8 per cent). As no candidate won an absolute majority, the two candidates with the highest vote percentage would contest a run-off presidential election.

President Kabila and his Alliance pour la majorité présidentielle (AMP) called for the holding of the run-off elections 15 days after the announcement of the first round, as provided for in article 71 of the Constitution, and for the separation of the second presidential round from that of the Provincial Assembly elections. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, William Lacy Swing, and the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) interpreted the wording of article 71 to mean that the Independent Electoral Commission would “proceed” to the second round within 15 days and first steps should be taken to organize the elections. On 21 August, at Mr. Swing’s request, CIAT met to discuss the high level of tension between the supporters of the President and the Vice-President, and the call for holding the run-off elections 15 days after the announcement of the results of the first. Shortly after the meeting began at the residence of the Vice-President, shots were heard around the house, making it impossible for CIAT members to leave. MONUC and EU troops and the MONUC Chief of Security immediately moved to the area. Mr. Swing contacted the President and his advisers, while the Force Commander established contact with the FARDC Chief of Staff. After discussions, two MONUC companies and one EUFOR R.D. Congo company extracted CIAT members and stabilized the situation. EUFOR R.D. Congo took action within its mandate and deployed along a key section of the main boulevard in central Kinshasa.

MONUC and EUFOR R.D. troops in the vicinity reported that a company of the President’s Republican Guard was assembled at a strategic junction, apparently ready to advance towards the Vice-President’s residence. Meanwhile, small groups of the Republican Guard were seen in the area exchanging fire with a group of some 200 of the Vice-President’s guards, who were positioned among the houses around his residence. During the fighting, the Vice-President’s personal helicopter was destroyed. Mr. Swing sought to end hostilities and restore calm, including by arranging a telephone conversation between the President and the Vice-President. The Secretary-General warned both parties that the fighting was jeopardizing the achievements of the transitional process. Calm was restored by early evening, and MONUC and EUFOR units deployed at key road junctions.

Following interventions by Mr. Swing and other members of the international community, MONUC facilitated the establishment of a working group, comprising the Ministers of Defence and the Interior, the FARDC Chief of Staff, the police Inspector General, representatives of the Vice-President’s guards, the commander of the Republican Guard, as well as the EUFOR and MONUC Force Commanders, to establish confidence-building measures, encourage dialogue and resolve security disputes. The President and Vice-President also agreed to establish a joint commission, facilitated by MONUC, to conduct an impartial inquiry into the events of 20 to 22 August and to foster agreement on rules of conduct for the upcoming run-off and provincial elections. They also agreed, in principle, to a weapon-free zone in Kinshasa. On 13 September, the President and Vice-President met to discuss the violence. On 26 August, representatives of several media outlets had signed an agreement committing themselves to respecting journalistic ethics during the electoral period.

The Supreme Court reviewed the provisional results, examined the electoral complaints, and on 14 September, confirmed that the President and Vice-President would contest a second round of presidential elections.

On 7 September, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the provisional results for the National Assembly elections, which indicated that AMP, the platform of parties supporting President Kabila, had won 224 of the 500 seats, followed by the Regroupement des nationalistes congolais...
(RENACO), the parties supporting Vice-President Bemba, 116 seats, and the Coalition des démocrates congolais (CODECO) supporting Pierre Pay-Pay, 25 seats. Individually, Vice-President Ruberwa’s Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) won 15 seats, President Kabila’s own party, PPRD, won 111 seats, and Vice-President Bemba’s party, Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC), 64 seats.

In rulings issued on 13 and 15 September, the Supreme Court of Justice reaffirmed the requirement under article 71 of the Constitution that the run-off elections be held within 15 days but acknowledged that that was not possible. It therefore granted an extension of up to 50 days after the announcement of the final results of the first round.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 22 September [meeting 5533], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/40 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council pays tribute once again to the extraordinary commitment of the citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrated by their peaceful participation in the first stage of democratic elections of historic importance to their nation.

The Council commends the substantial efforts being made by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the international community as a whole in support of peace and democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It stresses its commitment to the peaceful conduct of the second round of the presidential election and of the provincial elections scheduled for 29 October 2006, and its determination to ensure that the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo succeeds, in the interests of the Congolese people, as well as central Africa and the Great Lakes region.

The Council deplores the violence that erupted in Kinshasa from 20 to 22 August 2006 between security forces loyal to President Kabila and Vice-President Bemba, and commends the effective action of the European Union force, EUFOR R.D. Congo, in support of the Mission.

The Council shares the serious concern expressed by the International Committee in Support of the Transition, in its statement of 11 September 2006, regarding the unchecked circulation of weapons and armed individuals in Kinshasa. It endorses the call by the International Committee for a cantonnement of the security forces of both candidates and of troops of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the province of Kinshasa, and for a ban on the circulation of armed individuals in this province.

The Council calls upon all political parties and in particular President Kabila and Vice-President Bemba to restate their commitment to the peace process and to work within the framework they have agreed to establish with the facilitation of the Mission as a means of peacefully resolving political differences. It welcomes the meeting that took place between President Kabila and Vice-President Bemba as a first step in this direction and encourages them to continue to seek a peaceful resolution of their differences.

The Council reiterates its support to the Independent Electoral Commission and to the High Media Authority. It urges all candidates and all parties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to banish any message that could incite hatred and violence and to comply with the codes of conduct that those institutions have respectively elaborated for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections in a peaceful climate. It commends the role of the International Committee of Eminent Persons and reiterates its support for it. It emphasizes again the importance of respecting the electoral calendar.

The Council invites the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004) to examine the situation in Kinshasa, if appropriate, in the context of the arms embargo imposed by resolutions 1493(2003) and 1596(2005) and renewed by resolution 1698(2006). It also expresses its readiness to consider possible measures against individuals and entities who would further threaten the conduct of free and fair elections, in particular the use of hate media, preventing equal and responsible access to media, inciting violence and recourse to violence to prevent elections, disrupt their outcome or subvert the peace process.

The Council emphasizes the need for all political parties to act responsibly within the framework of democratic institutions after the elections.

The Council underscores to the Congolese parties the importance of preventing impunity for those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that constitute crimes.

**Further developments.** On the security front, said the Secretary-General in his September report, there were positive developments in the Ituri District, where armed groups continued to operate. MONUC and FARDC continued joint operations to protect civilians and compel militia groups to disarm. A joint MONUC-FARDC operation in Djugu territory was launched on 20 May to dislodge and capture elements of the Front des nationalistes et intégrationistes (FNI), led by Peter Karim. On 28 May, a MONUC unit was attacked by FNI during a cordon and search operation. One MONUC soldier was killed, three injured and seven captured and held by FNI. Two of the soldiers were safely released to MONUC on 27 June and the remaining five on 28 July. On 5 June, the Government reopened the disarmament and demobilization process in Ituri and, as at 8 September, 4,758 militia elements had surrendered, with 2,332 weapons.

In North Kivu, where the situation remained stable but fragile, standoffs and tension between the integrated brigades and the militias continued to be problematic. In South Kivu, MONUC patrols enhanced security for the population and deterred the militias. Katanga remained relatively calm, with the exception of the northern and central area, where Mayi-Mayi groups remained reluctant to demobilize. Although the Mayi-Mayi leader Gédéon had surrendered (see p. 132), splinter factions continued to commit atrocities. MONUC deployed an additional
battalion of four companies, a level 2 hospital and an aviation unit in Kamina.

The security situation in Kinshasa was tense following the August clashes between the guards of the Vice-President and the Republican Guard. The situation required the redeployment of Western Brigade troops to the capital, reinforced by a special forces company stationed in Lumumbashi. Eufor, on 29 July, reached its full operational capacity, with 1,100 troops stationed in the DRC and 1,307 troops stationed in Gabon, capable of responding to a Monuc request for assistance.

The Secretary-General recommended extending Monuc mandate for four and a half months, from 1 October 2006 to 15 February 2007, to allow time for consultations with the new Government on the Mission's future role. He also recommended that the Security Council extend until 15 February 2007, the authorization to redeploy troops from onub to Monuc and the increase in the military and civilian police strength.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,


Paying tribute again to the citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who, on 30 July 2006, demonstrated their extraordinary commitment to the democratic process by taking part in great numbers, freely and peacefully, in the first stage of democratic elections of historic importance to their nation,

Reaffirming its commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region, and its support for the process of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed at Pretoria on 17 December 2002,

Underlining the importance of elections as the foundation for longer-term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Commending the role in support of the electoral process played by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Development Programme and other international partners of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that provided support to the electoral process, in particular its African partners, especially South Africa, as well as the European Union and the force it has temporarily deployed during this period ("Eufor R.D. Congo"),

Taking note of the fact that the second round of the presidential elections, as well as the provincial elections, are scheduled for 29 October 2006,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring security during the period encompassing the elections,

Paying tribute to the donor community for the assistance it provides to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular to the electoral process, and encouraging it to maintain that assistance,

Deploring again the violence that erupted in Kinshasa from 20 to 22 August 2006 between security forces loyal to the two remaining presidential candidates,

Condemning the continuation of hostilities by militias and foreign armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the threat it poses to the holding of elections,

Deploring the persistence of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular those carried out by these militias and foreign armed groups and by elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stressing the urgent need for those responsible for these crimes to be brought to justice,

Condemning the continuing illicit flow of weapons within and into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and declaring its determination to continue close monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493(2003) of 28 July 2003 and expanded by resolution 1596(2005), and to enforce the measures provided for in paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596(2005) against persons and entities acting in violation of this embargo,

Bearing in mind that the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Burundi will expire on 31 December 2006,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 September 2006, and of the recommendations contained therein,

Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


2. Decides also to extend until 15 February 2007 the increase in the military and civilian police strength of
the Mission authorized by resolutions 1621(2005) and 1635(2005);

3. Decides further to extend until 31 December 2006 the authorization contained in resolutions 1669(2006) and 1692(2006) for the Secretary-General to redeploy temporarily a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital and 50 military observers from the United Nations Operation in Burundi to the Mission;

4. Takes note of the recommendation of the Secretary-General to temporarily maintain until 15 February 2007 the capabilities referred to in paragraph 3 above, and expresses its intention to re-examine this issue before 31 December 2006 with a view to ensuring that the Mission has adequate capabilities to perform its mandate fully until the date referred to in paragraph 1 above;

5. Underlines the temporary character of the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps with a view to downsizing or repatriating this additional strength by 15 February 2007, as long as their presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would no longer be vital to the successful completion of the electoral process;

6. Calls once again upon the transitional institutions and all Congolese parties to ensure that free, fair and peaceful elections take place and that the next steps of the timetable for polls developed by the Independent Electoral Commission are scrupulously respected, and calls upon all candidates, in particular the two remaining presidential candidates, to restate their commitment to the democratic process;

7. Reiterates the importance of a cantonment of non-police security forces in the province of Kinshasa and its support for the International Committee in Support of the Transition in this regard, and takes note of the Commitment for a weapons-free city-province of Kinshasa signed on 23 September 2006;

8. Calls upon the transitional institutions and all Congolese parties to ensure that the security forces exercise restraint and remain impartial while providing security to the electoral process, and to respect the right of every candidate to conduct a campaign;

9. Calls upon all Congolese parties to refrain from incitement to hatred and violence and from any threat or use of force to prevent elections, dispute their outcome or subvert the peace process, and to resolve political differences by peaceful means, including through the framework established with the facilitation of the Mission, and within the framework of democratic institutions and the rule of law;

10. Welcomes the intention expressed by the Secretary-General to consult closely with the new Congolese authorities on an adjustment of the mandate and capacities of the Mission after the completion of the electoral process, requests the Secretary-General to submit recommendations to the Security Council in this regard by the end of January 2007, and expresses its commitment to continue to contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the post-transitional period;

Elections (October). In a later report [S/2007/156], the Secretary-General said that the second round of the presidential and Provincial Assembly elections took place on 29 October, in a generally peaceful environment. The Independent Electoral Commission improved its performance in the conduct of the polls, the vote count and the compilation of results. Voter turnout was lower than in the first presidential round, with 65 per cent of the electorate casting votes. National and international observer missions, including those of the AU, the EU, South Africa and the Carter Center, regarded the elections as technically sound, transparent and credible.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 7 November [meeting 5562], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/44 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council pays tribute to the sense of civic responsibility once again demonstrated by the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who participated peacefully and in large numbers in the provincial elections and the second round of the presidential election held on 29 October 2006.

The Council expresses its gratitude to the Independent Electoral Commission and the Congolese National Police, which played a central role in, respectively, organizing the elections and providing security for them. It underlines the role of the High Media Authority, the International Committee of Eminent Persons and the International Committee in Support of the Transition in promoting a smooth conduct of the electoral process and a calm political climate and reaffirms its support for them. It also welcomes the support provided for the holding of the elections by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, RUFORD R.D. Congo, and the country’s other international and regional partners, in particular South Africa and the European Union.

The Council takes note of the fact that voting generally took place in an orderly and safe atmosphere. It deplores the isolated incidents that occurred, notably in Bumba and Bikoro in Equateur province and in Fataki in Ituri district.

The Council recalls that the Independent Electoral Commission is responsible for announcing the election results. It calls upon all political actors and the Congolese people to await and receive these results calmly and responsibly, refraining from any incitement to hatred or recourse to violence and respecting democratic institutions and the rule of law.

The Council attaches great importance to the signing of a declaration of post-electoral intent by the representatives of the two candidates in the second round of the presidential election at Kinshasa on 29 October 2006. It emphasizes that political differences must be settled by peaceful means only and calls upon the parties to comply with all the confidence-building measures to which they agreed after the incidents of 20 to 22 August 2006.

The Council recalls that these elections are historic for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and looks forward to the installation of a democratically elected government.
It stresses that the new authorities and all Congolese political actors will be responsible for ensuring the long-term sustainability of the restoration of peace and stability and for continuing to promote national reconciliation and the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law in the country.

The Secretary-General reported on 15 November that the President of the Independent Electoral Commission announced the provisional results of the second round of presidential elections, declaring President Kabila the winner with 58.5 per cent of the vote. On 18 November, Vice-President Bemba appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging electoral irregularities. On 21 November, violent demonstrations outside the Supreme Court building caused a temporary suspension of the Court’s review of the provisional results. Order was quickly restored with MONUC assistance, and on 27 November, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaints of irregularities were unfounded and officially declared Joseph Kabila President-elect. On 28 November, Vice-President Bemba stated that, in the interest of maintaining peace, he had accepted the results and would lead a strong opposition.

Two broad alliances emerged in the 500-seat National Assembly: AMP, the Parti lumumbiste unifié and the Union des démocrates mobutistes, having more than 300 seats, formed a bloc supporting President Kabila, while parties supporting Mr. Bemba’s presidential bid, including the Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) and a number of former presidential candidates, formed a political opposition, Unione pour la nation (UPN), with some 116 seats. Vital Kamerhe was elected Assembly President.

With the installation of the National Assembly and the inauguration of President Kabila on 6 December, the transition process envisaged by the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement [YUN 2002, p. 125] was brought to a formal conclusion. President Kabila, in his inaugural speech on 6 December, outlined an agenda of reform to end the cycle of crises and improve living conditions. On 30 December, the President appointed Antoine Gizenga as Prime Minister.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 6 December [meeting 5580], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/50 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council welcomes the announcement by the Supreme Court of Justice on 27 November 2006 of the formal results of the second round of the presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Council congratulates President Joseph Kabila on his election and once again commends the Congolese people, whose determination and sense of civic responsibility enabled the first democratic elections to be held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in more than 40 years.

The Council welcomes the commitment by Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, in his statement of 28 November 2006, to continue to participate actively in Congolese politics within the framework of the institutions of the Republic.

The Council looks forward to the completion of the electoral process, and reiterates the need for all political parties to act responsibly after the elections within the framework of democratic institutions and the rule of law. The Council attaches great importance to the fact that the democratically elected government should work side by side with all Congolese people and political actors to address the many reconstruction and security challenges facing the country and ensure long-term peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Council expresses its sincere appreciation for the central role played by the Independent Electoral Commission and the Congolese National Police in, respectively, organizing the elections and providing security during the electoral process. It commends the invaluable support provided for the holding of the elections by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the European Union operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, EUFOR R.D. Congo, and all the regional and international partners, in particular the African Union, South Africa and the European Union. The Council also recalls the vital roles that the International Committee of Eminent Persons and the International Committee in Support of the Transition have been playing throughout the electoral process.

The Council pays tribute to the donor community for the assistance it has provided to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular to the electoral process, and encourages the international community as a whole to continue to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the process of peace consolidation, reconstruction and recovery.

The Council expresses its serious concern at the recent hostilities launched by non-integrated army units in Sake, in North Kivu province, and at the impact that these actions have had on the civilian population, including women, children and the elderly. It calls upon these units to cease their hostilities, return without delay to their initial positions and submit themselves to the army integration or demobilization process.

The Council encourages the Mission, in accordance with its mandate, to continue to address with determination such security challenges, and supports the steps it has taken recently in this regard, particularly in Ituri district and North Kivu province.

**Temporary increase of MONUC strength.** On 15 November [S/2006/892], the Secretary-General requested the Security Council to consider a temporary increase in MONUC authorized military strength to accommodate the 916 ONUB troops the Council had authorized on 10 April (see p. 130).

The Secretary-General, in support of his request, recalled that the Council, by resolution 1711(2006) (see p. 137), had taken note of his recommendation to temporarily maintain ONUB forces in the DRC
until 15 February 2007, and the Council’s intention to re-examine the issue by 31 December.

The redeployed forces, stationed in northern and central Katanga since July, had helped to stabilize the situation and build an atmosphere of security, where uncontrolled Mayi-Mayi groups, which had resisted demobilization, had been preying on the population. The brigade utilized mobile operating base operations, compelling the Mayi-Mayi groups to disarm and engage in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Some 787 of an estimated 3,500 armed Mayi-Mayi elements in the area had disarmed, and some 132,703 internally displaced persons, out of an estimated 239,520, had returned to their communities.

However, northern and central Katanga continued to face serious security challenges. As a result of the financial crisis faced by the Government’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration structures, the programme for the Mayi-Mayi in Katanga was brought to a virtual standstill. Unpaid brigades of the armed forces continued to harass the population. The Secretary-General warned that, should the 916 troops be withdrawn on 31 December, the security situation could worsen, with a negative impact on stability and reductions in the return of internally displaced persons in the province.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions and the statements by its President concerning the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and the Great Lakes region,
 Paying tribute again to the citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the remarkable commitment they have demonstrated to the democratic process,
 Taking note of the letter dated 15 November 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, and of the recommendation it contains,
 Noting that the 50 military observers deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the authorized military strength of the United Nations Operation in Burundi pursuant to resolutions 1669(2006) of 10 April 2006 and 1692(2006) of 30 June 2006 have successfully performed observation tasks related to the electoral process and will be repatriated by 31 December 2006,
 Condemning the continuation of hostilities by militias and foreign armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the threat it poses to the security of civilians and to the stability of the region,
 Deploring the persistence of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular those carried out by these militias and foreign armed groups and by elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and stressing the urgent need for those responsible for these crimes to be brought to justice,
 Bearing in mind that the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will expire on 31 December 2006 and 15 February 2007 respectively,
 Looking forward to the proposals of the Secretary-General, after close consultations with the new Congolese authorities, regarding the future mandate of the Mission, including a review of its military strength,
 Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Authorizes, from 1 January 2007 until the expiry of the current mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 15 February 2007, an increase in the military strength of the Mission of up to 916 military personnel, to allow for the continued deployment to the Mission of the infantry battalion and the military hospital currently authorized under the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Burundi, and expresses its intention to examine this issue further before 15 February, in the context of the forthcoming proposals of the Secretary-General, with a view to ensuring that the Mission has adequate capabilities to perform its mandate;
2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

General Assembly decision. On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that agenda item “Armed Aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.

Arms embargo

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 137] (Security Council Committee on the DRC) to review and monitor the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493(2003) [YUN 2003, p. 130] reported [S/2006/1048] on its activities from 1 January to 31 December 2006, during which it held 11 informal consultations. The Committee received replies from 19 States to the request contained in resolution 1596(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 192] that all States inform the Committee of measures they had taken to comply with the arms embargo.

Group of Experts

The Group of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533(2004) (Group of
Experts on the DRC) to gather and analyze information on the flow of arms and related materiel, as well as networks, in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003) submitted two reports during the year [S/2006/53 and S/2006/525] (see below).

On 7 March [S/2006/139], the Secretary-General, as requested by resolution 1654(2006) (see below), re-established the Group of Expert for a period expiring on 31 July 2006, and appointed five experts to constitute the Group. On 7 August [S/2006/624], as requested in resolution 1698(2006) (see p. 143) that he take measures to extend the Group’s mandate until 31 July 2007, the Secretary-General re-appointed four experts until 31 December 2006. On 28 August [S/2006/693], he appointed an additional arms expert to the Group for that period. On 15 December [S/2006/984], he re-appointed four experts until 31 July 2007.


The Group had requested, but not obtained, from the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, documents identifying the exact nature of arms shipments imported since the beginning of the embargo. Elements of the DRC military had illegally flown within the country five cargo planes with weapons and ammunition, in violation of the embargo. One country that had produced weapons collected in a demobilization exercise stated it was not able to trace the weapons because of the date of manufacture. At Lumumbashi, a designated DRC site for legally importing military supplies, records were not kept on any of the firearms imported. Deficiencies in record keeping and firearms identification by many of those involved made distinguishing between legally and illegally held firearms difficult.

On the financing of arms embargo violations, the Group revealed abuses in the industrial extraction of precious minerals by DRC companies, as well as continued avoidance of full disclosure and transparency of gold imports by Uganda and cassiterite imports by Rwanda. Armed groups employed sophisticated means to entrench themselves and exploit their regional dominance. Through the parastatal goldmining company, OKIMO, the armed group FNI, had set up a parallel quasi-governmental structure, featuring a “Presidency” supported by an administration modeled on a conventional civil service and whose largest income came from taxation of the mining sector. Many financial aspects of the embargo violations could be prevented if neighbouring States imposed more scrupulous controls over the mainly illegal imports of natural resources. Instead of cooperating with the Group, some States preferred to frustrate each inquiry with deceptive information. Responses by Uganda in respect to its gold trading industry, and by Rwanda in respect to cassiterite and tin ore transactions were erroneous and unreliable. Low technology exploitation of the Shinkolobwe uranium mining site continued unabated, despite the prohibition of such activities. When Labo Laboratories, a local assayer from Lubumbashi, was authorized to apply some export controls, a number of States in southern and eastern Africa discovered smuggled quantities of minerals with intolerably high levels of radioactivity, forcing them to request the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to secure and safely store those materials. Regarding the Ituri gold trade, there was evidence that sanctionable activities were being carried out by the Argor-Heraeus group and other companies, with all the parties involved in gold transactions, including entities and individuals based in Ituri, Uganda, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, acting against the embargo. An enhanced traceability system was therefore needed for all precious minerals, including through a certification of origin system that would support fair and profitable trading relationships among all countries of the region.

With respect to civil aviation, the Group reported many cases of non-compliance. Considerable quantities of firearms and ammunition entered the region by air, and the documents on board some aircraft did not always include an authorization to ship dangerous materials. To overcome those problems, while rebuilding the capacity of its air traffic control authority, the DRC should make MONUC responsible for air traffic services in the eastern part of the country.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Declaring its determination to closely monitor compliance with the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493(2003) of 28 July 2003 and expanded by resolution 1596(2005) of 18 April 2005, and to enforce the measures provided for in paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596(2005) against persons and entities acting in violation of this embargo,
Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1533(2004), to re-establish the Group of Experts referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 1533(2004) and paragraph 21 of resolution 1596(2005), within thirty days of the date of adoption of the present resolution and for a period expiring on 31 July 2006;

2. Requests the Group of Experts to continue fulfilling its mandate as defined in resolutions 1533(2004), 1596(2005) and 1649(2005), to update the Committee on its work by 10 April 2006, and to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, before 10 July 2006;

3. Reaffirms its demand that all parties and all States cooperate fully with the work of the Group of Experts, and that they ensure:
   (a) The safety of its members;
   (b) Unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites that the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Communication. On 10 April [S/2006/264], Uganda, in its response to the Group of Experts’ report, expressed concern about omissions and attempts to obscure vital issues. Pointing out that it had a deep interest in the success of the arms embargoes and the stabilization of the DRC, Uganda said it was dismayed by the report’s attempts to implicate it in embargo violations and the Group’s confrontational approach. In fact, Uganda had undertaken several measures to strengthen the embargo, including the creation of a joint Uganda-DRC-MONUC verification mechanism to carry out surprise inspections, and establishment of a regional intelligence fusion cell and a joint DRC-Uganda security liaison office monitoring the border.

Uganda had provided the Group with all available information regarding air traffic, provided responses on precious minerals, and shared information and statistics. No arms transfer had taken place from Uganda to the DRC, and to allege otherwise was to engage in falsehood. Uganda had been the lead advocate for establishing an embargo over the whole territory of the DRC, not just the eastern part, and was ready to strengthen the embargo and make it more effective. The embargo had not been as effective as originally hoped for, and the task at hand was to address its weaknesses, which the Group of Experts had glossed over.


The report reviewed illegal movements of firearms and contraband across borders; the reluctance by FDLR to join the disarmament and demobilization process; civil aviation, including identification of suspicious flights, and air transport of arms and ammunition; responses by States to the embargo measures; the financing of arms embargo violations, including diversions of natural resources and reported incidents of smuggling of radioactive materials; customs and migratory flows, including efforts by the Congolese authorities to re-establish its control; cooperation between Member States and the Group of Experts; and compliance with financial sanctions and travel bans. The Group stated that persistent problems with border porosity, continued lack of air space surveillance and poor monitoring of financial flows had created a permissive environment for embargo violations.

To counter the illegal movements of firearms, the Group recommended that all arms held or imported by the DRC, including those of the armed forces and those collected in disarmament programmes, be separately registered and marked on the basis of a dedicated system, which should be supported by the international community. FARDC should establish an accurate database of its military materiel and those responsible for maintaining it be held accountable for any loss or theft.

The Group listed air transport operators based in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rwanda and Serbia, which had flown arms and ammunition from Bulgaria to Rwanda, and from which it had been difficult to obtain information for verification purposes. Since most arms and ammunition were shipped by air into the Great Lakes countries, the Group recommended that States identify and keep up-to-date lists of airlines authorized to transport arms, approved arms brokers and companies suspected of arms smuggling; ensure that requests by airlines for authorization to fly over or land specified what was being transported; and enact laws to prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition.

To address the illegal exploitation of natural resources for funding embargo violations, the Group recommended that the DRC develop, with international assistance, a natural resources control system, and that the Security Council make, for a period of one year, all illegal exploration, exploitation and commerce of DRC resources a sanctionable act.

In the area of customs, extensive fraud and the porosity of the DRC eastern borders facilitated cross-border movements of weapons by networks that il-
legally exploited natural resources in collusion with militia groups and administrative and military authorities. Armed groups profited from export fraud, and many reports showed that the Mayi-Mayi militia drew substantial income from the illegal tapping of Katanga’s mineral resources to purchase arms. In the Ituri district, customs frauds perpetrated by rebel forces continued, with the complicity of the political, military and administrative authorities and national and foreign economic operators. Since the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) General Directorate for Immigration had stated that the central authority was not responsible for any of the immigration agents unlawfully serving on the eastern borders, the rebel leaders enjoyed complete freedom of movement between the DRC and Uganda. The Group recommended reinforcing border controls and strengthening the capacities of customs and immigration services.

Cooperation with the Group by most Great Lakes region States continued to improve, with the exception of Uganda. As the Group felt that Uganda had ignored the Council’s specific demands, it recommended that the Council consider imposing restrictive measures, should Uganda continue to withhold its cooperation.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Reaffirming its commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region,
Condemning the continuing illicit flow of weapons within and into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and declaring its determination to continue close monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493(2003) and expanded by resolution 1596(2005), and to enforce the measures provided for in paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596(2005) against persons and entities acting in violation of the embargo,
Reiterating its serious concern regarding the presence of armed groups and militias in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, which perpetuate a climate of insecurity in the whole region,
Recognizing the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation of and trafficking in arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa,
Encouraging the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue their efforts with a view to promoting good governance and transparent economic management, and welcoming in this regard the work of the Special Commission of the National Assembly charged with evaluating the validity of the economic and financial contracts concluded during the 1996-1997 and 1998 conflicts,
Taking note of the reports of the Group of Experts referred to in paragraph 10 of resolution 1533(2004) and paragraph 21 of resolution 1596(2005) (hereinafter the Group of Experts), transmitted on 26 January and 18 July 2006 by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1533(2004) (hereinafter the Committee),
Recalling its resolution 1612(2005) of 26 July 2005 and its previous resolutions on children and armed conflict, Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 2006 on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and of the recommendations contained therein, Taking note also of the report of the Security Council mission on the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which visited Kinshasa from 10 to 12 June 2006, and endorsing the recommendations contained therein, Noting that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirms the demands made in paragraphs 15, 18 and 19 of resolution 1493(2003), paragraph 5 of resolution 1596(2005) and paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1649(2005);
Decides, in the light of the failure by the parties to comply with the demands of the Security Council, to renew until 31 July 2007 the provisions of paragraphs 20 to 22 of resolution 1493(2003), as amended and expanded by paragraph 1 of resolution 1596(2005) and by paragraph 2 of resolution 1649(2005), and reaffirms paragraphs 2, 6, 10 and 13 to 16 of resolution 1596(2005), as well as paragraphs 3 to 5 of resolution 1649(2005) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1671(2006) of 25 April 2006; Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible with a view to extending the mandate of the Group of Experts for a period expiring on 31 July 2007, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1654(2006) and appointing new members as necessary in consultation with the Committee.
4. Requests the Group of Experts to continue fulfilling its mandate as defined in resolutions 1533(2004), 1596(2005) and 1649(2005), to update regularly the Committee on its work, and to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, by 20 December 2006, and again before 10 July 2007;

5. Recalls that, by its resolutions 1533(2004), 1596(2005), 1616(2005) and 1649(2005), the Council has mandated the Group of Experts:
   (a) To examine and analyse information gathered by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the context of its monitoring mandate;
   (b) To gather and analyse all relevant information in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in countries of the region and, as necessary, in other countries, in cooperation with the Governments of those countries, on flows of arms and related materiel, as well as networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003);
   (c) To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of interested States, in particular those of the region, to ensure that the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003) are effectively implemented;
   (d) To report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003) and on the implementation of the measures set forth in paragraphs 1, 6, 10, 13 and 15 of resolution 1596(2005), with recommendations in this regard, including information on the sources of financing, such as from natural resources, which are funding the illicit trade in arms;
   (e) To keep the Committee frequently updated on its activities;
   (f) To exchange with the Mission, as appropriate, information that might be of use in the fulfilment of its monitoring mandate as described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1533(2004);
   (g) To provide the Committee, in its reports, with a list, with supporting evidence, of those found to have violated the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003), and those found to have supported them in such activities, for possible future measures by the Council;
   (h) Within its capabilities and without prejudice to the execution of the other tasks in its mandate, to assist the Committee in the designation of the leaders referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 1649(2005);

6. Requests the Group of Experts, in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, including the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the neighbouring States, the World Bank, the Mission and private sector actors:
   — To include in its report to be submitted by 20 December 2006 further recommendations based on paragraphs 158 and 159 of its report transmitted on 18 July 2006, on feasible and effective measures that the Council might impose to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources financing armed groups and militias in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including through a certificate of origin regime;
   — To include in the above-mentioned report an assessment of the relative importance of the exploitation of natural resources to the armed groups as compared to other sources of income;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to enable the Group of Experts to perform the tasks set out in paragraph 6 above without prejudice to the execution of the other tasks in its mandate, by providing it with the necessary additional resources;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit before 15 February 2007, in close consultation with the Group of Experts, a report comprising an assessment of the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact on the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of implementation of the recommendations and possible measures referred to in paragraph 6 above;

9. Expresses its intention to consider, after it reviews the reports referred to in paragraphs 6 and 8 above, possible measures to stem the sources of financing of armed groups and militias, including the illegal exploitation of categories of natural resources, in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

10. Urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to strengthen its efforts, with the support of the international community, including specialized international organizations, with a view to effectively extending State authority throughout its territory, to establishing its control over the exploitation and export of natural resources, and to improving the transparency of export revenue from those natural resources;

11. Welcomes the recommendations of the Group of Experts aimed at improving the tracking of ore and precious metals within a regional framework, and encourages States in the Great Lakes region of Africa to agree on ways to act upon those recommendations;

12. Recalls the terms of paragraph 13 of resolution 1493(2003), and once again strongly condemns the continued use and recruitment of children in the hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

13. Decides that, for a period expiring on 31 July 2007, the provisions of paragraphs 13 to 16 of resolution 1596(2005) shall extend to the following individuals, operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and designated by the Committee:
   — Political and military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict in violation of applicable international law;
   — Individuals committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement;

14. Decides also that the tasks of the Committee set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1596(2005) shall extend to the provisions set out in paragraph 13 above;

15. Expresses its intention to modify or to remove the provisions set out above if it determines that the demands reaffirmed in paragraph 1 above have been satisfied;
16. **Recalls** that, by its resolution 1565(2004), the Council has mandated the Mission:
   - To monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003), including on the lakes, in cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Burundi and, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the Group of Experts, including by inspecting, as it deems it necessary and without notice, the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings in North Kivu, in South Kivu and in Ituri;
   - To seize or collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 20 of resolution 1493(2003), and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;
17. **Requests** the Working Group of the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, as well as the Group of Experts, within its capabilities and without prejudice to the execution of the other tasks in its mandate, to assist the Committee in the designation of the individuals referred to in paragraph 13 above, by making known to the Committee without delay any useful information;
18. **Reaffirms its demand**, expressed in paragraph 19 of resolution 1596(2005), that all parties and all States cooperate fully with the work of the Group of Experts, and that they ensure:
   - The safety of its members;
   - Unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites that the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;
19. **Demands** that all parties and all States ensure the cooperation with the Group of Experts of individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control, and calls upon all States in the region to implement fully their obligations under paragraph 18 above;
20. **Acknowledges** the assurances given by the Government of Uganda to the Committee on 23 May 2006 in relation to its commitment to fulfil its obligations under paragraph 19 of resolution 1596(2005), and calls upon the Government of Uganda to demonstrate this commitment fully;
21. **Expresses its intention** to consider extending the application of the individual measures provided for in paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596(2005) to individuals obstructing the action of the Mission or of the Group of Experts, and requests the Secretary-General to present to the Council his observations in this regard;
22. **Recalls** that, in accordance with paragraphs 2(c) and 4 of resolution 1596(2005), States have an obligation to notify in advance to the Committee supplies to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance and training, as well as authorized shipments of arms and related materiel to the Democratic Republic of the Congo consistent with such exemptions noted in paragraph 2(a) of resolution 1596(2005);
23. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Communications.** On 5 September [S/2006/722], Uganda, responding to the 18 July report of the Group of Experts, stated that it had provided the Group with air traffic records, had always provided prompt, accurate and substantive responses to the questions posed by the Group, and remained available to provide further information. Uganda also addressed specific points raised in the report.

As required by resolution 1596(2005), Argentina [S/AC.43/2006/3], Brazil [S/AC.43/2006/1] and Ukraine [S/AC.43/2006/2] informed the Security Council Committee on the DRC of measures they had taken to comply with the arms embargo.

**Children and armed conflict.** In June, as requested by resolution 1612(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 863], the Secretary-General submitted to the Council and its Working Group on children and armed conflict a report [S/2006/389] on children and armed conflict in the DRC, which provided information on progress in ending the recruitment and use of children and other grave violations being committed against war-affected children in the DRC. The report contained recommendations for securing strengthened action for the protection of affected children in the DRC. (For more information see p. 895.)

**MONUC**

The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), established by Security Council resolution 1279(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 92], continued to discharge its mandate, as enhanced by Council resolution 1565(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 129], to provide operational and security support to guarantee the advancement of the transitional processes in the DRC. MONUC, headquartered in the DRC capital, Kinshasa, was headed by William Lacy Swing (United States), the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

On 30 March [S/2006/206], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after consulting with the DRC, MONUC and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), he intended to temporarily redeploy one ONUB infantry battalion, a military hospital and up to 50 military observers to MONUC until 31 December 2006. The battalion, which would operate in the central area of the DRC Katanga Province, would carry out the mandate entrusted to MONUC by the Council in resolution 1291(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 123] and subsequent resolutions on the DRC. The military observers would be
deployed in teams to various areas of the country in the context of the increased military observer capacity required during the election period. Related costs would be covered within the ONUB and MONUC budgets.

Sexual exploitation and abuse
Following allegations of sexual exploitation and misconduct by MONUC personnel [YUN 2005, p. 165], the Mission put in place a strategy for reporting and tracking allegations; enhancing sensitization and training; and identifying responsibility and accountability of the chain of command. Thousands of UN personnel were briefed and trained on the code of conduct for UN personnel [ibid. p. 119] through numerous briefing sessions, including train-the-trainer workshops for military personnel. During 2006, 176 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported to the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Investigations were completed against 49 personnel, as a result of which, three military contingent members were repatriated on disciplinary grounds. The remaining allegations were still under investigation. The head of Mission reaffirmed the accountability of all managers and their responsibility to ensure adherence to the code of conduct by all personnel, which were reiterated on numerous occasions in writing to all heads of regional offices and during briefing sessions for military and civilian senior staff.

Financing
In February [A/60/669], the Secretary-General submitted the performance report on the MONUC budget for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, amounting to $937,242,800, with expenditures amounting to $866,001,800, the proposed MONUC budget for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, amounting to $1,100,299,500 [A/60/840], and the related ACABQ report [A/60/888].

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION
On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee [A/60/574/Add.1], adopted resolution 60/121 B without vote [agenda item 140].

Financing of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The General Assembly,
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 1258(1999) of 6 August 1999 and 1279(1999) of 30 November 1999 regarding, respectively, the deployment to the region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of military liaison personnel and the establishment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission, the latest of which was resolution 1635(2005) of 28 October 2005, by which the Council extended the mandate of the mission until 30 September 2006,
Recalling also its resolution 54/260 A of 7 April 2000 on the financing of the Mission, and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 60/121 A of 8 December 2005,
Recalling further its resolution 58/315 of 1 July 2004,
Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,
Noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,
Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;
2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 172.1 million United States dollars, representing some 5 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only fifty–seven Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;
3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;
4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;
5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;
6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory
treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. **Also emphasizes** that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. **Reiterates its request** to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. **Welcomes** the establishment and development of the logistics base for the Mission at Entebbe, Uganda, as a regional hub for common use by missions in the region to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of logistical support operations, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly in the context of his overview report, to be submitted during the second part of its resumed sixty-first session, on economies and efficiencies realized through its utilization and on the increased effectiveness of regional support for peacekeeping operations;

10. **Notes with concern** the late submission to the General Assembly of the reports related to the financing of the Mission;

11. **Endorses** the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

12. **Requests** the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of its resolutions 59/296 and 60/266;

13. **Emphasizes** the importance of ensuring coordination and collaboration of efforts with the United Nations agencies and programmes, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on measures taken, including on the progress made in the development of an integrated work plan and the coordination network referred to in paragraph 54 of the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;

14. **Requests** the Secretary-General to ensure that the recommendations in the consultants' report on the comprehensive review of staffing and structure of the Mission are fully analysed by the Mission and that the results of the analysis are reflected in the budget for the Mission for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008;

15. **Looks forward** to the consideration of the comprehensive report requested in section VIII, paragraph 3, of its resolution 60/266;

16. **Requests** the Secretary-General to ensure that quick-impact projects are implemented in compliance with the original intent of such projects and relevant General Assembly resolutions;

17. **Decides** to approve the resources requested for quick-impact projects in the proposed budget for the Mission for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, in the interim;

18. **Requests** the Secretary-General to ensure full implementation of the quick-impact projects in the financial period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007;

19. **Also requests** the Secretary-General to review the administrative support structure of quick-impact projects with a view to minimizing overhead costs for their implementation;

20. **Further requests** the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

21. **Requests** the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;

**Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005**

22. **Takes note** of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

**Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007**

23. **Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo the amount of 1,138,533,000 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 1,091,242,800 dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, 39,060,000 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 8,230,200 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base;**

**Financing of the appropriation**

24. **Decides also** to apportion among Member States the amount of 284,633,250 dollars for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

25. **Decides further** that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of the amount of 5,944,125 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 4,690,000 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 1,098,375 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 155,750 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

26. **Decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 853,899,750 dollars for the period from 1 October 2006 to 30 June 2007 at a monthly rate of 94,877,750 dollars, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission;
27. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 26 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of the amount of 17,832,375 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 14,070,000 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 3,295,125 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 467,250 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

28. Decides further that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 68,769,500 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

29. Decides that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 68,769,500 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 28 above;

30. Decides also that the decrease of 2,640,600 dollars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 68,769,500 dollars referred to in paragraphs 28 and 29 above;

31. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

32. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Mission, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

33. Invites voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

34. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.

On 22 December [A/61/672], the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly a performance report on the MONUC budget for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, which showed expenditures amounting to $1,055,040,300 ($1,038,004,800 net).

Also on 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that the agenda item “Financing of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.

**Burundi**

Significant Progress was made in restoring Burundi to peace and stability in 2006. The Government and the last major rebel group outside the country’s peace process, the Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL), signed, on 18 June, the Agreement on Principles towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi, and on 7 September, the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, intended to put an end to all hostilities.

The withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), requested by Burundi in 2005, in the light of significant improvements in the security situation, continued through 2006. On 30 June, the Security Council extended ONUB mandate for the last time until 31 December. Meanwhile, Burundi requested the United Nations to establish an integrated office to assist in reform, reconstruction and development. On 25 October, emphasizing the need for the UN system and the international community to maintain their support for the country, the Security Council set up the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi.

**Political developments and ONUB activities**

**Report of Secretary-General (March).** In his March report on ONUB [S/2006/163] updating developments in Burundi since his November 2005 report [YUN 2005, p. 211], the Secretary-General stated that the Government had taken further steps to consolidate its authority. All key executive appointments were made and key legislation was adopted. Disarmament and demobilization proceeded broadly on schedule, and progress was made in disbanding militias. Although the Government addressed the country’s daunting socio-economic problems, significant challenges remained, making the situation fragile. No progress was made in reaching a negotiated solution with the Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL), and an intensification of the confrontation with that group led to a further deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situations. Advances towards the much-needed security sector reform and reintegration of former combatants were slow. The provision of public services continued to be impeded by a weak public administration and budgetary constraints. Food
shortages and the movement of refugees worsened, with over 6,000 Burundian refugees seeking shelter in the United Republic of Tanzania.

At the institutional level, over 60 presidential decrees were issued appointing senior Government officials and constitutionally mandated ethnic and gender quotas were generally respected. To expedite the processing of key legislation, President Pierre Nkurunziza convened an extraordinary parliamentary session in January, during which bills on the status of National Defence Force and Burundi National Police personnel, the intelligence services, and anti-corruption were adopted.

At a donors conference held in the capital Bujumbura on 28 February, the Government presented its emergency programme for 2006, which focused on the needs of the drought-affected population, education and health services, return and settlement of refugees and displaced persons, governance, rule of law and budget support. Donors pledged $170 million during the conference, $50 million of which was committed by the EU. The Burundi Partners’ Forum, meeting on 2 and 10 February, agreed that it would be transformed into a flexible framework for the exchange of views among international partners on issues related to peacebuilding, development and the consolidation of peace.

The security situation improved in most provinces, except the three affected by military confrontation with FNL. Criminality rose throughout the country, causing the midnight curfews to remain in force and movement on major routes restricted. Cross-border illicit activities reportedly committed by FNL, the Forces démocratique de libération du Rwanda and other groups included looting and arms smuggling. However, increased coordination between Burundi and DRC armed forces led to the handover of several FNL combatants to Burundi, and one Forces démocratique de libération du Rwanda element to the DRC. FNL remained militarily active and outside the peace process, and despite efforts by the United Republic of Tanzania to facilitate negotiations, no progress was achieved in that regard.

In the meantime, the Government intensified its military campaign against FNL, which continued its military attacks and acts of violence. The volatile situation along the borders with the DRC remained a threat to stability, with reports of continued collaboration between FNL and Congolese and foreign armed groups and the illicit cross-border movement of arms and combatants.

The disarmament and demobilization of former combatants proceeded with support from international partners and ONUB. As at 22 February, 16,724 adult combatants, including 482 women, and 3,015 child-soldiers had been demobilized. With the demobilization of 7,332 members of the National Defence Force, the Government achieved the target of a 30,000-member force, thus securing the disbursement of funds pledged by the European Commission and France. With support from the World Bank, 96 per cent of former combatants received reinsertion allowances for the first 18 months following their demobilization. Despite delays, the dismantling of militias proceeded satisfactorily, with 15,088 militia members having been disbanded.

Security sector reform saw scant progress. Two presidential decrees issued in January addressed the restructuring of the Ministry of Defence and the establishment of a single military court, and legislation was adopted on the status of security services personnel. A task force was established to address the remaining ethnic imbalances within the National Defence Force. However, the development of a framework for security sector reform did not advance. Both the Defence Force and the police continued to suffer from operational weaknesses due to lack of training, as well as essential equipment, logistics and infrastructure. The many human rights violations and common crimes committed by the Defence Force, the police and the intelligence services also affected operational effectiveness and credibility.

The rate of return of Burundian refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania decreased significantly. From a high of 68,000 in December 2005, only 1,747 returns were registered in January and February 2006. The decline was attributed to the precarious security situation, food insecurity in the north and east, increased human rights abuses, inadequate infrastructure and public services, as well as conflicts over access to land. Those problems led to an outflow of more than 6,000 Burundians to the United Republic of Tanzania since November 2005, including many new returnees. The return of displaced persons to their places of origin had also been minimal.

The human rights situation deteriorated noticeably in the western provinces as a result of the Government’s intensified military campaign against FNL. ONUB documented serious abuses, principally implicating the security forces, including summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, mainly of individuals suspected of supporting FNL. Hundreds of suspected FNL combatants or supporters remained detained, many arbitrarily, and credible testimonies indicated that they were tortured during interrogation. Following complaints by human rights organizations, human rights monitors were given access to most detainees,
and the police expedited their investigation of cases to facilitate legal proceedings. Onub intensified its campaign against sexual violence, which remained prevalent. On the humanitarian side, an estimated 68 per cent of the population suffered from food insecurity. Food shortages increased due to the security situation, poor rainfall, crop diseases and rural poverty. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), 2.2 million Burundians needed food aid in 2006.

Although onub started in December 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 216], the drawdown of 40 per cent of its military force, the precarious security situation in the western provinces forced it to reinforce its military observer teams in Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke. Following consultations with the Burundian authorities, onub submitted, on 27 January, proposals for the second phase of the withdrawal, which envisaged complete disengagement of the Mission by 31 December 2006, and for the completion of the liquidation phase by mid-2007. The proposals provided for a full withdrawal from Cibitoke by the end of September, from Bubanza in November, and from Bujumbura Marie in December. The proposals were approved on 15 February and the Government requested that a joint evaluation of the situation and the onub drawdown be carried out in May.

The Secretary-General observed that the Government had focused its initial steps on enhancing longer-term prospects for peace, putting forward an ambitious legislative programme, with an emphasis on enhancing security and combating corruption, supported by a budget focused on improving the delivery of social services and basic human needs. At the same time, the country faced a daunting combination of immediate and longer-term security, humanitarian, development and social challenges. Burundi’s security and economic situations remained extremely fragile. Continued fighting with fnl posed a long-term threat to Burundi and the region, impeded economic development and imposed enormous human suffering.

While strides towards building peace were made, peace remained fragile in view of the complex and deep-seated origins of the conflict, the scale of the changes required and the enormity of the challenges in all spheres. The peace process needed continual consultations and consensus-building among the various political and ethnic groups.

As to the plan to withdraw onub from Burundi by 31 December, given the severity of the challenges and the lessons learned by the United Nations in similar post-conflict situations, the risks involved should not be underestimated. In the absence of solid progress in addressing the root causes of conflict, the possibility of a relapse remained strong.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 23 March [meeting 5394], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRT/2006/12 on behalf of the Council:

The Secretary-General has taken note of the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, and approves his recommendations.

The Council is deeply concerned by the continuing violence carried out by the Forces nationales de libération and fighting between them and the Burundian army, by the human rights abuses committed by both sides, as well as by factors of instability remaining in the region. It calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and human rights abuses. It welcomes President Nkurunziza’s commitment to bring to justice those responsible for such abuses and encourages the Government of Burundi to work closely with the United Nations human rights monitors to this end.

The Council welcomes the statements recently made by the leader of the Forces nationales de libération, Mr. Agathon Rwasa, in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, expressing his readiness to negotiate with a view to putting a final end to violence. The Council urges both parties to seize this opportunity for negotiations with a view to bringing peace to the whole country.

The Council requests, in this context, the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed of developments in the situation and, in consultation with the Government of Burundi, the disengagement plan for the United Nations Operation in Burundi.

The Council welcomes the progress made by the Government of Burundi since the completion of the transition, in particular its efforts to reduce poverty.

The Council encourages the Burundian parties to continue on the course of the reforms agreed in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, while maintaining the spirit of dialogue, consensus and inclusion which made possible the success of the transition in their country.

The Council invites the States of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi to continue to work with the Burundian authorities on the consolidation of peace in the country and in the region. It encourages the international community, including the relevant United Nations agencies, to continue to support the Burundian authorities following the disengagement of the United Nations Operation in Burundi in the long term.

Report of Secretary-General (June). In his June report [S/2006/429] on onub, the Secretary-General said that the Government continued to implement governance reforms and institution-building. The Parliament worked towards the adoption of new legislation related to good governance and democratic reform, and took further measures to combat corruption. Despite the emergence of internal differences within the two largest parties, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) and Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU),
political stability was maintained and overall consensus sustained within the Government regarding its priorities. The Parliament adopted legislation establishing the framework for the creation of the National Commission on Land and Property and two laws on the privatization of public enterprises and community public services. The Commission on Political Prisoners completed its work by issuing a third decree releasing 1,846 prisoners, bringing the total to 4,330 since January.

Prospects for ending the armed conflict through a negotiated settlement between the Government and FNL gained momentum with the announcement by the FNL leader, Agathon Rwasa, on 11 March, of his movement’s willingness to negotiate with the Government without preconditions and to cease hostilities. The United Republic of Tanzania subsequently invited the Government of Burundi to undertake discussions with FNL in Dar es Salaam. Negotiations between the Government and FNL (Rwasa) began on 2 June, hosted by the United Republic of Tanzania and facilitated by South Africa’s Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula. The discussions took place in a Military Commission, to address the disarmament and demobilization of FNL elements or their integration into the security services, and in a Political Commission, to address provisional immunity for FNL leadership, refugee returns, resettlement of displaced persons and FNL participation in national politics. In the presence of South African President Thabo Mbeki, and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, the Government and FNL signed, on 18 June, in Dar es Salaam, an Agreement on Principles towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi. The Agreement outlined agreed principles on political and military aspects. Detailed technical negotiations were to continue towards a comprehensive ceasefire agreement.

Further progress was made in disarmament and demobilization. In April, 588 National Defence Force members were demobilized, reducing its strength to less than 28,000 personnel, which was within reach of the Government’s target of 25,000. The disbanding of militias also progressed. By 1 June, 26,041 militia elements, or 87 per cent of the caseload, had received their “recognition of service” benefits. The National Programme for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration continued to provide support to demobilized ex-combatants, reaching 99 per cent of the intended beneficiaries. However, the quality of services varied among the 11 national implementation partners.

The rate of Burundian refugee returns from the United Republic of Tanzania remained significantly below expectations. From January to June, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted 4,840 returnees, including 161 spontaneous returnees. The security situation and poor socio-economic conditions continued to dissuade refugees from returning. By mid-May, UNHCR and its partners had facilitated also the return of 1,805 Rwandans, leaving an estimated 19,311 Rwandan asylum-seekers still in Burundi.

The number of reported human rights abuses declined, but serious violations continued, mainly in the western provinces. ONUB continued to combat impunity and called upon the authorities to fully investigate allegations and to sanction perpetrators. On 29 March, the President met with National Intelligence Service personnel and reprimanded those responsible for the ill-treatment and torture of detainees. The meeting led to several positive developments, including a commitment to stop the use of an intelligence facility as a detention centre. The Administrator of the Service requested that ONUB provide human rights training for intelligence officers, which began in May. In March, a UN mission visited Burundi to consult with the Government, and other stakeholders on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Tribunal. Subsequently, the UN Legal Counsel wrote to the Government setting out the key issues arising from the consultations, including the principle of no immunity or amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and the need for neutrality and independence of the two bodies.

The ONUB military drawdown continued, and as at 15 June, its military strength stood at 3,516. In a 13 April letter addressed to the Secretary-General, the President requested that the UN system in Burundi be restructured by January 2007 to support the country’s reconstruction and development priorities. Following a visit to Burundi of a UN needs-assessment mission, the Government, on 24 May, confirmed its request for the establishment of a United Nations integrated office in Burundi, following the termination of ONUB mandate. As agreed with the Government, the priority areas of UN assistance identified were: peace consolidation and democratic governance; security sector reform and civilian disarmament; human rights, judicial reform and transitional justice; information and communications; and reconstruction and socio-economic development. The UN system was developing a common action plan to ensure a streamlined, coherent and integrated approach to UN activities in Burundi, with benchmarks for the achievement and completion of tasks (see p. 152). The Secretary-General would submit to the Council the details of
the structure and resource requirements of the office. He therefore recommended the establishment of the office for an initial 12-month period, beginning 1 January 2007 and a final extension of onub mandate until 31 December 2006.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region of Africa, in particular resolutions 1650(2005) of 21 December 2005 and 1669(2006) of 10 April 2006,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,
Congratulating again the people of Burundi on the successful conclusion of the transitional period and the peaceful transfer of authority to a representative and democratically elected government and institutions,
Welcoming the ongoing negotiations between the Government of Burundi and the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération which have been facilitated by South Africa and the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, and looking forward to the early conclusion of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement,
Bearing in mind that the current mandates of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will expire on 1 July 2006 and 30 September 2006, respectively,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 21 June 2006 on the United Nations Operation in Burundi,
Noting that, although there has been an improvement in the security situation since the completion of the transitional period, factors of instability remain in Burundi and in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Burundi until 31 December 2006;
2. Decides also to extend until 30 September 2006 the authorization contained in paragraph 1 of resolution 1669(2006) for the Secretary-General to redeploy temporarily a maximum of one infantry battalion, a military hospital and 50 military observers from the United Nations Operation in Burundi to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in accordance with resolution 1669(2006), with the intention of renewing such authorization according
to future decisions by the Security Council concerning the renewal of the mandate of the Mission;
3. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish at the end of the period mentioned in paragraph 1 above an integrated office of the United Nations in Burundi, and looks forward with interest, with a view to further consideration, to his proposals on structure, tasking and requisite resources in an addendum to his report of 21 June 2006 as mentioned in paragraph 79 of the report, as well as benchmarks referred to in paragraph 66 of the report;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UN Integrated Office in Burundi. In an August addendum [S/2006/429/Add.1], the Secretary-General outlined the proposed structure, mandate and requisite resources for the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (binub), as well as benchmarks and proposed time frames for completing its tasks. The benchmarks for achieving the tasks in the UN common plan during binub mandate, after which UN agencies, funds and programmes would continue to provide assistance under a country team configuration, included cessation of armed conflict between the two sides and implementation of both political and military aspects of a possible comprehensive agreement between them, along with full respect for constitutional provisions, such as power-sharing arrangements; the adoption of a national plan for reform of the security sector; notable improvements in the human rights situation and implementation of measures to deal with impunity; development and launching of a comprehensive legal and judicial reform strategy; a strengthened national council for monitoring the media and communications; qualitative improvement in the provision of basic services; and the successful reintegration of refugees and other war-affected population groups. Taking into consideration the need to ensure a seamless transition in UN support to Burundi following onub departure, the Secretary-General noted that the successful implementation of binub proposed mandate ultimately depended on the Government’s full support and engagement, as well as significantly enhanced donor assistance. Substantial financial support was required to address the immediate and longer-term reconstruction and development requirements. He recommended that the Council approve the proposed structure for an initial period of one year.

Security Council statement (August). On 25 August, following a briefing by the Secretary-General’s acting Special Representative, Nureldin Satti, on the situation in Burundi and on the setting up of binub, Council members, in a press statement [SC/8818], expressed concerns about reports of a
possible coup attempt and the subsequent arrests of political leaders (see p. 155); encouraged the Government to follow due process in its investigations; and called upon the Government and all parties to preserve peace and national reconciliation and to promote social cohesion in the country.

**Peacebuilding Commission.** On 13 October, the Peacebuilding Commission [S/2006/1050] discussed Burundi and recommended it for assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund. On 13 December, the Commission announced that it would allocate $25 million to Burundi from the Peacebuilding Fund.

**Comprehensive ceasefire agreement**

On 7 September, a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the Government and FNL, marking a milestone in the peace process, the Secretary-General reported [S/2006/842]. It was endorsed by regional leaders and signed by President Nkurunziza, on behalf of the Government of Burundi, and by Agathon Rwasa, on behalf of FNL, at a summit of the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi, held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania. The Agreement, which entered into force on 10 September, provided for a cessation of hostilities, as well as the integration of FNL combatants into the national security forces or their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Its implementation would be coordinated by a joint verification and monitoring mechanism and subsidiary bodies comprising representatives from the Government, FNL, the AU and the United Nations, with the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi as guarantor. The Agreement provided also for the deployment of an AU special task force to protect FNL leaders and combatants, while moving to designated assembly areas during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. ONUB would provide security at the assembly areas. On 28 September, the Government expressed its commitment to the comprehensive ceasefire agreement and reaffirmed its adherence to the provisions granting provisional immunity to FNL members. The joint verification and monitoring mechanism was launched on 11 October.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and emphasizing the importance of national ownership by Burundi of peacebuilding, security and long-term development,

Congratulating again the people of Burundi on the successful conclusion of the transitional period and the peaceful transfer of authority to a representative and democratically elected Government and institutions,

Welcoming the signing, on 7 September 2006 at Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu-Forces nationales de libération,

Paying tribute to the efforts made by the States of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, in particular Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, and the facilitation efforts of South Africa in the service of peace in Burundi, welcoming the continued commitment and engagement of these States, and recalling the role played by the Burundi Partners’ Forum established at the summit meeting on Burundi, held in New York on 13 September 2005,

Taking note with concern of reports of a possible attempt to perpetrate a coup d’état in Burundi and of the subsequent arrest of a number of political figures,

Reaffirming its support for legitimately elected institutions, and stressing that any attempt to seize power by force or derail the democratic process would be deemed unacceptable,

Calling upon the authorities and all political actors in Burundi to persevere in their dialogue on achieving stability and national reconciliation and to promote social harmony in their country, and underscoring the importance of successfully completing the reforms provided for in the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 28 August 2000, in the Global Ceasefire Agreement signed at Dar-es-Salaam on 16 November 2003 and in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement signed at Dar-es-Salaam on 7 September 2006,

Calling upon the authorities to persevere in their efforts to promote good governance, including through continued measures to combat corruption,

Emphasizing the need for the United Nations system and the international community to maintain their support for the security and long-term development of Burundi, inter alia, by strengthening the capacity of the Government of Burundi,

Expressing once again its gratitude to the United Nations Operation in Burundi, as well as to the African Mission in Burundi previously deployed by the African Union, for their important contribution to the successful completion of the transition process in Burundi and to peace in the region,

Welcoming the holding on 13 October 2006 of the first country-specific meeting of the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion on Burundi, and taking note of the Chairman’s summary of that meeting,

Having considered the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi, of 21 June 2006, and the addendum thereto, of 14 August 2006, and welcoming his recommendation on the establishment of a United Nations integrated office in Burundi following the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Burundi, with a view to providing continued peacebuilding assistance to the Government of Burundi by strengthening national capacity to address the root causes of conflict,

Underlining the need for a smooth transition from the United Nations Operation in Burundi to the United Nations integrated office in Burundi and to ensure the proper functioning of that entity,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi as recommended in the addendum to his report, of 14 August 2006, for an initial period of twelve months, commencing on 1 January 2007, to support the Government of Burundi in its efforts towards long-term peace and stability throughout the peace consolidation phase in Burundi, including by ensuring coherence and coordination of the United Nations agencies in Burundi, under the leadership of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi;

2. Requests that, once established, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi focus on and support the Government of Burundi in the following areas, in coordination with donors and taking account of the agreement concluded on 24 May 2006 by the Government and the Secretary-General and the role of the Peacebuilding Commission:

Peace consolidation and democratic governance

(a) Strengthening the capacity of national institutions and civil society to address the root causes of conflict and to prevent, manage and resolve internal conflicts, particularly through reforms in the political and administrative spheres;

(b) Strengthening good governance and the transparency and accountability of public institutions;

(c) Promotion of freedom of the press and strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for the media and communications, and enhancing the professionalization of the media;

(d) Consolidation of the rule of law, in particular by strengthening the justice and corrections system, including independence and capacity of the judiciary;

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reform of the security sector

(e) Support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement signed at Dar es Salaam on 7 September 2006;

(f) Support for the development of a national plan for reform of the security sector, including human rights training, and the provision of technical assistance for its implementation, including training and capacity-building for the Burundi National Police, and technical assistance to enhance the professionalization of the National Defence Force of Burundi;

(g) Support for the completion of the national programme for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants;

(h) Support for efforts to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons;

(i) Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity

(j) Promotion and protection of human rights, including by building national institutional capacity in that area, particularly with regard to the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups, by assisting with the design and implementation of a national human rights action plan, including the establishment of an independent national human rights commission;

(k) Support for efforts to combat impunity, particularly through the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, including a truth and reconciliation commission and a special tribunal;

Donor and United Nations agency coordination

(l) Strengthening the partnership between the Government and donors for the implementation of priority, emergency and longer-term activities, within the framework of the Government’s Emergency Programme and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is being finalized;

(m) Ensuring effective coordination among the strategies and programmes of the various United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Burundi;

3. Urges the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi to take account of the rights of women and gender considerations, as set out in resolution 1325(2000) of 31 October 2000, as cross-cutting issues in all the areas outlined in paragraph 2 above, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups, and requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout the Integrated Office and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence;

4. Stresses the need for cooperation, within the limits of their respective capacities and current mandates, between the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

5. Welcomes the recommendation, contained in the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General, that the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi should be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi and that the latter should also serve as the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme and as the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator;
6. Takes note of the benchmarks outlined in the addendum to the report of the Secretary-General for gauging progress made by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi during its mandate, in particular as they relate to the priorities mentioned in paragraph 2 above, and of the proposed time frame for the eventual transition to a primarily development-focused engagement, and reaffirms its willingness to adjust, as appropriate, the United Nations presence in Burundi during the peace consolidation phase, taking all circumstances into account;

7. Emphasizes that the Government of Burundi bears the primary responsibility for peacebuilding, security and long-term development in the country, and urges international donors to continue to support the efforts of the Government in those areas;

8. Urges the authorities and all political actors in Burundi to pursue the reforms agreed upon at Arusha and Dar es Salaam and to maintain the spirit of dialogue, consensus-building and inclusiveness that enabled them to achieve a successful transition in their country;

9. Encourages the Burundian authorities to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General, including for the establishment of the mechanisms referred to in resolution 1606(2005);

10. Calls upon the Burundian authorities, in their investigations into the alleged attempt to perpetrate a coup d'état, to follow due process and to respect the guarantees provided for by law and international obligations;

11. Expresses its deep concern at reports of continuing human rights violations, and urges the Government of Burundi to investigate all such reports, take the necessary steps to prevent further violations and ensure that those responsible for such violations are brought to justice;

12. Calls upon the Government of Burundi and the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu - Forces nationales de libération to expeditiously implement in good faith the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement which they signed at Dar es Salaam on 7 September 2006 and to pursue their efforts to resolve outstanding issues in a spirit of cooperation;

13. Encourages the States of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi and the South African Facilitation to continue to work with the Burundian authorities to consolidate peace in their country and in the region;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the progress made in establishing the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi and, subsequently, to report regularly to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, including with respect to the security situation and the human rights situation;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Further developments

Report of Secretary-General (October). In his October report [S/2006/842] on ONUB, the Secretary-General said that the signing on 7 September of a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement (see p. 153) contributed to an overall improvement in the security situation and appeared to spur refugee returns. However, there were continuing tensions between the Government and some political parties, the media and civil society, including allegations of a coup plot, associated arrests, and accusations by opposition parties of Government violations of the Constitution. Serious human rights abuses by national security elements were reported before the signing of the Agreement. At the same time, steps were taken to prosecute security service personnel responsible for abuses. The completion of the poverty reduction strategy paper was an important step towards addressing socio-economic challenges.

FNL did not participate in the first meeting of the joint verification and monitoring mechanism, stating that the Government should release their prisoners beforehand. On 12 October, FNL President Rwasa, in letters to the Chairman of the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, accused the Burundi Government of violating the Ceasefire Agreement by breaching provisions granting provisional immunity to FNL members, as well as by its continued detention of FNL members. In the meantime, groups of FNL elements, mostly of the Jean-Bosco Sindayigaya faction, began to assemble in the western provinces in anticipation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. On 28 September, the Government requested ONUB support for protecting assembly areas for FNL combatants, as stipulated in the Ceasefire Agreement.

Attempted coup plot. Political tensions heightened, following the Government’s allegation of a coup plot in August and the resignation of Second Vice-President Alice Nzomukunda. On 3 August, at a meeting with diplomats, UN representatives and the media, the Ministers of Information and of Interior and Public Security announced that an attempt to destabilize the Government had been foiled. Eight individuals were arrested by the security services between 31 July and 3 August, including former transitional Vice-President Alphonse-Marie Kadege and other political and military figures. Former transitional President Domitien Ndayizeye was also arrested on 21 August. On 22 August, two of the nine detainees accused of involvement in the alleged coup were released without charge, including a National Defence Force officer who had confessed to involvement prior to his detention. On 24 August, one of the detainees stated that he had falsely confessed to participation, in response to threats against his family. That fuelled media speculation that the alleged coup plot was fabricated. The Government
denied such allegations, and on 16 September, the President stated that there was irrefutable proof of the detainees’ involvement. Reports that several of them had been tortured caused concern. When interviewed by ONUB human rights officers, three of the detainees, including former Vice-President Kadege, showed visible signs of torture. Political parties, civil society groups and human rights organizations denounced the arrests of the alleged plotters and their treatment. As at 20 October, seven detainees, including Mr. Ndayizeye, were still in custody, after the Attorney-General overruled the Supreme Court’s decision ordering their release on bail.

Meanwhile, second Vice-President Nzomukunda resigned on 5 September, citing among other reasons, the Government’s gross violation of human rights and the lack of respect for the rule of law. The confirmation by the National Assembly of Marina Barampama to replace her sparked public debate. Frodebu and Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA) challenged the legality of the appointment through the Constitutional Court. Frodebu also boycotted Parliament. There was also tension at the local government level, with communal administrators accused of mismanagement and embezzlement being suspended from duty.

**Request for ONUB assistance.** On 1 November [S/2006/866], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the South African Facilitation of the Burundi peace process had requested ONUB to carry out until the end of December some of the tasks envisaged for the AU special task force under the 7 September Ceasefire Agreement (see p. 153). Those tasks included providing escorts to returning FNL leaders and combatants, as they moved to designated assembly areas. The Facilitation also requested ONUB logistical support during the deployment of the AU Force, expected to start in November. The Secretary-General agreed to those requests, which would not affect the expiration of ONUB mandate of 31 December. On 6 November [S/2006/867], the Council took note of the Secretary-General’s intention.

**AU communique.** On 9 November [S/2006/889], the AU Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, approved the establishment of the Special Task Force for protecting FNL leaders and combatants in fulfillment of the September Ceasefire Agreement. It mandated the Chairperson of the Commission on the implementation of the Agreement to seek the support of member States and to submit proposals on the modalities for establishing the Task Force.

**Report of Secretary-General (December).** In his December report [S/2006/994] on ONUB, submitted pursuant to resolution 1692(2006) (see p. 152), the Secretary-General said that implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement remained stalled. The FNL leadership continued to demand the release of all FNL prisoners and provisional immunity for FNL elements, as conditions for their leaders’ return to Burundi. In the absence of FNL representatives, the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism provided for in the Agreement did not convene. On 3 November, FNL accused the Government of violating the Agreement in various ways, including the continued detention of FNL members and supporters. FNL also alleged that the Government was conducting hostile military manoeuvres in areas where its combatants were located. On 14 November, FNL blamed the Government for the delay in the implementation of the Agreement and accused the South African Facilitation of bias in favour of the Government. On 27 November, President Nkurunziza promulgated a law providing provisional immunity to FNL members.

The demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration programme continued to make progress. Some 390 National Defence Force personnel were demobilized, bringing the total number of former combatants and soldiers demobilized to 21,769, as at 14 November. The National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration continued to support the reintegration of former combatants. As at 14 November, 18,642 adult former combatants had received cash reinsertion benefits, while 5,412 had received other forms of reintegration assistance. Of the 3,015 demobilized children, 599 were in school and 896 were receiving vocational training. On 1 November, presidential decrees were issued establishing a mechanism for the verification of combat status, eligibility criteria for the programme, and criteria and modalities for the attribution of ranks during demobilization, including for FNL combatants. ONUB continued to work with the Government in destroying unserviceable weapons and ammunition, destroying 17,880 rounds of munitions collected during the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process.

The absence of major confrontations between the security forces and FNL continued to have a positive impact on the human rights situation in the north-western provinces, where FNL had been most active. Nevertheless, impunity continued to prevail and, despite some arrests, the Government had yet to prosecute the security forces’ personnel implicated in serious violations. In some instances, there was political interference in the judicial process,
including the prevention of the execution of arrest warrants by senior Government officials. Reporting to the Human Rights Council [A/HCR/4/5], following his 7-14 October assessment visit to Burundi, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Burundi, Akich Okola, highlighted the systematic human rights violations, the threats to freedom of expression and opinion, the tensions between the Government and political parties and civil society and the ineffectiveness of the judicial and administrative systems. In other developments, the national criminal code was revised to bring it into line with international human rights treaties. Important changes proposed included the abolition of the death penalty and the criminalization of torture, and new provisions for the protection of women against sexual violence and for the protection of children.

The United Nations continued to develop a common understanding of its support to the national peace consolidation efforts and modalities for enhancing UN coordination and integration at the programmatic and operational levels. In addition to the 2007-2008 UN common action plan, the overall UN approach to peace consolidation would be articulated through the reformulation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, renamed the United Nations Integrated Peace Consolidation Assistance Framework. To ensure that BINUB was fully operational by January 2007, a number of joint programmes in the areas of governance, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration were developed in close coordination with the Framework process. Reflecting on the significant contribution of the United Nations, and particularly ONUB, to the Burundi peace process, the Secretary-General said that the Mission had been instrumental in creating the conditions that allowed Burundi to complete the process started by the 2000 Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi [YUN 2000, p. 146]. The Organization had played a critical mediation role, provided extensive support to the electoral process, actively supported the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, provided for a thorough and systematic monitoring of the country’s human rights situation, had a positive impact in monitoring the borders and providing military escorts, and supported negotiations between the Government and FNL. With the departure of ONUB, the United Nations intended to continue to help Burundi to address the root causes and immediate consequences of the conflict, help develop the capacity to sustain peace and create a propitious environment for economic recovery and development.

**End-of-year developments.** In a later report [S/2007/287], the Secretary-General said that the South African Facilitation organized a meeting in Dar es Salaam in December, at which the Government and FNL reached agreement on the issue of provisional immunity for FNL members and the release of detained FNL members who were nominated to participate in the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. Also in December, the AU Special Task Force became operational and the Chairman of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, Brigadier-General M. E. Phako (South Africa), arrived in Burundi.

On 21 December [meeting 5604], the Security Council held a private meeting with ONUB troop-contributing countries and was briefed by the Secretary-General’s acting Special Representative, Nureldin Satti. After the meeting, the Council President, in a press statement [SC/8921], called upon the authorities and all political actors to persevere in their dialogue on achieving stability and national reconciliation; urged all parties to promote social harmony, the rule of law and respect for human rights; and called upon the authorities to investigate human rights violations and ensure those responsible were brought to justice. He reiterated the need for the parties to the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement, in particular FNL, to proceed with its implementation without delay.

On 27 December [S/2006/1031], the Council noted the Secretary-General’s intention, set out in his 22 December letter [S/2006/1030], to seek the General Assembly’s approval of his decision to provide limited logistical assistance to the AU Special Task Force, following the conclusion of ONUB mandate on 31 December. ONUB last military contingent, the South African battalion, was re-hatted on 29 December to form the core of the AU Special Task Force supporting the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. That had become necessary as no progress was made in the implementation of the Agreement.

**Head of BINUB.** In an exchange of letters of 18 [S/2006/1020] and 22 [S/2006/1021] December between the Secretary-General and the Security Council President, Deputy Special Representative for Burundi, Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia), was appointed the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi and Head of BINUB as of 1 January 2007.

**Report on children and armed conflict.** The Secretary-General, in October [S/2006/851], presented to the Security Council and its Working Group on children and armed conflict a report on children and armed conflict in Burundi. The report,
prepared in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 863] and covering the period August 2005 to September 2006, provided information on progress in ending the recruitment of children into armed groups and other grave violations against war-affected children.

(For action by the Economic and Social Council on the reports of its Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the humanitarian and economic needs of Burundi, see p. 1084.)

**ONUB**

The United Nations Operation in Burundi, established in 2004 by Security Council resolution 1545(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 145] and extended until 1 July 2006 by resolution 1650(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 214], continued to carry out its mandate, which included ensuring respect of the ceasefire agreements; promoting the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces; carrying out the disarmament and demobilization portions of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, and the illegal flow of arms and movement of combatants across Burundi’s borders; contributing to the completion of the electoral process and to the creation of security conditions for providing humanitarian assistance; facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence; and ensuring the protection of UN personnel, facilities and equipment.

Headquartered in the capital, Bujumbura, ONUB was headed until 31 March by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Burundi, Carolyn McAskie (Canada). Her deputy, Nureldin Satti (Sudan), served as Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Acting Head of Mission of ONUB for the rest of the year.

**ONUB Financing**

In June, the General Assembly considered the Secretary-General’s March report on ONUB financing [A/60/731 & Add.1], in which he requested commitment authority in the amount of $79,179,200 for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006, as well as the related ACABQ report [A/60/893], pending submission of a full budget for the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION**

On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/917], adopted resolution 60/269 without vote [agenda item 137].

**Financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi**

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1545(2004) of 21 May 2004, by which the Council authorized, for an initial period of six months as from 1 June 2004, with the intention to renew it for further periods, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation called the United Nations Operation in Burundi, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Operation, the latest of which was resolution 1650(2005) of 21 December 2005,

Recalling also its resolution 58/312 of 18 June 2004 on the financing of the Operation and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 59/15 B of 22 June 2005,

Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Operation with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Operation in Burundi as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 47.3 million United States dollars, representing some 7 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only thirty-nine Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Operation in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing
adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Operation;

9. Welcomes the use of the Entebbe installation to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of its logistical support operations for peacekeeping missions in the region;

10. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of its resolutions 59/296 and 60/266;

12. Also requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Operation is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

13. Further requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Operation against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Operation;

Budget estimates for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006 for the maintenance of the Operation in a total amount not exceeding 78,959,200 dollars;

Financing of the commitment authority

15. Decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 40 million dollars at a monthly rate of 10 million dollars, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003 and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Operation;

16. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 15 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 2,092,500 dollars, representing the estimated staff assessment income approved for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006;

Estimates for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

17. Decides further to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Operation in Burundi the amount of 3,426,800 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, comprising 2,830,400 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 596,400 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base;

Financing of the appropriation

18. Decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 3,426,800 dollars, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007;

19. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 18 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 363,400 dollars, comprising the prorated share of 318,300 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 45,100 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

20. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

21. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Operation, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

22. Invites voluntary contributions to the Operation in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

23. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi”.

In September [A/61/309], the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly the ONUB budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, in the amount of $144,621,800, inclusive of the commitment authority approved in resolution 60/269 (above). A/CABQ[A/61/485] recommended the appropriation of an amount of $115,221,800, a reduction of $29.4 million.

Also before the Assembly were the financial performance report for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [A/60/612 & Corr.1] and A/CABQ comments and recommendations thereon [A/61/485].
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION

On 31 October [meeting 44], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/61/547], adopted resolution 61/9 without vote [agenda item 133].

Financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi

The General Assembly,
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
Recalling Security Council resolution 1545(2004) of 21 May 2004, by which the Council authorized, for an initial period of six months as from 1 June 2004, with the intention to renew it for further periods, the deployment of a peacekeeping operation called the United Nations Operation in Burundi, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Operation, the latest of which was resolution 1692(2006) of 30 June 2006, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Operation until 31 December 2006,
Recalling also its resolution 58/312 of 18 June 2004 on the financing of the Operation and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 60/269 of 30 June 2006,
Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,
Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Operation with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,
1. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Operation in Burundi as at 30 June 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 31.1 million United States dollars, representing some 5 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only forty-nine Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;
2. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Operation in full;
3. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;
4. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;
5. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;
6. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;
7. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Operation;
8. Welcomes the use of the installation at Entebbe, Uganda, to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of its logistical support operations for peacekeeping missions in the region;
9. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation, subject to the provisions of the present resolution;
10. Takes note of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 21, 25 and 27 of the report of the Advisory Committee;
11. Decides to establish two National Officer posts for the Human Rights Office and one National Officer post for the Office of the Chief of Administrative Services through redeployment of posts;
12. Also decides to establish four general temporary assistance positions (one P-4, one P-2 and two national staff, including one National Officer) for the Conduct and Discipline Team;
13. Re-emphasizes the need to refine budgetary assumptions through closer scrutiny of expenditure patterns of the Operation;
14. Reaffirms its resolution 59/296 of 22 June 2005, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of its relevant provisions and the relevant provisions of its resolution 60/266 of 30 June 2006;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Operation is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;
16. Also requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Operation against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Operation;
17. Welcomes the efforts of the Operation and its personnel, and looks forward to the successful completion of the mandate of the Operation;
18. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure an orderly transition, including the transfer of assets, to the planned follow-on mission—the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi—and the efficient liquidation of the Operation's assets in accordance with the Operation's exit strategy and liquidation timetables;
19. Also requests the Secretary-General to encourage strong coordination between the Operation, the planned follow-on mission and the United Nations country team with a view to ensuring a smooth transition to the
planned follow-on mission and to reducing the potential duplication of activities among members of the United Nations country team;

20. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the lessons learned from other peacekeeping missions are applied during the Operation's drawdown, liquidation and transition to the planned follow-on mission;

21. Notes the additional information on projected expenditure for the Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, amounting to 128,536,700 dollars, provided by the Secretary-General;

Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005

22. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

23. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Operation in Burundi the amount of 128,536,700 dollars for the maintenance and administrative liquidation of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of the amount of 78,959,200 dollars previously authorized by the General Assembly under the terms of its resolution 60/269 for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006, and in addition to the amount of 3,426,800 dollars already appropriated under the terms of the same resolution for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007;

Financing of the appropriation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

24. Also decides, taking into account the amount of 40 million dollars already apportioned under the terms of its resolution 60/269 for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006, to apportion among Member States the additional amount of 88,536,700 dollars for the maintenance and administrative liquidation of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003, and the scale of assessments for 2007;

25. Further decides that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of the amount of 1,774,600 dollars, representing the estimated additional staff assessment income approved for the Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007;

26. Decides that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share of the additional unencumbered balance in the amount of 115,500 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2004, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2004, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

27. Also decides that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the additional unencumbered balance in the amount of 115,500 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2004, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 26 above;

28. Further decides that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 31,523,100 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 26 above;

29. Decides that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 31,523,100 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 26 above;

30. Also decides that the decrease in the estimated staff assessment income in the amount of 583,800 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 31,523,100 dollars referred to in paragraphs 28 and 29 above;

31. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

32. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Operation, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

33. Invites voluntary contributions to the Operation in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

34. Decides to keep under review during its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi”.

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that the agenda item “Financing of the United Nations Operation in Burundi” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.
Central African Republic

Despite hopes for peace following successful presidential elections, the Central African Republic, in 2006, was increasingly drawn into the crisis affecting Chad and the Darfur region of the Sudan. In January, Government troops clashed with local insurgents near the border with Chad. Rebel attacks in the north increased during the year, becoming a rebellion aimed at toppling the Government.

As the conflict continued to affect the civilian population, some 5,000 refugees fled to southern Chad from attacks by Government forces, rebel groups and bandits, increasing the number of Central African refugees in that country to more than 48,000. In June, rebel groups attacked an army outpost in the north-western town of Gordil, near the Chad–Sudan border. Three rebel movements active in the north formed a coalition, and took the city of Birao and two other cities on 30 October. On 27 November, one of the rebel movements attacked the city of Ndélé. The Central African Republic accused the Sudan of supporting the rebellion, an accusation the Sudan denied. A Government counter offensive in November–December resulted in it retaking the city. Various diplomatic efforts by countries in the region did not defuse tensions between the Central African Republic and Chad, and the Sudan.

Established in 2000 [YUN 2000, p. 162], the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic continued to support Government efforts to return the country to stability and achieve reconciliation and reconstruction. On 22 November, the Security Council extended its mandate for another year. The multinational force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Authority (CEMAC) to work together to find a lasting solution.

Political and security developments

AU communiqué. The AU Peace and Security Council, in a 30 March declaration on the situation in the Central African Republic [S/2006/216], noted with concern the insecurity in the north of the country and its consequences on the political situation and the life of the population there, with several thousands of people already having sought refuge in Chad. The AU Council welcomed the decision of the AU Commission Chairperson to dispatch a multidisciplinary expert mission to the country to evaluate its needs and make recommendations on the assistance that member States and the AU could provide. The Council called on the AU Commission, the Central African Government, the United Nations Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) and the Central African Economic and Monetary Authority (CEMAC) to work together to find a lasting solution.

Report of Secretary-General (June). In a report [S/2006/441] on BONUCA activities from January to June, submitted in response to Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2001/25 [YUN 2001, p. 156], the Secretary-General said that the security situation remained volatile and dependent on the situation in neighbouring Chad and the Sudan. The country was a victim of the tension between Chad and the Sudan, which had accused each other of supporting rebels hostile to their respective regimes, even though providing such support was prohibited under the Tripoli Agreement signed on 8 February by Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno and Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir (see p. 297).

Since April, rebels hostile to the regime of Chad’s President had crossed through the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic to attack the Chadian army. On 25 and 26 April, an Antonov 35 aircraft unloaded armed men and military equipment in the north-eastern locality of Tiringoulo, violating the country’s territorial integrity. The Government objected to those repeated incursions and closed its border with the Sudan. However, armed individuals appeared to have established a foothold in the north-east, and the Central African Armed Forces were unable to control the situation for lack of adequate manpower and logistics. The Government, concerned about the situation, requested support from bilateral and multilateral partners.

Bangui, the capital, recorded a lull in the violence, thanks to the Central African Armed Forces patrols, supported by the CEMAC multinational force (FOMUC). In more remote areas, particularly in the north, security was undermined by abuses committed by armed gangs, “roadblockers” and rebels seeking to destabilize the country. The Government was faced with an armed rebellion, based in the north, aimed at overthrowing the regime of President François Bozizé. The rebellion included four armed groups: the Union des forces républicaines (UFR), the Armée pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie (APRD), the Mouvement patriotique pour la restauration de la république centrafricain (MPRC) and the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC). The armed forces, which were slowly being restructured, were not in a position to secure the national territory, even with FOMUC support.

The political situation was marked by the emergence of internal crises in several major political parties, the work of the National Assembly’s first regular session of 2006 and a number of peace and
security initiatives. The National Assembly adopted several draft laws, including on the establishment, organization and operation of the country’s High Council for Communication and on the organization and operation of the National Mediation Council.

The humanitarian situation deteriorated sharply, particularly in the north-west, where civilian populations had left their villages and taken refuge in the fields or forests or across the border in Chad, as a result of the insecurity created by the rebels, attacks by robbers and reprisals by the Armed Forces. An estimated 30,000 people were in need of emergency assistance. Despite the prevailing insecurity, UN agencies provided basic health care and food and non-food assistance through international NGOs operating in areas bordering Chad.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to register urban refugees in Bangui. On 1 February, the Central African Republic, the Sudan and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on the repatriation of Sudanese refugees. Some 2,115 refugees, out of 12,000 living in the south-eastern part of the country, were repatriated. On 15 April, UNHCR suspended its operations because of the Government’s decision to close the border with the Sudan.

The human rights situation also deteriorated, with many reports of arbitrary or summary execution, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, violation of time limits on police custody and restriction of the freedom of movement. The execution of a Staff Sergeant by members of the Presidential Guard, the assassination of the mayor of Bossangoa, for which rebels had claimed responsibility, the killing of the mayor of Korom-Mpoko municipality and his son by unidentified armed individuals, and the murder of two local physicians on official mission in the north were examples of the violations perpetrated in the country.

The emergence of rebel movements in the north, the situation in Chad and tension between that country and the Sudan seriously threatened the relative stability that had prevailed, the Secretary-General said. As a subregional force, FOMUC continued to play a key role in efforts to make the country more secure. The international community should intensify efforts to make the borders between Chad, the Central African Republic and the Sudan more secure, in order to discourage armed movements from taking root. For its part, the Government should engage in a dialogue with all national actors. The President should work towards promoting justice and respect for the rule of law, shed light on the serious human rights violations committed in recent months and put an end to impunity by bringing those responsible to justice.

**Press statement (July).** On 7 July, Security Council members [SC/8771], after a briefing on the situation in the country by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of BONUC, General Lamine Cissé, and by a representative of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, expressed, in a press statement, their concern at the increase in poverty, the fragility of the country’s economic recovery and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. They invited the Central African authorities to continue to improve public finances and governance, and urged bilateral partners and international institutions to increase their support of those efforts and provide the necessary humanitarian assistance.

Council members called on the authorities and all political parties to settle their disputes through peaceful means and dialogue, and to work for peace and national cohesion in full respect of human rights and the rule of law. They urged the authorities to put an end to impunity by bringing to justice those responsible for human rights violations.

Council members, concerned that the persisting violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan and the deterioration of relations between Chad and the Sudan might further negatively affect the security and stability of the country, condemned the attack perpetrated by armed groups in Gondil on 26 June (see p. 164). They stressed the importance of implementing the 8 February Tripoli Agreement ending the Chadian-Sudanese conflict (see p. 297), reiterated their respect of the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic and called upon all States in the region to cooperate in ensuring regional stability.

Council members invited the authorities to expedite the restructuring of the National Armed Forces, commended FOMUC efforts in support of the Armed Forces and welcomed the financial and material assistance provided to FOMUC by the EU, France and Germany.

**Report of Secretary-General (October).** As requested by the Council on 7 July, the Secretary-General, in October, submitted an interim report [S/2006/828] on the situation in the country. The lack of security continued to be a major concern, the Secretary-General said. While the situation had somewhat stabilized in the capital, it was precarious in the interior, particularly in the north and centre, where “roadblockers”, armed bands and rebels continued to prey on civilians, kidnapping the children of herdsmen for ransom and attacking traders on the
main highways. The 26 June attack by armed groups against an outpost of the Armed Forces and FOMUC in the north-western town of Gordil, near the Central African Republic/Chad/Sudan border triangle, resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides. The attack confirmed that rebel groups were operating in the north, and that insecurity was gradually expanding to the north-east, towards the Vakaga region bordering on Darfur region of the Sudan. The armed forces would continue to be supported by FOMUC, whose mandate had been extended until June 2007.

The security situation was made worse by the situation in neighbouring countries, particularly Chad and the Sudan. The Government was threatened by rebels and armed bands established along the border with Chad and the Sudan. President Bozizé had stated that security was seriously threatened in the northern part of the country, which was virtually living under occupation, posing a grave threat to the integrity of the national territory. The President appealed to the international community to help the Central African Republic find a solution to that situation. The rapprochement between the Sudan and Chad, as evidenced by the 26 July N’Djamena agreement (see p. 299) signed by both Heads of State was encouraging, but renewed hostilities in eastern Chad in September, and in Darfur, together with the presence of rebels and armed groups on Central African territory, were discouraging hopes for a lull in the conflict. The special summit meeting of CEMAC, held in N’Djamena, Chad, on 7 August, mandated President Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Central African Republic, and AU Chairman, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo to study ways of addressing the security problem in the country. A subregional approach to resolving the crisis should continue to be given preference, the Secretary-General said.

Roadblocks and confrontations between the army and rebel groups had a negative impact on the humanitarian situation and development activities, especially in the north-west and north-east, where UN humanitarian missions were unable to operate outside the urban centres. The human rights situation was marked by a resurgence of violence by “roadblockers”, unidentified armed gangs and regular soldiers, particularly in the north.

The Secretary-General observed that, although the defence and security forces were newly organized, with the support of France, they were still unable to repel the armed groups. Therefore, the Government, with subregional support, had requested the international community to provide additional resources to help the armed forces enhance their operational capabilities.

On the political front, President Bozizé, on 28 July, issued an invitation to all political groups and social strata to take part in a dialogue on peace and security. Participants unanimously agreed that the lack of security was the chief cause of the slowdown in economic activity and trade and was holding back development. Meanwhile, disagreements persisted within many of the political parties, chiefly as a result of crises in leadership and reorganization efforts. The Minister of the Interior, on 3 August, issued a circular prohibiting access to the media for political parties plagued by internal division, because of the risk to public order arising from statements made by the various camps. He set a three-month deadline for political organizations to resolve their leadership divisions or risk suspension. Politicians saw the Minister’s injunction as interference in their internal affairs. BONUCA, at the Minister’s request, organized a meeting, on 21 August, to clarify the terms of the circular. The discussions, also attended by the Chairperson of the committee responsible for monitoring the outcome of the national dialogue, and by journalists and diplomats, helped to dispel tension. Participants agreed to prepare a text to put into effect the order relating to political parties and the status of the opposition, to refrain from inciting hatred through the media, and to observe discipline in their parties. Participants were satisfied with the outcome and asked BONUCA to organize similar meetings on a regular basis.

A joint International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank/African Development Bank (ADB) mission to Bangui (12-19 August) assessed the execution of the second post-conflict programme adopted in January, and recommended that the Government continue to improve the management of the national treasury. The IMF invited the authorities to meet all quantitative targets so that discussions could begin on preparing a programme under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, an essential condition for reaching the decision point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. The World Bank and the ADB pursued dialogue with the Government on clearing the country’s arrears to multilateral financial institutions—a precondition for their re-engagement.

In the light of the Central African Government’s request for the renewal of BONUCA mandate for another year, the Secretary-General said that discussions were ongoing to determine the priority areas of further UN commitment.

**Security Council consideration (October).** On 30 October [meeting 5558], the Security Council held...
On 22 November [meeting 5572], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/47 on behalf of the Council:

"SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION."

In October 2006, the Security Council heard Mr. Elie Doté, Prime Minister of the Central African Republic, as well as General Lamine Cissé, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic. It reiterated its full support for the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic and for the United Nations staff in the Central African Republic.

The Council welcomes the efforts of the Government of the Central African Republic to revive dialogue through meetings with political stakeholders and representatives of civil society. It calls upon the Secretary-General to encourage, through the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic, the holding on a regular basis of such meetings, which are vital to restoring trust among Central Africans and promoting lasting reconciliation.

The Council also welcomes the courageous efforts of the Government of the Central African Republic to implement the reforms advocated by the bilateral partners and international financial institutions aimed at improving the management of the national treasury, ensuring transparency in economic activities and good governance. In that regard, it calls upon the Government to continue the reforms and dialogue with its international partners with a view to restoring economic growth and reducing poverty in the country.

The Council is deeply concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic, especially in the wake of the attacks on the towns of Bira, Ouanda-Djalle and Sam Ouandja. It expresses serious concern that instability along the border areas of Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic represents a threat to security and stability in the Central African Republic and its neighbours, while noting that Central African defence and security forces are still unable to repel the armed groups in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country.

The Council reafirms its commitment to the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic. It calls for the adoption of a subregional approach to stabilize the borders of the Central African Republic. It urges the Central African authorities to expedite their efforts to restructure the armed forces and enhance their operational capabilities, and encourages the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community to continue supporting the Central African armed forces beyond 30 June 2007. It notes that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat has dispatched a fact-finding mission to Chad and the Central African Republic to assess how the United Nations might help those countries to address the current instability. The Council looks forward to the findings and recommendations of the mission.

The Council requests the Secretary-General to reinforce cooperation between the United Nations and member States of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community with a view to facilitating and strengthening initiatives aimed at addressing trans-border insecurity in the subregion and bringing to an end the violations by armed groups of the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic. It also requests the Secretary-General to provide to it a report on the situation in the Central African Republic by 31 December 2006.

The Council decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic for a period of one year, until 31 December 2007, and invites the Secretary-General to submit to it the new modalities of the mission of the Office for the new period, no later than 30 November 2006.

Following the Security Council's request for the submission of new modalities for BONUCA mission, the Secretary-General, on 30 November [S/2006/934], said that the Office, in 2007, would focus on: supporting national reconciliation and dialogue; assisting efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; facilitating the mobilization of resources for national reconstruction, economic recovery, poverty alleviation and good governance; mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Council resolution 1325(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 1113]; and reinforcing cooperation between the United Nations and CEAMC member States and other regional entities to facilitate and strengthen initiatives aimed at addressing transborder insecurity in the subregion.

"Report of Secretary-General (December)." In his December report [S/2006/1034] on the situation in the country and the activities of BONUCA, the Secretary-General said that the political situation had been marked by the rebellion in the north, led by the Armée pour la restauration de la république et la démocratie, the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain and the Union des forces républicaines. The Government believed former President Ange-Félix Patassé to be complicit with those insurgents. The rebel movements had formed a coalition, the Union de forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement, whose members, on 30 October, attacked and occupied the northern city of Bira, capital of Vakaga prefecture, and the neighbouring cities of Ouanda-Djallé and Sam Ouandja. The Sudan denied accusations by the Central African Republic that it was supporting the rebellion. A high-level Sudanese mission visiting Bangui on 11 November reiterated that the Sudan wished to maintain good-neighbourly relations with the Central African Republic.

In their southward advance, the Union des forces républicaines rebels attacked the north-eastern city of Ndélé on 27 November. A Government-led counter-offensive, supported by French and Romuc contingents, retook Birao and Ndélé on 27 November and Sam-Ouandja and Ouanda-Djallé in December. To find a solution to the crisis, on 7 No-
nember, the President exchanged views with Bangui municipal, neighbourhood and group leaders on ways of avoiding a military escalation. On 8 November, he addressed the people of Bangui, following a peaceful protest march organized by civil society organizations. Several national consultations were also held from 14 to 18 November, involving all political parties, trade unions and civil society organizations. The AU Special Envoy for the Central African Republic visited Bangui from 15 to 18 November, and the AU Peace and Security Council met on 7 December to raise awareness of the urgency of assisting the country. President Muammar Gaddafi of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya organized a mini-summit in Tripoli on 22 November, attended by the Presidents of Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as by Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, to discuss the tensions between Chad, the Central African Republic and the Sudan, but to no avail.

Confrontations between rebel groups and Government forces in the north and north-west led to the displacement of some 15,000 to 20,000 people, making it harder for them to receive humanitarian assistance. However, collaboration among UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the field facilitated the delivery of emergency assistance, with the World Food Programme reaching some 50,000 displaced persons. On 12 December, UN agencies and NGOs launched a joint appeal for $50 million to meet the immediate needs of the internally displaced.

The restructuring of the defence and security forces moved forward and continued to benefit from BONUCA technical support. The same was true of the ex-combatant reintegration and community support project, which entered its final phase. BONUCA continued to strengthen the capacity of the police and gendarmerie, while its military team helped to train many contingents of the armed forces, thereby building their professional capacity.

The year was marked by further growth in the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Experts estimated that overall GDP should reach 3 per cent. In July, the African Development Bank approved a $4.9 million grant for a national economic management capacity recovery programme, and in November, the World Bank approved a transaction of nearly $82 million, allowing the country to clear its arrears.

**Financing of BONUCA**

On 31 January [A/60/585/Add.1], the Secretary-General submitted a budget in the amount of $6,467,400 for financing BONUCA throughout the year. The General Assembly, on 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252 (see p. 1614), approved that amount as part of the $326,500,000 approved for special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council.

**Chad and Central African Republic**

During 2006, the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic. Following attacks by armed groups in the eastern part of the country, Chad declared a state of emergency in the east and accused the Sudan of supporting the rebels. Likewise, after armed groups in the north-eastern Central African Republic mounted a rebellion against the Government, the Central African authorities accused the Sudan of backing the rebels. In August, the Security Council requested the United Nations Mission in the Sudan to establish a political and military presence in Chad and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic. The Secretary-General dispatched an assessment mission to the two countries, and in December, reported to the Council that conditions on the ground did not permit the deployment of a full-fledged peacekeeping operation, but only a robust monitoring and protection mission.

**Security Council request (August).** On 31 August the Security Council, by resolution 1706(2006) (see p. 282), decided that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) should deploy to Darfur to assist in addressing regional security issues, in liaison with international efforts to improve the security situation along the borders of the Sudan with Chad and the Central African Republic, including by establishing a presence in key locations in Chad, including in the internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and if necessary, in the Central African Republic. The Council also requested UNMIS to contribute to the implementation of the 26 July N’Djamena Agreement between the Sudan and Chad (see p. 299).

On 20 September, the AU Peace and Security Council, in a communiqué, encouraged any steps that could be taken, including by the United Nations, to enhance security along the Sudan/Chad and Sudan/Central African Republic borders, as well as to ensure the protection of refugees in Chad.

**Security Council mission.** The Secretary-General, in response to the Security Council request in resolution 1706(2006) that he make recommendations for a UN presence along the borders of Chad, the Central African Republic and the Sudan,
sent a technical assessment mission to Chad and the Central African Republic from 21 November to 3 December. The mission met with President Déby of Chad and President Bozizé of the Central African Republic, senior Government officials, political leaders from both majority and opposition parties, and civil society, humanitarian and human rights representatives. In the Central African Republic, the team met with the commander of the FOMUC multinational force, as well as with a joint EU-AU mission, which was in the country to conduct a midterm review of FOMUC.

Due to the security situation, the mission was not able to visit the north-eastern region of the Central African Republic and eastern Chad, both of which bordered the Darfur region of the Sudan. The visit to Chad was also curtailed, as the team was held up in Bangui for two days due to security concerns, following a major rebel attack on Abéché and other areas in eastern Chad at the end of November. Only a part of the team subsequently travelled to N’Djamena, as it became clear that a field visit to eastern Chad would not be possible.

**Report of Secretary-General (December).** In a December report [S/2006/1019] on Chad and the Central African Republic, based on the mission’s findings, the Secretary-General outlined some preliminary options for the mandate, structure and operations of a possible UN presence in both countries. According to the report, the Darfur conflict had clearly spilled over into Chad and the conflict there, and those in Chad and the Central African Republic, were increasingly interlinked. The situation in the border areas had deteriorated considerably and was threatening peace and security in the whole region. The humanitarian and human rights situations had also worsened and had a serious impact on the civilian populations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic.

In Chad, rebel groups had exploited the volatile situation in the border areas to launch increasingly coordinated attacks against the national army. The rebel groups reportedly comprised significant numbers of former army officers, as well as non-Chadians, including Sudanese nationals. In addition, some Sudanese armed elements appeared to be present in north-eastern Chad. Following the 8 February Tripoli Agreement between Chad and the Sudan ending the conflict between them (see p. 297) and the 26 July N’Djamena Agreement (see p. 299), Chad and the Sudan agreed to establish a joint mechanism to monitor the border situation. However, the Agreements had not been implemented and relations between the two countries deteriorated considerably, with both parties accusing each other of supporting rebel groups and mercenaries to destabilize their respective Governments. Rebel and criminal activities, as well as inter-ethnic clashes, increased in eastern Chad, while Janjaweed militias based in the Sudan launched raids into Chad, looting and pillaging. On 13 November, Chad declared a state of emergency in the eastern part of the country. Following a brief occupation of Abéché, in eastern Chad, by rebels on 25 November, the upsurge of rebel activities in the Abéché area and threats to attack N’Djamena, the Government, on 28 November, declared that it was in a state of war with the Sudan.

The conflict in Darfur and the instability in northern Central African Republic created a humanitarian crisis in Chad. As at 30 November, Chad was hosting approximately 232,000 refugees from Darfur, and an additional 48,000 from the Central African Republic. Altogether, some 92,000 Chadians had been displaced in the eastern part of the country as a consequence of the upsurge in fighting, out of a total population of about 1.1 million.

The technical assessments mission confirmed that the Darfur conflict had spilled over into Chad, with serious consequences for the country and beyond, while, in the Central African Republic, the Government asserted that the Sudan was backing the rebels in the northeast. At the same time, the north-east of the Central African Republic had been used by Chadian rebel groups to bypass the Darfur-Chad border, thereby destabilizing the north-eastern Central African prefecture of Vakaga.

The deployment of the UN presence envisaged in resolution 1706(2006) had been discussed with the Presidents of both countries. President Bozizé called for the deployment of UN troops as soon as possible, while President Déby indicated his acceptance, in principle, but wanted the nature, strength and composition to be further discussed.

The Secretary-General observed that the situation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic was extremely fluid, with ongoing hostilities between the respective Governments and rebel groups, especially in Chad. There were limited prospects for dialogue and reconciliation between the Governments and the rebels. Similarly, there were no signs of a credible and inclusive political process in Darfur. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic would face considerable risks, and its safe entry would depend on the consent of the parties. Otherwise, any UN presence could become the target of attacks by rebel groups, if they were to perceive it as interfering with their cross-border activities. Unless all the parties
concerned were to agree to a ceasefire and engage in an intra- and inter-State dialogue aimed at a political solution, a UN force would be operating in the midst of continuing hostilities and would have no clear exit strategy. The Secretary-General held the view that the conditions for an effective peacekeeping operation did not seem to be in place.

However, should the Council decide to pursue the idea, it should authorize the deployment of a robust monitoring and protection mission to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, monitor the human rights situation and strengthen the local judicial, police and correctional system. In addition to monitoring and reporting on the cross-border activities of armed groups along the border with Darfur, such a force would provide protection to civilians under imminent threat in its deployment areas, deter attacks by armed groups and react preemptively to protect civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council consider dispatching an advance team to the two countries to collect more information on the situation in the border areas, explore the possibilities of a political agreement and conduct detailed planning and logistical preparation.

Uganda

Communications. On 5 January [S/2006/13], Canada asked the Security Council to place the situation in northern Uganda on its agenda for immediate consideration. The humanitarian situation there, Canada said, was nothing short of catastrophic, with 1.7 million displaced persons confined to over 200 squalid and unsafe camps, and over 90 per cent of the rural population enduring those conditions. The main cause of the displacement was the conflict that had plagued northern Uganda for almost 20 years, and in which the insurgent group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), had attacked the population, raided the camps and abducted over 25,000 children, who had been forced into fighting or sexual slavery. There was a serious and growing threat to regional peace and security, as the LRA was bringing its violence into neighbouring countries. LRA had long taken refuge in the south of the Sudan, and its violence during recent months had interrupted the return of refugees and displaced persons to that country, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [YUN 2005, p. 301] that had ended the north-south conflict in the Sudan. More recently, the LRA had entered the eastern part of the DRC.

Canada outlined a number of steps the Council could take to address the situation, including calling upon all parties to ensure safe access to civilian populations for aid agencies, and for LRA to hand over those individuals indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Council should insist that all States in the region cease their support for LRA; call upon all parties to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict; and call for tripartite talks between Uganda, the DRC and the Sudan to ensure a coordinated response to LRA activity in the region.

On 16 January [S/2006/29], Uganda transmitted to the Council its position paper on the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda, which gave a factual account of the situation and of the Government’s efforts to address it. Any call for putting the situation on the Council’s agenda was therefore unjustified, Uganda said. The paper outlined the Government’s policy recommendations for resolving the LRA problem and the humanitarian situation.

Uganda said that the LRA, a renegade faction of the defeated Uganda National Liberation Army, which had re-organized under the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena, had opted to continue fighting, despite the peace treaty signed in 1988. After their defeat, Joseph Kony emerged to take over the reigns of those forces under the new name “the Lord’s Resistance Army” and by March 2002, had some 3000 armed fighters. The LRA operated in northern Uganda until 1994, when it started operating out of southern Sudan. Since 1998, the Uganda Peoples Defence Force had undertaken a number of military campaigns to dislodge the LRA. As a result, only a few remnants were located in South Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, Apach and Lira districts and some areas of southern Sudan and the DRC/Uganda border in the Garamba National Park. Several peace initiatives had been undertaken over the years, the latest in 2004, when contact was initiated between the Government and the LRA. The Government responded positively and declared a ceasefire and a safe zone for conducting the talks, but as at 31 December 2004, the Government team was still waiting for the LRA team to turn up. Due to the neutralization of its various fighters and their commanders, the LRA structure had broken down, reducing their capacity to plan. The losses incurred had also reduced their manpower, and defections of its senior commanders had further demoralized the force. Cooperation with the Government of the Sudan since 2000 enabled Uganda to dislodge the LRA from its major bases. Between 2002 and 2005, 17,779 abductees were rescued and handed over to various reception centres. The Uganda Peoples Defence Force continued to rescue those remaining in captivity, and had retrained and absorbed into its ranks LRA defectors. The ICC had indicted
Mr. Kony and four other LRA leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

As a way forward, Uganda recommended that sustained political and diplomatic pressure be put on the DRC and the Sudan to disarm and arrest or neutralize the remaining LRA elements in their territories and arrest and hand over those indicted; the AU efforts to disarm all groups in eastern DRC, including LRA elements in Garamba National Park be fully supported; increase support be provided to Uganda to modernize and equip its army; and humanitarian support increased, including financing for the National Resettlement Strategic Plan for internally displaced persons.

Security Council meeting on the Great Lakes Region (January). During the Security Council’s 27 January meeting [meeting 5359] on the situation in the Great Lakes region (see p. 121), Uganda’s Minister for Foreign Affairs said that his country wanted to engage the Council on the question of the LRA, a terrorist group that had inflicted tremendous suffering on the people of northern Uganda and southern Sudan, as well as the DRC. The Uganda People’s Defence Force had single-handedly fought against the LRA. Uganda was committed to working with the Secretary-General, the core partner countries (Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom), as well as with the EU and NGOs in addressing the humanitarian challenges of the situation in northern Uganda. Although the military campaign had not been completely eliminated, the LRA threat had been weakened, as it was reduced from a force of 3,000 to about 500-600 through defections and capture. Uganda was convinced that the LRA leadership would be captured and handed over to the ICC if it crossed back into the country. The Government had embarked on a number of peace initiatives to resolve the conflict. The 2000 Amnesty Act, and its implementing Amnesty Commission, were in place and some 2000 LRA rebels had taken advantage of it.

Uganda said that it had circulated to the Council a document detailing the Government’s commitment to effective interventions, in cooperation with UN agencies and NGOs, to deal with the humanitarian situation in northern Uganda. It called upon the Council to urge those countries and groups that provided financial, material and logistical support to the LRA to cease such support; and the DRC and the Sudan to disarm the LRA and cooperate with ICC in arresting and handing over LRA terrorist leaders.

Security Council consideration (April). Briefing the Security Council on 19 April [meeting 5415], Uganda’s Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs asked the Council to support strong measures to disarm the LRA. Defence Minister Amama Mbabazi called for combined regional efforts to disarm, capture or arrest the indicted LRA terrorist leaders and hand them over to ICC. He also proposed an arrangement with the DRC, similar to the one between Uganda and the Sudan, by which the Ugandan defence force would be allowed to enter Congolese territory and hand over LRA terrorists, under close supervision of the United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC). He also urged that MONUC and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) be mandated to forcefully disarm the LRA operating in the countries of their responsibility. Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa also informed the Council of the Joint Monitoring Committee and an emergency action plan for humanitarian intervention to be launched by President Museveni on 26 April.

On 28 April [S/2006/271], Uganda submitted a draft concept paper on the proposed regional mechanism to deal with the LRA as a threat to regional peace and security.

Report of Secretary-General report (June). In a June report [S/2006/478] submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1663(2006) (see p. 259), the Secretary-General said that for two decades the LRA had inflicted enormous suffering on the Acholi, the very ethnic group on whose behalf it claimed to be fighting. The conflict had claimed an estimated 100,000 victims. Throughout the two-decade insurgency, LRA had made the civilian population the target of most of its activity, carrying out abductions of children and adults, extrajudicial killings and sexual and gender-based violence, mostly rape and torture.

Although LRA forces were believed to have diminished over the past years, it remained active in the border regions between the DRC, Uganda and southern Sudan, and despite its reduced numbers, it presented a real threat and added to the security problems in the Great Lakes region. While it seemed to consist of no more than several hundred combatants, it had a proven ability to regroup and continue committing atrocities.

The Secretary-General observed that implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement [YUN 2005, p. 301] in southern Sudan had enhanced the opportunity for peace in northern Uganda. However, the challenges created by two decades of conflict required greater effort by all concerned, including building mutual trust between the Government and the Acholi community, as immediate prospects for a political settlement remained uncertain. The regional impact of the insurgency was a cause for further concern, which was underscored by the clash in
January between MONUC peacekeepers and the LRA in Garamba National Park. The crisis in northern Uganda went beyond the confrontation between the Ugandan Government and the LRA. It was fuelled, in part, by the general resentment of the population in that region against perceived economic, political and social exclusion.

The Secretary-General, noting the call for the establishment of a panel of experts to expose the sources of material and financial support for the LRA, recommended that Member States examine what possible action they could take in respect of LRA sources of funding and, in that regard, the Security Council should decide on the advisability of establishing a new sanctions mechanism. He also urged the Council to endorse and support the implementation of the national peace, recovery and development plan for northern Uganda, which would provide a framework for international involvement in efforts to address the root causes and implications of the LRA insurgency. He urged the Core Group to work with the Government on the issues of socioeconomic reintegration of former LRA combatants and assistance to internally displaced persons and other affected groups, and donors to support the efforts of the Amnesty Commission. Dealing with the regional implications of LRA activities remained the responsibility of the regional Governments, and while UNMIS and MONUC could provide assistance, they should not be seen as an alternative to the authorities in the LRA-affected region in the maintenance of law and order. Governments of the region had the capacity to address the LRA threat, if they could find a way to strengthen cooperation among their security forces to deal more effectively with it. However, UN agencies needed to work closer with Member States in gathering and sharing information about the LRA. The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of LRA elements should be encouraged through the establishment of a formal mechanism, and a focused and comprehensive approach should be taken to help Uganda address the challenges of recovery, rehabilitation and sustained development. The Secretary-General urged the international community to support Uganda during the development and implementation of its peace, recovery and development plan. He noted the proposal by some Member States for the appointment of a special envoy to help Uganda deal with the situation created by LRA activities. However, while President Museveni had agreed in principle with the idea, the mandate still had to be agreed upon, as the Government was reluctant to accept a special envoy to deal with what it considered domestic issues.

Commenting on the report in a 20 July letter [S/2006/558] to the Council President, Uganda said that the humanitarian situation had changed dramatically. Congestion in the internally displaced persons camps had been addressed, many people were returning to their villages and the Government was providing people with tools to farm and build houses. The Joint Monitoring Committee, to which the Government was fully committed, was adequate to address the humanitarian situation and foster reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration. Uganda reiterated its position on the appointment of a special envoy, whose mandate should be limited to coordinating regional efforts to arrest and disarm LRA fighters, especially the indicted leaders. It did not see the need for a group of experts to trace the sources of LRA funding and arms. Instead, all efforts should be directed at arresting LRA leaders, and UNMIS and MONUC should have a robust mandate to disarm them. Noting that the task of dealing with LRA was being left largely to the Governments of the region, Uganda was of the view that the Security Council, with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, had to be a key player in arresting LRA members.

Uganda-LRA agreement. On 26 August, Uganda and the LRA signed, in Juba, the Sudan, an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, which Uganda transmitted [S/2006/861] to the Security Council on 3 November. By the Agreement, the parties agreed to cease all hostile military action, as well as media and propaganda campaigns; identify the places of assembly of LRA forces; and guarantee safe passage to LRA forces moving to the assembly points, which should be completed in three weeks. They also agreed to the creation of a Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team. An addendum to the Agreement [S/2006/944], signed in Juba on 1 November, addressed issues such as violations, the determination of hostile propaganda, monitoring, additional obligations of the Government of Southern Sudan, and mechanisms to review implementation of the Agreement.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 16 November [meeting 5566], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/45 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council welcomes efforts aimed at bringing to an end the long-running conflict in northern Uganda, and is following closely the Juba talks process between the Government of the Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
The conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army has caused the displacement of up to 2 million people and the death of about 100,000 people in the region, as well as leading to the death of 8 United Nations peacekeepers.

The Council welcomes the cessation of hostilities which took effect on 29 August 2006, and was renewed on 1 November 2006, and stresses the importance, for peace and stability in the region, of both parties respecting that cessation of hostilities. The Council commends the Government of Southern Sudan for facilitating this agreement and for its efforts to further a long-term and peaceful solution to the conflict, and calls upon all parties to commit themselves fully to this end.

The Council demands that the Lord’s Resistance Army immediately release all women, children and other non-combatants, in accordance with Council resolution 1612(2005) on children and armed conflict, and that the peace process be concluded expeditiously.

The Council will continue to monitor developments closely. It invites Member States to support efforts to bring this conflict to an end so that peace and security can be restored to the region and the rule of law re-established, and to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice.

The Council welcomes the briefing provided by the Secretary on 7 November 2006, which it will consider further, in particular in the light of progress in the Juba talks process. It recalls the briefing provided on 19 April 2006 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Uganda, the visit to Uganda by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in June 2006 and the briefings provided by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs on northern Uganda on 20 April and 15 September 2006.

The Council welcomes the announcement by the Government of Uganda of the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Committee to oversee the delivery of a prioritized Emergency Action Plan to tackle the humanitarian issues in northern Uganda, looks forward to further progress on improving the living conditions for civilians in northern Uganda, measurable against clear benchmarks, and urges Member States to maintain their support to these efforts. It also welcomes the work done by the Government of Uganda so far on its Peace, Recovery and Development Plan to address the long-term needs of the region.

Appointment of Special Envoy. On 30 November [S/2006/930], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano as his Special Envoy for the LRA-affected areas. The regional dimensions of LRA activities, the Secretary-General said, required a comprehensive and sustained approach pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1653(2006) and 1663(2006) (see p. 122 & 259), which called for his recommendations on how the United Nations could address the problem. He had decided to offer his good offices to the countries of the region and, following consultations with Uganda and other countries in the region, to appoint a Special Envoy, who would facilitate the search for a root cause political solution to address the root causes of the conflict, develop a cohesive and forward-looking policy approach and liaise with icc, UN missions in the Great Lakes Region and other actors.

Rwanda

Arms embargo

On 9 March [S/2006/164], the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918(1994) [YUN 1994, p. 285] concerning the arms embargo against non-governmental forces in Rwanda issued a report on its activities from 1 January to 31 December 2005. During the reporting period, no violations were brought to the Committee’s attention.

On 28 December [S/2006/1049], the Committee reported to the Council on its activities from 1 January to 31 December 2006, which included three informal consultations on 25 April, 10 August and 3 November. On 10 March, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 138] (the DRC Committee) observed that an arms export/import transaction between Bulgaria and the Government of Rwanda, referred to in the report of the Group of Experts on the DRC (see p. 142), might fall under the Council’s request that States notify the Committee of such imports/exports. In a 10 November reply, the Committee stated that Bulgaria and Rwanda had acted in accordance with previous Committee judgements; however, the Committee was reviewing the notification requirement mechanism for any future arms transfer to the Government of Rwanda.

The Committee informed the Council that, due to differing views among its members, it was unable to reach agreement on future notification requirements, and asked the Council to decide on that issue.

Information and outreach programme

In June [A/60/863], the Secretary-General issued a report on the information and outreach programme entitled “The Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations”. The General Assembly had requested that programme, in resolution 60/225 [YUN 2005, p. 216], to mobilize civil society for Rwanda genocide victim remembrance and education, in order to help prevent future acts of genocide. The responsibility for developing the information and outreach campaign was assigned to the Department of Public Information, which in addition to its partnerships with civil society and NGOs, forged new relationships with groups working on human rights, geno-
cide and women’s development issues, particularly those in the Great Lakes Region and Rwanda. The report outlined action taken by the Department to establish the programme in the first six months of its mandate.

The programme, which was being implemented in consultation with interested Member States, including Rwanda, focused on two key themes: the prevention of genocide, especially the responsibility to protect; and genocide victim remembrance, with an emphasis on the impact of genocide on women, including victims of sexual violence. The two-year information and outreach programme, launched at UN Headquarters (5-7 April) and simultaneously in 11 other countries, coincided with the twelfth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide. The programme aimed to raise the awareness of civil society and the public at large on the need to recognize, at the earliest possible stages, the danger signs associated with genocide, and to seek help early to prevent its further development.

**West Africa**

In 2006, despite progress achieved in the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in West Africa, the region still faced significant challenges, such as illicit cross-border issues, institutional weaknesses, slow economic recovery, difficulties in security sector reform, the demilitarization, demobilization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) continued to bring a regional perspective to issues, promote conflict prevention and raise awareness about subregional problems, in particular, youth unemployment and migration. It worked in close collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to assist governments in improving security, ensuring humanitarian access and energizing peace processes.

In Côte d’Ivoire, efforts continued to move the peace process forward through the implementation of the 2005 Pretoria Agreement on the peace process in that country, and Security Council resolution 1633(2005), which provided a road map to guide the country towards the achievement of the Agreement. The ceasefire, monitored by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French Licorner forces, continued to hold, with no major violations of the UN imposed arms embargo. However, the peace process was impeded by political stalemates, disagreements over procedures for the preparation of voter lists and identification processes, and missed deadlines for the completion of crucial tasks in the peace process, such as dismantling of militias and identification of the population. Violent demonstrations, inflammatory statements and deliberate acts to obstruct the implementation of those processes further impeded progress. As the 31 October deadline for the holding of presidential elections was not met, regional leaders established new arrangements and guidelines for another twelve-month transition period, allowing President Gbagbo to remain as Head of State, and clarifying the role and authority of Prime Minister Banny, in order to address ambiguities that had arisen in the previous transition period.

In Liberia, the January inauguration of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf as President of Liberia and Africa’s first elected woman Head of State, and the installment of a new Government signaled the completion of the two-year transitional process stipulated in the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. President Johnson-Sirleaf addressed issues of corruption and governance reform and enacted measures to enhance transparency and accountability in the Government, which led to the lifting of UN sanctions. With the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, ECOWAS and other regional and international actors, Liberia made progress in several areas, including the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; the launching of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and the establishment of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme. In the light of that progress, the United Nations set benchmarks for the drawdown of its Mission in the country.

Meanwhile, events in Sierra Leone were dominated by efforts to further consolidate the peace and stability achieved in previous years. Preparations for the 2007 elections progressed, with the establishment of regional offices by the National Electoral Commission and completion of the boundary delimitation process, which would enable the elections to be constituency-based for the first time in two decades. Other developments included the signing by eight registered parties of a Political Parties Code of Conduct for the elections, the selection of Sierra Leone as one of the first countries to be considered by the Peacebuilding Commission and its eligibility to benefit from the Peacekeeping Fund. The transition from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, established to support the Government in consolidating peace, building national capacity and preparing for the 2007 elec-
tions, was successfully completed. However, youth unemployment, rampant corruption, dire economic conditions and tension along the borders, especially with Guinea, were potential threats to stability.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone continued to try those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean laws committed in the territory of Sierra Leone. The apprehension and transfer of the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, into the Court’s custody in Freetown, and then later to The Hague, Netherlands, where he would stand trial, was a major achievement towards the completion of the Court’s mandate.

In Guinea-Bissau, political tensions, which had surfaced following the 2005 presidential elections, polarized the new National Popular Assembly. Dialogue initiatives among the different factions and political groupings, such as the “Estados Gerai”, were launched, with the support of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and ECOWAS, which established an International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau. The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) continued to assist the country in further consolidating peace and promoting national reconciliation. It used its good offices to build on the progress already achieved and played a critical advisory role in supporting national efforts towards security sector reform. In view of those developments, the Secretary-General streamlined UNOGBIS mandate to highlight its mediation and good offices functions.

Cameroon and Nigeria continued to cooperate peacefully to advance progress in implementing the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice on the land and maritime boundary between them, through the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.

The worsening economic and social conditions in Guinea led to unprecedented national strikes and demonstrations over low wages, soaring prices and government inefficiency, some of which escalated into violence. The Secretary-General expressed his concern over the killing of some 10 students during the demonstrations and appealed to all social and political circles in the country to pursue constructive dialogue.

**Regional issues**

**Peace consolidation in West Africa**

**Security Council consideration.** The Security Council held an open debate on 9 August [meeting 5509] on peace consolidation in West Africa. To guide its deliberations, the Council had before it a concept paper [S/2006/610] on the subject, submitted by Ghana. Ghana noted that the political instability that had afflicted West Africa as a result of violent internal conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone had for the most part subsided, creating a unique opportunity for nation-building and the promotion of sustainable development. Over the years, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Security Council had been actively engaged in addressing the question of peace and security in the region, both through separate initiatives and collaboratively. The Council’s debate, which was being held at the ministerial level, was therefore an opportunity for UN members to propose concrete and realistic recommendations to enable the Council to formulate definitive measures spanning the peace consolidation spectrum of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The themes to be discussed included conflict prevention; human security and economic development to achieve sustainable peace; and the development of more complementary relationships between ECOWAS/African Union (AU)/United Nations and other regional organizations. Issues underpinning those themes related to the strengthening of national institutional capacity; promotion of health and education; transparent management of natural resources and the economy; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; post-conflict recovery and reconstruction; mobilization of resources; establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems to assess local and external actors’ performance; strengthening of international cooperation between the UN/ECOWAS/AU and other regional organizations; and the role of the Peacebuilding Commission.

In his statement to the Council, the Secretary-General said that political stability and prosperity continued to elude most West African countries. The region remained plagued by widespread shortcomings in governance, hampering progress in social and economic development. As conflicts in one country often spread and created problems in neighbouring countries, he stressed the need to focus on ending conflicts in the region and developing meaningful peacebuilding initiatives, including reconciliation and confidence-building processes, as well as mechanisms for strengthening the rule of law, especially in the fragile post-conflict countries of Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone.

Building on themes proposed in the concept paper (see above), the Council President said that the peace consolidation strategy should focus on
six broad objectives: resolving ongoing conflicts or at least preventing their escalation; preventing a relapse in countries emerging from war, and new outbreaks of conflict; developing institutional frameworks and capacities for peace initiatives; mobilizing the required resources for peace initiatives; and addressing the underlying causes of conflict in a comprehensive manner. Those objectives should translate into programmes and plans of action, the details of which could be elaborated during the Council’s debate. Issues posing clear and immediate danger to security in West Africa should be immediately addressed, namely: the completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process for ex-combatants, particularly for child soldiers and mercenaries; cross-border issues, such as the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; illegal dealings in natural resources; narcotics smuggling; human trafficking; repatriation of refugees; and resettlement of internally displaced persons.

The Special Representative for West Africa and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa, Mr. Ould-Abdallah, said that the region was in transition from the era of single parties to one of multiparty democracy and from State-run to private sector-led economies. Moreover, changing demographics, which indicated that 60 percent of the ECOWAS population of 270 million inhabitants was under 30 years old and mostly unemployed, represented a further threat to stability. For two decades, war had been the primary employer, and legitimate employment alternatives were essential to move forward. The informal migration of young people, sometimes referred to as “clandestine migration” was also emerging as a major political challenge for Governments of the sub-region. He cited other destabilizing factors, such as the vulnerability of border zones as shelters to criminal activity, the lessening visibility of well-established religious groups carrying out social functions formerly performed by the State and the development of piracy on the high seas. Despite those challenges, he said, West Africa was making progress and was more integrated politically and economically than it had been in the past. The Special Representative credited the work of ECOWAS as contributing to that progress. He identified youth unemployment, unauthorized immigration and conflict prevention as areas requiring immediate attention.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 9 August [meeting 5509], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/38 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council, recalling its relevant resolutions and the statements by its President, stresses the importance of addressing the issue of peace consolidation in West Africa in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. It recognizes the need for such an approach for durable solutions to the conflicts in West Africa and to explore ways and means to promote sustainable peace, security and development.

The Council welcomes the transition from war to democratic rule in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, as well as current efforts aimed at implementing measures leading to free and fair elections in Côte d’Ivoire. It also notes that the security situation in those countries remains generally stable but fragile.

The Council stresses the need to build the capacity of national institutions to address the root causes of conflict as an essential part of peace consolidation, especially in the areas of political and economic governance as well as the rule of law and the fight against impunity.

The Council recalls the measures it has implemented on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the region and encourages member States of the Economic Community of West African States to promote transparent and sustainable exploitation of such resources.

The Council stresses the primary role of each West African Government in peace consolidation for the benefit of all citizens and reiterates the importance of all leaders working together for peace and security in the region.

The Council considers that illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons still poses a threat to peace and security in the region. In this connection, it welcomes the decision of member States of the Economic Community of West African States to transform the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa into a binding Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. It further urges all States, both within and outside the region, to ensure compliance with its existing arms embargoes in West Africa, and States within the Economic Community to ratify the Convention as soon as possible to enable it to come into effect promptly.

The Council considers that civil society, including women’s organizations, has a role to play in supporting peace consolidation initiatives in the region and that their efforts in this regard deserve to be supported as appropriate.

The Council underlines the crucial importance of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, taking into account the special needs of child soldiers and women, and encourages the international community to work in close partnership with the countries concerned. It further affirms the need to find lasting solutions to the problem of youth unemployment in order to prevent the recruitment of such youth by illegal armed groups.

The Council considers reform of the security sector an essential element for sustainable peace and stability in West Africa and urgently calls upon the donor community and the international financial institutions to coordinate their efforts to support the States concerned.

The Council stresses the continued need for assisting West African States and the Economic Community of West African States to curb illicit cross-border activities.

The Council reiterates the importance of finding effective solutions to the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons in the region and urges the States in the region, in collaboration with relevant international organizations and donor countries, to create the necessary conditions for their voluntary and safe return.
The Council welcomes the positive role played by the international community and civil society in addressing the humanitarian situation in many parts of the region and urges them to provide adequate resources as part of a coordinated humanitarian response strategy to improve the human security of the people of West Africa in need of such protection.

The Council stresses the need to ensure improved coordination of donor initiatives in order to make the best use of available resources, and encourages donor partners to redeem their pledges in a timely manner.

The Council further stresses the need for continued and enhanced cooperation between the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in peace consolidation initiatives, based on an integrated approach and with the aim of maximizing the use of available resources. In this connection, it commends the role of the United Nations Office for West Africa, as well as other United Nations offices, missions and agencies in the region in facilitating, in close cooperation with the Executive Secretariat and member States of the Economic Community, the achievement of peace and security priorities of the region. It further encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the United Nations missions in the region to continue their efforts in coordinating United Nations activities to ensure their improved cohesion and maximum efficiency.

The Council underscores the importance and the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in assisting countries emerging from conflict to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

The Council emphasizes the regional dimension of peace and security in West Africa and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States, to submit to it by the end of the year a report with recommendations on the cooperation between the United Nations missions deployed in the region and on the cross-border issues in West Africa.

UNOWA

The United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), established by the Secretary-General in 2001 [YUN 2001, p. 162], and extended for three years from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007 on the recommendation of the Secretary-General [YUN 2004, p. 170] and the concurrence of the Security Council [YUN 2005, p. 224], continued to support the Organization’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. UNOWA continued to be headed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) and maintained its headquarters in Dakar, Senegal.

A midterm review of UNOWA was conducted by an independent consultant from 22 September to 30 November 2006, encompassing visits to UN Headquarters in New York and UNOWA premises in Dakar, to assess progress made in carrying out its mandate, including the enhanced functions assigned to it in 2005 [ibid.]; explore its strengths and constraints and the risks and opportunities it faced; highlight good practices and lessons learned; and offer recommendations for future policy and practice. Feedback on the work of UNOWA obtained from UN entities with regional offices in West Africa, ECOWAS and other key international partners of the region was also incorporated into the review.

UNOWA activities

During the year, UNOWA held regular meetings with the heads of UN operations and regional offices in West Africa to develop an integrated approach to conflict prevention and management, and to promote peace, security and development in the region. It continued to monitor the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire; promoted the electoral processes in Benin and Mauritania; convened regional meetings to consolidate peace in West Africa; and addressed the avian flu epidemic in Nigeria and its impact on the sub-region. In April, UNOWA warned that increasing levels of youth unemployment in West Africa—with almost three quarters of the population under 30 years of age—posed a serious threat to security and stability in the region. A second edition of UNOWA “Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West Africa” study was published in August, which highlighted, among other measures, the need to increase regional economic integration and address the issue of illegal checkpoints, as they represented a significant impediment to free circulation and trade. UNOWA also issued a study entitled “Life after State House: Addressing Unconstitutional Changes in West Africa”, which focused on military coups in West Africa and their impact.

UNOWA financing

In a January report [A/60/585/Add.1] on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, the Secretary-General submitted the proposed budget for UNOWA, which amounted to $4,150,400 for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2006. The estimated requirements would provide for a new military adviser; a civilian staffing component; services of experts and consultants; official travel; and other operational requirements.

In March [A/60/7/Add.37], the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) recommended acceptance of the Secretary-General’s recommendations. The Committee also looked forward to the results of the mid-term review of UNOWA scheduled for July 2006 (see above).

On 8 May, in Section I of resolution 60/255, the Assembly endorsed ACABQ conclusions and recommendations (see p. 1618).
Other regional developments

Throughout the year ECOWAS continued efforts to realize its peace consolidation strategy, particularly in the area of security sector reform and the on-going process of articulating an ECOWAS conflict prevention framework, as envisaged during the 2004 Security Council mission to region [YUN 2004, p. 169]. On 14 June 2006, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government signed the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, to replace the 1998 moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons [YUN 1998, p. 537]. The Convention would provide a legal basis for the control of small arms in West Africa and address the issue of their illicit trafficking and proliferation (see p. 684). The second and third memoranda on the ECOWAS Cross-Border Initiatives Programme, aimed at compiling, coordinating and formalizing West African cross-border initiatives to increase cooperation frameworks on intra-community borders, were issued in January and December, respectively.

During the year, ECOWAS also restructured its Executive Secretariat into a nine-member Commission to enable the institution to be more effective and allow ECOWAS parliamentarians to fully play their role in the integration process. The Commission, which would be composed of the President, Vice-President and seven Commissioners, would start functioning from January 2007.

Côte d’Ivoire

In 2006, concerted efforts by the United Nations, ECOWAS, the AU and the international community helped to move the Côte d’Ivoire peace process forward. Further progress was made in the implementation of the 2005 Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d’Ivoire [YUN 2005, p. 232] and Security Council resolution 1633(2005) [ibid., p. 243], which provided a road map for the transition period. A Zone of Confidence separated troops belonging to the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (Fanci), deployed in the Government-controlled south of the country, from those of the rebel movement, Forces nouvelles, deployed in the north. The main responsibility for peacekeeping rested with the Licorne (French forces), whose deployment was endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1464(2003) [YUN 2003, p. 168]. Those efforts were supported by the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), established by the Council in resolution 1528(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 173] to, among other things, monitor the May 2003 ceasefire and movements of armed groups, assist in the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of ex-combatants and support humanitarian assistance and implementation of the peace process. The Mission was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In February, the Council authorized the redeployment of one infantry battalion from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI, and in June, it authorized an increase in UNOCI military strength by 1,500 troops, bringing the Mission’s total military strength to 8,115 personnel. The Council also increased the number of UN police officers to 1,200.

During the year, the ceasefire monitored by UNOCI and the French Licorne forces continued to hold, and there were no major violations of the UN imposed arms embargo. However, the target dates for disarmament processes, including the pre-cantonnement of combatants, the dismantling of militias and the identification of the population, were not met; nor was the 31 October deadline for the holding of presidential elections. In an effort to break the political stalemate, the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting in Yamoussoukro, in July, where the Ivorian parties reaffirmed their commitment to implement the disarmament, identification and electoral processes outlined in the road map for peace in resolution 1633(2005) and set deadlines for the completion of specific crucial tasks. Nevertheless, disagreements over voters’ lists and the identification of the population, in particular the issuance of certificates of nationality by mobile courts, impeded the peace process. Demonstrations and violent protests by militia groups intent on disrupting the identification process and inflammatory statements by political leaders escalated tensions. A toxic waste dumping incident in late July, which became a major humanitarian and security crisis, leading to the dissolution of the Government in September, further complicated the situation.

Meanwhile, new disagreements emerged over the responsibilities of the Independent Electoral Commission and the National Institute of Statistics with regard to the preparation of the voter lists and the electoral process. ECOWAS convened an extraordinary summit on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and submitted its recommendations on the way forward to the AU. New arrangements and guidelines were established for another twelve-month transition period, in which President Gbagbo would remain as Head of State; the role and authority of Prime Minister Banny were more clearly delineated to address ambiguities that had arisen in the previous
transition period; and elections would be held in October 2007. The Security Council endorsed the new arrangements in November.

In the latter months of 2006, the political atmosphere deteriorated further, with deepening disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister, one of which resulted in the dismissal by Presidential decree of the Director General and management board of Radio Télévision Ivorienne. The incident prompted renewed hostilities and demonstrations to protest the President’s decisions. Despite the setbacks, optimism remained that the new transition period, drawing upon lessons learned and building on progress achieved, would move the country out of the current impasse and relaunch the key processes of the road map, including the dismantling and disarming of militias, security sector reform, restoration of State authority throughout the country, and, ultimately, the holding of national elections by October 2007.

**Political and security developments**

**Report of Secretary-General (January).** In his January progress report on UNOCI [S/2006/2], the Secretary-General said that the October 2005 decision of the AU Peace and Security Council [YUN 2005, p. 241], followed by the adoption of Security Council resolution 1633(2005) [ibid., p. 243] and the efforts of regional leaders [ibid., p. 246], played a crucial role in preventing a dangerous political and security crisis from developing in Côte d’Ivoire and gave the peace process a new lease on life. Going forward, all Ivorian parties would therefore have to extend full cooperation to the new Prime Minister and his Government and move expeditiously to implement the outstanding tasks under the peace agreements, including the dismantling of militias, the redeployment of State administration; the identification of nationals, the registration of voters and the organization of elections. They also had to work with the Prime Minister and the High Representative for the elections to resolve the bickering within the Independent Electoral Commission, respect the interim arrangement decided by the International Working Group concerning the enactment of legislation in the interim period [ibid.], respect the human rights of the Ivorian people, guarantee the free movement of the impartial forces throughout the country and create an enabling environment for the holding of the elections. The Secretary-General urged the Prime Minister to work with the AU International Working Group and the Mediation Group to finalize the road map for the transition period and convene the Forum for National Dialogue to ensure full implementation of the outstanding tasks under the peace agreements. He urged the Security Council to consider imposing targeted measures against individuals and groups obstructing the peace process, including incitement to violence, human rights violations and violations of the arms embargo.

However, the challenges ahead were formidable and urgent. The potential for violent disturbances remained very high throughout the country. Despite the semblance of calm following the appointment of the Prime Minister, there was concern over underlying tensions caused by such factors as combatants yet to be disarmed; ethnic and urban militias; extremist groups, such as the Young Patriots; elements who felt disempowered by the post-30 October governance arrangements; the soaring crime rate; and continuing human rights abuses. UNOCI reported an increase in violent acts against opposition political party leaders and some members of the armed forces, as well as extortion and racketeering activities. In the western part of the country, where reports of targeted ethnic killings by militia groups persisted, UNOCI and the impartial forces were obstructed from gaining access to areas dominated by such groups and the Young Patriots. Moreover, militia groups targeted UNOCI equipment for attack, notably in Gagnoa and San Pédro and incited anti-UN sentiment. On a positive note, the overall security assessment indicated that, despite rumors of attacks, the probability of renewed direct conflict between the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (Fanci) and the Forces nouvelles remained relatively low.

In anticipation of the review by the Security Council of UNOCI troop strength, which had been requested by the AU Peace and Security Council in October 2005, the Secretariat sent a technical team to Côte d’Ivoire to assess the Mission’s troop and police strength, taking into consideration the new circumstances since the adoption of resolution 1633(2005). The technical team confirmed that UNOCI troops were stretched thinly throughout the country. Moreover, concurrent implementation of the outstanding tasks under the peace agreements, as stipulated in resolution 1633(2005), would create such a surge in the military, police and civilian support personnel required on the ground that would be difficult, if not impossible, to manage within existing UNOCI resources. It therefore recommended that UNOCI troop strength be increased by four battalions (3,400 troops), including the battalion requested by the Secretary-General in his previous reports, to relieve infantry companies redeployed to reinforce security in Abidjan, and provide a secure environment for the concomitant implementation of the outstanding tasks of the peace agreements.
The team ascertained that no additional support to UNOCI could be expected from the Licorne forces beyond the current arrangements, particularly in the event of a violent crisis. In exploring options for generating the proposed additional troops, the team considered the arrangements under Security Council resolution 1609(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 236], which authorized the temporary redeployment of troops from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to strengthen UNOCI, and concluded that, in the event of a crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, a short notice reinforcement of UNOCI from UNMIL would not be feasible. However, reinforcement from UNMIL for pre-planned tasks, such as the identification process, voter registration and the elections, might be possible. The team also recommended that three additional formed police units (375 officers) and 100 civilian police officers be deployed to the Mission immediately. That would allow the 533 security auxiliaries trained by UN police to be deployed to 54 locations in the northern part of the country, which had been left without any law enforcement since the displacement of 4,000 police and gendarmes by the conflict.

The Secretary-General urged the Council to approve his recommendations for reinforcing the Mission’s strength, as a number of key tasks mandated to UNOCI were scheduled to start in early 2006. He also recommended the extension of UNOCI mandate for 12 months, until 24 January 2007, to adequately cover the post-election period.

**Transitional Government.** On 11 January [S/2006/21], Côte d’Ivoire transmitted to the Security Council President the list of members of the Transitional Government, which was announced on 28 December 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 246] by Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny. The 32-member cabinet, consisting of all parties that were signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement [YUN 2003, p. 166], included two senior Ministers, Guillaume Soros, the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles as Minister of State, Minister responsible for the reconstruction and reintegration programme, and Antoine Bouabré of the ruling Front populaire ivoirien, as Minister of State, Minister of planning and development; and two independent Ministers, René Kouassi, Minister of Defence and Joseph Dja Blé, Minister of Internal Affairs. Prime Minister Banny also assumed the functions of Minister of Economy and Finance, as well as Communication.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


**The Security Council,**

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and in the subregion,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the final communiqué of the International Working Group of 15 January 2006, and reaffirming the mandate of the International Working Group to assist the Prime Minister and his Government in the implementation of the road map it has established, and to evaluate, monitor and follow up closely the implementation of the peace process, in accordance with resolution 1633(2005) of 21 October 2005,

Takingle note of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 January 2006,

Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and of obstacles to the peace and national reconciliation process from all sides,

Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the respective mandates of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and of the French forces supporting it until 15 December 2006;
2. Decides also to extend the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 1609(2005) of 24 June 2005 for the period specified in paragraph 1 above;
3. Expresses its intention to keep under review the tasks and the troop level of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, and specifically to review these when the Security Council considers the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, taking into account the situation in both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, in the light of progress in the implementation of the road map established by the International Working Group, leading to the organization of free, fair, open and transparent elections no later than 31 October 2006;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

**International Working Group meeting (January)**

The International Working Group, created by the AU Peace and Security Council in 2005, and supported by the UN Security Council in resolution 1633(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 243], to evaluate, monitor and follow up the peace process, held its third ministerial meeting on 15 January in Abidjan. In a communiqué issued on the same date, and transmitted by the Secretary-General on 2 February [S/2006/79], the Group, comprising Ministers from
Benin, France, Ghana, Guinea, the Niger, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, congratulated Prime Minister Banny on the formation of the new Government. However, the Group indicated that, after holding extensive consultations with the Ivorian parties on the functioning of State institutions, it had concluded that the mandate of the National Assembly, which ended on 16 December 2005, should not be extended. The Group recommended that, during the transitional period, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Head of State, should entrust specific tasks to experienced former parliamentarians, with a view to promoting peace and national reconciliation. It condemned the 2 January attack on the military barracks in the Akouédo district of Abidjan and the resulting gross violations of the human rights of innocent civilians; encouraged the Government and the impartial forces to create a secure environment for the smooth implementation of the road map; and expressed concern over the inflammatory tone used by some political actors and the media, which ran counter to the spirit of peace and reconciliation. To assure an atmosphere of stability and security for the implementation of the key tasks of the peace process, the Group recommended that the Security Council review the personnel levels of UNOCI military and the police force.

The Security Council, in its Presidential statement S/PRST/2006/2 of 19 January (see p. 180), endorsed the Group’s 15 January communiqué. However, in a communiqué issued the previous day [S/2006/50] following a meeting held the same day between the AU Chairman, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, in the presence of Prime Minister Banny, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, the AU Mediator and the Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, the leaders took the position that, as it did not have the authority to do so, the International Working Group did not dissolve the National Assembly at the end of its 15 January meeting (see above). They invited the Ivorian President and Prime Minister to continue consultations on a political solution, which would be communicated to the nation by the International Working Group, and to urge the population to return to their homes, as well as to work the next day.

In a further letter dated 20 January [S/2006/43], Côte d’Ivoire drew the Security Council’s attention to “misunderstandings” regarding the implementation of resolution 1633(2005), which could seriously endanger the peace process. It stated that the International Working Group had deviated from its defined mandate “to monitor the implementation process”, by reinterpretting the provisions of the aforementioned resolution, particularly when the Group stated at its first meeting on 8 November 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 245] that the Prime Minister had to have “independent executive powers”, which was contrary to the resolution’s terms. Côte d’Ivoire accused the Group of continuing the same approach in its 15 January 2006 communiqué relating to the National Assembly, which had led to protests in Abidjan and a number of towns in the interior of the country. Its decision to oppose the extension of the National Assembly’s mandate not only adversely impacted the functioning of an Ivorian institution, but disregarded the views of the Constitutional Council. Côte d’Ivoire was also concerned that the UN Security Council had endorsed the Group’s final communiqué. While the Government would respect the outcome of the negotiations undertaken by the AU Chairperson, it hoped that the Group would, in future, abide strictly by the terms of its clearly defined mandate, pursuant to resolution 1633(2005).

**Outbreak of violence and National Assembly mandate**

An outbreak of violence early in the year presented a setback in the peace process. The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/222] that from 15 to 20 January, the Young Patriots organized violent demonstrations in Abidjan and in the western areas of the country to protest against the decisions of the International Working Group contained in its 15 January communiqué (see above). The well-orchestrated demonstrations stemmed from the deliberate falsification of the aforementioned communiqué to the effect that the Group had “decided to dissolve the National Assembly in contravention of the country’s sovereignty”. The virulent anti-UN propaganda and incitement of violence, especially on Ivorian Radio and Television and local radio networks, resulted in looting and destruction of assets and property of the United Nations and humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations in the western towns of Daloa, San Pedro and Guiglo. UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, the French Embassy and the 43rd French marine infantry battalion were repeatedly attacked for several days by crowds of the Young Patriots, resulting in extensive damage. The situation was exacerbated by serious inflammatory statements.

On 18 January, the AU Chairman, Nigerian President Obasanjo, visited Abidjan to help defuse the situation. Presidents Obasanjo and Gbagbo issued a joint communiqué (see above) stating that the International Working Group neither had the author-
ity nor had it dissolved the National Assembly, and calling for the cessation of violence. Following the intervention by President Obasajo, demonstrations by the Young Patriots ceased.

EU statement. The European Union (EU) Presidency, in a 19 January statement [S/2006/44], condemned the orchestrated acts of violence that had taken place in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in Abidjan, since 16 January, as well as the attacks on the UNOCI contingent. It called upon all political players to bring an end immediately to such unacceptable acts and requested that all necessary measures be taken to ensure the safety of the international and diplomatic presence in the country.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 19 January [meeting S350], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/2 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council strongly condemns the recent violent attacks against the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and international non-governmental organization facilities in Côte d’Ivoire by street militias and other groups associated with the ‘Young Patriots’, as well as their instigators. The Council also expresses its deep concern at the violent and orchestrated street protests led by the Young Patriots, in particular in Abidjan and in several cities in the west.

The Council regards these particularly serious and unacceptable incidents as endangering the process of national reconciliation enshrined in resolution 1633(2005) and as contrary to that resolution. It calls upon all Ivorians to refrain from any hostile action, and demands the immediate end of this violence and of all hate messages in the media, in particular the attacks against the United Nations. The Council welcomes the urgent mission to Abidjan led by President Obasajo. It pays tribute to his efforts and hopes that they will lead to a rapid decrease in the current tensions on the ground.

The Council also underlines the fact that the occupation of the facilities of Ivorian Radio and Television constitutes an attack against freedom and neutrality of information as well as a breach of the principles of the process of national reconciliation, of previous Council resolutions and of the peace agreements. It demands that effective control by the Board and the General Director over Ivorian Radio and Television be re-established immediately.

The Council reiterates its full support for the Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Konan Banny, and invites the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, in accordance with its mandate, to provide him with all the necessary support. It also reiterates its full support for the International Working Group, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire and the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire. It endorses the final communiqué of the International Working Group of 15 January 2006.

The Council firmly calls upon all the Ivorian parties to cooperate with the Prime Minister, the International Working Group, the Mediation Group, the Special Representative and the High Representative in implementing the road map.

It underlines the fact that targeted measures will be imposed against persons to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) who, among other things, block the implementation of the peace process, including by attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces, of the High Representative or of the International Working Group, or who publicly incite hatred and violence, as provided for in resolutions 1572(2004) and 1643(2005).

Presidential decree on National Assembly mandate. On 27 January, based on the December 2005 recommendations of the Constitutional Council, President Gbagbo signed a decree extending the National Assembly’s mandate. However, opposition parties and the Forces nouvelles rejected the extension, indicating that it was a flagrant violation of Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitution, as well as Security Council resolution 1633(2005).

On 29 January [SG/SM/10328], the Secretary-General issued a statement expressing concern that the Presidential decree on the National Assembly did not appear to be in conformity with the information received from Nigerian President Obasajo on his visit to Abidjan.

Further developments. In the light of the continuing incitement to violence, the Secretary-General issued a further statement, on 1 February, reminding the highest civilian and military authorities of Côte d’Ivoire, including President Gbagbo and the Chief of Staff, General Mangou, of their personal responsibility to prevent violence in the country, such as attacks perpetrated against UN personnel and installations and against ethnic groups.

An extraordinary session of the Parliament from 9 to 16 February, called for by the former Speaker of the National Assembly to review the extension of the mandate of mayors, was attended by 102 of 202 parliamentarians, primarily from the ruling party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), while most of the representatives of the opposition boycotted the meeting. The matter of the extension of the Assembly’s mandate remained unresolved and concerns were raised when reports emerged that another extraordinary session of the National Assembly would be convened, as it might undermine the progress achieved and jeopardize the implementation of the next phases of the peace process.

Security and humanitarian crisis

As a result of the violent demonstrations organized by the Young Patriots (see p. 179), without any resistance on the part of the authorities and often with silent abetting, the security situation deteriorated sharply. There were serious obstructions to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, inter-
rupture of social activities and rampant insecurity in Abidjan, as well as in various parts of Government-controlled areas, particularly Daloa, Guiglo, San Pédro and Yamoussoukro. Violent attacks against United Nations and humanitarian personnel led to the relocation of UNOCI camps to the Zone of Confidence. The growing insecurity and temporary departure of UNOCI troops from the western part of the country forced UN agencies to relocate their personnel, causing a dangerous security and humanitarian vacuum in those areas, leaving nearly 14,000 internally displaced persons, refugees and ethnic minorities unprotected. Humanitarian activities came to a standstill, owing to the destruction by protesters of the offices of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, their relief supplies, warehouses, and communications and other equipment. UNOCI relocated 382 staff to the designated safe haven in the region to minimize high security threats against UNOCI personnel.

On 1 February [S/2006/71], the Secretary-General, pending further consideration by the Security Council of the recommendations in his January report for strengthening UNOCI (see p. 177), and considering the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, sought the Council’s consent for his proposal, under the arrangements provided in Security Council resolution 1609(2005), to temporarily redeploy up to one mechanized infantry battalion and one formed police unit from UNMIL to UNOCI for an initial period of three months. The battalion, which would be deployed to Abidjan in phases, would provide extra security coverage for UN personnel and property and perform other tasks entrusted to UNOCI by the Council.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Taking note of the letter dated 1 February 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Recalling that the current mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia will expire on 31 March 2006,
Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and of obstacles to the peace and national reconciliation process from all sides,
Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to redeploy immediately a maximum of one infantry company from the United Nations Mission in Liberia to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, until 31 March 2006, in order to provide extra security coverage for United Nations personnel and property, and to perform other tasks mandated to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, without prejudice to any future decision by the Security Council concerning the renewal of the mandate and the level of troops of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and a further extension of the redeployment mentioned above;
2. Expresses its intention to review the provisions of paragraph 1 above in thirty days, and by 31 March 2006, in the light of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and in Liberia;
3. Also expresses its intention to keep under review possible additional redeployments of troops between the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Further political and security developments

International Working Group meeting (February). The International Working Group held its fourth ministerial meeting on 17 February, in Abidjan. In the final communiqué issued the same day [S/2006/131], the Group congratulated the Prime Minister on his efforts to implement the road map for peace drawn up by the Group, in particular, his initiative to convene a Government seminar (Yamoussoukro, 9–11 February), which was attended by most Cabinet Ministers, including the Secretary-General of Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, and where it was agreed to establish monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of key aspects of the road map. The Group called upon the Ivorian parties to proceed with the disarmament and identification processes, commit to strictly comply with the ban on public demonstrations and refrain from inflammatory statements or actions likely to exacerbate tensions. It also underscored the need to enhance the security of the personnel and equipment of Ivorian Radio and Television and to ensure its independence and the equitable access of all Ivorian parties to its broadcasts.

The Group endorsed the arbitration by the High Representative for the elections issued in his 16 February communiqué, according to which the election
of the Independent Electoral Commission was in compliance with the Pretoria Agreement; and his recommendation to invite the Head of State, the Prime Minister and the political parties to reach, as soon as possible, a political understanding to ensure the effective functioning of the Independent Electoral Commission, before the beginning of March.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 23 February [meeting 5378], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/9 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council reiterates its full support for the International Working Group and endorses its fourth final communiqué, of 17 February 2006. It commends Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny for his efforts to implement the road map established by the International Working Group in accordance with resolution 1633(2005). The Council reiterates its full support for him. It also welcomes the cooperation between the Prime Minister and the President.

The Council also endorses the arbitration by the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, according to which the election of the Bureau of the Independent Electoral Commission is in compliance with the Pretoria Agreement. It urges the Ivorian parties to ensure the effective functioning of the Commission as soon as possible.

The Council also underscores the imperative to guarantee the independence and neutrality of Ivorian Radio and Television.

The Council urges the Ivorian State authorities to facilitate, notably in the west, the return of humanitarian agencies and organizations.

The Council will review at the beginning of March 2006 the progress made in the implementation of resolution 1633(2005) and the decisions of the International Working Group. It will pay special attention to the functioning of the Independent Electoral Commission, the steps taken in order to guarantee unhindered and equitable access to Ivorian Radio and Television, and the launch of disarmament operations and the identification process.

**Yamoussoukro meetings of Ivorian leaders.**

Pursuant to a recommendation made at the 17 February Government seminar (see above), Prime Minister Banny convened a summit meeting (Yamoussoukro, 28 February) of the main Ivorian political leaders, which included President Gbagbo, former President, Henri Konan Bédié, former Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, and the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. In a communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting, their first such gathering since the crisis began in September 2002, Ivorian leaders reiterated their readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 1633(2005) did not contradict the Ivorian Constitution and should be complied with in a constructive, consensual and coherent manner. The leaders also agreed that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process should commence without further delay; the identification process and preparations for the elections should be conducted simultaneously; and the Independent Electoral Commission Bureau should be reconstituted, based on a balanced representation of political forces. Emphasis was also placed on the central role of Ivorian Radio and Television in the reconciliation process, as well as the need to ensure that all parties had equitable access to its broadcasting facilities.

**International Working Group meeting (March).** On 17 March, in the final communiqué issued following its fifth ministerial meeting held in Abidjan [S/2006/190], the International Working Group commended the political leaders for the 28 February meeting in Yamoussoukro (see above), welcomed the new spirit of political dialogue among the Ivorian political class and called upon leaders to promote that spirit among their followers to ensure that everyone contributed positively to the peace and reconciliation process and desisted from any incitement to hatred or violence. The Group noted the establishment of the Bureau of the Independent Electoral Commission and urged the Commission to ensure that the elections were held no later than 31 October 2006. With regard to the repeated obstructions to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, the Group underscored the imperative of facilitating the immediate redeployment of UNOCI troops to the western part of the country to pursue their peace and security mission, as well as the return of humanitarian agencies to facilitate the resumption of assistance to vulnerable groups. The Group called for the return of that region to civilian authority. It condemned the persistent human rights violations, particularly the attacks against Government Ministers, and called upon the Ivorian parties to combat the growing impunity in the country.

**Communication.** On 22 March [S/2006/184], the Secretary-General, in follow up to his January request to the Security Council to increase UNOCI strength by four battalions (see p. 178), updated the Council on recent developments in the political process in Côte d’Ivoire, which in his view, called for the reinforcement of UNOCI beyond the interim arrangements under which the Council had approved the transfer of one infantry company from UNMIL to UNOCI in February. He cited steps taken by Ivorian leaders to move the peace process forward, such as the seminar and round-table meeting, held respectively from 9 to 11 and 28 February in Yamoussoukro; the swearing-in of the members of the Independent Electoral Commission on 7 March and the subsequent submission to the cabinet of a framework for conducting the identification and
voter registration processes, thereby setting the stage for those crucial aspects of the process to begin; the conduct of school examinations in the northern part of Côte d’Ivoire, the first time since the outbreak of the conflict, and the 14 March arrival of the leader of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro, in Abidjan, to take up his post in the Government of Prime Minister Banny.

The Secretary-General stressed that the recent progress achieved had set in motion a fledgling process, which, if sustained, could put the peace process on track. It was therefore crucial to adequately reinforce UNOCI to enable it to support the full implementation of the road map and the organization of elections by October. Adding that UNOCI should be prepared to support the process, including in the area of security, he appealed to the Council to approve the recommendations contained in his January report.

**Security Council consideration (March).** In a 29 March [meeting 5399] briefing to the Security Council, the Ivorian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Youssouf Bakayoko, said that Côte d’Ivoire had entered a new era, which allowed the peace and reconciliation process to develop significantly. He summarized positive developments that had taken place since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1633(2005), including, among others, the February Yamoussoukro meeting (see p. 182), during which a fourth vice-president post for the ruling Front populaire ivoirienne was established to enable balanced representation of the political forces; the creation of the climate for the implementation of resolution 1633(2005) and the road map; the installation of the Independent Electoral Commission; and the return of the Forces nouvelles Secretary-General Soro after 17 months of absence from Abidjan. Moreover, the University of Bouaké, the headquarters of the Forces nouvelles, had been officially reopened on 28 March.

In the light of the events that created the humanitarian crisis in January, an interministerial commission, including humanitarian agencies, was set up, as a coordination framework for humanitarian action on a national scale, and a Special Counsellor for Humanitarian Action appointed by the Prime Minister. He identified the areas in which further work was required: financing of the electoral process; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; strengthening security throughout the territory to guarantee voter safety; resolving humanitarian problems; supporting human rights; strengthening the capacity of judicial institutions; providing support for the State’s economy and finances to reduce high youth unemployment; and facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons.

The Foreign Minister remarked that the progress attained had to be irreversible and security matters accorded the utmost attention. In an effort to create a more disciplined and professional army, the Government launched, on 21 February, a programme to restore the military barracks. The Minister, in recognition of the need to organize undisputed general elections as the only way out of the crisis, called upon the Secretary-General to appoint as soon as possible a new UN High Representative for the elections, to succeed Antonio Monteiro. Noting that strengthening security throughout the entire national territory was the greatest concern of all Ivorians, he appealed to the Council to support the Secretary-General’s proposal for strengthening UNOCI.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 29 March [meeting 5400], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/14 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council expresses its full support for the International Working Group and endorses its fifth final communiqué, of 17 March 2006. It commends Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny for his initiatives, taken in cooperation with President Laurent Gbagbo, which gave a new momentum to the peace process, and reiterates its full support for him. It also welcomes the efforts of Mr. António Monteiro and encourages the Secretary-General to appoint a new High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, as soon as possible.

The Council welcomes the progress achieved in recent weeks, in particular the meeting of the entire Cabinet, the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission, the organization of examinations in the north, and the preparation of operations of identification of the populations and disarmament.

The Council urges Ivorian leaders to fulfil all their commitments, in particular those made at Yamoussoukro on 28 February 2006, and to rapidly implement the road map, in good faith and in a spirit of trust, in order to organize free, fair, open and transparent elections by 31 October 2006. It underlines the urgency of progress in the identification process, the establishment of the electoral registers and the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

The Council calls upon donor countries to provide the Prime Minister with all the necessary support for the full and immediate implementation of the road map.

The Council nevertheless reiterates its grave concern at the situation in the west. It urges the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire to continue its redeployment in this region. It also calls for the return of this region to civilian authority.

The Council strongly condemns the persistence of violations of human rights, the attacks against members of the Government, the obstacles to the freedom of movement of impartial forces, and the incitements to hatred and violence in the media. In this regard, it requests the Ivorian authorities to guarantee, in close liaison with the United Nations
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, that all steps are taken to preserve the independence of Ivorian Radio and Television.

**Appointment of new High Representative.** In an exchange of letters on 11 [S/2006/242] and 13 April [S/2006/243] between the Secretary-General and the Security Council President, Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland) was appointed High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, replacing Antonio Monteiro.

**Report of Secretary-General (April).** In his April report [S/2006/222] on UNOCI, the Secretary-General said that the formation of the new Government, the resumption of dialogue among the parties, the end of the protracted stalemate over the Independent Election Commission and the return of the Forces nouvelles Secretary-General to the Government were encouraging developments. The positive steps taken by the parties had eased tensions and improved the overall political atmosphere, thereby permitting the redeployment of UNOCI.

Despite those positive developments, the security situation continued to present obstacles in the peace process. The failed attack on the military barracks in the Akouédo district of Abidjan on 2 January had heightened the feeling of insecurity among the population and further undermined confidence among the parties. The Government’s investigation of the matter was inconclusive. The violent demonstrations conducted by the Young Patriots from 15 to 20 January (see p. 179) had also created a security and humanitarian crisis, impacting some 14,000 persons. On 7 February, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 187] imposed targeted sanctions on two leaders of the Young Patriots. In contrast to earlier threats to unleash a new wave of violence against UN personnel and property, the leaders of the Young Patriots called upon their followers not to react. Nevertheless, the security situation in the western part of the country remained highly volatile and was marred by several incidents. From 26 February to 2 March, confrontations between Licorne and the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (Fanci) occurred around the villages of Bouennou and Zouan Hounien, in what appeared to be deliberate attempts to obstruct Licorne’s freedom of movement. On two occasions, armed Fanci soldiers infiltrated the Zone of Confidence at Bouennou and harassed French soldiers maintaining the integrity of the Zone. In the meantime, UNOCI developed plans to return to its former locations in the west. On 19 March, an advanced UNOCI joint military/police group was successfully deployed in Toulépleu and an infantry company in Bôléquín on 28 March. Formed police units were deployed alongside UN troops returning to the west. The redeployment, however, was hampered by local authorities and radical groups opposed to it.

Overall, UNOCI continued to carry out its Security Council-mandated tasks, including mobile patrolling of the Zone of Confidence; arms embargo inspections in both the Government and rebel-held areas; and improving its state of preparedness to prevent and address future disturbances. UNOCI also established a security sub-office at Duékoué to monitor the activities of UN agencies in the Guiglo sector and serve as a liaison with the local military administrations of the Moyen Cavally region. As at 31 March, UNOCI strength stood at 6,893 military and 696 police personnel. The Secretary-General said that the arrival of the one infantry battalion from UNMIL, authorized by Security Council resolution 1657(2006), served as a timely deterrent, and enhanced UNOCI’s response preparedness. However, as that reinforcement was limited and temporary, an urgent decision on the reinforcements proposed in his January report was needed. He added that the security situation could still deteriorate suddenly, triggered by the lack of progress in the peace process. It was therefore essential that UNOCI credibility and its role in the peace process were not challenged again.

With regard to implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, on 24 March, President Gbagbo appointed General Gaston Koné as Coordinator of the National Programme for Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration. Although the Programme was still undergoing some restructuring, the sequencing of the exercise was expected to remain as foreseen in the Yamoussoukro timetable signed on 9 July 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 240] by Fanci and the Forces nouvelles. The Chiefs of Staff of both forces met on 1 April to agree on the modalities for the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. UNOCI support of the Programme would include, securing disarmament and cantonment sites; assuming security functions previously undertaken by the disarmed troops in the north, alongside 600 Ivorian security auxiliaries trained by UNOCI; escorting and/or providing transportation to former combatants; responding to any disturbances around the camps; providing weapons control and destruction facilities; and ensuring a secure environment. UNOCI also provided technical assistance to the Office of the Prime Minister in formulating a comprehensive approach to disarmament, which would include the disarmament and dismantling of militias and the restructuring of the army.
Progress continued with the redeployment of State administration. Of the estimated 24,400 civil servants displaced during the conflict, some 6,000 had been redeployed, mainly in the southern and western areas of the country under Government control. Some 20,000 needed to be redeployed in areas under the control of the Forces nouvelles. UNOCI would be required to provide a secure environment for that process, which was expected to run parallel with the identification process and electoral registration.

In March, the working group on identification and elections made a number of recommendations for facilitating the identification process and voter registration. Although the cabinet endorsed its recommendation to conduct both processes simultaneously, there was fear that a considerable number of potential voters might not be able to obtain the necessary documentation for those purposes, as no appropriate judicial mechanisms existed in the north and in the Zone of Confidence, and many civil register records were missing. Modalities for the creation of mobile courts to facilitate the issuance of new national identity cards or other forms of legal identification to potential voters were under consideration. A divergence of ideas among the parties on the modalities for implementing the identification process also hampered progress.

Following the resolution of the stalemate that had prevented the Independent Electoral Commission from becoming operational, the High Representative for the elections, in a 16 February communiqué, confirmed that the October 2005 election of the Bureau of the Independent Electoral Commission, which had been contested by President Gbagbo’s supporters, was in conformity with the Pretoria Agreement. The Commission was formally inaugurated on 9 March and focused on a number of priority issues. UNOCI would provide support for the organization of the elections, and if strengthened, contribute to general security in main voting areas. The Mission, which would ensure security for 11,000 voter registration sites, the distribution and storage of electoral materials, and 18,000 polling stations, had already deployed electoral advisers to prepare for the establishment of the local branches of the Electoral Commission.

With regard to the Forum for National Dialogue, the Prime Minister initiated consultations with all political leaders to secure their agreement for the holding of such a dialogue. The Prime Minister’s Office also agreed with UNOCI to establish a joint mechanism to prepare for a donor conference, following which a standing resource mobilization committee would be established to secure funds for the implementation of the road map.

The Secretary-General observed that, despite the January violence in Abidjan and the west of the country, the peace process was advancing. Urging the parties to agree on the modalities for implementing the identification process, he indicated the UN willingness to assist in that regard. He emphasized that the window of opportunity was very narrow and further delays or disruptions would hinder the completion of the critical tasks necessary for elections to be held by October. If that deadline was not met, the international community might not again agree to extend the current governance arrangements. He again appealed to the Security Council to consider his recommendations on strengthening UNOCI, as the risk remained that any unraveling of the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire could spill over into the subregion, particularly to Liberia. The Secretary-General reminded the national authorities of their responsibility to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UNOCI, Licorne and the humanitarian and non-governmental agencies in the country. He said that those committing attacks against the United Nations should be held accountable for their actions, and underscored the urgent need to put an end to the culture of impunity in the country.

**International Working Group meeting (April).** On 20 April, in the final communiqué issued following its sixth ministerial meeting [S/2006/260] in Abidjan, the International Working Group expressed concern over delays in commencing activities for effectively implementing the road map. The Group called on the Government of National Reconciliation to accelerate the simultaneous implementation of the identification and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes; encouraged the Chiefs of staff of FANC1 and the Forces nouvelles to restore, under the leadership of the Government, conditions for the smooth continuation of their dialogue, with a view to ensuring the commencement of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; and urged them to sensitize their followers to the need to abide by all commitments made during the Yamoussoukro meetings. The Group invited all Ivorian parties to cooperate with the new High Representative for the elections, in order to accelerate preparations for holding the elections. It also invited the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004), in the light of persistent violations of resolutions 1633(2005) and 1643(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 251], to identify the perpetrators and take appropriate measures. It also recommended that the
Security Council provide UNOCI with the additional means to achieve its mandate.

**Security Council consideration (April).** On 27 April [meeting 5426], the Council heard a briefing by Prime Minister Banny, who said that, although events were not proceeding as quickly as the majority of observers and Ivorians would wish, the general situation in Côte d’Ivoire was satisfactory. He said that the momentum lost in the military staff-level contact was not a definitive breakdown, as everything pointed towards an early resumption of the talks. He pointed out that some resistance still existed, which prevented swifter progress in accordance with the timetable established by the International Working Group. However, the Government was working to resolve the basic problems resulting from the crisis. To help consolidate the progress made by the Ivorian Government, the Prime Minister shared the Secretary-General’s desire to see UNOCI further strengthened, particularly as various elements of the process of emerging from the crisis, such as the disarmament, demobilization and disarmament programme, the security of the electoral operations and safety of people during the elections, required an atmosphere of safety and confidence, which could only be assured by a more significant military presence that would also act as a deterrent. He appealed to the Council to increase the number of UNOCI troops as close as possible to that requested by the Secretary-General.

On the same date, the Council further met in private with Prime Minister Banny on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire [meeting 5427].

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 27 April [meeting 5428], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/20 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council commends Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny for his initiatives, taken in cooperation with President Laurent Gbagbo, which have injected a new momentum into the peace process as defined by resolution 1633(2005) and the road map established by the International Working Group, and which must lead to the organization of free, open, fair and transparent elections by 31 October 2006. It reiterates to him its full support.

The Council expresses its full support for the International Working Group and endorses its sixth final communiqué of 20 April 2006.

The Council welcomes the appointment of Mr. Gérard Stoudmann as High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire. It encourages him to take all necessary measures, in accordance with his mandate, to expedite the preparation of the electoral process. It calls upon all Ivorian parties to cooperate fully with him.

The Council, while taking note of the progress achieved, expresses its grave concern at the serious delay in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and of the identification operations. It recalls the commitments made by the main Ivorian political leaders in this regard at their meeting held in Abidjan on 8 April 2006 (Yamousoukro II), under the auspices of the Chair of the African Union. It urges them to fulfil those commitments without delay.

The Council shares the concern, expressed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 74 of his report of 11 April 2006, over the consequences of any additional delays in the implementation of the key deadlines of the road map.

The Council therefore invites the Prime Minister and the Government of National Reconciliation that he leads to take immediately all the measures necessary for the simultaneous implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and identification operations. It also invites the International Working Group, in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1633(2005), to report to it any hindrance or difficulty which the Prime Minister may face in implementing his tasks.

The Council will continue to evaluate and monitor closely the implementation of the road map, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and identification operations. It continues to underline the fact that targeted measures are to be imposed against persons to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) who, among other things, block the implementation of the peace process, including by attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces, of the High Representative for the elections or of the International Working Group, or who publicly incite hatred and violence, as provided for in resolutions 1572(2004) and 1643(2005).

**Incident between Ivorian and French Licorne forces**

In a letter dated 2 May [S/2006/294], Côte d’Ivoire drew the attention of the Security Council to alleged human rights violations committed by French Licorne troops against members of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, on 26 February, in Zouan-Hounien. It had reported the incident, on 12 April, to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004). It described the treatment inflicted on seven soldiers for allegedly entering the Zone of Confidence as cruel and degrading, and indicated that, if there was no reaction from the Security Council, it was likely to encourage further such incidents. Moreover, silence could give the impression that the condemnation of human rights violations depended on the nationality of the perpetrators. Annexed to the letter was a copy of Côte d’Ivoire’s 12 April statement to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004), as well as the map that the Secretary-General had annexed to his April report on UNOCI (see above), which he said, clearly showed that Zouan-Hounien was within the area under
Government control and fell outside the Zone of Confidence.

Renewed political tension and hostilities

The renewal of political tension and hostilities in April and early May further impeded progress in the peace process. The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/532] that the Young Patriots, leading members of the ruling party, and the Speaker of the former National Assembly led a campaign against the planned simultaneous implementation of the disarmament and identification processes. The campaign consisted of strident public statements aimed at discrediting UNOCI and the Prime Minister; threats against UN personnel; the announcement of plans to organize violent demonstrations; and an attack on a bus carrying UNOCI staff in the Yopougon area of Abidjan on 28 April. Following a discussion between the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and President Gbagbo on the negative impact of the hostile campaign on the political and security situation, the President’s spokesman issued a statement condemning the attack on the UNOCI bus, disavowed the Young Patriots’ plans to organize violent demonstrations and called upon all Ivorians to allow UNOCI to perform its mission. On 9 May, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny held a joint press conference, during which the President urged all Ivorians to allow the Prime Minister to do his work.

Meanwhile, the overall security situation in Côte d’Ivoire remained fragile and volatile. Between 27 April and 3 May, five persons were killed, at least 15 were injured, and some 4,000 people fled from their villages around Bangolo, in the western part of the Zone of Confidence. In addition, the lack of agreement on specific issues concerning the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the planned reintroduction of Forces nouvelles military personnel into the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, the delay in the implementation of that programme, as well as the postponement of the dismantling of the militias, had affected military dialogue between FANCI and the Forces nouvelles, giving rise to the potential threat of extremist groups and militias undermining the peace process.

Attempts by the Young Patriots to disrupt, between 18 and 26 May, the pilot project to test the procedures for the identification of the population through the deployment of mobile courts in seven locations failed. Some 3,907 persons, out of 5,003 applicants, received certificates of nationality through the project. In the meantime, the pre-cantonment of FANCI and Forces nouvelles troops was launched on 22 May.

International Working Group meeting (May).

On 19 May, in the final communiqué issued following its seventh ministerial meeting [S/2006/332] in Abidjan, the International Working Group welcomed the launch of the mobile court pilot project and the arrangements being made by the Chiefs of Staff of the Defence and Security Forces and the Forces nouvelles for the pre-cantonment of combatants. Concerned by persisting delays in the implementation of tasks, it called on both Chiefs of Staff to set new dates for implementing the timetable for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

The Group also expressed concern over the persistent culture of impunity and intensification of incitement to hatred and violence and condemned the acts of violence committed against the population, political leaders and the impartial forces, as well as the systemic denigration of representatives of the international community by certain organs of the media and political figures. The Group urged the national authorities to speed up the investigations into those acts of violence and identify and punish the perpetrators. It also warned those who were obstructing the implementation of the road map, that such activities would invite the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) to take appropriate measures against them.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 24 May [meeting 5442], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/23 on behalf of the Council:


The Council welcomes the launching of the first pilot operations of public hearings in seven locations, in particular in Abidjan, in the south and in the north of the country. It welcomes also the discussions engaged by the Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the Forces nouvelles to initiate without delay the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

The Council commends Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny for having taken, in cooperation with President Laurent Gbagbo, these concrete initiatives which constitute a first step towards the implementation of the peace process that he leads. It reiterates to him its full support.

The Council calls upon the community of donors to provide all the necessary financial resources to the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire to support the full implementation of his mission.
The Council underlines the fact that many of the essential tasks envisaged in the road map established by the International Working Group remain to be executed. It reiterates its grave concern at the serious delay in the implementation of the road map, as well as the concern expressed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 74 of his report of 11 April 2006.

The Council strongly condemns the acts of violence against civilians, political leaders and impartial forces. It demands that all Ivorian parties refrain from making any public messages that incite hatred and violence. It warns all Ivorian parties in that regard.

The Council invites the Prime Minister and the Government of National Reconciliation that he leads to take immediately, with the support of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in accordance with its mandate, all the necessary measures to accelerate the implementation of the road map, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and identification operations, the redeployment of the administration throughout the territory and the reunification of the country.

The Council calls upon the Ivorian authorities to take without delay all the necessary steps so that those responsible for acts of violence are identified and punished, to keep the International Working Group and the Secretary-General informed in this regard, and, in close liaison with the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, to ensure the full independence and neutrality of Ivorian Radio and Television.

The Council urges all Ivorian parties, including the Chiefs of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and the Armed Forces of the Forces nouvelles, to closely cooperate with the Prime Minister in order to create the conditions indispensable for the holding of free, open, fair and transparent elections by 31 October 2006.

The Council invites the International Working Group to report to it as soon as possible on its assessment of the implementation of the road map.

The Council underlines the fact that targeted measures are to be imposed against persons to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) who, among other things, block the implementation of the peace process, including by attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces supporting it, of the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire or of the International Working Group, or who publicly incite hatred and violence, as provided for in resolutions 1572(2004) and 1643(2005).

Strengthening of UNOCI

Communications. On 22 May [S/2006/345], the Security Council President informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his recommendations concerning the reinforcement of UNOCI. As the members were planning to consider a resolution on the strengthening of the Operation, the Council requested that he begin, without delay, planning for the possible deployment of additional troops to reinforce UNOCI.

On 25 May [S/2006/334], the Secretary-General, drawing the Security Council’s attention to the latest developments in Côte d’Ivoire, called for the urgent reinforcement of UNOCI to the levels indicated in his previous reports and for the Council to expedite its decision thereon. He said that the pilot project for determining the identification of citizens, launched by Prime Minister Banny on 18 May, would lead to the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme throughout Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the identification of populations and preparation of electoral lists. It was anticipated that the arrangements for the pre-regroupment of the Forces nouvelles and FANCI troops would be finalized in a short period of time. It was therefore crucial for UNOCI to be adequately reinforced to fulfil its mandate to support the delicate identification and disarmament processes.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and in the subregion, in particular resolutions 1652(2006) of 24 January 2006 and 1667(2006) of 31 March 2006, and reaffirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 1667(2006),
Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 January and 11 April 2006 and of the letters dated 1 February, 22 March and 25 May 2006 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,
Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and of obstacles to the peace and national reconciliation process from all sides,
Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Takes note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in his report of 3 January 2006, in particular paragraphs 48 and 52 thereof, and notes that those recommendations have been reiterated in his report of 11 April 2006;
2. Authorizes, until 15 December 2006, an increase in the strength of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire of up to 1,500 additional personnel, including a maximum of 1,025 military personnel and 475 civilian police personnel;
3. Expresses its intention to keep under review the appropriate personnel levels for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, in the light of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and in the subregion;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Implementation of resolution 1633(2005)

International Working Group meeting (June). On 23 June, at its eighth ministerial meeting [S/2006/455], the International Working Group commended the Prime Minister’s 22 June initiative launching peace and reconciliation missions entrusted to former parliamentarians, whose emoluments, the Group demanded, should be paid in full and without discrimination so that they could devote themselves exclusively to that task. The Group called upon the Prime Minister to ensure the speedy resumption of the mobile court hearings and their completion within the established deadlines, and upon the competent national authorities to set a definitive date for the commencement of the dismantling and disarming of militias. While welcoming the resumption of dialogue between the Chiefs of Staff of Fanci and the Armed Forces of Forces nouvelles, the Group stressed that the tasks should not be used as a pretext to reopen the debate on questions already agreed upon between the parties and urged both Chiefs of Staff to involve the impartial forces in their discussions, with a view to finalizing the calendar for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. Concerned at the slow pace of the Independent Electoral Commission activities throughout the national territory, the Group requested the Prime Minister to earmark appropriate budgetary resources to give impetus to the electoral process. The Group also appealed to all parties to refrain from any action that would jeopardize the Commission’s independence or threaten the security of its members.

Yamoussoukro high-level meeting and establishment of benchmarks

Following consultations conducted with various African Heads of State in the margins of the AU Summit (1-2 July, Banjul, the Gambia), the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, on 5 July, to discuss the situation in the country and implementation of the road map for the peace process. The meeting was attended by the Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, Burkina Faso and Ghana, representatives of ECOWAS, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, the co-chairs of the International Working Group and Ivorian authorities and leaders.

Reporting on the outcome of the meeting to the Security Council President on 12 July [S/2006/516], the Secretary-General said that participants reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process and the need to continue all efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1633(2005). They reaffirmed the commitments made at the 28 February Yamoussoukro meeting of Ivorian political leaders (see p. 182), in particular, that the media, and especially the written press, should embrace the peace process and refrain from printing articles that could jeopardize the process, and that political leaders should prevail on journalists close to them to join the peace process, and create an environment conducive to the conduct of political activities. The meeting agreed that a compulsory code of conduct should be established for members of the media. The Ivorian parties recommitted themselves to doing everything possible to accelerate the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, identification and electoral processes. Recognizing that the freedom of movement and involvement of the impartial forces in the military dialogue were crucial to the credibility and transparency of the process, the meeting decided to establish a Monitoring Committee for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Secretary-General said that he intended to convene a meeting in mid-September, in New York, to take stock of the situation and make any further determinations as might be necessary.

The meeting established a timetable for the completion of tasks related to the electoral process, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the media, which included: the deployment of 50 mobile courts by 15 July; issuance of a Presidential decree by 15 July to allow the Independent Electoral Commission to make adjustments to the electoral code; deployment of the Independent Electoral Commission’s countrywide structure by 31 July; reaffirmation of the validity of the July 2005 Pretoria Declaration [YUN 2005, p. 239]; convening of a donors’ conference to seek funds for closing the budgetary gap of the electoral process; establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration monitoring group by 15 July; immediate resumption of the quadripartite control of the pre-cantonnement process to facilitate its completion by 31 July; the dismantling and disarming of the militias by 31 July; and respect for the Pretoria and Yamoussoukro agreements on the media, which called for responsible behaviour by journalists, particularly during the elections. The Ivorian parties agreed to take action on those decisions.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 19 July [meeting 5491], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/32 on behalf of the Council:
The Security Council welcomes the initiative of the Secretary-General, who organized the high-level meeting held in Yamoussoukro on 5 July 2006. It urges all Ivorian parties to implement, in close liaison with the impartial forces, all their commitments made on this occasion concerning the identification operations, the establishment of a monitoring group for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the completion of the pre-cantonment process, the adjustment to the electoral code, the dismantling of militias and the establishment of a code of conduct for the media, and urges them in particular to meet the agreed deadlines.

The Council also urges all Ivorian parties to accelerate the implementation of the road map in order to create the conditions indispensable for the holding of free, open, fair and transparent elections by 31 October 2006.

The Council calls upon the International Working Group to monitor the full implementation of the decisions taken by all Ivorian parties in Yamoussoukro on 5 July 2006 and to report to the Council on its assessment in that regard.

The Council underlines the fact that it is fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) who are determined to be, among other things, blocking the implementation of the peace process, including by attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces supporting it, of the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire or of the International Working Group, responsible for serious violations of human rights and international law committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 September 2002, publicly inciting hatred and violence or in violation of the arms embargo, as provided for in resolutions 1572(2004) and 1643(2005).

The Council welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to call a meeting on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2006 to take stock of the situation regarding the implementation of the road map defined by resolution 1633(2005) and the International Working Group and to make any further determinations as may be needed. In this regard, it requests the Secretary-General to report to it before the September meeting on the obstacles encountered in the implementation of the road map and on those responsible.

The Council expresses its full support for the International Working Group and endorses its eighth final communiqué, of 23 June 2006. It reiterates its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire and the High Representative.

Report of Secretary-General (July). In his ninth report [S/2006/532] on UNOCI, the Secretary-General said that the political atmosphere remained generally calm, underpinned by the working relationship between President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny, assisted by periodic consultations within the framework of the “quintet”, comprising the five Ivorian political leaders: the President; the Prime Minister; the President of the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié; the President of the Rassemblement des Républicains, Alassane Ouattara; and the Secretary-General of the Forces nouvelles, Guillaume Soro. During the visit to Côte d’Ivoire of the AU Chairman, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso (Congo), from 6 to 8 April, the quintet reconfirmed its commitment expressed at the 28 February Yamoussoukro meeting to work together to launch simultaneously the disarmament and identification processes. However, renewed political tension in April and May (see p. 187) impeded progress. The expected simultaneous pre-cantonment of the forces, which represented the first phase of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, could not begin as the Forces nouvelles and FANCi disagreed on the modalities of the process. The identification process, initially scheduled to begin on 15 June, was delayed, owing to logistical reasons. The deployment of 50 mobile courts was expected to begin by mid-July, followed by an additional 100 teams. Thus, 150 mobile court teams would be deployed throughout the country to identify approximately 3.5 million people, including 1.8 million persons of voting age. Prime Minister Banny estimated that the operation would take two months to complete and would be followed by the issuance of national identity cards. The cost of the identification process countrywide was estimated at $55 million, of which $32 million was still needed.

Pre-cantonment of FANCi and Forces nouvelles troops was launched on 22 May, and by 18 June, some 12,547 elements of FANCi had been pre-canted at the 35 sites designated in their areas of control, and 12,885 elements of the Forces nouvelles at 31 of their 50 designated sites. Controversy arose over the next step in the process, the cantonment and collection of weapons, with the Forces nouvelles insisting that identification of the entire population, including combatants, should take place prior to the collection of weapons, while FANCi maintained that identification of combatants should be conducted during the pre-cantonment stage, as agreed by the parties. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff of FANCi and Forces nouvelles were unable to agree on Forces nouvelles demands for the retention of current military ranks, the establishment of an integrated military command and the payment of salary arrears. Limited progress was made toward the dismantling and disarming of militias, due to postponements, demands of militia leaders to include more individuals in the programme and lack of agreed modalities for dismantling militias in parts of the country, including Abidjan. The cost of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was estimated at $150 million, of which $140 million had been pledged. No pledges had been made for meeting the cost of dismantling and disarming of militias, estimated at $2.5 million.

With regard to election preparations, the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire worked with national and international actors to press for the launching of the electoral process. The
Institute of National Statistics continued to assert that it was responsible for preparing the register of voters and initiated unilateral preparations for doing so. At its June meeting, the International Working Group recalled the exclusive responsibility of the Independent Electoral Commission for the entire electoral process (see p. 189). The Commission Chairman submitted an electoral budget of $74 million, for which there was shortfall of $34 million.

In other political developments, on 26 April, the Speaker of the National Assembly convened an ordinary session of the Assembly and introduced new rules of procedure suspending the indemnities of the opposition parliamentarians who had not attended Assembly sessions since the expiration of its mandate in December 2005. On 19 June, following a request by the Mediation Group, President Gbagbo and the Prime Minister met with all members of the former National Assembly and set up a committee to formulate recommendations. On 22 June, the committee recommended that: parliamentarians return to the Assembly and carry out their duties; the National Assembly carry out its functions in conformity with the Constitution and Security Council resolution 1633(2005) until the next parliamentary elections; Assembly members undertake peace missions to be assigned by the Prime Minister in consultation with the President; legislators count on the President to resolve the issue of their unpaid salaries; and amendments made to the Assembly’s internal procedures in the absence of the opposition members should be rescinded. On 23 June, the opposition accepted the recommendations. On the same date, at its eighth ministerial meeting, the International Working Group demanded the payment of emoluments of former parliamentarians in their entirety and without discrimination.

The Secretary-General observed that the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire was again at the crossroads. The consolidation of the fragile gains achieved since the beginning of the year would need the sustained political will and efforts of all Ivorian parties. It was also critical that, in addition to the timely implementation of all components of the road map for peace, the conditions of a lasting peace be rapidly established throughout the country, including the promotion and protection of human rights, respect for the rule of law and assistance to the most vulnerable.

He also noted that, while much still remained to be done to prepare and conduct free and fair elections, the process of fostering national reconciliation and unity should not end with the completion of the transition period. In order to build lasting peace and stability, it was essential for all Ivorian parties to pursue dialogue on how to carry forward the efforts to foster unity and national reconciliation beyond the elections.

Implementation of Yamoussoukro benchmarks

Reporting on the implementation of the benchmarks established at the 5 July Yamoussoukro high-level meeting (see p. 189), the Secretary-General said that of the 50 mobile courts agreed to be deployed by 15 July to conduct public hearings for the issuance of birth certificates and certificates of nationality to those eligible, only about 25 had become operational. In the southern part of the country, the courts were disrupted by supporters of the ruling Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party. The party’s President, Affi N’Guessan, urged its followers to oppose the operation of the courts “by all means”, claiming that the issuance of certificates of nationality by such courts was inconsistent with the law. In addition, despite the joint monitoring mechanism put in place by UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann, President Laurent Gbagbo and his party warned that the mobile courts could be used fraudulently to grant Ivorian citizenship to those who were not eligible. The attempts by FPI supporters, in particular the Young Patriots, to disrupt the operations of the courts, led to violent clashes with the opposition parties. In Divo and Grand-Bassam, the clashes resulted in the death of at least eight Ivorians on 22 and 23 July. The violent disruption campaign continued until early August, when the Prime Minister announced new guidelines, based on a strict interpretation of the nationality law, which prohibited the mobile courts from issuing certificates of nationality. The opposition parties rejected the new guidelines, arguing that the public hearings conducted by mobile courts had been legally used to issue certificates of nationality prior to the conflict and that no law expressly prohibited the practice. After the proclamation of the new guidelines, the number of persons appearing before the mobile courts dropped precipitously. By mid-September, the operations of the mobile courts, which were initially scheduled to run for two months, had completely stopped in all areas. Between 17 July and 15 September, only 933 mobile court hearings were held (327 in the southern part of the country, 583 in the north, and 23 in the Zone of Confidence), issuing some 74,000 birth certificates and 70,000 certificates of nationality. UNOCI provided logistical support for the operation, including transporting préfets and sous-préfets to the areas controlled by the Forces nouvelles.

With regard to disarmament, demobilization and integration, the monitoring group was established
on 13 July, but the Forces nouvelles suspended its participation in the group and in the dialogue on military issues in reaction to the proclamation of the new guidelines on the operations of the mobile courts. The monitoring group was therefore unable to verify the claims by the Forces nouvelles and Fanci that they had completed the pre-cantonment of their respective combatants (24,000 Fanci personnel and 13,000 Forces nouvelles elements). With the breakdown of the military dialogue, many combatants reportedly left the pre-cantonment sites and returned to their deployment areas, and the two sides had not yet submitted the lists of their combatants and weapons. The Forces nouvelles insisted that the restructuring of the national army should proceed immediately, as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and in that regard, called for the establishment of an integrated command under the authority of the Prime Minister.

The dismantling and disarming of the militias started in the western part of the country on 26 July. However, the process was suspended on 4 August on account of the low number and poor quality of the surrendered weapons. Efforts to resume the process in a more credible fashion had not yet succeeded, and militia leaders were demanding that an additional 3,000 individuals be allowed to join the programme.

Concerning the preparation of elections, on 29 July, the President signed a decision empowering the Independent Electoral Commission to submit its proposed amendments to the electoral code to the Prime Minister, who would, in turn, assess them and refer them to the President for promulgation.

The leaders of the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié, and the Rassemblement des républicains, Alassane Ouattara, conveyed to the Secretary-General, on 17 August, their concern that President Gbagbo had not been following the AU consultative process for issuing such decisions, which had crucial implications for the electoral process. They also contended that the decision gave the President the final say on matters governing an election in which he would be a candidate.

As to the decision for the Independent Electoral Commission to establish countrywide structures by 31 July, only 19 regional commissions were established out of the 24 envisaged under its operational plan. The deployment was hampered by inadequate funding and organizational capacity, security concerns and the provision in the electoral law that each subnational commission should have the same membership composition as the central commission. That would require a total of some 33,000 commissioners, which made it impracticable. The High Representative for the elections suggested that the extraordinary procedures for changing the electoral law should be used to reduce the size of the local commissions.

Meanwhile, President Gbagbo and his supporters adamantly opposed the preparation of a new voters’ roll, maintaining that the 2000 voters’ list should be updated by the National Institute of Statistics. The opposition parties, for their part, rejected that list, insisting that a new voters’ roll should be prepared by the Independent Electoral Commission, and not the Institute, on the basis of the identification process. On 19 July, in response to a formal request from President Gbagbo, the AU Mediator, South African President Mbeki, clarified the disputed roles of the two institutions, reaffirming the exclusive responsibility of the Independent Electoral Commission for organizing the elections and indicating that the National Institute of Statistics should report directly to the Commission. The opposition parties were, however, concerned that the top posts at the Institute were dominated by officials with ties to the leadership of the ruling party. To resolve the stalemate, the Secretary-General proposed that identified FPI-affiliated officers should be replaced with non-partisan individuals. With regard to the re-establishment of State administration in the northern part of the country, the Prime Minister reported on 8 September to the International Working Group that 92 mayors’ offices had been reopened, as of 24 August, and 61 officials redeployed to their prefectures by 31 August. To date, some 12,000 displaced civil servants were yet to return to the areas controlled by the Forces nouvelles. UNOCI assisted the media regulatory bodies in preparing a draft code of conduct, but it had not yet been implemented.

Political stalemate and impasse in peace process

Despite the gains achieved, major disagreements among the Ivorian parties on fundamental issues relating to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and identification processes, resulted in a political stalemate and impeded further progress in the peace process, especially regarding the implementation of mobile courts to conduct the identification process, which started on 17 July, the Secretary-General reported [S/2006/821].

International Working Group meeting (July)

On 20 July, at its ninth ministerial meeting [S/2006/584], the International Working Group requested that the mobile court hearings, whose operation had been disrupted by FPI supporters and
had led to violent clashes, should no longer be impeded and should proceed under the best possible conditions of security and transparency. The Group condemned the serious disturbances in July that were provoked by organized groups impeding the smooth conduct of mobile court hearings and the call made by certain political leaders to oppose the operations. It called on national authorities to take urgent steps to put an end to the interference with the free movement of the population and of the impartial forces. It also condemned the incidents that took place on 15 July and called for strengthened security at Radio and Television Ivorien in order to preserve its independence. The Group expressed its wish to submit those elements for consideration by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) so that it could take appropriate measures against the perpetrators of those incidents and those behind them.

Press statements. In a 25 July press statement [SG/SM/10576], the Secretary-General expressed deep concern about inflammatory statements by the FPI leadership, which had incited the Young Patriots to resort to violent acts aimed at disrupting the ongoing identification process in Côte d’Ivoire, and resulted in the loss of human lives and an attack on the vehicle of the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann. He strongly condemned those acts, which, he said, were in breach of the agreements reached among Ivorian parties at the 5 July High-level meeting at Yamoussoukro, and urged all Ivorian parties to extend their full cooperation to the Prime Minister.

On 26 July [SC/8786], the Security Council condemned the obstruction to the normal functioning of the mobile courts, as well as the violence committed, and stated its intention to inform the sanctions committee. The Council also indicated that it would work on a presidential statement in order, in particular, to take stock of the implementation of the road map and the Yamoussoukro III agreements [see p. 189], and of the responsibilities of those who blocked the process, including the Ivorian defence and security forces.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 7 August [meeting 5505], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRES/2006/37 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council affirms its commitment to the implementation of the peace process and of the road map established by the International Working Group. It welcomes the initiatives of the Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Konan Banny, and the ongoing dialogue among President Laurent Gbagbo, the Prime Minister and all other Ivorian parties.

The Council reiterates its full support for the Prime Minister. It welcomes his determination to implement the decisions taken by all Ivorian parties at the high-level meeting held in Yamoussoukro on 5 July 2006. It strongly encourages him to continue his efforts and demands that all Ivorian parties cooperate with him fully and in good faith.

The Council welcomes the launch of the mobile courts throughout Côte d’Ivoire and the announcement by the Prime Minister of the completion of the pre-cantonment of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and of the Armed Forces of the Forces nouvelles. The Council also welcomes the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration monitoring group, the measures taken to implement the quadrupartite control of pre-cantonment operations and the beginning of operations to dismantle and disarm the militias. It takes note of the signing of a presidential decree allowing the Independent Electoral Commission to propose any technical adjustments to the electoral code for the transitional elections.

The Council expresses its concern that the structures of the Independent Electoral Commission as well as the local offices of the National Commission of Supervision of Identification have not been deployed throughout the country. It urges the Ivorian parties to settle these issues without delay.

The Council strongly condemns the obstructions to the normal functioning of the mobile courts which followed the calls for such action made by political leaders, in particular the Chairman of the Front populaire ivoirien and the President of the former National Assembly. It notes that the procedures of the mobile courts were decided in consultation with President Laurent Gbagbo. It urges all parties to ensure that the mobile courts function without further hindrance.

The Council expresses its utmost concern and condemns the acts of violence committed by organized groups, in particular the Young Patriots, which led to the deaths of civilians, and further condemns the attack of 24 July 2006 against the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, despite the presence of the Republican Guard at the scene.

The Council condemns also the incidents of 15 July 2006 at the premises of Radio Télévision Ivoirienne. It calls upon the Ivorian authorities to strengthen security measures at Radio Télévision Ivoirienne. It underlines the importance of guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of the media in Côte d’Ivoire.

The Council reaffirms its support for the implementation of measures against those responsible, as provided for in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004), and underlines that the reports of the events described above will be examined by the sanctions committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004).

The Council demands that the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, including the Republican Guard, act within the law of the land at all times to ensure full security of the population, including foreigners, and support the implementation of the road map led by the Prime Minister. It reaffirms in this regard paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 1633(2005). It recalls that the Defence and Security Forces and the Forces nouvelles must ensure the security of the mobile court hearings in the areas under their control.

The Council demands also that all Ivorian parties cooperate fully in the operations of the impartial forces, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of their personnel, as well as associated personnel, throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, and affirms that any obstacle to their freedom of movement or to the full
implementation of their mandates will not be tolerated. It
recalls paragraph 4 of resolution 1643(2005) in this regard.

The Council reaffirms the importance of the concomitant
implementation of the identification and disarmament, de-
mobilization and reintegration operations and of the accel-
eration by all Ivorian parties of the implementation of the road
map in order to create the conditions indispensable for the
holding of free, open, fair and transparent elections within
the agreed timetable.

The Council therefore considers that it is necessary to de-
ploy throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire as many mo-
bile courts as possible towards the objective of 150 mobile
courts called for in the Prime Minister’s plan and to com-
plete the second phase of the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration programme, the cantonment of combat-
ants, before the next meeting of the International Working
Group. It encourages the Prime Minister to take all the nec-
essary actions to this end, with the agreement of all Ivorian
parties, as well as for the organization of the elections. It calls
upon the Working Group to monitor such progress and to
report to it on its assessment of the progress made.

The Council expresses its full support for the Interna-
tional Working Group and endorses its ninth communiqué of 20
July 2006. It reiterates its full support for the Special Re-
presentative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire and the
High Representative for the elections.

**Yamoussoukro meeting (5 September).** On 5
September, Prime Minister Banny convened, in
Yamoussoukro, a further meeting of the main
Ivorian political leaders, President Gbagbo, former
President Bédié, former Prime Minister Ouattara
and the Forces nouvelles Secretary-General Guilia-
me Soro, to work out an agreement on measures
to break the stalemate in the peace process. Their
discussions focused on proposals by Prime Minister
Banny for the adoption of extraordinary measures
to allow the issuance of certificates of nationality to
eligible Ivorians. As no agreement could be reached
on the issue, the leaders requested the Prime Minis-
ter to continue his search for alternative solutions.

**Toxic waste crisis.** The impasse in the peace pro-
cess was further compounded by the dissolution of
the transitional Government by Prime Minister
Banny on 6 September, following a scandal created
in late August by the dumping of over 580 cubic
metres of toxic petrochemical waste from a foreign
cargo ship at 18 sites in Abidjan. The resulting con-
tamination caused the death of eight people, while
some 100,000 others received medical treatment.
The UN system assisted the Government in provid-
ing an emergency response to the environmental and
public health crisis. Although the Prime Minister
announced the formation of a new Government on
16 September, in which he replaced the Ministers
of Transport and Environment, the toxic waste cri-
sis sidetracked efforts to break the impasse in
the peace process. For several weeks, Ivorian youth held
demonstrations against the dumping of toxic waste,
which at times turned violent.

**International Working Group meeting (September).** On 8 September, at its tenth ministerial
meeting [S/2006/738], the International Working
Group condemned the dumping of toxic waste
in various sites in the district of Abidjan and the
culture of impunity that made it possible. It urged
the Government to accelerate the investigations in
order to identify and punish those responsible for
such criminal acts and appealed to international
partners to assist the Government in remedi-

The Group took note of the reasons mentioned by the Prime
Minister for the resignation of his Government and
called upon Ivorian political forces to support his ef-
forts to promptly form a new Government. It cited
the main obstacles to the peace process, such as the
lack of political will by main actors; disagreement
on the establishment of credible voters’ lists; halt-
ing of the dismantling of the militias; interruption
of the military dialogue; institutional duality and
legal interpretation conflicts; and the impossibility
of the Prime Minister to exercise the powers con-
ferred upon him by resolution 1633(2005). It urged
the adoption of exceptional measures to relaunch
the mobile court operations and to allow the issu-
ance of duplicate birth certificates and certificates
of nationality in an equitable manner. Concluding
that it would be impossible to meet the deadline
for the holding of the elections, the Group recom-
ended that the Security Council define a new
transitional framework that would address the
blockages identified, including the adoption of a
resolution, which would eliminate the ambiguities
in the current transition arrangements and reinforce
the powers of the Prime Minister. It also recom-
ended individual sanctions against those respon-
sible for obstructing the peace and reconciliation
process.

**Report of Secretary-General (October).** In his
tenth report [S/2006/821] on unoci, the Secretary-
General said that, in further efforts to break the
political stalemate, on 11 and 12 September, the AU
Chairman, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the
Congo, visited Côte d’Ivoire and met with the five
main Ivorian leaders to help resolve the issue of the
procedures for issuing certificates of nationality, but
his compromise solution was not accepted by one of
the parties.

On 20 September, the Secretary-General, as
indicated at the 5 July High-level Yamoussoukro
meeting (see p. 189), convened a follow-up meeting
of the Ivorian and regional leaders during the sixty-
first session of the General Assembly. A week be-
fore the meeting, President Gbagbo, who had made
public statements rejecting the International Work-
ing Group’s 8 September communiqué (see p. 194), informed the Secretary-General that he would not be attending the meeting, as he intended to present his own proposals on the Ivorian peace process to the AU. In his reply, the Secretary-General pointed out that the outcome and views emerging from the follow-up meeting in New York would be conveyed to the AU, ECOWAS and the Security Council, and, as such, the planned meeting was not intended to replace the meetings of those bodies.

At the 20 September meeting, the Secretary-General proposed that, in addition to taking stock of progress towards meeting the Yamoussoukro benchmarks and discussing measures needed to break the political stalemate, the meeting should also discuss the way forward after the 31 October elections and measures to ensure that the new transition period did not end again without the holding of those elections. The participants agreed that it was not technically feasible to organize and conduct elections in Côte d’Ivoire by 31 October, and an extension of the transition period was therefore necessary. Prime Minister Banny stressed the need to resolve the impasse regarding procedures for issuing certificates of nationality. However, President Mbeki said that it would be inappropriate to decide on those crucial issues in the absence of President Gbagbo. The participants agreed that it was important for the AU, ECOWAS and the Security Council to decide without delay on measures to break the impasse and on the extension of the transition period. In that connection, ECOWAS proposed convening an extraordinary summit to consider the situation (see below).

ECOWAS summit. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convened an extraordinary summit (6 October, Abuja) to discuss the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and measures to address the political stalemate in the country. The summit reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 1633(2005) remained an ideal framework for resolving the Ivorian crisis and recommended that the Council take all necessary measures to address the obstacles to its implementation. In a closed session, the ECOWAS leaders agreed on specific recommendations that were not made public, and which were to be considered at the meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (17 October, Addis Ababa) (see p. 196). On 27 October [S/2006/855], Côte d’Ivoire transmitted to the Council President the text of President Gbagbo’s statement delivered at the ECOWAS summit.

Further developments. The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/821] that the security situation remained unpredictable and volatile owing to tension created by the disruption of the mobile court hearings; the poor living conditions of combatants who had assembled at pre-cantonment sites; disagreements over implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme; the toxic waste scandal; inflammatory statements by political leaders; and strikes and protests by public servants and personnel from the gendarmerie. There were concerns that inflammatory statements by the President of the ruling party, calling for the departure of the French Licorne force, as well as public calls by President Gbagbo for the lifting of the Zone of Confidence, could exacerbate tensions and further obstruct the freedom of movement of the two forces. On 2 October, inflammatory statements were issued also threatening violence against ECOWAS nationals living in Côte d’Ivoire, should the 6 October ECOWAS summit fail to take a decision to force the Forces nouvelles to disarm. UNOCI continued to monitor and report on hate media. In August, President Gbagbo signed two decrees related to the mandates and powers of the National Press Council and the National Council on Audio-Visual media. Meanwhile, UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections elaborated, for adoption, a compulsory code of conduct for the media during the electoral period.

The Secretary-General expressed his disappointment that events in Côte d’Ivoire had taken a negative turn, with the main Ivorian political leaders unwilling to transcend bias and place the national interest first. Although the second transition period was coming also to a close without elections having taken place, the Secretary-General urged the international community to remain engaged in Côte d’Ivoire. He welcomed ECOWAS’ recommendations on the way forward after the expiration of the current transition period on 31 October, and encouraged the AU and the Security Council to build upon those proposals so as to accelerate the peace process and guarantee the success of the new transition arrangements. The duration of the new transition period should be determined by the time required to complete the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process; conduct effective identification; dismantle the militias; re-establish State authority; and finalize the technical preparations for the elections. It should be made clear to the Ivorian leaders that the proposed extension of the transition period should be the last, and if they again failed to move towards elections, the AU, ECOWAS and the Security Council should consider putting in place transitional governance arrangements, comprising eminent, non-partisan personalities from civil society to complete the remaining processes. However,
the Council also needed to give specific guidance on the core issues concerning the conflict; if not, the anticipated new transition period would end up like the first.

To eliminate loopholes and avoid previous obstacles in the transitional arrangements, the Secretary-General proposed ground rules and safeguards: international instruments setting out the special arrangements for the transition period should take precedence where there might be a divergence with the Constitution and national laws; the Prime Minister should have authority over all relevant public offices pertaining to the implementation of the road map, as well as the Defence and Security Forces; Defense and Security Forces commanders and political leaders should be held accountable for activities disrupting implementation of the road map, and should be subject to the imposition of individual sanctions by the Security Council or referral to the International Criminal Court for more serious cases; the Ivorian population and the impartial forces should be allowed freedom of movement; and the Prime Minister should have full and unfettered authority to implement the disarmament programme, the identification process, the dismantling of the militia and the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country, and to commit the necessary funds to ensure the implementation of those processes. The Secretary-General further proposed the establishment of two task forces under the Prime Minister’s authority, one on restructuring the defense and security force, and the other on the identification process.

On the role of the international community, the Secretary-General said that, in anticipation of the UN enhanced role, the UNOCI mandate should be reviewed by the Council and its resources augmented. As AU and ECOWAS support would be critical during the transition process, he called upon the two regional bodies to forge unity among the regional actors and mediators and urged the AU and ECOWAS Chairpersons to ensure that all mediation efforts were harmonized and properly coordinated. He hoped that the AU Peace and Security Council would come up with clear decisions for effective and expeditious implementation of the peace process at its upcoming summit.

Communication. On 16 November [S/2006/820], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that voluntary contributions received to support the activities of the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire were insufficient to maintain the functions entrusted to him by Security Council resolution 1603(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 233]. The UNDP special project for supporting the High Representative had not generated enough funds to enable the office to become operational, nor effective to deal with the important aspects of his work. The Secretary-General therefore informed the Council of his intention to seek General Assembly approval for the use of assessed contributions to fund the office of the High Representative.

Decision of AU Peace and Security Council (October). The AU Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the level of Heads of State and Government on 17 October, issued a communiqué [S/2006/829] endorsing the observations of the 6 October ECOWAS extraordinary summit (see p. 195) on the expiration of the twelve-month transition period and the impossibility of organizing presidential elections on the scheduled date. Taking note of the ECOWAS recommendations on the management of the post-31 October period, it decided that a new twelve-month transition period should be established, commencing on 1 November 2006, to complete the identification and registration of voters, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and restructuring of the defence forces, dismantling of the militias, restoration of State authority throughout the country, and technical preparations for the elections. President Gbagbo would continue as Head of State and Prime Minister Banny would have necessary powers and means to implement those key activities, as well as authority over all of the integrated Ivorian defense and security forces. Ministers would be accountable to the Prime Minister, who should have full authority over his Cabinet; and the Council of Ministers could, in all matters, take decisions by ordinances and decrees within the spirit of the law to speed up the issuing of duplicates of birth certificates and certificates of nationality. The Prime Minister would not be eligible to stand for election, to be organized on 31 October 2007.

The Peace and Security Council accepted President Thabo Mbeki’s request for South Africa to hand over the mediation role, following its election to the UN Security Council, and decided to entrust that role to President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo, in his capacity as AU Chairperson, with his representative leading the day-to-day mediation in Côte d’Ivoire. It urged the Government to ensure the speedy adoption and implementation of the code of conduct for the media. The Peace and Security Council called on the UN Security Council to take measures, including sanctions, against individuals or groups impeding or disrupting implementation of the peace process and relevant Council resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire, and to take appropriate measures for the effective implementation of the
arms embargo. It requested the AU Chairperson to submit its decision to the UN Security Council.

Security Council consideration. On 25 October [meeting 5555], the Security Council met in private on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and heard a briefing by Said Djinnit, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and a statement by Youssouf Bakayoko, the Foreign Affairs Minister for Côte d’Ivoire.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

Recalling that it endorsed the agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces at Linas-Marcoussis, France, on 23 January 2003 (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) and approved by the Conference of Heads of State on Côte d’Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, the agreement signed at Accra on 30 July 2004 (the Accra III Agreement) and the agreement signed at Pretoria on 6 April 2005 (the Pretoria Agreement),

Commending the continued efforts of the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Côte d’Ivoire, and reiterating its full support for them,

Paying tribute to President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa for the untiring efforts he has deployed in the service of peace and reconciliation in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the numerous initiatives he has taken to move forward the peace process, in his capacity as African Union Mediator, driven by his deep commitment to finding African solutions to African problems,

Commending the constant efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire, Mr. Pierre Schori, the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, Mr. Gerard Stoudmann, and the International Working Group, and reiterating its full support for them,

Reaffirming its support to the impartial forces, namely the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French forces supporting it,

Having taken note of the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted at its sixty-fourth meeting, held at the level of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 17 October 2006 (“the decision of the Peace and Security Council”),

Having heard on 25 October 2006 the report by Mr. Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the African Union,

Having taken note of the report of the Secretary-General of 17 October 2006, in particular paragraphs 68 to 80 thereof,

Bearing in mind that the constitutional mandate of President Laurent Gbagbo expired on 30 October 2005 and the mandate of the former National Assembly expired on 16 December 2005,

Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis and the deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, including its grave humanitarian consequences causing large-scale civilian suffering and displacement,

Reiterating its firm condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire,

Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Endorses the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, underlines that its unfettered implementation requires the full support of the Security Council, considers, therefore, that the following provisions of the present resolution, based on the decision of the Peace and Security Council, aim at implementing fully the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire and at organizing free, open, fair and transparent elections in the country by 31 October 2007, and affirms that such provisions are intended to be applicable during the transition period until a newly elected President takes up his duties and a new National Assembly is elected;

2. Takes note of the tenth final communiqué of the International Working Group, of 8 September 2006;

3. Takes note also of the impossibility of organizing elections, presidential and legislative, on the scheduled date and of the expiry, on 31 October 2006, of the transition period and of the mandates of President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny;

4. Recalls paragraphs 5 and 8 of the tenth final communiqué of the International Working Group, paragraph 10 of the decision of the Peace and Security Council and paragraph 75 (a) of the report of the Secretary-General of 17 October 2006, and therefore declares that the full implementation of the present resolution, consistent with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the decision of the Peace and Security Council, and of the peace process led by the Prime Minister requires full compliance by all Ivorian parties and that no legal provisions should be invoked by them to obstruct the process;

5. Endorses the decision of the Peace and Security Council that President Laurent Gbagbo shall remain Head of State as from 1 November 2006 for a new and final transition period not exceeding twelve months;

6. Endorses also the decision of the Peace and Security Council to renew the mandate of the Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Konan Banny, as from 1 November 2006 for a new and final transition period not exceeding twelve months, and endorses further the decision of the Peace and Security Council that the Prime Minister shall not
be eligible to stand for the presidential elections to be organized by 31 October 2007;

7. **Stresses** that the Prime Minister shall have a mandate to implement all the provisions of the road map drawn up by the International Working Group and of the agreements concluded between the Ivorian parties with a view to holding free, open, fair and transparent elections by 31 October 2007 at the latest, with support from the United Nations and potential donors, and to carry out, in particular:
   - The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;
   - The identification of the population and registration of voters in order to compile credible electoral rolls;
   - The operations of disarmament and dismantling of militias;
   - The restoration of State authority and the redeployment of the administration and public services throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire;
   - The technical preparations for the elections;
   - The restructuring of the armed forces, in accordance with paragraph 17 of the decision of the Peace and Security Council and paragraph 3(f) of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement;

8. **Stresses also** that the Prime Minister, for the implementation of the mandate set out in paragraph 7 above, must have all the necessary powers, and all appropriate financial, material and human resources, as well as full and unfettered authority, consistent with the recommendations of the Economic Community of West African States of 6 October 2006, and must be empowered to take all necessary decisions, in all matters, within the Council of Ministers or the Council of Government, by ordinances or decree-laws;

9. **Stresses further** that the Prime Minister, for the implementation of the mandate set out in paragraph 7 above, must also have the necessary authority over the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire;

10. **Recalls** paragraph 10 (iii) of the decision of the Peace and Security Council of 6 October 2005 and the statement by the President of the Security Council of 9 December 2005, reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 1633(2005) of 21 October 2005, and recalls that the Prime Minister shall have full authority over the Government that he will establish;

11. **Reaffirms** that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and identification processes should be carried out concomitantly, stresses the centrality of both processes to the peace process, urges the Prime Minister to implement them without delay, and calls upon all the Ivorian parties to cooperate fully with him in this regard;

12. **Demands** the immediate resumption of the programme for the disarmament and dismantling of militias throughout the national territory, stresses that this programme is a key element of the peace process, and underlines the individual responsibility of the leaders of the militias in the full implementation of this process;

13. **Urges** the Prime Minister to take immediately all appropriate measures, through the signing of the relevant ordinances in the conditions set out in paragraph 8 above, to expedite the issuance of birth and nationality certificates in the context of the identification process, in a spirit of equity and transparency;

14. **Demands** that all the Ivorian parties concerned, in particular the Armed Forces of the Forces nouvelles and the Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire, participate fully and in good faith in the work of the quadripartite commission responsible for overseeing the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the operations for the disarmament and dismantling of militias;

15. **Invites** the Prime Minister to establish immediately, in liaison with all the Ivorian parties, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French forces supporting it, a working group responsible for submitting to him a plan on the restructuring of the defence and security forces and preparing possible seminars on security sector reform to be organized by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, with a view to rebuilding defence and security forces committed to the values of integrity and republican morality;

16. **Encourages** the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States to organize seminars on security sector reform, in collaboration with partners and with the participation of commanding and senior officers from West African countries emerging from conflict, to examine, among other issues, the principles of civilian control of armed forces and personal and individual responsibility for acts of impunity or violation of human rights;

17. **Invites** the Prime Minister to establish immediately, in liaison with all the Ivorian parties concerned and the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, a working group responsible for helping him to implement the identification of the population and the registration of voters, in order to ensure their credibility and transparency;

18. **Encourages** the Prime Minister to seek, as appropriate, the active involvement of civil society in moving the peace process forward, and urges the Ivorian parties, the High Representative for the elections and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire to take account of the rights and resources of women and of gender considerations as set out in resolution 1325(2000) of 31 October 2000 as cross-cutting issues in the implementation of the peace process, including through consultations with local and international women's groups;

19. **Demands** that all Ivorian parties end all incitement to hatred and violence, in radio and television broadcasting as well as in any other media, and urges the Prime Minister to establish and implement without delay a code of conduct for the media, in conformity with the decisions taken at Yamoussoukro on 5 July 2006 and the decision of the Peace and Security Council;

20. **Endorses** the decision of the Peace and Security Council that, to avoid multiple and conflicting mediation efforts, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo
“the Mediator”), in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union, shall lead the mediation efforts, in liaison with the Chairmen of the African Union Commission and the Economic Community of West African States and, as the need may arise, in liaison with any other African leader willing to make a contribution to the search for peace in Côte d’Ivoire, and underlines that the representative of the Mediator in Côte d’Ivoire will lead, in liaison with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d’Ivoire, the day-to-day mediation;

21. Requests the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States to continue to monitor and follow up closely the implementation of the peace process, and invites them to review before 1 February 2007 the progress achieved and, should they deem it appropriate, to review the situation again between that date and 31 October 2007, and requests them to report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on their assessment and, if necessary, to submit to the Council any new recommendations;

22. Renews for a period of twelve months the mandate of the High Representative for the elections laid down in paragraph 7 of resolution 1603(2005) of 3 June 2005, underscores that the Peace and Security Council has encouraged the High Representative to play a greater role in the resolution of disputes linked to the electoral process, or issues arising out of the procedures and processes to be adopted to ensure open, free and transparent elections, and decides, therefore, that, in addition to the mandate, the High Representative, with the full support of and in consultation with the Prime Minister:

— Shall be the sole authority authorized to arbitrate with a view to preventing or resolving any problems or disputes related to the electoral process, in liaison with the Mediator;

— Shall certify that all stages of the electoral process, including the process of identification of the population, the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters’ cards, provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections, and decides, therefore, that, in addition to that mandate, the High Representative, with the full support of and in consultation with the Prime Minister:

23. Requests the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, consistent with its mandate in resolution 1609(2005) of 24 June 2005 to protect United Nations personnel, to provide security to the High Representative for the elections, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

24. Recalls paragraph 9 above, and stresses, therefore, that the Prime Minister must have authority over the personnel of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire who ensure his close protection and provide the security of his offices, including by designating them, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 2(g) of resolution 1609(2005);

25. Recalls also the International Working Group’s role of guarantor and impartial arbitrator of the peace process, and requests the Working Group:

— To establish as soon as possible, in liaison with the Prime Minister, a precise timetable for the implementation of the main components of the road map;

— To evaluate, monitor and follow up closely the progress achieved in implementing the road map on a monthly basis;

— To report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on its assessment of the progress achieved and on any obstacles encountered by the Prime Minister in carrying out his mandate set out in paragraph 7 above;

— To submit, as appropriate, to all the Ivorian parties concerned and to the Council any recommendations it deems necessary;

26. Demands that all Ivorian parties refrain from any use of force and violence, including against civilians and foreigners, and from all kinds of disruptive street protests;

27. Demands also that all Ivorian parties guarantee the security and freedom of movement of all Ivorian nationals throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire;

28. Demands further that all Ivorian parties cooperate fully with the operations of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French forces supporting it, as well as United Nations agencies and associated personnel, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of their personnel, as well as associated personnel, throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, and reaffirms that any obstacle to their freedom of movement or to the full implementation of their mandates would not be tolerated;

29. Urges countries neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire to prevent any cross-border movement of combatants or arms into Côte d’Ivoire;

30. Reiterates its serious concern at all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire, and urges the Ivorian authorities to investigate these violations without delay in order to put an end to impunity;

31. Recalls the individual responsibility of all Ivorian parties, including members of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire and of the Armed Forces of the Forces nouvelles, whatever their rank, in the implementation of the peace process;

32. Underlines that it is fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) who are determined to be, among other things, blocking the implementation of the peace process, including by attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces supporting it, of the High Representative for the elections, of the International Working Group, of the Mediator or of his representative in Côte d’Ivoire, responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 19 September 2002, publicly inciting hatred and violence or in violation of the arms embargo, as provided for in resolutions
Implementation of resolution 1721(2006)

Report of Secretary-General (December). In his eleventh report on UNOCI [S/2006/939], the Secretary-General said that, while Security Council resolution 1721(2006) was perceived in the sub-region as a major step forward, it received mixed reactions from the Ivorian parties. In his 2 November address to the nation, President Gbagbo welcomed the resolution, but added that those of its provisions that were inconsistent with Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitution would not be implemented. He subsequently announced a series of consultations with various segments of Ivorian society to develop an alternative framework for solving the Ivorian crisis, since, in his view, the peace plans devised by the international community since the conflict started had failed and Ivorians had the responsibility to find their own solution. The Fanci Chief of Staff, General Philippe Mangou, supported the President’s position in a 3 November radio/television broadcast, in which he assured the President of the Defence and Security Forces support. On 18 November, supporters of President Gbagbo, united under the umbrella group, the National Resistance Council for Democracy (CNRD), issued a statement calling for the appointment of a new Prime Minister; separation of the identification process from the preparation of the electoral rolls; the lifting of the Zone of Confidence; and the withdrawal of the French Licorne force. For its part, the Forces nouvelles had issued a 2 November statement in support of resolution 1721(2006), as it addressed their major concerns. The coalition of opposition parties, the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie at la paix, also welcomed the resolution and called on its supporters to boycott the consultations initiated by President Gbagbo. Addressing the nation on 8 November, Prime Minister Banny expressed his determination to implement the resolution and saw no need for another framework to resolve the crisis. He announced his intention to focus on the outstanding tasks assigned to him, to relaunch the disarmament programme and establish a new structure for the military dialogue between the Forces nouvelles and Fanci. The Prime Minister was supported by the Forces nouvelles, opposition parties and several civil society groups.

The Secretary-General called upon the AU Chairmen and ECOWAS to intervene to secure acceptance of the resolution by all parties and avert the new developing stalemate. His Special Representative, along with the High Representative for the elections and the Special Representative of the AU Mediator, General Jean-Marie Mokoko, engaged in extensive consultations with the main Ivorian parties and the local media to impress upon them the need to implement the resolution in good faith. On 23 November, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny held a private meeting, facilitated by the Special Representative of the International Organization of la Francophonie, Lansana Konaté, to discuss the way forward in setting the new transition period in motion.

Despite those efforts to encourage the Ivorian leaders to open a constructive dialogue and work together to relaunch the implementation of key tasks of the peace process, the political atmosphere deteriorated, with deepening disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister. On 23 November, the national commission of inquiry into the toxic waste scandal submitted its final report, in which it confirmed that the four officials (the Minister of Transport, the General Manager of the Port of Abidjan, the Director General of Customs and the Governor of the District of Abidjan) who had been suspended by the Prime Minister should be held accountable for the dumping of toxic waste. However, on 26 November, President Gbagbo issued presidential decrees limiting their suspension to three months. The next day, the Office of the Prime Minister broadcast a statement on national television stating that the Prime Minister had not been consulted on the decrees and that the President’s decisions were contrary to the principles of good governance, transparency and justice. On 28 November, the Defence and Security Forces entered the premises of the State-owned Ivorian Radio and Television by force and prevented a repeat broadcast of the Prime Minister’s statement; later the same day, President Gbagbo issued a decree dismissing its Director General and the management board. The President had, on 26 November, also dismissed the Director General and the board of the newspaper Fraternité Matin, after it had published an article expressing the view that resolution 1721(2006) was
In addition, on 1 December, the Republican Guard towns to protest against the President’s decisions. In addition, on 1 December, the Republican Guard blocked the UNOCI unit in charge of the Prime Minister’s security from access to the Prime Minister’s compound.

Violent clashes, unrelated to the resolution, occurred in Yopougon, near Abidjan, on 1 and 3 November, when the local population reacted to criminal harassment by the Groupement des patriotes pour la paix militia and the support that militia was receiving from the Defence and Security Forces. At least five people were killed during the clashes, including two militiamen who were burned alive by Yopougon residents. Other incidents involved demonstrations or protests. In the north, a significant rise in crime was reported, while ethnic tensions rose in the Zone of Confidence and in the south-west of the country, leading to the killing of five persons around the village of Blodi. To minimize the risk of escalation of the prevailing tensions in the country, particularly in Abidjan, UNOCI conducted extensive operational activities, in close cooperation with the French Licorne force. The Secretary-General said that, during the new transition period, UNOCI would adjust the overall posture of its military component, gradually reducing its presence in the Zone of Confidence, and shifting its emphasis from separating the armed groups to increasing its presence and mobility throughout the country, with a view to enhancing its role in providing security for the resumption of the mobile courts and for the cantonment, demobilization and disarmament sites, as well as securing the electoral process. It would provide technical assistance for the restructuring of the armed forces, strengthening the protection of civilians, and facilitating the freedom of movement, especially between the north and the south.

The report included steps to be undertaken to relaunch the key processes under the road map, and provided lessons learned and recommendations on the concomitant resumption of identification and disarmament processes; dismantling and disarming of militias; restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces; redeployment of the State administration; and technical preparations for the elections.

The humanitarian situation continued to be a source of concern, with new reports of cholera and yellow fever outbreaks, as well as continued shortages of water and sanitation facilities in the northern part of the country. UNOCI continued to assist the Government in mitigating the consequences of the dumping of toxic waste from foreign ship in Abidjan in August. As at 23 October, 10 people had died, 64 had been hospitalized and some 104,000 had sought health consultations.

The Secretary-General observed that Security Council resolution 1721(2006) provided tools and safeguards to overcome obstacles that had impeded progress in previous transition periods. However, complementary efforts from both Ivorian and international stakeholders were required to nurture a political environment in which trust could take root among the main political leaders. He called on President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Banny and international mediators to provide the leadership for sustained dialogue and the maintenance of constructive working relationships among all stakeholders. Ivorian civil society, which had also been marginalized, should be included in the peace process. Together, Ivorian political leaders and civil society should address the factors underlying the inclination to maintain the status quo. Moreover, in order to emerge from conflict, all Ivorian stakeholders had to recognize and accept the need for exceptional measures during and immediately following the transition period, including the possibility of power-sharing arrangements. The Secretary-General called upon the international community to support the peace process and to offer incentives to the parties, while being prepared to act against those who deliberately obstructed it or committed crimes against the civilian population.

With regard to UNOCI, he urged the Security Council to approve his recommendations on the Mission’s role in the transition process and to extend its mandate to 15 December 2007. He also appealed for the Council’s support for an expanded presence of UNOCI civil affairs, political affairs, human rights and rule of law components in the northern and western parts of the country to support the restoration of State administration. UNOCI public information component would develop a sensitization campaign, in collaboration with relevant counterparts and the High Representative for the elections, to combat hate media and sensitize the population to key processes, including the elections. It would also expand its radio coverage to remote areas, such as Aboisso, Bouna, Korhogo and Odienné.

On security aspects, the Secretary-General said that the conduct of the process for the identification of the population and preparations for the elections would require effective security from the impartial forces. With the need to adjust the posture of the UNOCI military component and enhance its role in facilitating freedom of movement and protecting civilians, he again appealed to the Council to approve the remaining three battalions for UNOCI, out
of the four recommended in his January progress report. In that connection, and pursuant to resolution 1609(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 236], he proposed that the Council take advantage of the envisaged departure of one UNMIL battalion at the end of 2006 to reinforce UNOCI. As funding from voluntary contributions for the activities of the High Representative for the elections continued to pose significant challenges, he appealed to potential donors to urgently provide resources to sustain the work of that office.

International Working Group meeting (December). On 1 December, at its eleventh ministerial meeting [S/2006/950], the first meeting following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1721(2006), the International Working Group clarified, at Prime Minister Banny’s request, the authority vested in him by that resolution over the Defence and Security Forces and the Forces nouvelles. The Group noted with concern the delay in the implementation of the resolution, as well as the deterioration of the political climate, particularly with regard to the recommendations of the National Commission of Inquiry into the toxic waste dumping crisis and the reinstatement of those officials suspended by the Prime Minister. The Group, condemning the dismissal of the Directors General of Ivorian Radio and Television and the newspaper Fraternité Matin, and the dissolution of their respective Boards of Directors, called for their reinstatement. Bearing in mind the assessment of the peace process scheduled to be conducted by 1 February 2007, the Group invited the Prime Minister to take or initiate the following measures: relaunch the pre-identification process for issuing substitute birth certificates and certificates of nationality, and by 10 December 2006, adopt regulatory texts to make that process more efficient, and assign new judges to the new jurisdictions so that registration could be completed by 1 February 2007; establish the working group on identification by 5 December 2006; ensure the nomination by political actors of their representatives on the local structures of the Independent Electoral Commission before 15 December, which should also publish an electoral timetable, including the date of the first round of presidential elections; ensure full participation of parties controlling the militias and ex-combatants in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the dismantling of the militias, with rehabilitation sites being completed by 15 January 2007; establish the working group on security sector reform by 5 December 2006, with the dates of the national seminar announced at the same time; and publish the Code of Conduct for the media by 15 December 2006.

The Group recommended that the impartial forces should help ensure the security of the electoral process, particularly in its pre-identification and identification phases, as well as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. It also reminded Ivorian parties that it would recommend to the UN Security Council appropriate sanctions against any person obstructing the effective start-up of the implementation of resolution 1721(2006), including through incitement to hatred and violence.

Security Council consideration. On 12 December [meeting 5585], the Security Council met in private with the troop-contributing countries to UNOCI and heard a briefing by Pierre Schori, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNOCI.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d’Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Having taken note of the report of the Secretary-General of 4 December 2006,
Reaffirming its support to the impartial forces, namely the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French forces supporting it,
Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis and the deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, including its grave humanitarian consequences causing large-scale civilian suffering and displacement,
Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and of the French forces supporting it shall be extended until 10 January 2007;
2. Decides also to remain actively seized of the matter.

On 21 December [meeting 5606], following consultations among Security Council members on the 1 December communiqué issued by the International Working Group (see p. 202), the President
made statement S/PRST/2006/58 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council reiterates its full support for the International Working Group, recalls its role as guarantor and impartial arbiter of the peace process, and endorses its final communiqué of 1 December 2006. It also encourages the Working Group to promote enhanced dialogue with all Ivorian parties. It insists that all Ivorian parties apply, under the direction of the Prime Minister, the implementation time-line for the road map drawn up by the Working Group.

The Council shares the grave concern expressed by the International Working Group at delays in the implementation of resolution 1721(2006), and urges all Ivorian parties to cooperate fully with the Prime Minister in order to implement all the provisions of the road map drawn up by the Working Group and referred to in resolution 1721(2006), including the identification of the population and the registration of voters, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which are central to the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire.

The Council, bearing in mind the provisions of resolution 1572(2004), recalls that the neutrality and impartiality of the public media are essential to the peace process, and supports the International Working Group, which considered that it is indispensable to reinstate the dismissed officials of Radio Télévision Ivoirienne and Fraternité Matin. It recalls also that obstacles to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, in particular those put up by the Republican Guard, are unacceptable.

The Council reiterates its full support for the Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Konan Banny. It strongly encourages him to continue his endeavours, in consultation with President Laurent Gbagbo, including his efforts to fight impunity and promote good governance, and to utilize all the powers referred to in resolution 1721(2006) to prepare for elections, which must be held by 31 October 2007 at the latest. The Council welcomes in this regard the announcement by the Prime Minister of immediate measures to relaunch the identification process, and expects more concrete measures in place to implement the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The Council reaffirms that the Prime Minister must exercise his powers without hindrance, including his authority over the Defence and Security Forces referred to in resolution 1721(2006), and calls upon all Ivorian parties to support his efforts.

The Council invites the African Union Mediator to visit Côte d'Ivoire to relaunch the peace process as soon as possible, if necessary in cooperation with all other African leaders.

The Council requests the International Working Group, in preparation for its next meeting on 12 January 2007, to provide a detailed update on the timeline for the implementation of the peace process, and all the recommendations needed for the consideration of the situation by the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union by 1 February 2007 at the latest.

The Council reiterates its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Pierre Schori, the High Representative for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire, Mr. Gerard Stoudmann, and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the French forces supporting it.

Later developments. In a later report [S/2007/133], the Secretary-General said that at year’s end, the political stalemate in the peace process remained unresolved, with no significant progress towards implementing Security Council resolution 1721(2006). In a 19 December radio address, with the aim of finding a “home-grown” solution to the crisis, President Gbagbo announced a new initiative, offering to open direct dialogue with the Forces nouvelles under the auspices of the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. He also called for the removal of the Zone of Confidence dividing the country; proposed the enactment of a new amnesty law; indicated his intention to launch a national civilian service for young people and an assistance programme for resettling displaced persons; and proposed that the elections be held by July 2007.

Prime Minister Banny made efforts to reinvigorate the peace process by implementing the schedule proposed by the International Working Group at its 1 December meeting, but the results achieved were limited. The working groups on identification of the population and on security sector reform were established on 5 and 12 December, respectively. However, the 15 December deadline for nominating political party representatives on the Independent Electoral Commission’s local structures, which was to be followed by the opening of those structures and the announcement of an electoral timetable by the Commission, was not met.

Sanctions

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 187] concerning Côte d’Ivoire continued to monitor implementation of the arms embargo, travel restrictions and assets freeze on designated individuals and entities imposed by that resolution, as renewed and expanded by resolution 1643(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 251] banning the importation of all rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. In 2006, the Committee held two formal meetings and nine informal consultations.

The Committee considered reports by Member States, submitted in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1643(2005), containing information on measures taken to implement the resolution [S/AC.45/2006/1-23]. In a report on its 2006 activities [S/2006/1017], the Committee Chairman indicated that, on 23 January, the Committee considered the implementation of targeted measures, and adopted, on 7 February, the list of individuals and entities subject to measures imposed by Council resolution 1572(2004). On 25 January, it adopted the annual report on its 2005 activities [YUN 2005, p. 248].

On 14 March 2006, the Committee received a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on his visit to Côte d’Ivoire. The Committee took note of the climate of impunity and the continuing incitement to violence by local media, and issued a 16 March press statement [SC/8665] expressing concern at the situation in the western part of the country. The Committee also sought explanations from the Ivorian authorities on incidents that had occurred between Fanci and Licorne forces.

On 17 May, the Committee considered the report by Côte d’Ivoire on the February incidents between Fanci and the French forces. The Committee was also briefed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the same incidents, as well as on instances of incitement to hatred by the local media. The Committee agreed to seek information from Côte d’Ivoire on the measures the Government intended to adopt to prevent further dissemination by local media of messages inciting violence. The Committee also considered UNOCI monthly arms embargo and media monitoring reports, the mid-term and final reports of the Group of Experts established by Council resolution 1643(2005) to assess compliance with the sanctions, and the Group’s updated report, in accordance with resolution 1632(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 249]. On 18 December, the Committee approved an updated list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by resolutions 1572(2004) and 1643(2005).

**Appointment.** In letters of 27 February [S/2006/135] and 20 September [S/2006/755], the Secretary-General, as requested in resolutions 1643(2005) and 1708(2006), informed the Council of the appointment of Agim de Bruycker (Belgium), Christian Dietrich (United States), Oumar Dièye Sidi (Niger), Nawa Raj Silwal (Nepal) and Alex Vines (United Kingdom) to the Group of Experts concerning Côte d’Ivoire.


**Communication.** On 2 May [S/2006/294], Côte d’Ivoire informed the Security Council President of alleged human rights violations committed by French Licorne troops against members of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, and transmitted his 12 April statement to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) on the matter. The Committee considered the report on 12 April.

**Report of Group of Experts (September).** In September [S/2006/735], the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) transmitted to the Council President the final report of the Group of Experts on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, in accordance with resolution 1643(2005). The report examined political developments; arms and disarmament; provision of military assistance, advice and training; maintaining airpower; embargo inspections; defence expenditure and natural resources; diamond embargo; and targeted measures on three Ivorian individuals.

The Group found no evidence of gross violations of Security Council measures. However, there were a number of incidents that the Group believed were cause for concern. It recommended that the Security Council Committee urgently address them, including concerns about the authenticity of Burkina Faso end-user certificate 732 that could be used to violate the sanctions; missing ammunition from the Bangladeshi Battalion 2 and the need for UNOCI to mark its ammunition to avoid future unaccounted losses, and review its inspection process; limited feedback from and direction by the Security Council Committee on the monthly embargo reports, which had contributed to a sense within UNOCI that all was fine; and the potential danger of maintaining the status quo, as it undermined the Council’s reputation and could lead to the monitoring system being easily circumvented in the event of a serious deterioration of the peace process.

On the provision of military assistance, advice and training, the Group recommended that the Committee should urgently request details from UNOCI and the Government about the pro-Government militia group, LIMA FS, and its leadership, which appeared to still maintain Liberians among its ranks. Other concerns included the need for increased patrolling of the Ivorian-Liberian border; the continued provision by nationals of Belarus, the Russian Federation and possibly Ukraine of assistance, advice and training to the Force aérienne de Côte d’Ivoire, and the continued maintenance and testing of a Mil Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.

The Group believed that financial disclosure and expenditure transparency had improved under Prime Minister Banny, but the investigation of reports that quasi-fiscal coffee and cocoa agencies had been used to channel funds for off-budget security expenditures made little progress. The Group concluded that Ivorian rough diamonds were being exported in violation of the Security Council embargo, via Ghana and Mali, prior to entering the international trade markets, and recommended that
Nations, security in the region, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and resolution 1643(2005), adopted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 of stability in Côte d'Ivoire, of West African States towards re-establishing peace and general, the African Union and the Economic Community of

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Welcoming the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States towards re-establishing peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire,
Recalling the final report of the Group of Experts created by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1643(2005),
Determining that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 December 2006, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures;
2. Requests the Group of Experts to submit a brief written update to the Security Council, through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004), before 1 December 2006, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraphs 4 and 6 of resolution 1643(2005), with recommendations in this regard;
3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Report of Group of Experts (December). In December [S/2006/964], the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572(2004) transmitted to the Council President an update by the Group of Experts on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, in accordance with resolution 1708(2006). The report examined arms; provision of military assistance; embargo inspections; diamonds; and targeted measures on three Ivorians. With regard to arms, in October, the Group intervened before the National Police could import ammunition and tear gas from Iran. The transaction would be placed before the Security Council Committee for exemption. The Group investigated the importation of small-arms ammunition into Côte d'Ivoire by a criminal network, using international courier firms. Yssouf Diabaté was arrested in September, in San Diego, California, and the ammunition was seized by United States agents. The ammunition already sent by Mr. Diabaté to Abidjan was also seized by customs in Abidjan. Noting the Ivorian Government admission that it had hired three foreign technicians for its Mi-24 helicopter, the Group recommended minimum requirements under an exemption system approved by the Secretary-Council to permit test flights and technical assistance, including full disclosure of the identities of foreign or dual-nationality Mi-24 technicians.

An embargo cell was created by unoci in August, to mainstream embargo monitoring. The cell would benefit from the services of a short-time maritime customs consultant to assist unoci in monitoring shipping activities, given that Côte d'Ivoire's ports were open to abuse and unoci had not conducted a port inspection since August.

The Group found continued evidence of production and illicit exportation of diamonds in Côte d'Ivoire, especially to Mali. The Group welcomed the efforts of the participants of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for controlling the production of rough diamonds (see p. 50) in assisting Ghana to reform its internal diamond controls so as to ensure that it did not receive conflict diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire. The Group also highlighted that Dubai had released a package of suspect “Ghanaian” diamonds to its importer without conducting a proper investigation.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President relating to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,
Taking note of the reports of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire issued on 5 October and 12 December 2006,

Expressing its serious concern at the persistence of the crisis and the deterioration of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, including its grave humanitarian consequences causing large-scale civilian suffering and displacement,

Determining that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


2. Demands that all Ivorian parties, including the transitional Government and the Forces nouvelles, provide unhindered access, particularly to the Group of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1643(2005), to equipment, sites and installations referred to in paragraph 2(a) of resolution 1584(2005) of 1 February 2005, and to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and French forces supporting it to enable them to carry out the tasks set out in paragraphs 2 and 12 of resolution 1609(2005) of 24 June 2005;

3. Reiterates that any serious obstacle to the freedom of movement of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and of the French forces supporting it, or any attack or obstruction to the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, of the French forces, of the High Representative for the elections in Côte d’Ivoire, of the International Working Group, of the Mediator mentioned in paragraph 20 of resolution 1721(2006) of 1 November 2006 or of his representative in Côte d’Ivoire constitutes a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process for purposes of paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004);

4. Requests the Secretary-General and the Government of France to report to it immediately, through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1572(2004) (the Committee), of any serious obstacle to the freedom of movement of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and of the French forces supporting it, including the names of those responsible, and requests the High Representative for the elections, the International Working Group, the Mediator mentioned in paragraph 20 of resolution 1721(2006) or his representative in Côte d’Ivoire to report to it immediately, through the Committee, any attack or obstruction to their action;

5. Requests all States concerned, in particular those in the region, to report to the Committee, within ninety days of the date of adoption of the present resolution, on the practical steps they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005), and authorizes the Committee to request whatever further information it may consider necessary;

6. Decides that at the end of the period mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the Council shall review the measures imposed by paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005) and reiterated in paragraph 3 above, in the light of progress accomplished in the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire as referred to in resolution 1721(2006), and expresses its readiness to consider the modification or termination of those measures before the aforesaid period only if the provisions of resolution 1721(2006) have been fully implemented;

7. Decides also to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts for a further six months, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Group of Experts and appointing new members as necessary, in consultation with the Committee, the mandate to be as follows:

(a) To exchange information with the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the French forces in the context of their monitoring mandate set out in paragraphs 2 and 12 of resolution 1609(2005);

(b) To gather and analyse all relevant information in Côte d’Ivoire and elsewhere, in cooperation with the Governments of those countries, on flows of arms and related materiel, on provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities, on networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572(2004), and on the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities;

(c) To consider and recommend, where appropriate, ways of improving the capabilities of States, in particular those in the region, to ensure the effective implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005);

(d) To seek further information regarding the action taken by States with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005);

(e) To report to the Council in writing before 15 June 2007, through the Committee, on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005), with recommendations in this regard;

(f) To keep the Committee regularly updated on its activities;

(g) To provide the Committee in its reports with evidence of any violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005);

(h) To cooperate with other relevant groups of experts, in particular the group of experts on Liberia established pursuant to resolutions 1521(2003) of 22 December 2003 and 1579(2004) of 21 December 2004;

(i) To monitor the implementation of the individual measures set out in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004).
8. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate, as appropriate, to the Council, through the Committee, information gathered by the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and, when possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, about the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;

9. Requests the Government of France to communicate, as appropriate, to the Council, through the Committee, information gathered by the French forces and, when possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, about the supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire;

10. Requests the Kimberley Process to communicate, as appropriate, to the Council, through the Committee, information, when possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, about the production and illicit export of diamonds;

11. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other organizations and interested parties, including the Kimberley Process, to cooperate fully with the Committee, the Group of Experts, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the French forces, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7, 9 and 11 of resolution 1572(2004) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1643(2005) and reiterated in paragraph 3 above;

12. Underlines that it is fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons to be designated by the Committee who are determined to be, among other things:
   (a) A threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular by blocking the implementation of the peace process as referred to in resolution 1721(2006);
   (b) Attacking or obstructing the action of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, of the French forces supporting it, of the High Representative for the elections, of the International Working Group, of the Mediator or of his representative in Côte d'Ivoire;
   (c) Responsible for obstacles to the freedom of movement of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and of the French forces supporting it;
   (d) Responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in Côte d'Ivoire;
   (e) Publicly inciting hatred and violence;
   (f) Acting in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572(2004);

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNOCI

The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established in 2004 by Security Council resolution 1528(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 173] to replace the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and ECOWAS forces. Its mandate was to monitor the ceasefire and the movement of armed groups; assist in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement; protect UN personnel and civilians; support implementation of the peace process; and provide assistance in the monitoring of human rights, public information and law and order. The Mission comprised a civilian, judiciary and corrections components, and was supported by the French Licorne forces. Headquartered in Abidjan, it was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Pierre Schori. The Security Council extended the Mission’s mandate until 10 January 2007.

Appointment. In an exchange of letters with the Security Council President on 30 August [S/2006/715] and 6 September [S/2006/716], the Secretary-General appointed Major General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin) as Force Commander, to replace Major General Abdoulaye Fall, who left the Mission in April.

UNOCI financing

In June, at its resumed sixtieth (2006) session, the General Assembly considered the performance report on the UNOCI budget for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [A/60/630], showing actual expenditures of $336,891,500 against a total appropriation of $375,472,800, and the proposed budget for UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 [A/60/753 & Corr.1] in the amount of $420,175,200, gross, together with the related ACABQ report [A/60/896]. The budget provided for the deployment of 200 military observers, 6,890 contingent personnel, including 120 force headquarters staff officers, 350 UN police officers, 375 formed police personnel, 467 international and 575 national staff, including 36 national officers, as well as 277 United Nations Volunteers and 8 government-provided personnel. ACABQ recommended approval of the full amount proposed by the Secretary-General for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION

On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/540/Add.1], adopted resolution 60/17 B without vote [agenda item 138].

Financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

The General Assembly,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

period of twelve months as from 4 April 2004, and the
subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended
the mandate of the Operation, the latest of which was
resolution 1652(2006) of 24 January 2006, by which the
Council extended the mandate of the Operation until 15
December 2006,
Recalling also its resolution 58/310 of 18 June 2004 on
the financing of the Operation and its subsequent resolu-
tions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 60/17 A
of 23 November 2005,
Recalling further its resolution 58/315 of 1 July 2004,
Reaffirming the general principles underlying the fi-
nancing of United Nations peacekeeping operations,
as stated in its resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963,
3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23
December 2000,
Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the
Operation with the necessary financial resources to en-
able it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant res-
olutions of the Security Council,
1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the
Head of Mission with the task of formulating future
budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions
of its resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of
30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;
2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire as at 30
April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in
the amount of 80.7 million United States dollars, repre-
senting some 9 per cent of the total assessed contribu-
tions, notes with concern that only twenty-eight Member
States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and
urges all other Member States, in particular those in
arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed
contributions;
3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States
which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and
urges all other Member States to make every possible ef-
fort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to
the Operation in full;
4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with re-
gard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards
the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear ad-
ditional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member
States of their assessments;
5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by
the Secretary-General in deploying and providing ade-
quate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions,
in particular those in Africa;
6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeep-
ing missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory
treatment in respect of financial and administrative ar-
rangements;
7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions
shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective
and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;
8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to
make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment
at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy,
in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the
Operation;
9. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations
contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests
the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementa-
tion;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full
implementation of the relevant provisions of its resolu-
tions 59/296 and 60/266;
11. Looks forward to the consideration of the com-
prehensive report requested in section VIII, paragraph 3,
of its resolution 60/266;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that
quick-impact projects are implemented in compliance
with the original intent of such projects and relevant
General Assembly resolutions;
13. Decides to approve the resources requested for
quick-impact projects in the proposed budget for the
Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June
2007, in the interim;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full
implementation of the quick-impact projects in the fi-
nancial period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007;
15. Also requests the Secretary-General to take all
necessary action to ensure that the Operation is admin-
istered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;
16. Further requests the Secretary-General, in order
to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to
continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Operation
against General Service posts, commensurate with the
requirements of the Operation;
Financial performance report for the period from
1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005
17. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General
on the financial performance of the Operation for the
period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;
Budget estimates for the period
from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007
18. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account
for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire the
amount of 438,366,800 dollars for the period from 1 July
2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 420,175,200 dollars
for the maintenance of the Operation, 15,025,600 dol-
ars for the support account for peacekeeping operations
and 3,166,000 dollars for the United Nations Logistics
Base;
Financing of the appropriation
19. Decides also to apportion among Member States
the amount of 200,328,914 dollars for the period from
1 July to 15 December 2006, in accordance with the lev-
els updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of
23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of
assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B
of 23 December 2003;
20. Decides further that, in accordance with the pro-
visions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955,
there shall be set off against the apportionment among
Member States, as provided for in paragraph 19 above,
their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 4,483,156 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 3,601,258 dollars approved for the Operation, the prorated share of 772,403 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 109,495 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

21. Decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 238,037,886 dollars at a monthly rate of 36,530,566 dollars for the period from 16 December 2006 to 30 June 2007, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Operation;

22. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 21 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 5,327,044 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 4,279,142 dollars approved for the Operation, the prorated share of 917,797 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 130,105 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

23. Decides further that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 19 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 57,385,300 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

24. Decides that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Operation, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 57,385,300 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 23 above;

25. Decides also that the decrease of 1,436,900 dollars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 57,385,300 dollars referred to in paragraphs 23 and 24 above;

26. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

27. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Operation, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

28. Invites voluntary contributions to the Operation in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

29. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire”.

On 26 September [A/61/468], the Secretary-General submitted a revised budget amounting to $472,889,300, including an increase of $52,714,100 to accommodate the increase in UNOCI strength, authorized by the Security Council in resolution 1682(2006) (see p. 188). In its October report [A/61/551], ACABQ recommended approval of the full amount proposed by the Secretary-General for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007.

On 22 December [meeting 84], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/61/621], adopted resolution 61/247 A without vote [agenda item 134].

Financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
Recalling Security Council resolution 1528(2004) of 27 February 2004, by which the Council established the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire for an initial period of twelve months as from 4 April 2004, the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Operation, the latest of which was resolution 1652(2006) of 24 January 2006, and resolution 1682(2006) of 2 June 2006, in which the Council authorized an increase in the strength of the Operation of up to 1,500 additional personnel, by a maximum of 1,025 military and 475 civilian police personnel,
Recalling also its resolution 58/310 of 18 June 2004 on the financing of the Operation and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 60/17 B of 30 June 2006,
Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in its resolutions 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,
Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Operation with the necessary financial resources to en-
able it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of its resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire as at 30 September 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 186.6 million United States dollars, representing some 17 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only thirty Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Operation in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Operation;

9. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

10. Reaffirms its resolution 59/296, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of its relevant provisions and the relevant provisions of its resolution 60/266;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Operation is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

12. Also requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Operation against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Operation;

Revised budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

13. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire the amount of 52,714,100 dollars for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, in addition to the amount of 438,366,800 dollars already appropriated for the same period under the terms of its resolution 60/17 B;

Financing of the appropriation

14. Decides also, taking into account the amount of 438,366,800 dollars previously apportioned for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 under the terms of its resolution 60/17 B, to apportion among Member States the additional amount of 24,089,777 dollars for the period from 1 July to 15 December 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

15. Decides further that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 14 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 63,842 dollars, representing the estimated increase in staff assessment income approved for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 15 December 2006;

16. Decides to apportion among Member States the additional amount of 28,624,323 dollars at a monthly rate of 4,403,742 dollars for the period from 16 December 2006 to 30 June 2007, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolutions 58/256 of 23 December 2003 and 61/243 of 22 December 2006, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, as set out in its resolution 61/237 of 22 December 2006, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Operation;

17. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 16 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of the amount of 75,858 dollars, representing the estimated increase in staff assessment income approved for the Operation for the period from 16 December 2006 to 30 June 2007;

18. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

19. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Operation, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

20. Invites voluntary contributions to the Operation in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appro-
With the assistance of the United Nations legislation, which led to the lifting of timber sanctions, the Liberian Government, including the passage of forestry reform legislation, which led to the lifting of timber sanctions. With the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Economic Community of West African States and other regional and international actors, Liberia made progress in several areas, including the consolidation of peace and promotion of national reconciliation; the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; security sector reform; the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the fight against corruption; and the launch of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme.

The Panel of Experts established to assess the implementation, impact and effectiveness of the arms, travel, diamond and timber sanctions imposed on Liberia, indicated that the assets freeze had not been implemented and that it was not aware of any travel ban violations in Liberia. Timber sanctions had been effective, but the illegal domestic industry continued. While considerable progress was made in meeting the requirements for lifting diamond sanctions, several important steps still needed to be taken. The Panel found that financial administration in Liberia had improved since the installation of the new Government and recommended continued vigilance to ensure that revenues directly benefited Liberians and would not be used to support conflict. In June, the Security Council lifted the sanctions on timber and adjusted the arms embargo to allow for the equipping and training of Liberia’s police and security officers. In December, the Council renewed the travel ban and extended the arms sanctions for a further 12 months and the diamond measures for six months.

Former President Charles Taylor was apprehended by UNMIL, while making his escape from Nigeria, where he had been in exile, and handed over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone and transferred to The Hague, where he would stand trial for war crimes and other serious violations of humanitarian law.

An interdepartmental mission, led by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, reviewed UNMIL mandate in the light of developments in Liberia and concluded that, although UNMIL had completed its initial core responsibilities, critical tasks remained in order to safeguard the progress already achieved. The mission proposed that there be a two-year consolidation phase, during which UNMIL would continue to support the Government. It established benchmarks for the future drawdown of the UNMIL military personnel. In September, the Security Council extended UNMIL mandate until 31 March 2007.

Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement and UNMIL activities

On 16 January [SG/SM/10302], the Secretary-General congratulated Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on her inauguration as the President of the Republic of Liberia, and Africa’s first elected woman Head of State. He acknowledged that, while the establishment of a democratically elected Government in the country marked the successful completion of the two-year transitional period stipulated in the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement [YUN 2003, p. 192], several challenges faced the new Government, including restructuring the security sector; stimulating economic growth; consolidating State authority throughout the country; re-establishing basic services; and strengthening economic governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights. Assuring the Government of the continued support of the United Nations, he called on the international community to assist Liberia as it laid the foundation for a better future.

Report of Secretary-General (March). In his March progress report on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) [S/2006/159], the Secretary-General provided recommendations on a drawdown plan for the Mission and an update on developments since his 2005 December report.
He said that completion of the transitional process and the handover of power to the new Government dominated political activity in Liberia. On 16 January, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who was sworn into office as President, identified, in her inaugural address, national reconciliation, political inclusion, sustainable development and economic governance reforms as the key priorities of her administration. Promising to address corruption, she announced that all persons appointed to high office would be required to declare their personal assets. On 28 January, she ordered all National Transitional Government political appointees to resign. Two days later, she ordered an audit of the Transitional Government and requested transitional officials to seek permission before travelling overseas, pending the outcome of the audit.

In other initiatives to enhance transparency, the President declared null and void a contract between the Liberian National Port Authority and Global Seals System, as well as all forestry concessions granted to timber companies under the former administration. Under the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme, an international financial expert assumed the post of Chief Administrator at the Central Bank of Liberia on 5 February, while international financial controllers for Liberia’s state-owned enterprises, as well as international concessions and budget experts for the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy and the Bureau of the Budget were being recruited. In welcoming the Programme, the President called upon donors to develop integrated capacity-building mechanisms to facilitate eventual Liberian ownership of it. The dividends from tighter control of Government revenue were becoming evident, as revenue inflow to the Ministry of Finance was higher in January 2006 than at the same time a year earlier.

On 17 January, the President began announcing nominees to Cabinet, Supreme Court and other key positions. As at 1 March, the Senate had confirmed 47 of the 200 nominees. Nominations to Cabinet posts were not without controversy. On 12 February, the opposition Congress for Democratic Change challenged the President’s nominations for the positions of Minister of Justice and Chairperson of the National Elections Commission. Those nominations were reviewed by the Senate.

The security situation in Liberia remained fragile. Disgruntled former armed forces personnel continued to challenge the restructuring of the armed forces. On 14 January, after repeated orders from the Transitional Government, former soldiers finally vacated Camp Shiefflin, the proposed training site for the new army, but left several buildings stripped and roofless. Meanwhile, widows of former soldiers protested the non-payment of allowances and pensions, and members of the disbanded Anti-Terrorist Unit—a militia group established by former President Charles Taylor—protested their exclusion from the security sector reform programme, as well as the unpaid salary arrears. Moreover, various groups and human rights organizations continued to call on President Johnson-Sirleaf to request the Government of Nigeria to transfer former President Charles Taylor, who was in exile there, to the Special Court for Sierra Leone where he was under indictment for war crimes.

The volatile conflict situation in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire remained a security concern due to the movement of armed groups across the border; the recruitment of former Liberian combatants, including children; and the risk of a surge of Ivorians seeking refuge in Liberia due to escalating violence in their country. UNMIL conducted air and ground patrols in border areas and the Government established a joint task force with UNMIL to investigate cases of recruitment of Liberians. One individual was arrested in January on suspicion of recruiting Liberians to fight in Côte d’Ivoire.

Assessment mission. In the light of developments in Liberia, a UN Secretariat interdepartmental mission, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), conducted a comprehensive review of UNMIL (3–15 February) to assess the status of implementation of all aspects of its mandate, with a view to making recommendations for the Mission’s future direction. It also analysed the security situation in the country, reviewed the Government’s priorities and action plan, surveyed views on UNMIL future role and determined the required adjustments to UNMIL mandate, size and configuration for the post-transition phase.

The assessment mission concluded that UNMIL had completed many aspects of its initial mandate and made substantial progress in implementing several remaining key tasks. However, while the overwhelming presence of 15,000 UN military personnel and 1,115 police personnel had provided the security environment for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the security situation in Liberia and neighbouring countries remained fragile and key unfinished tasks needed to be urgently completed in order to ensure sustainable peace and stability. UNMIL had disarmed 101,495 combatants, of which approximately 65,000 had benefited from reintegration and rehabilitation opportunities and 37,000 were awaiting placement in reintegration programmes. The Mission collected
and destroyed some 28,000 weapons, 34,000 unexploded ordnance and 6.5 million rounds of small arms ammunition. Progress was made in police reform, with UNMIL having trained 1,442 of the 3,500 Liberian National Police required, as well as 513 police in specialty areas. Shortfalls in funding, however, impeded the restructuring process and the Police still needed basic equipment, uniforms, arms, ammunition, vehicles and communication equipment. Reform of the armed forces continued, with the launch of a joint Government/United States recruitment and restructuring programme on 18 January. The new army would be made up of 2,000 military personnel.

UNMIL also facilitated the return of over 2,200 Government officials to the counties, but the poor condition of Government structures, lack of basic services and irregular payment of civil servant salaries had slowed progress in the extension of State authority, which remained limited in most parts of the country. In the area of human rights, national conciliation and justice, progress was made with the launch of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on 20 February. New laws were enacted, including on rape. The lack of State control over Liberia’s natural resources continued to be a source of instability, with the illegal occupation and exploitation of rubber plantations, and a large number of ex-combatants and unemployed youth engaged in illegal diamond and gold mining. Progress was made toward meeting the conditions to join the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme [YUN 2003, p. 55], but funds to support those efforts were lacking. With the support of UNMIL and the Liberia Forestry Initiative, advances were achieved by the Forestry Development Authority in meeting conditions for the lifting of timber sanctions. The President ordered the establishment of a Forestry Reform Monitoring Committee.

The Government informed the assessment mission of its agenda for the reconstruction of Liberia, which encompassed both a short-term (150 days) and long-term (1,000 days) plan, based on four priority areas: security; economic revitalization; basic services and infrastructure; and the rule of law and good governance. The proposed 150-day action plan focused on “quick win” projects, such as partial restoration of electricity, the repair of roads and the rehabilitation of Government infrastructure. The Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee, chaired by the President, was established to coordinate those activities.

The assessment mission observed that several critical tasks urgently needed to be completed to sustain peace and stability in the country. The assessment mission, the Government, UNMIL, the UN country team and international partners agreed that a two-year consolidation phase was required, during which UNMIL would focus on an adjusted mandate. UNMIL priority tasks would include: maintaining a secure environment, facilitating the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, accelerating the training and development of the Liberian National Police and demobilizing the former police, supporting the Government in building the capacity of State institutions, completing the reintegration programme for ex-combatants, restructuring the armed forces, consolidating State authority country-wide, meeting the conditions for lifting the diamond and timber sanctions, rebuilding the culture of human rights and respect for the rule of law, strengthening the capacity of judicial institutions and implementing the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme and other initiatives to ensure the collection and utilization of national revenues for the public good.

There was a consensus that a significant UN presence was needed to guarantee peace and stability during the consolidation period, and therefore, it was too early for a major drawdown of UNMIL. After conducting a troop-to-task analysis, the assessment mission recommended reducing UNMIL military component by two infantry battalions, one in mid-2006 and another in early 2007. Troop strength would be reduced by 250 troops by 31 March 2006. The assessment mission also recommended the deployment of an additional formed police unit for UNMIL, so as to give the Liberian Police Support Unit more time to develop the experience required to eventually assume those responsibilities currently performed by UNMIL. Following those adjustments to its military and police strength, UNMIL would commence its drawdown, beginning in early 2007, security conditions permitting.

The Secretary-General recommended the extension of UNMIL mandate for one year until 31 March 2007, and the approval of the proposed adjustments to UNMIL military troop capacity, police strength and revised mandate. He would submit a timetable for a calibrated drawdown of UNMIL, with specific benchmarks and timelines.

Security Council consideration (March). On 17 March [meeting 5389], President Johnson-Sirleaf presented the Government’s strategy for peacebuilding to the Security Council and indicated that she would personally lead the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee, established to coordinate the reconstruction effort. She cited reform mechanisms that had been enacted in the diamond and
timber sectors to enable the lifting of sanctions and to enhance transparency in governance. In addition to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to address issues such as impunity and national reconciliation, the Supreme Court had been reconstituted to start the reform of the judiciary. Concerning former President Charles Taylor, who was in exile in Nigeria, President Johnson-Sirleaf said that she had asked President Obasanjo of Nigeria to consult with colleagues in the subregion and the international community on the resolution of the matter. In closing, she emphasized that Liberia was a fragile State, and as security sector reform was not complete, she urged the Council to maintain its support for UNMIL. She also appealed for urgent donor contributions for Liberia’s recovery and development agenda, including debt relief.

On 24 March [meeting 5395], the Council met in private with UNMIL troop-contributing countries and heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Alan Doss (United Kingdom).

**Arrest and transfer of Charles Taylor.** On 25 March, Nigerian President Obasanjo officially informed President Johnson-Sirleaf that, pursuant to her request, and following consultations with African leaders, the Government of Nigeria would release Charles Taylor to the custody of the Government of Liberia. On 28 March, the Nigerian Government announced that Mr. Taylor had abscended from his official residence, but was subsequently apprehended the following day and flown to the Liberian capital, Monrovia. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1638(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 267], Mr. Taylor was promptly apprehended and detained by UNMIL and handed over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Freetown to be tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone.

On 16 June, the Security Council, determining that ex-President Taylor’s presence in the West African subregion was an impediment to stability and a threat to peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, took note, in resolution 1688(2006), (see p. 242) of the intention of the Freetown-based Special Court for Sierra Leone to move Mr. Taylor’s trial to The Hague, at the premises of the International Criminal Court.

Mr Taylor was transferred to The Hague on 20 June.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


**The Security Council,**

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President concerning the situation in Liberia and the subregion, in particular resolutions 1626(2005) of 19 September 2005 and 1638(2005) of 11 November 2005, Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 14 March 2006,

Welcoming also the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and the installation of the newly elected Government of Liberia,

Emphasizing that significant challenges remain in completing the reintegration and repatriation of ex-combatants and the restructuring of the Liberian security sector, as well as maintaining stability in Liberia and the subregion,

Expressing its appreciation for the continuing support of the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union for the Liberian peace process, as well as for financial and other assistance provided by the international community,

Welcoming the transfer of former President Charles Taylor to the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and renewing its expression of appreciation to Nigeria and its President, Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, for providing for the temporary stay in Nigeria of former President Taylor,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. **Decides** that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia shall be extended until 30 September 2006;
2. **Decides also** to extend the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 1626(2005) for the period specified in paragraph 1 above;
3. **Reaffirms its intention** to authorize the Secretary-General to redeploy troops between the Mission and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire on a temporary basis in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1609(2005) of 24 June 2005, as may be needed;
4. **Takes note** of the letter dated 22 March 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, and expresses its determination to review the tasks and the troop level of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire by the end of April 2006, with a view to a decision on its reinforcement;
5. **Requests** the Secretary-General to review his recommendations for a drawdown plan for the Mission and to present further recommendations in his next regular report to the Security Council on the progress of the Mission in the implementation of its mandate;
6. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Report of Secretary-General (June).** In his June progress report on UNMIL [S/2006/376], the Secretary-General said that the transfer of former Libe-
rrian President Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone had elicited mixed reactions from the Liberian public. Some believed that he should be tried immediately to demonstrate that impunity would not be tolerated, while others argued that he should have been left in Nigeria, as his trial could disrupt the Liberian national reconciliation process and destabilize the country and the subregion. On 30 March, President Johnson-Sirleaf urged the Security Council to adopt a resolution that would allow Mr. Taylor’s trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone to take place in The Hague, Netherlands.

In other political developments, the Liberian President undertook assessment visits to all 15 counties in Liberia from February to May and consulted with county officials and leaders on the challenges facing their communities, including poor roads, inadequate health and education facilities and the lack of office and residential accommodation for Government officials. Meanwhile, Senate confirmation hearings for high level officials continued. On 30 March, 21 cabinet ministers, along with their deputy and assistant ministers, the chairman and the commissioners of the National Elections Commission and the President’s nominees to several Government agencies and parastatals were sworn into office, rendering the three branches of Government fully functioning. In addition, as at 1 June, all 15 county superintendents had been confirmed by the Senate.

However, several issues, such as the payment of benefits for legislators, the release by a Supreme Court associate justice of two imprisoned ministers the day after their sentencing by the Senate for contempt of the Legislature, and claims that the President had failed to consult with the Legislature on the transfer of Mr. Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, created tensions between the executive and legislative branches of the Government. To improve relations, the President appointed a senior Government official to act as liaison between the two branches. As part of efforts to address the issues of governance and corruption, President Johnson-Sirleaf, by executive order, extended the life of the Governance Reform Commission and redefined its mandate to include preparation of an anti-corruption strategy and a code of conduct for public servants.

With regard to security matters, UNMIL launched Operation Kilbride to address the security concerns raised by Mr. Taylor’s transfer to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The security measures introduced, including robust patrolling within Monrovia, deployment of the UNMIL Quick Reaction Force in border areas not covered by the Mission and an increase of UNMIL troop presence in Mr. Taylor’s former strongholds, were intended to reassure the populace, send a message of the Mission’s resolve to maintain peace and stability in the country and deter potential spoilers. Nevertheless, the security situation was marred by various incidents. Demobilized armed forces personnel staged several violent street demonstrations, the most serious occurring on 25 April, when approximately 400 ex-army personnel blockaded three roads leading to the Ministry of National Defense. Tires and military checkpoints were set on fire and UNMIL troops were attacked, as well as personnel of the Liberian Police Support Unit who were protecting the Ministry. In response to the incident, the Government made arrangements for the payment of severance pay and other arrears, and announced measures to deal with public disorder, which included the arrest and prosecution of the instigators or leaders of the attack, as well as those who had destroyed property; a ban against a demonstration by civil servants scheduled for the following day, 26 April; a temporary ban on the sale of petroleum in glass bottles; and a ban on the carrying of cutlasses and machetes during the night, as those weapons were usually used to attack citizens in their homes. The illegal occupation by former combatants of rubber plantations remained a threat to stability, as some former commanders of the disbanded warring factions continued to organize the illegal exploitation of the plantations and operate criminal groups there. Other security risks included disputes over land and other property, as refugees, internally displaced persons and ex-combatants returned to their communities, and the unstable situation in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire.

UNMIL continued to assist Liberia in its recovery, rehabilitation and development efforts. In the area of security sector reform, progress was made in restructuring the Liberian National Police. The target of 3,500 fully trained police personnel was expected to be completed by July 2007. The Government appointed a new Director of Police and several deputy and assistant directors. Nonetheless, basic and specialized training programmes for the police were still inadequately funded, with a shortfall of some $1.6 million, and operations continued to be hampered by the lack of equipment, uniforms, weapons and vehicles.

The recruitment drive for the armed forces was ongoing, with 1,776 of 4,265 applicants having passed the initial screening as at 1 June. The report of a United States-funded security sector review, conducted by the RAND Corporation, was presented
to the Government and would form the basis of a national dialogue on security sector reform.

The Government intensified efforts to regain control over the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. On 23 May, a joint Government/UN task force established to assess Liberia’s rubber plantations submitted its report to the President, which contained recommendations for ending the use of forced and child labour and for halting the illegal trafficking of raw rubber, including the re-possession of illegally occupied plantations, review of concession and management agreements and the establishment of interim management teams. The Forestry Reform Management Monitoring Committee, established in February, reviewed new proposals for the allocation of forestry concessions and contracts and the establishment of a forestry strategic management plan.

Other UNMIL activities included facilitating the return of Government officials to their duty stations; providing transportation to customs, excise, immigration and naturalization officers to enable them to monitor revenue collection points and border crossings; assisting the Government in deploying mineral inspectors to diamond-mining areas, setting up Kimberley Process Certification Scheme offices and carrying out diamond-mining area surveillance and inspections; operating joint UNMIL/Forestry Development Authority checkpoints to ensure adherence to new pit-sawing policy; supporting the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s public outreach programme; advising the Government on engaging national prosecutorial consultants to reduce the backlog of pending criminal cases; rehabilitating or repairing more than 2,500 kilometres of unpaved roads; carrying out community-level broadcasts and increasing its programming on Government activities; and assisting the Government in the implementation of its 150-day action plan to address the most basic needs of the population.

The resettlement of internally displaced persons was completed, with some 312,015 persons having been assisted. As at 18 May, a total of 266,059 refugees had returned to Liberia, with another 169,525 registered refugees remaining in other West African countries.

On the drawdown of UNMIL, the Secretary-General indicated that progress made in security sector reform and restructuring should constitute the key security benchmark to determine the pace of that process. Given the relative stability in the country and based on the detailed assessment in his March report (see p. 212), he recommended that the first military component infantry battalion be withdrawn during the latter part of 2006, subject to the continued stability of the security situation. Details of the adjustment would be provided in his next report and further adjustments, including the withdrawal of the second infantry battalion in early 2007, would be considered as the situation permitted.

In view of the ongoing police reform and restructuring programme and the critical role of UNMIL formed police units in supporting the Liberian National Police in addressing recurrent violent demonstrations, the Secretary-General concluded that the security situation did not permit a drawdown of the UNMIL police component. He reiterated his March recommendation for the deployment of an additional formed police unit to enhance UNMIL capacity to respond effectively to public unrest and other security threats that could arise.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President, including resolution 1667(2006) of 31 March 2006,

Noting that, in his report of 14 March 2006 the Secretary-General recommended, inter alia, changes to the configuration of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, in view of the completion by the Mission of a number of tasks, and in the context of a review of the appropriate mandates for and composition of the Mission, and that, in his report of 9 June 2006, he reiterated his recommendation for the addition of a formed police unit,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Decides to increase the authorized size of the civilian police component of the United Nations Mission in Liberia by 125 and to decrease the authorized size of the military component of the Mission by 125, from the current authorized levels;

Decides also to remain actively seized of the matter.

Further peace process developments

Report of Secretary-General (September). In his September report on UNMIL [S/2006/743], the Secretary-General said that he had visited Liberia from 3 to 5 July and was reassured by the progress made, notwithstanding the country’s economic and financial limitations. In August, the Legislature passed and President Johnson-Sirleaf signed into law the Government’s first national budget for the fiscal
period 2006-2007, based on revenue projections of $129.9 million. The President continued the anti-corruption campaign, dismissing a number of senior Government officials for corruption and terminating the appointments of three revenue collectors, a senior economist and a supervisor of the foreign travel section for financial improprieties. She reconstituted the task force on recovery of public assets, and instructed the Ministry of Justice to conclude action on the audit reports of different Government entities and identify, for the purpose of prosecution, individuals who had abused the public trust. In July, the Government released the long-awaited ECOWAS report on economic crime in Liberia, prepared during the tenure of the National Transitional Government [YUN 2005, p. 262]. In the report, recommendations were made for the immediate dismissal of four former senior officials of that Government for misappropriation and mismanagement of public funds. Civil society groups called for the prosecution of the individuals so named. On 20 August, the Cabinet approved a draft anti-corruption policy paper prepared by the Governance Reform Commission, which set out a framework for tackling impunity and promoting a system of accountability and public integrity. The Commission also submitted a draft code of conduct and declaration of income, assets and liabilities form for public servants.

The overall security situation remained calm but fragile. While the transfer of Mr. Taylor's trial from the region had reduced tensions considerably, the activities of his associates and supporters remained a concern. Demobilized personnel from the former armed forces, national police and special security services staged demonstrations to demand severance payments and other benefits. Some of the demands were met, but many of them had limited access to employment opportunities and were susceptible to manipulation by various interest groups. Incidents of armed robbery within Monrovia and its environs increased, leading to calls by the public for arming the Liberian National Police and adopting more extensive security measures. Armed robberies and killings were reported also at the Cocopa and Guthrie rubber plantations. UNMIL police, in cooperation with the Liberian National Police, increased their patrol in high crime areas in Monrovia, including night patrols, as well as in Cocopa and other rubber plantations. On 15 August, with UNMIL assistance, the Government officially re-established control over the Guthrie rubber plantation and efforts instituted interim management teams at abandoned or contested plantations, as recommended by the joint Government/UNMIL task force on rubber plantations. Concerns over the security of President Johnson-Sirleaf arose on 26 July, when a fire broke out in the Executive Mansion, causing extensive damage, as well as in August, when shooting incidents occurred in Monrovia involving officials of the Special Security Service, which provided close protection to the President. No one was injured in the fire and an investigation, conducted with the assistance of UNMIL and South African forensic experts, attributed its cause to an electrical fault. Three separate shootings on 3, 5 and 8 August took place at the residence of the Director of the Special Security Service, with one resulting in the death of the Director's personal bodyguard.

The programme for the establishment of a new police service was on course, with 2,073 Liberian National Police, 392 Special Security Services and 155 Seaport Police officers having been trained and deployed as at 1 September. To achieve the target of 3,500 fully trained National Police personnel by July 2007, the field training programme was compressed from 26 weeks to 16 weeks. UNMIL developed a basic management course and a senior leadership qualification programme to address the shortfall in the mid-level ranks of the police service. The presence of National Police in the interior of the country remained far below acceptable levels, with only 454 officers deployed throughout Liberia's 15 counties.

To assist in the restoration and consolidation of State authority throughout Liberia, UNMIL facilitated the return of government officials to their duty stations. Three additional Central Bank payment centres were constructed, with UNMIL assistance, in Kakata, Gbargna and Buchanan for the payment of salaries to officials stationed in remote locations. Other progress included the election of a new nine-member National Traditional Council of Paramount Chiefs and Elders and preparation by the National Elections Commission for municipal and chieftaincy elections in October 2007.

To regain control over the country's natural resources, the Government, with UNMIL assistance, enacted a national forestry reform law, implemented its policy on the movement of timber within the country at joint UNMIL/Forestry Development Authority checkpoints and developed an environmentally sustainable pit-sawing policy. The mandate of the joint Government/UNMIL task force was extended to oversee the implementation of the recommendations contained in its May assessment report on Liberia's rubber plantations. The Government accepted the recommendations of the Kimberley Process assessment team, including the need to establish a task force on Kimberley process compliance and to suspend all large-scale mining
activities. As illegal artisanal mining continued to be reported in the western part of the country and in Nimba and Sinoe counties, UNMIL assisted the Government with its surveillance, mapping and inspection activities.

Judicial system reform progressed, with the completion of six court construction and renovation projects, with another seven in progress, all of which were funded by UNMIL quick-impact project scheme. UNMIL assisted with the hiring of 12 national prosecutorial and 11 public defense consultants for an initial six-month period, resulting in more cases being heard by the courts, and provided advice and assistance to legal and judicial officers in the counties. The Mission assisted the Bureau of Corrections in improving conditions at correctional facilities, with work being completed at Kakata prison, while rehabilitation at the Buchanan, Gbarnga, Harper and Monrovia prisons and the Zwedru Palace of Corrections were at varying stages of completion.

Further progress was made with the implementation of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme. On 16 June, the Government signed a memorandum of understanding for the consolidation of operational bank accounts for State-owned enterprises. The Economic Governance Steering Committee technical team worked with the internationally recruited experts to improve financial management and transparency and build the capacity of Government institutions through the transfer of skills. At the partner’s review meeting to assess the Government’s performance during its first six months in office (Monrovia, 12-13 July) and to agree on the way forward for Liberia’s national recovery, reconstruction and development, the Government highlighted the capacity and implementation constraints it faced in achieving its objectives and presented a case for targeted budgetary support and early debt relief. The World Bank signed an agreement with the Government for the first part of a $68 million grant to conduct emergency rehabilitation and repair of critical infrastructure, including rehabilitation of the Monrovia-Buchanan and Monrovia-Ganta highways, repairs of 65 bridges and the construction of six more. The second part of the grant would be used to increase Government capacity to carry out road maintenance functions, build the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation’s capacity and to construct ports, airports, schools and health clinics.

The Secretary-General observed that Liberia continued to make tangible progress in a number of areas and served as an example of what could be achieved when leaders and citizens worked together and were committed to peace. Nevertheless, the country still faced enormous challenges. He emphasized that the Government and UNMIL would need to remain vigilant and carefully manage the internal threats to stability, as well as closely monitor Liberia’s borders in the light of the volatile situation in the subregion, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire. The Government should also work expeditiously to develop its national security policy, which would enable it to set out a road map for assuming security responsibility for the entire country. He called on donors to support judicial sector reform, the enhancement of the rule of law and the work of the Independent National Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the light of the security issues outlined in the report, and the planned drawdown of UNMIL, the Secretary-General recommended the extension of the Mission’s mandate until 30 September 2007. Benchmarks for phase I of UNMIL consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal were annexed to the report.

Security Council consideration. On 25 September [meeting 5534], the Council met in private with UNMIL troop-contributing countries and heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


Welcoming also the steps taken by the Government of Liberia to combat corruption,
Expressing its appreciation for the continuing support of the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union for the Libyan peace process, as well as for financial and other assistance provided by the international community,
Commending the United Nations Mission in Liberia, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, for the significant part its support has played in restoring peace and stability to Liberia,
Emphasizing that significant challenges remain in completing the reintegration and repatriation of ex-combatants and the urgent restructuring of the Liberian
security sector, as well as maintaining stability in Liberia and the subregion,

Welcoming deployments of the Mission in vulnerable areas at Liberia’s borders,

Reiterating the continuing need for support by the Mission for the security of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Liberia shall be extended until 31 March 2007;

2. Reaffirms its intention to authorize the Secretary-General to redeploy troops between the Mission and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire on a temporary basis in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1609(2005) of 24 June 2005, as may be needed;

3. Endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General for a phased, gradual consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal of the troop contingent of the Mission, as the situation permits and without compromising the security of Liberia;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor progress on the stabilization of Liberia and to continue to keep the Security Council informed, with particular reference to the broad benchmarks laid down in paragraphs 71 and 72 of his report of 12 September 2006 and in annex I thereto, in particular the restructuring of the security sector, the reintegration of former combatants, the facilitation of political and ethnic reconciliation, the consolidation of State authority throughout the country, judicial reform, the restoration of effective Government control over the country’s natural and mineral resources, and the establishment of a stable and secure environment necessary to foster economic growth;

5. Calls upon the Government of Liberia, in close coordination with the Mission, to take the necessary steps on its part towards achieving the benchmarks laid down in paragraph 4 above, including ensuring the effective implementation of the National Forestry Reform Law, the continuing commitment to the Government and Economic Management Assistance Programme, and the rapid development of a national security policy and architecture, and encourages the international community to support those efforts;

6. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Mission to implement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, and requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action, including conducting predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary and other action to ensure that allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse against their personnel are properly investigated and, if substantiated, punished;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Report of Secretary-General (December). In his December report [S/2006/958], the Secretary-General said that the relationship between the legislative and executive branches of the Government improved, allowing the national forestry reform law to be passed. To further national reconciliation, President Johnson-Sirleaf reaffirmed her Government’s commitment to religious freedom and tolerance, and on 21 November, convened a meeting of the leaders of registered political parties, including those who had contested the 2005 presidential elections. The party leaders exchanged views on several issues of national importance, such as national security and the country’s draft interim poverty reduction strategy. The Presidential Commission established to investigate inter-ethnic land property disputes in Nimba County completed its work. Unmil worked closely also with the Government and civil society organizations to address other inter-ethnic, religious, community and property disputes in various parts of the country.

The President, in continuing efforts to combat corruption, signed into law two acts ratifying the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Corruption [YUN 2003, p. 112]. The Government also approved the Governance Reform Commission’s anti-corruption policy statement and considered a draft national anti-corruption strategy. Improvements by the Ministry of Finance in the process for the payment of civil servant salaries resulted in the removal of over 4,700 “ghost” workers from the Government’s payroll.

Disturbances by deactivated security service personnel demanding outstanding benefits and salary arrears prompted President Johnson-Sirleaf to direct her Cabinet, the Inspector General of the Liberian National Police and the Director of the Special Security Services to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the remaining salary arrears and pensions and develop a plan for their liquidation and payment. On 8 September, in response to the increase in reported criminal activities, especially armed robberies and rapes, the President launched a joint Liberian National Police/unmil operation, which resulted in a significant reduction in violent crime in Monrovia and its environs. Unmil conducted successful operational readiness exercises to respond to a possible major deterioration of the security situation in Monrovia and closely monitored the security situation along Liberia’s borders with Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.
Although efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-combatants continued, as at 15 November, some 39,000 of them had not yet been absorbed into reintegration programmes. The Joint Implementation Unit approved 10 new vocational skills training projects, which would absorb 8,000 ex-combatants, 3,000 of whom had so far registered for the projects. Ex-combatants also had the option of enrolling in several formal education schemes. Further progress was made in the training and restructuring of the Liberian National Police. As at 1 December, 2,214 police officers had been trained and deployed, and some 358 Special Security Service personnel and 155 Seaport Police officers had graduated from the National Police Academy. An intensified country-wide recruitment drive was launched, targeting civil society leaders and educational institutions in an effort to identify and attract young recruits. Training of the new armed forces continued with the assistance of the United States. On 4 November, the first group of 106 recruits for the new army graduated from basic training and 500 recruits were selected for the next basic training class scheduled to commence in early 2007.

UNMIL continued its promotion, protection and monitoring of the human rights situation in Liberia. An UNMIL consultant conducted an audit of key Liberian legislation and concluded that several laws, including some provisions of the Constitution, were not in compliance with international human rights standards and instruments, and recommended that the applicable laws be amended to comply with those standards. On 10 October, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission commenced taking statements in the counties. UNMIL assisted in training more than 200 statement-takers on the promotion and protection of human rights, but the programme had to be suspended on 28 November, due to insufficient funds to pay their salaries. The Secretary-General appealed to the international community to support the work of the Commission. In the area of judicial reform, with UNMIL support in the engagement of national lawyers, court activities increased throughout the country, particularly trials for serious offences. Significant progress was also made in the establishment of the Law Reform Commission.

The Government achieved steady progress in gaining control over the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. Following the full lifting of the sanctions on timber exports on 20 October (see p. 226), the Government finalized regulations for the effective management of the timber industry. Between April and November, with UNMIL assistance, the Forestry Development Authority issued 1,873 permits for the transportation of 695,480 pieces of timber, which resulted in public revenue of $423,321, compared to $62,262 for the same period in 2005. President Johnson-Sirleaf established a National Diamond Task Force to work on implementing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, with a view to ensuring that conditions for lifting Security Council sanctions on diamonds were met. The Government also convened a stakeholders’ forum to prepare a national mineral policy for Liberia. UNMIL continued to support the Government in re-establishing its authority over the Guthrie Rubber Plantation. The interim management team appointed by the Government began commercial operations and provided employment for more than 1,500 workers on the plantation. In addition, some 200 registered ex-combatants and residents at the plantation had signed up to participate in reintegration and rehabilitation programmes.

The Secretary-General reported that progress was made in meeting the broad benchmarks outlined in his September report for the drawdown of UNMIL personnel (see p. 218). Progress in meeting those benchmarks included the likelihood of reaching the recruitment target of 3,500 trained police officers by July 2007; marked improvement in financial management and revenue administration in the public sector; and the restoration of street lighting and piped water in parts of Monrovia. On the other hand, the new army would not be fully operational until 2008; deployment of police officers remained hampered by logistical and management constraints; some 39,000 ex-combatants had yet to access reintegration programmes; corrections facilities had been established in only seven of the 15 counties; extension of public health services to the counties remained limited; and the country was heavily dependent on non-governmental organizations, which provided 90 per cent of primary health care and hospital services. He said that a full update on progress made in meeting the benchmarks would be provided in his next progress report on UNMIL, and subsequently on a six-monthly basis at the time of each mandate renewal.

The Secretary-General encouraged President Johnson-Sirleaf to continue involving Liberians in the country’s recovery process and appealed to all political and civil society leaders to continue their engagement in the reconstruction and reform processes. He called upon the Government to finalize its national security strategy and prepare a comprehensive architecture to enable Liberian security agencies to sustain a stable security environment, which was a crucial element in the planning and management of the drawdown of UNMIL forces. As
a review team from DPKO would travel to Liberia in early 2007 to assess the impact of the UNMIL police component on the capacity of the National Police, the Secretary-General stressed that everything possible should be done to operationalize the force and expedite its deployment to the countryside. Deeply concerned by the high incidence of sexual violence, in particular rape committed against women and girl children, the Secretary-General further emphasized that every effort should be made to ensure that criminal justice was fairly addressed and widespread violence against women and children brought to an end.

On 20 December, by resolution 61/218 on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, the General Assembly appealed to donors and the international community to provide assistance to Liberia, including financial and technical support for the Government’s national reconstruction and development agenda (see p. 1081).

UNMIL

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), established by Security Council resolution 1509(2003) [YUN 2003, p. 194], was mandated to support the implementation of the 2003 Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities [ibid., p. 189] and of the peace process; protect UN staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; and assist in national security reform, including national police training and the formation of a new, restructured military. By resolution 1638(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 267], the Council enhanced the mandate to include the apprehension and detention of former President Charles Taylor, as well as his transfer to the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

By resolution 1694(2006) (see p. 216), the Council supported the Secretary-General’s recommendation to increase the civilian police component by 125 personnel and decrease the military troop strength by the same number. By resolutions 1667(2006) (see p. 214) and 1712(2006) (see p. 218), it extended UNMIL mandate until 30 September 2006, and 31 March 2007, respectively, and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation for a phased consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal of the troop contingent, as the situation permitted. The Council, by resolution 1657(2006) (see p. 181), authorized the transfer of one military company from UNMIL to the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, until 31 March 2006.

During 2006, the Secretary-General submitted reports to the Security Council on developments in Liberia and the activities of UNMIL in March [S/2006/159] (see p. 211); June [S/2006/376] (see p. 214); September [S/2006/743] (see p. 216); and December [S/2006/958] (see p. 219). In addition to political and security aspects, the reports summarized UNMIL activities to address the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country, as well as efforts to assist in national recovery, reconstruction and development. Throughout the year, the Mission also provided HIV/AIDS awareness training and sensitization to its personnel and promoted gender mainstreaming in its activities.

UNMIL continued to be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Alan Doss (United Kingdom) and maintained its headquarters in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. Lieutenant General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor (Nigeria) continued as the Force Commander of UNMIL.

UNMIL financing

In June, at its resumed sixtieth (2006) session, the General Assembly considered the performance report on the UNMIL budget for 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [A/60/645], showing actual expenditures of $740,964,800, against a total appropriation of $821,986,000. It also considered the proposed budget for UNMIL for 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 [A/60/653 & Corr.1,2] of $716,855,700, gross, and the related ACABQ report [A/60/852]. The budget provided for the deployment of 215 military observers, 14,785 military contingents, 1,115 civilian police officers, including formed units, 599 international staff, 957 national staff and 278 United Nations Volunteers. ACABQ recommended a reduction of $138,000 in the proposed UNMIL budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION

On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/924], adopted resolution 60/276 without vote [agenda item 148].

Financing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia

The General Assembly,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1497(2003) of 1 August 2003, by which the Council declared its readiness to establish a United Nations stabilization force to support the transitional government and to assist in the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement in Liberia,
Recalling also Security Council resolution 1509(2003) of 19 September 2003, by which the Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Liberia for a period of twelve months, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission, the latest of which was resolution 1667(2006) of 31 March 2006, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission until 30 September 2006,

Recalling further its resolution 58/315 of 1 July 2004,

Recalling its resolution 58/261 A of 23 December 2003 on the financing of the Mission and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 59/305 of 22 June 2005,

Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,

Noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Mission in Liberia as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 212.9 million United States dollars, representing some 8.9 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only six Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, subject to the provisions of the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

10. Emphasizes the importance of ensuring coordination and collaboration of efforts with the United Nations agencies and programmes and implementation of a unified workplan, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on measures taken, as well as progress made and to provide clear descriptions of respective roles and responsibilities in its future budget submissions;

11. Looks forward to the consideration of the comprehensive report requested in section VIII, paragraph 3, of its resolution 60/266;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that quick impact projects are implemented in compliance with the original intent of such projects and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

13. Decides to provide 1 million dollars for quick impact projects for the period 2006/07, in the interim, and requests the Secretary-General to utilize resources in strict compliance with the original intent of this type of project;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to review the administrative support structure for the quick impact projects with a view to minimizing overhead costs for their implementation;

15. Decides to reduce operational costs by 1 million dollars;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of its resolutions 59/296 and 60/266;

17. Also requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

18. Further requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;

Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005

19. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

20. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission in Liberia the amount of 745,572,300 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 714,613,300 dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, 25,571,000 dollars for the sup-
port account for peacekeeping operations and 5,388,000 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base;

**Financing of the appropriation**

21. *Also decides* to apportion among Member States the amount of 186,393,100 dollars for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

22. *Further decides* that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 21 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 3,394,000 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 2,573,000 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 719,100 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 101,900 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

23. *Decides* to apportion among Member States the amount of 559,179,200 dollars for the period from 1 October 2006 to 30 June 2007, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission;

24. *Also decides* that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973 (X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 23 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 10,182,100 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 7,718,900 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 236,100 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 305,900 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

25. *Further decides* that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 24 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 108,308,700 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 25 above;

26. *Decides* that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 108,308,700 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 25 above;

27. *Also decides* that the decrease of 316,800 dollars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 108,308,700 dollars referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 above;

28. *Emphasizes* that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

29. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Mission, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

30. *Invites* voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

31. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia”.


**Sanctions**

The Security Council received several reports on the implementation of sanctions imposed on Liberia, pursuant to Council resolutions 1521(2003) [YUN 2003, p. 208] and 1647(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 274]. Those sanctions banned the importation of arms and related materiel, military training, the export of Liberian timber products and rough diamonds, and international travel by individuals constituting a threat to the peace process in Liberia and the subregion. Financial sanctions had also been imposed on Mr. Charles Taylor and his immediate family by resolution 1532(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 204].

**Appointment of Panel.** On 23 January [S/2006/36], the Secretary-General informed the Council of his appointment of five members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1647(2005), which was mandated to conduct an assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States in order to report on the implementation of resolution 1521(2003) and any violations of the sanctions imposed by that resolution and by resolution 1532(2004); the impact and effectiveness of the measures imposed; progress made towards meeting the conditions for lifting the sanctions; and the humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the measures imposed by resolution 1521(2003). The Secretary-General, on 23 June [S/2006/438], informed the Security Council of the names of the five experts he
had re-appointed to the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 1689(2006) (see p. 226).

**Implementation of sanctions regime**

**Communication.** On 6 June [S/2006/365], Liberia transmitted the text of a 24 May letter from President Johnson-Sirleaf requesting that the Security Council consider the lifting of sanctions imposed on Liberia under resolution 1521(2003), as the country had complied with the demands of the relevant paragraphs of the resolution and had taken additional measures to satisfy the Council’s demands for the lifting of the sanctions. She noted that Liberia, Sierra Leone and the subregion were at peace; former Liberian President Charles Taylor was in the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and most of the individuals considered to be a threat to peace in the subregion were positively engaged in the country, either in private business or public office. In addition, the war in Liberia had ended, a democratic government had been elected, all combatants had been disarmed and demobilized, and in keeping with the terms of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Accord, the military and security sectors were being reformed and restructured.

President Johnson-Sirleaf outlined 14 specific measures, eight related to the diamond industry and six pertaining to the timber industry, which the Government of Liberia had taken to meet the conditions for lifting the sanctions. She stated that the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolutions 1521(2003) had documented the severe socio-economic effects of the sanctions on the Government and the population and emphasized that Liberia could not make any significant stride in poverty reduction or the provision of social services with the diamond and timber industry—two significant life wires in the country’s economy—under UN sanctions. The Government also requested a review of the travel ban, taking into account that those sanctions were imposed because of the relationship with or involvement in the activities of former President Taylor. Where no relationship continued to exist or where there was no threat to the security of Liberia by the activities of those individuals, the Government wanted to have those sanctions lifted to send a message to law-abiding citizens that they could enjoy the rights granted them by the Liberian constitution.

She reiterated the call by ECOWAS at its Ministerial Conference (Monrovia, 15 May) for the United Nations to lift the sanctions to enable the new Government to have access to needed resources to execute its programmes and improve the standard of living of the people.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,

_Recalling_ its previous resolutions and the statements by its President on the situation in Liberia and West Africa,

_Welcoming_ the leadership of newly elected President Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and her efforts to restore peace, security and harmony throughout Liberia,

_Underscoring_ the continuing need for the United Nations Mission in Liberia to support the Government of Liberia in building a stable environment that will allow democracy to flourish,

_Recognizing_ the need for newly vetted and trained Liberian security forces to assume greater responsibility for national security, including policing, intelligence-gathering and executive protection,

_Determining_ that, despite significant progress having been made in Liberia, the situation there continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

_Acting_ under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. _Decides_ that the measures imposed by paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of resolution 1521(2003) of 22 December 2003 shall not apply to the weapons and ammunition already provided to members of the Special Security Service for training purposes pursuant to advance approval, under paragraph 2 (e) of that resolution, by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 21 of that resolution, and that those weapons and ammunition may remain in the custody of the Special Security Service for unencumbered operational use;

2. _Decides also_ that the measures imposed by paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of resolution 1521(2003) shall not apply to limited supplies of weapons and ammunition, as approved in advance on a case-by-case basis by the Committee, intended for use by members of the Government of Liberia police and security forces who have been vetted and trained since the inception of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in October 2003;

3. _Decides further_ that a request made in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall be submitted to the Committee by the Government of Liberia and the exporting State, and, in case of approval, the Government of Liberia shall subsequently mark the weapons and ammunition, maintain a registry of them and formally notify the Committee that these steps have been taken;

4. _Reiterates_ the importance of continuing assistance by the Mission to the Government of Liberia, the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Liberia, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, and without prejudice to its mandate, including in monitoring the implementation of the measures in paragraphs 2, 4, 6 and 10 of resolution 1521(2003), and in this regard requests the Mission to inspect inventories of weapons and ammu-
tion obtained in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above to ensure that all such weapons and ammunition are accounted for, and to make periodic reports to the Committee on its findings;

5. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

**Report of Expert Panel (June).** The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1521(2003) and 1647(2005) concerning Liberia transmitted a June report [S/2006/379] to the Council, which contained an assessment of all sanctions. While the Panel indicated that there had been no evidence of timber exports or detection of industrial logging, pitsawing—using chainsaws to process logs into planks—remained widespread, with approximately 1,000 pitsawyers, many of whom were ex-combatants. The Panel concluded that, although the export sanctions were effective, the domestic industry continued illegally and the necessary reforms, including laws and regulations, had not been completed and enacted. In addition to its previous recommendations, the Panel proposed further Forestry Development Authority (FDA) collaboration with UNMIL military observers in conducting joint patrols; continued FDA cooperation with the Liberia Forestry Initiative (LFI) and the newly established Forest Reform Monitoring Committee (FRMC) to implement the agreed reform package; and codification by the European Commission and China of a voluntary partnership agreement with Liberia to ensure that only legal wood entered international trade.

The Panel continued to work with the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy towards meeting the Security Council requirements, especially with the disbursement by the United States of a $1.4 million funding package for achieving Kimberley Process compliance. However, illegal mining activity continued unabated, with one large, foreign-owned operation being of particular concern. Surveys of mining areas conducted by the Panel in Nimba County, Sinoe County and the Lofa River regions from March to May, revealed that activity had steadily increased during the dry season. Illicit diamond-buying offices continued to operate in Monrovia and provincial towns and Liberian diamonds were being trafficked through Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Panel estimated Liberian diamond production to be worth some $1.2 to $1.5 million per month.

While most of the components for a credible, internationally accredited certification scheme were available, harmonization into a functioning mechanism had yet to be completed. The Panel recommended that the international community continue to support the Liberian Government in its efforts to meet the requirements of the Security Council and the Kimberley Process and that UNMIL be given a robust mandate to assist the Government to regularize and control the diamond sector.

The Panel determined that financial administration in Liberia was improving, but continued vigilance was needed to improve the overall transparency of all financial activities and ensure that revenues went directly to the Government. The Panel recommended that all contributions and donations made by State-owned enterprises to functionaries of the former National Transitional Government of Liberia be investigated to confirm they had been used appropriately and that all balance amounts, vehicles and equipment were properly transferred to the new Government. It advised that the Liberia Petroleum Refining Corporation (LPRC) should reconcile actual quarterly payments made by importers, so that they could be reflected in the determination of the prices of petroleum products. The General Auditing Office (GAO) should be strengthened and provided with adequate infrastructure and qualified manpower to perform its responsibilities, which should include, among other functions, auditing of the payment of import duties by rice importers, as well as the conduct of a new audit of the Liberian Mining Company (LIMINCO). The Panel also proposed that the Government should discuss with the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry ways to restore revenues back to the 1997-2000 level.

Two years after the Security Council passed resolution 1532(2004) concerning the assets freeze [YUN 2004, p. 204], the Government still had not frozen anyone’s assets. The Panel recommended that all efforts be made to speed up the legislation process to enable the Government to implement the Council’s resolution. Indicating that the lack of infrastructure and information about the travel ban, combined with corruption and the porosity of the borders constituted serious obstacles to controlling travel, the Panel concluded that it was likely that the travel ban had been violated by more individuals than those identified in its report. Moreover, it was not clear if countries had monitoring systems in place to detect violations. The Panel advised countries to report at least once a year to the Committee, describing their investigations and any travel ban violations.

Concerned that an undetermined number of ex-combatants had kept weapons, even if only for protection, the Panel recommended that the arms embargo remain in place until the end of the training of the Liberian Army, and if it were lifted, the lifting should not extend to non-State actors.
The Panel found that the socio-economic impact of the sanctions had changed little. The commodity sanctions had resulted in a loss of jobs and revenue and poor road maintenance. The Panel recommended that Liberia and its international partners create opportunities for Liberians to have greater access to markets and other social services in the larger population centres around the country; give priority to the development of Liberia’s human capital; and adopt a proactive stance in ensuring the sustainable management of its natural resources, particularly the forests.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President on the situation in Liberia and West Africa,

Welcoming the rapid progress made by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf since January 2006 in rebuilding Liberia for the benefit of all Liberians, with the support of the international community,

Applauding the actions of President Johnson-Sirleaf, President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and others in the international community for their roles in transferring Mr. Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone,

Welcoming the progress made by the Government of Liberia in implementing the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, designed to ensure prompt implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed at Accra on 18 August 2003 and to expedite the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 1521(2003) of 22 December 2003,

Applauding the commitment of the Government of Liberia to transparent management of the country’s forestry resources for the benefit of Liberians and its reforms in the timber sector, including promulgating Executive Order No. 1 of 2 February 2006, which declared all purported timber sector, including promulgating Executive Order No. 1 and that is consistent with the recommendations of the Forest Reform Monitoring Committee,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation by the Government of Liberia with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, and noting Liberia’s progress towards compliance with the Kimberley Process,

Stressing the continuing importance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in improving security throughout Liberia and helping the new Government to establish its authority throughout the country, particularly in the diamond- and timber-producing regions and border areas,

Taking note of the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted on 7 June 2006,

Having reviewed the measures imposed and conditions set out by paragraphs 6 to 9 of resolution 1521(2003), and concluding that insufficient progress has been made towards meeting those conditions,

Having reviewed also the measures imposed and conditions set out by paragraphs 10 and 11 of resolution 1521(2003), and concluding that sufficient progress has been made towards meeting those conditions,

Underlining its determination to support the Government of Liberia, and encouraging donors to do likewise,

Determining that the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides not to renew the measure in paragraph 10 of resolution 1521(2003) that obligates Member States to prevent the import into their territories of all round logs and timber products originating in Liberia;
2. Decides also to review the decision in paragraph 1 above after a period of ninety days, and expresses its determination to reinstate the measure in paragraph 10 of resolution 1521(2003) unless the Security Council is informed by that time that the forestry legislation proposed by the Forest Reform Monitoring Committee has been passed;
3. Urges the speedy adoption of the forestry legislation proposed by the Forest Reform Monitoring Committee;
4. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1521(2003) shall be renewed for an additional six months with a review by the Council after four months, to allow the Government of Liberia sufficient time to establish an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable, with a view to joining the Kimberley Process, and calls upon the Government of Liberia to provide the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 1521(2003) with a detailed description of the proposed regime;
5. Requests that the Secretary-General renew for an additional six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts re-established pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1647(2005) of 20 December 2005, and requests that
the Panel of Experts report to the Council through the Committee no later than 15 December 2006 its observations and recommendations;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council press statement. The Security Council, in a 20 October press statement [SC/8856], stated that after having been briefed by the Sanctions Committee, and pursuant to resolution 1689(2006) (see above), it had reviewed the Council’s decisions not to renew the ban on the import of rough diamonds and timber products from Liberia and had decided to renew the ban on imports of rough diamonds from Liberia until 20 December.

The Council commended the Liberian legislature for passing the National Forestry Reform Law, within the 90-day deadline set by resolution 1689(2006), which would ensure a transparent, accountable and Government-controlled forestry sector and that revenues from the timber industry would not again fuel conflict. Noting that the law was signed by President Johnson-Sirleaf on 5 October, it urged the Government to bring the law into effect as soon as possible. The Council concluded that there was no basis for reinstating the measures on timber. However, as the Panel of Experts had determined that more needed to be done to meet the requirements for lifting the measures on diamonds, the Council urged the Government to accelerate implementation of the necessary reforms, including stronger management and effective verification and accountability mechanisms, so that Liberia could join the Kimberley Process.

Report of Expert Panel (November). The 27 November report of the Panel of Experts was transmitted by the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the Security Council President [8/2006/976]. The Panel reported that, while the January 2005 moratorium on diamond mining imposed by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy continued, the Government had been unable to fully enforce the measure. The Panel commended the Ministry for successfully stopping all class A industrial and class B semi-industrial activity in the interior. However, it remained concerned by illegal artisanal digging in Sinoe County, especially at the Butaw Oil Palm Corporation site, where another substantial satellite mining camp had opened. The Panel estimated that some of the 130,000 to 150,000 carats of Liberia’s annual diamond production might have been smuggled through Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana, where it was exported through legitimate channels to the international market. A United States-based company, Futures Group, was contracted to assist the Government in diamond sector reform and in applying for participation in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Following the second Kimberley Process expert mission to Liberia, from 22 to 27 May, the Ministry and the Futures Group agreed to modify the proposed system of internal controls to include the issuance of sales vouchers or vendor forms that would record the seller, buyer, volume and value of the transaction and the registration of all actors in a national computerized, relational database to enable effective and accurate cross-checking. The Panel concluded that, while most of the components of an internal control system were in place, the country was still not in a position to demonstrate the functioning of such a system necessary for participation in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. It emphasized that stronger leadership and ownership by relevant stakeholders, especially by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy, were needed, as well as effective, ongoing management of human, financial and material resources.

Sanctions on timber continued to effectively reduce the timber trade. However, concerns were raised over the forthcoming three-year phase-out of UNMIL peacekeepers, who were controlling forest areas in Liberia, and the limited capacity of Forestry Development Authority (FDA) regional offices to control illegal pit-sawing. In addition, the dramatic increase in revenue since January, suggested that the previous National Transitional Government managers, who belonged to the rebel group MODEL, had profited from logging. Evidence also indicated that logging was being directed by ex-combatants. The Panel recommended that the FDA should accept UNMIL offer to provide joint patrols in order to establish control over pit-sawing. The results of a financial audit conducted by the European Commission (EC) and the FDA, covering the period from 1 October 2003 to 31 January 2006, validated concerns of corruption and incompetence during the National Transitional Government period. The Panel recommended that the Government should hold accountable those who had committed crimes, including fraud and misappropriation of timber revenues, especially those identified in the EC audit report. To make international buyers accept responsibility, the EC should sign a voluntary partnership agreement with Liberia to ensure that only legal timber was exported and that trade did not fund conflict.

On economic and financial matters, the Panel received positive feedback on the effectiveness of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme in increasing revenue from State-owned enterprises. The Panel recommended that the Government and its international partners
speed up the construction and rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure, which would provide employment opportunities and facilitate the delivery of development aid and social services to rural Liberia and increase access to markets by rural farmers. The Panel indicated that the Government’s financial management had improved owing to higher revenues, stricter enforcement of tax regulations and tighter expenditure control. However, concerns remained over the lack of internal control systems and external oversight. The Panel recommended annual audits of ministries, departments and agencies going back to 2003, with legal action pursued against corrupt officials; an audit of the payment of import duties and taxes; immediate commencement of pre-shipment inspection of petroleum imports; establishment by the Government of a collections department to pursue outstanding arrears; disallowance of contracts or concessions to anyone in arrears; and annual audits of ministries, departments and major revenue-generating parastatals.

Two and a half years after its imposition, the assets freeze had not been implemented, and there was no chance that the required legislation could be passed by the Legislature. The Panel recommended that the Government institute measures, whether through legislation or executive order, to implement the related Security Council resolutions without delay. The Panel documented travel ban violations in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, the Netherlands and Togo, as well as two waivers granted by the Council. It was not aware of any violations in Liberia and indicated that facilities to obtain fraudulent passports, the lack of political will, and poorly equipped and trained law enforcement staff combined to make the travel ban difficult to enforce.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President on the situation in Liberia and West Africa,
Welcoming the sustained progress made by the Government of Liberia since January 2006 in rebuilding Liberia for the benefit of all Liberians, with the support of the international community,
Recalling its decision not to renew the measures in paragraph 10 of resolution 1521(2003) of 22 December 2003 regarding round logs and timber products originating in Liberia, and stressing that Liberia’s progress in the timber sector must continue with the effective implementation and enforcement of the National Forestry Reform Law signed into law on 5 October 2006, including the resolution of land and tenure rights,
Welcoming the Government of Liberia’s continuing cooperation with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, and noting Liberia’s progress towards putting in place the necessary internal controls and other requirements in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process,
Stressing the continuing importance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in improving security throughout Liberia and helping the new Government to establish its authority throughout the country, particularly in the diamond- and timber-producing regions and border areas,
Recognizing the need for newly vetted and trained Liberian security forces to assume greater responsibility for national security, and taking note of the need for Liberian armed forces to procure humanitarian, medical and/or training equipment,
Taking note of the report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia of 27 November 2006, including on the issues of diamonds, timber, rubber and arms,
Having reviewed the measures imposed by paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 of resolution 1521(2003) and paragraph 1 of resolution 1532(2004) of 12 March 2004 and the progress towards meeting the conditions set out in paragraphs 5 and 7 of resolution 1521(2003), and concluding that insufficient progress has been made towards that end,
Underlining its determination to support the Government of Liberia in its efforts to meet those conditions, and encouraging donors to do likewise,
Determining that, despite significant progress having been made in Liberia, the situation there continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides, on the basis of its assessment of progress made to date towards meeting the conditions for lifting the measures imposed by resolution 1521(2003):
   (a) To renew the measures on arms imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1521(2003) and modified by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1683(2006) of 13 June 2006 and to renew the measures on travel imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1521(2003) for a further period of twelve months from the date of adoption of the present resolution;
   (b) That the measures on arms imposed by paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of resolution 1521(2003) shall not apply to supplies of non-lethal military equipment, excluding non-lethal weapons and ammunition, as notified in advance to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 1521(2003), intended solely for use by members of the Government of Liberia police and security forces who have been vetted and trained since the inception of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in October 2003;
   (c) To renew the measures on diamonds imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1521(2003) and renewed by
paragraph 4 of resolution 1689(2006) of 20 June 2006 for an additional six months, with a review by the Council after four months, to allow the Government of Liberia sufficient time to establish an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in Liberian rough diamonds that is transparent and internationally verifiable, with a view to joining the Kimberley Process, and calls upon the Government of Liberia to provide the Committee with a detailed description of the proposed regime;

(d) To review any of the above measures at the request of the Government of Liberia, once the Government reports to the Council that the conditions set out in resolution 1521(2003) for terminating the measures have been met, and provides the Council with information to justify its assessment;

2. Notes that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532(2004) remain in force, and reconfirms its intention to review those measures at least once a year;

3. Encourages the Government of Liberia to benefit from the Mission’s offer to provide joint patrols with the Forestry Development Authority with a view to strengthening Government control in forestry areas;

4. Decides to extend the mandate of the current Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1689(2006) for a further period until 20 June 2007 to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To conduct a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring States in order to investigate and compile a report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures imposed by resolution 1521(2003) and renewed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, including any information relevant to the designation by the Committee of the individuals described in paragraph 4(a) of resolution 1521(2003) and paragraph 1 of resolution 1532(2004), and including the various sources of financing, such as from natural resources, for the illicit trade in arms;

(b) To assess the impact and effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532(2004), including, in particular, with respect to the assets of former President Charles Taylor;

(c) To assess the implementation of forestry legislation passed by the Liberian Congress on 19 September 2006 and signed into law by President Johnson-Sirleaf on 5 October 2006 and the progress and humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the measures imposed by paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of resolution 1521(2003) and renewed in paragraph 1 of resolution 1647(2005) of 20 December 2005;

(d) To report to the Council, through the Committee, by 6 June 2007 on all the issues listed in the present paragraph, and to provide informal updates to the Committee, as appropriate, before that date, especially on progress towards meeting the conditions for lifting the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1521(2003) and on progress in the timber sector since the lifting in June 2006 of the measures imposed by paragraph 10 of resolution 1521(2003);

(e) To cooperate with other relevant groups of experts, in particular the group of experts on Côte d’Ivoire established pursuant to resolution 1708(2006) of 14 September 2006, and with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme;

(f) To identify and make recommendations regarding areas in which the capacity of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1521(2003) and paragraph 1 of resolution 1532(2004);

5. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures, in this exceptional instance, to reappoint the current members of the Panel of Experts as referred to in his letter dated 23 June 2006 to the President of the Security Council and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel;

6. Calls upon all States and the Government of Liberia to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts in all the aspects of its mandate;

7. Encourages the Kimberley Process to inform, as appropriate, the Council, through the Committee, about any possible follow-up visit to Liberia and its assessment of progress made by the Government of Liberia towards joining the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Security Council Committee. The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521(2003) concerning Liberia submitted a report [S/2006/1044] on its activities for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. During the reporting period, the Committee held three formal and 10 informal meetings.

The Committee received four requests for exemptions to the arms embargo. It approved requests for an exemption to ship weapons and ammunitions for training the Liberian Special Security Service, to import material for the training of Liberian police officers, as well as the armed forces of Liberia. The fourth request concerned the import of sidearms and related material for use by the Liberian National Police, which had been petitioned in 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 275], but had remained in limbo at the end of the year. The Committee also received and approved a request for the import of dummy weapons and special effects equipment for a company shooting a feature film on location in the country. Following the adoption of resolution 1683(2006), which modified the arms embargo on Liberia to allow for exceptions for the Government (see p. 224), the Committee agreed on procedures to facilitate its consideration of those requests and ensure, with UNMIL assistance, that any arms exported to Liberia were accounted for, as called for in the resolution.

The Committee considered 14 requests for travel ban waivers, three of which were granted. It held quarterly reviews of the travel ban list, initially issued on 16 March 2004 [YUN 2004, p. 211], retaining the names of 58 of the 59 persons listed as at 31 De-
December 2005, having removed one individual from the list during the reporting period [SC/8909]. The Committee conducted three six-month reviews of the assets freeze list in January, June and December. It considered four de-listing requests, but did not remove any names from the assets-freeze list in 2006.

The Committee did not receive any additional replies from States on actions taken to implement resolution 1521(2003); thus, the total number of replies received remained at 17. It received one reply from a State on action taken to trace and freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources described in resolution 1532(2004), bringing the total number of replies received to 15.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone made further efforts to consolidate peace and stability by strict adherence to the 2000 Agreement on the Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities [YUN 2000, p. 210]. To assist in that process, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) successfully transitioned to the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which was established to support the Government in consolidating peace, building national capacity and in preparing for the 2007 elections. The Office became operational on 1 January 2006. During the year, UNIOSIL, the UN country team and the Government of Sierra Leone developed a peace consolidation strategy, which identified challenges and set out programme interventions to address them. In anticipation of the increased workload of the Office in 2007, particularly with regard to the elections, the Security Council authorized an increase in UNIOSIL strength and extended its mandate to 31 December 2007.

Preparations by the Government of Sierra Leone for the 2007 elections progressed with the establishment of regional offices by the National Electoral Commission, the allocation of seats to the 14 electoral districts and completion of the electoral boundary delimitation process. Some 28 parties registered with the Political Parties Registration Commission, the allocation of seats to the 14 electoral districts and completion of the electoral boundary delimitation process. Some 28 parties registered with the Political Parties Registration Commission and a turnout of 4 million voters was expected. However, a number of challenges emerged, such as signs of political intolerance among political party leaders and their supporters; perceptions that the ruling party was using its incumbency to its advantage; and persistent funding shortfalls. A UN-led electoral assessment mission visited the country in October to determine in what ways the United Nations could assist in facilitating the electoral process. The leaders of eight registered parties signed a Political Parties Code of Conduct for the elections.

Other developments included the selection of Sierra Leone as one of the first countries to be considered by the Peacebuilding Commission; its eligibility to benefit from the Peacekeeping Fund; and the conclusion of investigations into several high-profile cases by the Anti-Corruption Commission.

Although the security situation in the country remained calm, following the departure of UNAMSIL, youth unemployment, rampant corruption, dire economic conditions and tension along the borders, especially with Guinea, were potential threats to stability. The security sector reform programme passed a milestone when it reached its targeted goal of 9,500 fully-trained police.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone continued to try those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean laws committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 1996. The trial stages of two cases were completed, with judgments expected to be delivered in 2007. The apprehension and transfer of the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, into the Court’s custody in Freetown, and then later to The Hague, Netherlands, where he would stand trial, was a major achievement towards the completion of the Court’s mandate.

In the light of the progress made in peacebuilding efforts during 2006, the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee encouraged the Security Council to determine the appropriate time to streamline the legal basis for sanctions in Sierra Leone.

Peacebuilding efforts

Peace consolidation process and UNIOSIL activities

Report of Secretary-General (April). In his first report on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) [S/2006/269], the Secretary-General said that the Office was the first of its kind established to support the peace-consolidation process after completion of a peacekeeping operation. The transition from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to the Office, which became operational on 1 January, was well planned and executed. UNIOSIL comprised a small office to support the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Victor Angelo (Portugal), and five components focusing on the key areas of its mandate: peace and governance; human rights and the rule of law; civilian police; UNIOSIL military cell; and public information. The UN country team constituted
were made to strengthen the capacity of the local agriculture sector decentralization initiatives. Efforts left the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) isolation. The ongoing trial of Charles Margai, who had handed approach in dealing with the political opposition, what was perceived as the Government’s heavy-handedness in attempting to promote national cohesion, the UN country team also agreed on a joint public information strategy to promote national cohesion, political tolerance and partnership in the development process. The strategy also set out specific programme interventions for addressing those issues. UNOSIL and the UN country team developed an integrated workplan for 2006, which designated priority activities to be carried out by UNOSIL individual components, in collaboration with the relevant UN agencies. The peace consolidation strategy complemented the national poverty reduction strategy and the UN development assistance framework. UNOSIL and the UN country team also agreed on a joint public information strategy to promote national cohesion, political tolerance and partnership in the development process.

In political developments, concern increased over what was perceived as the Government’s heavy-handed approach in dealing with the political opposition. The ongoing trial of Chales Margai, who had left the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and formed the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), was seen by some as politically motivated. Opposition political parties complained about the Government’s use of the police to break up their political meetings and allegations emerged about the politicization of the paramount chieftancy system and its use to deny the opposition access to their supporters, particularly in the Eastern and Southern Provinces.

While progress was made in streamlining the operations of the Anti-Corruption Commission by adopting performance benchmarks for 2006, no high-profile case had been fully prosecuted and there was a general feeling that the Commission was unable or unwilling to achieve tangible results. Slow, but encouraging progress was made in Sierra Leone’s decentralization process, especially through implementation of the World Bank-funded capacity-building programme, and the UNDP-supported agriculture sector decentralization initiatives. Efforts were made to strengthen the capacity of the local councils to address the pressing needs of their communities.

Progress was also made in the trial of members of the former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the “Westside Boys” militia, arrested and detained without trial since 2000. Of the 57 RUF members charged with conspiracy to murder and shooting with intent to kill, 42 had been acquitted and discharged; three sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment each, and 12 were awaiting a final ruling. With respect to the “Westside Boys”, 26 were acquitted and discharged, and six sentenced to long prison terms.

The security situation remained calm since the departure of UNAMSIL, although the worsening youth employment situation threatened stability. Violent student and labour protests, as well as an upsurge in criminality throughout the country, were consequences of the dire economic conditions in Sierra Leone. The lack of improvement in water and power supplies, the high cost of basic commodities, the persistent fuel shortages and the general perception that the Government’s inability to deliver was due to corruption and mismanagement had become a source of tension. Illegal diamond mining and trading, the ongoing trials of the former armed groups at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the transfer of the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor to the Court (see p. 214) also posed serious challenges to efforts to consolidate peace and stability. An increase in incidents of encroachment by the armed forces of Guinea on Sierra Leonean territory in the Eastern and Northern provinces further exacerbated the fragile security situation. It was reported that Guinean troops were still occupying border-disputed areas and harassing the local Sierra Leonean population. Dialogue between the two countries to resolve the dispute over the Makona/Moa River, in the Yenga village area, had stalled. A study of the 1912 Franco-British Protocols regarding the exact boundary line between Guinea and Sierra Leone conducted by cartographical experts from France and the United Kingdom, produced conflicting reports and further compounded the stalemate. Boundary problems developed also in the Kambia District, where Guinean troops encroached on Sierra Leonean territory and ordered a bauxite mining company licensed by the Government of Sierra Leone to stop prospecting activities. On 19 April, the Secretary-General expressed his concern to Sierra Leonian President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and Guinean President Lansana Conté over reports of mounting border tension between the two countries and informed them of the UN readiness to assist in their efforts to resolve the dispute.
The reform and training of the Sierra Leone police and armed forces, which had taken over responsibility for security following the departure of UNAMSIL, continued to make satisfactory progress. The graduation of 405 more recruits in February from the Police Training School brought the overall strength of the police to 9,267 personnel. Although the police force was well-equipped and maintained high mobility and visibility throughout the country, it was still plagued by corruption, inexperience, and a shortage of accommodation, vehicles and communications equipment. The reform and restructuring of the armed forces by the International Military Advisory and Training Team continued, with a focus on low-level training and reducing troop strength to 10,500, as initially approved by the Government. As at February, troop strength stood at 10,600 military personnel and the Government was considering a further reduction to 8,500. However, increasing disaffection within the armed forces with regard to the demobilization of personnel, including more than 70 senior officers, was an issue, as was the serious decline in the operation of the District and Provincial Security Committees, following the departure of UNAMSIL. UNIOSIL and the Office of National Security discussed ways to improve the work of those Committees.

The Secretary-General said that, although the security situation remained calm since the departure of UNAMSIL, he was concerned by the dire economic situation, increasing youth unemployment, rampant corruption and mismanagement, as well as the growing tension along border areas, particularly with Guinea. He urged the Government to focus on those issues and take corrective measures expeditiously, especially against the corrupt elements of the police. He appealed to Member States to provide logistical assistance to the Sierra Leone police and armed forces to support the security sector reform programme.

Report of Secretary-General (August). In his August report [S/2006/695] on UNIOSIL, the Secretary-General said that he had visited Sierra Leone on 1 and 2 July and consulted with the President, Vice-President and other senior Government officials, as well as UNIOSIL personnel and the UN country team, on the situation in the country. Representatives of both the Government and the UN system expressed satisfaction with the progress made in the peace consolidation process, particularly with the finalization of the peace consolidation strategy. They also reported on gains made in security sector and governance reforms and on the support provided by the UN system and other partners to improve the socio-economic situation. Illustrations of the strengthening democracy, which were highlighted in the President's 23 June address to Parliament, included the increase in the number of political parties to 28, the expansion of political discourse throughout the country and the proliferation of local media outlets. There were 49 daily newspapers and 39 radio stations operating in Sierra Leone. On the other hand, the Government and UNIOSIL cited youth unemployment as the most immediate potential threat to stability and said that slow economic recovery hindered efforts to create economic opportunities. The need to intensify anti-corruption efforts and accelerate reform of the judiciary was stressed. They underlined the challenges that the 2007 elections posed for the limited capacity of the national security sector and the National Electoral Commission, and in that regard, agreed on the need for substantial technical, logistical and financial support from the international community to ensure the success and credibility of the elections.

In June, President Kabbah's Office issued a statement expressing the Government's determination to address emerging negative trends in the country, including corruption within the police and the lack of respect shown by personnel in some Government ministries. Concerned also by increasing lawlessness and indiscipline across the spectrum of political and civil society, the President called upon political parties and their members to respect the Constitution and the law, and urged Government officials to conduct themselves in a professional manner. The fragility of the political stability in Sierra Leone was underscored by a controversial election on 12 August to fill the vacancy of the Biriwa-Limba Chiefdom in the Northern Province, which divided the population of the fiefdom along ethnic lines. Ignoring the National Electoral Commission's rejection of its request to conduct the election on account of the insecurity in the chiefdom and procedural problems, the Government proceeded to hold the election, contending that the Commission did not have the mandate to do so. The six Limba candidates boycotted the election, and the seat, which had been vacant since 2002, was won by the sole candidate of the Mandingo ethnic group. The prolonged period of heightened tension between the Limba ethnic group, which traditionally held the chieftancy and was challenging the election, and the minority Mandingo ethnic group continued to simmer and created security concerns in the area. Other developments during the period included the consultations held in July by civil society groups
to identify possible areas of support by the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the President’s announcement, on 17 August, of the Government’s intention to initiate amendments to the Constitution, which would be included on the ballot for a referendum during the 2007 elections. The Law Reform Commission reviewed the 1991 Constitution to ensure that it reflected the country’s new political, social and economic reality. The Government emphasized that, notwithstanding that review, the Constitution would remain in force during and after the 2007 elections.

In the area of governance reform, progress was made in the decentralization of responsibilities, which led to improved participation in local governance, although local councils still suffered from lack of funding. However, some ministries were reluctant to devolve their authority to local councils, and overlapping roles and functions of traditional leaders in the new local government structure had not been rationalized. As its effectiveness was hampered by its limited capacity to detect, investigate and document corrupt practices, the Anti-Corruption Commission developed a strategic plan of action, which would include benchmarks, focusing on improving its investigation, detection and prosecutorial capabilities. It also worked to sensitize the general public to the social and economic consequences of corruption.

A major potential source of instability in the country was removed on 20 June, when former Liberian President Charles Taylor was transferred to the Hague for trial (see p. 214). The continuing border dispute between Guinea and Sierra Leone remained a concern. The technical committees of Guinea and Sierra Leone met in Conakry in May, and follow-up consultations between the Minister of Territorial Affairs of Guinea and the Sierra Leone Government were held on 25 August. The Secretary-General appealed to Presidents Conté and Kabbah to expedite the peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of the matter.

Progress in security sector reform continued, with the troop strength of the police and the armed forces standing at 8,900 and 10,300, respectively. Still short of the target strength of 9,500 police set by the Government, a six-month training course for a new group of police recruits was held, and the police developed a comprehensive strategic plan for 2006-2008 to enhance professionalism in the force, particularly in middle management. While UNOSIL continued to support the police in key areas, given the wide range of areas requiring support and capacity-building, the small team of 20 UNOSIL police advisers was overstretched. With regard to the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence reviewed their overall structures, with a view to achieving cost-effectiveness and sustainability, without compromising their capacity to carry out their constitutionally mandated tasks and responsibilities. The international community contributed significantly to strengthening the capacity of the armed forces, including the provision of patrol boats, which had enhanced the capability of the maritime wing. The conditions of service for the armed services continued to improve, especially medical care, rations and the payment of salaries. However, a lack of adequate housing for soldiers, mainly in the outlying areas of the country, continued to negatively impact their morale. UNOSIL continued to assist in security sector reform, with a focus on planning guidance at all levels and information-gathering to help in the Government’s decision-making process. The Office of National Security continued to enhance its role of coordinating security agencies and other government departments on security-related matters, as well as to establish liaison with its counterpart in Liberia for the purpose of sharing information.

UNOSIL continued to coordinate UN system support to the Government’s peace consolidation efforts. It held an international workshop (30 June–1 July, Freetown) to discuss ways of implementing the peace consolidation strategy jointly prepared by UNOSIL, the Government and the UN country team; co-organized a number of workshops to strengthen the capacity of Parliament to conduct informed debates and provided training for its staff; and proposed, along with other partners, an early review of the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy launched in 2005.

The Secretary-General concluded that overall, the Government had made considerable progress towards consolidating peace in Sierra Leone. He was optimistic about its prospects for long-term peace, stability and economic recovery, yet remained concerned about potentially destabilizing factors, such as youth unemployment, pervasive poverty, as well as persistent mismanagement. He considered the inclusion of Sierra Leone on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda as an opportunity to benefit from the goodwill of the international community and recommended that the Government, Commission members, UNOSIL and other international partners agree on the specific priorities and modalities of the Commission’s engagement at its next meeting in October (see p. 237). The Secretary-General also urged the Government and all national stake-
holders to implement the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and to exercise tolerance as the country moved toward the elections.

Report of Secretary-General (November). In his third report on UNOSIL [S/2006/922], the Secretary-General said that further gains were made in reforming the security sector and in building the capacity of the national institutions responsible for conducting the 2007 elections. On 24 October, the Government announced the establishment of the Constitutional Review Commission, which was mandated to bring the 1991 Constitution into conformity with the new political, social and economic realities of the country. The participation of paramount chiefs in partisan politics was the subject of national debate, with the citizenry supporting the role of the traditional leaders. However, there were reports that opposition parties were being prevented from conducting electoral activities in some chiefdoms and concerns raised that the existing legislation prohibiting meetings without prior approval from the relevant paramount chiefs and the police might be abused during the pre-electoral period. With regard to the August election of the paramount chief in the Biriwa Chiefdom (see p. 232), on 10 November, the Supreme Court ruled against the petition of the Limba ethnic group contesting it, on the grounds that the election was not a public election and therefore, did not require the involvement of the National Electoral Commission.

Parliament continued to improve its oversight functions, with ministers and Heads of Government agencies being invited to brief Parliament on the implementation of their respective mandates. Three new bills were prepared to address practices affecting women's rights, including the Devolution of Estates Act 2006, the Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce Act 2006, and the Domestic Violence Act 2006. The Anti-Corruption Commission concluded investigations into several high-profile cases involving senior civil servants and parliamentarians and forwarded them to the Attorney General for prosecution. The Secretary-General said that prompt action taken on the cases would attest to the Government's political will to deal resolutely with corruption and dispel the perception that the anti-corruption drive might have stalled. Following a discussion of the national anti-corruption strategy at a conference of the main stakeholders (16 November, Freetown), participants established a review mechanism to remedy identified flaws and ensure that the strategy was consistent with the priorities and actions of the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact, agreed by the Government in July 2006, with the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the World Bank and the European Commission. Other progress included the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission in October, with the nomination by President Kabbah and approval by Parliament of five commissioners to serve as its members.

The capacity of the police to maintain law and order and discharge its security responsibilities continuing to develop. At a national conference (30-31 August), organized by UNOSIL and UNDP, on the role of the police in the 2007 elections, participants expressed confidence in the police force's ability to maintain law and order during the electoral process. However, stability remained threatened by the high level of youth unemployment, the poor social and economic conditions and the public perception of the Government's mismanagement of public funds. Student demonstrations and industrial action by employees in schools increased, with riotous and sometimes destructive behaviour spilling into the streets and straining the limited resources of the police. Many of the incidents were related to the deplorable conditions in the schools and colleges, and the poor conditions of service of teachers. The situation was further exacerbated by the activities of the three major political parties on college campuses.

Further steps were taken to resolve the border dispute between Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Ministers of Interior for both countries met on 18 and 19 September and decided to request that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provide boundary demarcation experts to work with the technical committees of both countries. UNOSIL continued to play a facilitating role in the conduct of border patrols between Liberia and Sierra Leone, and discussed modalities of joint border patrols between the Guinean and Sierra Leonean security agencies.

The programme for security sector reform passed a major milestone when the full strength of 9,500 trained police personnel was achieved during the reporting period. A recruitment programme for 2007 was developed for a further 250 officers, and key updates on basic crowd control and maintenance of public order were added to the training curriculum to ensure that it remained operationally relevant. UNOSIL and international partners also developed a special training programme to further enhance the ability of the police to respond to possible civil unrest during the electoral period. The planned downsizing of the armed forces was completed and its strength stood at some 10,300 personnel. However,
as Sierra Leone was unlikely to be able to sustain an armed force of that size, the Government discussed the appropriate size of the army in the medium-term, being mindful of the socio-economic situation in considering further retrenchments of the armed forces. A survey of morale within the armed forces conducted by UNOSIL indicated that recent improvements in the training and welfare of army personnel had resulted in a corresponding improvement in morale.

**Strengthening UNOSIL.** The UNOSIL police personnel increased considerably its focus to training Sierra Leone police officers to perform election-related tasks. It was envisaged that during 2007, UNOSIL police personnel would continue to coordinate the development of a Sierra Leone training task force; support the capacity-building of the police by training an additional 25 officers to become part of the Force’s newly formed Evaluation Team; and increase support for the improvement of corrections facilities and the training of management personnel. As a result, the Secretary-General proposed temporarily increasing UNOSIL police personnel by 10, to bring their total strength to 30, and the UNOSIL Military Liaison Team by an additional five military advisers, both of which would to be withdrawn during the second half of 2007 after the elections.

The Secretary-General concluded that Sierra Leone would need the sustained support of the international community in its future peacebuilding efforts and urged the Government to work closely with the Peacebuilding Commission to make further progress in consolidating peace in the country. He said that the security architecture needed to be further strengthened so that both the police and the armed forces could carry out their tasks effectively and be sustainable in the long term. He recommended that the Security Council approve the proposed increases in the strength of the UNOSIL Military Liaison Team and Police Section. Highlighting the significant contribution UNOSIL had made during the previous 12 months in assisting the Government to consolidate peace and address the root causes of the conflict, the Secretary-General stated that the upcoming July 2007 elections would be a major milestone, which would help define an exit strategy for UNOSIL. In that respect, he indicated that a comprehensive assessment of the role of the Office should be conducted—closer to the election date—with a view to determining its exit point after the elections. In the meantime, he recommended the extension of UNOSIL mandate for an additional 12 months, until 31 December 2007.

On 22 December, by resolution 1734(2006), the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations (see p. 238).

**Preparations for 2007 elections**

In April [S/2006/269], the Secretary-General reported that national elections in Sierra Leone were scheduled to be held between February and May 2007. The allocation of seats to the 14 electoral districts were announced on 23 March, and the boundary delimitation process was expected to start in July, and voter registration in September. The National Electoral Commission, which had already established 14 regional offices, faced a number of remaining challenges, including the shortage of vehicles, overall logistics support for the elections, recruitment and training of 800 Commission staff, and the conduct of civic and voter education. The Political Parties Registration Commission formulated its 2006 action plan, emphasizing inter-party conflict management and the monitoring of party activities. There were 28 registered political parties in Sierra Leone, with only four being active between elections: the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), the All People’s Congress (APC), the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) and the Peace and Liberation Party. Following allegations by opposition political parties that the ruling party was campaigning ahead of schedule and denying its opponents access to the State radio, the National Electoral Commission broadcast a statement explaining what constituted electoral activities and calling on all parties to abide by the rules.

Election costs were estimated at $26 million, of which the Government would contribute one-third and donors the balance. UNOSIL, with funding from UNDP, provided technical assistance to the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Registration Commission, and helped to mobilize donor support for political party capacity-building and the promotion of inter-party dialogue. As the Sierra Leone Police was expected to provide overall security for the 2007 elections, a committee was set up to continuously review police preparedness for that task. The National Electoral Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the police and was consulting on the preparation of a police operational plan for the elections.

In August [S/2006/695], the Secretary-General reported that there were worrisome signs of growing intolerance among political party leaders and their supporters, some of whom had reportedly declared certain areas “off-limits” to their opponents. The Government’s 21 June directive requiring political parties to obtain police permission to hold political
meets created concern that it had the potential for abuse and could limit legitimate political activities. In July, a UN-sponsored consultant reviewed the country's electoral legal framework and recommended revisions for bringing it into conformity with international electoral and human rights standards, minimizing the potential for abuse, establishing a credible electoral dispute process and guaranteeing the freedoms of association, speech and assembly.

On 3 August, President Kabbah announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would be held on 28 July 2007. The National Electoral Commission completed the delimitation of the 112 boundaries in the country's 14 districts, which would be submitted to Parliament for approval, and was developing a detailed workplan, with timelines. The Political Parties Registration Commission, in addition to registering political parties, focused its activities on monitoring their conduct and mediating disputes. It also collaborated with UNIOSIL to finalize a political parties' code of conduct. UNIOSIL and UNDP worked jointly with the Commission to host conflict-prevention workshops for Sierra Leonean political parties.

With the announcement of the date for the elections, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to dispatch an electoral needs assessment mission to discuss with the Government the nature and scope of assistance the UN system could provide.

In November [S/2006/922], the Secretary-General reported that the National Electoral Commission, with UN assistance, continued to prepare for the voter registration exercise, which was expected to commence between late February and early March 2007. The Commission recruited its core personnel, and four UN technical advisers were assigned to support its work. A voter registration operational task force was established, specifications for voter registration equipment and personnel finalized, and a database of estimated voter population per constituency developed. Preparations for the Commission's public information and voter education campaign were under way, including a civic education programme targeting youths. The UN electoral advisory team was strengthened, with the number of international advisers and UN volunteers expected to reach 44 by the end of January 2007.

All political parties, including the ruling SLPP, APC and PMDC, intensified their election-related activities. However, the Secretary-General noted that the general culture of political intolerance in the country and the perception among opposition parties that the ruling party might be using its incumbency to its advantage, while denying the opposition a level playing field, were potential sources of heightened tensions. Furthermore, the socioeconomic marginalization of a large segment of society, particularly young people, rendered them susceptible to political manipulation. A polarized atmosphere had emerged, in which the three main parties displayed a “winner takes all” attitude, even though none of them had articulated a clear political platform.

The Political Parties Registration Commission continued to face serious staffing and resource shortages, as well as a leadership problems. President Kabbah appointed a new Chairman on 2 November, which required confirmation by the Parliament. In a positive development, on 23 November, the leaders of eight registered political parties signed the Political Parties Code of Conduct for the elections, which had been developed by the Commission with UNIOSIL support. The Code provided for a monitoring and enforcement mechanism to address irregularities and complaints. The Commission would also play a key role in ensuring compliance with the Code.

**Electoral assessment mission.** An interdisciplinary electoral assessment mission, led by the Electoral Assistance Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs visited Sierra Leone (15-23 October) to conduct a comprehensive review of electoral preparations and consult with the Government on assistance the UN system could provide to support the process. The mission identified serious challenges to the successful conduct of the 2007 elections, including the delay in parliamentary approval of the draft law on boundary delimitation prepared by the National Electoral Commission, finalization of the amendments to the legal framework for the elections, and the failure to establish the mechanism for resolving electoral disputes.

The mission concluded that the elections could be conducted in a timely and credible manner, if the national electoral institutions received financial and technical support from the Government and donors on time; outstanding laws, including on boundary delimitations, were passed expeditiously by Parliament; overall security remained stable and national security agencies met their obligations to secure the electoral process; measures were taken to strengthen the electoral dispute mechanisms; and an electoral offences court—broadly accepted and credible across the political spectrum—was established quickly.

The mission recommended that the Government should avoid creating a perception that State resources were being used to promote the interests of one party; all parties should have equitable access
to the State media; and paramount chiefs should be encouraged to allow free campaigning and political expression in their areas of control. The UN system should provide substantial technical support to the voter registration exercise and identify the technical challenges that could arise due to the inclusion of the constitutional referendum on the ballot. The UN system and the international community, particularly African organizations, should also consider providing long-term observers to the electoral process. Observing that Sierra Leone needed considerable technical and material support from its international partners to ensure the success of the elections, the Secretary-General reiterated his appeal to Member States to close the funding gap.

**Other electoral developments.** In later developments [S/2007/257], the Secretary-General reported that, on 30 November, the Sierra Leone Parliament approved the constituency boundary delimitation proposal prepared by the National Electoral Commission, which established new boundaries and took into account the population’s considerable movement throughout the country since the end of the conflict. Since the general elections held in 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 153] were based on proportional representation, the July 2007 voting process would be the first constituency-based elections to be held in more than two decades. With regard to security matters, UNOSIL and other major stakeholders were jointly developing a national security plan for voter registration. Donor contributions of £2.5 million received in November and a grant of €8 million, in December, helped to alleviate the shortfall in electoral funding.

**Peacebuilding Commission consideration**

The Peacebuilding Commission, established by Security Council resolution 1646(2005) and General Assembly resolution 60/180 [YUN 2005, p. 94], at the first meeting of its Organizational Committee on 23 June, selected Sierra Leone as one of the first countries to be considered by the Commission (see p. 55). The Commission held an informal country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone on 19 July, and its first (12 October) and second (13 December) country-specific meetings, all in New York, in response to a 21 June request [PBC/OC/1/2] of the Council President for the Commission’s advice on the situation in Sierra Leone. The Commission Chairman, responding to that request, submitted to the Council President, on 20 December [S/2006/1050], his summary of those meetings.

At the Commission’s informal meeting on 19 July, the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone stressed that the problem of youth unemployment in the country was compounded by the large number of ex-combatants and school dropouts, who could be a source of threat to the country’s security. He acknowledged that there was a persistent public perception of corruption within the Government and State institutions, and identified Sierra Leone’s weak infrastructure as a major constraint to stimulating economic recovery. Civil society groups in the country also held consultations (19-20 July, Freetown) to identify possible areas where the Commission could support Sierra Leone.

At the Commission’s first country-specific meeting, participants reinforced the Government’s view of the specific critical challenges that were impeding the consolidation of peace, and which needed to be addressed urgently. Those challenges included social and youth empowerment and employment, consolidating democracy and good governance, justice and security sector reform and capacity building, and ensuring community recovery. Taking note of the poverty reduction strategy and the peace consolidation strategy developed by the Government and its partners, the Commission asked the international community to remain engaged in Sierra Leone, and requested donors to increase their support. The Commission declared Sierra Leone eligible to benefit from the Peacebuilding Fund and invited it to consult with the UN country team on accessing those funds. The Commission called upon the international community to sustain its political and financial support to Sierra Leone and encouraged the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other donors to ensure the allocation of resources and activities to reflect the Government’s peacebuilding priorities.

At its second country-specific meeting, the Commission assessed progress achieved and identified gaps, with regard to the four critical challenges highlighted at the October meeting: social and youth empowerment and employment; consolidating democracy and governance; justice and security sector reform; and capacity-building. While it emphasized the importance of mapping the identification of further gaps, the Commission recommended that completion of the mapping process should be carried out in parallel with the provision of support for immediate, short-term, quick-impact priorities. It requested the Peacebuilding Support Office to present a calendar of ongoing and planned peacebuilding-related activities in Sierra Leone, and the Chair of the country-specific meeting for Sierra Leone to develop a workplan with a clear timelines and division of responsibilities for actions to be undertaken by the Government, the UN system and
other stakeholders in preparation for the Commission's next country-specific meeting.

**Security Council consideration (December).** On 22 December [meeting 5608], the Security Council heard a briefing by the Commission Chairman (the Netherlands), who highlighted some of the key outcomes of the country-specific meetings on Sierra Leone. He announced that approximately $25 million could be made available, as an initial contribution from the Peacebuilding Fund, and that the next follow-up meeting of the Commission on Sierra Leone would be held in March 2007. The United Kingdom representative identified three priority areas for 2007: the fight against corruption, civil service reform and the development of clear policies and strategies, particularly to address youth unemployment, poverty and economic development. He cited the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone as crucial to reconciliation and the establishment of the rule of law and stressed the need for further work on implementing resolution 1325(2000), as gender inequality remained a serious problem in the country.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements by its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone, in particular resolutions 1620(2005) of 31 August 2005 and 1688(2006) of 16 June 2006,

Commending the valuable contribution that the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone has made to the recovery of Sierra Leone from conflict and to the country's peace, security and development,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 28 November 2006, and welcoming his recommendation that the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone be extended for a further twelve months, until 31 December 2007, with a view to providing continued peacebuilding assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and preparing for the general elections in July 2007,

Taking note of the letter dated 27 November 2006 from the President of Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General that likewise emphasizes the need for the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone to be extended for a further twelve months,

Stressing that the July 2007 elections and the wide acceptance of their outcome will be a major milestone indicating the sustainability of peace and security in Sierra Leone, which should also help to define an exit strategy for the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone,

Emphasizing the importance of the continued support of the United Nations system and the international community for the long-term peace, security and development of Sierra Leone, particularly through the strengthening of the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone,

Taking note of the country-specific meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission held on 12 October and 13 December 2006, at which the Commission discussed four priority areas for peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone as well as gaps in those areas, recommended next steps for peacebuilding and noted the determination of the Government of Sierra Leone to coordinate and prioritize work in the country, working with the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, donors, international institutions, civil society and the private sector to take forward these priorities in order to help to bring about a sustainable peace,

Welcoming the progress made in reforming the security sector in Sierra Leone and, in particular, the developing professionalism of the Sierra Leone armed forces and police, and urging further strengthening and rationalizing of the security architecture so that the police and armed forces are sustainable in the long term and able to carry out their tasks effectively, in particular in connection with the elections in July 2007,

Welcoming also the launch in July 2006 of the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact agreed between main donors and the Government of Sierra Leone, which sets out ten critical governance commitments, including on anti-corruption, public procurement, civil service reform and democracy, and a further ten donor principles of engagement to improve aid effectiveness,

Reiterating its appreciation for the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and its vital contribution to reconciliation and the rule of law in Sierra Leone and the subregion, stressing the importance of the forthcoming trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor by the Special Court and the progress being made in other trials, reiterating its expectation that the Special Court will finish its work expeditiously, noting in this regard the Secretary-General’s letter of 27 November 2006, and calling upon Member States to contribute generously to the Special Court,

Encouraging the member States of the Mano River Union and other regional organizations to continue their dialogue aimed at building regional peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, as outlined in resolution 1620(2005), until 31 December 2007;

2. Endorses the increase in the number of personnel of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone recommended in paragraph 70 of the report of the Secretary-General of 28 November 2006 for the period from 1 January to 31 October 2007 in order to enhance the support provided by the Office for the elections and its ability to carry out its functions elsewhere in Sierra Leone;

3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the role of the United Na-
tions Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, closer to the election date, with a view to developing its exit strategy;

4. Calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to demonstrate their full commitment to the democratic process and to ensure that the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections are peaceful, transparent, free and fair;

5. Calls upon the Government of Sierra Leone to provide the necessary support for the electoral institutions, and urges Member States to provide technical and material support, including to address the shortfall in the electoral budget;

6. Emphasizes that the Government of Sierra Leone bears the primary responsibility for peacebuilding, security and long-term development in the country, and encourages the Government to continue its close engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission and international donors to continue to provide support to the Government;

7. Calls upon the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone and all other stakeholders in the country to increase their efforts to promote good governance, including through continued measures to combat corruption, improve accountability, promote the development of the private sector to generate wealth and employment opportunities, strengthen the judiciary and promote human rights;

8. Calls upon the Government of Sierra Leone to expedite the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and calls upon Member States to assist the Government in funding the activities of the National Human Rights Commission;

9. Emphasizes the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognized in resolution 1325(2000) of 31 October 2000, underlines that a gender perspective should be taken into account in implementing all aspects of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, welcomes in this regard the action plan developed by the Office, encourages the Office to work with the Government of Sierra Leone in this area, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that there is adequate capacity, expertise and resources within the Office to carry out this work;

10. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence;

11. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone to implement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress made in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone and the present resolution.

UNIOSIL

The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), established by Security Council resolution 1620(2005) [UN 2005, p. 282], was mandated to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in strengthening the capacity of State institutions, rule of law, human rights and the security sector; developing economic empowerment initiatives for youth; improving transparency and good governance; building capacity to hold free and fair elections in 2007; as well as liaising with the Sierra Leonean security sector; coordinating with UN missions and regional organizations in West Africa to address cross-border issues; and coordinating with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

In 2006, the Secretary-General submitted reports to the Security Council on developments in Sierra Leone and the activities of UNIOSIL in April [S/2006/269]; August [S/2006/695]; and November [S/2006/922]; with a later report covering the remainder of the year [S/2007/257]. In addition to political and security aspects, the reports summarized UNIOSIL activities relating to humanitarian issues, human rights and the rule of law, public information, as well as its efforts to assist in the country’s recovery, reconstruction and development.

Financing of missions

UNIOSIL

In a January report [A/60/585/Add.1] on estimates in respect of 26 special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed requirements for UNIOSIL amounting to $23,298,600 for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2006.

On 8 May, in section I of resolution 60/255 (see p. 1618), the General Assembly approved, as recommended by ACABQ [A/60/7/Add.37], for UNIOSIL a prorated amount out of the additional charges of $202,469,500 approved for the special political missions under Section 3, Political affairs, of the 2006-2007 programme budget.

In his November report [A/61/525/Add.3] on estimates for special political missions, including ten in Thematic cluster III, the Secretary-General submitted proposed requirements for UNIOSIL in the amount of $30,564,000 for the period 1 January to

On 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252 (see p. 1615), the Assembly endorsed ACABQ recommendations on UNAMSIL budget for the period 1 January to 31 December 2007.

**UNAMSIL**

In June, the General Assembly considered the performance report on the UNAMSIL budget for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [A/60/631], which showed expenditures of $264,525,800 against a total appropriation of $291,603,600, leaving an unencumbered balance of $27,077,800.

ACABQ [A/60/786] recommended that the unencumbered balance, as well as income and adjustments of $72,209,800 be credited to the Member States in a manner to be determined by the General Assembly.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION**

On 22 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/926], adopted resolution 60/279 without vote [agenda item 150].

**Financing of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone**

*The General Assembly,*

_Having considered_ the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,*

_Bearing in mind_ Security Council resolution 1270(1999) of 22 October 1999, by which the Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council revised and extended the mandate of the Mission, the latest of which was resolution 1610(2005) of 30 June 2005, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for a final period of six months until 31 December 2005,*

_Recalling_ its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998 on the financing of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and subsequent resolutions on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the latest of which was resolution 59/14 B of 22 June 2005,*

_Reaffirming_ the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,*

_Not_ noting _with appreciation_ that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,*

_Mindful_ of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to meet its outstanding liabilities,*

1. _Takes note_ of the status of contributions to the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 42.6 million United States dollars, representing some 2 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only eighty-three Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

2. _Expresses its appreciation_ to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

3. _Welcomes_ the great efforts of the Mission and its personnel in the successful completion of the mandate of the Mission;

4. _Also welcomes_ the structured, carefully planned and executed drawdown that allowed the established benchmarks to be achieved as scheduled;

5. _Requests_ the Secretary-General to ensure that the lessons learned from the Mission, including its drawdown stages, are applied, as best practices, in other missions as appropriate, and to report thereon in the context of the final performance report;

6. _Notes with concern_ the cases of fraud and presumptive fraud identified by the Mission, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session on the matters, including investigations undertaken in this regard and actions taken regarding proven cases, in accordance with established procedures, as well as efforts to recover any lost funds;

7. _Endorses_ the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

**Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005**

8. _Takes note_ of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

9. _Decides_ that Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission shall be credited with their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the amount of 99,287,600 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

10. _Decides also_ that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, their share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the amount of 99,287,600 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against their outstanding obligations in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 9 above;
In his initial appearance before the Court, also on 3 April, Mr. Taylor pleaded not guilty to all counts in the indictment, which, as amended on 16
March, alleged that he was at the head of a joint criminal enterprise responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of humanitarian law. On 13 April, the Registry of the Special Court concluded a memorandum of understanding with the International Criminal Court (icc) allowing the Special Court to use its courtroom and detention facilities for the purposes of Mr. Taylor’s trial.

On 15 June [S/2006/406], the United Kingdom indicated that it would allow former President Taylor, if convicted, to enter the country to serve any sentence imposed by the Special Court, without prejudice to the eventual location or outcome of the trial. It also stressed that Mr. Taylor’s right to a fair trial had to be respected. However, should the Court acquit Mr. Taylor, the United Kingdom would not be required to allow him to come to the country. Furthermore, upon his subsequent release after serving a sentence, Mr. Taylor would be required to leave or face removal from the United Kingdom.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,


Recalling also that the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“the Special Court”) was established by the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002 (“the Agreement”) pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315(2000) of 14 August 2000,

Recalling further article 10 of the Agreement, pursuant to which the Special Court may meet away from its seat if it considers it necessary for the efficient exercise of its functions, and recalling rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court, pursuant to which the President of the Special Court may authorize a Chamber or a Judge to exercise their functions away from the seat of the Special Court,

Recalling the determination of the Council to end impunity, establish the rule of law and promote respect for human rights and to restore and maintain international peace and security, in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its appreciation to President Johnson-Sirleaf of the Republic of Liberia for her courageous decision to request the transfer of former President Taylor in order that he may be tried at the Special Court,

Expressing its appreciation also to President Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for his decision to facilitate the transfer of former President Taylor, and noting the role that Nigeria has played in securing and promoting peace in Liberia and the wider subregion, including President Obasanjo’s decision in 2003 to facilitate the removal of former President Taylor from Liberia, which allowed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to take effect, and recognizing the contribution made by the Economic Community of West African States in this regard,

Recognizing that the proceedings in the Special Court in the case against former President Taylor will contribute to achieving truth and reconciliation in Liberia and the wider subregion,

Expressing that it remains committed to assisting the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone in their efforts to a more stable, prosperous and just society,

Reiterating its appreciation for the essential work of the Special Court and its vital contribution to the establishment of the rule of law in Sierra Leone and the subregion,

Welcoming the transfer of former President Taylor to the Special Court on 29 March 2006, and noting that, at present, the trial of former President Taylor cannot be conducted within the subregion due to the security implications if he is held in Freetown at the Special Court,

Noting that it is not feasible for the trial of former President Taylor to be hosted at the premises of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 due to its full engagement on the completion strategy, and that no other international criminal tribunals exist for the trial of former President Taylor in Africa,

Taking note of the exchange of letters dated 29 March 2006 between the President of the Special Court and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (“the exchange of letters dated 29 March 2006”),

Taking note also of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 13 April 2006 between the Special Court and the International Criminal Court (“the Memorandum dated 13 April 2006”),

Noting that former President Taylor has been brought before the Special Court at its seat in Freetown, and determining that the continued presence of former President Taylor in the subregion is an impediment to stability and a threat to the peace of Liberia and of Sierra Leone and to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Takes note of the intention of the President of the Special Court to authorize a Trial Chamber to exercise its functions away from the seat of the Special Court, and his request to the Government of the Netherlands to host the trial, including any appeal;
2. Welcomes the willingness of the Government of the Netherlands, as expressed in the exchange of letters dated 29 March 2006, to host the Special Court for the detention and trial of former President Taylor, including any appeal;

3. Takes note of the willingness of the International Criminal Court, as requested by the Special Court and as expressed in the Memorandum dated 13 April 2006, to allow the use of its premises for the detention and trial of former President Taylor by the Special Court, including any appeal;

4. Requests all States to cooperate to this end, in particular to ensure the appearance of former President Taylor in the Netherlands for purposes of his trial by the Special Court, and encourages all States to ensure that any evidence or witnesses are, upon the request of the Special Court, promptly made available to the Special Court for this purpose;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to assist, as a matter of priority, in the conclusion of all necessary legal and practical arrangements, including for the transfer of former President Taylor to the Special Court in the Netherlands and for the provision of the necessary facilities for the conduct of the trial, in consultation with the Special Court, as well as the Government of the Netherlands;

6. Requests the Special Court, with the assistance of the Secretary-General and relevant States, to make the trial proceedings accessible to the people of the subregion, including through video link;

7. Decides that the Special Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction over former President Taylor during his transfer to and presence in the Netherlands in respect of matters within the statute of the Special Court, and that the Netherlands shall not exercise its jurisdiction over former President Taylor except by express agreement with the Special Court;

8. Decides also that the Government of the Netherlands shall facilitate the implementation of the decision of the Special Court to conduct the trial of former President Taylor in the Netherlands, in particular by:
   (a) Allowing the detention and the trial in the Netherlands of former President Taylor by the Special Court;
   (b) Facilitating the transport upon the request of the Special Court of former President Taylor within the Netherlands outside the areas under the authority of the Special Court;
   (c) Enabling the appearance of witnesses, experts and other persons required to be at the Special Court under the same conditions and according to the same procedures as applicable to the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991;

9. Decides further that the measures imposed by paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1521(2003) of 22 December 2003 shall not apply to former President Taylor for the purposes of any travel related to his trial before the Special Court, as well as any travel related to the execution of the judgment, and decides to exempt from the travel ban the travel of any witnesses whose presence at the trial is required;

10. Recalls that the costs to be incurred as a result of the trial of former President Taylor in the Netherlands are expenses of the Special Court in the sense of article 6 of the Agreement and that no additional costs can be incurred by any other party without their prior consent;

11. Recalls also the Secretary-General's letter dated 5 April 2006 and reiterates its appeal to States to contribute generously to the Special Court, and notes with appreciation the States which have done so in the past;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

On the same day, the President of the Court ordered the proceedings to be conducted in The Hague, where the accused was subsequently transferred on 20 June.

The Secretary-General, in a 20 June press statement [SG/SM/10524], encouraged all States to cooperate with the Special Court with respect to Mr. Taylor's trial, by ensuring that evidence and witnesses were made available to the Court upon its request. He also appealed to States to contribute to the Court's budget.

Financing

The General Assembly, in resolution 60/245 [YUN 2005, p. 1483] of 23 December 2005, on a request by the Secretary-General [A/60/572/Add.1] and ACABQ recommendation [A/60/597], approved a subvention in the amount of $11.2 million for the Special Court for Sierra Leone under the 2004-2005 programme budget. The subvention was requested to meet the Court's cash requirements for the period from 1 November to 31 December 2005, and cover the liquidation of outstanding obligations as at 31 December 2005, after the funds appropriated under resolution 59/294 [YUN 2005, p. 1488] for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2005 were fully utilized.

In the first performance report on the utilization of the subvention, submitted in November 2006 under the 2006-2007 programme budget [A/61/593/Add.1], the Secretary-General reported that $4.5 million was remitted to the Court for expenditures from 1 November to 31 December 2005, leaving an unencumbered balance of $6.7 million. Of that amount, $3.4 million was disbursed between January and November 2006; an additional $885,178 was anticipated to be disbursed by the end of 2006 to cover liquidation obligations, and the balance of $1 million in unliquidated obligations would be cancelled. The Assembly was asked to note that the estimated unspent balance of $2.4 million
would be surrendered under the programme budget, as at 31 December 2006.

The Assembly, in section VIII of resolution 61/252 of 22 December (see p. 1616), took note of the performance report on the utilization of the subvention.

Sanctions

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132(1997) [YUN 1997, p. 135] concerning Sierra Leone submitted a 28 December report [S/2006/1043] covering its 2006 activities to monitor and implement the 1998 embargo on the sale or supply of arms to Sierra Leone and the travel ban on leading members of the former military junta in Sierra Leone and of the Revolutionary United Front (ruf), imposed by resolution 1171(1998) [YUN 1998, p. 169].

During 2006, the Committee held one session of informal consultations; it considered the travel ban list on 11 July. The Committee reviewed notifications of 10 August from Denmark of the proposed export of commercial explosives to a private company in Sierra Leone for use in a diamond industry bulk sampling programme, and of 21 April from Switzerland of a proposed donation of certain vehicles, trailers and related spare parts and services to the Consortium for the Rehabilitation and Development of Sierra Leone. In both cases the Committee concluded that the proposed items did not qualify as embargoed items and therefore were not subject to the Committee’s further consideration.

The Committee noted that, as of the reporting date, the travel ban list included the names of 30 individuals designated as leading members of the former military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and ruf. Since the list was last revised in September 2004 [YUN 2004, p. 223], no further information or recommendation had been received from Sierra Leone. On 14 July, the Committee requested the views of the Government on the future of the travel ban measure, as well as any information or suggestions regarding individuals who remained on the list. A response from the Government was still pending. The Committee approved a 5 December request by Canada, transmitted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, for a waiver of the travel restriction to enable an accused suspect of the Special Court to receive medical treatment.

During the reporting period, no violations or alleged violations of the sanctions regime were brought to the attention of the Committee. In the light of Sierra Leone’s continued progress in its peacebuilding efforts, the Committee Chairperson encouraged members of the Committee and the Security Council to determine the appropriate time to streamline the legal basis for sanctions in Sierra Leone. The Chairperson indicated that the Committee, with a view towards updating the sanctions regime, would ensure that the travel ban list reflected as closely as possible the current situation in Sierra Leone, and in that regard, was awaiting the views of the Government before reviewing the list.

Guinea-Bissau

In 2006, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (unogbis) continued to assist Guinea-Bissau in its efforts to further consolidate peace, promote national reconciliation and mobilize international financial assistance to enable the Government to meet its financial needs. During the year, political tensions hampered democratic progress in the country and the divisions that surfaced following the 2005 presidential elections polarized the National Popular Assembly, with no side able to assure sustainable support in the Parliament. Some progress was made in launching dialogue initiatives, such as the “Estados Gerais”, with the support of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the Economic Community of West African States, which established an International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau. Although the parties made a commitment, in September, to improve the political climate, tensions escalated when former President Koumba Yalá returned to Guinea-Bissau, won the leadership of the Party for Social Renewal at its national congress in November, denounced the Government as illegitimate, and called for the holding of legislative elections before 2008. By year’s end, the political situation was severely strained, characterized by bitter disputes among parliamentarians, intra-party divisions and heightened tensions. In the light of the erratic political situation, concerns were raised, as disbursement of the pledged donations made at the donor round table in November hinged upon the precondition of political stability.

The security situation was marked by various incidents throughout the year. In March, the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau launched a month-long military operation against a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, a separatist group demanding independence from Senegal. The conflict caused the displacement or isolation of some 30,000 people from their homes or communities. Low cash crop yields added more hardship to the country’s fragile economic base and compromised the Government’s ability to pay salaries and
deliver basic services. As dire economic and social conditions persisted, demonstrations and protests, particularly in the public sector, continued to pose a threat to stability in the country. Meanwhile, increasingly large seizures of drugs and weapons elevated concerns that organized crime and drug trafficking were growing in the country.

Throughout the year, UNOGBIS used its good offices to further consolidate peace and build on the progress already achieved. Activities focused on facilitating the national reconciliation and dialogue process, conducting training workshops and galvanizing support for a capacity-building project for Parliament. Moreover, along with key national stakeholders and international partners, UNOGBIS continued to play a critical advisory role in support of national efforts towards security sector reform. As a result, the Government finalized a strategy paper on security sector reform, which was approved by the Council of Ministers, along with a triennial investment plan for $184 million. It also established the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

In view of those developments, the Secretary-General streamlined UNOGBIS mandate to highlight its mediation and good offices functions. Its activities would focus on national reconciliation and dialogue; security sector reform; rule of law and human rights; mainstreaming a gender perspective in peacebuilding; small arms and light weapons proliferation; cooperation with regional organizations, key stakeholders and other international partners; and mobilization of international assistance for reconstruction.

Political and security developments and UNOGBIS activities

Report of Secretary-General (March). In his March report [S/2006/162] on developments in Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBIS activities, the Secretary-General noted that political tensions along personality and party lines continued to hamper further democratic progress. The bitter divisions over the 2005 elections [YUN 2005, p. 293] were mirrored in a National Popular Assembly polarized into two blocs: one, including a dissident faction of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), supporting the Government appointed by President João Bernardo Vieira in November 2005; and the other, allied to the former PAIGC Government dismissed by the President in October 2005 [ibid., p. 296]. Hence, the balance of power remained fluid, with neither side able to assure sustainable support in Parliament. PAIGC urged President Vieira to replace the Government led by Prime Minister Aristides Gomes with a broad-based one, drawing from parties not represented in the Assembly. It organized civil actions to protest the Supreme Court’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of the President’s decision to appoint Mr. Gomes as Prime Minister. Joining forces with 10 smaller parties that had supported its presidential candidate, Malam Bacai Sanhá, PAIGC established the Broad Republican Front, with the aim of preventing a dictatorship. In addition, political controversy surrounded the appointment or replacement of deputies and appointments to parliamentary commissions, with some Government supporters accusing the Assembly Speaker of obstruction and partisanship. UNOGBIS led joint efforts with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to get the two sides to resolve their differences constructively. Although the process initiated to bring together senior presidential advisers, government representatives, parliamentary parties and the Assembly’s Permanent Commission resulted in the participants affirming their commitment to constructive dialogue and reconciliation, the will to engage in joint-problem solving was still lacking. UNOGBIS convened workshops, including one (2-5 February) that examined the causes of the political crisis and proposed strategies to foster positive developments; and the other, a one-day (7 February) pilot training workshop that focused on leadership and conflict transformation skills for parliamentarians.

In the area of security sector reform, progress was made on 16 January, when the armed forces National Commission on Reconciliation and Reintegration launched the second phase of its sensitization campaign. The Commission’s work was expanded to cover the police, security and other paramilitary forces. To consolidate progress already achieved, activities focused on, among other areas, the negative impact of ethnicity in the armed forces; the role the armed forces played in the 2005 presidential elections; and the inclusion in the reconciliation process of Guinea-Bissau citizens who had served in the Portuguese colonial army during the independence struggle. An inter-ministerial committee on security sector reform, established in December 2005 by the Prime Minister [ibid.], was formally launched on 7 February. A steering committee was set up to orient the work of a technical team and approve its proposals prior to submission to the inter-ministerial committee and the Cabinet. The United Kingdom Security Sector Development Advisory Team met in Bissau (20 February–3 March) for its second visit.
to consult with key stakeholders on the process and content of a security sector review exercise.

An increase in the number and quantity of weapons and drugs seized had not resulted in a reduction in delinquency, implying that the causes were not being addressed. In a mission to Guinea-Bissau (23–27 January) to assess the country’s law enforcement capacity, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime found that the Government lacked the ability to ensure the execution of sanctions and the capacity to provide border security, which led to international criminal networks using the country as a transit point for drug trafficking. The mission also reported that prison conditions in Bissau, the capital, were appalling and the rehabilitation of detention facilities was a pressing concern.

The Secretary-General observed that the lack of constructive dialogue had undermined the authority of two State institutions: the Supreme Court, which was challenged by opponents of the Government; and the Speaker of Parliament, who was challenged by Government supporters. He stated that it was important for the people of Guinea-Bissau to re-establish the authority of their democratic institutions and urged them to put aside the contradictions of the recent past and join forces to start a process of sustainable reconciliation. He commended the close cooperation among UNOGBIS, ECOWAS and CPLP, as well as their joint initiatives to ensure more constructive partnership in support of Guinea-Bissau. He noted the positive role played by the military leadership in consolidating the recovery process, in particular the directive that the military remain outside the political arena and subordinate itself to the civilian authorities. He encouraged the international community to continue its support to Guinea-Bissau in order to avert worsening social and political tensions.

Launch of military operation against Casamance faction

The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/487] that the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau launched a military operation on 14 March, against a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDPC), led by Salif Sadio, near the border with Senegal. Armed confrontation between the national armed forces and the faction, a separatist group demanding independence or autonomy from Senegal, caused more than 5,500 civilians to flee from the areas in and around the city of São Domingos in northern Guinea-Bissau. Of those, some 3,000 fled to other areas of the country, including to the nearby cities of Ingoré and Cacheu and to a makeshift camp near Bourkadie, and across the border in Senegal.

On 24 March, [AFR/1349], the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, called upon all parties to cease their hostilities, which had endangered the lives of thousands. He expressed concern over the anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines that had been placed in the conflict area, particularly in the light of the authorities’ recent encouragement of the internally displaced and refugees to return to their homes. The World Food Programme and the United Nations Children’s Fund provided food, essential drugs and clean drinking water to affected populations.

On 14 April, President Vieira announced that Guinea-Bissau troops would continue their offensive in the north until all Senegalese rebel bases established there had been destroyed. On 22 April, the military authorities declared that the operation had been successfully completed; Salif Sadio’s camps within the national territory had been dismantled and his fighters expelled beyond national borders. No official estimate of casualties was made public.

Overall, the military operations resulted in the displacement of about 10,000 persons, mostly women and children, and isolated some 20,000 from farming and fishing communities. Although hostilities had ended, conditions in the affected villages were not conducive to their return, mainly due to mine risks and the destruction of and damage to their property during the clashes. The Secretary-General indicated that mine risk education and sensitization, as well as mine survey and identification had begun in the areas affected by the clashes and field demining operations were under way. Moreover, in Bissau, the removal of unexploded ordnance continued, and it was likely to be declared mine-free soon.

Aftermath of military operations

Report of Secretary-General (July). In his July report [S/2006/487] on developments in Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBIS activities, the Secretary-General said that the fragility of the political situation was demonstrated by the controversy and tensions that arose over military operations launched in March by Guinea-Bissau armed forces against an MFDPC faction (see above), prompting heated debates in Parliament. According to official sources, the operations were undertaken to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as civilians against the actions of MFDPC rebels. However, some members of the National Popular Assembly,
leaders of political parties, civil society organizations and the media questioned the wisdom of military intervention in view of the country's financial and economic difficulties. In late March, President Vieira consulted with key national actors on ways to address the country's political and socio-economic challenges. Expectations arose that the consultative process could lead to sustainable political dialogue that would allow the State to function more effectively and break the political deadlock. Another positive development was the 7 March launch of the “Estados Gerais” initiative by a group of citizens, under the auspices of UNOGBIS, ECOWAS and CPLP, aimed at creating a space for consensus-building on the sources of instability and root causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau. Following the visit of a high-level delegation to the country (2-5 May) to assess the political, military, humanitarian and socio-economic situation, ECOWAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Monrovia, Liberia, 15 May) discussed a proposal to establish a contact group on Guinea-Bissau to harmonize international strategies in support of the country and mobilize resources for peacebuilding and reconstruction.

UNOGBIS continued to play a critical advisory role in supporting national efforts towards security sector reform. However, conflicting schedules and salary arrears hampered progress in the security sector review process and the drafting of a national security sector reform strategy document. Both exercises would follow a template developed with the assistance of the United Kingdom Security Sector Development Advisory Team, which visited the country in late 2005 and early 2006. A third visit of the Advisory Team was planned for later in the year to assist Guinea-Bissau officials in concluding the review process and finalizing the strategy document.

Guinea-Bissau's socio-economic and financial situation remained difficult, with the Government unable to cover costs related to the minimum functioning of the State, and to meet its external debt service payments. The marketing of cashew nuts, the country's top export, was adversely affected by a 30 per cent increase in the Government's reference price. An IMF mission visited Guinea-Bissau (15-16 March) to assess the Government's performance and agree on a new programme for 2006. A follow-up mission in June (19-20) identified areas of concern in the implementation of that agreement. It was hoped that a donor's conference could be convened in 2006, leading to an emergency post-conflict assistance package. Given the disastrous conditions in the country, Nigeria and ECOWAS offered Guinea-Bissau an emergency financial package to help pay salary arrears. UN agencies submitted a $1.5 billion request to the Central Emergency Response Fund to finance a plan for addressing the urgent needs of the affected population, which would, along with the flash appeal of $3.6 million launched in May, allow Guinea-Bissau to cover humanitarian assistance for six months.

The Secretary-General noted that the slow pace of the country's reconciliation process had delayed both political normalization and the restoration of donor confidence, which could impact the flow of critically needed assistance to the country. He welcomed the steps taken by President Vieira to launch constructive dialogue with relevant stakeholders, raising hopes that institutional stability could be achieved. The Secretary-General stressed the need for joint efforts by all States affected by the Casamance question—the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal—to find solutions to the causes of the crisis. He called upon States and institutions to support Guinea-Bissau in the organization and conduct of the dialogue and reconciliation process; the coordination and harmonization of socio-economic and financial assistance packages; preparation for the donor round table later in the year; and assistance in the security sector reform process. He also called upon the international community to respond to the flash appeal to assist the displaced population and refugees.

The Secretary-General said that the mission dispatched by the UN Department of Political Affairs to Guinea-Bissau (22 to 27 May) had reported that political and socio-economic challenges continued to hinder the post-conflict recovery process, with many social indicators being lower than before the 1998-1999 conflict. Interlocutors inside and outside Guinea-Bissau cited the lack of financial resources as a critical factor impeding the Government's recovery efforts and underscored the nexus between insufficient resources and instability. The mission's interlocutors also expressed their appreciation for the positive role played by UNOGBIS in the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau. In that regard, the Secretary-General said that he would make recommendations to the Security Council on the role of the Office in the immediate future and beyond.

Press statement. In a 21 July press statement [SC/8783], the Security Council, which had been briefed the previous day on developments in Guinea-Bissau by the Special Representative, reiterated the Secretary-General’s request for the international community to positively respond to the flash appeal to address the needs of the population affected by the military operations. The Council
also called upon political leaders in Guinea-Bissau to constructively engage in the dialogue process; encouraged the international community to consider ways to help the Government deal with the prevalence of illegal narcotics trafficking in Guinea-Bissau's coastal islands; reaffirmed its intention to closely follow the developments in the country; and expressed its readiness to consider the Secretary-General’s forthcoming recommendations on the future role of UNOGBIS.

Further political developments

Report of Secretary-General (September). In his September report [S/2006/783] on Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBIS activities, the Secretary-General said that the political climate was marked by developments within the country’s two main political parties: PAIGC and the Party of Social Renewal (PRS). The PAIGC leadership started negotiations to reintegrate the group of dissidents who had supported President Vieira’s candidacy against the party’s candidate, Malam Bacai Sanhá, in the 2005 presidential elections. Included in that group of dissidents were Prime Minister Aristides Gomes and the Ministers of Defence and of Natural Resources and Energy. PRS, the party of former President Koumba Yalá, reaffirmed its confidence in the party’s leadership and expressed its support for the “Forum para a Convergência de Desenvolvimento”, the coalition supporting the Government in Parliament. At their sixth summit (17 July, Bissau), Heads of State and Government of CPLP expressed full support for ECOWAS efforts to establish an International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau. The Group, at its first meeting (New York, 21 September), decided to assist Guinea-Bissau in strengthening its institutions’ capacities; mobilize funds to make up the 2006 budget deficit; and assist in the preparation of the donors round table scheduled to take place in Geneva, from 7 to 8 November, and in the implementation of the reforms in the security and judicial sectors and in public administration. Since the launch of the “Estados Gerais” dialogue initiative in March (see p. 247), discussions supporting it had spread beyond the capital Bissau. On 2 September, over 100 participants attending the dialogue initiative’s first regional consultation in Biombo expressed their commitment to move away from conflict and work collectively towards a peaceful future. Preparations were under way by UNOGBIS to launch a capacity-building project in conflict transformation skills for parliamentarians and civil society groups to enhance national stakeholders’ capacity to mainstream conflict prevention and resolution into their national programmes.

Progress was made on security matters, with the establishment by Government decree of the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLLCPAL), thus paving the way for the implementation of the pilot small arms collection and destruction programme within the framework of the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism. In other developments, the capital Bissau was declared mine-free as of July; the survey of contaminated areas affected by military operations against Casamance rebels along the border with Senegal was completed; and the demining of secondary roads and affected villages was under way. UNOGBIS continued to support security sector reform. The technical team responsible for drafting the National Security Sector Reform strategy document resumed its work after a three-month interruption, and, in September, the United Kingdom Security Sector Development Advisory Team undertook its third mission to the country to assist Guinea-Bissau authorities in finalizing the document. The National Commission on the Reconciliation of the Armed Forces undertook a sensitization campaign throughout the country, from July to mid-August, with a view to extending the reconciliation process to the paramilitary forces and consolidating civil-military relations. Shortly thereafter, on 28 August, two senior reintegrated officers were summoned by the Military Tribunal to assist in the investigation into an alleged plot against the Chief of General Staff. While no charges were brought against the officers, the incident was criticized as going against the grain of the reconciliation process.

Economic conditions in Guinea-Bissau remained difficult and social tensions escalated, as illustrated by a wave of public sector strikes, including a three-day strike in June over civil service wage arrears. Although the Assembly approved the Government’s 2006 budget on 20 July, the country still faced severe financial difficulties, particularly the payment of salary arrears and alleviating the hardship faced by the population. Following a visit to Guinea-Bissau from 18 to 21 August by an IMF mission, the Fund indicated its readiness to approve, pending a successful donors round table, an emergency post-conflict package for 2007.

The Secretary-General remarked that, although a strong commitment to improve the political climate continued to emerge, tensions and difficulties highlighted the ever-present risk of a relapse. The significant drop in cashew nut revenues, a poor rice harvest and the ongoing challenge of salary arrears in the public sector aggravated social tensions. He urged the international community to actively par-
ticipate in the donors round table in November to help the country address its immediate concerns and move towards the achievement of medium- and long-term development goals. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations should remain engaged in Guinea-Bissau and announced his intention to revise UNOGBIS mandate and request its extension until 31 December 2007.

Return of former President Yalá and other developments

Report of Secretary General (December). In his December report on Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBIS [S/2006/946], the Secretary-General stated that, on 28 October, former President Koumba Yalá, who had been away from the country for a year, returned to Guinea-Bissau, announcing his intention to contest the elections for the leadership of PRS, which he intended to lead to victory in the 2008 elections. Mr. Yalá, who was overthrown in a military coup in September 2003 [YUN 2003, p. 227], and was defeated in the first round of the 2005 presidential elections by Messrs. Sanhá and Vieira [YUN 2005, p. 294], won the PRS leadership contest by securing nearly 67 per cent of votes cast at the party’s national congress (8-12 November). Political tensions heightened when Mr. Yalá, who had initially supported the establishment of the current Government, declared as illegitimate the Forum para a Convergência do Desenvolvimento, the coalition of parties in the Assembly that supported the Government, as well as the Government itself. Meanwhile, PAIGC leadership, along with former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes and the party’s 2005 presidential candidate, Malam Bacai Sanhá, deemed the 2008 legislative elections as unnecessary and instead called for the Government to be replaced by one of national unity. Moreover, opposition parties accused the Government of incompetence and corruption. Concerned by the strained political climate, Prime Minister Aristides Gomes warned that the disbursement of pledged donations made at the donors round table (7-8 November, Geneva) hinged upon the precondition of political stability. In view of the criticisms, President Vieira consulted with various political actors to help stabilize the situation. Further controversy arose when Mr. Yalá stated that he had been asked by the AU to support President Vieira in the second round of the 2005 elections, prompting supporters of the losing candidate, Mr. Sanhá, to accuse the AU of interference in the country’s internal affairs and to question the legitimacy of President Vieira’s 2005 victory.

Meanwhile, efforts continued to reunify and stabilize PAIGC, which had suffered major internal divisions during the 2005 presidential campaign and elections. Seven leading dissidents were reinte-grated into the party’s decision-making organ, the Political Bureau, in October. The “Estados Gerais” dialogue initiative, despite resource constraints, continued to make headway, holding a consultation on 29 September, with some 60 representatives of the security forces, including the Chief of General Staff, General Tagme Na Waïe attending. UNOGBIS facilitated the national reconciliation and dialogue process by holding two workshops on leadership skills for departmental heads and leaders of parlia-mentary special commissions, and galvanized support for a capacity-building project for Parliament.

On security matters, the Government finalized its strategy paper on security sector reform in October, which was approved by the Council of Ministers, along with a triennial investment plan costing $184 million. The security sector reform plan envisaged the reduction of the armed forces from 9,650 to 3,440, the streamlining of law enforcement bodies and the creation of a national gendarmerie. UNOGBIS would assist the authorities in carrying out a systematic national information campaign on the modalities of the plan, and would support the national commission to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. During the reporting period, UNOGBIS trained 33 police officers on the code of conduct for law enforcement officers and the use of force and firearms. On 24 September, 674 kilogrammes of cocaine and stockpiles of weapons and communications equipment were seized, raising concerns that organized crime in the country was increasing.

The economic situation remained precarious and continued to compromise the Government’s ability to pay civil servants’ salaries and to deliver basic services. The gravity of the situation was presented at the donors round table (7-8 November, Geneva), under the theme “Security and Development”. Pledges of $262.5 million were made, well short of the overall goal of $538 million, making urgent short-term support vital for closing the 2006-2007 budget gap. Moreover, Government revenue fell below target, despite efforts to improve revenue performance and contain expenditure.

The Secretary-General commended the Government’s successful organization of the donors round table, particularly its recognition of the linkage between security, stability and development. He urged political actors in Guinea-Bissau to put the national interest above other considerations, as the country could not afford disruptions at a time when its partners were considering budgetary support and the IMF was planning a mission in January 2007 to discuss emergency assistance. In the light of the IMF
decision to support Guinea-Bissau’s access to post-conflict assistance, the Secretary-General renewed his appeal to the international community to help close the 2006-2007 budget gap and called on the Government to vigorously pursue good governance and the fight against corruption.

Highlighting the critical advisory role played by UNOGBI S and the United Kingdom Security Sector Development Advisory Team supporting the drafting of the national security sector reform strategy, the Secretary-General encouraged the authorities to keep public administration and security sector reform high on the country’s agenda.

Press statement. In a 15 December press statement [SC/8910], the Security Council expressed concern over the precarious political, security and economic conditions in Guinea-Bissau. It urged political leaders to exercise restraint, focus on development, reconciliation and good governance, negotiate solutions to their differences and place the national interest above all. It also called upon the international community, international institutions and donors to continue their support to Guinea-Bissau. The Council also called for the early implementation of the Security Sector Reform Plan.

Further developments. In a later report [S/2007/178], the Secretary-General said that, on 14 December, the commander of the border guards was held hostage by subordinates protesting the non-payment of salary arrears and demanding improved conditions of service. A week later, some 300 former soldiers staged a protest at the secretariat for Veterans Affairs over the non-payment of pension arrears, while another group of protesters prevented people from entering and leaving the Prime Minister’s office for two hours. In both cases, General Tagme Na Waie, the Chief of General Staff intervened to appease the protesters.

The socio-economic situation remained fragile. Most of the pledges made at the November donors round table remained outstanding. In mid-December, the World Bank suspended support for a multisector infrastructure rehabilitation project after concluding that a joint venture agreement between the Government and a foreign energy company was incompatible with the project as envisaged. That compromised the expected disbursement of $10 million by the Bank in budgetary support, as well as budgetary support of other partners.

In other developments, the “Estados Gerias” dialogue stalled because of resource constraints. The initiative organized a regional meeting in the Oio Region on 28 November, while preparations for another such meeting in the provincial capital of the south were halted, owing to a lack of financial resources. Although President Viera had called for a debate on a proposed general amnesty for all those involved in the 1980 and 2004 military coups, Parliament did not schedule the debate in its November-December session.

On 5 December, President Viera wrote to the Secretary-General requesting that UNOGBI S and the UN country team be transformed into an integrated office.

Ad hoc advisory group. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau continued to assist the country with its development priorities. The Group’s April report [E/2006/8] highlighted its activities and provided an overview of developments in the country, including the overall economic and social situation. The Economic and Social Council, in resolution 2006/11 of 26 July (see p. 1086), called upon donors to provide budgetary support to Guinea-Bissau, including through the Emergency Economic Management Fund.

UNOGBI S

The United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBI S), a political mission established in 1999 by decision of the Secretary-General and supported by Security Council resolution 1233(1999) [YUN 1999, p. 140], was extended until 31 December 2006. Its mandate had been revised by resolution 1580(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 229] in the face of intensified political turmoil and uncertainty in 2004. The Office was headed by the Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, João Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique). By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council President on 5 October [S/2006/790, S/2006/791], the Council noted the Secretary-General’s intention to designate Mr. Shola Omorogie (Nigeria) as his Special Representative in Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNOGBI S, effective 3 October, to succeed Mr. Honwana.

During 2006, in line with resolution 1580(2004), the Secretary-General submitted reports on developments in Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBI S in March [S/2006/162], July [S/2006/487], September [S/2006/783] and December [S/2006/946]. A UN assessment mission that visited Guinea-Bissau from 22 to 27 May, concluded that a UN political presence remained vital in that country to contribute to stabilization, without which the full resumption of development assistance and economic investments, essential for sustainable peace and progress, could not be guaranteed. In September, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to slightly revise the Mission’s mandate and request its extension through 31 December 2007.
**Revision of mandate.** In a letter dated 8 December [S/2006/974] to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that, while progress had been achieved in Guinea-Bissau, much more remained to be done to consolidate and sustain momentum for democratic governance and to prevent a relapse into conflict. The intensified pressure from major opposition parties on President Vieira to dismiss the Government appointed in October 2005, illustrated the continued volatility of the situation. The Secretary-General drew the attention of the Council of an 8 November letter from Prime Minister Aristides Gomes requesting emergency financial assistance from the UN Peacebuilding and Democracy Funds to fill the budget gaps for 2006 and 2007, which further exemplified the need for continued international engagement in Guinea-Bissau.

In the light of the work that remained, and to allow the Office to continue assisting Guinea-Bissau in its peacebuilding efforts, the Secretary-General recommended the extension of unogbis mandate for one year, until 31 December 2007. The proposed extension would allow unogbis to operate under a streamlined mandate, highlighting its mediation and good offices functions aimed at promoting dialogue and reconciliation. In addition to supporting national reconciliation and dialogue, unogbis activities would focus on assisting with security sector reform; promoting respect for the rule of law and human rights; mainstreaming a gender perspective in peacebuilding activities, in line with Security Council resolution 1325(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 1113]; promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes; helping to mobilize international assistance for reconstruction; facilitating efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and enhancing cooperation with the AU, Ecowas, CPLP, the EU and other international partners.

On 13 December, the Security Council took note of the Secretary-General’s proposal [S/2007/975] and subsequently accepted his proposal to revise, and recommend to extend the Mission’s mandate until 31 December 2007.

**Financing**

The General Assembly, in section VI of resolution 60/248 [YUN 2005, p. 1495], had approved a prorated amount for unogbis out of the $100 million authorized for the 26 political missions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006. In a January report [A/60/585/Add.1] on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed resource requirements of $3,226,200 for unogbis for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2006.

The Assembly, in section I of resolution 60/255 of 8 May, approved, as recommended by ACABQ [A/60/7/Add.37], a prorated amount for unogbis out of the additional charge of $202,469,500 against the provision for special political missions already approved under Section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2006-2007 (see p. 1618).

In a November report [A/61/525/Add.3 & Corr.1], which dealt with estimated requirements for special political missions grouped under Thematic Cluster III (UN offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and commissions), the Secretary-General proposed requirements for unogbis in the amount of $3,467,700 for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007, which ACABQ recommended for approval [A/61/640 & Corr.1].

On 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252, the Assembly endorsed ACABQ recommendations within the appropriation of $230,616,400 authorized under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the 2006-2007 biennium (see p. 1615).

**Cameroon-Nigeria**

In 2006, Cameroon and Nigeria continued to cooperate peacefully to advance progress in implementing the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice on the land and maritime boundary between them through the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. The Secretary-General, through his good offices and with UN Secretariat support, continued to facilitate implementation of that ruling. At their fifth meeting with the Secretary-General, the Heads of State of the two countries reaffirmed their willingness to peacefully implement the judgment of the Court and signed an agreement on the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula. Major progress was achieved during the year with the demarcation of more than 460 kilometres of the land boundary from Lake Chad to the south-west and the withdrawal of Nigerian Armed Forces from the Bakassi peninsula. Hence, three of the four issues—Lake Chad area, Land Boundary and Bakassi Peninsula—addressed by the Court’s ruling had been resolved to the satisfaction of the two countries.

**Cameroon–Nigeria Mixed Commission**

The Cameroon–Nigeria Mixed Commission, the mechanism established by the Secretary-General in 2002 [YUN 2002, p. 1265], at the request of the
Presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon, to facilitate the peaceful implementation of the 10 October 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the border dispute between them. The ICJ, under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania). The Commission was responsible for the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries; the withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary; the eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi peninsula; the protection of the rights of the affected populations; the development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation; and the reactivation of the five-member Lake Chad Basin Commission (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Nigeria and Nigeria), created in 1964 to regulate and plan the use of the Lake and other natural resources of the conventional basin.

The Mixed Commission established two sub-commissions: one responsible for the demarcation of the 1,700-kilometre land boundary between the two countries, with a joint technical team to carry out field assessments of the boundary and to supervise the demarcation work to be undertaken by outside contractors; and the other to assess the situation of the affected populations and to consider ways to ensure the protection of their rights. Two of the four working groups established by the Commission, the group on the withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces and the transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area and the group on withdrawal and transfer of authority in the land boundary, completed their work in December 2003 and July 2004, respectively. The remaining two groups, one on withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula and the other on the maritime boundary, continued their activities. Since December 2003, the Commission's civilian observer personnel carried out nine follow-up missions to the Lake Chad area and the land boundary and noted that peaceful and good relations prevailed among the population and the new authorities. A UN team based in Dakar, Senegal, provided technical and logistical assistance and substantive support to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies. The United Nations Office for West Africa also supported the work of the Mixed Commission.

In 2006, the activities of the Mixed Commission focused on three core tasks: completing and consolidating the transfer of authority carried out in 2004 and 2005 through monitoring, assessment and support activities; finding definitive solutions to the outstanding maritime boundary issues; and concluding the demarcation process.

The withdrawal of Nigerian armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula took place on 14 August.

Activities

Progress report. On 28 September [S/2006/778], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the latest activities and achievements of the Mixed Commission in implementing the 2002 ICJ ruling. He said that, since his previous report [YUN 2005, p. 297], the Mixed Commission had moved the process smoothly and peacefully and maintained an open dialogue and communication between Cameroon and Nigeria. At the fifth summit (12 June, Greentree, New York, United States) of the Presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria and the Secretary-General to review the Commission's work, the Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful implementation of the ICJ ruling, and signed the Greentree Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula, the text of which was transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General on 20 June [S/2006/419]. The Agreement established a Follow-up Committee to monitor its implementation, whose membership, as communicated to the Council by the Secretary-General on 28 June [S/2006/454], comprised Cameroon, Nigeria, the four witnesses to the Agreement (France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States) and the United Nations. The Follow-up Committee met on 10 July and 31 August, and was expected to meet subsequently on a monthly basis.

The UN team of civilian observers of the Mixed Commission was also working with the Follow-up Committee. Following the 14 August withdrawal of Nigerian forces and transfer of authority in the Bakassi peninsula, the Commission planned to recruit and deploy observers to consolidate the achievement, as it had done in the case of the Lake Chad area and along the land boundary. The Commission continued to discuss with Cameroon, Nigeria and development partners projects to promote cross-border cooperation for the benefit of the local population on both sides.

The demarcation exercise progressed steadily, with some 462 kilometres having been demarcated. The exercise would be followed by the emplacement of pillars, a final survey and final mapping. The Commission signed an agreement with the European Commission for a contribution of €4 million
to help meet the initial estimated $12 million cost of the entire demarcation exercise [YUN 2005, p. 297]. On the maritime boundary, it was estimated that the delineation would be finalized in 2006, which would allow the Commission to address, as necessary, the tri-point between Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. Taking into account the progress made in the demarcation exercise and the calendar of activities set out in the Greentree Agreement, it was estimated that the Mixed Commission would not be able to complete its mandate by the end of 2007. The Secretary-General therefore indicated his intention to ask for additional funds from the regular budget for the Commission’s work in 2007.

On 17 October [S/2006/819], the Security Council took note of the information provided by the Secretary-General and of his intention to continue the activities of the UN support team to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission with funding from the UN regular budget. The Council requested further information and clarification on the activities to be performed by the Mixed Commission in 2007 and following years, as well as those to be undertaken by the UN team of observers. It also urged the parties to the Mixed Commission to work with international donors to seek further voluntary contributions.

**Future activities.** On 1 November [S/2006/859], in response to the Council’s request, the Secretary-General provided information on the Commission’s 2007 planned activities and beyond, which included completing the demarcation of an estimated 750 kilometres of the 1,700-kilometre land boundary; carrying out civilian observation activities following the transfer of authority in some 40 villages in the Lake Chad area, along the land boundary and in the Bakassi peninsula; addressing issues related to the needs of affected populations, monitoring the application of international human rights instruments and ensuring respect for their rights; supporting meetings of the Lake Chad Basin Commission; sustaining the efforts of the African Development Bank in the cross-border road project; completing outstanding issues further to the delineation of the maritime boundary; contributing to an agreement on the tri-point between Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria; and seeking further voluntary contributions.

Activities beyond 2007 would focus on continuing the land boundary demarcation exercise estimated to be completed in 2008; monitoring the parties’ obligations in conformity with the Greentree Agreement, which defined a zone that would remain under Nigerian administration until 2008; following up on the rights of affected populations in the border areas; continuing to monitor progress in joint economic ventures and cross-border activities; and following up on the activities of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Gulf of Guinea Cooperation Council.

At its sixteenth meeting (8 November, Abuja), the Mixed Commission discussed the remaining issue of the maritime boundary and decided that a joint field visit by a UN-led team of experts would be undertaken, from 16 to 26 November, to collect data to enable the physical delineation of the maritime boundary between the two countries. The meeting also pledged to double the teams of surveyors to speed up the process of demarcating the 1,700-kilometre land-boundary [UNOWA/CNMC/2006/03].

**Financing**

In his January report [A/60/585/Add.1] on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed resource requirements of $7,339,000 for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2006.

The Assembly, in section I of resolution 60/255 of 8 May, approved, as recommended by ACABQ [A/60/7/Add.37], a prorated amount for the Commission out of the additional charge of $202,469,500 against the provision for special political missions already approved under Section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2006-2007 (see p. 1618).

In a November report [A/61/525/Add.3 & Corr.1], which dealt with estimated requirements for special political missions grouped under Thematic Cluster III (United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices, integrated offices and commissions), the Secretary-General proposed requirements for the Commission in the amount of $9,303,000 for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2007, which ACABQ recommended for approval [A/61/640 & Corr.1].

On 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252, the Assembly endorsed the ACABQ recommendations, including that on the Commission’s budget under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the 2006-2007 biennium (see p. 1615).

**Guinea**

In 2006, the worsening economic and social conditions in Guinea led to unprecedented national strikes and demonstrations over low wages, soaring...
prices and Government inefficiency, some of which escalated into violence. In March, a strike that had been ongoing for several days, despite Government appeals for people to return to work, brought the capital city Conakry nearly to a halt. It had also allegedly resulted in the death of an innocent bystander. Stone-throwing youths targeting the cavalcade of President Lansana Conté were met with live fire from the President’s bodyguards. Three months later, on 8 June, the main labour unions called a nationwide strike for lower prices for fuel and rice. The teachers’ union joined the strike against the poor payment of salaries. Four days into the strike, 11 people were killed in violence linked to anti-Government protests and demonstrations.

The following day, in a 13 June press statement [SG/SM/10514], the Secretary-General expressed his concern over the killing of some 10 students during the demonstrations. Underscoring the need for the non-violent resolution of disputes, he called on the authorities to exercise restraint and appealed to various segments of Guinean society to continue to engage in constructive dialogue to address the challenges facing the country.

The EU Presidency, in a 16 June statement on Guinea [S/2006/451], expressed its concern with regard to the violent clashes between Guinean law enforcement authorities and demonstrators. It reiterated the Secretary-General’s appeal to all social and political circles in the country to pursue constructive dialogue and expressed its willingness to provide assistance in the preparations for general elections scheduled for 2007.

Horn of Africa

The political landscape in the Horn of Africa continued to be affected by complex, interlocking conflicts. The Sudan, the largest country in the region, took positive steps to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, including the redeployment of troops and the fulfillment of other security commitments. Nevertheless, areas of the country were still plagued by armed militias, disagreements over borders and disputed oil revenues and the escalating crisis in the Darfur states. A milestone was reached in July, when the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) pulled its remaining 5,672 soldiers out of eastern Sudan and moved them to the south. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) closed its eastern Sudan office in September, withdrawing 80 civilian and 250 military staff.

The Sudanese armed forces continued to withdraw from the south, with a target date of July 2007 for complete redeployment to the north. People in the south, however, still faced the threat of renegade bands of former combatants who had failed to join either Sudan’s armed forces or the SPLA, as stipulated in the peace agreement. In addition, southerners suffered sporadic attacks by the regionally based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), until talks mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan led the LRA and Uganda to sign a cessation of hostilities agreement in August.

As southern Sudan struggled to rebuild, demarcation of the North-South border faced serious delays. Government parties disagreed on the status of the National Petroleum Commission—whether it should be advisory or decision-making—and the equitable division of oil revenues between North and South Sudan. The Commissions envisioned in the peace accord were either non-functional or yet to be established, including those dealing with human rights, the civil service and land disputes.

Meanwhile, the crisis in western Sudan’s Darfur region continued to deteriorate. African Union-mediated talks in Abuja, Nigeria, culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May, after months of negotiations. However, the Agreement was signed by the Government and only one of the Darfur rebel groups. The African Union, in January, endorsed a transition from its Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping operation, which the Security Council approved in March. However, the Sudan did not support the transition, citing threats to its sovereignty. A series of high-level meetings and missions sought to convince the Sudanese Government that the operation would only aim at protecting civilians and help bring peace and stability. On 31 August, the Security Council expanded UNMIS mandate by up to 17,300 international military personnel to be deployed to Darfur. However, that was rejected by the Sudan, which instead showed its intention to pursue a military solution to the crisis.

As the conflict between the Sudanese army and militias intensified, the Secretary-General, on 16 November, convened a high-level meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which brought together the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Sudanese Government, States and organizations with political influence in the region and AMIS troop-contributing countries. Participants agreed on a three-phased approach for deploying a hybrid AU-UN force. That was endorsed by the AU on 30
November, by the Council of Ministers of the Sudan on 3 December, and by the Security Council on 19 December. However, by the end of the year, the parties had shown no signs of abandoning the pursuit of their objectives through military means, and the conflict had spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic.

In Somalia, the year opened on a promising note, with the January signing of the Aden Declaration, brokered by Yemen, to end differences between the President and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament. With the signing of the Declaration, the Transitional Federal Government and Parliament relocated to Baidoa, 140 miles northwest of Mogadishu, and the Parliament held its first session in February.

February also saw a dramatic shift in Somalia’s complicated clan-based balance of power, with the emergence of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), whose aim was to combat the Union of Islamic Courts, accused of supporting terrorism and harbouring foreign terrorism suspects. ARPCT and Islamic Courts fighters engaged in fierce battles in Mogadishu, which killed hundreds and displaced thousands. By June, the Courts had routed ARPCT and established their authority in central and southern Somalia. A sense of law and order returned to Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years.

By contrast, the Transitional Federal Government barely held control of Baidoa, a fact starkly illustrated by the assassination of the Minister for Constitutional Affairs in the city, in July, and by an unsuccessful car bombing attempt on the life of the President on 18 September. The previous day, an Italian Catholic nun was assassinated in Mogadishu. In June, a Swedish cameraman and a journalist were killed while filming a rally in Mogadishu. Those incidents and a number of threats forced the United Nations to curtail its operations and withdraw all international staff from Somalia in October.

As tensions increased, the pace of diplomacy quickened. With the support of the United Nations, the League of Arab States launched a round of talks between the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts in Khartoum on 22 June. After attending the talks, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia travelled to Baidoa and Mogadishu in July for separate meetings with the President, Prime Minister and Speaker and with the Chairman of the Courts, obtaining commitments from both sides to continue the dialogue. A second round followed on 2 September in Khartoum.

After their surprisingly quick overthrow of the warlords who had ruled Mogadishu by fear for some 15 years, the Islamic Courts continued to expand the territory under their control. In September, they took control of the strategically important port city of Kismayo. By late October, their forces had flanked Baidoa, cut off its fuel supply and seized control of eight of the country’s 18 administrative districts. The Courts vowed to fight any foreign troops opposing them on Somali soil, and declared jihad against Ethiopian forces, which they alleged were already inside the country protecting the Transitional Government.

The Security Council, on 6 December, endorsed the request for a joint peace operation to be deployed by the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union. However, the military build-up by both sides came to a head on 24 December, when skirmishes threatened the Transitional Government in Baidoa and provoked the full force of the Government, backed by Ethiopian troops. The Courts militia retreated to Mogadishu, which fell to the Transitional Government/Ethiopian coalition on 28 December, and then to Kismayo, which fell soon after.

Notwithstanding multiple efforts, including diplomatic initiatives by the United States and the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, 2006 began and ended with Ethiopia and Eritrea still at a stalemate over the demarcation of the border between them.

The Security Council passed three resolutions reiterating its long-standing call for Ethiopia to enable demarcation of the border and for Eritrea to end its restrictions on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Meanwhile, the situation in the buffer zone, the Temporary Security Zone, and adjacent areas turned tense in mid-October, when some 1,500 Eritrean troops backed by tanks, artillery and air defence equipment, entered the Zone in Sector West. Eritrea later stated that the troops had entered the area to assist with crop harvesting and other development projects.

UNMEE forged ahead with its mandate obligations and kept watch over those developments in spite of a significant reduction in troop levels. This situation was exacerbated by Eritrean restrictions, including the flight ban on the Mission’s helicopters imposed in 2005, which greatly curtailed UNMEE capacity to monitor the Zone.

During the year, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission failed to advance its demarcation activities, stalled in 2003, following the rejection by Ethiopia of significant parts of the Commission’s
Political and security questions

2002 final and binding delimitation decision, previously accepted by both parties. On 27 November, the Commission announced that, because of impediments in fulfilling its mandate, it planned to demarcate the border on maps, leaving the two countries to establish the physical boundary themselves. Ethiopia and Eritrea were given one year to reach agreement on border demarcation, failing which, the locations established in the Commission’s 2002 delimitation decision would take effect. Both countries rejected the Commission’s proposal: Ethiopia stated that the Commission was acting beyond its mandate, and Eritrea maintained that the Algiers Agreement required the Commission, not the parties, to implement the 2002 delimitation decision.

The deadlock in the search for an agreed political solution to the long-standing conflict concerning the governance of the Territory of Western Sahara continued, with no hope of an early breakthrough. The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy intensified his efforts in exploring with the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para La Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra de Río de Oro (Frente Popular), the best way to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. However, Morocco reiterated that it would not accept a referendum that would include the option of independence, while Frente Popular maintained that the only way forward was to implement the 2003 Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara, or the 1991 Settlement Plan.

The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council call upon the parties to enter into open-ended negotiations without preconditions and, rather than just extending the Mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, to consider passing a more substantial resolution on the situation in Western Sahara.

In other matters, Mauritius, during the General Assembly’s general debate, complained that 38 years after its independence, it still was not able to exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The United Kingdom maintained that the Territory was British. While it did not recognize Mauritius’ sovereignty claim, successive British Governments had given the undertaking that the Territory would be ceded, when no longer required for defence purposes, and that it would liaise closely with Mauritius at that time.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly discussed the issue of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the areas of peace and security, including in Darfur, and implementation of the 2005 World Summit outcome, in which Member States committed themselves to meeting Africa’s special needs. Towards that end, the heads of both organizations signed a declaration entitled “Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the ten-year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union”.

Sudan

Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement

In 2006, limited progress was made in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Government of the Sudan. While the parties respected the letter of the Agreement, there was an increasing climate of distrust between them. The implementation of several major provisions of the Agreement had fallen behind schedule, important contentious issues remained to be resolved, and the parties continued to contest the interpretation of several aspects of the Agreement. People’s expectation of the peace dividend remained high, particularly in the south, but they had seen little improvement in their living conditions. The parties continued to face a growing security problem, which was further aggravated by the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army, operating out of neighbouring Uganda. A Security Council mission visited the Sudan, from 6 to 8 June, to hold talks on the north-south peace accord.

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) continued to play a key supporting role in the implementation of the Agreement. It completed its deployment in southern Sudan, where the Government of Southern Sudan was working hard to transform the region into a functioning administration. Having fulfilled its mandate in eastern Sudan, UNMIS withdrew from the area. With the deteriorating security situation in the Darfur region and the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the Security Council, in response to a AU request, expanded UNMIS mandate and increased its strength to 17,300 troops in the transition to a UN operation in Darfur.

In October, Eritrean-mediated peace talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Eastern Front rebel movement culminated in the signing of the Eastern Sudanese Peace Agreement.
On 22 October, the Sudan informed the Secretary-General that it had decided to terminate the mission of Special Representative Jan Pronk and requested him to leave the Sudan within 72 hours. The Security Council, on 27 October, backed the Secretary-General’s decision to retain Mr. Pronk as his Special Representative to the Sudan. He retained his post until the end of the year, when his contract expired.

Security Council consideration (January). Briefing the Council on 13 January [meeting 5344], Jan Pronk, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Sudan and Head of UNMIS, said that, although the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) [YUN 2005, p. 301] remained firm, many in the south had become suspicious and were losing their belief in the north’s sincerity, especially regarding the Government’s lack of transparency in reporting oil revenues that were supposed to be shared. Matching the cynicism in the south, was suspicion in the north that SPLM did not want to promote national unity as it prepared for the referendum on separation scheduled for 2011. Nonetheless, some progress had been made in the past year. Constitutions for the Sudan and southern Sudan had been adopted, two new Governments had been formed, all institutions required under the Agreement had been established, though some had hardly met and others were facing political disputes, and the redeployment of the Sudanese army away from the south had started. Talks between SPLM and the other armed groups in southern Sudan were proceeding well, which could pave the way for the integration of all combatants into one of the armies or into civil society. However, a great deal still needed to be done. The peace process had to be more inclusive, security laws brought into line with the constitution, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants begun, resources provided to support the return of displaced persons and refugees, and the rehabilitation and development of the economy started. The unity option should be given a real chance in the 2011 referendum, but the Government in the north should do everything to make that attractive, especially by guaranteeing a fair share of power, resources and income to the people of the south.

The Special Representative also raised concerns over the issue of Abyei, one of the transition areas, where uncertainty about its future status posed a threat. He warned that, in the east, close to the Eritrean border, a confrontation was likely to arise as soon as SPLM withdrew to the south, as it was committed to doing under the Peace Agreement. The Government and the eastern rebels had agreed to start peace discussions, with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as facilitator. Those talks had not yet started, even though the redeployment deadline of 9 January had passed, thereby creating a void, with the potential for new armed conflict.

Communication. On 3 February [S/2006/95], the Sudan submitted information on progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including ratification of the Interim National Constitution and those of southern Sudan and the other states, appointments made, and constitutional institutions and implementation bodies established. It also identified implementation priorities for the first quarter of 2006.

Report of Secretary-General (March). In his March report on the Sudan [S/2006/160], submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1590(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 305] and covering developments since his December 2005 report [ibid., p. 311], the Secretary-General said that progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was accompanied by worrisome delays. While the National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM had respected the letter of the Agreement, they had not shown the spirit of cooperation, inclusiveness and transparency envisioned therein. Various commissions called for in the Agreement, including those dealing with human rights, the civil service, elections, land and the protection of the rights of non-Muslims, had not been established.

The Ceasefire Political Commission, mandated to supervise implementation of the ceasefire and settle deadlocks reported by the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, met for the first time on 23 February. The meeting, attended by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the UNMIS Force Commander, cleared up procedural questions and approved the Commission’s terms of reference. The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission and the National Petroleum Commission had been established but were not yet performing their critical functions. However, the parties had moved forward on other tasks. President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir established the Joint Defence Board and appointed the president and members of the Constitutional Court. First Vice-President Salva Kiir and the leader of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) signed, on 8 January, the Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the South Sudan Defence Forces. However, by late February, most of the commanders had declared their allegiance to SPLA. As the 9 January deadline for the
incorporation of other armed forces into the regular forces of either of the parties or their integration into civil society had not been met, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee extended the date for the final reporting of armed groups to 9 March. The incorporation issue was not addressed, as the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee had not been activated.

President Al-Bashir, during his visit to southern Sudan on 14 February, affirmed the right of the people of that region to vote in the referendum in 2011, and declared that he would prefer separation over war. He reiterated that NCP was ready to share wealth with the south.

The Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), remained a concern in southern Sudan, threatening civilians, as well as assistance activities. The already strained relations between the Sudan and Chad deteriorated, following a reported attack by Chadian opposition groups on 18 December 2005 on the Chadian border town of Adre.

The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, continued to provide a forum for oversight, coordination and liaison between the parties, facilitating their efforts to implement the Peace Agreement. Both parties selected most of the forces required to form the Joint Integrated Units and moved them to assembly areas. However, although the Sudanese armed forces reported that 15,752 troops were available, and SPLA, 14,929, no Joint Integrated Units had yet been formed. That threatened implementation of the Peace Agreement, as the Units were essential for addressing potential conflicts. Frustration among soldiers, many of whom were not being regularly paid, was on the rise.

The Secretary-General observed that implementation of the Peace Agreement was falling short of expectations. The parties had not yet begun to use effectively the Peace Agreement’s institutions to resolve differences. Since the National Petroleum Commission was not fully functional, there was a lack of transparency in the sharing of oil revenues with the Government of Southern Sudan. That complicated relations between SPLM and NCP and eroded the confidence of many southern Sudanese. Security arrangements were proceeding slowly, and any further delay in forming the Joint Integrated Units could weaken the parties’ capacity to prevent or address conflicts. The Darfur crisis (see p. 268) was having a negative effect on the Peace Agreement’s implementation. Efforts to negotiate an end to that conflict were putting pressure on the relationship between the partners in the Government of National Unity.

Making unity attractive for the people of southern Sudan remained one of the greatest challenges of the interim period. To move forward, the partners in the Government of National Unity needed to confront difficulties together through the Peace Agreement institutions and make the necessary compromises. The United Nations remained committed to implementing peace, however, the growing anti-UN campaign in Khartoum and other cities, as well as personal attacks in the media against the UNMIS leadership, were troubling. People’s expectations of the peace dividend were high, particularly in the south, yet they had seen little improvement in their living conditions. Many had returned to their home areas in the south, but no basic infrastructure or social services had been established to receive them. Making the dividends of peace visible to the population was an essential part of implementing the Peace Agreement, said the Secretary-General.

**Security Council consideration (March).**

Briefing the Security Council on 21 March [meeting 5392], the Secretary-General’s Special Representative said that, although NCP and SPLM had respected the letter of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on the ground, there was an increasing climate of mistrust between them. He noted President Al-Bashir’s statement on the 2011 referendum (see above) and Vice-President Kiir declaration, during the first meeting of the Sudan Consortium in Paris (9-10 March), that there was no longer any substantial disagreement on the sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south. Another encouraging sign was the fact that, at that meeting, the two parties united to participate as the Government of National Unity, led by Vice-President Kiir. The commitments made by both the north and the south to ensure transparency and accountability, as well as good financial and economic governance, augured well.

However, southern Sudan was suffering from severe poverty. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, no tangible reconstruction had taken place. Although people were returning, they lacked the means to reintegrate. There were mines everywhere and work on clearing them had not started. The southern capital city of Juba, already short of water and power, was receiving more and more people, and many villages could hardly sustain the increasing number of their inhabitants because of insufficient food production. The reconstruction and development deficit in the south was the greatest challenge to peace.

The security situation in the south was already showing signs of deterioration. The disarmament of ex-combatants had not yet started, and the in-
Acknowledging the importance of urgently reaching a successful conclusion of the Abuja Peace Talks, and calling upon the parties to conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible,

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 1627(2005) of 23 September 2005 and 1653(2006) of 27 January 2006, and the statements by its President, in particular that of 3 February 2006, concerning the situation in the Sudan,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan,

Welcoming implementation by the parties of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and urging them to meet their commitments,

Acknowledging the commitments by troop-contributing countries in support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, and encouraging deployment in order for the Mission to support timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

Reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to the violence and atrocities,

Stressing the importance of urgently reaching a successful conclusion of the Abuja Peace Talks, and calling upon the parties to conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible,

Welcoming the communiqué of 10 March 2006 issued by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its forty-sixth meeting, and the decision of that Council to support in principle the transition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation within the framework of partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, to pursue the conclusion of a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April 2006, and to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in the Sudan until 30 September 2006,

Expressing its deep concern at the movement of arms and armed groups across borders, such as the long-running and brutal insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has caused the death, abduction and displacement of many innocent civilians in the Sudan,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan until 24 September 2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every three months on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan;

3. Reiterates its request, made in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1590(2005) of 24 March 2005, that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in the Sudan, and urges it to intensify its efforts in this regard;

4. Requests that the Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the Government of National Unity, expedite the necessary preparatory planning for transition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation, including options for how the United Nations Mission in the Sudan can reinforce the effort for peace in Darfur through additional appropriate transitional assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan, including assistance in logistics, mobility and communications, and that the Secretary-General present to the Council by 24 April 2006 for its consideration a range of options for a United Nations operation in Darfur;

5. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to provide the maximum possible assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan;

6. Requests the Secretary-General and the African Union to consult with international and regional organizations and member States to identify resources to support the African Union Mission in the Sudan during transition to a United Nations operation;

7. Strongly condemns the activities of militias and armed groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, which continue to attack civilians and commit human rights abuses in the Sudan, and in this regard urges the United

...
Nations Mission in the Sudan to make full use of its current mandate and capabilities;

8. Recalls resolution 1653(2006) and its request that the Secretary-General make recommendations to the Council, and looks forward to receiving by 24 April 2006 those recommendations which would include proposals on how United Nations agencies and missions, in particular the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, could more effectively address the problem of the Lord’s Resistance Army;

9. Encourages the Sudanese parties to finalize the establishment of national institutions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to expedite the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan as provided for in resolution 1590(2005);

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Report of Secretary-General (June). In his June report [S/2006/426], the Secretary-General said that the parties continued to make slow progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. They had not yet activated the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee for overseeing the integration of allied militias into their regular forces. The integration was, therefore, well behind schedule and threatened to ignite further violence. On 7 March, two days before the deadline for incorporating the other armed groups, a convoy of unarmed former ssdf soldiers, currently aligned with spla, was attacked near Abyei by another group of ssdf elements aligned with saf. Thirteen people died and 30 were wounded in the attack. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee made slow progress on most issues before it. Both parties failed to provide comprehensive data on their forces. Unmis observers continued to verify the forces that the parties had moved to assembly areas to form Joint Integrated Units. Some 8,410 saf troops (out of 15,752 ready for the Units) and 14,446 spla troops (out of 14,929 troops reported) had been verified. However, the establishment of the Units remained dependent on decisions still to be taken by the Joint Defence Board.

In a significant step in implementing the Peace Agreement, some 3,000 spla soldiers and their families had started moving from eastern Sudan to the south on 20 April. On 11 June, spla withdrew from the eastern town of Hameshkoreib, handing over control to State authorities. The redeployment of saf from the south to the north was also proceeding on schedule.

The Assessment and Evaluation Commission, responsible for monitoring implementation of the Peace Agreement, formed four working groups—on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and the three war-affected areas. Law reform envisaged in the Agreement was progressing slowly. The National Assembly, which convened its second session on 3 April, still needed to adopt a number of key acts, including those required to prepare for midterm elections. The Legislative Assembly of southern Sudan, which convened its second regular session on 10 April, in Juba, had yet to table laws to establish key commissions in the south.

Meeting in April, the splm Political Bureau expressed concern over the slow implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but reaffirmed its desire for a strong partnership with ncp and a more active role in resolving the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan. The splm and ncp leadership councils held their first joint meeting in May, co-chaired by President Al-Bashir and First Vice-President Kiir. Participants affirmed their determination to implement the Peace Agreement and to work as partners for peace and development, but failed to reach agreement on the implementation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission report. They referred the report to the Presidency, with four options: a political agreement; a call on the experts of the Abyei Boundaries Commission to defend their recommendations; refer the matter to the constitutional court; or arbitration by a third party. The parties did agree, however, to form a fully representative transitional administration for Abyei.

Relations between the Sudan and Eritrea improved. The two countries exchanged high-level visits and agreed to restore full diplomatic relations. However, Chad severed diplomatic and economic relations with the Sudan, after a 13 April rebel attack on the Chadian capital of N’Djamena.

UN agencies and partners, including the International Organization for Migration, organized several large-scale returns, including that of 4,000 internally displaced persons from Juba to Jonglei State, and 6,000 from Yei to Bor. The Government of Southern Sudan scaled back its plans to return 501,000 people to their homes during the dry season, settling a new target of 151,000.

The Government of National Unity prudent macroeconomic policies and structural reforms, along with rising oil prices, contributed to robust economic growth, single-digit inflation and high levels of foreign investment. Pro-poor spending was significantly raised under the 2006 budget, but the fast pace of non-concessional borrowing was increasing the already large external debt. At the first meeting of the Sudan Consortium (Paris, 9-10 March), organized by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the United Na-
tions, the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan committed themselves to transparent budgets. The meeting brought together representatives of 22 donor countries and international institutions to increase resources for development, encourage accountability and good economic governance, and increase the transparency of budgets.

The parties took further steps to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Secretary-General observed. Overall, the implementation process remained broadly on track and the parties continued to demonstrate commitment to the spirit of the Agreement. However, there were too many delays in implementation and too few indications of real progress in key areas. The parties did not invest enough in the commissions established under the Peace Agreement, and the spirit of cooperation, inclusiveness and transparency envisioned in the Agreement was sometimes lacking. The Secretary-General urged the parties to establish the Joint Integrated Units, act appropriately on the findings of the investigation into the violent incidents that took place in Abyei on 7 March, and ensure that such tragic incidents were not repeated. He also urged the Presidency to resolve the impasse over the implementation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission recommendations and called on the Government to allow freedom of movement of UN personnel in the Abyei area. In addition, he encouraged the Security Council to consider extending UNMIS monitoring and verification presence in the eastern region, in the light of renewed efforts to organize peace talks between the Government and the Eastern Front. Noting the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (see p. 274), the Secretary-General said that efforts to address that crisis should not prejudice work for the recovery of southern Sudan, where the greatest challenge was the creation of a true peace dividend for the people.

Security Council mission

On 26 May [S/2006/341], the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that it had decided to send a mission to the Sudan, Chad and the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, from 4 to 10 June. The mission, to be led by Emur Jones Parry (United Kingdom), would deal with Darfur issues, North-South and southern Sudan issues and Sudan-Chad relations.

In its 22 June report [S/2006/433], the mission reported that it visited Khartoum, Juba and El Fasher in the Sudan; the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa; and N'Djamena and Goz Beida in Chad. In the Sudan, the mission met, among others, with President Al-Bashir, First Vice-President Kiir, Foreign Affairs Minister Lam Akol, SPLM Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor and opposition party leaders. In Chad, the mission met, among others, with President Idriss Déby and his cabinet.

The mission was encouraged by the number of key measures taken to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but noted the challenges that were undermining its implementation, especially the question of the future status of the Abyei region, the slow pace in setting up the commissions under the Peace Agreement and the lack of a peace dividend for the population, owing to the failure of international donors to live up to their pledges. The Legislative Assembly in Juba raised the issue of power-sharing within the Government of National Unity, complaining that SPLM representatives in Khartoum felt ignored within their ministries, their deputy ministers were bypassed and that parallel institutions answering directly to the President had been created in ministries where SPLM held the post of minister. The Government of Southern Sudan and the international humanitarian community expressed concern over the growing insecurity in some areas of southern Sudan, owing to the activities of militias which had not yet been integrated into SAF or SPLA, and their potential to destabilize the region. A number of humanitarian activities were curtailed due to growing militia activity. Fearing a vacuum of authority and of the rule of law, UN country teams and NGOs urged that UNMIS be sufficiently resourced to deal with the fragile situation. The Government of Southern Sudan was also faced with the challenge of the presence of the LRA, which it wanted expelled from the region.

The mission recommended faster implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, so that the Sudanese public might not lose faith in it. Given the continuing security concerns in the south, UNMIS should not be affected by the deployment of a UN force in Darfur. The problem of LRA required firm attention and steps should be taken to develop a decisive international response to remove that threat, should peace talks fail. The International Criminal Court indictments against LRA members should be acted upon. International aid agencies and donors should live up to their pledges and not allow the problems in Darfur to detract from the problems in southern Sudan.

Security Council consideration. Briefing the Council on 15 June [meeting 5462], Ambassador Jones Parry, the head of the Council’s mission, said that during its visit, the mission stressed the Council’s wish to work in partnership with the Government and other main actors to help tackle the range of
problems facing the country. However, while the international community’s attention was focused on the problems in the Darfur region of the country, the mission left with a clear sense that the Council should not lose sight of the wider problems of the Sudan, in particular in the south. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement marked the cessation of hostilities and was moving forward, its implementation was slow and international donations were drying up. Yet, Darfur’s future was linked to that of the south and the south’s to that of Darfur. A holistic solution was required to address all the country’s problems through a coordinated UN response.

The Council considered the mission’s written report on 29 June [meeting 5478].

Report of Secretary-General (September). In his September report [S/2006/728], the Secretary-General said that one year after the inauguration of the Government of National Unity, progress in carrying out commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was limited and the implementation of several of its major provisions had fallen behind schedule. The parties were unable to resolve important contentious issues and made little progress in the crucial areas of power and wealth-sharing, including the Abyei situation, the sharing of oil revenues, the north-south border and the question of other armed groups. The parties continued to contest the interpretation of several aspects of the Agreement and neglected other commitments.

UNMIS and the wider UN system continued to play a key role in the implementation of the Agreement, providing good offices and political support to the parties, monitoring and verifying their security arrangements and offering assistance in governance, recovery and development. The parties’ efforts to implement the Agreement’s security provisions had reduced the likelihood of future conflict. The redeployment of SAF from southern Sudan was generally on schedule, although SPLA had accused SAF of concentrating around oilfields in the region bordering the north and the south, rather than redeploying further north. On 4 July, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee established that SPLA had completed its redeployment from eastern Sudan. UNMIS verified the redeployment of 5,672 troops out of a declared strength of 8,763; the troops unaccounted for were considered to have abandoned SPLA. The completion of the redeployment marked a milestone in implementing the Agreement, as well as the end of the UNMIS monitoring mandate in the east, allowing the Mission to commence its withdrawal. Some of the Peace Agreement’s security mechanisms, such as the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees, were largely functioning and had helped in resolving incidents with the potential for triggering wider conflict, such as the August clash between off-duty SPLA and SAF officers in Rubkona market in Unity State, in which eight civilians and three soldiers were killed.

Southern Sudan continued to suffer from insecurity due to the presence of armed groups, communal violence and forced disarmament campaigns. While SPLA had absorbed much of the former SSDF soldiers, other armed groups remained a major threat, as the schedule for incorporating them had fallen well behind. Although the formation of Joint Integrated Units had been slow, the parties had taken the first step to co-locate such units in Juba, Torit and Khartoum. However, the Units needed additional training, as well as budgetary and material support, for which international assistance would be required. International support would also be important in reforming the national security sector, including the police.

The parties were well behind schedule in implementing the power- and wealth-sharing aspects of the Peace Agreement. Disagreement continued over the National Petroleum Commission, its relationship with the Ministry of Energy and Mining and its participation in oil contract negotiations. The Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee had not yet started substantive work on delineating the north-south border, thereby hindering the fulfilment of obligations relating to military redeployment, the distribution of oil revenues, Joint Integrated Unit formation and preparations for the 2011 referendum to confirm the unity of the Sudan, or allow the secession of the south. Abyei remained a serious potential flashpoint. The local Executive Council (Abyei Area Council) had not yet been appointed, leaving the people of that region without formal policing, public sanitation and health services.

Few of the commissions called for in the Peace Agreement functioned as intended. Hardly any action had been taken to start preparing for national elections, scheduled for mid-2009. However, the National Assembly was emerging as a vibrant forum for political dialogue. Meanwhile, SPLM was facing the challenge of transforming itself from a liberation movement into a political party, reflecting the diversity of the peoples of southern Sudan.

The LRA continued to attack civilians and destabilize the area along the borders with Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Uganda and LRA launched talks, in Juba, on 14 July, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan. On
26 August, Uganda and LRA signed a cessation of hostilities agreement, which required LRA members to assemble at two designated points in southern Sudan.

Talks between the Government and the Eastern Front, mediated by Eritrea and observed by UNMIS, began in Asmara, Eritrea, on 13 June. Eritrea’s role in the talks confirmed the warming of relations between Eritrea and the Sudan; on 12 June, the two countries’ Presidents met for the first time in more than five years.

The relatively stable humanitarian situation in southern Sudan led to increased activity and optimism among the international aid community. Between January and early June, international assistance contributed to the building or repairing of 370 kilometres of road, which allowed over 10,000 refugees to return, food to be delivered to 3 million people, as well as polio immunization for 4.8 million children. Donor support continued to lag behind needs, and by the end of August, donor pledges met only 56 per cent, or $896.5 million, of the humanitarian workplan requirements. Only some $430 million of the $2.6 billion needed for post-conflict reconstruction had been committed.

The Government continued to breach the status-of-forces agreement. SAF personnel prevented UNMIS movement north of Abyei, restricting UN monitoring to only 20 per cent of the sector. The Government continued to arrest and detain national UNMIS staff.

The Secretary-General observed that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was entering a new and challenging phase. In the months ahead, the parties had to make substantial progress in security-sector reform, police reform and restructuring, preparing for the return of internally displaced persons, the national census and future elections, while continuing determined disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes. He called upon the international community to support the Sudanese people in meeting those challenges and to lend technical and political assistance to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He recommended that the Security Council renew UNMIS mandate until 24 September 2007.

**Security Council consideration.** In presenting the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on 18 September [meeting 5528], the Special Representative said that UNMIS had completed its deployment in southern Sudan, had fulfilled its mandate in eastern Sudan, and had withdrawn from the area. That withdrawal sent a strong signal to the people of the Sudan that the United Nations, which had come to eastern Sudan at the Government’s invitation, had accomplished its task and had left. The Organization continued to monitor the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Government and the Eastern Front and an agreement was expected to be signed later in the year. In the south, the Government of Southern Sudan was working hard to transform the region into a functioning administration. President Kiir reshuffled his cabinet and administration to enhance good governance and abate corruption. His 200-day action plan was intended to put the needs of the people in front.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,


Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan and to the cause of peace,

Noting with deep concern the restrictions placed on movements and materiel of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the adverse impact that such restrictions have on the ability of the Mission to perform its mandate effectively,

Expressing its grave concern over the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to the violence and atrocities in that region,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan until 8 October 2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods;
2. Decides also to remain actively seized of the matter.

On 6 October [meeting 5545], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1714(2006). The draft [S/2006/792] was submitted by the United States.

The Security Council,

in particular that of 3 February 2006, concerning the situation in the Sudan,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan and to the cause of peace,

Welcoming the progress in the implementation of security arrangements by the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and calling upon the parties to urgently accelerate progress on implementing these and other aspects of the Agreement,

Welcoming also the full deployment of United Nations forces within the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in those areas of operation in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and acknowledging the commitment by troop-contributing countries in support of this mission,

Welcoming further the improving humanitarian situation in southern Sudan resulting from progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

Noting with concern the restrictions placed on the movements and materiel of the Mission by the Government of the Sudan and the adverse impact that such restrictions have on the ability of the Mission to perform its mandate effectively,

Expressing its grave concern over the recruitment and use of children in conflict in the Sudan, particularly by other armed groups in southern Sudan,

Expressing its grave concern also over the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur, including non-parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, to put an end to the violence and atrocities in that region,

Welcoming the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, at its sixty-third meeting, held on 20 September 2006, to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in the Sudan until 31 December 2006,

Encouraging the efforts of the Secretary-General and the African Union to implement those provisions of resolution 1706(2006) on United Nations assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan, and calling upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement and all other parties in Darfur to facilitate this process,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan until 30 April 2007, with the intention to renew it for further periods;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every three months on the implementation of the mandate of the Mission;

3. Calls upon the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Darfur Peace Agreement and the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement to respect their commitments and implement fully all aspects of the Agreements without delay, and calls upon those parties that have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the Agreement;

4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Further report of Secretary-General. In a later report [S/2007/42], the Secretary-General said that the Eritrean-mediated talks between the Government and the Eastern Front rebel movement culminated in the signing on 14 October of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. The Agreement was approved by the National Assembly on 6 November and its incorporation into the Constitution was pending discussions between NCP and its allies regarding the allocations of parliamentary seats. The state of emergency was lifted in Kassala state and Red Sea state. The Agreement’s implementation, however, was progressing slowly.

A most serious violation of the ceasefire occurred in Malakal, Upper Nile, where heavy fighting between SAF and SPLA, from 27 to 30 November, killed at least 150 people, including civilians. A long-running dispute over the “commissionership” of a county in neighbouring Jonglei state triggered the skirmishes between groups aligned with SAF and the SPLA Joint Integrated Unit contingent, which escalated into a full-scale confrontation. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee played a key role in bringing the fighting to a halt, and the parties subsequently withdrew to their pre-conflict positions. The failure to integrate other armed groups into existing military structures and to create functioning Joint Integrated Units had left the parties facing a growing security problem, where militia violence, as witnessed in Malakal, could easily erupt and spiral out of control. On 18 November, President Al-Bashir called for better cooperation between NCP and SPLM on security matters, particularly the problem of other armed groups, and stressed the need for the Joint Integrated Units to function in order to secure the border areas and oil installations. The clashes in Malakal led the United Nations to relocate temporarily 230 non-essential UN and NGO personnel. Elsewhere in southern Sudan, unidentified armed men, allegedly belonging to SAF-aligned militia groups, were held responsible for attacks on arterial roads outside Juba, in October and December, killing some 75 people.

UNMIS continued to face considerable challenges in carrying out its mandate. On 26 September, two UNMIS staff members monitoring demonstrations at Khartoum University were detained and threatened by unidentified security personnel. They were subsequently declared persona non gratae and requested to leave the Sudan. On 22 October, the Sudan informed the Secretary-General that it had decided to “terminate” the mission of Special Rep-
resentative Jan Pronk and requested that he leave the Sudan within 72 hours, reportedly due to comments Mr. Pronk had made on his blog. The United Nations strongly protested that decision. Mr. Pronk returned to UN Headquarters for consultations and later to the Sudan for a short farewell visit prior to the expiration of his contract at the end of the year.

UNMIS

The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), established by Security Council resolution 1590(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 304], was headed by Johannes Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan. UNMIS continued to discharge its mandate, in accordance with resolution 1590(2005), to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A; facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; assist with humanitarian demining; and protect and promote human rights. Its mandate was extended by the Council three times during the year, the first time until 24 September, the second until 8 October and the third until 30 April 2007.

Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May (see p. 274), the Security Council, in resolution 1706(2006) of 31 August (see p. 282), decided to expand UNMIS mandate to deploy to Darfur and to strengthen its size up to 17,300 military personnel, 3,300 civilian personnel and 16 formed police units.

As at 31 December, UNMIS comprised 8,734 troops, 592 military observers and 680 international civilian police.


UNMIS activities

UNMIS continued to assist the parties in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolving conflicts in the Sudan through the provision of good offices and political support. In the east, UNMIS supported the Government and the Eastern Front, the coalition of rebel groups operating along the border with Eritrea, in peace talks. With the completion of SPLA redeployment to the south, UNMIS Redeployment Coordination Headquarters, based in the north-eastern town of Kassala, fulfilled its tasks in eastern Sudan, and the Mission started to withdraw on 1 August.

In the south, UNMIS intensified reconciliation efforts and helped to defuse tensions in areas of potential conflict, in close liaison with the SAF, SPLA and other armed groups. The Mission was able to prevent or manage the escalation of local conflicts, many of them associated with the seasonal movement of people and cattle to the dry-season grazing areas. UNMIS used its good offices to help restore calm in a number of volatile situations, including the clashes in May caused by the forced disarmament campaign in Jonglei and the Rubkona market incident in August. Starting on 11 August, UNMIS convened several emergency meetings of the Area Joint Military Committee to secure a halt to the fighting between the SPLA and the SAF-aligned Pangak Peace Force in the town of Malakal (see p. 264). UNMIS good relations with most commanders of SAF, SPLA and other armed groups proved crucial in defusing the tense situation in Upper Nile State. More broadly, it continued to perform an important early warning role throughout southern Sudan, identifying and addressing intercommunal tensions.

UNMIS also assisted in efforts to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Mission continued to persuade the non-signatory groups to support the Agreement, and participated in the work of the AU-led Joint Commission and Ceasefire Commissions.

UNMIS continued to train the local police. Its mine action teams made major progress in clearing 7 million square metres of suspected dangerous areas and destroying some 2,100 anti-personnel mines, over 900 anti-tank mines and some 270,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and small-arms ammunition. With the United Nations Children’s Fund, it provided mine-risk education to more than 834,000 people. The Mission focused on clearing humanitarian routes, verifying or clearing over 1,200 kilometres of road for emergency deployment and aid delivery and making it possible to drive from Khartoum to the Ugandan border.

Financing of UNMIS

In March [A/60/726 & Corr.1], the Secretary-General submitted the UNMIS performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 315], and the UNMIS budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, amounting to $1,081,659,300.

In May [A/60/868], ACABQ recommended a reduction of $594,300 in the amount requested. The amount to be appropriated totalled $1,081,065,000.
On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee, adopted resolution 60/122 B [A/60/562/Add.1] without vote [agenda item 140].

Financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

The General Assembly,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,

Recalling Security Council resolution 1590(2005) of 24 March 2005, by which the Council established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan for an initial period of six months as from 24 March 2005, and the subsequent resolutions by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission, the latest of which was resolution 1663(2006) of 24 March 2006,

Recalling also its resolutions 59/292 of 21 April 2005 and 60/122 A of 8 December 2005 on the financing of the Mission,

Recalling further its resolution 58/315 of 1 July 2004,

Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in its resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 52.9 million United States dollars, representing some 4 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only sixty Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing ad-equate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. Welcomes the use of the Entebbe installation to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of its logistical support operations for peacekeeping missions in the region;

10. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, subject to the provisions of the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

11. Reaffirms its resolution 59/296, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of its relevant provisions and the relevant provisions of its resolution 60/266;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

13. Welcomes the efforts of the Mission in developing the unified mission concept, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to improve this concept;

14. Notes with appreciation the strong coordination between the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the United Nations country team, and requests the Secretary-General to share the Mission’s experiences and lessons learned with other complex peacekeeping missions with a view to increasing their coordination and reducing potential duplication of activities with other entities, and to report thereon to it at its sixty-first session in the context of the overview report of the Secretary-General on progress made in this regard;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to continue providing the latest available information on specific management efficiencies achieved as well as future plans in this regard in the unified area-based and decentralized organizational structure of the Mission in the context of the next budget submission;

16. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Mission implementation plan and results-based budgeting are integrated and to report on progress made to the General Assembly in the context of the next budget submission for the Mission;

17. Further requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;
18. Requests the Secretary-General to intensify his ongoing efforts, including through innovative approaches, to ensure the expeditious filling of all vacant posts;

19. Decides to establish a Planning Officer post at the P-4 level in the Strategic Planning Office;

20. Stresses the crucial role of demining for the speedy and successful implementation of the Mission’s mandate, and welcomes the intention of the Mission to enhance successful implementation of this activity through collaboration and coordination with the relevant partners in the field;

21. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance coordination and provision of technical advice and operational demining in support of the full deployment of the Mission, in accordance with relevant mandates, and to report thereon in context of the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009;

22. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide clear information on the budget provision for mine detection and mine-clearing services, including staffing and operational costs, in the Mission’s next budget submission;

23. Welcomes the increasing use of the inland waterway;

24. Notes the considerable reliance on air assets for transportation, and, bearing in mind the expected lifetime of the Mission, requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Mission also effectively utilizes and, where possible, increases the available road, rail and inland waterway transport modes where they are reliable, cost-effective and safer than air transportation, and also requests the Secretary-General to report on the experience of the Mission in this area and to indicate the actual and expected efficiencies resulting from the use of such modes of transportation as well as a long-term strategy in this regard;

25. Requests the Secretary-General to increase the Mission’s utilization of information and communication technology tools wherever it is possible and creates efficiencies and to report back on their utilization to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session in the context of the budget submission for the Mission;

26. Looks forward to the consideration of the comprehensive report requested in section VIII, paragraph 3, of its resolution 60/266;

27. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that quick-impact projects are implemented in compliance with the original intent of such projects and relevant General Assembly resolutions;

28. Decides to approve the resources requested for quick-impact projects in section II of the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007;

29. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the fullest implementation of the quick-impact projects in the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 in the light of the Mission’s capacity to undertake these activities;

30. Reaffirms the provisions of its resolution 59/296 on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and requests the Secretary-General to utilize the proposed resources in accordance with the provisions of that resolution;

31. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that future budget submissions include clear information regarding mandated disarmament, demobilization and re-integration activities, including clear justification for post and non-post resource requirements and their projected impact on the effective delivery of Mission objectives in this field as well as information on the collaboration with all relevant United Nations entities present in the field and acting in this area;

Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005

32. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

33. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan the amount of 1,126,295,900 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 1,079,534,400 dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, 38,623,300 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 8,138,200 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy;

Financing of the appropriation

34. Decides also to apportion among Member States the amount of 262,802,400 dollars for the period from 1 July to 24 September 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

35. Decides further that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 34 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 5,883,800 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 4,726,300 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 1,013,700 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 143,800 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

36. Decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 863,493,500 dollars for the period from 25 September 2006 to 30 June 2007, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256 and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission;

37. Decides also that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 36 above, their respective share in the
Tax Equalization Fund of 19,332,400 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 15,529,400 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 3,330,800 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 472,200 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

38. **Decides further** that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 34 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 2,804,000 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

39. **Decides** that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 2,804,000 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 38 above;

40. **Decides also** that the net increase of 455,200 dollars in the staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, representing the difference between the additional staff assessment income of 678,100 dollars previously approved under the terms of its resolution 60/122 A for the financial period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and the decrease in the staff assessment income of 222,900 dollars in respect of the same financial period, shall be added to the credits from the amount of 2,804,000 dollars referred to in paragraphs 38 and 39 above;

41. **Emphasizes** that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

42. **Encourages** the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Mission, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

43. **Invites** voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

44. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan”.

On 15 November [A/61/598], the Secretary-General informed the Assembly President that **UNMIS** expansion would require extensive augmentation of the support infrastructure and the building of sustained capabilities, and indicated the extraordinary measures he had authorized in that regard. He noted that, under Assembly resolution 60/122 B, an amount of $1,079.5 million had been appropriated for **UNMIS**. The light support package recommended by the Secretary-General was being implemented under the existing approved budget.

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that agenda item “Financing of **UNMIS**” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.

**Situation in Darfur**

In 2006, the conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan, which had erupted in 2003, intensified. The Government of the Sudan continued to confront the two main rebel movements—the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The AU, through the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), continued to help the parties to observe the 2004 N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement [YUN 2004, p. 235] and led international efforts to resolve the crisis, through the inter-Sudanese peace talks, also known as the Abuja talks, which began in 2004.

Those talks, supported by international partners and the United Nations, culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May, 2006. While all parties to the conflict attended the talks, only the Government and the SLM/A faction led by Minni Minawi signed the Agreement. In the light of the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the intensification of the fighting, the AU Peace and Security Council, on 15 May, requested further UN assistance to help it fulfill its obligations under the Agreement and that steps be taken to transition from AMIS to a UN operation. The Council responded in resolution 1706(2006) of 31 August, by expanding the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (**UNMIS**) and authorizing an increase in its strength to 17,300 military personnel. However, the Government of the Sudan declared its objection to such a mission. At the same time, the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement maintained their opposition to the Agreement and created alliances to oppose its implementation. Efforts, led by the AU Special Envoy, were made to persuade the non-signatories to support the Agreement. Pending agreement by the Government of the Sudan to allow a UN operation in Darfur, the AU and the United Nations agreed to assist AMIS in the form of a “light support package” and on 16 November, they further agreed to a phase two “heavy package” of assistance, and to establish an **AU-UN** hybrid operation in Darfur, with a force that would be predominantly African in nature. On 19 Decem-
ber, the Security Council endorsed those decisions and called on all parties to implement them.

The conflict in Darfur also resulted in an escalation of tension between Chad and the Sudan, despite the signing in February of the Tripoli Agreement on the normalization of relations between the two countries.

**Political and security developments**

The Secretary-General, in his January report on Darfur [S/2006/59], said that African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) continued to liaise closely with UNMIS through periodic meetings between the United Nations Assistance Cell and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The report of the AU Commission’s December 2005 in-depth review of AMIS operations [YUN 2005, p. 335] was considered by the AU Peace and Security Council on 12 January, 2006. In a communiqué issued the same day, the Peace and Security Council noted that, despite serious financial, logistical and other constraints facing AMIS, it had contributed significantly to the protection of the civilian population and the improvement of the security and humanitarian situations in Darfur. The Peace and Security Council supported, in principle, the transition from AMIS to a UN operation and decided to convene at the ministerial level in Addis Ababa, in March, to review the situation and make a final decision on the transfer and its modalities. The Secretary-General said that the United Nations would work closely with the AU and other stakeholders to take the matter forward. The transition itself would be difficult and costly, but, in the meantime, everything possible should be done to support and strengthen the existing AMIS operation, including providing it with the necessary funding.

**Security Council consideration (January).** On 13 January [meeting 5344], the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Johannes Pronk, in briefing the Security Council, said that the 31 December 2005 deadline for reaching an agreement on Darfur had passed unnoticed and there seemed to be no sense of urgency. Despite his best efforts, the AU Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur, Salim A. Salim, could not get the parties to reach an agreement. They could learn from the way the north-south Peace Agreement was reached, whereby the parties agreed upon a sustained and lasting ceasefire first, making it possible to continue negotiations for a fair distribution of power and wealth. However, any agreement reached would be sustainable only if the international community assisted in guaranteeing security. AMIS had done an admirable job but had not been provided with adequate resources and means to prevent attacks. International guarantees would have to be provided to allow internally displaced persons and refugees to return, and the military force to provide such guarantees should be bigger than the current AMIS force, stay long enough to provide confidence, and be an integral element of a unified approach to Darfur, with humanitarian, political, police, legal, human rights, reconstruction and economic development instruments, supported by sanctions.

The AU Special Envoy for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks told the Council that the AU mediation intended to ensure that the parties were continuously engaged until a comprehensive agreement was reached on all the major issues that separated them. The negotiations had been characterized by inflexibility, suspicion, lack of confidence and deep distrust. The parties, the Government and the armed movements needed to show more willingness to compromise. As a way forward and to give the Abuja talks fresh momentum, he proposed that efforts be made to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanisms established to implement the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement [YUN 2004, p. 235], with credible sanctions for those violating it. The parties should know that they would be held responsible for prolonging the suffering of the people, and would be subject to UN sanctions. There needed to be stronger cohesion, transparency and coordination among regional countries facilitating the peace process. Other external conditions needed to be addressed urgently, especially the tension between Chad and the Sudan. Cohesion and greater coordination between the AU mediation and international partners were essential for the negotiations. AMIS should be strengthened as a matter of priority, including the provision of adequate funding. The Special Envoy appealed to the Council to remain engaged and to send strong signals of its support for the Abuja peace process.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 3 February [meeting 5364], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/5 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council commends the efforts of the African Union for successful deployment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan and for significant contribution to the provision of a secure environment for civilians and the humanitarian situation in Darfur. The Council welcomes the recognition by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.
The Security Council takes note of the communiqué of 12 January 2006 issued by the Peace and Security Council, in which it expressed its support, in principle, for a transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation and requested the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union to initiate consultations with the United Nations and other stakeholders on this matter.

The Security Council therefore requests the Secretary-General to initiate contingency planning without delay, jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the Government of National Unity, on a range of options for a possible transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation. Such planning should be undertaken on the basis of a unified, integrated approach; of maximum use of existing resources of the African Union Mission in the Sudan and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, subject to the agreement of troop-contributing countries; of an assessment, to be confirmed by the Council, of the essential tasks to be carried out in southern Sudan and Darfur with a view to reallocating existing troops and assets to the maximum extent practicable; and of a readiness to review and adjust the current structure of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, including command and control and logistics, at the earliest opportunity, to make the best use of available resources when the African Union deems a transition feasible and agreeable. The Council will be engaged throughout this process.

The Security Council emphasizes the importance of maintaining strong support for the African Union Mission in the Sudan until any eventual transition is completed. The Council looks forward to an early decision from the Peace and Security Council and will keep this issue under consideration with a view to reviewing the options submitted by the Secretary-General.

The Security Council stresses the importance of urgently reaching a successful conclusion of the Abuja Peace Talks and calls upon all parties to negotiate in good faith in order to reach a peace accord as soon as possible. The Council reiterates in the strongest terms the need for all parties in Darfur to end the violence and atrocities. The Council demands that 


The situation worsened in Western Darfur, particularly in Jebel Marra, where about 160 fighters from the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) attacked SAF in Golo, on 23 January, leading to several days of fighting. On 23 January, SLA fighters ambushed a police unit escorting 80 commercial trucks from Al Fasher to Kabkabiya, killing 20 police officers, including the convoy commander. Attacks on humanitarian workers continued. To reduce their exposure, the United Nations restricted their movements to Geneina, the capital of Western Darfur, and reduced staff levels in the region. In Southern Darfur, fighting erupted in Shari between SLA and Government forces on 25 January, and humanitarian convoys were attacked by bandits.

Following the 12 January decision (see p. 269) of the AU Peace and Security Council to support, in principle, a transition from AMIS to a UN operation, demonstrations against the United Nations were held in various parts of Darfur, which were, for the most part, peaceful. However, that decision appeared to have given fresh momentum to the Sudanese parties negotiating in the Abuja peace process. The wealth-sharing commission made significant progress, and the commission on power-sharing and security arrangements finally addressed substantive issues. The commission on security arrangements was broken up into smaller working groups and the pace of negotiations increased significantly, with discussions focusing on ways to revitalize the Joint Commission.

In the area of human rights, the police did not provide protection to civilian populations facing continuing attacks by militias. In Western Darfur, the December 2005 militia attack on Abu Sorouj town [YUN 2005, p. 336] created a retaliatory cycle of violence between the police and local residents. Civilians living close to rebel territory and sharing the same ethnicity were particularly vulnerable to human rights violations by the armed forces. An assessment mission by UNMIS and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (7-10 January) in Golo, Eastern Jebel Marra (Western Darfur), revealed arbitrary arrests and detentions and intimidation of the population by the armed forces. The deteriorating security situation led to new forced displacements. While some of those displacements were due to inter-tribal conflict, including in the Zalinje area, where thousands were forced out of their homes in late December 2005 and early January 2006, others were due to fighting between SLA and SAF, supported by militias, especially in the Jebel Marra area, where about 20,000 people were displaced.

Humanitarian efforts conducted in that violent and uncertain environment were hindered by armed hijackings of commercial and humanitarian trucks, including clearly marked World Food Programme (WFP) vehicles. Because of the deteriorating security situation, there was no longer humanitarian access to some 30,000 people in areas north of Geneina, where threats from renegade forces had even grounded humanitarian helicopter flights.
In contrast, the situation in Northern Darfur was relatively positive, as aid workers had good access throughout the state. Aid workers in Darfur were constrained also by frequent administrative delays related to visa extensions, identity documents and travel permits. The resulting denial of access and the inability to move humanitarian goods had a detrimental impact on the affected communities.

As at 3 March, AMIS had 6,898 personnel in Darfur, comprising 4,760 troops, 715 military observers, 1,385 civilian police, 27 international civilian staff and 11 Ceasefire Commission personnel. UNMIS continued to liaise closely with AMIS. In accordance with the 3 February statement by the Secretary-General to the United Nations, its Charter, principles and objectives. To redress that situation, the United Nations had to consult with the Government to allay fears, correct perceptions and make clear that the extension of the UN presence in the Sudan was not an infringement on the country's sovereignty. The consent of the Government in the transition to a UN operation would greatly advance the cause of peace in the country.

**Security Council consideration (March).** In his 21 March briefing to the Security Council, the Special Representative said that, since his last briefing (see p. 269), the towns of Sharia, Graida, Aro Sharow, Tama, Abu Sorouj, Tawila, Labado, Hamada and Khor Abeche all stood witness to cruel atrocities, terror, killings and rape. There was no peace agreement and the killings continued. In Jabl Marra, fighting between the Government and SLM intensified. Along the border with Chad, tensions had heightened, and the area was a "no-go" area for humanitarian workers. In Southern Darfur, militias continued to cleanse village after village and AU commanders on the ground openly spoke about continued support for militias from forces allied to the Government. Rebel movements were more and more fragmented, fighting each other, forming new alliances, and alienating themselves from their representatives at the Abuja peace talks. Demands laid down in Council resolutions were brushed aside, the 2004 N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was being violated, and the sanctions foreseen with the establishment of the Security Council Panel of Experts (see p. 292) existed only in theory.

The UN strategy should focus on two objectives: bringing about peace between the warring parties and protecting unarmed civilians, in particular against movements that were not party to the peace talks. Three steps were therefore necessary: the swift conclusion of an agreement in Abuja on power and wealth-sharing, followed by an all-inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue between all stakeholders; conclusion of a new ceasefire agreement, with firm implementation provisions and procedures, clear sanctions for violations and a strong peacekeeping force to enforce them; and creation of a large, robust peace force, with a mandate broad enough to meet all possible threats.

Steps should be taken to augment the AU, concurrent with planning for the transition to a UN operation. Public reaction to the transition was not very positive, as evidenced by the carefully orchestrated campaign against UN operations in Darfur. However, many Sudanese people were confused about the United Nations, its Charter, principles and objectives. To redress that situation, the United Nations had to consult with the Government to allay fears, correct perceptions and make clear that the extension of the UN presence in the Sudan was not an infringement on the country's sovereignty. The consent of the Government in the transition to a UN operation would greatly advance the cause of peace in the country.

**AU support for UN mission (March).** The AU Peace and Security Council, meeting at the ministerial level on 10 March on the situation in Darfur [S/2006/156], decided to support in principle the transition from AMIS to a UN operation. It also extended AMIS mandate until 30 September to contribute to the improvement of the security situation, monitor compliance with the 2004 N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent agreements and assist in confidence-building.

The Security Council, in resolution 1663(2006) of 24 March (see p. 259), welcomed the AU support for the transition to a UN operation in Darfur and its intention to conclude a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April. The Council requested the Secretary-General to expedite planning for the
transition and present a range of options for its consideration.

Report of Secretary-General (April). In his April report on Darfur [S/2006/218], the Secretary-General said that a high level of violence persisted during March, with armed clashes between the parties, including between different SLA factions. In Northern and Southern Darfur, all of the parties pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting civilians to stem alleged support for enemy groups, creating further population movements.

Tensions remain high in Southern Darfur, with increasing inter-tribal clashes and militia attacks. On 14 February, armed tribesmen, allegedly supported by Government forces, attacked an SLA camp near the town of Shearia, and SLA shot down a Government helicopter. Two days later, armed tribesmen attacked several villages south-east of Gereida. The situation in Gereida itself remained tense.

In Western Darfur, attacks on villages, violence in camps for internally displaced persons, the presence of Chadian armed groups and harassment of populations by militias led to further displacement of civilians. In the Jebel Marra area, fighting between the SAF and SLA forced virtually the entire population of the town to flee. In Northern Darfur, Government attacks on villages in the area of Haskanita also forced many inhabitants to do likewise.

Local leaders were arrested for raising concerns about internally displaced persons or providing information to “foreigners”. That resulted in internally displaced persons being reluctant to share concerns with the international community. Police harassment and arbitrary arrests of community leaders contributed to a climate of intimidation in South and West Darfur. Civilians sharing the same ethnicity as the rebel groups continued to be targeted for arbitrary arrest and detention.

Humanitarian access continued to be limited in Western Darfur. Only about 50 per cent of the affected populations in the area around, and to the north of Geneina, were accessible to UN operations. There was no humanitarian presence in the Kulbus-Silea area and large parts of Jebel Marra, leaving some 300,000 vulnerable people without assistance. Despite those constraints, the humanitarian situation remained under control due to the efforts of the aid community. In January, WFP delivered 36,000 tons of food to 2.1 million beneficiaries. Nearly 14,200 dedicated national and international humanitarian workers continued to assist some 3.6 million vulnerable people in Darfur, about half of whom were displaced.

The Secretary-General said that the recent escalation in the fighting had forced thousands more civilians to flee their homes, exposing them to a wide range of abuses. He was alarmed by reports of widespread human rights violations in Gereida, Mershing and Shearia in Southern Darfur. The most serious problem was the continued attacks by militias on armed civilians. The Government had to take action to rein in those forces over which it had direct or indirect control, and unless the attacks were halted, it would be difficult to reach a sustainable peace and ceasefire agreement. The Secretary-General welcomed the 12 March remarks by senior AU officials, emphasizing that the parties had to sign the draft enhanced ceasefire agreement. The presentation to the parties of that draft agreement was a positive development and a critical step in achieving a settlement. However, the fragile relationships within and between the movements, as well as among the commanders in the field, posed a challenge to the success of the peace process. The fractures within SLM/A, in particular, were worrisome. Moreover, the heightened violence in Western Darfur and the tenuous relationship between Chad and the Sudan continued to impinge negatively on peace negotiations. While the Tripoli agreement signed, on 8 February (see p. 297), between those two States was an encouraging development, much more needed to be done to reinforce the process. The Secretary-General urged both Chad and the Sudan to take concrete steps towards implementing the Tripoli agreement, with a view to normalizing relations and reducing tensions along the border.

Regarding the transition from AMIS to a UN operation in the Sudan, the Secretary-General noted the concerns of the Sudan and other AU member States on that subject and indicated that he was taking steps to address them. Extensive discussions had been held with the AU Commission on planning for the transition and the next critical step was to send a joint AU/ UN technical assessment mission to Darfur, as well as Chad.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 11 April [meeting 5409], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/16 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council strongly commends the efforts of the African Union to achieve lasting peace in Darfur, which have its full support. It reiterates in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an immediate end to the violence and atrocities; reaffirms its concern that the persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the country as well as the region, including
the security of Chad; and expresses its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict in Darfur for the civilian population.

The Security Council regrets the decision of the Government of National Unity not to renew the contract of the Norwegian Refugee Council and expresses its grave concern over the humanitarian consequences. It also regrets the decision of the Government of National Unity to deny the entry of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator to Darfur. It looks forward to the forthcoming briefing by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and to his being able to visit Darfur at the earliest possible opportunity. The Council also calls for an explanation from the Government of National Unity on its decision.

The Security Council reiterates its full support for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in Abuja, noting that an inclusive political settlement is key to peace in the Sudan, that the talks provide a mechanism to achieve such a settlement and that the African Union should maintain leadership. It welcomes the timely involvement of the Chair of the African Union and the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the talks during their visit to Abuja on 8 April 2006; endorses the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union that 30 April 2006 is the final deadline for reaching an agreement; demands that all parties make the necessary efforts to reach an agreement by this date; and reaffirms its determination to hold accountable those impeding the peace process and committing human rights violations, noting the view of the African Union that the Security Council has a critical role in this respect.

The Security Council commends the African Union for what the African Union Mission in the Sudan has successfully achieved in Darfur despite exceptionally difficult circumstances, and the efforts of Member States and organizations that have assisted the Mission. It reiterates its welcome, in resolution 1663 (2006) of 24 March 2006, for the decision of the Peace and Security Council of 10 March 2006 to support in principle the transition of the Mission to a United Nations operation and to extend the mandate of the Mission until 30 September 2006; calls, therefore, upon all parties to take all necessary measures to ensure a smooth and successful transfer to a United Nations operation; urges Member States and international and regional organizations to provide additional assistance to the Mission so that it may be strengthened in line with the conclusions of the report of the joint assessment mission of 10 to 20 December 2005; and calls for the convening of a pledging conference.

The Security Council reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which will be unaffected by the transition to a United Nations operation.

The Security Council stresses that the Secretary-General should consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the Government of National Unity, on decisions concerning the transition; stresses that a United Nations operation will have strong African participation and character; recalls its request, in resolution 1663 (2006), that the Secretary-General expedite the necessary preparatory planning for the transition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation; in this regard, calls for a United Nations assessment mission to visit Darfur by 30 April 2006; and calls upon international and regional organizations and Member States to provide every possible additional assistance to a United Nations operation.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 25 April [meeting 5422], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/17 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan.

The Council strongly commends and supports the efforts of the African Union to achieve lasting peace in Darfur. It reiterates in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an immediate end to the violence and atrocities, reaffirms its concern that the persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the country as well as the region, including the security of Chad, and expresses its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict in Darfur for the civilian population. It further reaffirms the right of the displaced persons to return to their homes if they wish to do so.
The Council reiterates its full support for the African Union-led Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in Abuja, in particular the tireless efforts of the Chief Mediator, Mr. Salim A. Salim and his team. It welcomes the developments so far in the negotiations and urges the parties to make speedy progress in concluding a Darfur peace accord.

The Council further reiterates its endorsement of the decision of 10 March 2006 of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union that an accord must be reached by 30 April 2006 and strongly urges that all parties make the necessary efforts to reach an accord by this date.

The Council recognizes that an inclusive political settlement is key to peace in the Sudan, and that the Talks provide a mechanism to achieve such a settlement in Darfur. The Council reiterates its call to all parties to the conflict to fulfil their commitments to conclude a peace accord in the interest of the people of Darfur and the Sudan as a whole.

The Council calls upon and expects the parties in Abuja to consider in good faith proposals to be made by the Chief Mediator with a view to reaching peace, security and stability in Darfur and the Sudan as a whole. It emphasizes that working towards a positive outcome is a collective responsibility of all the parties to the conflict.

The Council commends the various partners and stakeholders for their support to the African Union-led Abuja peace process and encourages them, in particular the United Nations, to continue supporting the parties in the implementation of the peace accord.

**EU statement.** In a 27 April letter to the Security Council President [S/2006/292], the EU Presidency noted with concern that the Sudan had not authorized representatives of the international community, most recently the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, to visit Darfur. The EU recalled that the humanitarian situation in Darfur required sustained action by the international community, and that it was committed to providing adequate support and funding. Humanitarian actors should be given free access by all those concerned. The Sudanese Government, the EU stated, had a clear obligation to work with the United Nations and NGOs.

The statement followed a 2 April incident in which Sudan had refused permission for Mr. Egeland’s plane to land in the country.

**Darfur Peace Agreement and follow-up**

The Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, between representatives of the Government of National Unity, SLM/A factions and the Justice and Equality Movement concluded on 5 May with the finalization of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The 85-page document, prepared by the AU mediation team, led by Salim A. Salim, the AU Special Envoy to the talks and Chief Mediator, covered power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements and a Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation. It was signed by the Government and the Minawi faction of SLM/A.

In the area of power-sharing, the parties agreed on a federal system of government, with the establishment of a Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which would have jurisdiction over the three Darfur States. They also agreed to hold a referendum no later than July 2010, to determine the future status of Darfur, namely whether to establish a region of Darfur or retain the three States. The northern boundaries of Darfur would return to their position as at 1 January 1956, with an ad hoc technical team to carry out the demarcation process. The Agreement also outlined posts at various levels of government to be allocated to nominees of the movements. In that regard, the parties agreed on the creation of the posts of Senior Assistant to the President, the fourth-ranking member in the Presidency, and Chairperson of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, to be nominated from the movements. The Agreement allocated to the movements 12 of the 360 seats in the National Assembly, 21 of the 73 seats in the legislatures of the three Darfur states, as well as the post of Governor in one of the Darfur states and two posts of Deputy Governor in the other two Darfur states. The Agreement also called for measures to address the representation of Darfurians in the national civil service, armed forces and the police.

With regard to wealth-sharing, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission established by the Agreement would decide on a formula for transferring funding from Khartoum to the Darfur states. A Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund would be established, to which the Government would allocate $300 million in 2006, and not less than $200 million for both 2007 and 2008, and provide an initial $30 million to a compensation fund to address claims of people affected by the conflict.

The Agreement also provided for a Joint Assessment Mission to identify the needs of post-conflict economic recovery, development and poverty eradication in preparation for a donors’ conference, to be convened within three months of the signing of the Agreement; the establishment of three State Land Commissions to address issues related to land-use management and natural resource development, and a Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission to address the needs of displaced and war-affected persons, including the return to their homes and the provision of basic services.

Concerning security arrangements, the parties agreed to strengthen the existing ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanisms. The Agreement detailed measures for increasing security for internally displaced persons and humanitarian supply
events, including the establishment of demilitarized zones around displaced persons camps, and buffer zones to separate forces on the ground. The Government would submit and implement a plan for the neutralization and disarmament of the Janjaweed and armed militias, while the movements would receive non-military support in assembly areas. With regard to demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, some of the movements’ military personnel would be integrated into Sudanese security organs, while others would be provided with social and economic support to assist their return to civilian life. The Agreement established the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission to coordinate implementation of all security provisions.

The parties also agreed to convene a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, under AU leadership, and in cooperation with international partners, to promote reconciliation and broader ownership of the Darfur peace process. A preparatory committee, representing the Government, movements, civil society organizations, tribal leaders, the United Nations, the EU and the League of Arab States, and to be chaired by the AU, would prepare the agenda of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, identify the some 800 to 1,000 participants, and determine the venue and funding modalities.

Report of Secretary-General (May). In his May report [S/2006/306], the Secretary-General said that the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement by the Sudan and the Minawi faction of the SLM/A, paved the way for the restoration of peace, the return of displaced persons and economic recovery and reconstruction. Other rebel leaders, however, had not signed the Agreement and the international community had to convince them to choose peace over conflict for the sake of their people. The Secretary-General noted that, even during the final rounds of talks, all parties continued to engage in violence and attacks against civilians.

On 31 March, the Secretary-General met with the AU Commission Chairman, Alpha Oumar Konaré, to discuss the future of the AU peacekeeping operation, as well as options for a UN peace support operation. A UN delegation travelled to Addis Ababa and consulted with the AU Commission from 12 to 14 April on joint planning for the transition to a UN peace operation. The delegation then travelled to Khartoum where, on 15 April, it met with President Al-Bashir to discuss Sudan’s concerns about the transition.

The security situation was marked by armed clashes between the warring parties, acts of banditry, continued infighting between SLA factions and further destabilization along the Chad/Sudan border. In Northern Darfur, clashes between SAF and SLA in Haskanita, Al Lait and Al Tawisa resulted in casualties among combatants and civilians. On 8 April, SAF launched attacks against villages in the Jebel Wana area, in which three SLA soldiers were reportedly killed. Late in March, SAF and armed tribesmen attacked the SLA-controlled village of Debbis. On 7 April, SLA ambushed a large SAF convoy in Jebel Wana, killing about 40 Government soldiers. Government forces then attacked several villages in the area. Meanwhile, tensions between the SLA Minni Minawi faction and the Abdul Wahid faction remained high. The factions clashed on 3 April in Khazan Jedid area, and on 19 April, in the Tawilla area. Other intra-SLA clashes in mid-March and early April led to thousands of people becoming displaced. Instability in Chad complicated the security situation in the border region, with armed groups operating on both sides of the border. New armed groups continued to be formed in Darfur as local populations sought ways to defend themselves against attack, often recruiting people younger than 18 years old.

Displaced persons continued to arrive from villages under attack or caught in the crossfire, swelling the populations in the camps, where harassment by armed elements, criminality and shooting incidents were on the rise. Meanwhile, the ability of the UN and other relief organizations to move freely and assist the populations had been reduced by growing insecurity and funding shortages. Administrative measures taken by the Government further limited humanitarian access. High-ranking State officials and leaders of armed groups were not being held accountable for violence and crimes against civilians. UNMIS continued to report cases of young women and girls being raped or brutalized, but the police had rarely taken action to investigate, arrest or prosecute the perpetrators. In addition, local officials continued to limit UNMIS access to detention facilities.

The Secretary-General noted the dramatic and ongoing deterioration in human rights, security and humanitarian conditions, as reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Both the High Commissioner and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs had called attention to the urgent need for the Government to ease travel restrictions and create a safer environment for human rights and humanitarian activities. The Under-Secretary-General was successful in negotiating the reinstatement of the Norwegian Refugee Council, after it was expelled without explanation by the Government of Southern Sudan.
The Secretary-General said that every effort had to be made to ensure that the people of Darfur were protected and assisted. The immediate priorities for the international community were the strengthening of AMIS and addressing the continuing humanitarian crisis.

Security Council ministerial meeting (May). Meeting at ministerial level on 9 May [meeting 5434], the Security Council was briefed by the Secretary-General, on the latest developments in the Darfur peace process.

The Secretary-General, welcoming the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement by the Government and the SLM/A Minawi faction, said that everything should be done to convince the other significant rebel leaders to choose peace over conflict, ensure that those that had signed implemented it and that the people of Darfur could survive the next few months. The United Nations’ aim was to agree with the AU on the additional resources AMIS would require to implement key provisions of the Darfur Peace Agreement and then hold a pledging conference in early June. In the meantime, he appealed to all to help AMIS. No less urgent was the need to raise money for emergency relief to deal the worst humanitarian crisis facing the world. The challenge of helping to protect the people of Darfur and implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement would be one of the biggest tests the United Nations had ever faced. It was clear that the follow-on UN force would have to be bigger than AMIS had ever faced. It was clear that the follow-on UN force would have to be bigger than AMIS but would need major logistical support from Member States. The Secretary-General said that he had written to President Al-Bashir to seek his support for the assessment mission to Darfur to identify what was needed to implement the Agreement. He appealed to all parties to show respect for the ceasefire in Darfur and prove by their actions their determination to honour the Agreement.

Sudan’s representative told the Council that settling the Darfur crisis was a strategic objective of the Government. Anyone who had followed the Abuja peace process would have realized the Sudan’s eagerness to achieve a political settlement. The Government had tried to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance and improve the security situation for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. The Sudan was committed to implementing the Agreement in every detail and had begun doing so. The country looked to the Security Council to send a strong message to those who had not signed it to demonstrate a sense of responsibility by doing so, bearing in mind the suffering of the civilians. The historic agreement would thrive only through the support of the international community, which could help revive the tradition of co-existence among the people of Darfur. Hopefully, the same resolve and cooperation would be shown during the challenging task of reconstruction.

The representative welcomed the announcement by the Netherlands that it would host a pledging conference in September.

Security Council action

On 9 May [meeting 5434], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/21 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council strongly welcomes the agreement of 5 May 2006 reached at the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks in Abuja as a basis for lasting peace in Darfur; commends the signatories to the agreement; expresses its appreciation of the efforts of President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo, President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in his capacity as host of the Talks, and the Special Envoy of the African Union and Chief Mediator Mr. Salim A. Salim; calls upon all the parties to respect their commitments and implement the agreement without delay; urges those movements that have not signed the agreement to do so without delay, noting the benefits it will bring them and the people of Darfur, and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the agreement; and welcomes the forthcoming meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 15 May 2006.

The Security Council commends the African Union for what the African Union Mission in the Sudan has achieved in Darfur despite difficult circumstances; stresses the need for the Mission to be urgently further strengthened in line with the conclusions of the report of the joint assessment mission of 10 to 20 December 2005 so that it is able to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement until a United Nations operation is deployed; calls, in this regard, for the Secretary-General and the African Union to convene a pledging conference without delay; and urges Member States and international and regional organizations to provide every possible assistance to the Mission.

The Council stresses that the Secretary-General should consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the Government of National Unity, on decisions concerning the transition to a United Nations operation; looks forward to receiving from the Secretary-General at the earliest opportunity detailed planning proposals for a United Nations operation in Darfur; calls, in this regard, for the Government of National Unity to facilitate immediately the visit of a joint United Nations and African Union technical assessment mission to Darfur; encourages the Secretary-General to consult urgently with potential troop-contributing countries on the assets required for a United Nations operation in Darfur; stresses that a United Nations operation should have strong African participation and character; and calls upon international and regional organizations and Member States to provide the United Nations operation with every possible assistance.

The Council expresses its deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Darfur; welcomes the visit of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland; expresses its deep concern at the shortfall in
humanitarian funding; urges Member States to make additional funds available; and calls upon all the Sudanese parties to respect the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian assistance.

EU statement (May). On 5 May [S/2006/293], in a letter to the Council President, the EU Presidency expressed its commitment to supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and expressed concern at the ongoing fighting in Darfur and the continued failure of the Sudan to allow the visit of the UN planning team dealing with the transition from AMIS to a UN operation.

AU communiqué. The AU Peace and Security Council, at its fifty-first meeting (Addis Ababa, 15 May) [S/2006/307], endorsed the Darfur Peace Agreement, and decided that it would enter into force on 16 May. It regretted the failure of the SLA/Abdul Wahid faction and JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim, to sign the Agreement. It urged them to do so by 31 May, failing which it would consider measures, including sanctions, to be applied against their leadership. The Peace and Security Council demanded that all Darfur groups immediately commit themselves to be bound by the Agreement, in particular those relating to the Comprehensive Ceasefire. It decided that steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation, and urged the UN Security Council and the Government of National Unity to consult towards that end, and ensure the commencement of the UN operation in Darfur at the earliest possible time.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 16 May [meeting 5439], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1679(2006). The draft [S/2006/296] was submitted by Argentina, the Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Peru, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States.

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which would be unaffected by transition to a United Nations operation, as well as of all States in the region, and to the cause of peace, security and reconciliation throughout the Sudan,

Expressing its utmost concern over the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict in Darfur for the civilian population, and reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties to the conflict in Darfur to put an immediate end to violence and atrocities,

Welcoming the success of the African Union-led Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in Abuja, in particular the framework agreed between the parties for a resolution of the conflict in Darfur (the Darfur Peace Agreement),

Commending the efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, host of the Talks; President Denis Sassou Ngouesso of the Republic of the Congo, Chair of the African Union; Mr. Salim A. Salim, Special Envoy of the African Union for the Talks and Chief Mediator; the respective delegations to the Talks; and the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement,

Stressing the importance of full and rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement to restore a sustainable peace in Darfur, and welcoming the statement, made on 9 May 2006 by the representative of the Sudan at the special meeting of the Security Council on Darfur, of the Government of National Unity’s full commitment to implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement,

Reaffirming its concern that the persisting violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan, as well as the region, including the security of Chad,

Noting with deep concern the recent deterioration of relations between the Sudan and Chad, and urging the Governments of both countries to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and to implement the confidence-building measures which have been voluntarily agreed upon,

Commending the efforts of the African Union for successful deployment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan, despite exceptionally difficult circumstances, and the role of the Mission in reducing large-scale organized violence in Darfur, and commending further the efforts of Member States and regional and international organizations that have assisted the Mission in its deployment,


Stressing that a United Nations operation would have, to the extent possible, strong African participation and character,

Welcoming the efforts of Member States and regional and international organizations to maintain and strengthen their support to the Mission and potentially to a follow-on United Nations operation in Darfur, look-
ing forward in particular to the convening of a pledging conference in June 2006, and appealing to African Union partners to provide the necessary support to the Mission to allow it to continue to perform its mandate during the transition,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to respect their commitments and implement the Agreement without delay, urges those parties that have not signed the Agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the Agreement, and expresses its intention to consider taking, including in response to a request by the African Union, strong and effective measures, such as a travel ban and an assets freeze, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the Agreement;

2. Calls upon the African Union to agree with the United Nations, regional and international organizations and Member States on requirements now necessary, in addition to those identified by the joint assessment mission of 10 to 20 December 2005, to strengthen the capacity of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to enforce the security arrangements of the Darfur Peace Agreement, with a view to a follow-on United Nations operation in Darfur;

3. Endorses the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in its communiqué of 15 May 2006 that, in view of the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation, calls upon the parties to the Agreement to facilitate and work with the African Union, the United Nations, regional and international organizations and Member States to accelerate transition to a United Nations operation, and, to this end, reiterating the requests of the Secretary-General and the Security Council, calls for the deployment of a joint African Union and United Nations technical assessment mission within one week of the adoption of the present resolution;

4. Stresses that the Secretary-General should consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the Council, and in cooperation and close consultation with the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the Government of National Unity, on decisions concerning the transition to a United Nations operation;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit recommendations to the Council within one week of the return of the joint African Union and United Nations technical assessment mission on all relevant aspects of the mandate of the United Nations operation in Darfur, including force structure, additional force requirements, potential troop-contributing countries and a detailed financial evaluation of future costs;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Speaking after the vote, China said that it had reservations concerning the resolution’s invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter, which dealt with action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The resolution’s contents were clearly inconsistent with that wording. On the basis of its political support for the AU in establishing conditions for the speedy implementation of the resolution, China had not pressed its objection, which should not be considered as constituting a precedent. Also, if the United Nations were to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Darfur, the agreement and cooperation of the Government should be obtained. That was a basic principle for deploying all peacekeeping operations. Qatar said that the resolution did not imply that the Security Council was prepared to carry out the transfer of responsibilities from AU forces to a UN force prior to the Sudanese Government’s approval.

Further developments

On 17 May [S/2006/302], Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha informed the Security Council of measures the Sudan had taken to improve the situation in Darfur. Those measures included the allocation of 20,000 tons of food to WFP; a call to all Governments, state governments and humanitarian partners to implement an emergency limited-term relief plan; the Government’s commitment to provide all available facilities for humanitarian organizations working in Darfur; a directive to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to coordinate its efforts with national and international humanitarian partners to execute the humanitarian emergency action plan; a directive to the Finance Ministry and state governments to begin the execution of an emergency relief plan in preparation for the return of refugees; and the Government’s commitment to upholding the ceasefire.

Briefing by Emergency Relief Coordinator (May). Briefing the Security Council on 19 May [meeting 5441] on the situation in Chad and the Sudan, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator called for immediate steps to strengthen AMIS, speed up the transition to a UN operation and ensure that the humanitarian lifeline to more than 3 million people was secure and funded. The Under-Secretary-General, who visited the Sudan and eastern Chad between 6 and 11 May, said that attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers were continuing despite the Darfur Peace Agreement. Drawing attention to the $389 million shortfall for Darfur and the $983 total shortfall under the 2006 workplan, he appealed to those donors that had contributed much
Report of Secretary-General (June). In June [S/2006/430], the Secretary-General reported that, following the failure of Abdul Wahid (SLA/m) and Khalil Ibrahim (Jem) to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement by the 31 May deadline fixed by the AU Peace and Security Council, on 8 June, some senior leaders of the two movements presented to the AU a signed declaration of commitment to the Agreement on behalf of their followers. Despite the signing of the Agreement, fighting continued in several areas. Demonstrations were organized against the Agreement, some of which turned violent. There were several attacks on humanitarian aid workers, while militia groups continued to attack civilian targets and AMIS.

Incidents in Southern Darfur included an attack by SLA against a Government police camp at Abjarage, in which a dozen police officers were killed; an attack against the village of Karbba by SAF, in which at least seven people were killed; a raid by the Janjaweed militia against the villages of Natiga and Baju Baju, in which 35 civilians were killed; and an attack by armed tribesmen against SLA-controlled villages. In Western Darfur, armed militias attacked SLA at Jebel Muktarin on 5 May; five days later, armed tribesmen, allegedly supported by SAF, attacked the Abdul Wahid SLA-controlled village of Shau Fugo. Tension between Chad and the Sudan heightened insecurity in Western Darfur and contributed to the displacement of the population along the border. There was a reported increase in the presence of Chadian rebels on Sudanese territory, and reports of continued recruitment of civilians by Chadian rebels in internally displaced persons camps in Western Darfur. On 21 May, some 150 armed tribesmen attacked and looted a camp near Gereida. Several protests were organized by communities of internally displaced persons affiliated with groups that did not sign the Peace Agreement, some of which turned violent. Sentiments against the Agreement in the camps led to attacks against AMIS personnel and assets.

The Secretary-General observed that, while the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement was a significant achievement, the parties, with the assistance of the international community, had to act quickly to begin the implementation process. Disarming the Janjaweed, improving civilian protection and strengthening ceasefire monitoring and verification were absolute priorities. He noted that the AU ceasefire Commission was inaugurated on 13 June, and the Joint Commission would be inaugurated on 23 June. He urged that consultations to ensure the transition to a UN operation take place at the earliest opportunity. In that regard, his Special Envoy to Darfur, Lakhdar Brahimi and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hédi Annabi, travelled to Khartoum to consult with the Government and secured agreement for the fielding of the technical assessment mission authorized by the Security Council. The mission, led by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, held consultations on 8 June with the AU.

Security Council mission to Chad and the Sudan. The Security Council mission to Chad and the Sudan (4-10 June) [S/2006/433] concluded that the Darfur Peace Agreement could provide a basis for sustained security in Darfur, but efforts would have to continue to get further support from the non-signatories, in particular Abdul Wahid. Those who had signed the Agreement should take immediate steps to implement it, particularly the Government of the Sudan, which should disarm the Janjaweed. The mission called for improved public diplomacy by the United Nations, the AU and the Governments of Chad and the Sudan in explaining the Agreement’s benefits to the population of Darfur. The United Nations should work, with the Government of the Sudan’s agreement, on deploying a UN force in Darfur, which would take over a strengthened AMIS mandate. There would be a seven-stage process towards full UN operational capacity in Darfur by January 2007. In the meantime, AMIS would need immediate strengthening and reinforcing. The mission called upon the international community to provide AMIS with every possible assistance. Urgent action was also needed by the Government of the Sudan and other Sudanese parties to tackle the serious problem of gender violence.

AU communiqué. In a 27 June communiqué [S/2006/461], adopted at its ministerial-level meeting on the situation in Darfur, the AU Peace and Security Council urged the signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement to honour their commitments; took note of the steps taken by the AU Commission Chairperson towards its implementation, including the establishment of an implementation team within AMIS; and decided to impose targeted measures, including a travel ban and asset freeze, against all persons or groups undermining the Agreement. It reaffirmed its decision to end AMIS mandate on 30 September and to transition to a UN operation. In the meantime, it approved additional tasks and a new mandate for AMIS, including the protection of civilians.

Communication. On 5 July [S/2006/490], the Sudanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lam Akol
Ajawin, informed the Security Council that the National Redemption Front (nrf), an alliance of groups that had refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement, attacked the town of Hamrat al-Sheikh in Sudan’s North Kordofan State on 3 July, in an attempt to impede the implementation of the Agreement. Sudan called on the Council to shoulder its responsibilities to protect the Agreement and take decisive and comprehensive measures against that group, as a deterrent to anyone planning to destroy the Agreement.

Authorization of UN operation in Darfur

The Secretary-General, in his July report [S/2006/591], said that the formation of new alliances among various factions was severely complicating an already complex security situation on the ground. The nrf attack on Government positions in Northern Kordofan on 3 July (see above) had widened the conflict beyond Darfur’s eastern border. The Minni Minawi slm/a faction, supported by saf, carried out major military operations against non-signatories of the Agreement and villages in areas under their control, resulting in further massive displacements and suffering. There was a growing perception among non-signatories that amis was not in a position to implement the Agreement. Some members of the G19, a rebel group that did not support the Agreement, believed that amis was not resisting the military operations of the saf and the slm/a Minni Minawi faction and threatened to attack amis.

The un/au technical assessment mission visited the Sudan from 9 to 23 June, during which it consulted with President Al-Bashir and Government officials in Khartoum and with a wide range of stakeholders. It also travelled to Chad to meet with President Idriss Deby. The mission found that the Sudanese people held polarized views about amis performance and the necessity of a UN operation. Government officials supported the strengthening of amis, but questioned the need for a transition from an au to a UN operation. On the other hand, representatives of internally displaced persons camps, civil society groups and some political parties voiced serious misgivings about the effectiveness of the protection provided by amis and demanded the earliest transition to a UN mission. The mission’s findings were presented to President Al-Bashir on 22 June, who reiterated that he and his Government did not accept the transition from amis to a UN operation.

On the basis of the mission’s report, and in response to Council resolution 1679(2006) (see p. 277), the Secretary-General recommended, subject to the Government of the Sudan’s consent, an expansion of the unified UN mission in the Sudan into Darfur as from 1 January 2007. The mission would have as its priority the protection of civilians and would work closely with the Government of National Unity and other key actors towards that end. It would promote and support the parties in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. Its main tasks would be in the areas of providing support for the peace process and good offices; the rule of law, governance and human rights; humanitarian assistance, recovery and reintegration; and security and physical protection.

Regarding the size of the force, the assessment mission concluded that the magnitude of the protection task and the need to ensure compliance with the Peace Agreement would require a large, agile and robust military force. The Secretary-General therefore recommended three options: a force of some 17,300 troops, consisting of 14 infantry battalions, three fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft, up to eight reconnaissance and 18 military utility helicopters; a force of 18,000 troops, four reconnaissance and nine utility helicopters, but with two additional battalions to compensate for the lower respond capacity; or a force of 15,000, with 11 battalions, six additional helicopters and three additional rapid reaction companies.

The Secretary-General urged the Security Council to fully support his proposals. However, securing the Sudanese Government’s consent for the UN operation would require continuing intensive discussions by Council members, regional organizations and the United Nations with Khartoum. He reiterated that the Organization had no hidden agenda beyond the urgent need to help the population and prevent the crisis for spreading further, and appealed to the Sudanese authorities to ensure that the United Nations was not misrepresented to suit political ends.

An addendum to the report [S/2006/591/Add.1] estimated the financial implications of a four-month support to amis at some $21.2 million, or $53.7 million for more resource-intensive support. The financial implications of expanding unmis into Darfur for a 12-month period, based on the three options set out in the report, were estimated at some $1.6 billion, $1.7 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively.

Statement of Secretary-General. On 10 August [S/2006/645], the Secretary-General called on the Security Council to give urgent consideration to the situation in Darfur, following the recent upsurge in violence, mostly in Northern Darfur and areas near the Chad border. The violence emanated principally from fighting between Darfur Peace
Agreement signatories and non-signatory groups, between Government forces and rebels in the Jebel Moon area in Western Darfur, and in Southern Darfur. As a result of the fighting and direct targeting of humanitarian workers, only 50 per cent of the civilians affected by the conflict could be reached by humanitarian organizations. The rest, some 1.6 million people, were either inaccessible or could be reached only by putting the lives of aid workers directly at risk.

In the meantime, some progress was made in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Government submitted its plan for disarming the Janjaweed to AMIS on 23 June. In respect of power-sharing, the Northern and Southern Darfur assemblies convened emergency sessions to amend their interim state constitutions to allow for increased numbers of ministers and assembly members. Minni Minawi, the head of the only movement signatory to the Peace Agreement, was appointed senior assistant to the President in the Government of National Unity, and representatives of his SLM/A faction met with Government officials in Khartoum to establish joint committees to address implementation of the Agreement. With regard to wealth-sharing, the joint assessment mission called for in the Agreement had been initiated.

Nevertheless, implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement was behind schedule and faced difficulties. Basic aspects of mechanisms for implementing the ceasefire were yet to be clarified. While the plan for disarming the Janjaweed had been submitted, the Government had not restricted their activity to designated areas by 20 July as required by the Peace Agreement. In relation to power-sharing, the 15 June deadline for the finalization of all senior state and national Government and civil service appointments, the establishment of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund and the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, had passed, as well as the 15 July deadline for the establishment of a Compensation Commission.

In that difficult environment, AMIS continued to face enormous challenges, including uncertainty with regard to its funding. Despite a relatively positive result from the 18 July Brussels pledging conference, sufficient funding was not in place to support the Mission for the remainder of its mandate, which was to expire on 30 September.

As to the transition to a UN operation on 1 January 2007, and the Government of the Sudan’s opposition to that proposal, the United Nations held intensive consultations to address the Government’s concerns, but was unable to achieve a mutually agreeable solution. Moreover, the Sudan’s plan for restoring stability and protecting civilians in Darfur (see below) did not indicate a willingness on its part to agree to a transition to a UN operation in Darfur. While the Government maintained its firm opposition to a UN operation, the situation on the ground was deteriorating, and the AU mission’s ability to function for the remainder of 2006 was jeopardized by a funding crisis.

Sudan national plan for stability and protection. On 8 August [S/2006/665], the Secretary-General received the Sudanese Government’s plan for the restoration of stability and protection of civilians in Darfur, which he transmitted to the Security Council on 17 August. The six-month plan, based on the Darfur Peace Agreement, covered control over the security situation, the attainment of stability, the protection of civilians, the strengthening of mechanisms for enforcing the rule of law, as well as a number of quick-impact economic programmes. While appreciating the role played by the African forces in Darfur, President Al-Bashir emphasized that restoring stability and protecting civilians were central to the responsibilities of the Government of the Sudan.

The elements of the plan were: strengthening cooperation between the Government and UNMIS; gaining control over the security situation and achieving stability; improving the humanitarian situation and preparing an environment to permit the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees; carrying out emergency reconstruction programmes; improving the legal and human rights situations; and addressing political concerns, including through a Darfur-Darfur dialogue conference.

Communications. In a 21 August letter to the Security Council President [S/2006/683], President Al-Bashir listed the steps being taken to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement. He indicated that SLM Chairman Minni Minawi, appointed first senior assistant to the President, was overseeing the formation of a transitional authority in Darfur. Other parties that had signed the Addis Ababa Agreement had begun to work on its implementation. Work had also begun on opening up corridors for sending humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and those in need, and a plan initiated for disarming the militias and incorporating the forces of the liberation movements into SAF. A six-month plan (see above) for returning the security and humanitarian situations to normal had been submitted to the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

Transferring AMIS mandate to UN forces did not find acceptance among large sectors of the Sudanese
people. All legislative, parliamentary and executive institutions at every level, including the Government of National Unity, had adopted unanimous resolutions rejecting the transfer. The movements that rejected the Peace Agreement would see the entry of UN forces as an infringement or negation of the Agreement, and would be emboldened to frustrate implementation of the pact. The militias would be suspicious of UN forces and oppose the Government’s plan to disarm them. The transfer would create a very disorderly situation, leading to acts of violence and unmanageable confrontations. The Council should therefore be patient and not be in a hurry to adopt a new resolution. It should allow the Government sufficient time to resolve the situation in Darfur, concentrate on implementing the Peace Agreement under the six-month plan and provide support to UNMIS.

On 23 August [S/2006/685], responding to the Secretary-General’s request that the Sudan send a high-level representative to the forthcoming Security Council meeting on Darfur, President Al-Bashir said that, while the planned meeting coincided with his appeal for dialogue between the Council and the Sudan, it should be postponed in order to provide more time to prepare for it, and allow for the participation of important regional organizations concerned about the situation in Darfur.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 31 August [meeting 5519], the Security Council adopted resolution 1706(2006) by vote (12-0-3). The draft [S/2006/699] was submitted by Argentina, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United States.

The Security Council,


Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, which would be unaffected by transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur, and to the cause of peace, expressing its determination to work with the Government of National Unity, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various problems confronting the Sudan and that a United Nations operation in Darfur shall have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and character,

Welcoming the efforts of the African Union to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur, including through the success of the African Union-led Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in Abuja, in particular the framework agreed between the parties for a resolution of the conflict in Darfur (the Darfur Peace Agreement), commending the efforts of the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement, expressing its belief that the Agreement provides a basis for sustained security in Darfur, reiterating its welcome of the statement, made on 9 May 2006 by the representative of the Sudan at the special meeting of the Security Council on Darfur, of the Government of National Unity’s full commitment to implementing the Agreement, stressing the importance of launching, with the African Union, the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation as soon as possible, and recognizing that international support for the implementation of the Agreement is critically important to its success,

Commending the efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of the African Union Mission in the Sudan, as well as the efforts of Member States and regional and international organizations that have assisted it in its deployment, and the role of the African Union Mission in reducing large-scale organized violence in Darfur, recalling the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2006, and its decision of 27 June 2006, as outlined in paragraph 10 of its communiqué, that the African Union is ready to review the mandate of the Mission in the event that the ongoing consultations between the Government of National Unity and the United Nations conclude on an agreement for a transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, stressing the need for the Mission to assist implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement until transition to the United Nations force in Darfur is completed, welcoming the decision of the Peace and Security Council of 27 June 2006 on strengthening the mandate and tasks of the Mission, including on the protection of civilians, and considering that the Mission needs urgent reinforcing,

Reaffirming its concern that the ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region, in particular Chad and the Central African Republic, and stressing that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve long-lasting peace in Darfur,

Remaining deeply concerned over the recent deterioration of relations between the Sudan and Chad, calling upon the Governments of the two countries to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 Feb-
ruary 2006 and the agreement between the Sudan and Chad signed at N’Djamena on 26 July 2006 and to begin implementing the confidence-building measures which they have voluntarily agreed upon, welcoming the recent re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Sudan and Chad, and calling upon all States in the region to cooperate in ensuring regional stability,

Reiterating its strong condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur, and calling upon the Government of National Unity to take urgent action to tackle gender-based violence in Darfur, including action towards implementing its Action Plan to Combat Violence Against Women in Darfur, with particular focus on the rescission of Form 8 and access to legal redress,

Expressing its deep concern for the security of humanitarian aid workers and their access to populations in need, including refugees, internally displaced persons and other war-affected populations, and calling upon all parties, in particular the Government of National Unity, to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need in Darfur as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees;

Taking note of the communiqués of 12 January, 10 March, 15 May and 27 June 2006 of the Peace and Security Council regarding transition of the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation,

Taking note also of the report of the Secretary-General of 28 July 2006 on Darfur,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides, without prejudice to its existing mandate and operations as provided for in resolution 1590(2005) and in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan shall be expanded as specified in paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 below, that it shall deploy to Darfur, and therefore invites the consent of the Government of National Unity for this deployment, and urges Member States to provide the capability for an expeditious deployment;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange the rapid deployment of additional capabilities for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, in order that it may deploy in Darfur, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 28 July 2006;

3. Decides that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan shall be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 formed police units, and expresses its determination to keep the strength and structure of the Mission under regular review, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground and without prejudice to its current operations and mandate as provided for in resolution 1590(2005);

4. Expresses its intention to consider authorizing possible additional temporary reinforcements of the military component of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, at the request of the Secretary-General, within the limits of the troop levels recommended in paragraph 87 of his report of 28 July 2006;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to consult jointly with the African Union, in close and continuing consultation with the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, including the Government of National Unity, on a plan and timetable for transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan to a United Nations operation in Darfur; decides that those elements outlined in paragraphs 40 to 58 of the report of the Secretary-General of 28 July 2006 shall begin to be deployed no later than 1 October 2006, that thereafter, as part of the process of transition to a United Nations operation, additional capabilities shall be deployed as soon as feasible and that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan shall take over from the African Union Mission the responsibility for supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement upon the expiration of the mandate of the African Union Mission but in any event no later than 31 December 2006;

6. Notes that the status-of-forces agreement for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan with the Sudan, as outlined in resolution 1590(2005), shall apply to the operations of the Mission throughout the Sudan, including in Darfur;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to strengthen the African Union Mission in the Sudan through the use of existing and additional United Nations resources with a view to transition to a United Nations operation in Darfur; and authorizes the Secretary-General during this transition to implement the longer-term support to the African Union Mission outlined in the report of the Secretary-General of 28 July 2006, including provision of air assets, ground mobility packages, training, engineering and logistics, mobile communications capacity and broad public information assistance;

8. Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in Darfur shall be to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement of 5 May 2006 and the N’Djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur of 8 April 2004 (“the Agreements”), including by performing the following tasks:

(a) To monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of chapter 3 (“Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements”) of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the N’Djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur;

(b) To observe and monitor movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in areas of deployment of the Mission by ground and aerial means in accordance with the Agreements;

(c) To investigate violations of the Agreements and to report violations to the Ceasefire Commission; as well as to cooperate and coordinate, together with other in-
international actors, with the Ceasefire Commission, the Joint Commission and the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit established pursuant to the Agreements, including through provision of technical assistance and logistical support;

(d) To maintain, in particular, a presence in key areas, such as buffer zones established pursuant to the Darfur Peace Agreement, areas inside internally displaced persons camps and demilitarized zones around and inside internally displaced persons camps, in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, in particular by deterring use of force;

(e) To monitor transborder activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic, in particular through regular ground and aerial reconnaissance activities;

(f) To assist with development and implementation of a comprehensive and sustainable programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and women and children associated with combatants, as called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement and in accordance with resolutions 1556(2004) and 1564(2004);

(g) To assist the parties, in cooperation with other international actors, in the preparations for and conduct of referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;

(h) To assist the parties to the Agreements in promoting understanding of the peace accord and of the role of the Mission, including by means of an effective public information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society, in coordination with the African Union;

(i) To cooperate closely with the Chairperson of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, provide support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate the activities of other United Nations agencies to this effect, as well as to assist the parties to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation in addressing the need for an all-inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peacebuilding;

(j) To assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in the Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police;

(k) To assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of the human rights of all people of the Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework;

(l) To ensure an adequate human rights and gender presence, capacity and expertise within the Mission to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection and monitoring activities that include particular attention to the needs of women and children;

9. Decides also that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in Darfur shall also include the following:

(a) To facilitate and coordinate in close cooperation with relevant United Nations agencies, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions in Darfur;

(b) To contribute towards international efforts to protect, promote and monitor human rights in Darfur, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians with particular attention to vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children;

(c) To assist the parties to the Agreements, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination, as well as mine awareness programmes targeted at all sectors of society;

(d) To assist in addressing regional security issues in close liaison with international efforts to improve the security situation in the neighbouring regions along the borders between the Sudan and Chad and between the Sudan and the Central African Republic, including through the establishment of a multidimensional presence consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key locations in Chad, including in internally displaced persons and refugee camps, and, if necessary, in the Central African Republic, and to contribute to the implementation of the agreement between the Sudan and Chad signed on 26 July 2006;

10. Calls upon all Member States to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to the Sudan of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in Darfur;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement, respect for the ceasefire, and the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan in Darfur, and to report to the Council, as appropriate, on the steps taken to implement the present resolution and any failure to comply with its demands;

12. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) Decides that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan is authorized to use all necessary means, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities:

——To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, Assessment and Evaluation Commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibil-
ity of the Government of the Sudan, and to protect civilians under threat of physical violence;
— In order to support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, to prevent attacks and threats against civilians;
— To seize or collect, as appropriate, arms or related materiel whose presence in Darfur is in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556(2004), and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;
(b) Requests that the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic conclude status-of-forces agreements as soon as possible, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 of 9 December 2003 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and decides that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement with either country, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 shall apply provisionally with respect to forces of the Mission operating in that country;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the protection of civilians in refugee and internally displaced persons camps in Chad and on how to improve the security situation on the Chadian side of the border with the Sudan;
14. Calls upon the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to respect their commitments and implement the Agreement without delay, urges those parties that have not signed the Agreement to do so without delay and not to act in any way that would impede implementation of the Agreement, and reiterates its intention to take, including in response to a request by the African Union, strong and effective measures, such as an assets freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the Agreement or commits human rights violations;
15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 1706(2006):

In favour: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States.
Against: None.
Abstaining: China, Qatar, Russian Federation.

Speaking after the vote, the United Kingdom said that the tragedy in Darfur had gone on far too long and the transition to a UN operation was the only viable solution. The Sudanese Government’s plan (see p. 281) would be a military solution imposed by one of the parties to the conflict, in violation of the Peace Agreement. The resolution sent a clear message from the Council regarding the need for a well-equipped third party to ensure the protection of civilians. The Council was appealing to the Sudanese Government in the strongest possible terms to allow the United Nations to provide assistance. The Council wished to help the Sudan, not to threaten, or undermine it.

China said that, while it concurred that a UN operation should take over from AMIS as soon as feasible, the timing of the vote and the fact that the resolution did not specify “with the consent of the Government” meant it had to abstain.

The Russian Federation said that the Council should support a transition to a UN operation, but with the consent of the Government. Pending the receipt of such consent, the Russian Federation had decided to abstain, although it had no objections in principle to the resolution.

Qatar said that the Council should have given due regard to the principles of international practice before taking up a resolution that would have a bearing on the sovereignty of the Sudan, and made more efforts to prepare the ground for Sudan’s voluntary consent. Darfur had undergone many positive developments since the signing of the Peace Agreement. The Sudan had submitted a multifaceted plan to address the situation but, regretfully, the Council had not responded to it or submitted any explicit proposals. Nor had enough efforts been made to engage the Sudan, instead of pressuring it into approving the draft resolution. Qatar would have preferred to support AMIS financially and logistically to enable it to complete its mandate. In addition, the League of Arab States and Qatar had requested a postponement of the Council meeting but the resolution’s sponsors wanted its speedy adoption. In the circumstances, Qatar had been unable to support the resolution, given its repercussions and the modalities of its implementation.

Implementation of resolution 1706(2006) and further political developments

Security Council consideration (September). Briefing the Council on 11 September [meeting 5520], the Secretary-General called upon Governments and individual leaders in Africa and beyond who were in a position to influence the Sudanese Government, to bring pressure to bear, and convince Khartoum to accept a UN operation. He condemned the recent offensive by Government forces, which included renewed aerial bombing and the deployment of thousands of troops, in violation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The various factions had engaged in renewed fighting, bringing even greater misery to the population and making it harder for humanitarian workers to reach them. Twelve aid workers had been killed in the past two months alone, more than in the entire previous two years. He urged Khartoum to embrace resolution...
1706(2006), give its consent to the transition and pursue the political process with commitment.

Sudan said that it remained open to dialogue and cooperation with the United Nations, but the Council had ignored or downplayed attacks by rebel groups and had not considered the Government’s own detailed plan for stabilizing the situation in Darfur on the basis of the Peace Agreement, even though some Council members had requested a meeting on the plan. Some members had spoken of growing violence in Darfur, without mentioning the perpetrators and without condemning the criminal acts of NRF. In adopting resolution 1706(2006), the Council had taken hasty measures without preparing the political context with all the parties involved, foremost among them, the Sudan. The Council had chosen a confrontational approach, but the Sudan was always ready to engage in dialogue on the basis of respect for its sovereignty and independence.

Report of Secretary-General (September). In his September report on Darfur [S/2006/764], the Secretary-General said that situation in Darfur had deteriorated considerably and the Government’s decision to deploy a large number of military troops there signalled its determination to pursue a military solution to the crisis. Although the signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement maintained the ceasefire between themselves, violence flared between the Agreement’s signatories and non-signatories. Two AMIS peacekeepers were killed in the 19 August ambush of an AU fuel convoy at Kuma, and attacks against humanitarian workers continued unabated. Militia groups continued to attack civilians and internally displaced persons, while banditry was rampant across most of Darfur. The region was again descending into a vicious cycle of violence, the Secretary-General noted. On 28 July, SAF, reportedly assisted by Janjaweed militia, clashed with Peace Agreement non-signatory forces in the Jebel Moon area of Western Darfur. On 18 August, assailants believed to belong to non-signatory groups attacked an SAF camp at Goz Mino, killing three soldiers. On 24 August, another armed group ambushed a Government convoy near Abu Sorouq, killing the Assistant Commissioner of Kulbus and six others. Government-affiliated militia repeatedly attacked villages near Jebel Marra between 17 July and 2 August, killing 12 civilians. Meanwhile, SAF and troops of the SLM-Minawi faction attacked NRF forces north of El Fasher. Clashes between SAF and NRF continued throughout August.

In Northern Darfur, SLM-Minawi elements, currently aligned with the Government forces, attacked villages near Korma town, killing at least 100 civilians. Those and other clashes resulted in at least 20,000 internally displaced persons arriving in Northern Darfur camps in July. Displaced persons reported indiscriminate killing, rape and abduction, as security in the camps remained precarious. The militarization of some of the camps continued unabated. SLM-Minawi soldiers harassed persons in the camps around El Fasher, while SLA-Abdul Wahid troops harassed civilians in Otash camp in Southern Darfur.

Armed robbery against humanitarian workers grew increasingly brazen. On 15 and 16 August, armed men hijacked and stole three vehicles of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) near El Fasher, killing one driver. Twelve humanitarian workers died in July and August alone. Sexual violence increased dramatically throughout Darfur, and Government authorities appeared unable or reluctant to address it. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, Sima Samar, who visited the country from 11 to 17 August, (see p. 942) was disturbed by the critical human rights situation, and raised concerns with senior Government officials about the killings of civilians, rape, torture and displacement. On many occasions, authorities obstructed UN human rights officers performing their duties, while the intelligence and security service continued to restrict UNMIS access to Darfur detention facilities.

In public statements, the Government continued to reject the Security Council’s decision on the transition to a UN peace operation. President Bashir and Vice-President Taha threatened armed resistance and other violence against the United Nations if the decision was implemented. However, the proposed transition was welcomed by senior members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Darfur rebel groups, as well as northern opposition parties. Demonstrations in support of and against the Council’s decision were seen throughout Darfur.

In spite of the efforts of the wider international community and major AU and UN initiatives, no additional signatories joined the Darfur Peace Agreement. Its implementation remained well behind schedule, and the inability of its mechanisms and arrangements to halt the continuing violence undermined its credibility. Efforts by the Government of the Sudan and the international community to persuade Abdul Wahid to sign the Agreement were unsuccessful. Abdul Wahid did not entirely reject the Agreement, but wanted amendments or additions to satisfy his four political demands: a role in reviewing the Janjaweed disarmament; a national Vice-Presidency position for Darfur; more compensation; and the merging of the three Darfur states into one re-
gion. At the same time, his authority had reportedly been challenged by several influential commanders and his position and strength within sla remained unclear. In addition to the Abdul Wahid faction of the sla, the “anti-Darfur Peace Agreement bloc” consisted of the G19, a group of former disaffected sla-Abdul Wahid commanders and their followers, jem, and elements of nrf. jem, which had taken the toughest line against the Darfur Peace Agreement, had also splintered into the jem-Wing for Peace supporting the Darfur Peace Agreement, and some jem commanders in Jebel Moon, who eschewed further intra-rebel violence.

Although the groups that had signed the 8 June Declaration of Commitment to the Darfur Peace Agreement (see p. 279) had been recognized by the au Peace and Security Council as “partners in the peace process”, and had been invited by the Joint Commission to participate in its meetings, the Darfur Peace Agreement signatories opposed any significant role or benefits for them, and the au and the parties had yet to develop a plan for including them in the implementation process. The Ceasefire Commission continued to meet regularly, but had been largely incapacitated by disagreements over the non-signatories’ role and the relationship between the N’Djamena and Darfur Peace Agreement ceasefire commissions.

On 7 August, Minni Minawi was sworn in as Senior Assistant to the President, the fourth-highest position in the National Executive, and as Transitional Darfur Regional Authority Chairman. On 9 September, Minni Minawi announced the formation of seven committees for the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as a first step towards the implementation of the Agreement, and confirmed that the structures of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority would include the parties that had signed the 8 June Declaration of Commitment.

UN support for AMIS. On 28 September [S/2006/779], the Secretary-General and the au Chairperson transmitted to the Security Council President the joint UN/AU proposal for UN support to AMIS in the form of an immediate “light support package”, which included logistical and material support, 105 military staff officers, 33 police advisers and 48 civilians to assist in the areas of staff support to AMIS senior management, mine action, public information, humanitarian coordination and support for the Darfur Peace Agreement implementation. The proposal was in response to the au Peace and Security Council request, made at its 20 September meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government, for support to help AMIS to carry out its mandate under the Darfur Peace Agreement. They also transmitted their joint request of 22 September to President Al-Bashir, requesting his Government’s full support in implementing the package.

On 3 October [S/2006/789], President Al-Bashir informed the Security Council President of his personal support for the envisaged UN support to AMIS, and suggested that a protocol be drawn up to spell out the details for implementing the package. He looked forward to more mutual understanding between the Sudan, the United Nations and the au on cooperation in handling the Darfur situation.

Communication. On 16 October [S/2006/823], the Sudan forwarded to the Security Council six presidential decrees issued on 24 September, establishing implementation mechanisms under the Darfur Peace Agreement: the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, the Darfur Compensation Commission for War-affected Persons, the Darfur Compensation Fund for War-affected Persons, the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission, the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund and the Darfur Boundary Demarcation Commission.

Reports of Secretary-General (November-December). In his November report [S/2006/870], the Secretary-General said that violence had increased in Darfur in September, as fighting between the signatories and non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement intensified, with the Government using aerial bombardment in attacks against villages controlled by nrf and the G19 rebel groups. Tensions between signatories also surfaced for the first time. Although, the ceasefire between the sla-Minni Minawi faction and the Government held generally throughout Darfur, several incidents revealed tensions between the two signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement. On 30 August, an slm-Minawi spokesperson accused the Government and the Janjaweed militia of random killing in Southern Darfur, including the torching of around 13 villages south of Nyala. Meanwhile, fighting between Peace Agreement signatories and non-signatories continued. On 28 August, saf launched an aerial and ground offensive against nrf forces in the Kafod and Abu Sakin area, 60 kilometres north of El Fasher. Heavy fighting was also reported in Southern Darfur between 10 and 13 September, when saf troops, assisted by militia and aerial support, launched an offensive against non-signatory groups in Eastern Jebel Marra. In Southern Darfur, on 24 August, an armed group attacked the saf garrison at Songo, 265 kilometres south of Nyala. Reports were received that Government aircraft had bombed areas near Tura, Sayeh and Um Sidir, in Northern
September also saw increasing tension between and within rebel groups in Southern Darfur. On 1 September, a group of Massalit SLM-Minawi soldiers attacked their Zaghawa comrades in Gereida. Tensions rose between SLM-Minawi (mainly Zaghawa) and SLM-Free Will (mainly Birgid) in Muhajirya, Southern Darfur, and in October, armed clashes were reported there between SLM-Free Will and SLM-Minawi. Armed banditry and looting targeting humanitarian and commercial traffic also continued to be a major source of insecurity and an indicator of the lawlessness prevailing in Darfur. AU peacekeepers were targeted frequently. On 3 September, 12 armed men disarmed an AU team near the camp in Kassab, Northern Darfur. The next day, armed men ambushed an AMIS patrol on its way from Tina to Kutum, in Northern Darfur.

The Government’s military campaign in Northern and Southern Darfur was taking its toll on the civilian population, resulting in indiscriminate killings and other grave abuses against civilians, including death, injury, rape and displacement. The presence of armed groups within camps in Northern Darfur made them increasingly militarized and insecure. There were widespread and persistent reports of violence against civilians in those camps, including murder, physical attack, rape and armed robbery. On 12 September, 10 armed men entered the Tawila Camp, in Northern Darfur. Attacks on female internally displaced persons by armed militia outside the camps were recurrent. The increase in insecurity and military conflict exacerbated the already persistent practice of targeting women and girls with sexual violence. The unwillingness of the authorities to recognize the pervasiveness of that problem and to cast doubt on reported incidents only further burdened the victims and prevented an adequate Government response.

In terms of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, no new parties joined. The already weak pro-Darfur Peace Agreement bloc was further threatened by frictions between and within rebel groups. In September, both the Agreement’s signatories and civil society organizations stepped up efforts to bolster the peace process. The Zaghawa Native Administration spearheaded an initiative aimed at reconciling the SLM-Minawi and some G19 commanders in Northern Darfur. Representatives of the Native Administration met G19 commanders in Gira on 15 September. Talks reportedly also commenced between SLM commanders in Eastern Jebel Marra and the Southern Darfur State authorities. However, the fragility of the rebel groups and alliances further complicated efforts to consolidate political support for the Darfur Peace Agreement. On 23 and 24 September, local media reported frictions within the leadership of SLM-Free Will, whose Secretary-General issued a statement on 22 September relieving the group’s Chairman, Abdul Rahman Moussa, of his duties. That move was rejected by other elements within the faction. Moreover, recent conflicts within the SLM-Minawi faction in Gereida and between SLM-Minawi and SLM-Free Will in Muhajirya appeared to have divided the pro-Darfur Peace Agreement parties along ethnic lines.

On 26 August, following amendments in the Northern and Southern Darfur state constitutions, the state Legislative Council in Western Darfur amended its constitution to allow for representation of pro-Darfur Peace Agreement groups in the executive and legislative branches of the State. The Wali (Governor) of Western Darfur approved the amendments, which were awaiting endorsement from the Ministry of Justice in Khartoum.

In September, the AU Darfur Peace Agreement Implementation Team in Khartoum commenced work on the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation and circulated a strategy paper outlining the main priorities of the Consultation. The AU named Abdul Mohamed (Ethiopia) as the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, while consultations continued on the appointment of the Chairperson of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

The Secretary-General observed that, five months after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, violence has increased again in Darfur, and thousands of SAF troops had been deployed to the area in clear violation of the Agreement and Security Council resolution 1591(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 319]. He called upon all parties to halt the violence, uphold their obligations under the various agreements and work towards a political solution of the conflict. The suffering of the Darfurian population, he said, had lasted far too long. The gains made in 2005 were coming under strain with humanitarian needs expected to increase. At the same time, the efforts of humanitarian aid workers were being undermined by violence targeted at them. Twelve workers had lost their lives since the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed, more than in the previous two years. The Secretary-General appealed to all parties to respect humanitarian principles, and allow humanitarian actors to provide much-needed assistance and monitor protection concerns without being subject to harassment, looting and killing.
In December [S/2006/1041], the Secretary-General reported that military confrontations between the Government and the non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement reached new heights in October and November, spreading to areas outside Northern Darfur. On 3 October, Janjaweed militias supported by SAF helicopters attacked G19/NRF positions in Malagat, Northern Darfur. In retaliation, NRF attacked an SAF post in Karyare, close to the Chadian border. The combined rebel forces reportedly took control of Karyare on 7 October, with SAF suffering a large number of casualties. Government aircraft subsequently bombed the rebel-held town. On 12 and 13 October, SAF attacked rebel positions in Kulbus, Western Darfur. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, visiting Northern Darfur from 16 to 18 October, appealed to G19 and NRF commanders to cease attacks and obtained pledges from them to act only in self-defence. Meanwhile, SAF continued its attacks, with an aerial bombardment of suspected NRF positions north of Kulbus on 17 October.

Fighting among rebel groups and tribal tensions in areas controlled by parties supporting the Darfur Peace Agreement further hampered its implementation. Clashes resumed between SLM-Minawi and the breakaway faction, SLM-Free Will, in Muhajirya, Southern Darfur. Meanwhile, tensions further increased in Gereida, Southern Darfur, between the Zaghawa-dominated SLM-Minawi and the local Massalit population. Following the 28 September attack on the SLM-Minawi headquarters, members of the Massalit tribe in Gereida revolted against the SLM-Minawi forces, protesting the recent increase in attacks on civilians.

In October, armed militias continued to attack civilians with impunity. Armed elements on camels and in vehicles burned down several villages near the Shadad internally displaced persons camp, south of El Fasher. On 29 October, several hundred Arab militia members, wearing military uniforms and armed with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, attacked the villages of Gebasesh, Hijlija, Siberia and Goze Mino in Western Darfur, looting livestock and killing at least 52 people. Government forces from a nearby SAF post did not intervene to stop the attack. Clashes between Janjaweed forces and SLA-Minawi forces on 4 December, forced the relocation of some 135 UN staff to Khartoum.

At the regional level, relations between Chad and the Sudan deteriorated, marked by the attack on an SAF post in Karyare and a new offensive against the Government of Chad by Chadian armed opposition groups based in Darfur. On 25 November, the Chadian rebel group, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development, took control of the town of Abéché, 900 kilometres east of N’Djamen, which served as a base for dozens of relief organizations. Although the Government of Chad retook the town the next day, the incident undermined the delivery of aid to populations in need. On several occasions, Chadian rebel groups were reported to have crossed the border with the Sudan. The Central African Republic also accused the Sudan of supporting rebels in the country after a rebel group took the town of Bifao near the Chad/Sudan border.

Little progress was made in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. However, the hosting by SLM-Minawi on 16 October, of a forum in Khartoum, in anticipation of the Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, was seen as a positive development. The forum, attended by a cross-section of approximately 500 Darfurians, as well as SLM-Free Will and senior representatives of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, represented the first significant effort by the Darfur Peace Agreement signatories to jointly reach out to civil society. During the last week of November, the AU Special Envoy Salim A. Salim met Sudanese officials, as well as non-signatories to the Agreement to broaden support for the peace process in Darfur. Subsequently, a UNMIS representative and Mr. Salim held bilateral consultations on reinvigorating the political process under a joint AU/UN umbrella and agreed to form a working-level team to prepare for the resumption of talks in January 2007. The team was also mandated to consult with the Agreement’s signatories, non-signatories and other local actors and to stress the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities, a commitment to a ceasefire and the related mechanisms created by the Agreement and a credible Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.

Concerning UN support to AMIS, UNMIS had started to implement the “light support package” (see p. 287). On 12 November, President Al Bashir agreed that a tripartite AU-United Nations-Government of the Sudan mechanism be created to facilitate its implementation. The AU and UNMIS held consultations on the longer-term “heavy” UN support package, which would include substantial air assets, significant military and police advisory capacity, civilian support for the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and a range of UN enabling capabilities.

Addis Ababa high-level consultations. On 16 November, the Secretary-General co-chaired a high-level meeting in Addis Ababa with the AU
Chairperson to identify steps for improving the situation, notably to re-energize the peace process, establish a strengthened ceasefire and delineate the way forward for peacekeeping in Darfur. The meeting, attended by the Government of the Sudan, UN Member States, the EU, the League of Arab States and a number of troop-contributing African countries, produced an understanding that only a negotiated settlement could bring the conflict to an end. It agreed that the Darfur Peace Agreement would remain at the heart of any settlement, but would have to be more inclusive; the various efforts to bring non-signatories on board had to be brought under one umbrella, and the AU and the United Nations were best positioned to lead that process; and, as a next step, the AU and the United Nations would convene a meeting of non-signatories, the SLM-Minawi faction and the Government to resolve outstanding issues by the end of the year.

As to peacekeeping in Darfur, the meeting confirmed that a peacekeeping force could be predominantly African in nature, with troops, as far as possible, sourced from the continent. The United Nations would provide backstopping and command control structures. To strengthen AMIS in Darfur, the meeting concluded that the United Nations would continue to implement the previously agreed “light support package” for AMIS, in collaboration with the AU and the Sudan; the “heavy support package”, or phase two, would be initiated and its implementation facilitated by the tripartite (UN-AU-Government of the Sudan) mechanism established for the light package; an AU-UN hybrid operation would be established, led by a Special Representative and commanded by a Force Commander, jointly appointed by the AU and the United Nations; and the United Nations would provide all required funding for peacekeeping in Darfur. The hybrid operation would, in principle, reflect the recommendations made in the Secretary-General’s July report to the Security Council (see p. 280).

**Communication.** On 30 November [S/2006/961], the AU Peace and Security Council, meeting in Abuja at the level of Heads of State and Government, endorsed the conclusions of the 16 November meeting. In a communiqué issued the same day, the Council indicated, with respect to the AU/UN hybrid operation, that: the Special Representative should be jointly appointed by the AU Commission Chairperson and the Secretary-General, and the Force Commander by the AU Commission Chairperson, in consultation with the Secretary-General; the hybrid mission should benefit from UN backstopping and command control structures and systems; and the size of the force should be determined by the AU and the United Nations, on the basis of factors on the ground and requirements for effectively discharging its mandate.

The Peace and Security Council extended AMIS mandate, which was due to expire on 31 December, for six months and appealed to the United Nations to consider providing logistical and financial support to the Mission, as envisaged in the conclusions of the Addis Ababa consultation.

On 3 December, the Sudan’s Council of Ministers endorsed the Peace and Security Council communiqué of 30 November.

**Report of Secretary-General.** The Secretary-General, in a later report [S/2007/104], said that the Government of the Sudan had accepted, on 23 December, the three-phased approach to peacekeeping in Darfur—the “light support package”, the “heavy support package” and the AU/UN hybrid operation. It also confirmed its readiness to start immediately, through the tripartite committee, implementation of the Addis Ababa conclusions and the Abuja communiqué (see above).

Concerning implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, preparatory work for the convening of a conference of non-signatories and rationalization of the various initiatives to broaden the base of the Agreement were ongoing. In December, further progress was made to reinforce the ceasefire mechanism, including the creation of a second chamber of the Ceasefire Commission for non-signatories. In a related development, on 27 December, members of the three non-signatory parties, the SLM-Abdul Wahid, SLM-Abdul Sahif and G19, announced their merger into one movement known as the SLM-Nonsignatory Factions, and a cessation of hostilities unless attacked. They reiterated their commitment to the 2004 N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.

The security situation in November and December was characterized by increased violence. SAF, supported by armed militia, clashed with non-signatory forces, especially in Northern and Southern Darfur. In their ongoing efforts to flush out non-signatory combatants, the Government intensified aerial bombardment of their positions, including civilian targets. Tension also persisted along the Sudan-Chad border. Humanitarian organizations and AMIS suffered harassment and attacks, while theft and carjackings of their vehicles reached new heights. Clashes occurred between SAF and the NRF coalition in both Northern and Southern Darfur, especially in Birmaza, Sani Hayi, Umm Sidr, Sayah, Gubba, Dobo (Northern Darfur), Abu Jabre and Adilya (Southern Darfur). On 15 November, SAF forces and armed militia, supported by helicopter
gunships, attacked several villages in the Birmaza area. The G19 faction of NRF retaliated by attacking SAF and militia forces, as well as Government property, including the oil installations at Abu Jabre on 26 November. On 4 and 5 December, Government helicopter gunships and aircraft bombed the Adilya area (Southern Darfur) in an attack on NRF forces. On 16 December, SAF and G19 members clashed in Sayah (Northern Darfur), during which nine G19 members were killed and seven of their vehicles destroyed. On 20 December, armed militia and Government forces launched a combined ground and air strike against a joint force of the G19 group, SLM-Abdul Shafi and JEM in Gubba (Northern Darfur).

Much of the violence targeted innocent civilians, in contravention of ceasefire arrangements and international law. On 18 November, SAF and armed militia attacked and burned a significant portion of the village of Buli (Western Darfur), where more than 10,000 internally displaced persons had found refuge, and looted several villages between Rowata and Bul Bul (Western Darfur). Dozens of civilians were killed and thousands displaced in the attack. Armed militia also attacked and torched several villages, causing the death of many civilians. On 5 and 6 December, Government aircraft bombarded Shagbuba, with ground support from armed militia, and on 9 December, armed men on horseback attacked a commercial vehicle convoy carrying people and medical and other supplies near Runju in the Sirba area (Western Darfur), killing 31 civilians.

Tension along the Sudan-Chad border remained high, following the 25 November capture of the eastern Chadian town of Abéché by Chadian armed opposition groups. On 28 November, Chad declared itself in a “state of war” with the Sudan and on 12 December, fighting between Chadian armed opposition groups and Chadian armed forces broke out at Armankul (Western Darfur).

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 19 December [meeting 5598], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/55 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council endorses the conclusions of the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, the immediate deployment of the United Nations light and heavy support packages to the African Union Mission in the Sudan and a hybrid operation in Darfur, for which backstopping and command and control structures and systems will be provided by the United Nations. The Council requests the Secretary-General to keep it updated.

The Council reaffirms its deep concern about the worsening security situation in Darfur and its repercussions in the region. It stresses that a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur lies in a comprehensive approach with the concerted efforts of all relevant parties, in accordance with the Darfur Peace Agreement, and will contribute to restoring security and stability in the region.

Council press statement. In a 27 December press statement [SC/8931], Security Council members welcomed the report of the visit of the Secretary-General’s Envoy, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to the Sudan. In discussing the report, Council members also welcomed the 23 December letter from the President of the Sudan, in which he reconfirmed his commitment to implementing the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, in particular, to bring about the cessation of hostilities, revitalise the political process and allow the immediate implementation of the UN three-phased support plan to the AU, culminating in the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-AU force in Darfur.

Briefings by ICC Prosecutor

Presenting his third report to the Security Council on 14 June [meeting 5499], the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, said that, given the scale of alleged crimes committed in Darfur, and the complexities of identifying those most responsible, he anticipated the prosecution of a sequence of cases, rather than a single case dealing with the situation as a whole. His Office had gathered significant amounts of information to determine whether the Government had dealt with, or was dealing with, the cases that were likely to be selected for prosecution. The Court’s concern was to see that effective justice was delivered to the victims. The Government had provided much information on traditional tribal reconciliation mechanisms in Darfur, but it did not appear to have investigated or prosecuted any cases in such a way as to render those cases inadmissible before the Court. The Government, in responding to the request of the Office, had agreed to allow it to conduct interviews in the country so as to establish a complete account of events in Darfur since 2002. There was a reluctance or inability on the part of witnesses and victims to come forward, and there were allegations of intimidation of complainants, especially regarding rape allegations. The Office of the Prosecutor would, in due course, identify those
to be prosecuted on the basis of evidence collected, and present its conclusions to the judges. Cooperation was needed to ensure accountability, not only for past, but for current crimes that continued to affect the displaced populations. International justice efforts should contribute to their protection and the prevention of further crimes. However, more information was needed on groups that continued to attack the displaced population.

Sudan said that the ICC Prosecutor had reflected very important aspects of cooperation established with the Sudanese Government; that cooperation had led to several positive results. The Prosecutor had quickly come to an understanding of the situation during his visit and heard briefings by members of the Sudanese judiciary concerning its independence and relationship with other judicial organs in the country. The Prosecutor had also learned about a great number of cases that had been decided and about charges that had been followed up. Special courts had been established, which had issued many criminal sentences, including execution and life in prison. Measures were also taken to compensate the victims.

Briefing the Council on 14 December [meeting 5589], Mr. Moreno-Ocampo said his Office was completing the investigation and collection of evidence to identify those who bore the greatest responsibility for some of the worst crimes in Darfur, adding that there was reasonable ground to believe that those identified had committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, including persecution, torture, murder and rape. The Sudan had formally advised that it had arrested 14 individuals, but those indications did not appear to render the Court’s case inadmissible. His Office had taken more than 100 formal witness statements and screened hundreds of potential witnesses since the start of its investigation, travelling to 17 countries to pursue inquiries. The Sudan had participated in the process. Despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, there were almost daily allegations of extra-judicial killings that might fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. By completing the investigation, the Office was sending a signal to those who were considering committing further crimes that they could not do so with impunity.

Children and armed conflict

An August report [S/2006/662] of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan, prepared in response to Security Council resolution 1612(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 863], stated that grave child rights abuses in the Sudan continued largely unabated. The report, which covered the period from May to July, said that parties to the conflict committing grave abuses included SAF, SLA, the Popular Defence Forces, the White Army, the Janjaweed militia, the Lord’s Resistance Movement operating out of Uganda and Chadian opposition forces. Individual commanders of the various forces bore responsibility for grave violations by their forces, but the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan were also directly accountable for violations by individuals within their command structures. The report highlighted action plans and programmes to address violations, and made recommendations for strengthening the protection of war-affected children, including criminalizing the recruitment and use of children, ensuring that children released from the military received adequate support and taking steps to address the special needs of girls. (For further information on children and armed conflict, see Part II, Chapter II.)

Sanctions Committee

The Security Council, by resolution 1556(2004) [YUN 2004, p. 240], imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in Darfur. By resolution 1591(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 319], the Council imposed a travel ban and assets freeze and established a Committee to oversee implementation of those sanctions against individuals to be designated by it. The Secretary-General was requested to appoint a Panel of Experts for six months to assist the work of the Council and the Committee.

The Panel of Experts, established in June 2005 [ibid., p. 322], had as its mandate, to assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo and the sanctions; make recommendations to the Committee on possible Council actions; and provide information on individuals who impeded the peace process, committed violations of international law, or were responsible for offensive military overflights.

Appointment of experts. On 13 January [S/2006/23] and 10 February [S/2006/99], the Secretary-General informed the Council President of the appointment of four members to serve on the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005). In addition, on 10 February [S/2006/99], he appointed Bernard Saunders (Canada).

Report of Panel of Experts (January). On 30 January [S/2006/65], the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005), submitted to the Council the report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan. The Panel reported that arms, especially small arms and ammunition, continued to enter Darfur from
other countries and regions of the Sudan. Although the Council had imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental groups, SLM/A and JEM continued to receive arms, ammunition and/or equipment through Chad, Eritrea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and from numerous other sources. According to numerous reports, they also received financial, political and other material support. It also appeared that the Council’s intent to deny arms to the Janjaweed militia was circumvented by the fact that many of the militias were already formally part of the Government’s security organs or were incorporated into those organs, especially the Popular Defence Force (PDF), the border intelligence guard, the central reserve police, the popular police and the nomadic police. The Panel believed that Eritrea appeared to have provided arms, logistical support, military training and political support to both JEM and SLA, including in training camps in Eritrea. Reports were also received that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in southern Sudan had provided training and arms to SLM/A. The Panel also identified ways in which the Government violated the arms embargo.

The Panel identified individuals who had impeded the peace process and committed violations of international humanitarian or human rights law, and provided their names in a confidential annex to the report.

The Sudanese Government and SLA, and to a lesser extent JEM, committed consistent, wilful and systematic violations of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Sudan failed to fulfil its agreed commitments to identify, neutralize and disarm militias under its control or influence. It continued to support those militias and on occasion engaged in coordinated military operations with them. Several individuals had been identified as having committed acts intended to impede the work of AMIS, including hostile acts against AMIS personnel.

Having found that Sudan continued to violate the provisions of the arms embargo through the movement of arms into Darfur from other parts of the Sudan and the deployment of additional attack helicopters to Darfur, the experts recommended strengthening that embargo by complementing it with the installation of a verification/inventory component, and extending it to the entire territory, while providing appropriate exemptions for the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of the Sudan.

The Panel found evidence of widespread violations of international humanitarian law in Darfur during the period 29 March–5 December 2005. The parties to the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and other belligerents operating in Darfur, in particular the non-State militias, had undertaken military operations with scant regard for the principles of distinction, proportionality or military imperative. While all parties had violated the rules and norms of armed conflict, SLA, the Government and the militias had shown the least regard for the welfare of civilians.

The experts proposed that the Committee and the Security Council adopt a zero tolerance approach to violations of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; and any future ceasefire violation reports verified by the Joint Commission should be used as the basis for direct action by the Committee against the leadership of the violating party and against the local commanders that committed the offending act. In view of the failure of the Sudan to identify, neutralize and disarm militias in Darfur, the Council should consider subjecting individuals identified by the report as failing to disarm the militias to sanctions under resolution 1591(2005). Additional measures should be considered against select Government members, as provided for under Article 41 of the Charter.

Communications. In a 17 January letter [S/2006/31] to the Security Council President and the Secretary-General, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, responding to the Panel’s report, denied providing arms, ammunition and other military equipment to the armed movements or the other parties. On the contrary, it had requested two AU summit meetings to address the Darfur issue, taken part in all meetings to settle the conflict, participated in the Joint Commission’s monitoring of implementation of the ceasefire and called for peace-building meetings. An enclosure to the letter summarized Libya’s efforts to assist in resolving the Darfur problem.

In a 1 March letter to the Security Council President [S/2006/136], Sudan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lam Akol Ajawin, stated that the country had sought to ensure that the Panel of Experts obtained unimpeded access to any information it desired, including highly secret and important information. It was confident that the Panel would handle that information with the requisite confidentiality, secrecy and institutional treatment that took into account the immunity of leaders and officials. However, the Sudan was shocked to see the secret list prepared by the Panel, containing the names of leaders, ministers and officials, carried by western media. The Sudan expected to receive the Council’s assurance that such acts would not be repeated, otherwise it would be compelled to suspend its cooperation.
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,

Stressing again its firm commitment to the cause of peace throughout the Sudan, including through the African Union-led inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja (“Abuja Talks”), full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and an end to the violence and atrocities in Darfur,

Urging all parties to the Abuja Talks to reach without further delay an agreement that will establish a basis for peace, reconciliation, stability and justice in the Sudan,

Commending the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the African Union, the Secretary-General and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Darfur,

Taking note of the observations and recommendations contained in the report of 9 December 2005 of the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) of resolution 1591(2005) and extended by paragraph 1 of resolution 1651(2005), anticipating the receipt of the second report of the Panel currently under consideration by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1591(2005), and expressing its intent to study further the recommendations of the Panel and to consider appropriate next steps,

Emphasizing the need to respect the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning privileges and immunities, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as applicable to United Nations operations and persons engaged in such operations,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

Decides to extend until 29 September 2006 the mandate of the Panel of Experts originally appointed pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) and extended by resolution 1651(2005), and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures;

Requests the Panel of Experts to provide, no later than ninety days after the adoption of the present resolution, a midterm briefing on its work to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1591(2005), and a final report to the Council no later than thirty days prior to the termination of its mandate, with its findings and recommendations;

Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies, the African Union and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1556(2004) and 1591(2005);

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Communication. The Secretary-General, on 17 May [S/2006/301], informed the Council that he had appointed four experts to serve on the Panel until 29 September.

Report of Panel of Experts (March). In its March report [S/2006/250], the Panel stated that arms, especially small arms and ammunition, continued to flow into Darfur from other countries and other regions of the Sudan during the January–March period, and the Government continued to move in armed troops and supplies without seeking Committee approval, as required by resolution 1591(2005). Pro-Government Arab militias appeared to be maintaining their stock of weapons and ammunition through support from Government entities, banditry and clandestine sources. Adjacent States had ignored their obligations to abide by the embargo and failed to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction complied with it. SLA violated ceasefire accords by expanding territory under its control, while the Government still had not identified, neutralized and disarmed armed groups.

The Panel recommended, among other things, expanding the embargo to all of the Sudan, with certain exemptions for non-lethal supplies; establishing a verification mechanism and an arms inventory; requiring end-use certification for the sale of military goods and services to the Sudan; and imposing additional measures on the Government and SLA as entities, rather than on individuals, for actions that impeded the peace process. Since the Government continued its offensive military overflights, the Council should consider establishing a no-fly zone over the entire Darfur region for all Government aircraft and those utilized by parties to the conflict.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 25 April [meeting 5423], the Security Council adopted resolution 1672(2006) by vote (12–0–3). The draft [S/2006/255] was submitted by Argentina, Denmark, France, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Security Council,

Stressing again its firm commitment to the cause of peace throughout the Sudan, including through the African Union-led inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja (“Abuja Talks”), full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005 and an end to the violence and atrocities in Darfur,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that all States shall implement the measures specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 1591(2005) with respect to the following individuals:
   - Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (Commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces)
   - Sheikh Musa Hilal (Paramount Chief of the Julul Tribe in North Darfur)
   - Adam Yacub Shant (Sudanese Liberation Army Commander)
   - Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri (National Movement for Reform and Development Field Commander);

2. Decides also to remain actively seized of the matter.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 1672(2006):

In favour: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States.

Against: None.

Abstaining: China, Qatar, Russian Federation.

Speaking after the adoption of the resolution, the Russian Federation said it had abstained because the resolution might have a negative impact on concluding a peace agreement and would not promote international peace efforts. Sanctions should be linked to promoting the resolution of conflicts and ensuring regional stability. Qatar said that there was no evidence to condemn those individuals identified in the resolution and justify sanctions against them. Given the positive developments at the Abuja peace talks, it would have been preferable to postpone the vote until the end of the process. China said that it had always been careful on the adoption of sanctions, as experience showed that they could not achieve the expected results and victimized the civilian population. In the Sanctions Committee, China had joined others in requesting clarifications on the inclusion of individuals on the sanctions list. Regrettably, such information had yet to be provided, and certain members had requested ending discussions and submitting the resolution to the Council. More importantly, the timing of the vote was not right. The peace talks were at a crucial juncture, and the Council should assist the AU in bringing the Abuja talks to a conclusion. China was concerned about the situation in Darfur, supported the role of AMIS and felt that those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law should be brought to justice.


The Committee held four formal and 12 informal meetings and submitted three 90-day reports to the Council. The Panel of Experts, in its two reports (see above), provided information on individuals who could be subject to the travel ban and the assets freeze. By the end of the period under review, the Committee had not concluded its consideration of the Panel’s recommendations, nor had it designated any individual as subject to the targeted sanctions.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 29 September [meeting 5543], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1713(2006). The draft [S/2006/775] was submitted by Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Security Council,


Stressing again its firm commitment to the cause of peace throughout the Sudan, full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, full implementation of the framework agreed between the parties for a resolution of the conflict in Darfur (the Darfur Peace Agreement), and an end to the violence and atrocities in Darfur,

Urging those parties that have not signed the Darfur Peace Agreement to do so without delay and not act in
any way that would impede the implementation of the Agreement, and further urging that those that have signed the Agreement to implement their obligations without delay,

*Deploring* the ongoing violence, impunity and consequent deterioration of the humanitarian situation, reiterating its deep concern about the security of civilians and humanitarian aid workers and about humanitarian access to populations in need, and calling upon all parties in Darfur to cease offensive actions immediately and to refrain from further violent attacks,

*Commending* the efforts of, and reiterating its full support for, the African Union, the Secretary-General and the leaders of the region to promote peace and stability in Darfur,

*Recalling* the midterm briefing of 25 July 2006 by the Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) of resolution 1591(2005) and extended by resolutions 1651(2005) and 1665(2006), anticipating the receipt of the final report of the Panel presented on 31 August 2006 to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591(2005) and currently under consideration, and expressing its intent to study the recommendations of the Panel further and to consider appropriate next steps,

*Emphasizing* the need to respect the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning privileges and immunities, and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as applicable to United Nations operations and persons engaged in such operations,

*Reaffirming its commitment* to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region,

*Determining* that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Decides* to extend until 29 September 2007 the mandate of the Panel of Experts originally appointed pursuant to resolution 1591(2005), previously extended by resolutions 1651(2005) and 1665(2006), and requests the Secretary-General to appoint a fifth member to enable the Panel to better carry out its mission, and to take the necessary administrative measures;

2. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide, no later than 29 March 2007, a midterm briefing on its work, and no later than ninety days after the adoption of the present resolution an interim report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 1591(2005), and no later than thirty days prior to the termination of its mandate a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations;

3. *Urges* all States, relevant United Nations bodies, the African Union and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1556(2004) and 1591(2005);

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Speaking before the vote, Qatar said that it had repeatedly advised the Panel of Experts and the Security Council Committee on the Sudan to be precise, cautious and professional in addressing the issue of Darfur. Qatar expressed concern that the Panel had hastened to hurl allegations and accusations against Sudanese high officials without respect for legal principles and protocol. The Panel had treated as equals the Government and the rebel groups that were hindering the peace process and ignoring calls to join the Peace Agreement. The experts should be accurate, professional, transparent and non-selective so as to maintain the Council’s credibility.

**Report of Panel of Experts (August).** In its August report [S/2006/795], the Panel of Experts said that blatant violations of the arms embargo by Government forces, allied Janjaweed militias, rebel groups and insurgents from Chad continued unabated. Weapons continued to enter Darfur and rebel forces had shown a notable increase in capacity to engage the Sudanese forces.

Chadian insurgents were contributing to the conflict by reportedly joining Sudanese Government forces and the Janjaweed in their operations against rebel groups. According to reliable reports, the Sudan was re-supplying the Chadian insurgents with weapons and vehicles. Weapons and ammunition had been observed being offloaded at local airports and moved to locations within Darfur. Credible information also indicated that the Government continued to support the Janjaweed by providing weapons and vehicles. The Janjaweed/armed militias appeared to have upgraded their modus operandi from horses, camels and AK-47s to land cruisers, pick-up trucks and rocket-propelled grenades.

The Sudan had not implemented the financial sanctions against the four persons designated in resolution 1672(2006) (see p. 295) and had wilfully avoided its commitment under the resolution. Chad had advised the Panel that it was not implementing the resolution, thus posing a major impediment to peace. The Panel was informed that the Darfur rebels were receiving financial and logistical support from the Sudanese diaspora abroad, and it was awaiting information on the matter from Member States.

The Panel recommended, among other things, that Member States providing arms, ammunition, other military equipment and dual-use items to the Sudan should submit a prior notification to the
Committee; an in-depth assessment be undertaken of the customs and border control capacity of the countries bordering Darfur; and airlines and other related agencies informed of the travel ban.


Report of Sanctions Committee (December). On 28 December, the Sanctions Committee Chairman transmitted to the Council a report [S/2006/1045] on the Committee’s activities between 1 April and 31 December. The Committee held six informal consultations and submitted to the Council its fourth, fifth and sixth 90-day reports. It had received no additional replies from Member States on steps taken to implement the sanctions.

Financing of Panel of Experts

On 31 January [A/60/585/Add.1], the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly estimated requirements relating to the Panel for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2006, amounting to $1,725,700 net ($1,779,200 gross). A/C.1/297, on 10 March [A/60/7/Add.37], endorsed that amount.

The General Assembly, on 22 December, by section VII of resolution 61/252 approved the budget in that amount as part of the $326,500,000 budget for special political missions (see p. 1615).

Chad-Sudan

Tripoli Declaration and Agreement. On 14 February [S/2006/103], the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya transmitted to the Security Council President the Tripoli Declaration concerning the situation between Chad and the Sudan and the Tripoli Agreement to Settle the Dispute between the Republic of Chad and the Republic of the Sudan, adopted on 8 February, in Tripoli, at a summit meeting of the Presidents of the two countries, and those of Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic, under the chairmanship of the Leader of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Also participating were the AU Chairperson, the Secretary-General of the Community of the Sahelo-Saharan States and a representative of the UN Secretary-General. By the Agreement, the parties pledged, among other things, to prevent the use of their territories for subversive activities against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other country; prohibit the presence of rebel elements from either country in their respective territories; and normalize diplomatic and consular relations. They also agreed to establish a ministerial committee to follow up on the implementation of the Agreement and a peace and security force to secure the common border.

Communications. On 21 March [S/2006/187], the AU Peace and Security Council, in a communiqué on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, took note of steps taken to implement it, including the request that AMIS provide security for the observer posts to be established on Sudanese territory, such as air transportation, communication and training assistance. On 13 April [S/2006/256], Chad’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and African Integration told the Secretary-General that, despite the Tripoli Agreement, the Khartoum regime persisted in destabilizing Chad. For several days, mercenaries, acting on behalf of the Government of the Sudan, had been waging an offensive against military garrisons in eastern Chad and a Sudanese refugee camp within Chadian territory. On 13 April, the capital city of N’Djamena was attacked. The attackers were repelled and military equipment destroyed or seized. Several mercenaries were captured, including combatants holding Sudanese nationality. Chad urged that measures be taken under the UN Charter to put an end to the aggression against it and to protect Sudanese refugees sheltering in Chadian territory.

Security Council press statement. In a 13 April press statement [SC/8690], the Security Council President said that the situation in Darfur and the mounting tension at the Chad/Sudanese border were considered by Council members, who were concerned about the recent attacks by armed groups in Chad. Council members urged Chad and the Sudan to respect the Tripoli Declaration and Agreement, fully implement the commitments made therein and facilitate the work of the follow-up mechanisms agreed upon.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 25 April [meeting 5425], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/19 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council welcomes the briefing by the Secretary-General on 18 April 2006 on relations between Chad and the Sudan and endorses his deep concerns over the political and security situation and the instability along Chad’s borders with the Sudan, as well as over the possible spillover effects of these crises on neighbouring countries and the entire region. The Council encourages the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with relevant parties, in particular the African Union, on the matter and requests him to closely follow the situation and continue to keep the Council informed.
security questions

The Council welcomes the fact-finding mission dispatched by the African Union to Chad and looks forward to its conclusions.

The Council fully endorses the statement of 13 April 2006 made by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in which it strongly condemned the rebel attacks against N'Djamena and the eastern town of Adré, and reiterates that any attempt to seize power by force, pursuant to the 1999 Algiers Declaration of the Organization of African Unity, would be regarded as unacceptable.

The Security Council calls for political dialogue and a negotiated solution to the continuing crisis within Chad.

The Council also reaffirms the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Chad and the Sudan, as well as of all States in the region, and calls upon all Members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Council calls upon States in the region to cooperate in ensuring their common stability.

The Council notes with deep concern the deteriorating relations between Chad and the Sudan and urges the Governments of the two countries to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and to urgently start implementing the confidence-building measures which have been voluntarily agreed upon. Both the Sudan and Chad must refrain from any actions that violate the border.

The Council is concerned about the situation of the refugees from the Darfur region of the Sudan and from the Central African Republic, as well as the situation of the thousands of internally displaced persons in Chad. It therefore notes the decision by the Government of Chad not to expel the Sudanese refugees and urges the Government of Chad to continue supporting the efforts of humanitarian and relief agencies in the country in accordance with international principles governing the protection of refugees. The Council further reaffirms the right of all displaced persons who wish to do so to return to their homes. It reminds all Governments in the region of their obligation to respect international humanitarian law. In this regard, the Council calls upon donor countries to provide additional resources to respond to the emergency humanitarian situation in both the Sudan and Chad.

Report of Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, in his May report on Darfur (S/2006/306), said that the Security Council had been informed on 26 April that tension along the border between Chad and the Sudan had increased further, after the Government of Chad accused the Sudan of having supported an apparent coup attempt in Chad on 13 April (see above). The Sudan denied any involvement in the incidents in Chad. It was also reported that elements of the Chadian armed opposition had returned to Western Darfur following those events. On 19 April, Beida in Western Darfur was shelled from a position within Chad.

Security Council consideration. During the Security Council’s consideration, on 19 May [meeting 5441], of the situation in Chad and the Sudan, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that threats against relief workers and the civilian population in eastern Chad were as serious as those in Darfur. A total of 24 vehicles had been hijacked from humanitarian organizations in eastern Chad in the past few months alone. As a result of the insecurity, UN agencies and NGOs had been forced to reduce staff and programmes in many areas, at a time when needs were increasing, particularly those of the 50,000 new internally displaced persons.

Another major concern in eastern Chad was the targeting of refugees and displaced persons, including children, for recruitment by various armed groups. That development was undermining the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps and further increased their vulnerability to attack. The displaced and the civilian population were also being threatened by militia and rebel attacks and by the almost total lack of law and order in the area. One indication of the lawlessness in eastern Chad was the fact that at least 13,000 people had fled from Chad to Darfur in recent weeks to escape the fighting and the attacks.

The situation in eastern Chad was expected to deteriorate further, and President Déby had made it clear that the Government lacked the capacity to ensure the security and protection of the civilian population and the humanitarian organizations that were there to assist them. That meant that the vacuum was being filled by rebels, militias and others, leaving civilians, the camps and relief workers exposed.

Something had to be done urgently to prevent civilians from being attacked and displaced, refugee camps from being increasingly militarized and potentially embroiled in the conflict, and relief workers from being withdrawn. A number of options could be considered, including assistance to the Government of Chad to enable it to meet its security responsibilities.

Security Council mission. The Security Council mission (see p. 279), which visited Chad and the Sudan from 4 to 10 June (S/2006/433), concluded that the future of Darfur was tied to that of the rest of the Sudan and the wider region, and failure to resolve the Darfur crisis would bring serious regional implications. It was important that the Governments of Chad and the Sudan begin dialogue and implement the Tripoli Agreement. The Council announced its intention to review international protection of the camps in Chad and asked the Secretary-General to make recommendations in that regard. It also recommended an increase in humanitarian aid.

Agreement of 26 July. On 10 August (S/2006/637), Chad transmitted to the Security Council President the 26 July Agreement on the normalization of re-
lations between Chad and the Sudan, finalized by
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan and
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and African Inte-
gration of Chad; and the official communiqué of
the Chadian Government, following the successful
conclusion of the mini-summit held in N’Djamena
on 8 August concerning the Chad-Sudan dispute.
The leaders agreed to put an end to their dispute
through the immediate normalization of diplomatic
and economic relations.

**Security Council action.** The Security Council,
in resolution 1706(2006) of 31 August (see p. 282),
expanded UNMIS mandate with a view to impro-
ving security along the borders between the Sudan,
Chad and the Central African Republic, including
through the establishment of a multinational pres-
ence. The Secretary-General was to report on the
protection of civilians in refugee and internally dis-
placed persons camps in Chad and on ways to im-
prove the security situation on the Chadian side of
the border with the Sudan. The Secretary-General
reported to the Council in December (see p. 300).

**Reports of Secretary-General.** In September
[S/2006/764], the Secretary-General reported that re-
lations between Chad and the Sudan had improved
considerably. Under the 26 July Agreement on the
normalization of relations (above), both countries
agreed to create a political commission to follow up
on its implementation and a mixed military com-
mission to monitor the situation along their com-
mon borders, as well as deploy a mixed military
force to their respective border towns. However,
Chadian armed opposition groups remained ac-
tive in Western Darfur. On 23 August, Chadian
officials reportedly arrested seven JEM leaders in
N’Djamena. On 28 August, in Khartoum, Chad’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that his Gov-
ernment intended to hand over 17 JEM and 30 SLA-
Abdul Wahid leaders to the AU.

In October [S/2006/1041], bilateral relations be-
 tween Chad and the Sudan deteriorated, as a result of
an attack on an SAF post in Karyare and an offe-
nsive against the Government of Chad by Chadian
armed opposition groups based in Darfur. On 22
and 23 October, a new Chadian rebel group, the
Union of Forces for Democracy, presumably based
in Darfur, briefly captured the towns of Goz Beida
and Am Timam, before retreating. Violent clashes
between the rebels and Chadian armed forces en-
sued on 29 October, close to the Sudanese border.
Chad accused the Sudanese air force of bombing
several towns along its eastern frontier, which the
Government of the Sudan denied. On many oc-
casions, Chadian rebels were reported to have crossed
the border with the Sudan.

On 21 November [S/2007/104], Chad and the Su-
dan met in Tripoli under a peace initiative by the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Egypt, Eritrea and the
Central African Republic also attended. On 28
November, Chad declared itself in a “state of war”
with the Sudan over the latter’s alleged support of
Chadian rebels. On 12 December, fighting between
Chadian armed opposition groups and the Chadian
armed forces at Armankul (Western Darfur) re-
sulted in the displacement of the local population.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**

On 15 December [meeting 5595], following consul-
tations among Security Council members, the Coun-
cil President made statement S/PRST/2006/53 on
behalf of the Council:

The Security Council expresses its grave concern regarding
the increase in military activities of armed groups in
eastern Chad.

The Council strongly condemns all attempts at destabiliza-
tion by force, including the recent offensive carried out by
these groups in Biltine and Ouaddei in eastern Chad, and
supports the statement of the Chairperson of the African
Union Commission that those attacks against Chad are a
blatant violation of the principles stated in the Constitutive
Act of the African Union, including respect for the territorial
integrity and unity of member States. The Council reaffirms
that any attempt to seize power by force is unacceptable. It
recalls the importance of an open political dialogue based on
constitutional provisions to foster national reconciliation and
durable peace in the country.

The Council expresses its concern regarding the threat
that the increase in military activities of armed groups in
eastern Chad poses for the safety of the civilian population
and of humanitarian personnel and the maintenance of their
operations in the eastern part of the country. It reiterates
that the presence of a large number of refugees places a heavy
burden on the host country and the local communities, and
emphasizes the need for humanitarian aid to continue reach-
ing the people in need of assistance without any hindrance. It
calls upon the Government of Chad to do all it can to protect
its civilian population.

The Council reaffirms its deep concern about the worsen-
ing security situation in Darfur. It stresses that a peaceful
settlement of the conflict in Darfur, in accordance with the
Darfur Peace Agreement and relevant Council resolu-
tions, will contribute to restoring security and stability in
the region, in particular in Chad and the Central African
Republic, and reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty,
unity, independence and territorial integrity of all States in
the region.

The Council expresses its concern over the continuing ten-
sions between Chad and the Sudan, urges the two States to
abide fully by the obligations they assumed with regard to re-
spect for and securing of their common border in the Tripoli
Agreement of 8 February 2006 and in subsequent agreements
concluded between them, and once again urges the States of
the region to cooperate with a view to ensuring their common
stability.

The Council recalls that it looks forward to a prompt report of
the Secretary-General with recommendations, as requested
in previous relevant Council resolutions, focusing on ways of
improving security conditions on the Chadian side of the border.
with the Sudan and the monitoring of trans-border activities between Chad, the Sudan and the Central African Republic, bearing in mind the need to foster regional peace and stability.

Report of Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1706(2006)

In response to Security Council resolution 1706(2006) (see p. 282), the Secretary-General submitted a December report [S/2006/1019] on the multidisciplinary technical assistance mission to Chad and the Central African Republic to investigate the feasibility of establishing a UN operation in the region. The mission, which visited Chad and the Central African Republic from 21 November to 3 December, was not able to visit the north-eastern Central African Republic and eastern Chad, the regions bordering Darfur, due to the security situation. The report provided an overview of the political, security, humanitarian and human rights situations in both countries, in particular, the protection of civilians in refugee camps and internally displaced persons locations in Chad. It also outlined preliminary options on the mandate, structure and concept of operations of a multinational UN presence in both countries.

In Chad, the mission found that the 8 February Tripoli Agreement (see p. 297) and the 26 July N'Djamena Agreement (see p. 299) had not been implemented and relations between Chad and the Sudan had deteriorated considerably, with both countries accusing each other of supporting rebel groups and/or mercenaries seeking to destabilize their respective Governments. Rebel and criminal activities, as well as inter-ethnic clashes had increased in eastern Chad. On 7 November, Chad called for the limited deployment of an international civilian force to ensure security in the refugee camps in the east of the country and guarantee their neutrality, made up of gendarmes from African countries, and paid for by European countries and the United Nations. On 15 November, Chad alleged that genocide was being committed at the Chad-Sudanese border and accused the Sudan of instigating a “scorched-earth” policy in Darfur and eastern Chad. It called on the international community to deploy a UN force along the border with the Sudan and to effectively implement resolution 1706(2006).

As at November, Chad was hosting 232,000 Sudanese refugees in camps, most of which were located about 50 kilometres away from the border region adjacent to Darfur. In November, the Government of Chad decided that the camps should be located some 500 kilometres further inside the country, and appealed for international assistance to do so. The aim was to ensure the safety of refugees and put to rest the accusations by the Sudan that N’Djamena encouraged Sudanese rebels to use the refugee camps as a rear base. The Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees established a technical working group to identify alternative sites.

The mission found that the deployment and sustenance of any UN presence in Chad and the Central African Republic would pose enormous logistical challenges, as the terrain was difficult, weather conditions extreme and infrastructure poor. It therefore proposed two options: a monitoring mission to observe the situation in the border area, provide early warning and contribute towards improving security; or a larger monitoring and protection mission, which would, in addition, deter attacks, and provide protection, within its capabilities, to civilians under imminent threat. The latter option would have a division-sized military contingent and a police component.

The Secretary-General observed that, as there were limited prospects for a meaningful dialogue and reconciliation process between the Governments and the rebels in the two countries, and no signs of a credible and inclusive political process in Darfur, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic would face considerable risks. Unless all the parties concerned were to agree to a cease-fire and engage in an intra- and inter-State dialogue aimed at a political solution, a UN force would be operating in the midst of continuing hostilities and would have no clear exit strategy. The conditions for an effective UN peacekeeping operation did not, therefore, seem to be in place.

However, should the Security Council decide to pursue the idea, it should consider authorizing the deployment of a robust monitoring and protection mission as suggested in the second option (see above). The decision to deploy such a robust UN monitoring and protection mission should be contingent upon a cessation of hostilities and an agreement by all parties to allow the induction of the force, facilitate its operations and fully comply with its mandate. The Governments concerned should engage each other and their respective opposition groups, including armed rebel movements, in a process of dialogue and reconciliation aimed at reaching a political solution. In addition, the Council should ascertain that Member States were prepared to make available the necessary troops and police, and to assist in addressing the logistical challenges. In the meantime, the Council could authorize the dispatch of an advance team to the two
countries to collect more information on the situation in the border areas, explore the possibilities for a political agreement, and conduct further detailed planning and logistic preparations, so as to enable the Secretary-General to submit more comprehensive recommendations to the Council.

**Somalia**

At the beginning of 2006, the prospects for returning Somalia to peace and stability improved, as efforts to end the long-standing political impasse within Somalia’s transitional federal institutions resulted in the signing, on 5 January, by Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Adan, of the Aden Declaration, in which they pledged to end their differences, relocate the transitional federal institutions to Baidoa, 140 miles northwest of Mogadishu, and hold the first-ever session of the Transitional Federal Parliament. The agreement raised hopes for a resolution of the clan and faction-based conflict that had plagued the country for more than 15 years.

However, political progress was accompanied by increasingly fierce fighting in the capital, Mogadishu, between militias of the Islamic Courts and those of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. Fighting erupted in March and escalated in May, leading to the deaths of at least 220 people. The Security Council in May condemned the clashes and called for an immediate ceasefire. In early June, the Union of Islamic Courts took control of Mogadishu. The League of Arab States arranged a meeting in Khartoum on 22 June, where President Yusuf and representatives of the Union of Islamic Courts agreed to pursue dialogue. The Union gained control of eight of Somalia’s 18 administrative regions, and on 26 June, its leaders announced the creation of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts. On 4 September, at the second round of peace talks in Khartoum, the parties agreed to reconstitute a joint Somali national army and police and discuss political, power-sharing and security issues at a third round of talks to be held in October.

Clashes between Union militia and forces allied to the Transitional Federal Government renewed on 21 October. On 6 December, as requested by the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Security Council authorized the establishment of an AU/IGAD protection and training mission in Somalia to help defend the Transitional Federal Institutions in Baidoa. The Union demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, which were reportedly assisting the Government, and on 12 December, gave Ethiopia seven days to do so. The Security Council, on 22 December, voiced grave concern at the intensified fighting, as the Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by Ethiopian ground and air forces, engaged with Union forces on a 400-kilometre front. Within days, the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition had retaken several towns that had fallen to Union forces, and took control of Mogadishu on 28 December.

The United Nations Political Office in Somalia continued to fulfil its expanded role in Somalia in advancing the cause of peace and national reconciliation. The Office, headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, remained in contact with the parties and worked to get them to resume peace talks.

The Monitoring Group on Somalia, charged with investigating violations of the arms embargo imposed on the country, reported on the activities of the Transitional Federal Government, the Mogadishu-based opposition groups and the militias of the Islamic fundamentalists, and all those who violated the embargo. In May, the Security Council expressed its intention to consider specific action to improve implementation and compliance with the sanctions imposed by resolution 733(1992) [YUN 1992, p. 199]. At the request of the Council, the Secretary-General, in May and December, re-established the Group, each time for a period of six months, in order to continue its functions.

**National reconciliation process and security situation**

**Aden Declaration (January).** On 9 January, Somalia transmitted to the Security Council President the Aden Declaration [S/2006/14], signed in Aden, Yemen, on 5 January, by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, Speaker of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Parliament. With a view to reconciling and solving the differences of opinion among members of the institutions of State [YUN 2005, p. 344], the two leaders agreed to respect the principles and norms of the Transitional Federal Charter and to hold a session of Parliament within 30 days. They called upon members of Parliament and of the Transitional Federal Government to put aside their differences and unite in the interest of the nation, and called upon the international community to support efforts to convene the first session of the Transitional Federal Parliament inside the country, at a venue to be agreed upon.
On 16 January [S/2006/37], the EU welcomed the Aden Declaration and called upon the members of Parliament and the Government to respond positively to the initiative. It reaffirmed its willingness to provide logistical and financial support to facilitate the work of the Parliament.

AU decision. The AU, at its January Summit (Khartoum, the Sudan, 11-24 January), welcomed the signing of the Aden Declaration. Recalling the decision of its Peace and Security Council on the deployment of an IGAD peace support mission, to be followed by an AU peace support mission, the Summit asked the UN Security Council for an exemption of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733(1992) [YUN 1992, p. 199] to facilitate the envisaged deployment.

Report of Secretary-General (February). In his February report on the situation in Somalia [S/2006/122], submitted pursuant to the Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2001/30 [YUN 2001, p. 210], the Secretary-General said that the President, the Speaker and the Prime Minister met again in Nairobi, Kenya, on 14 January, and were joined the following day by Prime Minister Gedi for their first meeting since the May 2005 split within the leadership of the transitional federal institutions, and later with Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki. At those meetings, they underscored their commitment to the Aden Declaration and to the early convening of Parliament. At a meeting with François Lonsény Fall, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, the Somali President and Prime Minister requested his assistance in securing a waiver of the UN arms embargo for the training of the Somali national police and army.

After consultations among the leaders of the transitional federal institutions, the Speaker announced, on 30 January, that Baidoa had been selected as the venue of the first session of the Transitional Federal Parliament inside Somalia, to be held on 26 February. There were reports that Prime Minister Gedi had concerns regarding the choice of Baidoa, and the President called upon the international community to help bring the Prime Minister on board. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative and a group of ambassadors met in Jawhar with Prime Minister Gedi on 1 February. The Prime Minister expressed concern about the security situation in Baidoa, but reaffirmed his commitment to the Aden Declaration and stated his willingness to work towards resolving outstanding issues with the President.

Insecurity remained a significant problem for aid agencies in much of the country. Inter- and intra-clan clashes over land, water and grazing rights resulted in many civilian casualties, especially in central and southern Somalia, making humanitarian access difficult. Reports indicated continuing violations of the arms embargo, while increasing attacks on ships and other acts of piracy hampered UN relief activities. Piracy had become a major problem along the east coast at Somalia, where more than 34 attacks on commercial shipping had been reported between March 2005 and January 2006. On 21 January 2006, a United States Navy warship captured 10 suspected Somali pirates off the coast of Somalia and handed them over to Kenyan authorities, which had started legal proceedings to prosecute them. Extremist activities were reportedly increasing in Mogadishu and in Lower Juba, and fighting increased between Shariah Court militias and those of other factions in north Mogadishu. Some militias were suspected of having links to Al-Qaeda operatives.

The humanitarian situation deteriorated significantly, due to the worst drought in a decade. The number of people in need of urgent assistance rose to 1.7 million. In addition, some 400,000 internally displaced persons continued to need assistance and protection. In February, UNDP Somali Emergency Budgetary Support Project planned to pay allowances to members of Parliament and to help establish a Parliament secretariat for its first session. UNDP also funded four policy studies on key civil service issues through its Governance and Financial Services Programme.

The Secretary-General observed that the signing of the Aden Declaration created encouraging prospects for reconciliation among the leaders of the transitional federal institutions. Those leaders faced complex political and security challenges, including the development of a national security and stabilization plan, the promotion of reconciliation and the urgent need to improve the humanitarian situation and the quality of life. The international community should continue supporting the political reconciliation efforts, especially the convening of the Transitional Federal Parliament.

EU statement (March). On 3 March [S/2006/166], the EU welcomed the opening session of the Transitional Federal Parliament in Baidoa on 26 February, and reiterated its intention to maintain its political, moral and material support for the transitional federal institutions.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 15 March [meeting 5387], following consultations among Security Council members, the Presi-
dent made statement S/PRST/2006/11 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council reaffirms all previous statements by its President and its resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular the statements by its President of 14 July and 9 November 2005.

The Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 21 February 2006 and reaffirms its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia and its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council commends the efforts of the President of the Somali Republic and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament towards reconciliation and dialogue, particularly the signing, with the facilitation of the Government of Yemen, of the Aden Declaration on 5 January 2006, which culminated in the convening of the first session of the Transitional Federal Parliament inside Somalia, in Baidoa on 26 February 2006. The Council encourages all leaders and members of the transitional federal institutions to continue their efforts towards inclusive dialogue and consensus-building within the framework of the transitional federal institutions and in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic adopted in February 2004.

The Council welcomes and supports the convening of the first session of the Transitional Federal Parliament and looks forward to sustained sessions of the Transitional Federal Parliament as Somali leaders seek peacefully to resolve their differences. The Council calls upon the Transitional Federal Parliament to promote peace and reconciliation in its work towards implementing the Transitional Federal Charter and encourages the members of the Transitional Federal Parliament to use this opportunity to address key issues of national concern. In this regard, the Council urges the members of the transitional federal institutions to continue to organize their work in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter, such as the formation of independent commissions and parliamentary committees, which will provide a framework for addressing the complex and divisive issues of the transitional period.

The Council reiterates the urgent need for the rapid finalization of an agreed national security and stabilization plan, to include a comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire agreement, as well as plans for the restoration of public safety and security institutions and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The Council reiterates its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and calls upon all Member States to provide their full and active support in this regard.

The Council remains seriously concerned over the continued intermittent fighting and armed violence, kidnapping and other use of force, particularly in recent incidents in the capital Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, which have caused loss of life among innocent civilians and have the potential to undermine the current progress achieved by the leaders of the transitional federal institutions. The Council calls upon all the parties to cease all hostilities and resolve their differences peacefully in the spirit of the Aden Declaration through the framework of the transitional federal institutions.

The Council expresses its growing concern over the situation of 1.7 million Somalis in a state of humanitarian emergency or suffering from serious malnutrition, severe livelihood distress and the rising civil and food insecurity in parts of southern Somalia. The Council urges all Somali leaders to ensure complete and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as provide guarantees for the safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers in Somalia. The Council emphasizes the importance of the international commitment and coordinated support for improving the humanitarian situation.

The Council commends the neighbouring countries, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and concerned Member States for their keen interest and persistent efforts in support of the peace, reconciliation and recovery process in Somalia. The Council encourages them to continue to use their influence in support of the transitional federal institutions, in particular to help them in their efforts to move ahead on the key issues of security and national reconciliation.

The Council welcomes the African Union summit decision on Somalia of 25 January 2006, including the possible deployment of an Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia, to be followed by an African Union Peace Support Mission. In the event that a national security and stabilization plan includes the need for a peace support mission, the Council reiterates that it expects the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority to work out a detailed mission plan in close coordination with and with the broad consensus of the transitional federal institutions and consistent with the national security and stabilization plan. The Council stands ready to consider an exemption to the arms embargo imposed against Somalia by Council resolution 733(1992) on the basis of such a mission plan.

The Council takes note of resolution A.979(24), adopted on 23 November 2005 at the twenty-fourth session of the biennial Assembly of the International Maritime Organization, concerning the increasing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia. The Council encourages Member States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law. In this regard, the Council welcomes the communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Jawhar, Somalia, on 29 November 2005, in which the Council of Ministers decided to coordinate its strategies and action plans to face this common challenge in close collaboration with the international community. The Security Council further urges cooperation among all States, particularly regional States, and active prosecution of piracy offences.

The Council takes note of the annual report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751(1992) concerning Somalia and the mid-term briefing of the Monitoring Group on Somalia to the Committee. The Council condemns the increased inflow of weapons into Somalia and the continuous violations of the United Nations arms embargo, and further reminds all States of their obligations to comply fully with the measures imposed by resolution 733(1992) and urges them to take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable. Continued violations of these measures prevent the establishment of a stable and secure...
environment and undermine the efforts of those who seek to establish peace in Somalia.

The Council reaffirms its full support to the peace process in Somalia and welcomes the commitment of the United Nations to assist in this regard. In this connection, the Council encourages the transitional federal institutions and the international partners to reinvigorate the Coordination and Monitoring Committee in the interest of a more effective international engagement in the peace, reconciliation and recovery process in Somalia.

**Fighting in Mogadishu**

The political progress in Somalia was accompanied by some of the worst fighting for nearly a decade in Mogadishu, pitting militias loyal to the leaders of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) against those of the Shariah Courts. ARPCT, formed on 18 February and comprising Government ministers, powerful businessmen and faction leaders, had the stated aim of uprooting terrorist elements reportedly linked to some of Mogadishu’s Shariah Courts, which, in the absence of a functioning central or city government, provided basic security and social services in the city. While not all of the Shariah Courts had extremist leanings, some had been accused of being responsible for assassinations, terrorist attacks, and harbouring foreign terrorism suspects. However, leaders of the Transitional Federal Government distanced themselves from ARPCT, and urged them to go to Baidoa to work with them in the fight against terrorism.

Fighting erupted in Mogadishu on 22 March, when militia loyal to Abukar Umar Adani, believed to be the main financier of the Shariah Courts, attacked militia loyal to Bashir Raghe Shirar, a prominent businessman and ARPCT member. The fighting was seen as a continuation of the clashes that had taken place in January between the same militias for the control of the port of El-Ma'an. The fighting, which lasted four days, resulted in the death of at least 60 people, most of them civilians. Another intermittent round of clashes continued throughout April, with neither side achieving substantial success, and erupted again on 6 May in North Mogadishu, between militia loyal to the Chairman of the Union of Islamic Courts, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and others loyal to ARPCT member Nur Hassan Ali “Nur Dicle”, leading to the displacement of 17,000 people. Both sides used heavy weapons indiscriminately, killing at least 160 people, mostly civilians. At least 60 people were reported killed in renewed fighting between 24 and 27 May. The fighting ended on 2 June, with the Courts’ militias having made significant territorial gains, especially in central Mogadishu. Some ARPCT leaders fled to Jowhar, while others were reported to have regrouped in north Mogadishu. On 4 June, Shariah Courts militias were reported to have taken control of Balad, a town on the road to Jowhar.

Meanwhile, at a Summit held in Nairobi on 20 March, IGAD Heads of State and Government reiterated their decision to deploy a peace support mission to Somalia and urged the UN Security Council to approve a partial lifting of the embargo, not only for the proposed mission but also to enable the Transitional Federal Government to raise a national army and police force.

**Security Council press statements (May).** In a 16 May press statement [SC/8722], Security Council members expressed concern at the reports of violence in Mogadishu, leading to a large number of casualties, particularly among civilians, and the displacement of thousands of people. They called for an unconditional and immediate ceasefire by the warring parties so as to allow the resumption of humanitarian activities, the rescue of survivors and the recovery of the deceased. They urged all parties to return to dialogue and reconciliation and work within the framework of the transitional federal institutions.

In another statement of 31 May [SC/8735] condemning the resumption of fighting in Mogadishu, Security Council members again called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire and urged both sides to find solutions within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. They reiterated the urgent need for a rapid finalization of an agreed national security and stabilization plan, as called for in presidential statement S/PRST/2006/11 (see p. 303), and called upon Member States to strictly comply with the arms embargo.

**Further political developments**

**Report of Secretary-General (June).** Reporting in June [S/2006/418], the Secretary-General said that, following the first extraordinary session of the Transitional Federal Parliament in Baidoa on 26 February, the transitional federal institutions addressed some of the key differences that had divided the leadership and paralysed the political process. Differences over the interim location of the institutions were resolved on 22 April, when the Parliament endorsed Baidoa as the interim seat of the Transitional Federal Government and Parliament. The Parliament established 14 parliamentary committees and set up a national constitutional commission. At a meeting in Baidoa on 21 May, the Council of Ministers adopted the draft national security and stabilization plan, which was submitted to Parliament for consideration. The plan provided
for the deployment of an IGAD/AU peace support mission, the details of which were to be prepared in consultation with those institutions.

However, concerns remained about insecurity in Baidoa. On 13 April, an agreement was signed in Wajid, formally ending the dispute between factions of the former Rahanweyn Resistance Army, and reconciling Hassan Mohamed Nur “Shattigudud” with a rival group headed by Mohammed Ibrahim “Habsade“. Years of fighting in and around Baidoa had generated a large number of freelance militias without allegiance to any faction leader. The continued activity of those militia posed a significant security challenge to Baidoa and the surrounding areas. Efforts by local leaders to dismantle checkpoints and restore order had limited success. There was an urgent need for those leaders to agree on an appropriate administrative structure and to relocate the freelance and other factional militias to camps outside the city. Some international assistance had been provided for that purpose and the United Nations planned to begin a cash-for-work programme to support the demobilization of some of the encamped militiamen.

The central and southern regions of the country also remained insecure due to the absence of formal State structures, clan disputes and political and resource-related disputes. In Kismayo, which had been relatively calm, the security situation became fragile owing to the emergence of localized disputes along the Lower Juba Valley and a spill-over of tension from Mogadishu. However, in the north, “Somaliland” remained relatively peaceful and continued to make substantial progress in development and reconstruction, while intensifying efforts to obtain international recognition. Neighbouring “Puntland” was generally stable, although disagreements remained within the administration. The dispute between “Somaliland” and “Puntland” over the Sool and Sanaag areas continued.

The human rights situation continued to be of great concern. Perpetrators of human rights abuses acted with impunity. Violence against women was endemic and the rights of minority groups remained unprotected. There was no functional administration of justice. Elders dispensed justice through the practice of compensation. In Mogadishu, the Shariah Courts had established their own private detention centres, inaccessible to defence lawyers and human rights defenders. Somali human rights organizations continued to operate in a context of insecurity and fear.

The United Nations and donors provided support for the first session of Parliament in Baidoa, including by rehabilitating the Parliament’s facilities and paying stipends to its members. UN programmes and agencies carried out training programmes and workshops for prospective Supreme Court judges, civil society leaders, civil servants and youth, as well as vaccination campaigns against polio, measles and tetanus.

Fighting in Mogadishu and the continuing insecurity in Baidoa risked undermining the significant gains in Somalia’s political process, the Secretary-General observed. The priorities were to achieve an enduring ceasefire in Mogadishu, strengthen the transitional federal institutions, and build a bridge between Mogadishu and Baidoa. Effective transitional federal institutions would enable Somalia to strengthen its internal security and deal with such threats as terrorism. There was an urgent need to assist in the establishment of a district administration in Baidoa to provide basic services and enforce public security. Greater international commitment and coordinated support were also needed to alleviate the plight of Somalis and improve the humanitarian situation.

Consolidation of Islamic Courts control of Mogadishu

Report of Secretary-General. After defeating the ARPCT forces in June, the Union of Islamic Courts had consolidated their control over Mogadishu and restored a semblance of security, said the Secretary-General in his October report [S/2006/838]. The fall of Mogadishu was followed by the extension of the Union of Islamic Courts’ authority into the regions of Middle Shabelle, Hiran, parts of Galgudud and Mudug, the traditional heartland of the Hawiye clan. The Islamic Courts’ influence also extended to the Lower Shabelle and the Lower Juba region. On 26 June, the leaders of the Union of the Islamic Courts announced the creation of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts, comprising a 90-member legislative committee, and an executive committee. The rapid expansion of the Courts’ influence posed a threat to the transitional federal institutions, which already faced difficulties in extending their authority beyond Baidoa. The Islamic Courts reopened Mogadishu International Airport on 15 July and the main seaport on 23 August; both had been out of operation for more than a decade.

To reduce tension between the Transitional Federal Government and the Courts, the League of Arab States organized a meeting in Khartoum on 22 June, attended by the three main leaders of the transitional federal institutions—the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker—and by a lower-level delegation of the Islamic Courts. By a communiqué [S/2006/442] issued on the same day, following
a meeting of the League’s Ministerial Committee on Somalia, in Khartoum, the Somali parties, Somali President Yusuf and representatives of the Union of Islamic Courts conveyed their agreement to recognize the legitimacy of the Somali Transitional Government; recognize the Union of Islamic Courts; continue dialogue without preconditions; bring war criminals to justice; remain committed to the cessation of military campaigns; address security and political issues at the next round of talks on 15 July; and form technical committees to make proposals on those issues. The Committee appealed for rapid assistance, including urgent humanitarian assistance.

EU statements. On 29 June, [S/2006/486], the EU welcomed the agreement, as a basis for negotiation between the two sides and reaffirmed its readiness to provide political and material support.

In a 14 July letter to the Secretary-General [S/2006/561], the EU condemned the fighting in Mogadishu and expressed support for the efforts of the League of Arab States to facilitate dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and the Union of Islamic Courts.

Soon after signing the agreement (see above), however, each side accused the other of violating it, and the Courts accused the Transitional Federal Government of inviting Ethiopian troops into the country. As a result, the second round of talks scheduled for 15 July, was postponed. The Special Representative, meeting on 25 July in Baidoa with the three leaders of the transitional federal institutions, and later that day in Mogadishu with the head of the executive committee of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts, encouraged all parties to send a delegation to Khartoum for the second round of talks.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 13 July [meeting 5486], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/31 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council reaffirms all previous statements by its President and its resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular the statement by its President of 15 March 2006.

The Council reiterates its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia and its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council reiterates its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. François Fall. The Council encourages Mr. Fall and other United Nations agencies and offices to actively engage in the region to promote peace and stability. It calls upon all Member States to provide him their full support in this regard.

The Council supports the Transitional Federal Government and Transitional Federal Parliament as the internationally recognized authorities to restore peace, stability and governance to Somalia. It notes the importance for stability in Somalia of broad-based and representative institutions and of an inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter.

The Council welcomes the agreement reached in Khartoum on 22 June 2006 between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts, transmitted to the President of the Council on 29 June 2006. The Council commends the League of Arab States for facilitating the talks. The Council condemns the recent fighting in Mogadishu and requests all parties to adhere to the ceasefire agreed to on 22 June 2006. In this regard, the Council emphasizes the importance of dialogue between the transitional federal institutions and the Islamic Courts.

The Council therefore urges all parties involved in this dialogue to engage constructively at the next round of talks, scheduled for 15 July 2006, when it looks forward to further progress in pursuit of a lasting political process.

The Council requests all parties inside and outside of Somalia to refrain from action that could provoke or perpetuate violence and violations of human rights, endanger the ceasefire and political process, or further damage the humanitarian situation.

The Council expresses its grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia, and demands that all Somali leaders ensure complete and unhindered humanitarian access, as well as providing guarantees for the safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers in Somalia.

The Council commends the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development for their continuing efforts to promote peace and stability in Somalia and the region. The Council notes their meetings held on 19 June and 28 and 29 June 2006, and welcomes the role of the fact-finding mission of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States and the European Union to Somalia from 5 to 7 July 2006 in promoting peace, stability and a political process.

The Council welcomes the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held in Banjul on 5 July 2006, and notes the request made at that meeting for the Council to consider an exemption to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by its resolution 733(1992) of 23 January 1992, to pave the way for the possible deployment of a peace support mission and to help to facilitate the re-establishment of the national security forces of Somalia.

The Council states its willingness, if it judges that a peace support mission would contribute to peace and stability in Somalia, to consider the above request for a peace support mission, on the basis of a detailed mission plan from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development or the African Union.

The Council welcomes the fact that the Transitional Federal Government and the Transitional Federal Parliament were able to agree on 14 June 2006 to adopt the National Security and Stabilization Plan for Somalia. The Council believes that the adoption of a security plan is an important step towards providing a framework for effective security sector reform in Somalia, in order to help to deliver peace for all Somalis.

The Council expresses its readiness to consider a limited modification of the arms embargo to enable the transitional federal institutions, on the basis of a sustainable peace
Further peace efforts

Internal squabbles prevented the Transitional Federal Government from establishing its own authority, the Secretary-General said in his October report [S/2006/838]. On 26 July, a number of parliamentarians, including ministers, criticized the leadership style of Prime Minister Gedi and some ministers subsequently resigned. On 30 July, the Prime Minister narrowly survived a parliamentary no-confidence vote. The vote, however, did not resolve the crisis and more ministers resigned. On 5 August, an Ethiopian delegation, led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin, arrived in Baidoa on a mediation mission, which led to the signing of a 6 August memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the crisis. On 10 August, the President dissolved the Government and asked Prime Minister Gedi to appoint a leaner, better qualified cabinet. On 18 August, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding, the Prime Minister announced a new Council of Ministers comprising 31 ministers, five ministers of state and 31 assistant ministers. On 18 September, the Parliament endorsed the new Government by 174 votes in favour to 25 against.

The second round of peace talks, which opened in Khartoum on 2 September, under the auspices of the League of Arab States, led to the signing of the 4 September agreement, in which the Transitional Federal Government and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts pledged to reconstitute the Somali national army and national police force and reintegrate the forces of the Islamic Courts, the Transitional Federal Government and other armed militias once an agreement on a political programme was in place; discuss political, power-sharing and security issues in a third round of talks, to be held on 30 October in Khartoum; establish a joint committee to follow-up on the agreement; and form a technical committee, consisting of the Arab League presidency (the Sudan), its General secretariat, and Committee on Somalia, and representatives from the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts. Following the second round of talks, the European Commission offered to establish a task force to facilitate inter-Somali dialogue, which would work with the League of Arab States to provide technical and financial support to the transitional federal institutions and the Islamic Courts for the functioning of the follow-up committees envisaged in the 4 September agreement.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative maintained contact with the Transitional Federal Government and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts, urging them to refrain from any provocative actions and to find a negotiated solution. As requested by the Security Council on 13 July, in presidential statement S/PRST/2006/31 (see p. 306), he visited Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Uganda and Yemen for consultations with the leaders of those countries.

Meeting in Brussels on 17 July, and in Stockholm on 29 August, the International Contact Group on Somalia (Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States) together with the AU, EU, IGAD, the League of Arab States and the United Nations, urged the parties to engage in consultations with a view to resolving their differences, build confidence and address issues of common concern.

On 5 September, a summit meeting of IGAD member States endorsed the deployment plan for the IGAD-led support mission for Somalia, which was approved by the AU Peace and Security Council on 13 September. However, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts opposed the proposed peace mission, and in a 24 September letter to UN Security Council members, urged the Council to maintain the arms embargo and to give the Khartoum negotiations a chance.

Security in Baidoa remained unstable. On 28 July, the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Abdallah Deerow Isaq, was murdered while leaving a mosque after Friday prayers. On 4 September, the Transitional Federal Government police clashed with local clan militias over control of the airport, killing at least 10 militiamen. On 8 September, the Transport Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, a former Baidoa faction leader, called on the Transitional Federal Government to relocate from Baidoa, saying that it was no longer welcome there. Following the murder of an Italian nun and her bodyguard in Mogadishu on 17 September, the attempt on the life of the President (see below) and threats against UN staff, the United Nations, in September, relocated its international staff from Baidoa to Nairobi and suspended all missions to Mogadishu. President Yusuf narrowly survived an assassination attempt on 18 September, when a car bomb exploded as he was leaving Parliament. The international community, the transitional federal institutions and
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts condemned the assassination attempt, in which at least 11 people died. The police arrested three suspects on 29 September.

As some 1.8 million people, mostly along the southern Gedo region and Juba Valley, were in need of critical assistance, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia led three missions to Mogadishu, meeting with leaders of the Islamic Courts, business leaders and civil society groups. The outflow of refugees into Kenya continued unabated, exacerbated by insecurity and the effects of the drought. Since January, some 25,000 new Somali refugees had been registered at the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, most of them fleeing clashes between the Islamic Courts and warlord militias in Mogadishu and Kismayo, which came under control of the forces of the Islamic Courts on 24 September.

The seasonal smuggling of Ethiopian migrants and Somali nationals to Yemen from ports in “Puntland” also continued. Reports indicated that since the beginning of 2006, close to 12,000 Somalis and Ethiopians had arrived in Yemen from Bossaso.

The United Nations supported a seminar on the re-establishment of the judiciary, the training and equipping of police cadets in Baidoa, a demobilization and reintegration initiative in “Somaliland” and “Puntland” and a civilian weapons registration project in Hargeisa, the de facto capital of “Somaliland”. From June to September, UNICEF provided training on education to 1,779 head teachers and training on peacebuilding to 4,000 teachers.

As later reported by the Secretary-General [S/2007/115], the military forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia in December, dislodged the Islamic Courts, which had gained control of eight of Somalia’s 18 administrative regions. Clashes between Islamic Courts militia and forces allied to the Transitional Federal Government began on 21 October near the town of Buale, Middle Juba region. Other clashes followed around the town of Burhakaba in the Bay region, 60 kilometres south-east of Baidoa. Remnants of the Islamic Courts were pursued in southern Somalia by forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopia.

The third round of peace talks was postponed due to differences between the parties. The Islamic Courts demanded the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia and objected to Kenya serving as co-chair of the talks on behalf of IGAD. Transitional Federal Parliament Speaker and a number of parliamentarians, who had travelled to Mogadishu, reached an agreement with the Islamic Courts on resuming dialogue, but the Government refused to accept it, as the Speaker had not consulted with the Parliament or the Government. The Special Representative sought to mend the growing rift between the Speaker and the Government and encouraged the Government and the Islamic Courts to return to the Khartoum talks.

The Islamic Courts stated that the deployment of foreign forces was tantamount to an invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia. Intermittent clashes followed in the Bay region, and on 7 December the Islamic Courts took the town of Idale, and reached Daynune, a Government military training camp 30 kilometres south of Baidoa. Both sides accused each other of relying on support from foreign elements. The Defence Chief of the Islamic Courts, on 12 December, gave Ethiopia seven days to withdraw its forces. On 20 December, heavy fighting broke out once more in southern Somalia’s Bay region and spread to the central Galkayo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle administrative regions, where Islamic Courts forces confronted warlords of the former ARFCT, who were allied with the Transitional Federal Government. On 23 December, Islamic Courts leaders called for jihad against the Ethiopian troops and appealed to foreign fighters for support. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, on 24 December, stated that his Government had taken self-defense measures and started counter-attacking the aggressive extremist forces of the Islamic Courts and foreign terrorist groups. The Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by Ethiopian ground and air forces, engaged with the Islamic Courts forces on a front stretching more than 400 kilometres, from the Lower Juba Valley in the south to the region of Galkayo in central Somalia. Within days, the towns of Bandiradley (Galkayo), Beletweyne (Hiran), Bulo-barde (Middle Shebelle), Burhakaba (Bay) and Dinsor (Bay) fell to the Transitional Federal Government/Ethiopian coalition. Mogadishu fell to the coalition on 28 December. Meanwhile, heavy rains in November displaced an estimated 454,000 people in the south.

**Authorization of IGAD mission in Somalia**

On 6 December [meeting 5579], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1725(2006). The draft [S/2006/940] was submitted by the United Republic of Tanzania, Ghana, the Congo and the United States.

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Reiterates that the Transitional Federal Charter and the transitional federal institutions offer the only route to achieving peace and stability in Somalia, emphasizes the need for continued credible dialogue between the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, and affirms, therefore, that the following provisions of the present resolution, based on the decisions of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, aim solely at supporting peace and stability in Somalia through an inclusive political process and creating the conditions for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Somalia;

2. Urges the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts to fulfil commitments they have made, resume without delay peace talks on the basis of the agreements reached in Khartoum, and adhere to agreements reached in their dialogue, and states its intention to consider taking measures against those that seek to prevent or block a peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the transitional federal institutions by force, or take action that further threatens regional stability;

3. Decides to authorize the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and member States of the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia, to be reviewed after an initial period of six months by the Security Council with a briefing by the Intergovernmental Authority, with the following mandate drawing on the relevant elements of the mandate and concept of operations specified in the deployment plan for the Peacekeeping Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia:

(a) To monitor progress by the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue;

(b) To ensure free movement and safe passage of all those involved with the dialogue process;

(c) To maintain and monitor security in Baidoa;

(d) To protect members of the transitional federal institutions and the Transitional Federal Government as well as their key infrastructure;

(e) To train the transitional federal institutions’ security forces to enable them to provide their own security and to help to facilitate the re-establishment of national security forces of Somalia;

4. Endorses the specification in the deployment plan of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development that those States that border Somalia would not deploy troops to Somalia;

5. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733(1992) and further elaborated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425(2002) shall not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment and technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the force referred to in paragraph 3 above;
6. Encourages Member States to provide financial resources for the Peacekeeping Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia.

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the African Union Commission and the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the mandate of the Peacekeeping Mission of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia within thirty days, and every sixty days thereafter.

8. Emphasizes the continued contribution made to Somalia’s peace and security by the arms embargo, demands that all Member States, in particular those of the region, fully comply with it, and reiterates its intention to consider urgently ways to strengthen its effectiveness, including through targeted measures in support of the arms embargo;

9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Statement by Eritrea. In a 15 December letter to the Secretary-General [S/2006/1009], President, Isaias Afwerki, said that at its June and August meetings at the Foreign Minister level, IGAD had decided to promote sustainable peace in Somalia by supporting the dialogue initiated in Khartoum. While there was consensus among IGAD member States on Somalia’s political realities, there was no understanding to deploy a peacekeeping force in support of one faction or to request a partial lifting of the arms embargo. Several IGAD members, including Eritrea, had insisted that any peacekeeping arrangement would follow the achievement of a viable framework for a political solution. Arrangements for a peacekeeping force had been considered merely on a contingency basis, and for eventual reactivation when and if necessary. Thus, Security Council resolution 1725(2006) did not reflect the unified position of IGAD. He urged the United Nations not to become a party to a misguided approach that would sow further conflict and suffering in Somalia and the region as a whole.

Security Council consideration (December). Briefing the Security Council on 26 December [S/PV/5614], the Secretary-General’s Special Representative said that the crisis in Somalia had escalated dangerously, involving foreign forces and the use of heavy weapons and aircraft, which had dealt a serious blow to an early resumption of peace talks. The fighting had also compounded an already serious humanitarian crisis, resulting in additional displacement of populations. In a 22 December statement, the Secretary-General deplored the fighting and called on both sides to cease hostilities and resume peace talks without delay or preconditions. He expressed concern at reports of the involvement of foreign forces in the conflict and implored all concerned to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Secretary-General spoke with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the President of Kenya on 26 December and reiterated the need to encourage the Somali partners to resume peace talks. On 4 December, the Islamic Courts pledged to consider the Special Representative’s appeal to return to dialogue, but denied that they were harbouring international terrorist suspects. They reiterated their invitation for an international fact-finding mission to visit Somalia to verify that claim. The International Contact Group on Somalia, meeting on 19 December, in Nairobi, to discuss the worsening situation, also called on the parties to resume direct talks and to guarantee support and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance. On 20 December, the EU Commissioner, on a visit to Somalia, discussed the possibility of establishing the joint verification mechanism proposed at previous rounds of the Khartoum talks and presented both
sides with a draft memorandum of understanding on avoiding conflicts and resuming dialogue, which they did not accept.

**Report of Secretary-General on IGASOM.** On 28 December [S/2006/1042] the Secretary-General, in his first report on the implementation of the mandate of an IGAD Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), as requested by resolution 1725(2006), said that, while Uganda and the Sudan had initially indicated their willingness to provide the first two battalions for IGASOM, the Sudan recently voiced its opposition to the intervention of foreign troops in Somalia, while Uganda expressed reluctance to deploy its troops in the absence of a secure environment. No other troop-contributing countries seemed to have been identified, and there was no information on whether financial resources and logistical support for deploying IGASOM had been secured.

**United Nations Political Office for Somalia**

The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), established in 1995 [YUN 1995, p. 402] and headed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, continued to assist in advancing the cause of peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The Office, through the United Nations Trust Fund for Peacebuilding in Somalia, carried out three projects, focusing on the reconstitution and revival of the judiciary, the establishment of a national reconciliation commission and the organization of a seminar on federalism and constitutional affairs. The judiciary project sought to assist in establishing a judicial commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Somali legal traditions and the rule of law through training and capacity-building for judges and other court personnel. The national reconciliation commission project sought to build national capacity to meet the reconciliation objectives defined in the Transitional Federal Charter. A five-day seminar in May, in Baidoa, on federalism and constitutional affairs, organized to help members of Parliament prepare for the drafting of a new federal constitution, saw more than 180 of the 275 members of Parliament attending. The Office also established a security sector technical working group to provide a forum for coordinating security sector reform.

On 20 April [S/2006/261], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to extend the mandate of his Special Representative for Somalia and Head of the UNPOS until 8 May 2007. On 25 April [S/2006/262], the Council took note of that intention.

**Financing**

The Secretary-General, in his March report [A/60/585/Add.1] on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, presented resource requirements for the Office from 31 January to 31 December in the amount of $7,129,200 net ($7,770,400 gross). A CABQ on 10 March [A/60/7/Add.37] endorsed that request.

The General Assembly, on 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252 approved the budget in that amount, as part of the $326,500,000 budget of special political missions (see p. 1615).

**Arms embargo**


On 22 May [S/2006/313] and 15 December [S/2006/986], the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the experts he had appointed to the Monitoring Group.

**Report of Monitoring Group (May).** As requested by Security Council resolution 1630(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 349], the Nairobi-based Monitoring Group of four experts re-established by the Secretary-General for a period of six months [ibid., p. 350], continued to investigate arms embargo violations, update the draft list of individuals and entities violating the embargo and make recommendations.

In its 5 April report [S/2006/229], which the Committee transmitted to the Council on 4 May, the Group said that arms embargo violations and the militarization of central and southern Somalia continued. Violations were related to arms and ammunition, military advice and training, military materiel and equipment, and financial support. The arms embargo violators were the three principal antagonists—the Transitional Federal Government, the Mogadishu-based opposition groups and militant Islamic fundamentalists—as well as the business elite, pirate groups, and clans involved in feuds over natural resources and other issues.

Like the other main contenders, the Islamic fundamentalists contending for political power
in Somalia through violent means obtained arms and equipment in violation of the arms embargo on a sustained basis. All parties obtained their supplies from three basic sources: a widening circle of States that clandestinely provided support to the antagonist of their choice; the arms supermarket in Mogadishu, the Bakaraaha Arms Market; and individuals and businesses. While States were the main suppliers of military support and funding, powerful individuals and businesses also channelled arms, military equipment and financial support to the antagonist of their choice.

The Monitoring Group uncovered the existence of a number of Mogadishu-based business cartels and associated businesses with sprawling business empires inside and outside of Somalia, generating millions of dollars each year, portions of which were spent to maintain well-equipped militias and support warlords. They also had direct relationships with the militant fundamentalists; in some cases, they were themselves militants. Business cartels, associated businesses and local administrations created a powerful cross-clan web of economic vested interests. Their combined economic, military and political strength was powerful enough to maintain a status quo that preserved their interests and bring the process of establishing a new government to a standstill. Supplies violating the embargo were shipped from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Italy, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The report recommended an integrated arms embargo on Somalia, complemented by an embargo on the export of charcoal and fish, and a ban on foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters, in order to curtail funds to embargo violators who accrued revenues from exporting charcoal and issuing rights to foreign businesses for fishing in the Somali exclusive economic zone. It also recommended targeted sanctions against individuals and entities violating the embargo.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,


Reaffirming also the importance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating the urgent need for all Somali leaders to take tangible steps to continue political dialogue,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia,

Stressing the need for the transitional federal institutions to continue working towards establishing effective national governance in Somalia,

Commending the efforts of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in support of the transitional federal institutions, and welcoming the continued support of the African Union for national reconciliation in Somalia,

Taking note of the report of the Monitoring Group of 5 April 2006 submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 (i) of resolution 1630(2005) and the observations and recommendations contained therein,

Condemning the significant increase in the flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, which constitutes a violation of the arms embargo and a serious threat to the Somali peace process,

Concerned about the increasing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia, and their impact on security in Somalia,

Reiterating its insistence that all Member States, in particular those in the region, should refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and should take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable,

Reiterating and underscoring the importance of enhancing the monitoring of the arms embargo in Somalia through persistent and vigilant investigation into the violations, bearing in mind that strict enforcement of the arms embargo will improve the overall security situation in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Stresses the obligation of all Member States to comply fully with the measures imposed by resolution 733(1992);

2. Expresses its intention, in the light of the report of the Monitoring Group of 5 April 2006, to consider specific actions to improve implementation of and compliance with the measures imposed by resolution 733(1992);

3. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751(1992) (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”), to re-establish within thirty days of the date of adoption of the present resolution, and for a period of six months, the Monitoring Group referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 1558(2004), with the following mandate:

(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587(2005);
(b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

(c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

(d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733(1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

(e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425(2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474(2003) of 8 April 2003, and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519(2003), 1558(2004), 1587(2005) and 1630(2005);

(f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

(g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

(h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within ninety days of its establishment;

(i) To submit, through the Committee, for consideration by the Council, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than fifteen days prior to the termination of the mandate of the Monitoring Group;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the work of the Monitoring Group;

5. Reaffirms paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of resolution 1519(2003);

6. Requests the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the Monitoring Group and other relevant United Nations entities, to consider the recommendations contained in the report of the Monitoring Group of 5 April 2006 and recommend to the Council ways to improve implementation of and compliance with the arms embargo, in response to continuing violations;

7. Also requests the Committee to consider, when appropriate, a visit to Somalia and/or the region by its Chairman and those he may designate, as approved by the Committee, to demonstrate the determination of the Council to give full effect to the arms embargo;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Report of Monitoring Group (October). In accordance with the above Security Council resolution, the Monitoring Group issued its report on 16 October [S/2006/913], which the Committee transmitted to the Council on 21 November. The Group said that the Union of Islamic Courts had become the pre-eminent force in central and southern Somalia and had consolidating its grip in the areas under its control, while the much weaker Transitional Federal Government, was attempting to hold on to its tenuous power base in Baidoa.

Those developments were accompanied by rampant arms flows to the Transitional Government and the Union of Islamic Courts. Behind the scenes, large cargo aircraft and ocean-going dhows clandestinely delivered arms and military support from States, arms-trading networks and others. Both contenders were engaged in an aggressive military build-up, which involved obtaining a wide variety of arms, including surface-to-air missiles, military materiel and trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms. Both sides, especially the Islamic Courts, had the financial capacity to maintain their military machinery and were supported by the presence inside Somalia of combat troops, military trainers and advisers from certain States. Eritrea supported the Islamic Courts, and Ethiopia and Uganda, the Transitional Government.

The Monitoring Group requested information on their activities from several States, businesses and other entities. Some of the respondents provided information that was not relevant to the questions asked, others gave conflicting responses, and all denied any involvement in violating the arms embargo.

To offset the momentum towards a military catastrophe, the Group recommended strengthening the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort to curtail or cut off the flow of arms and materiel by air, sea and land; applying financial sanctions on significant Somali businesses; and pursuing a high-level international diplomatic effort to disengage States from contributing to the military build-up.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 29 November [meeting 5575], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1724(2006). The draft [S/2006/921] was submitted by Qatar.

The Security Council,
Reaffirming also the importance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Stressing the need for the transitional federal institutions to continue working towards establishing effective national governance in Somalia,

Reiterating the urgent need for all Somali leaders to take tangible steps to continue political dialogue,

Commending the efforts of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the League of Arab States for their continued support for national reconciliation in Somalia, and urging both the transitional federal institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts to recommit to the principles of the Khartoum Declaration of 22 June 2006 and the agreements made at the meeting held in Khartoum from 2 to 4 September 2006 and to engage in the next round of talks without further delays,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia,

Taking note of the report of the Monitoring Group of 16 October 2006 submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 (i) of resolution 1676(2006) and the observations and recommendations contained therein,

Condemning the significant increase in the flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, which constitutes a violation of the arms embargo and a serious threat to peace and stability in Somalia,

Reiterating its insistence that all Member States, in particular those in the region, should refrain from any action in contravention of the arms embargo and should take all necessary steps to hold violators accountable,

Reiterating and underscoring the importance of enhancing the monitoring of the arms embargo in Somalia through persistent and vigilant investigation into the violations, bearing in mind that strict enforcement of the arms embargo will improve the overall security situation in Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Stresses the obligation of all Member States to comply fully with the measures imposed by resolution 733(1992);

2. Expresses its intention, in the light of the report of the Monitoring Group of 16 October 2006, to consider specific action to improve implementation of and compliance with measures imposed by resolution 733(1992);

3. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751(1992) (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”), to re-establish within thirty days of the date of adoption of the present resolution, and for a period of six months, the Monitoring Group referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 1558(2004), with the following mandate:

   (a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587(2005);

   (b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

   (c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

   (d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733(1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;

   (e) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the previous reports of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolutions 1425(2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474(2003) of 8 April 2003, and on the previous reports of the Monitoring Group appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519(2003), 1558(2004), 1587(2005), 1630(2005) and 1676(2006);

   (f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

   (g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

   (h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within ninety days of its establishment, and to submit progress reports to the Committee on a monthly basis;

   (i) To submit, through the Committee, for consideration by the Council, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than fifteen days prior to the termination of the mandate of the Monitoring Group;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to support the work of the Monitoring Group;

5. Reaffirms paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of resolution 1519(2003);

6. Requests the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the Monitoring Group and other relevant United Nations entities, to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the Monitoring Group of 5 April and 16 October 2006 and recommend to the Council ways to improve implementation of and compliance with the arms embargo, in response to continuing violations;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Communication. On 29 November [S/2006/943], Uganda, in its response to the Monitoring Group’s report, objected to its inclusion in the list of arms embargo violators and questioned the Monitoring Group’s methodology and conclusions. Affirming its commitment to the arms embargo, Uganda denied the allegations in the report and challenged the Monitoring Group to provide evidence implicating it.
Financing of Monitoring Group

On 31 January [A/60/585/Add.1], the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly estimated financial requirements for the Monitoring Group, from 1 January to 31 December 2006, amounting to $1,626,600 net ($1,646,900 gross).

Acabq, on 10 March [A/60/7/Add.37], endorsed that amount. The General Assembly on 22 December, in section VII of resolution 61/252 (see p. 1615) approved the budget in that amount, as part of the $326,500,000 budget for special political missions.

Eritrea-Ethiopia

The United Nations, in 2006, maintained its presence in Eritrea and Ethiopia to assist both countries in implementing the June 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and the December 2000 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, both signed in Algiers (the Algiers Agreements), which regulated their border dispute that had led to armed conflict in 1998 and subsequent intermittent fighting. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (unmee), established in 2000, continued to monitor the border region, also referred to as the Temporary Security Zone, which marked the formal separation of forces, and to support the work of the five-member Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, the neutral body mandated under the terms of the Peace Agreement to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border. During the year, the Security Council extended the unmee mandate five times.

To resolve the impasse between the two countries, the United States, in January, launched a new peace initiative, which was endorsed by the Security Council. The Council, on 24 February, urged both countries to abide by the Boundary Commission's decisions. During the year, Eritrea imposed new restrictions on unmee monitoring and verification activities and detained several unmee personnel. The situation deteriorated in October, when some 1,500 Eritrean troops and 15 tanks entered the Temporary Security Zone. On 17 October, the Council called on Eritrea to withdraw and urged both sides to exercise restraint. At year's end, some 2,000 Eritrean troops remained inside the Zone, equipped with battle tanks, anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers.

During the year, the Boundary Commission failed to advance its demarcation activities, stalled since 2003, following the rejection by Ethiopia of significant parts of the Commission's 2002 final and binding delimitation decision, previously accepted by both parties. Ethiopia maintained that specific delimitation problems on the ground should be resolved through negotiations by the parties, while Eritrea pointed out that the Commission's 2002 delimitation decision was final. On 27 November, the Commission announced that, because of impediments in fulfilling its mandate, it planned to demarcate the border on maps, leaving the two countries to establish the physical boundary. The Commission decided to give Ethiopia and Eritrea one year to reach an agreement on border demarcation. If they failed to do so, the locations established in its 2002 delimitation decision would take effect. Ethiopia and Eritrea rejected the proposal. Eritrea maintained that the Algiers Agreements required the Commission, not the parties, to implement the 2002 delimitation decision, while Ethiopia held the view that the Commission was acting beyond its mandate.

Implementation of Algiers Agreements

Report of Secretary-General (January). In his January report on Ethiopia and Eritrea [S/2006/1], submitted pursuant to security Council resolution 1320(2000) [YUN 2000, p. 174], the Secretary-General said that, despite the efforts of the international community, the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea had deteriorated as a result of the protracted stalemate caused by Ethiopia's non-compliance with the implementation of the Boundary Commission's decisions [YUN 2002, p. 187], lack of dialogue between the two countries, the dangerous escalation of tensions, including the forward movement of troops and heightened military activity in and around the Temporary Security Zone, and the exacerbation of the situation caused by the restrictions imposed by Eritrea on unmee, including most recently, the helicopter ban and the arbitrary demand that Mission staff of certain nationalities be removed. Since the situation had become untenable as a result of those restrictions, and in response to Security Council presidential statement S/PRST/2005/62 [YUN 2005, p. 363], the Secretary-General proposed options for the future of the Mission: maintain its current configuration but with a diminished monitoring capacity, with the hope that diplomatic initiatives would unblock the current stalemate; relocate the entire unmee headquarters and related units from Asmara to Addis Ababa, leaving only a small liaison office in the Eritrean capital; transform unmee into an observer mission, either on both sides of the Temporary Security Zone or exclusively on the Ethiopian side, with limited monitoring and conflict prevention capabilities; deploy a strong preventive force entirely south of the Temporary Security Zone currently held by Ethiopia; downgrade unmee to a liaison mission, maintaining a small office in each

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capital, while pursuing efforts towards a political solution; or withdraw unmee entirely. While none of the options was perfect, the Council would have to take into consideration the objective reality on the ground, the attitudes of the parties and the international community’s commitment to the implementation of the Algiers Agreements [YUN 2000, p. 173].

Communication (January). On 2 January [S/2006/3], Eritrea stated that for four years, Ethiopia had flouted international law and continued to occupy its sovereign territories and to reject the award of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. The Council, by failing to exercise its moral and legal responsibilities in regard to Ethiopia’s rejection of the Commission’s final and binding award, was condemning the violation of the rule of law and potentially sowing the seeds of tension and instability in the region.

Statement by Algiers Agreements Witnesses. The United States, on 22 February [S/2006/126], transmitted to the Security Council President the statement issued the same day by the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements (the African Union, Algeria, the European Union, the United Nations and the United States) following their meeting in New York, in which they endorsed the United States’ diplomatic initiative (see above) to resolve the impasse in the peace process; stressed that the parties had to implement the Algiers Agreements fully and without qualifications uphold their commitment to the binding determinations of the Boundary Commission; urged the Commission to meet with the parties and consider holding technical discussions, supported by a neutral facilitator, to assist with the demarcation process; and urged the parties not to restrict unmee operation.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 24 February [meeting 5380], following consultations among Security Council members, the President made statement S/PRST/2006/10 on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council welcomes the successful convening of the meeting of the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements in New York on 22 February 2006 and their efforts to resolve the current impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in order to promote stability between the parties and lay the foundation for sustainable peace in the region.

The Council calls upon both parties to show maximum restraint and refrain from any threat or use of force against each other.

The Council emphasizes that both parties bear the primary responsibility for the full, unconditional and expeditious implementation of the Algiers Agreements.

The Council recalls that, under the Algiers Agreements, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have agreed to accept the delimitation and demarcation decisions of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as final and binding.

In this regard, the Council calls upon both sides to cooperate with the Boundary Commission to implement its decisions without further delay.

The Council urges the Boundary Commission to convene a meeting with the parties to prepare to resume demarcation and strongly urges the two parties to attend the Boundary Commission meeting and to cooperate with and abide by the requirements specified by the Boundary Commission, in order to successfully conclude the demarcation process.

The Council commends the role of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and expresses once again its deep appreciation for the contribution and dedication of the troop-contributing countries to the work of the Mission.

The Council demands that the parties permit the Mission to perform its duties without restrictions and provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of these duties, including its mandated task to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implementation of the delimitation decision, in accordance with Council resolutions 1430(2002) and 1466(2003).

The Council calls upon Member States to provide continued support for the Mission and contributions to the trust fund established pursuant to Council resolution 1177(1998) and referred to in article 4, paragraph 17, of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000, in order to support the demarcation process.

Report of Secretary-General (March). In his March report [S/2006/140], the Secretary-General said that, while there had been no serious incidents, the military situation remained tense. Since their redeployment from forward positions in December 2005, as requested by the Security Council in resolution 1640(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 360], Ethiopia’s armed forces remained deployed south of the Temporary Security Zone in a defensive posture. On the Eritrean side, Eritrea’s defence forces conducted training exercises in the areas adjacent to the Zone. Unmee observed the continued presence of groups of armed personnel inside the Zone at more than 15 locations. Since they refused to identify themselves, unmee suspected that at least some of them could be regular troops rather than militia.

Eritrea’s restrictions on unmee continued to inhibit its ability to carry out its task. Unmee patrols experienced restrictions on their freedom of movement inside the Zone, especially in Sectors West and Centre. As a result of the helicopter ban and restrictions on ground patrols, unmee could monitor only about 40 per cent of the territory in its area of responsibility. However, the Mission, to the extent possible, continued to carry out its major monitoring and verification functions, carrying out more than 100 patrols per day and maintaining dozens of checkpoints.

At the thirty-fourth meeting of the Military Coordination Commission (Nairobi, Kenya, 13 Janu-
ary), Eritrea stated that it could not accept Security Council resolution 1640(2005) because it dealt with secondary issues, while overlooking Ethiopia’s intransigence with regard to border demarcation. Ethiopia expressed concern over the degradation of the Mission’s monitoring capability due to Eritrea’s restrictions, as well as its expulsion of UNMEE staff of selected nationalities. Both countries expressed appreciation for UNMEE work and reaffirmed their commitment to peace. As at 28 February, the UNMEE military component stood at 3,355, comprising 3,069 troops, 78 headquarters staff and 208 military observers.

On 1 March, an Indian peacekeeper who had suffered a cardiac arrest in Adigrat (Ethiopia) died after having been evacuated to Addis Ababa, instead of the UNMEE hospital in Asmara because of the helicopter ban, including on aerial medical evacuations. That was the tenth instance since Eritrea imposed the helicopter ban in October 2005, in which UNMEE had to carry out medical evacuation by alternative means. The temporary relocation of staff, in December 2005, following Eritrea’s demand that UNMEE personnel of certain nationalities leave the country, limited the Mission’s operations, with most civilian components seriously understaffed. On 23 January, Eritrea imposed new immigration regulations on UNMEE personnel, requiring them to apply for entry and exit visas five days prior to arrival or departure. The new procedures presented further unacceptable operational constraints and contravened the model status-of-forces agreement and the UN Charter. Furthermore, between 11 and 14 February, Eritrean security personnel detained 27 locally recruited UNMEE staff.

The United States diplomatic initiative and the 22 February meeting of the Algiers Agreements Witnesses were positive developments aimed at ending the stalemate, the Secretary-General observed. In view of those developments, the Security Council had decided to maintain UNMEE current configuration. In the circumstances, he recommended that the Council extend the Mission’s mandate for two to three months to allow the diplomatic process to proceed and the forthcoming meeting of the Boundary Commission to bear fruit.

Report of Boundary Commission (March). The Boundary Commission, in its twentieth report [S/2006/140, annex II], issued in March and covering its activities from 1 December 2005 to 28 February 2006, stated that, although there had been little change in the situation, it was seeking to arrange a meeting with the parties in March as a further attempt to secure the consent of the parties to the resumption of the demarcation process interrupted in 2003.

Security Council press statement. By a 3 March press statement [SC/8656], Security Council members expressed their condolences at the death of a member of UNMEE Indian contingent (see above) and stated their concern that the death occurred in the circumstances of the “unacceptable restrictions” imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE operations, which had grave implications for staff safety and should be lifted without further delay.

Communication. On 6 March [S/2006/143], Eritrea expressed its condolences over the death on 1 March of the Indian peacekeeper, Kamble Ramesh Annappa. While his death was to be mourned, it was sad that the Security Council and the Secretary-General, in recent statements, had chosen to politicize it and blame it on Eritrea, which had no control over what happened in Ethiopia. The circumstances, including the location of the incident and the medical response time, raised more questions. It would have been more appropriate to look into the UNMEE mechanisms for coping with emergencies than to link the incident to Eritrea’s restrictions. Eritrea refused to be used as a scapegoat and could not accept statements that failed to honestly assess incidents that occurred outside of its jurisdiction.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION


The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and the statements by its President pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the requirements contained therein, including in particular resolutions 1622(2005) of 13 September 2005 and 1640(2005) of 23 November 2005, as well as the statement by its President of 24 February 2006,
Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (“the Algiers Agreements”),
Stressing further that lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea (hereinafter referred to as the parties) as well as in the region cannot be achieved without the full demarcation of the border between the two parties, and recalling that both parties have agreed to accept the delimitation and demarcation decisions of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as final and binding,
Reaffirming its strong commitment to ensure that the two parties permit the United Nations Mission in Ethio-
pia and Eritrea to perform its duties without restrictions and provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of these duties, and, in this regard, stressing that the demarcation of the border cannot proceed effectively unless the Mission is allowed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations,

Welcoming the successful convening of the meeting of the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement in New York on 22 February 2006, as well as the convening of the meeting of the Boundary Commission in London on 10 March 2006,

Bearing in mind the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 January and 6 March 2006 and the options on the future of the Mission contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea for a period of one month, until 15 April 2006;
2. Demands that the two parties fully comply with resolution 1640(2005), in particular paragraphs 1 and 5 thereof;
3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

On 13 April [meeting 5410], the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1670(2006). The draft [S/2006/232] was prepared in consultations among Council members.

The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and the statements by its President pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the requirements contained therein, including in particular resolutions 1640(2005) of 23 November 2005 and 1661(2006) of 14 March 2006, as well as the statement by its President of 24 February 2006,

Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (“the Algiers Agreements”),

Stressing further that lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea (hereinafter referred to as the parties) as well as in the region cannot be achieved without the full demarcation of the border between the two parties, and recalling that both parties have agreed to accept the determinations of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as final and binding,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to ensure that the two parties permit the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea to perform its duties without restrictions and provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of these duties, and, in this regard, stressing that demarcation of the border cannot proceed unless the Mission is allowed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations,

Welcoming once again the successful convening of the meeting of the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreement in New York on 22 February 2006, as well as the convening of the meeting of the Boundary Commission in London on 10 March 2006, and looking forward to the next meeting of the Boundary Commission,

Stressing that the unacceptable restrictions on the Mission, which must be lifted, have drastically reduced the operational capacity of the Mission and could lead to serious implications for the future of the Mission,

Commending the role of the Mission, and expressing once again its deep appreciation for the contribution and dedication of the troop-contributing countries to the work of the Mission, despite the immense difficulties which they are facing,

Mindful of the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 January and 6 March 2006 and the options on the future of the Mission contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea for a period of one month, until 15 May 2006;
2. Demands that the parties fully comply with resolution 1640(2005), in particular paragraphs 1 and 5 thereof;
3. Calls upon Member States to provide continued support for the Mission and contributions to the trust fund established pursuant to resolution 1177(1998) of 26 June 1998 and referred to in article 4, paragraph 17, of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000, in order to support the demarcation process;
4. Affirms its intention, in the event that it determines that the parties have not demonstrated full compliance with resolution 1640(2005) by the beginning of May 2006, to review the mandate and troop level of the Mission by 15 May 2006, with a view to a decision on possible adjustments of the Mission, as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 January 2006, including, inter alia, a transformation into an observer mission;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.


The Security Council,
Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and the statements by its President pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea (hereinafter referred to as the parties) as well as in the region cannot be achieved without the full demarcation of the border between the two parties, and recalling that both parties have agreed to accept the determinations of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as final and binding,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (“the Algiers Agreements”),

Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (“the Algiers Agreements”),

Bearing in mind the progress achieved at the meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission held in London on 10 March 2006, and looking forward to a...
positive outcome at the next meeting of the Boundary Commission on 17 May 2006,

1. Decides to extend the current mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea until 31 May 2006;

2. Demands that the parties fully comply with resolution 1640(2005), in particular paragraphs 1 and 5 thereof;

3. Calls once again upon Member States to provide continued support for the Mission and contributions to the trust fund established in support of the demarcation process;

4. Decides, in the event that it determines that the parties have not demonstrated full compliance with resolution 1640(2005), in the light of the outcome of the meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission on 17 May 2006, that it shall adjust the mandate and troop level of the Mission by the end of May 2006;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the parties' compliance with resolution 1640(2005) within seven days of the adoption of the present resolution, and to provide to the Council any further recommendations on adjusting the Mission to focus on support for the demarcation process;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Boundary Commission meeting (May).** On 21 May [S/2006/362], the Boundary Commission President transmitted to the Secretary-General a report on the Commission's meeting with the parties on 17 May, in London. At that meeting, the Commission announced its intention, as a first step towards the resumption of the demarcation process, to reopen its field offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara. However, progress in that regard was impeded by UN administrative procedures and the need for the re-establishment of arrangements to ensure the security of the Commission's field personnel. Eritrea had submitted a security plan in 2003, but Ethiopia had not yet done so. The Commission reiterated its request that Ethiopia produce by 19 May a security plan based on the assumption that UNMEE would continue to play its part in the demarcation process.

The full resumption of UNMEE role for the continuation of the demarcation process was discussed. The Commission was advised that any significant reduction in the size of UNMEE would seriously impair its ability to protect the surveyors and demining personnel. The parties did not disagree with that assessment and Eritrea expressed the hope that its Government would be able to withdraw the restrictions affecting the Commission's work. Ethiopia, while accepting the Commission's 2002 decision, maintained that, difficulties in demarcating the border could only be resolved by negotiations between the parties, thus implying that the decision of the Commission with which Ethiopia did not agree might not be binding.

The meeting decided that demarcation would resume as soon as the Commission was assured that UNMEE would be retained in the area at a level to enable it to provide adequate support to the field staff; the parties should confirm their proposed security arrangements; contracts could be concluded with the surveyors and the contractors; and both parties should cooperate fully with the Commission in the field. The Commission proposed convening a further meeting on 15 June.

**Communications.** On 22 May [S/2006/323], Ethiopia submitted to the Security Council and the Secretary-General a report on its compliance with resolution 1640(2005) and its cooperation with the United States-led peace initiative. The report said that Ethiopia had fully complied with the requirements of that resolution and was cooperating with the peace initiative. Ethiopia had accepted resuming border demarcation with the support of a neutral facilitator, and to entering into normalization talks. It was committed to the peaceful settlement of all disputes with Eritrea in accordance with the Algiers Agreements, fully supported the new peace initiative and had demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the Boundary Commission. Eritrea, on the other hand, had rejected resolution 1640(2005), and continued to deploy its military forces in the Temporary Security Zone, prevent UNMEE from fulfilling its mandate and place obstacles to border demarcation and the peace initiative. Ethiopia called on the Council to ensure that Eritrea restored the integrity of the Zone, removed all restrictions against UNMEE and entered into political dialogue.

Ethiopia, on 25 May [S/2006/328], transmitted to the Council a letter from its Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Boundary Commission. The Legal Counsel said that Eritrea, in a 22 May letter, had misrepresented Ethiopia's actions toward the Commission. Eritrea had erected practical barriers to demarcation activities and had refused to honor the Commission's instructions to withdraw from the Zone and remove restrictions against UNMEE. Ethiopia, unlike Eritrea, had sent senior government officials to attend Commission meetings, had appointed field liaison officers and was eager to submit a security plan so that demarcation could resume. Eritrea rejected Eritrea's assertion that Ethiopia alone was responsible for the current delays. It was Eritrea that had raised physical barriers to demarcation and, in its 22 May letter, had refused to remove them. Ethiopia was committed to settling all disputes peacefully, supported the
new peace initiative and had shown willingness to cooperate with the Boundary Commission.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,

Reaffirming all its previous resolutions and the statements by its President pertaining to the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea (hereinafter referred to as the parties) and the requirements contained therein, including in particular resolutions 1320(2000) of 15 September 2000, 1430(2002) of 14 August 2002, 1466(2003) of 14 March 2003, 1640(2005) of 23 November 2005 and 1678(2006) of 15 May 2006, as well as the statement by its President of 24 February 2006,

Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (‘the Algiers Agreements’), and the importance of prompt implementation of the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as a basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between the parties,

Reaffirming the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone as provided for in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, and recalling the objectives of its establishment and the commitment of the parties to respect the Zone,

Stressing further that the full demarcation of the border between the two parties is vital to lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in the region, and recalling that both parties have agreed to accept the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Boundary Commission as final and binding,

Welcoming the convening of the meetings of the Boundary Commission in London on 10 March and 17 May 2006, and supporting the ongoing Boundary Commission process,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to ensure that the two parties, as agreed by them, permit the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea to perform its duties and provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of these duties,

Commending the role of the Mission, and expressing once again its deep appreciation for the contribution and dedication of the troop-contributing countries to the work of the Mission, despite the immense difficulties which they are facing,

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to keep the operations of the Mission under close review while continuing to take into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties, and to revert to the Security Council with recommendations, as appropriate, for further adjustments to the mandate, force levels and concept of operation of the Mission as soon as warranted,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 January and 6 March 2006 and the options on the future of the Mission contained therein,

Noting paragraph 4 of resolution 1678(2006),

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea for a period of four months, until 30 September 2006;

2. Authorizes the reconfiguration of the military component of the Mission, and, in this regard, approves the deployment within the Mission of up to 2,300 troops, including up to 230 military observers, with the existing mandate, as stipulated in resolution 1320(2000) and further adjusted in resolution 1430(2002);

3. Demands that the parties fully comply with resolution 1640(2005);

4. Calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, in order to resume the demarcation process, stresses that the parties have primary responsibility for the implementation of the Algiers Agreements, and calls again upon the parties to implement completely and without further delay the decision of the Boundary Commission and to create the necessary conditions for demarcation to proceed expeditiously;

5. Demands that the parties provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties, including its mandated task to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implementation of the delimitation decision, in accordance with resolutions 1430(2002) and 1466(2003), and demands that any restrictions be lifted immediately;

6. Calls upon Member States to provide continued support for the Mission and contributions to the trust fund established pursuant to resolution 1177(1998) of 26 June 1998 and referred to in article 4, paragraph 17, of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000, in order to support the demarcation process;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council closely and regularly informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Report of Secretary-General (September).** In his September report [S/2006/749], the Secretary-General said that the military situation in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas remained generally stable but tense. Ethiopian troops continued to train and maintain defence facilities in areas adjacent to the Zone, but without any significant change in their strength close to the Zone’s southern boundary. On the Eritrean side, Eritrean forces carried out routine training and maintenance activities outside the Zone but had not significantly increased their deployment inside the Zone and adjacent area. However, some 650 additional militia
had entered the Zone in Sector West, reportedly for farming activities. Eritrea's restrictions on unmee, including on the freedom of movement in Sectors West and Centre of the Zone, continued to impede the Mission's ability to effectively monitor the Zone and the adjacent area on the Eritrean side.

At the thirty-seventh meeting of the Military Coordination Commission (Nairobi, 30 July), Ethiopia expressed concern over the drastic reduction of unmee strength which, coupled with Eritrea's restrictions, further affected the Mission's ability to carry out its tasks. Eritrea, for its part, regretted the lack of progress in demarcating the border and argued that the downsizing of unmee would not resolve the stalemate. Both reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process. Following Eritrea's expression of concern about the constraints of holding future commission meetings in Nairobi, the parties agreed to meet in a third country in the region, to be determined, and requested unmee to facilitate the meeting.

Since early May, Eritrea had detained some 29 locally recruited unmee staff, usually on the grounds that they were required to fulfil national service obligations. Four of them remained in detention, including on the freedom of movement in Sectors West and Centre of the Zone, continued to impede the Mission's ability to effectively monitor the Zone and the adjacent area on the Eritrean side.

The Mission destroyed more than 200 unexploded ordnance and four anti-personnel mines. Unmee provided mine risk education to 4,101 inhabitants, focusing on those who had recently returned from internally displaced persons camps.

The June meeting of the Boundary Commission did not take place as Eritrea refused to attend. It also refused to attend the meeting planned for 24 August, while Ethiopia did not respond to the invitation.

Expressing concern about the untenable stalemate in the peace process four years after the 2002 decision of the Boundary Commission, the Secretary-General observed that the parties' political will to finally resolve the issue and implement the Commission's decision remained elusive. The meetings of the Boundary Commission and the ongoing United States diplomatic initiative, supported by the Security Council, gave the parties a unique opportunity to resolve the stalemate. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend unmee mandate for six months, until 31 March 2007.

**Report of Boundary Commission (September).** The Boundary Commission, in its twenty-first report (S/2006/749, annex II) issued in September, and covering its activities from 21 May to 31 August, stated that Eritrea had declined to attend the 15 June meeting because it felt that Ethiopia had still not accepted the delimitation decision without qualification. The Commission held an internal meeting on 15 June, believing that it might be helpful in reopening its field offices in Asmara and Addis Ababa. In spite of the lack of cooperation from the parties, the Commission, with unmee assistance, reopened its field office in Addis Ababa on 7 August, but was unable to reopen one in Asmara. On 21 August, Eritrean President Isaias set out a number of fundamental issues that needed to be settled before other aspects of the process could be addressed, including Ethiopia's acceptance of the Boundary Commission decision before any other matters could be discussed. The Commission met from 22 to 24 August, without the participation of the parties, to review the situation and consider how best to advance its work. Its next meeting was scheduled for November.

**SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION**


The Security Council,

Stressing its unwavering commitment to the peace process and to the full and expeditious implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000 and the preceding Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities signed on 18 June 2000 (the “Algiers Agreements”), and the importance of prompt implementation of the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission as a basis for peaceful and cooperative relations between the parties,

Reaffirming the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone as provided for in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 18 June 2000, and recalling the objectives of its establishment and the commitment of the parties to respect the Zone,

Commending the efforts made by the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and its military and civilian personnel to accomplish its duties, despite the difficult circumstances,

Stressing further that the full demarcation of the border between the two parties is vital to lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in the region, and recalling that both parties have agreed to accept the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Boundary Commission as final and binding,

Expressing its full support for the ongoing process, aimed at implementing the final and binding decision of the Boundary Commission,

Taking note of the statement by the Mission of 25 September 2006 on allegations against Mission staff,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 September 2006,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea for a period of four months, until 31 January 2007;
2. Reiterates its demand, expressed in paragraph 1 of resolution 1640(2005), that Eritrea reverse, without further delay or preconditions, all restrictions on the movement and operations of the Mission, and provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties, and in this regard expresses its deep concern at the recent expulsion of Mission personnel by Eritrea;
3. Reiterates its call, expressed in paragraph 2 of resolution 1640(2005), for the parties to show maximum restraint and refrain from any threat or use of force against each other;
4. Reiterates its demand, expressed in paragraph 5 of resolution 1640(2005), that Ethiopia accept fully and without delay the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission and take immediately concrete steps to enable, without preconditions, the Commission to demarcate the border completely and promptly;
5. Regrets the lack of progress on demarcation, calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with the Boundary Commission, including attending meetings of the Commission, stresses that the parties have primary responsibility for the implementation of the Algiers Agreements, and calls again upon the parties to implement completely and without further delay or preconditions the decision of the Commission and to take concrete steps to resume the demarcation process;
6. Demands that the parties provide the Mission with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties, including its mandated task to assist the Boundary Commission in the expeditious and orderly implementation of the delimitation decision, in accordance with resolutions 1430(2002) and 1466(2003), and demands that any restrictions be lifted immediately;
7. Intends, in the event that it determines that the parties have not demonstrated progress towards demarcation by 31 January 2007, to transform or reconfigure the Mission as the Security Council may decide;
8. Also intends to review the situation before 30 November 2006, in order to prepare for possible changes by 31 January 2007, and to that end requests the Secretary-General to present updated options for possible changes to the mandate of the Mission;
9. Expresses its willingness to reconsider any changes to the Mission that it may make in accordance with paragraph 7 above in the light of subsequent progress towards demarcation, and also expresses its readiness to take further decisions to ensure that the Mission will be able to facilitate demarcation as progress becomes possible;
10. Calls upon Member States to provide contributions to the trust fund established pursuant to resolution 1177(1998) of 26 June 1998 and referred to in article 4, paragraph 17, of the comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea on 12 December 2000, in order to support the demarcation process;
11. Expresses its deep appreciation for the contribution and dedication of the troop-contributing countries to the work of the Mission;
12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Violation of the Temporary Security Zone

The Secretary-General reported [S/2006/992] that the security situation in and around the Temporary Security Zone had deteriorated further. On 16 October, in the most serious violation of the Zone’s integrity, some 400 Eritrean soldiers, along with military vehicles, six battle tanks and one anti-aircraft gun entered the Zone’s Sector West. At the same time, some 1,000 Eritrean troops, with artillery guns, rocket-propelled grenades and 10 battle tanks, forcefully passed the UNMEE checkpoint at Maileba heading towards Om Hajer located in the Zone’s Sector West. In the following two weeks,
Eritrea sent some 745 additional troops and stopped all movement of unmee patrols in the area.

On the same day, the Secretary-General stated that the incursion constituted a major breach of the ceasefire and urged Eritrea to withdraw. While some Eritrean forces withdrew or moved out temporarily, some 2,000 troops remained inside the Zone, equipped with battle tanks, anti-aircraft guns and multi-barrel rocket launchers. Eritrea stated that the troops had been moved to “help harvest crops” from state-owned farms in the area, and that their movements were “a natural decision” due to development projects in the area. Ethiopia condemned the incursion as a provocation and a flagrant violation of the Algiers Agreements.

Security Council press statement. In a 17 October press statement [SC/8854], Security Council members expressed their concern over reports that Eritrean Defence Forces had moved approximately 1,500 troops and 15 tanks into the Temporary Security Zone. Such actions were contrary to the 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Security Zone. Such actions were contrary to the Algiers Agreements. Security Council members called upon Eritrea to immediately withdraw its troops and to extend its full cooperation to unmee, particularly in maintaining the ceasefire arrangements. They called upon both parties to show maximum restraint and to refrain from any threat or use of force against each other.

Communication. On 23 October [S/2006/840], Eritrea expressed concern about the Security Council’s press statement on its troop movements to the southwestern part of its territory to conduct developmental work. Eritrea’s troop movements to its own sovereign territory constituted neither an incursion nor a breach of the Algiers Agreements. The Council’s concern was misplaced and the blame for not advancing in the peace process ought to be placed where it belonged. The Eritrean Defence Forces had been building and maintaining basic infrastructure in all parts of the country. Eritrea had refrained from deploying its defence forces in the southern part of the country bordering Ethiopia, with the expectation that the border would be demarcated expeditiously, in accordance with the Boundary Commission’s decision.

Eritrea had exercised maximum restraint for over four years, refraining from any developmental work in its border territories to allow maximum time and opportunity for the Council to use its leverage over Ethiopia’s intransigence. Eritrea would therefore exercise its legitimate right of vigorously pursuing its development policy in its own sovereign territory.

Despite having acted in good faith in all its commitments, Eritrea continued to be targeted unjustly by some Council members. In that connection, the Council should take the necessary steps to implement the Boundary Commission decision without interfering in the Commission’s mandate.

Boundary Commission demarcation decision

On 9 November, the Boundary Commission President informed the Secretary-General that he intended to convene a meeting with both Governments on 20 November, in The Hague, to discuss a proposal to demarcate the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia by coordinates, thus avoiding the need to place boundary pillars on the ground. The Commission also invited the Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements to the meeting. The Commission had to take that action because of the persistent lack of cooperation by the parties, neither of which had granted it access to the border area to erect boundary pillars on the ground and complete the demarcation process. Using image-processing and terrain-modelling to demarcate the boundary, by identifying the location of boundary points by both grid and geographical coordinates, allowed a degree of accuracy that did not differ significantly from pillar site assessment and emplacement undertaken in the field.

Communications. On 15 November [S/2006/890], Ethiopia expressed dismay at the Commission’s 20 November demarcation decision, which noted that, since the Commission’s 2002 delimitation decision [YUN 2002, p. 187], a careful process had been established, involving field work for demarcating the boundary. Ethiopia, although concerned that the process did not conform to international practice, as it did not allow sufficient consideration of anomalies between the 2000 delimitation decision and the realities on the ground, had been encouraged by the Commission’s recognition that those difficulties existed and that a cooperative process was needed.

Meanwhile, Eritrea had moved troops in the Temporary Security Zone, placed restrictions on unmee, stalled the demarcation process and asserted its right to seize by force territory allocated to it under the delimitation decision. Against that background, it was impossible to understand the Commission’s plan to issue a demarcation decision, notwithstanding the parties’ and Witnesses’ understanding that final demarcation would be impossible without a cooperative process.

Since the Commission’s President did not provide a clear indication of the nature of the proposed demarcation decision, Ethiopia would not be able to comment on it at the proposed meeting. The is-
suance of a demarcation decision was inconsistent with the Commission's responsibilities and mandate. Noting the 9 November letter of the Boundary Commission President to the Security Council, which suggested that action by the Commission, at its proposed 20 November meeting, would complete the demarcation process and fulfill a precondition for “transfer of territorial control”, Ethiopia said that any decision purporting to effect a final demarcation under those circumstances would be invalid; therefore, there was no question of a transfer of territorial control.

Ethiopia urged the Commission to withdraw that communication and cancel the meeting. If the Commission wished to proceed along that path, Ethiopia would have to conclude that, by its own action, the Commission had lost its mandate under the Algiers Agreements.

On 20 November [S/2006/905], Eritrea stated that it could not agree with the Boundary Commission's decision to schedule a meeting to reconsider the modalities for demarcating the boundary. Had Ethiopia complied with its obligations to cooperate with the Commission in demarcating the boundary, the process would have been completed years ago. From Ethiopia's response to the Commission, it was clear that Ethiopia's position had not changed and the country would not implement the award.

Eritrea remained committed to the delimitation/demarcation process of the Algiers Agreements and the Commission 2002 Award. The Commission should face the problem of Ethiopia's non-compliance directly rather than search for ways to avoid the issue. To alter or modify the terms of the award would be beyond the Commission's authority. Any attempt to accommodate Ethiopia's demands to change the boundary ruling would therefore be ultra vires and without effect.

**Boundary Commission statement.** The Commission, meeting in The Hague on 20 November, in the presence of the Witnesses, including the United Nations, explained its decision to demarcate the boundary by coordinates and invited the Witnesses to express their views. At the end of the meeting, the Commission informed the participants that it would issue a statement on the issue.

On 27 November, the Commission, in a statement [S/2006/992, enclosure], announced that the most practical way to carry out its mandate was to provide the parties with the list of boundary points that it had identified by the techniques indicated on 9 November. The list provided the locations at which, if allowed, the Commission would construct permanent pillars. The list and explanatory comments annexed to the Commission's statement were accompanied by 45 maps illustrating the boundary points. The boundary so illustrated did not differ significantly from the one identified in the 2000 delimitation decision, although two areas (Tserona and Zalambessa) had been clarified. Since the Commission could not remain in existence indefinitely, it proposed that the Parties, over the next 12 months, consider their positions and seek to reach agreement on the emplacement of pillars. If, by the end of that period, the parties failed to do so or permit the Commission to resume its activity, the boundary would automatically stand as demarcated and the Commission would deem its mandate as fulfilled. In the meantime, the Commission remained in existence and until such time as the boundary was finally demarcated, the 2002 demarcation decision was the only valid legal description of the boundary. The Commission urged the parties to cooperate with it to expeditiously implement the demarcation of the border.

**Further developments**

**Report of Secretary-General (December).** In his December special report on Ethiopia and Eritrea [S/2006/992], submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1710(2006) (see p. 322), the Secretary-General said that the security situation in and around the Temporary Security Zone had deteriorated further. On 16 December, Eritrean armed militia stopped at gunpoint, threatened and temporarily detained an UNMEE patrol inside the Zone's Sector West. On 22 December, about 350 Eritrean militias entered the Zone in Sector Centre.

Eritrea instituted further measures, which affected UNMEE ability to perform its tasks. It imposed a ceiling on the purchase of diesel fuel and turned down the Mission's request to import diesel fuel directly. That situation severely restricted the Mission's operation, forcing it to introduce austerity measures. Eritrea stated, on 1 November, that it did not recognize the appointment of Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia) as the Secretary-General's Acting Special Representative, even though he had been appointed since 11 August. Mr. Ennifar had to relocate to Addis Ababa. Eritrea then stated that UNMEE officials could have their visas revoked if they attended functions in Addis Ababa convened by Mr. Ennifar. On 29 November, Eritrea stated that Mr. Ennifar should not be maintained as the Head of the Mission and not decide on operational issues related to the border question, regardless of his location. On 6 November, Eritrea notified UNMEE that, owing to the threat of bird flu, it had banned the importation of any supplies of poultry products by UNMEE and had prohibited their consumption.
The thirty-eighth meeting of the Military Coordination Commission could not be held, as Ethiopia requested a postponement because of Eritrea’s incursion in the Temporary Security Zone. Eritrea said that it would suspend participation in the Commission until Ethiopia rescinded its request for a postponement, which it said, amounted to a withdrawal from the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

The crippling Eritrean restrictions, the Secretary-General said, presented a challenge to several core principles of UN peacekeeping; the safety of its personnel, the need for freedom of movement, the exclusively international character of the personnel working under the UN flag and the Secretary-General’s prerogative to appoint the required staff. UNMEE had to operate under unacceptable conditions for far too long, and he feared that, if allowed to continue, it could have very serious implications for the wider concept of peacekeeping.

Despite its reduced relevance, UNMEE presence still helped to some extent to reduce the risk of the conflict flaring up again, and remained a political, operational and psychological obstacle to any precipitous action that might result from the current situation, where the two armies were already directly facing each other, without a separation zone.

In the light of the developments that had taken place, the Secretary-General proposed that the Security Council, in considering future options for UNMEE, authorize a reduction in the Mission’s strength from 2,300 to 1,700 military personnel. That option would allow the current observation capacity to be maintained, while reducing the overall strength. Contingents in all check posts at key and sensitive points of entry and exit from the Zone would also be reduced, while UN Military Observers would carry out patrolling tasks. The Mission would maintain its presence inside the Zone and the adjacent areas. If, however, there was no progress in the coming months towards implementation of the Commission’s recommendation, the Council could consider converting UN operations into an observer mission, supported by a smaller protection force of 800 personnel, while removing all permanent observer sites, or converting it into a liaison mission, with 30 to 40 military liaison officers.

Communication (December). On 28 December [S/2006/1036], Eritrea, responding to the Secretary-General’s report (see above), said it had been accused of rejecting the appointment of the Acting Special Representative, without mention of its concerns or the patience it had shown in getting clarifications, or the facts surrounding the nomination of another person for the post of Acting Special Representa-
2000, left in April. His deputy, Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia), who acted in the capacity of Officer-in-Charge, was appointed Acting Special Representative in August. In November, Eritrea refused to accept Mr. Ennifar's appointment, and in December, he was relocated to Addis Ababa.

By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council [S/2006/235, S/2006/236], Major General Mohammad Taisir Masedeh (Jordan) was appointed UNMEE Force Commander as of 9 April, replacing Major General Rajender Singh (India).

**UNMEE Financing**

At its resumed sixtieth session, the General Assembly considered the Secretary-General's performance report on UNMEE budget for the period 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, and the proposed UNMEE budget for 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 [YUN 2005, p. 353], and the related ACABQ report [A/60/790].

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION**

On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/920], adopted resolution 60/272 without vote [agenda item 143].

**Financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**

*The General Assembly*

*Having considered* the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,*


*Recalling* its resolution 55/237 of 23 December 2000 on the financing of the Mission and its subsequent resolutions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 59/303 of 22 June 2005,*

*Reaffirming* the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,*

*Noting with appreciation* that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,*

*Mindful of* the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,*

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. *Takes note* of the status of contributions to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 29 million United States dollars, representing some 2.6 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only eighteen Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

4. *Expresses concern* at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. *Also expresses concern* at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. *Emphasizes* that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. *Also emphasizes* that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. *Reiterates its request* to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. *Endorses* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions subject to the provisions of the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

10. *Recalls* its request as contained in section XIV, paragraph 4, of its resolution 59/296;

11. *Decides* to finance resources for conduct and discipline capacity equivalent to 622,300 dollars under general temporary assistance;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of its resolutions 59/296 and 60/266;

13. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

14. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff,
to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;

**Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005**

15. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial performance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005;

**Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007**

16. Decides to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea the amount of 182,237,800 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 174,679,200 dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, 6,243,100 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 1,315,500 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base;

**Financing of the appropriation**

17. Decides also to apportion among Member States the amount of 45,559,450 dollars for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2006, and, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission, to apportion the amount of 45,559,450 dollars for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

18. Decides further that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 17 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 1,091,375 dollars for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2006, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 890,925 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 175,550 dollars approved for the support account, and the prorated share of 24,900 dollars approved for the United Nations Logistics Base and their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 1,091,375 dollars for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2006, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 890,925 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 175,550 dollars approved for the support account and the prorated share of 24,900 dollars approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

19. Decides that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 17 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 32,154,200 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

20. Decides also that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 32,154,200 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 19 above;

21. Decides further that the decrease of 556,500 dollars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 32,154,200 dollars referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20 above;

22. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;

23. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in peacekeeping operations, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

24. Invites voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

25. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled "Financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea".

On 22 December, the Assembly considered the Secretary-General’s report on the revised budget for the UNMEE for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 [A/61/521 & Corr.1], showing revised cost estimates totalling $145,516,400; and the related ACABQ report [A/61/575], which recommended an amount of $137,385,100.

On 22 December [meeting 84], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/61/617] adopted resolution 61/248 A without vote [agenda item 139].

**Financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,


Recalling its resolution 55/237 of 23 December 2000 on the financing of the Mission and its subsequent reso-
Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874(S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101(XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000, noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea as at 30 September 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 49.2 million United States dollars, representing some 4.4 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only thirty-nine Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear additional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. Also expresses concern at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. Emphasizes that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. Also emphasizes that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

10. Reaffirms its resolution 59/296, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of its relevant provisions and the relevant provisions of its resolution 60/266;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

12. Also requests the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;

13. Further requests the Secretary-General, in view of the recent reconfiguration and reduction in the strength of the Mission, to rejutify all posts and to report thereon to the General Assembly in the context of the budget of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008;

Revised budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

14. Decides to reduce the appropriation of 174,679,200 dollars authorized for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 under the terms of its resolution 60/272 by the amount of 37,294,100 dollars, to 137,385,100 dollars;

15. Also decides to reduce the amount of staff assessment income for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007 from 3,563,700 dollars to 2,751,000 dollars;

Financing of the appropriation

16. Further decides to apportion among Member States the amount of 53,824,800 dollars, inclusive of the amount of 3,121,550 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 657,750 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base, at a monthly rate of 8,970,800 dollars for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2007, in addition to the amount of 91,118,900 dollars already apportioned for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2006, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolutions 58/256 of 23 December 2003 and 61/243 of 22 December 2006, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2007, as set out in Assembly resolution 61/237 of 22 December 2006;

17. Decides that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 16 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 1,370,050 dollars for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2007, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 969,150 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 351,100 dollars approved for the support account and the prorated share of 49,800 dollars approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

18. Emphasizes that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;
19. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in peacekeeping operations, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

20. Invites voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

21. Decides to continue its consideration of this question at its resumed sixty-first session.

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that the agenda item on the financing of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.

North Africa

Western Sahara

The year 2006 proved to be another frustratingly uneventful one for the United Nations in Western Sahara, with continuing deadlock in the search for an agreed political solution to the long-standing conflict. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) continued to monitor compliance by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente Polisario) with the 1991 ceasefire that ended their armed hostilities over the disputed governance of the Territory of Western Sahara.

The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum, continued to explore with the parties, as well as with Algeria and other countries, how best to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. Morocco reiterated its non-acceptance of a referendum that would include the option of independence, while Frente Polisario reaffirmed that the only way forward was to implement either the 2003 peace plan proposed by the previous Personal Envoy, James Baker III, or the 1991 settlement plan proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the Security Council, which provided for self-determination through a referendum, with independence as an option. The Secretary-General urged the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions, and called on Member States not to acquiesce to the temptation of maintaining the status quo. However, the positions of the parties remained far apart, and efforts by the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to initiate direct negotiations were unsuccessful. Given the continuing impasse, the Secretary-General proposed that the Security Council prepare for a more substantial resolution on the situation concerning Western Sahara.

As recommended by the Secretary-General, the Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate twice, the second time until 30 April 2007.

Peacemaking efforts

Security Council consideration (January).

Briefing the Security Council on 18 January in closed consultations, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, pointed out that, since Morocco’s rejection in 2004 [YUN 2004, p. 275] of the 2003 Peace Plan for self-determination of the People of Western Sahara [YUN 2003, p. 259], the Plan was never mentioned again in a Council resolution, nor had any country with close ties to Morocco tried to persuade it to reconsider its position. Mr. Van Walsum concluded that the Council was firm in its opinion that it could only contemplate a consensual solution. In that context, he did not see how he could draft a new plan to replace the 2003 Peace Plan. A new plan would be doomed to rejection by Morocco, unless it excluded the provision for a referendum with independence as an option. On the other hand, the United Nations could not endorse a plan that excluded a genuine referendum, while claiming to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

However, what was unthinkable in a Council-endorsed plan might not be beyond the reach of direct negotiations, he said. Once the Council recognized the political reality that Morocco would not give up its sovereignty claim, it would realize that there were only two options left: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock in anticipation of a different political reality, or direct negotiations between the parties. He dismissed the first option, calling a continuation of the impasse a recipe for violence. What remained therefore was a recourse to direct negotiations, which should be held without preconditions. The objective should be to accomplish what no plan could—work out a compromise between international legality and political reality that would produce a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution providing for self-determination. After years of reliance on UN-sponsored plans, it should be made clear to the parties that the United Nations was taking a step back and that the responsibility rested with them. That did not mean that the parties...
would henceforth be on their own. There seemed to be a consensus in the Council that any solution had to be found in the framework of the United Nations. Mr. van Walsum urged the Council to invite Algeria to participate in the negotiations, and called on those Council members who had been supporting Morocco's position to do all in their power to make the negotiations succeed.

Communications. Morocco, in a 26 January letter to the Secretary-General [S/2006/52], said that under the 1991 ceasefire [YUN 1991, p. 796], the buffer strip between the defensive wall and the border with Algeria was designed to mitigate tensions between the two countries and prevent any risk of escalation. There was never any question of sanctioning a division of the Territory or legitimizing the idea of “liberated territory”, as that was an uninhabited buffer strip. Morocco had, at every opportunity, drawn UN attention to violations of the buffer strip. In 2000, the United Nations, having concluded that the referendum proposed in the 1990 settlement plan could not be carried out, sought an alternative political solution. Increasingly, however, the other parties to the dispute, rather than engaging in genuine negotiations, were attempting to establish a fait accompli in the buffer strip by constructing buildings, carrying on “diplomatic activities” there and even signing contracts of convenience with oil companies for oil prospecting. Such actions, which were illegal, were aimed at giving credence to the existence of a “pseudo-republic of Sahara” on territorial grounds. As long as there was no agreement on a political solution, Morocco, under the 1975 Madrid Accord concluded with Spain, remained the sole competent administrative authority over the entire Territory. That authority was confirmed by the 1990 settlement plan [YUN 1990, p. 919] and reinforced by the 2001 Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara [YUN 2001, p. 216]. The other parties, in disregard of international law, were laying greater obstacles in the path of international efforts to reach a negotiated solution. Those parties should fulfill their obligations, refrain from entering into agreements or contracts involving the Territory and show the necessary political will by participating in the internationally-supported negotiations. Morocco was prepared to initiate negotiations, and would soon submit a proposal on autonomy.

Responding to Morocco, Frente Polisario Secretary-General Mohamed Abdelaziz, in a 7 February letter transmitted to the Council by Namibia [S/2006/84], recalled that, since May 1991, Moroccan “occupying forces” had been stationed inside and to the west of the defensive wall, by which Morocco had divided the Territory into two parts, while Saharawi forces had been positioned outside the defensive wall and eastwards. Contrary to Morocco’s claims, there was currently a liberated area of Western Sahara and another under Morocco’s illegal occupation. Frente Polisario and the international community did not recognize any valid legal title to Morocco’s presence. The 1975 Madrid Accords, whereby the former colonial power renounced its responsibilities as an administering Power, were an illegal transaction that did not alter the colonial nature of the problem. The International Court of Justice, in 1975, denied any validity to Morocco’s territorial claims, and the Legal Counsel, in 2002, had stated that the Madrid Accords did not confer on Morocco the status of administering Power. Morocco’s presence in the Territory was therefore illegal. The United Nations was dealing with a decolonization question, which should be resolved in conformity with the Charter and the resolutions elaborated by its supreme bodies, which had unequivocally affirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to decide their future through a self-determination referendum. In several resolutions, the Security Council had advocated a referendum to enable the Saharawi people to choose independence, autonomy or integration into the occupying Power. The Council could not resign itself to a dangerous stalemate. Only the resumption of the Council-approved referendum process offered real possibilities for resolving the conflict. Any other approach would imply the renunciation of the Charter, the legitimization of a “colonial fait accompli” and the establishment of force in international relations.

In a further communication of 24 February [S/2006/129], Morocco said that it had learned that the other parties were organizing, on 28 February, on the eastern side of the berm, a march of some 3,000 to 4,000 people from the Tindouf camps, accompanied by foreign guests, and planned to cross over it. Morocco requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the other parties to the illegal nature of the demonstration and the danger it posed to the participants, and to take all necessary steps to prevent it from taking place.

Report of Secretary-General (April). In his April report [S/2006/249], submitted in response to Security Council resolution 1634(2005) [YUN 2005, p. 369] and covering developments since his October 2005 report [ibid., p. 369], the Secretary-General said that his Personal Envoy had undertaken an exploratory mission to the region from 11 to 17 October, during which he met, among others, with King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Prime Minister Driss Jettou; Frente Polisario Secretary-General
Abdelaziz and other senior officials and sheikhs; Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika; and Mauritania’s Head of State, Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall. Following the visit, the Personal Envoy informed the Secretary-General that the question was still at an impasse, with no agreement on how to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination. Morocco reiterated that it would not accept a referendum that would include the option of independence, while advocating negotiations to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, and made it clear that those negotiations would have to be only about the Territory’s autonomy status. Frente Polisario, with Algeria’s support, maintained that the only way forward was to implement either the 2003 Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara or the 1991 Settlement Plan. Any other course would be unacceptable to Frente Polisario. Mauritania reiterated its strict neutrality. During meetings in Rabat, Morocco, Tindouf and Algiers, Algeria, and Nouakchott, Mauritania, all officials confirmed their commitment to cooperating with the United Nations in reaching a solution, as a prerequisite for the region’s stability and development.

After two rounds of consultations, in October 2005 and February 2006, involving France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, the AU Commission Chairperson and senior EU authorities, the Personal Envoy perceived the emergence of a consensus on the need to reach a solution as soon as possible to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination.

The Secretary-General observed that forces outside the region mediated against the negotiations option. Although no country would admit that it favoured a continuation of the impasse, Western Sahara was not high on the political agenda in most capitals, and great store was set by continuing good relations with both Morocco and Algeria. Those two factors constituted a powerful temptation to acquiesce to the continuation of the impasse. The Security Council could not afford to adopt such an attitude, while the situation deteriorated from potential instability to a threat to international peace and security. The Council and individual Member States should rise to the occasion and do all in their power to help negotiations get off the ground. The objective of negotiations should be a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Turning to recent developments, the Secretary-General said that, on 6 November 2005, a ceremony was held in Laayoune to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Morocco’s “Green March” into the Territory. From 24 to 28 February 2006, Frente Polisario celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the “Saharan Arab Democratic Republic” in Tindouf, Algeria, and Tifariti, Western Sahara. On 20 March, King Mohammed VI of Morocco paid a five-day visit to Laayoune and announced the appointment of a new President and other high-level officials to the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs in an effort to revive that body, which comprised traditional leaders (sheikhs), civil society representatives and elected members.

On 25 March, the King of Morocco granted pardons to 216 prisoners, including 30 Saharan activists. Pro-Saharan demonstrators were organized in Laayoune, Boujdour, Dakhla and Smara to welcome their release and demand the release of 37 more political prisoners. According to media reports, Moroccan security forces intervened to disperse the demonstrators, resulting in a number of arrests. On 28 March, Mr. Abdelaziz wrote again to the Secretary-General expressing concern about the human rights abuses perpetrated by Moroccan security forces, particularly in Smara, where several people were reportedly detained and some, including women, injured on 26 March. Mr. Abdelaziz, who travelled to UN Headquarters and met with the Secretary-General on 3 April, expressed concern about the situation.

As to MINURSO, the Secretary-General said that the Mission’s new concept of operations, which took effect in October 2005 [ibid., p. 364], had resulted in a 25 per cent increase in the number of ground patrols compared to the period covered in the previous report. Frente Polisario lifted the restrictions on the movement of MINURSO observers that had been in place for several years, allowing access to its military units for inspection. New violations of the military agreement occurred during the period under review. From 14 October 2005 to 15 March 2006, MINURSO observed eight violations by the Royal Moroccan Army and four by Frente Polisario—a decrease of almost 50 per cent compared to the previous period. They included continued incursions into the buffer strip by armed elements from both sides, construction of new physical structures and movement of weapons and military units without prior notification or MINURSO approval. One such violation was Frente Polisario’s concentration of military forces during the 27 February military parade in Tifariti, involving some 2,600 troops, 150 camels and 40 armoured personnel carriers. MINURSO continued to observe long-standing violations by both parties, including the presence of radar equipment and improvement of the defence infrastructure, including expansions of the berm by
the Royal Moroccan Army, and the continued deployment of military personnel and infrastructure improvements by Frente Polisario in the “Spanish Fort” area. The parties continued to cooperate with MINURSO in the marking and disposal of mines and unexploded ordnance. On 27 February, Frente Polisario destroyed 3,100 anti-personnel mines and an anti-tank mine near Tifariti.

With regard to assistance to Western Saharan refugees, following the joint Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-World Food Programme (WFP) decision to reduce the number of assisted beneficiaries from 158,000 to 90,000, UNHCR and WFP representatives met with senior officials of Algeria and Frente Polisario to review the issue. Between 50,000 and 60,000 refugees in the Tindouf area were left homeless after their shelters were destroyed by heavy rainfalls and flash floods from 9 to 11 February. UNHCR, WFP and the Algerian Red Crescent immediately put in place an emergency response mechanism, while Algeria dispatched a humanitarian convoy. MINURSO assisted by providing water tanks and by coordinating assistance.

UNHCR and MINURSO resumed, on 25 November 2005, the programme of exchange of family visits between the Territory and the refugee camps in the Tindouf area, after an eleven-month hiatus. As at 15 March 2006, some 610 persons had taken the weekly UN flights to and from the Territory and the Tindouf area refugee camp, and over 17,000 candidates were on the waiting list.

The Secretary-General recommended that MINURSO mandate be extended for a further period of six months, until 31 October.

Communications. Responding to the Secretary-General’s report, Algeria, in a 24 April letter [S/2006/258] to the Secretary-General and the Security Council President, recalled that Western Sahara was a decolonization question, under the responsibility of the United Nations, which should see that process to conclusion. The 1988 United Nations Plan, the 1997 Houston Accords and the 2003 Baker Plan, accepted by the parties and endorsed by the Security Council, provided that the question could only be settled through the expression of the will of the people of Western Sahara. On the pretext that one party had rejected those plans, the United Nations intended to withdraw from a settlement process in which it bore political, legal and moral responsibility. Algeria could not support or accept the shift in approach recommended by the Personal Envoy and endorsed by the Secretary-General. It regretted that the United Nations would sacrifice compliance with international law for realpolitik. The only valid negotiations, which should be limited to Morocco and Frente Polisario, were those dealing with the modalities for implementing the Council-approved 2003 Peace Plan. Only that plan, which represented a delicate compromise between the positions of the parties, could ensure a just and lasting settlement in accordance with the Charter and international law.

Namibia, in a 26 April letter [S/2006/266] to the Secretary-General and the Security Council President, expressed concern at the attempts to legalize the occupation of Western Sahara through proposed solutions that were based on the denial of the right of the Western Saharan people to self-determination. Any attempt to depart from the 2003 Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara, the only viable peaceful solution to the conflict which provided for a referendum, was unacceptable. Namibia urged the United Nations, particularly the Security Council to reject any attempt to deny the people of Western Sahara their right to self-determination and independence, reiterated its support for the implementation of all General Assembly and Security Council resolutions aimed at holding a referendum and urged Morocco to accept the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. Namibia also requested that the Security Council mandate MINURSO to monitor and submit reports on human rights violations.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 28 April [meeting 5431], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1675(2006). The draft [S/2006/268] was submitted by France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,
Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 April 2006,
1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for
the Referendum in Western Sahara with regard to the ceasefire;
2. Calls upon Member States to consider voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family reunification visits;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara before the end of the mandate period;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in the Mission with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General’s bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including conducting pre-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;
5. Decides to extend the mandate of the Mission until 31 October 2006;
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Letter of Secretary-General (June). In a 26 June letter [S/2006/466] to the Security Council President, the Secretary-General said that his April report had referred to certain factors that could constitute a powerful temptation to acquiesce in the continuation of the impasse for several more years. It was feared that many countries might find the status quo more tolerable than any of the possible solutions. Although he had stated that the Council could not afford to adopt such an attitude, resolution 1675(2006) (see above) did not reflect his recommendations. There was a danger in prolonging the impasse, and everyone should do everything possible to move the process forward. His Personal Envoy was preparing to visit the region again, to explore how the parties and the neighbouring States could help the Council to go beyond just extending MINURSO mandate. That opportunity should not be lost and Council members should use the next four months to prepare for a more substantial resolution.

On 30 June [S/2006/467], the Council informed the Secretary-General that it had taken note of his suggestion.

Report of Secretary-General (October). In his October report [S/2006/817], submitted in response to Security Council resolution 1675(2006), the Secretary-General said that the parties should drop any preconditions and begin negotiations to try to find a lasting solution. Such preconditions—Morocco’s demand that its sovereignty over Western Sahara be recognized and Frente Polisario’s demand that there should be a referendum, with independence as an option—should be raised by the respective parties during the negotiations instead.

However, such negotiations would not get off the ground unless the Security Council made it absolutely clear that the exercise of self-determination was the only agreed aim of the negotiations. The fact that the Council had acquiesced in Morocco’s rejection of a referendum with independence as an option did not imply that it had rejected such a referendum itself. If either party could not accept that open-ended approach, there would be no negotiations. That would be a setback for Morocco, which was anxious to obtain international recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, and for Frente Polisario, for, as the impasse continued, the international community would grow more accustomed to Moroccan control over Western Sahara. Frente Polisario would be well advised to enter into negotiations immediately, while there was still consensus in the Council that a negotiated political solution had to provide for self-determination. Any proposal should be judged on its potential for being an exercise of the right to self-determination.

The Secretary-General recommended that the Council call upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Algeria and Mauritania should be invited to those negotiations. Once the parties had responded favourably, he would submit further proposals on the format of the negotiations and the UN role.

Nothing that the two military sides did not have direct contact with each other 15 years after the ceasefire went into effect, which had had a negative effect on mutual confidence and prevented the adoption of procedures for stabilizing the situation during critical periods, the Secretary-General invited the parties to establish direct cooperation through a joint military verification commission or other fora.

Turning to other developments, the Secretary-General said that, in a 29 July speech, the King of Morocco had referred to the Moroccan initiative to find a political solution, which included a proposed autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and his decision to strengthen the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs, whose members had been invited to submit views on the plan. The King stated that the
international community’s reaction had been positive, thanks to Morocco’s wish to cooperate with all parties towards realizing the full potential of a common regional future.

On 22 April, the King ordered the release of 46 prisoners, including 38 Saharan activists who had been jailed in 2005 for participating in demonstrations for self-determination. Their release sparked demonstrations in towns across the Territory, with consequent allegations of further arrests and detention of demonstrators by Moroccan authorities. Violent confrontations were reported between Moroccan security forces and demonstrators, leading to arrests and detentions. Frente Polisario Secretary-General Abdelaziz, in letters to the Secretary-General in May and June, alleged human rights abuses by Moroccan authorities in the Territory, including detention, torture, lack of judicial due process and the disappearance of political prisoners and human rights activists. Morocco, on 2 June, called for UN intervention to stop oppression in the Tindouf camps, following alleged reports of unrest there. On 26 July, Morocco signed a fisheries agreement with the EU, granting EU fishing vessels access to territorial waters off Morocco, not excluding the waters off Western Sahara. On 23 May, Mr. Abdelaziz deplored Morocco’s exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources, stating that certain clauses of the fishing agreement constituted a breach of international law and might complicate the situation.

The Secretary-General’s Envoy held consultations with both sides, neighbouring States and other parties. Algeria reiterated that it was not a party to the conflict and that any negotiations should be between Morocco and Frente Polisario. Mauritania once again stressed its strict neutrality, but also its strong support for UN effort to reach a mutually acceptable solution. The Personal Envoy explained to the parties that he had advocated negotiations because, given the Security Council’s firm rejection of a non-consensual solution, they were the only alternative to indefinite prolongation of the impasse. Frente Polisario officials replied that it would opt for the continuation of the impasse, while realizing that that would lead to renewed armed struggle and that the pressure of frustrated young Saharans might be impossible to resist.

Besides the position taken by the parties in prolonging the impasse, the positions adopted by third countries could also hinder the search for a negotiated solution, the Secretary-General observed. Most third countries were anxious to be strictly impartial by trying to please both parties. While they showed understanding for Morocco’s reluctance to see a territory the size of the United Kingdom, with only a few hundred thousand inhabitants, become a fully independent State, they were opposed to exerting pressure on Frente Polisario to accept Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and be content with a referendum without the option of independence. The Special Envoy underlined that negotiations would have only one Council-endorsed objective: to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. However, the negotiations would not get off the ground unless the Security Council made it absolutely clear that they would have to be opened.

During the period under review, Minurso observed eight new violations of the military agreement by Morocco and five by Frente Polisario—a decrease of almost 50 per cent compared with the same period in 2005. From the start, both parties had imposed restrictions on the freedom of movement of Minurso military observers. On 1 June, Minurso started to record such restrictions as violations of the military agreement. During the period 1 June –1 October, Minurso recorded 539 such violations by Morocco and 86 by Frente Polisario.

Minurso general food distribution programme continued to support 90,000 beneficiaries deemed most vulnerable in the Tindouf refugee camps, and provided an extra 35,000 food rations for refugees affected by the February torrential rains. A supplementary feeding programme reached some 9,500 pregnant and nursing women, as well as children under 5 years old. In August, Minurso assisted 15 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa stranded in the “no-man’s land” south of the berm, near the Mauritanian border, with basic medical assistance, blankets, food and water. The Secretary-General recommended that the Mission’s mandate be extended until 30 April 2007.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) conducted a mission to Rabat, Laayoune and the camps in the Tindouf area from 15 to 23 May and to Algiers on 19 June, to gather information on the human rights situation in Western Sahara and the refugee camps in Algeria. The OHCHR delegation, which enjoyed very good cooperation by all parties, was to report to the High Commissioner and make recommendations on improving protection of the rights of the people of Western Sahara. The report, transmitted on 15 September as a confidential document to Algeria, Morocco and Frente Polisario, was leaked to the press.

In a later report [S/2007/292], the Secretary-General said that the King of Morocco, in a 6 No-
November statement, confirmed that his Government was developing an autonomy proposal, with a view to finding a political solution. The ongoing consultations on that initiative would be completed on a broad basis. Morocco remained committed to cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to find a consensual political solution to which all parties could adhere.

Demonstrations by Saharans calling for respect for human rights and the right to self-determination were reported to have continued in the Territory. On 11 December, Frente Polisario Secretary-General Abdelaziz wrote to the UN Secretary-General to protest the brutal repression and arrest of demonstrators by Moroccan security forces during protests to mark International Human Rights Day on 10 December.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

On 31 October [meeting 5560], the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1720(2006). The draft [S/2006/850] was submitted by France, Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy,
Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,
Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 16 October 2006,
1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara with regard to the ceasefire;
2. Calls upon Member States to consider voluntary contributions to fund confidence building measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family unification visits;
3. Requests the Secretary-General provide a report on the situation in the Western Sahara before the end of the mandate period;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in Mission with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action, including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;
5. Decides to extend the mandate of the Mission until 30 April 2007;
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom and France urged the parties to use the next six months to finally break the impasse. The United States urged Morocco to move quickly to fulfil its promises to table a comprehensive and credible autonomy proposal for Western Sahara and to engage in serious discussions with all Saharawi people, including Polisario, in a way that could form the basis for a new, UN-led negotiating process. The United States asked the Secretary-General to examine the mechanisms and timetable for the Mission’s dismantlement, should MINURSO continue to be ineffective in fulfilling its mandate or the concerned parties prove unable to make substantial progress towards a political solution. The United Kingdom restated that the only solution had to be a mutually acceptable one and provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION


On 14 December [meeting 79], the Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth (Special Political and Decolonization) Committee [A/61/415], adopted resolution 61/125 by recorded vote (70-150-91) [agenda item 39].

Question of Western Sahara

The General Assembly,
Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,
Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Recalling its resolution 60/114 of 8 December 2005,
Recalling also all resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Western Sahara,


Taking note of the responses of the parties and neighbouring States to the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General concerning the peace plan contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 23 May 2003,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations towards the people of Western Sahara,

Noting with satisfaction the entry into force of the ceasefire in accordance with the proposal made by the Secretary-General, and stressing the importance it attaches to the maintenance of the ceasefire as an integral part of the settlement plan,

Underlining, in this regard, the validity of the settlement plan, while noting the fundamental differences between the parties in its implementation,

Stressing that the lack of progress in the settlement of the dispute on Western Sahara continues to cause suffering to the people of Western Sahara, remains a source of potential instability in the region and obstructs the economic development of the Maghreb region and that, in view of this, the search for a political solution is critically needed,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in search of a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara,

Having examined the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having also examined the report of the Secretary-General,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;
2. Underlines Security Council resolution 1495(2003), in which the Council expressed its support of the peace plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as an optimum political solution on the basis of agreement between the two parties;
3. Underlines also that the parties reacted differently to this plan;
4. Continues to support strongly the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute over Western Sahara;
5. Commends the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their outstanding efforts and the two parties for the spirit of cooperation they have shown in the support they provide for those efforts;
6. Calls upon all the parties and the States of the region to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy;
7. Reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations towards the people of Western Sahara;
8. Calls upon the parties to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its efforts to solve the problem of the fate of the people unaccounted for, and calls upon the parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law to release without further delay all those held since the start of the conflict;
9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session;
10. Invites the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-second session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 61/125:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Chad, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominica, Ecuador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, France, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States, Vanuatu, Yemen.
MINURSO

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), established by Security Council resolution 690(1991) [YUN 1991, p. 794], continued in 2006 to monitor compliance with the 1991 formal ceasefire [ibid., p. 796] between Frente Polisario and Morocco. Monitoring was carried out by the Mission’s military observers through a combination of ground and air patrols and observation posts, and through inspections of larger-than-company-size military units of Frente Polisario and the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA). The main focus was on military activities close to the berm, the defensive sand wall built by RMA between 1981 and 1987 across Western Sahara, extending from the north–east corner down to the south-west, near the Mauritanian border.

Military Agreement No.1, which MINURSO signed separately with the parties [YUN 1998, p. 194], remained the basic legal instrument governing the ceasefire monitoring of the five parts into which, for operational purposes, the disputed territory of Western Sahara was divided: one five-kilometre-wide buffer strip to the east and south of the berm; two restricted areas—one, 25 kilometres wide east of the berm and the other, 30 kilometres wide west of it; and two areas with limited restrictions that encompassed the remainder of the Territory. Bilateral military agreements Nos. 2 and 3 [YUN 1999, p. 180], committing both parties to cooperating with MINURSO in the exchange of mine-related information, marking of mined areas, and clearance and destruction of mines and unexploded ordnance, remained in force.

MINURSO maintained its headquarters in Laayoune, Western Sahara; a liaison office in Tindouf, Algeria; and nine military-observer team sites located across the Territory, four on the Moroccan-controlled side and five on the Frente Polisario side.

On the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Council extended MINURSO mandate twice during the year, the first time until 31 October 2006 and the second until 30 April 2007.

MINURSO financing

The General Assembly, at its resumed sixtieth session, considered the Secretary-General’s report [A/60/724] on the MINURSO budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, showing cost estimates of $42,804,400; of the ACABQ report thereon, and the report on MINURSO financial performance for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 [YUN 2005, p. 366].

GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION

On 30 June [meeting 92], the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee [A/60/927], adopted resolution 60/280 without vote [agenda item 152].

Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The General Assembly, Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,


Recalling also its resolution 45/266 of 17 May 1991 on the financing of the Mission and its subsequent resolutions and decisions thereon, the latest of which was resolution 59/308 of 22 June 2005,

Reaffirming the general principles underlying the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as stated in General Assembly resolutions 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963, 3101 (XXVIII) of 11 December 1973 and 55/235 of 23 December 2000,

Noting with appreciation that voluntary contributions have been made to the Mission,

Mindful of the fact that it is essential to provide the Mission with the necessary financial resources to enable it to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to entrust the Head of Mission with the task of formulating future budget proposals in full accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 59/296 of 22 June 2005 and 60/266 of 30 June 2006, as well as other relevant resolutions;

2. Takes note of the status of contributions to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara as at 30 April 2006, including the contributions outstanding in the amount of 45.5 million United States dollars, representing some 8 per cent of the total assessed contributions, notes with concern that only seventy-one Member States have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States, in particular those in arrears, to ensure payment of their outstanding assessed contributions;

3. Expresses its appreciation to those Member States which have paid their assessed contributions in full, and urges all other Member States to make every possible effort to ensure payment of their assessed contributions to the Mission in full;

4. Expresses concern at the financial situation with regard to peacekeeping activities, in particular as regards the reimbursements to troop contributors that bear ad-
ditional burdens owing to overdue payments by Member States of their assessments;

5. *Also expresses concern* at the delay experienced by the Secretary-General in deploying and providing adequate resources to some recent peacekeeping missions, in particular those in Africa;

6. *Emphasizes* that all future and existing peacekeeping missions shall be given equal and non-discriminatory treatment in respect of financial and administrative arrangements;

7. *Also emphasizes* that all peacekeeping missions shall be provided with adequate resources for the effective and efficient discharge of their respective mandates;

8. *Reiterates its request* to the Secretary-General to make the fullest possible use of facilities and equipment at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, in order to minimize the costs of procurement for the Mission;

9. *Endorses* the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure their full implementation;

10. *Reaffirms* its resolution 59/296, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full implementation of its relevant provisions and the relevant provisions of its resolution 60/266;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to ensure that the Mission is administered with a maximum of efficiency and economy;

12. *Also requests* the Secretary-General, in the context of the next performance report, to report any savings or efficiencies resulting from the military operational audit of June 2005;

13. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, in order to reduce the cost of employing General Service staff, to continue efforts to recruit local staff for the Mission against General Service posts, commensurate with the requirements of the Mission;

Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005


Budget estimates for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007

15. *Decides* to appropriate to the Special Account for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara the amount of 44,460,000 dollars for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, inclusive of 42,619,400 dollars for the maintenance of the Mission, 1,520,300 dollars for the support account for peacekeeping operations and 320,300 dollars for the United Nations Logistics Base;

Financing of the appropriation

16. *Decides also* to apportion among Member States the amount of 14,820,000 dollars for the period from 1 July to 31 October 2006, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006 as set out in its resolution 58/1 B of 23 December 2003;

17. *Decides further* that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X) of 15 December 1955, there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 16 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 800,534 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 735,467 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 57,000 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 8,067 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

18. *Decides* to apportion among Member States the amount of 29,640,000 dollars for the period from 1 November 2006 to 30 June 2007, at a monthly rate of 3,705,000 dollars, in accordance with the levels updated in General Assembly resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2006 as set out in its resolution 58/1 B, and the scale of assessments for 2007, subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission;

19. *Decides also* that, in accordance with the provisions of its resolution 973(X), there shall be set off against the apportionment among Member States, as provided for in paragraph 18 above, their respective share in the Tax Equalization Fund of 1,601,066 dollars, comprising the estimated staff assessment income of 1,470,933 dollars approved for the Mission, the prorated share of 114,000 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the support account and the prorated share of 16,133 dollars of the estimated staff assessment income approved for the United Nations Logistics Base;

20. *Decides further* that, for Member States that have fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their apportionment, as provided for in paragraph 16 above, their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 1,483,200 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the levels updated in its resolution 58/256, and taking into account the scale of assessments for 2005, as set out in its resolution 58/1 B;

21. *Decides* that, for Member States that have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the Mission, there shall be set off against their outstanding obligations their respective share of the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of 1,483,200 dollars in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005, in accordance with the scheme set out in paragraph 20 above;

22. *Decides also* that the decrease of 597,000 dollars in the estimated staff assessment income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2005 shall be set off against the credits from the amount of 1,483,200 dollars referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above;

23. *Emphasizes* that no peacekeeping mission shall be financed by borrowing funds from other active peacekeeping missions;
24. **Encourages** the Secretary-General to continue to take additional measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel under the auspices of the United Nations participating in the Mission, bearing in mind paragraphs 5 and 6 of Security Council resolution 1502(2003) of 26 August 2003;

25. **Invites** voluntary contributions to the Mission in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General, to be administered, as appropriate, in accordance with the procedure and practices established by the General Assembly;

26. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-first session the item entitled “Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara”.

In December, the Secretary-General submitted the performance report [A/61/683] on the MINURSO budget for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006.

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that agenda item “Financing of MINURSO” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.

## Other issues

### Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the General Assembly decided that the agenda item “Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986” would remain for consideration during its sixty-first (2007) session.

### Mauritius–United Kingdom/France

On 22 September [A/61/PV.16], Mauritius’ Prime Minister, Navinchandra Rangolaam, speaking during the General Assembly’s general debate, drew attention to the fact that, 38 years after its independence, Mauritius had still not been able to exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The Archipelago was excised from the territory of Mauritius by the former colonial Power to be subsequently used for military purposes behind Mauritius’ back, in total disregard of Assembly resolutions 1514(XV) [YUN 1960, p. 49] and 2066(XX) [YUN 1965, p. 587]. That exercise also involved the displacement of the inhabitants of the Chagos from their homeland, thereby denying them their fundamental human rights. Mauritius called once again upon the United Kingdom to pursue constructive dialogue with Mauritius to enable it to exercise its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Mauritius viewed positively the visit jointly organized by its Government and the United Kingdom in April to enable the former inhabitants of the Chagos to visit the Archipelago for the first time since their displacement to pay respects at their relatives’ graves.

Mauritius also hoped to continue meaningful dialogue with France on the sovereignty of Tromelin, and viewed the Agreement reached in Paris, at the expert level, in January, to set up a French-Mauritanian joint commission for the co-management of the Tromelin Zone as a positive first step.

On 29 September [A/61/488], the United Kingdom, in the exercise of its right of reply, maintained that the British Indian Ocean Territory was British and had been since 1814, and did not recognize Mauritius’ sovereignty claim. However, the British Government recognized Mauritius as the only State which had a right to assert a claim of sovereignty whenever the United Kingdom relinquished its own sovereignty. Successive British Governments had given undertakings to Mauritius that the Territory would be ceded when no longer required for defence purposes. The British Government remained open to discussions regarding arrangements governing the British Indian Ocean Territory or the future of the Territory; and had stated that when the time came for the Territory to be ceded, it would liaise closely with the Government of Mauritius.

### Cooperation between the AU and the UN system

On 31 May [meeting 5448], the Security Council was briefed by the AU Chairman, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo, who expressed the AU deep gratitude to the Council for its efforts and determination in supporting peace and security on the continent. The Council’s stabilizing action and partnership with the AU should be encouraged. Both institutions were striving to harmonize their undertakings, including through regular consultations. The way the AU and the Council together managed such complex issues, as Côte d’Ivoire and the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan, were testimony to the relevance of that vision.

The partnership between the two organizations was based on a vision that there could be no peace without development, or development without peace. Issues of economic and social development,
Poverty elimination, national reconciliation, good governance and social justice were closely linked, and should be dealt with appropriately. The partnership between the United Nations, the AU and Africa’s subregional communities should be strengthened. The AU and the United Nations had a common will to put an end to conflicts in Africa by making the best use of all the means that international cooperation provided, particularly in the framework of the partnership between the two organizations.

The Secretary-General, on 11 December [A/61/630], informed the General Assembly President of the Secretariat’s efforts to implement the 2005 World Summit Outcome [YUN 2005, p. 48], in which Member States had committed themselves to meeting Africa’s special needs and agreed to develop and implement a 10-year plan for capacity building with the AU. To further the World Summit Outcome, the Secretary-General and AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré, signed in Addis Ababa, on 16 November, a declaration entitled “Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union”, which reflected a shared commitment to maintaining peace and security, promoting human rights and post-conflict reconstruction and advancing Africa’s development and regional integration. The declaration provided a framework for UN system-wide support to the capacity-building efforts of the AU Commission and the regional economic communities. Both sides agreed on strategic priorities and political aspects of their relationship. Mr. Konaré stated the need for the United Nations and other partners to promote African integration, including by helping the AU Commission to become a real executive body. If the AU had the capacity to undertake certain tasks in Africa, it would unburden the United Nations. The United Nations-AU cooperation within the 10-year programme covered a much wider spectrum than the cooperation between the United Nations and the defunct Organization for African Unity, the Secretary-General said.

The Secretary-General, in his consolidated report [A/61/256] on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, said that the AU 10-year capacity-building plan would be the overall framework under which the UN system could enhance its various activities in Africa and its cooperation with the AU, covering all aspects of UN assistance to the organizations.

On 22 December, by decision 61/552, the Assembly decided that agenda item on “Cooperation between the United Nations and the AU” would remain for consideration during its resumed sixty-first (2007) session.