PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Country Study

United Nations

SBE Annexes
CARANA COUNTRY STUDY

Updated some months before the peace agreement
BACKGROUND NOTES

After years of violent conflict between the Caran dominated Government of Carana and rebel forces, a ceasefire agreement was agreed and the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) was signed on 19 May 2017.

The KPA was facilitated by the regional organization; the Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) to put a halt to the violence and pave the way for a peace process in Carana.

The KPA foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the light CRC observer mission in Carana (CRCAC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country.

The UN Security Council in Resolution 1544 (M¹ 2017) authorises the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNNY has planned the mission to date using its internal capacities. A Carana country study and technical survey have been completed as well as a basic UN strategic concept. These documents are provided as pre-reading to allow participants to become familiar with the scenario that will be used throughout the complete course.

This document: Carana Country Study, provides an overview of Carana. This document was last updated some months before the Kalari Peace Agreement was signed.

COUNTRY STUDY

GEOGRAPHY

1. Location: Carana is located on the east coast of the 8th continent between the 8th and 10th latitudes. The total area of Carana is 120 000 sq km with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries

¹ Where M is the day that the UNSCR authorising the deployment of UNAC is agreed at the SC. M+10 is M plus ten days.

SBE Annexes
2. **Topography:** Carana is divided into two major areas; the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level through to a height of 1200 m.

The undulation is mostly flat and smooth with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain. The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The coastal waters are generally calm but only a few areas are suitable for deep-water shipping.

3. **Hydrography:** The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The Kalesi River discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamp lands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, the Torongo is the only waterway used for transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

4. **Climate and Weather:** The climate in Carana is hot and humid. Close to the equator, Carana has no distinct winter and summer. The average daily temperature during the dry season is 36 degrees C; the average nightly temperature is 22 degrees C. The rainy season runs from early October to December with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month.

5. **Vegetation:** Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been
cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit.

The west and south of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

6. **Natural Resources:** Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle covered mountains of the west, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources.

Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands west of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

7. **Human Geography:** Human development in Carana has been shaped by differences in climate zones, creating a divided society featuring disparate social structures organized around different modes of subsistence. The most salient cleavage is between the semi-nomadic pastoralists inhabiting the pasturelands in the southwest (Tereni and Mahbek provinces) and the largely sedentary farmers and miners in the east.

8. **Population:**

**General Facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>14 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Age Distribution       | <15 : 44 %  
15 to 18 : 13 %  
18 to 60 : 39 %  
>60 : 4 %         |
| Fertility Rate         | 5.1 children per woman   |
| Sex Ratio              | 1.06 females/male        |
| Infant Mortality       | 9.1 deaths per 100 live births |
| Life Expectancy        | Total population: 45.3 years  
Male: 42.1 years  
Female: 47.9 years |

SBE Annexes
In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French.

9. **Ethnic Distribution**: The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Caran, Kori and Tatsi represent 90 percent of the population.

The Caran (49%) are the ethnic majority in the country and live in the east and centre of Carana. The Kori (38%) live in the west and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Tatsi (13%) live in the south, mainly in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution of the region. The Caran make up 10% of the population of neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 38% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 45% of the population of Rimosa.

10. **Religion**: According to 2010 World Bank estimates some 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. About 35% of the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholic.

Islam is practised by over 20%, mainly in the South. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni who overwhelmingly live in the South, however, there are small but active Shia communities along the coastal plains. Several of the Sunni groups are extremist in nature and have instituted Sharia Law in the southwest areas of Leppko.

In terms of ethnic distribution the majority of the Caran are Catholic, while the majority of the Kori are Protestant. The Tatsi people are mainly Sunni Muslim.

The 1991 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah’s witnesses. They tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in Caran occupied territories.

**HISTORY**

11. **Colonial Period**: The State of Carana was founded in 1904 as French colony. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal and religious structures of the country, as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1951 was relatively
calm and peaceful. The following period from 1951 to 1955 was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From 1952, unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In 1954, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, they were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana.

In 1955, the legal status of Carana changed from a French colony to a republic of the French community. In 1962, Carana gained independence.

As a result of a long period of French colonial rule, a strong French influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems were built during the French colonial period and have not been improved since then. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

12. Post Colonial Developments: After the liberation of Carana in 1962, Joseph Uroma (the leader of the largest of the liberation movements and with a power base derived from the backing of the Caran majority in the east of the country) came to power and immediately tried to cut all ties with France. He attempted to establish a communist system with the assistance of USSR and Cuba. With significant economic and military support, he successfully established his regime and suppressed all other liberation movement parties and opposition groups.

During the first years of his government, Uroma received broad public support and enhanced powers. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the Uroma regime to establish effective governmental functions, public support declined and opposition to his leadership increased. In 1971, Uroma was ejected from power and killed. Christian Hakutu, the former Chief of the Caran dominated Army, replaced him.

Hakutu re-established the links with France and promised massive social and economic reform. Even though he received intensive support from western countries, Hakutu was unable to solve the economic problems and stabilise the country. In 1975, Hakutu was removed from power by a coup and replaced by a military junta under Colonel Tarakoni, also Caran. The military government of Tarakoni was also unable to address the economic and humanitarian issues but was quite successful in maintaining public order in the country.

In 1983, the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling into a humanitarian crisis. During the crisis opposition groups evolved and challenges
to the Tarakoni regime became more frequent. After years of instability, and under international pressure free elections were conducted in 1986.

The PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Caran, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 Constitution.

During the early years some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo’s focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 1995 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo’s Caran tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Since 2002, the previously growing economy has been in decline and regional humanitarian crises have occurred on a regular basis.

13. **Recent History:** As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of the Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the mid 2010s. The government suppressed most of these groups, resorting to the military and gendarmerie to suppress any attempt to challenge Ogavo’s regime.

In 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organised rebel group known as MPC (Movement Patriotique de Carana) and formed a well structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC achieved some local success in the west over the Caran dominated Carana Defence Force (CDF), gaining increasing support from the local population in the west of the country; in 2016 this culminated in the CDF losing control of significant parts of the western highlands. Though the MPC’s military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels lacked a coherent political strategy and failed to capitalise on their success; their only stated objectives were to remove Ogavo from power and to secure better representation for non-Caran ethnicities.

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the west increasingly tied down the CDF, leaving it with little real capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Caran civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these
small rebel groups united and called themselves CISC (Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana).

14. **Relations with Neighbouring Countries:** The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good. Even though the Caran make up only 10% of the population of Sumora they are strong politically. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and Katasi are strained. Carana accused Katasi several times of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. Nonetheless it is sufficient to ensure that Carana lays the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi’s door.

The relations between Carana and Rimosa are also strained. There is, a perennial civil conflict in Rimosa. Rimosa, has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the minority and also Muslim Elassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. There, a shadowy rebel army calling itself the Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias. The ELF is said to have loose links with the CISC in Carana.

Carana is a member of the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC). This coalition, consisting of the 12 countries of the continent, is focused primarily on improving the continent’s economic well-being. On occasions, however, the coalition has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between some of the Member States of the CRC. Since late 2016 the CRC has attempted to mediate between the groups in Carana and in February of 2017 it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, which held the CRC presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven to be unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The rotating CRC presidency was assumed by Kazuri at the end of 2016. Being more distant from Carana, Kazuri has the advantage of not being seen to have any vested interest in the conflict, and has made renewed efforts to resume negotiations.
POLITICAL SYSTEM

15. **Government:** Carana is governed under a constitution adopted by a referendum in 1991. It is a presidential republic with a president as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since about 2010 Carana has effectively been a one-party state. Today the only legal political party is the Caran-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

16. **Administration:** Carana is administratively divided into eight provinces. The Capital is Galasi. The Province Capitals are Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Amsan and Corma.

The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The provinces are divided into a number of districts. The political and administrative role of these districts is not defined in the constitution. Most district boundaries were established by the French colonial administration. Side by side with the formal administrative structure, there exists a traditional system built around chiefdoms. Chiefdom chiefs exercise considerable de-facto authority, particularly in rural areas, and preside over traditional courts applying unwritten customary legal codes, which vary across ethnic and religious groups. Sharia law is prominent in Leppko province amongst the Tatsi people.

17. **Judicial System:** Carana’s judicial system is based around a supreme court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial court. The government appoints judges in these courts. Governors appoint judges to the District Courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

Under the constitution, the judicial system is designed to counter the political weight of the government. However, as a result of the judiciary’s politicisation under the one party system, its independence is highly questionable. In addition,
the judiciary sector has for years lacked institutional capacity and resources and suffered from limited territorial coverage and endemic corruption.

Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups.

There is no functioning juvenile justice system, and no public defence counsel service. The legal education system, centred on the University of Galasi Law School, has come to a standstill through a lack of government funding.

18. Media: There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally, there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers.

ECONOMY

19. Economic System: The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels groups control some major diamond mining areas.

Basic Economic Data (of 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>$9.3 billion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| GDP composition by sector | Agriculture: 27%
                                      Manufacturing: 16%
                                      Mining: 32%
                                      Services: 25% |
| GDP growth  | 1919 to 1997: average 3% per year |
|              | 2013: -4%     |
|              | 2014: -2.5%   |
|              | 2015: -2.8%   |
|              | 2016: -6.9%   |
| Country Comparison to the World | 223rd |
| Inflation rate | 300%         |
20. **Banking and Monetary Economy:** The Central Bank of Carana is responsible for the national currency reserve, the international currency exchange and all government monetary transactions.

Constitutionally the Central Bank is responsible for the currency value and economic growth. In reality, the Central Bank is more a government institution than an independent instrument for economic growth and stability.

The government owned BEC (Banque Economique de Carana) is the only monetary institution operating on a countrywide basis. The BEC is represented in all provincial capitals and some of the larger towns.

Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

21. **Mining:** The mining of diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Prior to 1996, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprise but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry.

22. **Manufacturing:** Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP. The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption.

23. **Agriculture:** Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes. The goods produced, fruits, corn, and grain are sold mostly on the local market. Cotton is the only significant agricultural commodity that is exported.

Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

24. **Foreign Trade:** Carana’s main exports are timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts. Carana’s main imports are industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products.
Carana has established trade relations with its neighbours, and with France. Until 1996, Carana had a positive trade balance.

**INFRASTRUCTURE**

25. **Roads:** Carana had a well-developed road network, capable of supporting commercial traffic, with all major towns connected. However, the years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that parts of the road network are often impassable in the rainy season.

As well as the paved roads, there is an intricate network of unpaved roads and tracks. The bridges throughout this network are generally of wooden construction and are rarely capable of sustaining heavy vehicle movement.

26. **Railroads:** Carana has two railroad tracks with a total length of 280 km. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the French colonial period. One track connects Galasi with the coal mining area east of Sureen. The second track connects Maldosa and Mia, and was built to transport copper to the harbour in Turen. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape, although it is still periodically operational.

27. **Harbours:** Carana has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Galasi is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with a Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) capability and working cranes.
The harbour in Cereni does not have a RoRo capability but is equipped with loading systems for containers for heavy goods.

The harbour in Maldosa was originally built for the loading of copper. It has railroad access but limited facilities for loading containers and heavy equipment.

28. **Airports:** Carana has two international airports in Galesi and Corma. Both airports are operational, capable of taking wide bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is limited.

Additionally, there are 25 airstrips around the country. Not all of these airstrips have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

29. **Electricity.** Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by two coal power plants and two hydro-electric power stations. The weakness lies in the distribution network which is only able to support Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local water power plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

30. **Water and Sanitation:** The capital and some larger cities have a water supply system but only to the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. However, the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps, is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavy populated areas.

31. **Telecommunications:** The land-line telephone system covers less than 20% of the city and is unreliable. Consequently, cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country, and some of the remoter border areas that can access nodes in neighbouring countries.

Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

**MILITARY AND SECURITY**

32. **Security Overview:** Though there have been several conflicts with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, and while relations with Katasi
and Rimosa remain strained, the likelihood of conflict is low. There is no current external military threat to Carana.

The main internal security problems centre around the ongoing conflict between armed groups and the government which is increasingly becoming more radicalised and the high level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas, resulting from the poor economic situation. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in the last six months and anything up to 200,000 forced to flee their homes as a result of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. Many civilians have been abducted by armed groups, mainly by extremist rebel elements but also by the CDF.

33. Military

Structure of the CDF
The CDF has a total strength of approximately 10,000 men (9,000 Army, 800 Air Force, 200 Navy). The chiefs of the services report directly to the President.

With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but minor role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited strike capacity. This capacity allows the government to project its power over the entire country, but is insufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Caran people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Caran. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. Their areas of responsibility do not match the administrative and provincial boundaries, but reflect the location of the headquarters and their troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Command</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Assigned Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Maroni</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>Alur</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Folsa</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Corma</td>
<td>2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Major Equipment
The French Government provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well-trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMX 13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Light Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML 60/90</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>APC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>105 mm Artillery Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120 mm Brandt</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 mm Brandt</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Mortar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCL M 40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>106 mm Recoilless Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard M 3 VDA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L 60</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun</td>
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</table>

Air Force

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Jet C</td>
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<td>Ground Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker 100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 421</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F 33 C Bonanza</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospatial SA 330 H Puma</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerospatiale SA 316 Alouette</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Utility/Communication</td>
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Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suscal A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150 to Coastguard Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC-84</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>River Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. Presidential Guard: The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions (about 1500 personnel) and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are Caran and recruited by President Ogavo. Members of the Presidential Guard have received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the
recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against the rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

35. **Police:** The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, CDF units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, logistical and financial resources, and training. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement. Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,400 citizens. Out of this number, only 5% are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking, as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility within the population.

**REBEL GROUPS**

36. **MPC:** The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters, structured into groups of 700 men, with 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the west and cuts across the different religions. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. While the groups have no internally defined military structure they are based on a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the sub-commanders is high and discipline is good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. As a result of broad public support for the rebels, and
the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well-accepted by the largely Kori population in the west.

37. **CISC**: The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverse backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the CDF, while others are refugees from the war in Rimosa. The total strength is estimated to be around 3000 fighters. Public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province.

The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is currently low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

**HUMANITARIAN SITUATION**

38. **Nutrition**: Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural areas most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year.

39. **Health**: Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support.

One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held south and west. Here there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The WHO (World Health Organisation) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana this year.

40. **Refugees and IDPs**: As a result of fighting in the west and south many people have been displaced from their homes. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (approximately 40,000 refugees), Katasi (approximately 40,000 refugees) and Rimosa (approximately 20,000 refugees).

Another 100,000 have fled their homes but remained within Carana; most of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) have headed east to Galasi and other
coastal cities, where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist discontent.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elassi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elassi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elassi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora, near the village of Lora approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. Camp Lora is maintained by UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

Report of the UN Technical Survey of Carana

United Nations

SBE Annexes
REPORT OF THE
UN TECHNICAL SURVEY
OF CARANA

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SBE Annexes
Political

Overview

Despite the signing of the CRC–brokered Kalari Treaty (Peace Agreement), and the presence of the CRC observer mission CRCAC, Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has little control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration’s real power had been limited and its replacement, the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR), has not yet been able to change these facts on the ground. An increasing level of public resistance is challenging the limited resources of the government’s security forces. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

GNR

The Kalari Treaty called for the establishment of an ethnically representative Government of National Reconciliation pending the Presidential and national elections which will elect a new government. The GNR is now in place and struggling with its responsibilities.

Under the provisions for the Treaty, effective power is in the hands of a consensus Prime Minister. Lucien Langata, or LL as he is known, was a member of the PDC and Finance Minister until he took a stand against corruption in the mid 2000s. Narrowly escaping execution due to his popular following amongst the Caran, LL refused to leave Carana and President Ogavo had allowed him to live in relative obscurity. He is considered a popular and sensible choice for caretaker Prime Minister and enjoys sufficient support across the country to have a reasonable chance of pulling the GNR together.

While nominally still President, Ogavo has been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity and now by the GNR for corruption. Unfortunately, he has disappeared and was last seen in Rimosa in late April. He is believed to be protected by a group of hard line former members of the Presidential Guard, most of whom still remain in Carana, based in the capital Galesi. Depending on the Guards loyalty, this nexus could potentially disrupt the peace process since there is neither the will nor the capability within the former security forces to track Ogavo down.

Political Parties

Carana has been essentially a one party state represented by the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC). Years of repression have destroyed any
effective and legitimate opposition, or have driven it underground; any legitimate opposition capability is so fragmented that it is unlikely to be politically viable for some time.

Those opposition groups that do exist tend to be relatively insignificant, ethnically-based and provincial; this includes some communist groups in the capital and Maldosa, as well as Kori ethnic minority groups on the coast and the Tatsi grouping in the South. However, these groups are not organised and have little importance because of their narrow interest and small following. Other groups having some political influence are the coal and copper miners’ trade unions, which are mainly interest-based.

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of the MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it could become an effective political force. It enjoys broad cross-confessional public support in the west through its ability to be seen to address the concerns and needs of the people where the government has failed.

In contrast the CISC currently lacks the structure or organization that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the excesses and religious discrimination of the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Caran minority in Leppko province. It has never made an attempt to capitalise on its potential nor articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated and radicalized when it sees itself marginalised.

Carana has no political diaspora or organised groups in exile.

**Elections**

While the Kalari Treaty calls for elections within 12 months, the current highly unstable security situation could threaten the credibility and legitimacy of such an ambitious electoral process.

After years of human rights violations, sectarian discrimination, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Potential political opposition groups will be hard pressed to organise themselves in time to conduct an effective election campaign; this could result in calls to delay the elections, or attempts to subvert the electoral process itself. Nevertheless, the timeline for elections was a crucial element in the peace negotiations. There will be considerable pressure on the GNR to manage this process.
Another significant factor is the absence of an accurate census: the last national census having taken place in 1990. When combined with the large scale displacement of the population, voter registration will be a long, complex and costly exercise.

If all parties honour the commitments of the Kalari Treaty, it can be hoped that the MPC will participate in future elections and evolve into a legitimate political party. The long-term political role of the CISC is uncertain. A further uncertainty is the potential emergence of hitherto unidentified groups, some extremist, which are not signatories to the Kalari Treaty. Whether they join the political process or oppose it, there is a real danger of further political instability, leading to an increased violence and the ensuing security risks to the elections.

**DDR**

The requirement for all parties to the conflict to disarm is stated in the Kalari Treaty. It can be assumed that the MPC will honour this commitment if all parties adhere to the Treaty, especially in view of its political aspirations and its expectations for its fighters to be included within the restructured national armed forces.

Whilst there are no indications that CISC will not disarm in accordance with the Kalari Treaty, the lack of a proper organizational structure and the inherent lack of discipline within the various splinter factions will make it a high risk process. It is evident that some factions have become radicalized by Islamist extremists, and probable some factions will see themselves being disadvantaged, leading to freelance military activity, which may have sectarian, religious, political, or criminal motivation. Many of these CISC soldiers have also been involved in systematic sexual violence against Christian women, girls and young boys in reprisal for similar and historical CDF excesses against the Tatsi Muslim population. It is therefore difficult to determine how the integration of these armed groups will be perceived by the population in the affected areas. In the CISC group, there is also a high percentage of women and girls who have been abducted and now live with the militia. In effect, these women and girls also constitute the logistics and healthcare of the CISC military structure. A further complication is that these women are not welcome back into their original villages.

By extension, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of any other armed groups which have no allegiance to any group, are not signatories of the Kalari Treaty and which focus is largely extremist or criminal.

**Constitution and Judicial System**
The Constitution and judicial system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles. Violations of human rights and other legal shortcomings stem from a systematic abuse and exploitation of the existing rules by the Ogava regime.

Under the “State of Emergency” (see below) a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crime.

A number of human rights organisations have issued reports outlining arrests, detentions and executions without due legal process. There are also reports of torture, including sexual abuse and rape, and uninvestigated deaths in the prisons. Many of the detainees are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions generally give cause for concern and official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain. The ICRC has limited access to only the main prison in Galasi. There are reliable reports of children being detained with adults as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. Some of the women have their infants with them. In general, prisoners are treated harshly, conditions are inhumane, nutrition is inadequate and there is little or no medical assistance. No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in CDF military holding facilities. Equally, the rebels are known to be holding many detainees.

**Human Rights**

Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention Against Torture. It has also ratified the Statute of the ICC.

The Constitution states that all laws must be consistent with Carana’s international human rights obligations. It underlines that these rights should be upheld regardless of gender, ethnic group or creed. In reality, Carana legislation contains many laws inherited from the colonial period, which are incompatible with international human rights standards – for instance the Carana criminal procedure code. The Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights. It is silent on other rights such as economic, social and cultural rights.

Currently, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Carana government has declared a “State of Emergency” which permits it to override the constitutional provisions, including its human rights elements. In 2013, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the
situation of Human Rights in Carana. The Special Rapporteur has visited the country on a number of occasions and has sharply criticised all parties to the conflict for human rights abuses perpetuated against civilians generally, and women in particular. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict has also visited Carana and highlighted the disturbingly large number of children used in combat roles by rebel elements as well as by the national army.

The Carana Government does not have a human rights ministry – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. In 2008, the National Human Rights Commission was established. The commission is not compliant with the international standards for a national human rights institution as set out in the “Paris Principles”. Carana has a number of active human rights NGOs, including women’s and youth groups, whose freedom to operate has been inhibited by the fear of reprisals, but with the change in the situation they are becoming increasingly vocal. A number of international humanitarian NGOs are also represented in the country.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Women**

Carana holds 130th place in the Gender Development index ranking of Gender Development index and has high mortality rates in childbirth and low literacy rates for women. As many men are working in the mines or manufacturing industry as well as being forcefully recruited to the military organizations, women are largely left with responsibility for small-scale farming to support extended families. This distribution of labour, which leaves many women vulnerable to threats, has resulted in their increased political awareness.

In parliament, however, women represent only 8% of members, which makes it difficult for their concerns to be heard. In public life women have held posts generally associated with assistance, i.e. women’s affairs, health, etc. and have not been in decision-making positions. The only official women’s organization is the women’s wing of PDC which has advocated a return to traditional roles for women and men.

With the new political situation, women are mobilizing at the grass-root level. In the past, the State used abduction and rape to stigmatize and undermine female political involvement. The only women’s organizations that could operate addressed less overt political issues such as children’s issues (i.e. education, nutrition). However, there were women’s organizations in the conflict-affected areas helping victims of sexual violence. These women’s groups report high levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse, especially in the IDP camps.
Systematic sexual violence was used in some of the conflict-affected areas. The CISC is one of the main perpetrators of violence resulting from their poor command and control structures. The CDF and law enforcement agencies are also responsible for sexual violence against civilians of the Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups. The conflict seems to have exacerbated the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighboring countries. Trafficking in humans is related to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, all three of which have been used by the warring parties to continue the conflict.

**Gender Specific Considerations: Men**

Given the high crime rates, a large number of young men are being killed in crime related violence such as riots or gang fights. Men’s health is also negatively affected by the working conditions in the mines and manufacturing industry. Trade unions have not been able to address this situation effectively, partly because of their political involvement in the conflict. Sanitary conditions in the shanty towns are poor with high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction as well as HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases. In the southern and western areas, affected by conflict, there is often forced recruitment of men, particularly the very young. As a result, many men are leaving the country with their families being left behind. Men involved in the political struggle can be subjected to violence with reports of sexual torture and rape being used against political prisoners. In the southern region, civilian men of the Caran minority are the main target of violence by the CISC. Similarly, civilian men of the Kori and Tatsi are targeted by the CDF in their campaigns.

**The Situation with Regard to Girls and Boys**

The political conflict along with a deteriorating economy has had a grave impact on the young population, of which 44% is under the age of 15. Both girls and boys leave school to help support their families. Forced genital mutilation of girls in their early teens, though illegal, is practiced extensively by both the Kori and the Tatsi. There has been extensive abuse of both boys and girls throughout the conflict by all parties. The CISC are the main culprits for abductions but also sections of the CDF have been reported to be responsible. This high degree of violence toward girls, boys and women has prompted public discussion about the need to fight violence against women in the society at large.

**Security**

**Overview**

The level of general security in Carana is very low as a result of the intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, the sectarian tensions, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence
outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest is widespread and occurs on a regular basis. The level of crime is high and there is evidence that much of it, especially in the sectors of diamonds and narcotics, is both organized and transnational. Overall, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as “Medium Risk”. Some areas, such as the territory around Galasi, as well as Hanno and Leppko Provinces, have to be assessed as “High to Very High Risk”. Male abductees of all ages are often coerced into the fighting forces and girls and women are used as what amounts as slaves, including being forced to become “wives” of combatants. These women are also at times forced to participate in outright fighting. If they refuse they are killed. Rape and other forms of sexual abuse are commonplace and are used to intimidate.

Since March, at the invitation of the GNR, there has been an emergency deployment of a French force “Opération Intrépide” along the Rimosa border in the South West mountains. Their stabilizing effect is still uncertain. Of limited duration (6 months) the operation is designed to neutralize the emerging threat of extremist Islamic activity operating either side of the Carana/Rimosa border. The question remains, however, whether the stability they can bring to this region can be sustained once they withdraw.

**Galasi**

In Galasi the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of male youth, of up to 100 in number, rule the streets. These gangs pose a threat even to unwary military formations. There is increasing evidence that their activities are organized and are funded by trafficking in narcotics and women. Within the IDP camps there is a high level of crime, mostly as a result of poverty and hopelessness, but this has been on the decline recently since the appearance of vigilante groups who dispense their own form of summary justice.

**Akkabar**

In Akkabar the coal mine workers went on strike in May 2015 as they had not been paid for four months. These men live in shantytowns in poor conditions, separated from their families. What started as an industrial dispute soon escalated into open conflict after excess use of force by the police resulting in the death of several miners. In reaction, some miners have subsequently attacked a number of government institutions, particularly police stations and banks. Much of this may well be inspired by the criminal cartels. Activity is sporadic and often spontaneous but it has increasing local support.

**Leppko**

The breakdown of government authority in Leppko province has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups, that together with CISC combatants, have preyed on the Kori and Caran elements of the local population. Much of this violence is radicalized and sectarian in nature. Many of these
groups are former Elassi rebels from neighbouring Rimosa who have taken advantage of the unstable situation in Carana. Links between the CISC and these groups are denied by the CISC but several independent reports indicate such links exist. These groups are involved in the organised smuggling of weapons, drugs and women. It is hoped that Opération Intrépide will bring a needed degree of stability to the mountainous border areas.

**Military**

**General Situation**

Following the signing of the Kalari Treaty the signatory combatants have generally remained where they were, unwilling to concede any gains made, and each fearful that the other side might renege on its commitments. This has resulted in an unstable stalemate in a number of areas and, while no violations of the ceasefire have been reported, the close proximity of opposing forces poses a significant risk that will increase the longer it is allowed to continue. Therefore disengagement, separation and a start to the disarmament process are high priorities. Less predictable is the increasing presence of Islamist extremists operating out of Leppko Province, particularly in the mountainous South West adjacent to the Rimosa border; as well as the activities of radicalized non-signatory armed groups operating in Hanno and Leppko who are responsible for a continued level of violence against civilians.

**Carana Defence Force (CDF)**

The CDF have remained in their positions after the ceasefire. Four infantry battalions remained deployed along the separation line between CDF and MPC, and an additional three deployed in the South in Corma, Maldosa and North Leppko. The Airborne Battalion, in conjunction with Gendarmerie units, is deployed in the city of Maroni to handle the riots of the coal miners. The engineer units and the Reconnaissance Company are co-located in the North West with the Infantry Units. The location of the Artillery Battalion and the Air Defence Units is unknown.

The six Alpha Jets of the Carana Air Force can be assessed as non-operational. The helicopters have been used frequently for air patrols.

According to our own observations, the logistic situation for the CDF appears poor. Spare parts seem to be a particular problem.

The CDF has a reputation of not respecting international humanitarian law, with reported cases of sexual violence. This is primarily true of the CDF positioned in the South where historically there has been a sectarian element to their excesses.
MPC

Original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6000 to approximately 10,000. Approximately 5000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary. It is assessed that the remaining 5000 MPC rebels are sufficient to balance the presence of the CDF on the separation line and maintain the status quo, especially when backed up by the knowledge that they can quickly be reinforced. It is assessed that the underlying reason for this redeployment is to ensure that the front line MPC troops are logistically sustainable, and they certainly appear better prepared than many of their CDF counterparts.

The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 mainly male soldiers (including their families and dependants) from whence they conduct patrols west of the separation line. While this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to trigger an engagement with the CDF whether by mistake or by design.

After the end of the formal fighting, the official HQ in Alur increased in importance and has become a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in Alur.

The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but has repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of children. As a result of broad public support and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the West.

CISC

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are living in their home villages and group only occasionally.

The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that their number has not changed and remains in the region of 3000 active male fighters.

Hitherto the CISC has focused its attention on the CDF and has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However, recently there have been reports of several acts of what appears to be extremist violence against ethnic minorities in the south of Leppko adjacent to the border with Rimosa. It is not clear whether members of the CISC have been involved, which would be in violation of the Kalari Treaty, or whether these acts are the
responsibility of radicalized splinter groups that are not signatories. In any case, civilians from the Caran and other minorities in the region seem to be the target.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions or exercise control in the region except by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

**Police**

The concept of conventional policing is almost non-existent. In government controlled areas the police, both National Police and Gendarmerie, are viewed as elements to only enforce government policy and protect government interests. In the remainder of the country the police are targeted as they are so closely identified with the repressive Ogavo regime. Consequently, many have been killed, and others have either fled or changed allegiance. As a result, law and order is either maintained, or not, by the dominant militia group in any given area. In some areas, such as those in which the MPC has asserted control, a quasi capacity to maintain law and order exists. In others, mainly in the south, there is none at all. Certain crimes – such as domestic violence or Gender Based Violence – are not addressed at all by the police. Reporting sexual violence to the police entails the risk of renewed attack by the police itself, as the victim is sometimes considered as guilty as the perpetrator.

Where police do exist they are ill-trained, poorly paid, or not paid at all, with low morale. The result is that corruption remains endemic. Police stations have little equipment and that which they do have is of military origin and entirely unsuitable for a democratic police force. Police training, especially human rights training, has virtually ceased. To compound the problem the existing police structure is so identified with President Ogavo that no member of it would be accepted in the MPC or CISC controlled areas. Effectively this means that the South is lawless.

**Economy**

Prior to the civil war, the Caranian economy was already suffering from over a decade of negative growth due to excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. It continued to deteriorate during the war which brought the production of copper to a halt and saw much of the diamond production hijacked by a number of criminal groups. The flow of foreign currency reduced to a trickle, and what did exist was mostly used to buy weapons or was misappropriated. Fighting in rural areas meant that the timber industry was reduced to approximately 20% of its pre-conflict capacity and agricultural production fell to approximately 40-50%. The net result has been an inflation rate that has been running somewhere around 300% and a significantly reduced supply of basic commodities. The warfare in the countryside has also affected the small-scale farming used to support many women who are heads-of-
household. This concerns widows as well as wives of men who are working in the mines or the manufacturing industry.

The result is an increasingly dire humanitarian situation, which has only been prevented from becoming a major crisis by external aid and reliance on a subsistence economy. Inevitably the consequences are most acute in the major towns where increasing social dissatisfaction frequently erupts into violence.

**Infrastructure**

**Roads**

Carana has an adequate road network with paved routes connecting most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the west and the north, these roads also link to the networks in neighbouring Katasi and Sumora. A few paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season, but most roads are in need of significant maintenance. Carana has also a comprehensive network of secondary (unpaved) roads and tracks, which often become impassable during the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles up to approx 20 tons. Those along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and need to be assessed individually before they can be used by UN traffic.

**Railways**

The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both operational but degraded. Currently the Galasi to Akkabar line can go no further than Maroni as the main railway bridge was destroyed by flooding in 2010 and has yet to be repaired.

There are rail yards at Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa capable of handling containers, vehicles and other goods. The station in Mia is specialised for the transport of copper and has no freight handling facilities.

In common with the road network there has been little or no maintenance over the past few years, consequently the tracks are deteriorating and are likely to be subject to increasing restrictions both in terms of speed and capacity.

**Harbours**

In Carana there are three deep-water harbours and a number of smaller fishing ports. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.
The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped, can handle large ships and has a roll-on roll-off (RoRo) and container capability. This harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential UN Mission.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo or significant container capability but is equipped with operational cranes and can take break-bulk ships up to approximately 600 ft in length. However, there is only limited dock space without disrupting regular trade; this effectively limits capacity to no more than two ships above the routine shipping.

The harbour in Maldosa in the South is geared to specialised handling for the export of copper but has a similar capacity to Cereni for the handling of regular transport ships. Only two wharves are equipped with cranes which will limit capacity, and there is very limited parking or storage space due to the harbour being in the town; this being said there is ample space on the western outskirts. Currently, the French Opération Intépide has its main supply routes coming through Katasi, where they historically have had a base and a permanent military presence. The UN will need to find alternatives to this arrangement.

**Airports**

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports have runways suitable for heavy transport aircraft.

The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material and has ample ramp space in excess of its routine requirements. Space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles in close proximity to the airport is limited, but generally it meets most requirements for the deployment of personnel and equipment.

Limitations on ramp space and cargo handling capacity restrict the capacity of the airport at Corma, however it has almost unlimited space close to the airport for storage/parking, and there are no significant limitations to the deployment of personnel. The French have a small logistic presence at Corma in support of Intrepid.

The airstrips in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

All other airstrips are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.
Electricity

There are three operational power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and two coal power plants in Galasi. In recent years, Carana was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The instability in the Hanno area, caused by the miners’ unrest, has led to a shortage of coal and has limited the production of electricity.

Since the power supply system is not designed as a network with redundancies, but organised on a regional oriented star pattern, the damage of one main line can cut supply to a large area. Accordingly, most of the country is currently without regular power supply.

Water

Potable water is available in most parts of the country but the quality of water varies. In the more arid areas south west of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water is drawn mostly from small ponds and slow flowing brooks which are often of poor quality and a source of various water borne diseases. Daily collection of water is time-consuming and onerous, particularly for women. The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted, causing health problems for the men living in the surrounding shantytowns. These poor hygienic conditions are connected with a high infant mortality rate. Near the major rivers there is ample water supply but it still needs purification.

Humanitarian

Refugees and IDPs

The refugee and IDP situation remains unchanged from the information provided in the UN Country Team Report. IDPs are mainly women and their children and they mostly headed east to the capital and other coastal cities, where most are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in, or near, urban areas. The crime rate – such as murder, rape, domestic violence
and theft – is high in the camps. The situation concerning health and sanitation is poor.

There is also fear among the refugee/IDP women that the already agreed DDR process will lead to the reintegration into their villages or areas of the men who sexually abused them.

Nutrition

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price of food and basic goods increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased over the last several years.

The most affected areas are north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni, where the situation has already reached a crisis.

Landmines

During the conflict between CDF and rebels, landmines were used intensively by all parties, yet the nature of the conflict and the forces involved meant that very little documentation was maintained. Consequently, mines pose a major and unpredictable threat to the population at large, aid agencies and any potential peacekeeping mission. There is an immediate need to identify the areas of highest risk, many of which are in the west of the country, and begin action to reduce the threat.

The UN Country Team and Non-governmental Organisations in Carana

Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of NGOs operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organisations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years. However, despite the Kalari Agreement, the continued levels of background violence has meant that large tracts of Carana are no-go areas for international humanitarian organizations. There is no Country Team presence in Hanno or Leppko provinces (apart from Corma) due to the high level of violence.

The UN Country Team in Carana consists of the following organizations:

- World Food Program (WFP)
Responsible for food distribution programmes and maintains offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.

  
The lead agency for programmes helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.

- **The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**
  
Protects and assists refugees; it has offices in Galasi, and Alur.

- **The World Health Organisation (WHO)**
  
Coordinates international health programmes; it has an office in Galasi.

- **The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)**
  
A small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.

- **United Nations Development Program (UNDP)**
  
Responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Representative is also the UN Resident Coordinator and chairs weekly UN country team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above. She is currently the Designated Official for Security in Carana.

**NGOs**

A total of fifty international and local NGOs operate throughout Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children’s issues and women's issues. Additionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC), mandated to assist victims of war, is present in Maroni, Arum, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Sureen, and Alur.

**Public Information**

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers have been rigorously controlled by the government. There is no press freedom. Editors and journalists who have opposed the PDC have been imprisoned or have fled. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. Government approved national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several
months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station out of Alur.

As a result of the war several radio and TV transmission stations were destroyed, effectively leaving large areas of the country without access to information or TV and radio programmes.

**Education**

Prior to the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed education systems in the region from primary through to tertiary levels. The effects of war and a declining economy have seriously degraded the system, reducing the overall number of schools, particularly at the primary level, and resulting in a general decline in the number of students, particularly female. The decrease in the number of female students and therefore female literacy is particularly acute, the causes of which are the levels of violence as well as cultural discrimination.

**Support**

Notwithstanding the poor economic situation in Carana, most basic goods and supplies are still available, although both quality and availability can be erratic. Local purchase to meet UN mission requirements is therefore uncertain.

Fuel, construction material and food can be purchased, or contracted, in country, although the rampant inflation rate and the potential of a UN deployment is already leading to escalating prices.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors.

There is an ample supply of timber which can be purchased from local dealers in the larger towns, but concrete and steel are only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Specialised construction materials such as plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. In addition, furniture of adequate quality is largely unavailable. Technical goods such as IT equipment, vehicles and spares are generally unavailable in country.

Transport services can be contracted in the Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa although a series of truck driver strikes during the last year has meant that service has become unpredictable. There are no vehicle or aircraft rental companies currently in Carana.

**Local Labour**

SBE Annexes
Given the increased levels of unemployment following the war, there is no shortage of unskilled, or semi-skilled labour. Availability of skilled labour has reduced as many professional people left the country during the war. In the former two categories only approximately 30% have any English, the remainder uses either French or local dialects.

**Banking**

The banking system is only operational in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa and it does not support electronic cash transfer in any location. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns, rudimentary banking functions do exist but these are of little practical significance.

**Availability of Real Estate**

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, office and accommodation is available for rent, although much is sub-standard and suffering from a lack of basic maintenance and facilities, particularly water, sanitation and power.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Peace Agreement

United Nations

SBE Annexes
AGREEMENT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN CARANA

We, the undersigned:

Recognize there is no military solution to the crisis affecting Carana, and that a sustainable peace can only be resolved through political dialogue and a spirit of reconciliation,

Understand the need to take bold decisions,

Agree to immediately cease all hostile activity and further agree to facilitate the deployment of monitors from the United Nations and the CRC,

Hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

1.1 A Government of National Reconciliation, fairly representative of the ethnic diversity of Carana, will be set up immediately following the ceasefire to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services, restructuring the security forces and rebuilding the country.

1.2 The Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

1.3 The GNR will conduct free and fair elections within 12 months of the signing of this agreement.

1.4 The GNR will immediately set up a national human rights commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Carana and investigate abuses. The commission will be made up of delegates of all parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.

ARTICLE II
Annex C – Kalari Peace Agreement

2.1 A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana, between the signatory belligerents. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be effected as soon as possible.

2.2 The ceasefire covers all warlike acts by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage and incitement of ethnic hatred, and requires disengagement of opposing forces as defined hereafter.

2.3 The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within xxx after the signing of the ceasefire.

2.4 Details of the ceasefire and its monitoring by the United Nations are attached to this agreement at Annex1.

ARTICLE III

3.1 The GNR will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the national human rights commission, mentioned in Article 1.4 above, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

ARTICLE IV

4.1 The GNR will establish a national commission to oversee disarmament of former combatants and the restructuring of the military and police forces.

4.2 The GNR will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and professionalism and representative of the ethnic diversity of Carana. The GNR will, as soon as practical begin the restructuring of the defence and security forces, including the police forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers.

4.3 In order to contribute to restoring the security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the GNR will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all non-government forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

4.4 Those ex-combatants of the CDF, MPC and CISC who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria, and that the armed forces reflect the geo-political structure of Carana within the established strength, which shall not exceed 10,000.

SBE Annexes
(Signed)

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CARANA

FOR THE MPC

FOR THE CISC

(Witnessed by)

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR THE CONTINENT REGIONAL COALITION
Annex 1

PROVISIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE

1 The disengagement of forces shall mean the immediate breaking of tactical contact between the opposing Military Forces of the Parties to this Agreement at places where they are in direct contact by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

2 Where immediate disengagement is not possible, a framework and sequence of disengagement is to be agreed by all Parties through the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).

3 The immediate disengagement of all military units shall be limited to the effective range of direct fire weapons. Further disengagement to pull all weapons out of range, shall be conducted under the guidance of the JCC.

4 The Carana Defence Forces (CDF) will withdraw all armored vehicles and weapons larger than Caliber .50in from Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek and Leppko provinces.

5 The resupply of weapons, ammunition or other lethal logistical supplies will cease by the effective date and time of this agreement.

6 A complete ban on any mine-laying operations will come into effect by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

7 Any attempt to hinder or prevent operations to remove mines will be considered a breach of the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
8 Upon the cease-fire taking effect, all Parties shall provide International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent with relevant information concerning their prisoners of war or persons detained because of the war. They shall subsequently accord every assistance to the ICRC representatives to enable them to visit the prisoners and detainees and verify any details and ascertain their condition and status.

9 On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Parties shall release persons detained because of the war or taken hostage within three days of the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement and the ICRC/Red Crescent shall give them all the necessary assistance including relocation to any provinces within Carana or any other country where their security will be guaranteed.

10 All domestic and external propaganda between the parties and any other action aimed at inciting ethnic hatred will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

11 All acts of violence against the civilian population will cease by the effective date and time of the Cease-Fire Agreement. This includes acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1 The verification and control of the ceasefire will be overseen by a United Nations mandated mission and will include the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) chaired by the UN, and Joint Liaison Teams (JLTs) that will function at national, provincial and local levels.

2 The JCC will be composed of appointed representatives of all parties and the UN. It shall be established immediately upon signing of the Peace Agreement.

3 All parties will provide details to the JCC giving the strength and locations of their forces. In view of the sensitivity of such information the head of the JCC is to make provision for its appropriate handling. All CDF soldiers and Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) members shall be registered.
4 The JCC shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN, which will define its tasks and duties. Rules of procedure will be drafted in consultation with the parties and these will be promulgated through the JCC. The JCC shall report formally to the GNR on a regular basis.

5 The JCC will establish the JLTs and make appropriate arrangements for reporting and dealing with issues that are brought to its attention, specifically any issues requiring arbitration between the parties or violations of the ceasefire.

6 The JLTs will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and led by officers of the UN. The JLTs will be responsible to the JCC.

7 The JLTs will facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

DPKO Assessment and Planning Directive

United Nations

SBE Annexes
SITUATION

The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the Government can no longer control significant portions of the country and increasingly armed and extremist elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the west, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the MPC while the south is increasingly fragmented, lacking any structure and reverting to control by individual local leaders splintering away from the CISC. No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and the ethnic and religious tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas.

The worst case scenario would see the current stalemate sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a de facto breakup of the country under individual factions; while the latter may be a viable option in the eyes of the MPC, it is not so in CISC areas, which would witness a further deterioration of law and order. The just-concluded Kalari peace agreement offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.

The CRC has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward including its efforts to promote the Kalari peace agreement. The functions of its light observer mission (CRCAC) will be folded into the UN peacekeeping operation and most of the observers will be re-designated to participate in this new mission. So long as the French force ‘Operation Intrepide’ remains in Southern Carana, the peacekeeping operation will need to establish clear lines of cooperation and liaison.

Key aspects of the new agreement include:

- The establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation;
- Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
- Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
- Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
- Respect for human rights;
- Disarmament and demobilization of armed groups;
- Restructured military police and intelligence capacities.
United Nations Security Council Resolution xxx of 3 June xxxx confirmed the Council’s readiness to establish a UN peacekeeping operation to support the implementation of the Kalari Agreement and a long-term political settlement.

DPKO has assumed lead responsibility for planning of the UN operation and an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been established.

The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission to support the new Kalari agreement. The conditions to deploy are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences both for the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.

The plan produced under DPKO’s leadership must synchronize the immediate stabilization objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long term stability in Carana.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The strategic direction, as derived from the Secretary-General and the Security Council, will be as follows:

“The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence”.

This constitutes the UN system’s objective for Carana, the achievement of which will include:

- Supporting political dialogue at national and sub-national levels to foster an inclusive and viable peace agreement and its implementation;
- Supporting security and stabilization in key contested areas; and
- Completing the establishment and operationalization of full Mission capacity in key areas.

STAKEHOLDERS

Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. At HQ, the full involvement of the agencies, funds and programs in the work of the ITF is critical from the outset.
In the field, it is essential to ensure that:

- The Government of National Reconciliation is included and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties;
- The CRC remains engaged as a full partner in the process;
- Individual Member States, international and regional organizations and donors, who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort, are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

ASSUMPTIONS

- The cooperation of the Government of National Reconciliation is required for meaningful planning to take place, and that all parties agree not to put obstacles in the way of a UN deployment.

- Other assumptions:
  - That military and police personnel required for a possible United Nations operation in Carana will be forthcoming from troop and police contributing countries, and will be deployed as per SCR XXX.
  - That only those tasks that are clearly indicated by this directive will be included in the planning; any additional tasks should be the subject of a separate recommendation and approved by DPKO.
  - That the Kalari peace agreement will be the basis for meaningful change in Carana and that it will receive full and timely international support.
  - That the humanitarian operation currently taking place in Carana will continue.
  - That the CRC will support UN efforts to ensure that Carana's neighbours do not interfere in the internal affairs of Carana.

CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

- The following targets represent what we need to achieve:
  - Deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission within 14 days of the signing of a peace agreement;
o Deployment of a peacekeeping mission within 90 days of a Security Council resolution;

o Stabilisation of the current humanitarian crisis within six months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution. Stabilisation will occur when it is no longer necessary to provide emergency relief;

o Cessation of hostilities as specified by the Kalari peace agreement;

o Implementation of the terms of the peace agreement as specified by that agreement;

o Commencement of a programme of disarmament and demobilization of armed groups within three months of the peace agreement, and completion within 12 months;

o Completion of planning for support to an election process within 12 months from the adoption of a Security Council resolution;

o Return of all IDPs and refugees within two years, and provision for displaced voters to participate in the election should it occur before they are able to return.

CONSTRAINTS

☐ The general state of the Caranian infrastructure presents significant operational and logistical challenges and road movement can become a major problem in the rainy reason, particularly in the more remote parts of the country; this will require that the movement of goods and personnel be carried out by air, particularly by helicopter at certain times of the year.

☐ The timeline that has been established by the Kalari peace agreement envisages elections within 12 months; this will place us and the Government of National Reconciliation under significant pressure. On one hand we will need to have our plans to support the electoral process in place in good time, and on the other we must be prepared for a contingency should the date for the elections slip.

☐ The scenario described in the previous point is likely to be complicated because the Government of National Reconciliation will initially lack the capability to undertake its own responsibilities, both in preparing for elections and also potentially in other areas such as disarmament and security sector reform.

PROCESS

SBE Annexes
Planning for the deployment of the peacekeeping operation will be led from United Nations Headquarters, under the direction of the Carana Planning Team that has been established for this purpose.

The process will be guided by the Integrated Assessment and Planning process (IAP), whose major benchmarks and outputs include:

- The Mission Concept and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF);
- The Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council;
- Security Council resolutions;
- Establishment of an Integrated Mission Headquarters;
- Assumption of operational planning responsibilities by the Mission HQ; and
- Validation and endorsement of the Mission Concept.

**TIMELINE**

- Draft Mission Plan: one week prior to technical assessment mission,
- Technical Assessment Mission: Within 21 days of the signing of a peace agreement,
- Secretary-General submits a report to the Security Council: three weeks after return of technical assessment mission,
- Mission Concept: 21 days after Secretary-General’s report to Security Council
- Integrated Strategic Framework: 100 days after the establishment of the mission,
- Establishment of the mission headquarters, augmented by the temporary deployment of the ITF within five weeks of the Security Council resolution.

**RESPONSIBILITIES & DEADLINES**

**DPKO / ITF:**

- The head of the Carana Planning Team and DPKO chair of the ITF is responsible to the USG and is to lead all UN planning activities during the foundation and operational planning phases until a USG Directive to the SRSG is issued to guide an integrated peace support operation in Carana.
S/he is also responsible for ensuring the substantive integration of all relevant dimensions of UN system involvement.

- The DPKO chair of the ITF is to provide the USG with an initial presentation for the Security Council on options for an integrated peace support operation in Carana immediately on the return of the technical assessment mission.

- S/he is to lead a technical assessment mission to Carana at the earliest opportunity.

- S/he is to produce recommendations for the Secretary-General on the structure, size and concept of an integrated peace support operation in Carana to the Security Council within 21 days of return from the technical assessment, or as directed by the USG.

- S/he is to present a final draft for an integrated peace support operation in Carana within 28 days of return from the technical assessment mission, or as directed by the USG.

- She/he is to ensure that throughout the planning there is full compliance with Decision No. 2008/24 of the Policy Committee of 26 October 2008 on human rights in integrated missions.

SRSG

- Once a SRSG has been appointed and the USG DPKO has issued a directive, s/he will assume the lead for planning for the mission in Carana.

INTEGRATION OF ALL UN EFFORTS IN CARANA

- A critical function of the Mission Concept is to integrate the work of all Mission components behind clearly-established mission-wide priorities to ensure maximum coherence and unity of effort. Individual components of the Mission - substantive, military, police and support - will be expected to align their respective Concepts of Operation on the basis of the Mission Concept.

- The UNCT will participate actively in, and contribute to, the planning process in order to ensure proper alignment, coordination and consistency in the development of the UN system-wide response. This involvement is in addition to that of the UNDG and ECHA planning capacities and individual agencies represented on the IMTF.
A comprehensive strategic communication strategy will be developed in consultation with UN partners as soon as possible. This strategy should be implemented well in advance of the UN mission assuming responsibility. The strategy will have the objective of promoting an understanding among local communities, the parties to the peace process and the public at large, with regard to the role of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Carana.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

United Nations Security Council President’s Statement
Statement by the President of the Security Council

At the 5917th meeting of the Security Council, held on 26 M 20xx, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “The question concerning Carana”, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

“The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

“The Security Council commends the 8th Continent Regional Coalition (CRC) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

“The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use of force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 1991 constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

“The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the subregion that are affected by the Caranian crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations.”

“The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.
"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the CRC, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict.

“The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains engaged on the matter.”
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Scenario Base Exercise

Mission ROE

United Nations
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION CARANA (UNAC)

INTRODUCTION

1. This document, including all of its Annexes (A-D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

2. This document provides the authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE.

3. These ROE are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which designated United Nations’ military personnel may use force during the UN peacekeeping operation, UNAC. They are founded on UN Security Council resolution 1544 of 30 June 2017. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they provide the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission. The ROE allow for the use of the necessary degree of force to guarantee self-defence and define the circumstances under which the use of force by UNAC military personnel may be justified.

4. In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:
   a. Authorised Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNAC: Annex A
   b. ROE for UNAC – DEFINITIONS & AMPLIFICATIONS: Annex B
   c. ROE for UNAC – DIRECTIONS & PROCEDURES: Annex C
   d. ROE for UNAC – WEAPON STATES: Annex D
   e. ROE for UNAC – SOLDIER’S CARD: Annex E

AUTHORITY

5. The power and authority of UNAC is derived from Security Council resolution 1544 dated 30 June 2017 and must be exercised in a manner consistent with the UNAC mandate as described in this resolution.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

6. The area of operations for the application of these ROE is defined by the territory of Carana. This includes the adjacent territorial sea, adjacent airspace and any designated air and sea corridors to be utilized by UNAC.
Annex F – Mission ROE

MISSION

7. The relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1544 (2017) dated 13 June 2017 for UNAC are contained in Annex A - Authorised ROE for UNAC.

EXECUTION OF ROE

8. **Principles.**
   a. **General:**
      (1) The conduct of peacekeeping operations is guided by the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of International Law.
      (2) All UNAC military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out by relevant Security Council Resolutions.
      (3) UNAC ROE provides direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the mission area. They define the degree and the manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE inform commanders of the constraints imposed and the degree of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.
      (4) Throughout the conduct of peacekeeping operations, where force is to be used, all UNAC military personnel must comply with the international principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to minimise the potential for collateral damage.
      (5) Contingents are only to use weapons authorised by the United Nations in accordance with the respective Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU).
      (6) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:
         I. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.
         II. Address safety-related restrictions.
   
   b. **Self-Defence:**
      (1) Nothing in these ROE negates a Commander’s right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
      (2) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals, or individual units under attack, as well as other UN military personnel who are able to assist those individuals or individual units under attack, or which are in imminent danger of being attacked.
   
   c. **Military Necessity:** The principle of military necessity authorises the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the mission. Military necessity does not authorise acts otherwise prohibited under international law.
   
   d. **Alternatives to the Use of Force:** Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potential hostile incident by SBE Annexes
means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from local authorities).

e. **Duty to Challenge and Warn:** Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter any person or group from displaying hostile intent or committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given at Annex C.

f. **Duty to Observe Fire/Target Identification:** See Annex C, paragraphs 1 and 6.

g. **Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force:**
   1. Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary and proportionate to achieve the objective. In some circumstances operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.
   2. The use of force should be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of response may have to be higher in order to minimise the cost in terms of UN casualties and civilian casualties.
   3. Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force such as negotiation, psychological methods, and other non-lethal means, which may include the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

h. **Avoidance of Collateral Damage:** When force is used, all necessary measures are to be taken to minimise collateral damage.

i. **Duty to Report:** Each confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties and/or damages or not. More details are included in Annex C.

j. **Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.**
   1. The use of force beyond self-defence may be applied only where necessary to fulfil the UNAC mandate, in the particular circumstances listed below, consistent with the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1544 of 22 July 2006 and subject to the conditions set out in these ROE:
      - I. Protection of UN, and other key, installations, areas or goods;
      - II. Ensure security and freedom of movement of UNAC personnel;
      - III. Permit UNAC personnel to discharge their duties;
      - IV. Protection of civilians
   2. The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorization has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

9. **Applicability:** The ROE set out in this document apply to all armed military personnel assigned to UNAC as authorised by the Security Council.
10. **Responsibility of the Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders:**
   a. The implementation of the ROE is a command responsibility. The ROE are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all Subordinate Commanders.
   b. The Force Commander and his/her Subordinate Commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, recommend more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, for United Nations Headquarters (UN HQ) approval. The Force Commander will issue the ROE to all contingents as received from UNHQ. He/she will ensure that all military personnel understand and apply these ROE correctly. The Force Commander and/or the subordinate commanders may issue additional guidance on the ROE and may incorporate these ROE into appropriate orders or instructions. The subordinate commanders must inform the Force Commander of such instructions issued by them.
   c. All commanders must seek clarification if they consider the authorised ROE to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.
   d. It is the responsibility of the contingent commanders to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To this end, the ROE must be translated in a clear and concise way into the language of each troop contributing country. To assist in this process, they must issue to each individual an ROE Aide-Memoir (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for each contingent.
   e. Training in the application of ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions must be conducted on a regular basis and as a minimum once per month and whenever UNAC military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the mission area.
   f. The Force Commander shall issue a Detention and Disarmament directive setting out his guidelines and procedures for implementing the ROE, including:
      (1) Grounds for apprehension/detention;
      (2) Search procedure following apprehension;
      (3) Detention procedure following apprehension
      (4) Weapons confiscation and disarmament;
      (5) Treatment of detainees

11. **ROE Contravention:** The following procedures apply in dealing with a UNPKO ROE contravention:
   a. Any ROE contravention must be reported to UN HQ (DPKO), through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
   b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed where the consequences are likely to affect them.
   c. Remedial measures, including training, must be taken to avoid reoccurrence.
   d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. Any alleged contravention of the ROE must be investigated in accordance with the UNAC Standard Operating Procedures and the United Nations Directives for Disciplinary Matters involving Military members of National Contingents. The findings will be forwarded to United Nations Headquarters, which will provide relevant evidence and findings to the troop contributing country for follow-up and disciplinary action. The troop-contributing country may also undertake its own
Annex F – Mission ROE

investigation.

12. **Security Classification:** The ROE should be classified as **UN RESTRICTED.**

13. **ROE Changes:** These ROE can only be amended or changed with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

14. **Revocation:** N/A

Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations

Annexes:

A. Authorised Rules of Engagement for UNAC
B. ROE for UNAC – Definitions and Amplifications
C. ROE for UNAC – Supporting Directives and Procedures
D. ROE for UNAC – Weapon States
E. UNAC Soldier’s Card

SBE Annexes
Annex A of (Annex F - Mission ROE)

ANNEX A

AUTHORISED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR UNAC

Security Council Resolution


2. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 1544 (2017) appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations’ activities in Carana.

UNAC Mandate

3. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1544 (2017), the UNAC mandate consists of the following elements:

Support for the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement:

☐ To assist the Government of National Reconciliation of Carana (GNR) to implement swiftly the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) towards the restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Carana;

☐ To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

☐ To support the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) including the ceasefire through the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) mechanisms

(d) To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties’ military forces;

(e) To support the transitional government of Carana, in cooperation with relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations, and donor nations, developing and implementing programmes for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) programme for all non-government forces; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;

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Annex A of (Annex F - Mission ROE)

(f) To carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized, nationally led, DDRR programme;

☐ To provide security to the highest priority locations within capabilities and areas of deployment;

Protection of Civilians:

☐ To ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;

☐ To ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;

☐ To support the efforts of the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) to ensure the protection of civilians from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence;

Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

☐ To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;

☐ To monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana and to fight impunity, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilised child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;

Support for Security reform:

SBE Annexes
To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in conjunction with other international partners, in the reestablishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both national and local level;

To assist the new Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in preparing for national parliamentary elections scheduled for no later than end 20xx;

To assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

Authorization to use force

4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and in pursuance of its mandate the Security Council, UNAC may use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed, to carry out the following tasks:
   - Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
   - Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
   - Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
   - Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance;
   - Coordinate operations with the CDF with a view to:
Disarming the recalcitrant local armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) and the release of children associated with those armed groups;

Disarming the armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process (DDR) and the release of children associated with those armed groups;

Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Caranese combatants and their dependents, with particular attention to children, by monitoring the disarmament process and providing, as appropriate, security in some sensitive locations, as well as supporting reintegration efforts pursued by the GNR authorities in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team and bilateral and multilateral partners;

Provide military training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the CDF elements as part of international broader efforts to support the security sector reform;
SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

5. The following ROE have been authorised for use by UNAC Force:

Rule 1 — Use of Force

Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized:

- Rule 1.1  To defend oneself or other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent.
- Rule 1.2  To resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself or other UN personnel.
- Rule 1.3  To defend against a hostile act or hostile intent members of units of the CDF or the CNP that one’s unit has been assigned to assist or support.
- Rule 1.4  To resist attempts to abduct or detain members of units of the CDF or the CNP that one’s unit has been assigned to assist or support.
- Rule 1.5  To defend individuals designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander against a hostile act or a hostile intent.
- Rule 1.6  To resist attempts to abduct or detain individuals designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander.
- Rule 1.7  To protect civilians, including humanitarian workers, under imminent threat of physical violence. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.8  To protect UN facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
- Rule 1.9  To protect key facilities, installations, areas, equipment or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.
- Rule 1.10 Against any individual or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.11 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or tends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.
- Rule 1.12 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of members of units of
the CDF or of the CNP that one’s unit has been assigned to assist or support, in order to ensure their freedom of movement. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.13   To prevent or put a stop to the commission of a particularly serious crime that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Rule 1.14   To prevent or put a stop to acts of civil unrest. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.15   To prevent the supply of weapons, related materiel, military advice and training and other supplies and logistic support to illegal armed groups, including illegal foreign armed groups, when supporting the CDF. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.16   To prevent or suppress hostile activities or operations by illegal armed groups, including illegal foreign armed groups. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.17   To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through roadblocks, checkpoints or cordons whose establishment has been authorized by the Force Commander if that forcible passage involves a grave threat to life or of seriously bodily injury.

Rule 1.18   Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, is preventing or demonstrating an intent to prevent oneself or other members of one’s unit from carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander, in order to ensure the ability of oneself or of other members of one’s unit to carry out those orders.

Use of force, excluding deadly force:

Rule 1.19   To protect UN facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Rule 1.20   To protect key facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Rule 1.21   Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.

Rule 1.22   Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.

Rule 1.23   Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of members of units of the CDF or of the CNP that one’s unit has been assigned to assist or support, in order to ensure their freedom of movement.
Rule 1.24 To prevent or put a stop to the commission of a crime when providing assistance to the CDF or the CNP.

Rule 1.25 To disperse assemblies that are unlawful but not violent. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 1.26 To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through roadblocks, checkpoints or cordons whose establishment has been authorized by the Force Commander if that forcible passage does NOT involve a grave threat to life or of seriously bodily injury.

Rule 1.27 Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of unarmed force, is preventing or demonstrating an intent to prevent oneself or other members of one’s unit from carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander, in order to ensure the ability of oneself or of other members of one’s unit to carry out those orders.

Rule 1.28 To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament operation, is authorised.

Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.

Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organised training and as authorised in these ROE, is prohibited.

Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorised.

Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorised.

Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorised.

Rule No 2.7 Use of explosives in order to destroy installations, facilities, equipment, supplies or workings is authorized, in the course of operations to prevent the provision of support to illegal armed groups.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

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Rule No 3.1  Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorised.

Rule No 3.2  Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and hand held anti-tank weapons, is authorised.

Rule No 3.3  Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels, are authorised.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

Rule No 4.1  If the use of force against a person or group is authorized by Rule 1, detention of that person or of members of that group is also authorized.

Rule No 4.2  Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorised.

Rule No 4.3  Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorised.

Rule 5 — Duty to Hand-over Detained Persons to Appropriate Authorities

Rule No 5.1  All detained persons are to be handed over to appropriate local authorities as soon as possible.
ANNEX B

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC
DEFINITIONS AND AMPLIFICATIONS

1. Civil Unrest: The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence, which affect public peace and order.

2. Collateral Damage: Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorised target.

3. Cordon: A deployment of UNAC personnel around an object or location with the intent to isolate an area and restrict and/or control both access and exit.

4. Detainee: A detainee or detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction of an offence.

5. Force: The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. Such means are used by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of UNAC and generally imply the potential to use appropriate and authorised levels of violence.
   a. Armed Force: The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets. Note: Such weapons are generally designed to inflict deadly force, but can also be used in a non-deadly manner.
   b. Deadly Force: The level of force, which is intended, or is likely to cause, death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.
   c. Non-deadly Force: The level of force which is neither intended nor likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.
   d. Minimum Force: The minimum degree of authorised force, which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force if appropriate.
   e. Unarmed Force: The use of physical force, short of the use of “armed force.”

NOTE: Riot control equipment and other “non-lethal weapons” may be used as a means of unarmed force as they are designed and intended to be used so as not to inflict deadly force.

6. Hostile Act: An action where the intent is to cause death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

7. Hostile Intent: The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorised. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:
a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
c. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Operations (AO).

8. **Loaded Weapon**: A weapon that has ammunition attached to it but none of the ammunition has been placed into the chamber.

9. **Positive Identification**: Assured identification by a specific means. This can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.

10. **Proportionality**: The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or hostile intent, or to achieve an authorised objective.

11. **Reasonable Belief**: Reasonable belief is when the Commander, or individual, logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile threat exists.

12. **Self-Defence**: Self-Defence is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one’s unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.

13. **Pre-emptive Self-Defence**: Action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where there is clear indication that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one’s unit and UN personnel.

14. **UN Personnel**: All members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN officials and experts on mission on official visits.

15. **Other International Personnel**: Personnel belonging to international agencies associated with UNAC in the fulfilment of its mandate, and other individuals or groups formally and specifically designated by the SRSG in consultation with UN HQ, including:
   a. Members of organisations operating with the authority of the UN Security Council (SC) or General Assembly (GA);
   b. Members of authorised charitable, humanitarian or monitoring organisations;
   c. Other individuals or groups specifically designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG); but excluding foreign nationals, such as businessmen and journalists.

16. **Warning Shots**: A warning shot is a signal demonstrating resolve, or a capability to convince persons to stop threatening actions, or as a warning and potential precursor to the actual use of deadly force. A warning shot is a shot fired at a safe point of aim with no intent to cause death, injury or severe damage.
AMPLIFICATIONS

17. **General Amplification to Rule No 1:** Rule No 1 generally allows the use of force up to and including deadly force in given circumstances. Any use of force must be graduated where possible and only the minimum force necessary to meet the threat must be used. This does not prevent the immediate use of deadly force if the threat to life is imminent and there is no alternative but to use deadly force immediately to remove that threat.

18. For the purposes of both Rule No 1.8, 1.9, 1.19 and Rule No 1.20, the following property has been designated by the SRSG and declared “designated property” by the Force Commander:
   a. UNAC aircraft and vessels, including any aircraft and vessels of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that are deployed to the UNAC AO for the purpose of assisting UNAC to fulfil the mandate (whether occupied or not);
   b. Occupied UNAC vehicles, premises and compounds (including police stations, courts, and other central and district administration buildings);
   c. Occupied vehicles, premises and compounds of organisations and agencies who are assisting UNAC in the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate, including United Nations specialised agencies, other international organisations, foreign government agencies and non-governmental organisations;
   d. Carana community power stations and water reticulation and purification plants (whether occupied or not);
   e. UNAC arming and refuelling points (whether occupied or not); and
   f. UNAC and civil communication facilities essential for UNAC command and control between battalions, units and higher headquarters (whether occupied or not).

19. **Amplification to Rule No 1.10, 1.11 and 1.12:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to restrict movement if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duty if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. This does not prevent you from using non-deadly force to resist the individual or groups attempt to prevent you from discharging your duties. If in so doing the response from that individual or group threatens yours or any other person’s life, or is likely to cause serious injury, then deadly force may be used.

20. **Amplification to Hostile Intent:** Hostile intent will always be determined on a case-by-case basis and will be heavily dependent upon local conditions. Hostile intent can be demonstrated by:
   a. Persons that carry out armed attacks against UN personnel and other international personnel or against those falling under the protection of UNAC;

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b. Members of any military or paramilitary group or organisation carrying personal weapons or manning weapon systems, whether or not they are engaged in attacks against UN personnel, other international personnel and/or those falling under the protection of UNAC; Civilians that spontaneously take up arms against UN personnel, other international personnel or those falling under the protection of UNAC.

21. In the case of Militia or suspected Militia, at all times the determination of hostile intent shall require weapons being carried in a manner deemed ready for immediate use. When UNAC Security Force units are confronted by Militia or suspected Militia who are:
   a. Positively recognised, and
   b. Carrying firearms and/or grenades, and
   c. Operating in a tactical manner,
then such Militia or suspected Militia may be engaged on the basis that they are demonstrating hostile intent. In such circumstances, the requirement to provide a warning in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex C is not mandatory.

22. NOTE: “Positively recognised” means that a person is observed and is understood to be Militia or suspected Militia.

23. “Operating in a tactical manner” shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. The following examples would normally constitute operating in a tactical manner:
   a. Militia or suspected Militia patrolling in a tactical manner or military formation;
   b. Militia or suspected Militia in an ambush position;
   c. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or deploying at a road block(s);
   d. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or assessed as deploying as an armed sentry, or sentries to their position.
Annex C of (Annex F - Mission ROE)

ANNEX C

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC
SUPPORTING DIRECTIONS AND PROCEDURES

General

1. Identification: Assured identification (positive identification) of hostile forces (groups and persons) prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited.

2. Civil Action: UNAC military personnel should avoid any action that would result in the disruption of legitimate civil activities in the mission area.

3. Prohibitions: The following prohibitions are to be observed, even when authorised ROE are being used:
   a. Use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons is prohibited.
   b. Use of weapons or methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
   c. Use of weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
   d. Attacks on monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries, which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the UNAC shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes, which may expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property are strictly prohibited.
   e. Use of methods of warfare to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking water installations and supplies.
   f. Making installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if
such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.


g. Engaging in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this paragraph above.

h. Engaging in punitive use of force and retaliation.

4. **Cordon Principles**: Cordons may only be conducted if the Force Commander judges that the situation warrants isolation of the area and that such action is consistent with the mandate of UNAC.

**WARNING PROCEDURES**

5. **General**: The use of armed force is normally a measure of last resort, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. If a confrontation threatens the UNAC military personnel on the scene, the UN aim must be to dissuade the parties concerned from carrying on.

6. **Graduation**: The following graduated procedures are to be observed:

   a. **Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration**: Every effort must be made to warn any potential or actual aggressor before UNAC military personnel respond with force. The aim is to stop hostile activity.

   b. **Unarmed Force**: If the preceding step is unsuccessful, where possible, minimum unarmed force may be employed. If riot control equipment or other non-lethal weapons are possessed by UNAC personnel trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring the threat to an end before having to resort to deadly force, then they may be used if authorised by the on-scene commander.

   c. **Charge Weapons**: An attempt should be made to make use of the visual and audible effect of charging weapons to convince any aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may result in the use of deadly force.

   d. **Warning Shots**: If the threat continues, and subject to the orders of the commander on the scene, warning shots should be fired at a safe point of aim, to avoid causing personal injury or collateral damage.

   e. **Armed Force**: If all the preceding steps, including the use of unarmed force, are unsuccessful and there are no other choices available, the necessary armed force may be used. The decision to open fire will be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time. Before opening fire, a final warning is to be given as follows:
Annex C of (Annex F - Mission ROE)

i. The warning may be given verbally (in English, in the local language, and/or visually by a sign or by illumination (e.g. handheld red flares, searchlights, etc.).

ii. You are to challenge in English:

“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I SHOOT.”

iii. This challenge will be repeated in French as follows:

“NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE.”

iv. The verbal or visual warning should be repeated as many (and at least three) times as necessary to ensure understanding or compliance.

FIRING PROCEDURES

7. **Opening Fire Without Warning:** The only circumstance, under which it is permitted to open fire without attempting to follow the warning sequence, would be if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that, even a moment’s delay could lead to death of, or grievous injury to oneself, UN personnel and those who are under the protection of UNAC as specified in this ROE.

8. **Procedures During Firing:** The use of firearms must be controlled, and there should be no indiscriminate firing. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort. The following points must be kept in mind during fire:

   a. Fire must be aimed.
   b. Minimum rounds are to be fired to achieve the authorised objective.
   c. All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid collateral damage.

9. **Procedures After Firing:** After any weapon firing, the following actions are to be taken:

   a. **Medical Assistance:** All injured persons should be given first aide as soon as possible, when such aide can be given without endangering lives.
   b. **Recording:** Details of the incident are to be recorded, including:

      i. Date, time and place of firing;
      ii. Unit and personnel involved;
      iii. The events leading up to firing;
      iv. Why UNAC personnel opened fire;
      v. Who or what was fired on;
      vi. The weapons fired and the number of rounds discharged;

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vii. The apparent results of the firing; and
viii. A diagram of the incident scene.

10. **Reporting:** Following an immediate report that firing has taken place, the above information and the current situation are to be reported through the UN chain of command, to the Force Commander and UN HQ (DPKO), as rapidly as possible.

**SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES**

11. See the Force Commander’s Detention and Disarmament Policy issued separately.
ANNEX D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC WEAPON STATES

1. **General:** The weapon states provided below might be authorised by the Force Commander, as he believes operationally appropriate, provided the state selected does not exceed the authority given by Security Council resolution 1544 (2017) and all other relevant subsequent resolutions and as defined in the Numbered ROE for UNAC.

2. In urgent circumstances, a commander or individual soldier may increase weapon readiness. As soon as the immediate danger has passed, weapon readiness status will be returned to that ordered by higher authority.

3. **Graduated Weapon States:**

**State 1 — Personal Weapons (Rifles, carbines, light machine guns and pistols):**

1.1 Personal weapons should be carried in a non-offensive manner.
1.2 Personal weapons may be carried by all military personnel serving in formed UNAC military units, but ammunition is to be carried separately from the weapon.
1.3 Personal weapons may be carried and have a loaded magazine or belt ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon. However, the weapon may not be cocked and no ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber.
1.4 Personal weapons may have a loaded magazine or belt ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon. The weapon may be cocked and ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber.

**State 2 — Anti-tank weapons:**

2.1 Anti-tank weapons/RPG may be carried covertly by designated UNAC military personnel.
2.2 Anti-tank weapons/RPG may be carried overtly by designated UNAC military personnel.

**State 3 — Riot Control Weapons:**

3.1 No riot control weapons may be carried.
3.2 Riot control weapons may be issued to UNAC patrols, but are to be carried in patrol vehicles and must remain out of sight of non-UN personnel.
3.3 Riot control weapons may be carried openly.

**State 4 — Laser Equipment:**

4.1 Ground / vehicle laser sources may only be used in the "Passive" state.
4.2 Ground / vehicle laser sources may be used in the "Active" mode. All reasonable precautions are to be taken to ensure that no injuries are inflicted as a result of the use of laser.

State 5 — Mortars:
5.1 Mortars may be carried covertly by UNAC patrols and in UNAC vehicles.
5.2 Mortars may be carried overtly by UNAC patrols and in UNAC vehicles.

State 6 — Ground, Vehicle and Aircraft-Mounted Weapons (Crew served weapons):
6.1 Ground, vehicle, vessel and aircraft-mounted weapons may be deployed, but not loaded with missiles or shells. Where the weapon system contains ammunition integral to the system, the weapon is not to be prepared for firing, i.e., not “charged.”
6.2 Ground, vehicle, vessel and aircraft mounted weapon systems may be prepared for firing, i.e., “charged.”

State 7 — Helicopter-Mounted Weapons:
7.1 Helicopter-mounted missiles may not be deployed.
7.2 Helicopter-mounted guns and missiles may be deployed. Guns may have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon, but they may not be cocked, and no ammunition may be inserted into the breech or chamber. Missiles may not be prepared for immediate firing.
7.3 Helicopter mounted guns and missiles may be deployed. Guns may have a loaded magazine or belted ammunition inserted in or attached to the weapon and may be cocked and ammunition inserted into the breech or chamber. Missiles may be prepared for immediate firing.

NB: Instructions for armoured-fighting vehicles (AFV), artillery\howitzer guns, anti-aircraft systems and any additional weapon systems authorised by the United Nations will be issued separately.
ANNEX E

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: AIDE-MEMOIRE (SOLDIER’S CARD)

GENERAL RULES FOR USE OF FORCE

1. The principles of minimum use of force and proportionality shall apply at all times and in all circumstances.

2. Wherever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort shall be made to control a situation through measures short of force, including personal contact and negotiation, visual signals, manoeuvres, charging of weapons and firing warning shots.

3. The use of force, including deadly force, shall only be resorted to if all other means to control the situation have failed or do not hold any promise of achieving the authorised objective.

4. Any force used must be limited in its intensity and duration to what is necessary to achieve the authorised objective and must be commensurate with the level of the threat. In some cases, operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of deadly force.

5. Use force only when absolutely necessary to achieve your immediate aim, to protect yourself, your soldiers, UN or other designated personnel, installations, equipment and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

6. The decision to open fire shall be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time to obtain such an order. Before opening fire, give a final warning at least three times, either in French, which is the national and administrative language in the mission area, or in English:

   “NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”
   “UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL FIRE”

You may open fire without warning only when an attack is so unexpected that a moment’s delay could lead to death or grievous injury to yourself, to other members of the UNAC military component or to other persons who are under protection of UNAC military component as specified in these ROE.

7. Fire must be aimed and controlled. Automatic fire will be opened only as last resort. If possible, a single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of the body in order not to kill. Indiscriminate fire is not permitted. Fire for effect must not last longer than necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

SBE Annexes
8. Avoid or minimise collateral damage.

9. After fire has ceased, render medical assistance and record the details of the incident and report them as soon as possible through the chain of command, whether or not casualties have occurred.

10. When in doubt, always seek clarification from higher command.

**You are allowed to use force, UP TO AND INCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:**

1. To defend oneself, other UN personnel, individuals designated by the Head of Mission or other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent;

2. To resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself, other UN personnel, other international personnel or individuals designated by the Head of Mission;

3. To protect installations, facilities, equipment, areas or goods designated by the Head of Mission against a hostile act or hostile intent;

4. To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance*;

5. To resist attempts by any person or group that limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers or individuals designated by the Head of Mission*;

*When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

**You are allowed to use force, EXCLUDING DEADLY FORCE:**

6. To prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities;

7. To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through a checkpoint** and to detain those who have forcibly effected passage through a checkpoint**.

**Whose establishment has been authorised by the Force Commander.

8. Detained persons are to be handed over to appropriate local authorities as soon as possible.

**Hostile Act:** A hostile act is defined as an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.

SBE Annexes
Hostile Intent: Hostile intent is defined as the threat of imminent use of force, demonstrated through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorised. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- The capability and preparedness of the threat;
- The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack;
- Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Scenario Base Exercise

Mission Planning Matrix

United Nations

SBE Annexes
### CARANA – MISSION PLANNING MATRIX

#### Objective 1: Reestablishment of Peace and Security

**Key Assumptions:**
1. All parties (warring factions) abide by the Kalari Peace agreement.
2. All elements of UNAC are well established in their respective locations.
3. Free movement of UN personnel is secured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Output</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Success Criteria</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Keep warring factions are kept at a distance amongst them and not getting closer to each other</td>
<td>UN military contingents, observers and police will be deployed in areas including Lisbo, Akkabar, Maldosa, Lora, Perkes, visiting positions of all parties.</td>
<td>By September 22, all factions lay down their arms</td>
<td>No major confrontations would occur</td>
<td>Two infantry brigades deployed in each sector with 20 military observers</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>Forces assets and efforts will be initially concentrated on more difficult situations in the Western and Southern parts of Carana where MPC and ICSC elements together with organized criminal groups will be the biggest challenge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties’ military forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Success Criteria</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN military observers and Grade 1 staff officers from sector headquarters will meet the warring</td>
<td>Immediately put into effective from September 22 to November 22</td>
<td>All elements of warring factions maintain ceasefire and remain in their respective areas</td>
<td>Infantry Brigades and military observers</td>
<td>UNAC Force Commander Sector Headquarters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
### Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

| 3. Implement Voluntary DDR programme for all warring parties | 1. DDR cell will be established Joint UN | Immediately | UNAC | Force Commander | DDR process will be fully integrated into planning of Objective 4
|  | 2. Joint technical committee will be formed to that end. | | | DSRSG | |
|  | 3. Ex-combattants will be reintegrated into the army provided that they meet standard criteria. | Immediately | UNAC | UNDP together with UNAC | |
|  |  | Within 6 months | | UNDP | |
|  |  | 95% of weapons belonging to warring factions are desposed | | | |
|  | 4. Keep stable relations with warring factions on a number of issues | Continued negotiations with the warring factions | Launching immediately and continue until the end of the mandate | ---Maintenance of complete ceasefire | ---SRSG
---UN military personnel | |
|  |  |  |  | ---No Violation of the Agreement | ---Force Commander
---UN Police | |
|  |  |  |  | ---Calm maintained | ---Police Commissioner | |
|  |  |  |  | | |
|  | 5.1 Establish the foundation for Force Projection | 1. Build deployment bases with appropriate C4I network for | M+120 | Complete the establishment of force receiving plan | UNCT | UNCT | |

SBE Annexes
## Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Description</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Secure the sealift/airlift installations to ensure the freedom of movement and logistics/supply requirement</td>
<td>M+60</td>
<td>Project the appropriate armed troops to secure the Airport (Galasi &amp; Corma), Seaport (Galasi &amp; Cereni &amp; Maldosa) for exclusive use of UN</td>
<td>UNCT/PDT</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Establish ground transportation network between key stations</td>
<td>M+60</td>
<td>Establish key logistics supply sites and ensure the free transit between each stations</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Establish Intelligence activities</td>
<td>M+180</td>
<td>Using helicopters and UNV for intelligence operations</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conduct Ground Patrol and Reconnaissance</td>
<td>M+60 (M+120)</td>
<td>Collecting the intelligence and warning the uncontrolled armed group that UN patrol troops monitoring their activities</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Protect High Value Facilities</td>
<td>M+60 (M+120)</td>
<td>Project security forces to designated</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
## Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.4 Protection of Civilians</th>
<th>1. Planning and preparing to action mission’s resources in all POC phases of response.</th>
<th>Deployment + 30</th>
<th>Civilians are protected from physical harm posed by armed groups.</th>
<th>UNAC DMS – Budget Carana PD Country Team Donations</th>
<th>FC Sector/Contingent Commanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Execute military operations planned and approved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Secure the UN Facilities</th>
<th>M+60 (M+120)</th>
<th>Project security forces to designated important facilities to protect them</th>
<th>UNAC</th>
<th>FC Sector/Contingent Commanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Protect assigned important facilities with vital infrastructure</td>
<td>M+60 (M+120)</td>
<td>Project security forces to designated important facilities to protect them</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>FC Sector/Contingent Commanders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
## Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5.5 Secure free access in Carana</th>
<th>De-mining in support of free access of Ground Patrol, Recon forces</th>
<th>To be determined</th>
<th>De-mining and secure the field for free access</th>
<th>UNAC</th>
<th>FC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.6 Enhance associated military operations</td>
<td>1. Establish LNO with field headquarters of all parties’ military forces</td>
<td>Before main body arrives</td>
<td>All military operations are associated in prior, to prevent Blue-on-Blue incident</td>
<td>UNAC (Force Hq)</td>
<td>PDT/FC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objective 2: Restoration of Good Governance

**Key Assumptions:**

---Kalari Peace Agreement will not be broken by either party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Output</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Success Criteria</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reestablish the national authority throughout the country</td>
<td>Administrative assistance to each ministry and local entities by dispatching administrative advisers in different areas</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Establishment of functional administration</td>
<td>Funding by UN agencies and international donors</td>
<td>UNAC Civil Affairs Office UNDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
### Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

| 2 | Create a functional legal / judicial systems | 1. Assessing Carana Criminal Justice System | Within 3 months | 1. Adoption of a national legal framework | Funding by UNDP, UNODC, UNAFEI and international donors | Carana GNR supported by Judiciary and Corrections Office in UNAC | Coordination among donors is critical
<p>| | | 2. Technical assistance for establishment of a national legal framework | Within 6 months | 2. Successful functioning of judicial systems | | | Competent existing officers are considered for continuing for development training session, |
| | | 3. Recruit and training of judges, prosecutors, other needed officials in judicial system | Within 9 months | 3. Public Prosecutor and its office, Court and judges, Corrections and its officers, organization are reformed and their capacity is developed. | | | |
| | | 4. Establishment of several correctional institutions. | Within 12 months | | | | |
| 3 | Establish National Counter Corruption Agency/Commission | 1. Adoption of necessary laws &amp; regulations | Within 6 months | National Counter Corruption Commission and its office are established | Funding by UNDP, UNODC and UNAFEI | UNAC and other CJ Experts | |
| | | 2. Establish organization with necessary: Personnel/staff Facility | Within 1 year | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 3: Reestablishment of Rule of Laws including Human Rights</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Nurturing an environment conducive to holding elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Raising awareness amongst the people on electoral system 2. Providing support for formation of electoral committee 3. Other necessary preparations for elections</td>
<td>Start immediately and complete by June 2007 Within 6 months Within 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Holding of elections at an appropriate timing</td>
<td>Funding by UN DPA and UNDP in addition to international donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral Assistance Team dispatched by DPA</td>
<td>Targeting at holding elections as soon as a relatively stable environment is secured, preferably toward the end of 12 months. However, timing of national elections is to be determined according to the progress in other areas of the mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix
### Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

#### Key Assumptions:
1. Agreement on the International Police Task Force is in place (Sovereignty & Legitimacy (jurisdiction) Issue);
2. Criminal Code or Interim Criminal Laws exists.
3. Government of National Reconciliation give full and unlimited access to the current police force.
4. Supporting and relevant laws are already in place.
5. Local Resource Person, Police Experts and necessary Contact Person are available to provide assistance and involvements.
6. UNAC activities progresses as per the time-lines given in the Security Council Resolution 1544

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Output</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Set up the structure and system for UN Police Administration and Operation</td>
<td>Establish Rules &amp; Regulations</td>
<td>Within the 1\text{st} week and onward</td>
<td>UN Police HQ and Regional HQ, Police Station and Substations are established. Functional &amp; operational UN Police The Command, Control, Communication and Information Center (C3I) system &amp; facilities is established and functioning</td>
<td>DMS – Budget Carana PD Country Team Donation</td>
<td>UN Police Commission</td>
<td>Use what is provided. Repair what is broken. Build/acquire what is needed. Maintenance and continuous develop on what we have.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating with Carana PD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contracting with relevant unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budgeting Allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Provide police service through out the country.</td>
<td>Staffing UN Police HQ</td>
<td>After the 1\text{st} week and onward</td>
<td>All police units at every level are staff (at least to the minimum operable level)</td>
<td>DMS – Budget Carana PD Country Team Donations</td>
<td>UN Police Commission Regional Com. Station Chief UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries</td>
<td>Use what is provided. Repair what is broken. Build/acquire what is needed. Maintenance and continuous develop on what we have.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deploying UN Police to staff Regional HQ, Stations and Substations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Assess Carana PD</th>
<th>Assess CPD’s current capacity, capability and needs</th>
<th>Within 1 month</th>
<th>Assessment Report: (Where we are; what is needed to be where we want to be)</th>
<th>DMS - Budget</th>
<th>Assessment Team</th>
<th>Assistance from Local Resource persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Build Internationally acceptable police officers</td>
<td>Reform Police Personnel System:  - Recruiting &amp; Selection  - Training  - Salary, Benefits, Rewarding  - Discipline  - Termination</td>
<td>Within 3 month  Within 6 month</td>
<td>100 Police Officers with basic skills and professionalism</td>
<td>DMS – Budget UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries</td>
<td>Carana PD – Main Training Team – Sub Advisory Group – Sub</td>
<td>Competent existing police officer will be considered for continuing with the Force (on a case by case basis) and given priority for a short (1 mth) separate retaining course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Provide necessary facilities including - Station house - Holding Cells</td>
<td>Budgeting Allocation Coordinating/ Contracting with relevant unit</td>
<td>After 1 month onward</td>
<td>Functional &amp; operational police facilities</td>
<td>Carana PD Country Team Donation</td>
<td>Carana PD UNODC and Country Team Donor Countries</td>
<td>Capacity Bldg. Repair what break. Maintenance what have Build what need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Reform and Restructure Carana</td>
<td>Assess and Evaluate the Org.</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>Carana PD is restructured of its</td>
<td>DMS – Budget Country Team</td>
<td>Assessment Team Resource Person</td>
<td>Institutional Capacity Bldg.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PD</th>
<th>Structure of Carana PD Re-engineer the Police organization structure and system</th>
<th>1 year</th>
<th>organization &amp; work system</th>
<th>Donation</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Reform and Restructure Carana Defense Forces (CDF) composed of 10,000 military personnel</td>
<td>1. Establishing Military Academy</td>
<td>By August 2007</td>
<td>Army, Navy and Air Force Chiefs take over the stock of the forces and chain of command established</td>
<td>UN Country Team of UNAC Donor Agencies Friendly States GNR Peace Building Commission</td>
<td>Restructuring of CDF will be progressing simultaneously with other tasks and activities of UNAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Success Criteria</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Strengthening human rights, especially those of women and children</td>
<td>Strengthen law enforcement with a particular attention to women and children</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>UNDP OCHA</td>
<td>Police Commissioner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Objective 4: Creating a sustainable environment for the people of Carana**

**Key Assumptions:**
--- Provision of humanitarian assistance to all IDP and refugee camps is sufficiently secured.
--- Donors and other stakeholders in Carana continue to commit to a sustainable development of the country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Output</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improve living condition of 11 IDP and refugee camps in accordance with UN standards through humanitarian</td>
<td>1. UN country team and representatives of donors visit IDP and refugee camps for a fact-finding mission</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>Situation in camps and basic needs for their living are identified properly</td>
<td>Funding by UNDP, WFP UNHCR, WHO and other UN agencies ICRC/IFRC International</td>
<td>DSRSG and UN country team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>for needs assessment</td>
<td>Within one month</td>
<td>Better coordination amongst UN agencies and donors</td>
<td>Donors NGOs</td>
<td>CERF may be utilized accordingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Joint Coordination Committee is established for better coordination amongst stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Initial start-up for emergency relief for a selected locations of IDP and refugees camps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Engagement of local and international media on the suffering of IDPs and refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Render support for the capacity building of IDPs and refugees in preparation for their return to home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Capacity-building programme for IDPs and refugees</td>
<td>Within 3 months</td>
<td>IDPs and refugees acquire sufficient capacity to reestablish their life</td>
<td>Funding by UNHCR, IOM, UNDP and other UN Agencies and donors</td>
<td>UN Country Team UNHCR, IOM, UNDP and other UN Agencies</td>
<td>Security should be established before their return to homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assistance to their relocation</td>
<td>Within 12 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SBE Annexes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Launch initial preparation for recovery and sustainable development</th>
<th>1. Establishment of joint coordination committee to better prepare for peace-building</th>
<th>Within 3 months</th>
<th>Sufficient amount of assistance is pledged and committed by international donors</th>
<th>Funding by UNDP and other UN agencies World Bank International donors</th>
<th>UN Country Team UNDP and other UN agencies World Bank International donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Active engagement of donors and other stakeholders for the recovery of Carana through assisting in holding of donor conference</td>
<td>Within 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Launching quick impact projects</td>
<td>Within 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Secure funding for long-term sustainable development including also better management of natural resources</th>
<th>1 Dispatch of experts in areas of mining to assist Carana GNR for better management of natural resources</th>
<th>Within 3 months</th>
<th>Funding by World Bank</th>
<th>World Bank + UN Country Team as necessary</th>
<th>World Bank will take lead on sustainable development including management of natural resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Design a new strategy for sustainable development of Carana</td>
<td>3 Launching of donor conference based on a new strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Other measures necessary for Mission Support:

**Key Assumptions:** negotiation with TCC/PCC for the conclusion of MOU (List of support item) is in progress.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Output</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<th>Resources</th>
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<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Budget approval</td>
<td>Submit the budget request</td>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>Request has been approved in order to execute Operation plan</td>
<td>DMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Conclude MOU with TCC/PCC</td>
<td>Negotiate the logistics plan and supply items with TCC/PCC</td>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>Complete coordination with TCC/PCC, determining the detail logistics/support items and reinvestment</td>
<td>SRSG/DMS/CT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Establish robust logistics mechanism</td>
<td>1. provide sealift/airlift capability for military operations and logistics requirement</td>
<td>Within 6 months after projection started</td>
<td>Complete contract with commercial company to schedule the logistics sealift/airlift, or negotiate with TCC to provide strategic transportation</td>
<td>Charter (TCC)</td>
<td>DMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Provide land transportation for military logistics/supply</td>
<td>Within 6 months after projection started</td>
<td>Establish ground transportation for distribution of supply items</td>
<td>UNAC</td>
<td>DMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Annex G – Mission Planning Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>requirement, and humanitarian assistance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

SBE Annexes
Areas with reported cases of Cholera

Muka
Eres
Lora
Lora
Norke
Torta
Kalei
Lisbo
Jumi
Lora
Perkes
Karo
Akkabar
Sumora
Kika
Maui
Lurok
Akkabar
Folsa
Sureen
Karanci
Maroni
Mia
Xalksa
Karaoy
Folsa
Sumora
Sureen
Galasi
Cereni
Lora
Turen
Maldosa
Eres
Rimosa

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Carana

Area of humanitarian crisis
As result of mal nutrition
Area of High Security Risk
Areas with reported cases of Cholera
IDP Camp
IDP Movements
Area of humanitarian crisis
As result of malnutrition